Vehicle-mounted network security authentication method and system

Abstract

The invention provides a vehicle-mounted network security authentication method and system, and the method comprises the steps: responding to the OTA upgrading operation of a user, and transmitting an upgrading request for a vehicle end to a cloud end; receiving a quantum key generated from the cloud in response to the upgrading request based on the quantum communication channel; collecting real-time palmprint information of a user, and generating a dynamic key based on dynamic characteristics of the real-time palmprint information; combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fusion quantum key, performing encryption and digital signature on the upgrade data packet based on the fusion quantum key, and sending the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud to verify the digital signature; and in response to an authorization instruction which is sent by the cloud and indicates that digital signature verification is passed, decrypting the upgrade data packet based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and executing OTA upgrade operation. The non-replicability of the quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key are fused, the possibility that the key is cracked is eradicated, and the safety of the vehicle-mounted software in the OTA upgrading process is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a vehicle-mounted network security authentication method and system. Background Art

[0002] Vehicle software systems and applications are updated and iterated at an increasingly rapid pace, and user demands are also increasing. Software systems need to be regularly upgraded and maintained to increase functional compatibility with different devices and software and resolve other fault issues.

[0003] Existing technologies often utilize OTA (Over-the-Air) technology, enabling online upgrades without having to visit the manufacturer. This allows users to enjoy manufacturer-promoted upgrade packages and enhance the driving experience. OTA technology enables remote management of mobile devices and SIM card data via the mobile communications air interface. However, OTA has also become a key target for hackers, with attacks such as eavesdropping, malicious upgrades, rollback attacks, and DDOS attacks presenting multi-faceted security challenges for vehicle OTA upgrades.

[0004] Today's OTA authentication method involves a server sending a digitally signed data packet. The vehicle then decrypts and verifies the signature using a pre-set fixed key to complete authentication and implement software upgrade authentication. Because the vehicle-side system requires a pre-set fixed key, which is extremely vulnerable to theft, the fixed key must be stored securely (such as in a secure area of the system or in a security chip). However, since the key is fixed and unchanging, it can be leaked during transmission or use due to lax security controls, posing a significant security risk. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In view of this, the purpose of the present invention is to provide an in-vehicle network security authentication method and system, which solves the problem in the prior art that in the OTA upgrade authentication process, the key is leaked during transmission and use due to lax security control, posing a major security risk.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a vehicle-mounted network security authentication method for use on a vehicle side, the method comprising:

[0007] In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, sending an upgrade request for the vehicle to the cloud and establishing a quantum communication channel with the cloud;

[0008] receiving, based on the quantum communication channel, a quantum key generated from the cloud in response to the upgrade request;

[0009] Collecting the user's real-time palmprint information and generating a dynamic key based on the dynamic characteristics of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used for the current session of the upgrade request;

[0010] Combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and sending the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature;

[0011] In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud that the digital signature has been verified, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

[0012] In one embodiment, generating a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information specifically includes:

[0013] Processing the real-time palmprint information using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value for the first digit;

[0014] The first second digit of the hash value is taken as the SM4 symmetric key, and the dynamic key is generated according to the SM4 symmetric key; the second digit is half of the first digit.

[0015] In one embodiment, the use of the SM3 hash algorithm to process the real-time palmprint information to generate a hash value of the first digit specifically includes:

[0016] Filling the total length of the real-time palmprint information to M×N bits and obtaining filled palmprint data; the value of M is twice the value of the first digit; and N is a positive integer;

[0017] Dividing the padded palmprint data into N M-digit message blocks;

[0018] Initializing an intermediate hash value, taking the message block as input, and iteratively updating the intermediate hash value according to a preset compression function;

[0019] When the iteration is completed, the intermediate hash values of the final iteration are taken and concatenated to form the hash value of the first digit.

[0020] In one embodiment, combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, and encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, specifically includes:

[0021] Combining the dynamic key with the quantum key based on a key derivation function to generate a fused quantum key of a third digit; the third digit is equal to the value of the first digit;

[0022] Splitting the fused quantum key into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, where the sum of the fourth-digit and the fifth-digit values is equal to the third-digit value;

[0023] The upgrade data package is encrypted based on the encryption key, and the upgrade data package is digitally signed based on the signature key.

[0024] In one embodiment, after performing the OTA upgrade operation, the method further includes:

[0025] When the OTA upgrade operation is completed, the quantum key, the dynamic key and the fused quantum key are destroyed.

[0026] In a second aspect, the present application provides a vehicle network security authentication method for use in the cloud, the method comprising:

[0027] Receiving an upgrade request from a vehicle and establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle;

[0028] generating a quantum key in response to the upgrade request, and distributing the quantum key to the vehicle end through the quantum communication channel;

[0029] receiving an upgrade data packet sent by the vehicle, and verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on a fused quantum key and a pre-stored biometric template; the fused quantum key is a combination of the quantum key and a dynamic key; the dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the user's real-time palm print information and is only used for the current session of the upgrade request; the upgrade data packet is encrypted and digitally signed by the fused quantum key;

[0030] If the digital signature is verified, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle end; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle end to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform the OTA upgrade operation based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

[0031] In one embodiment, before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle, the method further includes:

[0032] Obtaining the vehicle identification information corresponding to the vehicle on the vehicle side, and performing vehicle identity authentication on the vehicle side based on the identity identification information;

[0033] When the vehicle end fails to perform vehicle identity authentication, the quantum communication channel with the vehicle end is canceled.

[0034] In one embodiment, after verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template, the method further includes:

[0035] Verifying the validity of the timestamp and random number factor of the upgrade data packet;

[0036] If the upgrade data package does not pass the validity verification, the authorization instruction sent to the vehicle end is canceled.

[0037] In a third aspect, the present application provides an in-vehicle network security authentication system, comprising a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the computer program is used by the processor to load and execute the in-vehicle network security authentication method as described in any one of the first aspect and / or any one of the second aspect.

[0038] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions, which are used by a processor to load and execute the in-vehicle network security authentication method as described in any one of the first aspect and / or any one of the second aspect.

[0039] In this embodiment of the in-vehicle network security authentication method and system, quantum key distribution technology is used to generate an unclonable quantum key. This is combined with a unique dynamic key generated by the palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Due to the unclonable nature of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of key cracking is fundamentally eliminated, thereby improving the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, by binding the OTA upgrade operation to the user's dynamic palm print information through the fused quantum key, unauthorized remote manipulation of the vehicle upgrade is prevented, ensuring the security of vehicle and user data, and effectively defending against common network attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0040] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate certain embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other relevant drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0041] Figure 1 A flowchart of the in-vehicle network security authentication method provided in the first embodiment of the present application.

[0042] Figure 2 A flowchart of the in-vehicle network security authentication method provided in the second embodiment of the present application.

[0043] Figure 3 A schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided in accordance with an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0044] Specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the described embodiments are merely some, and not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments derived by persons of ordinary skill in the art based on the description of the present invention without inventive effort are intended to fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0045] In the description of the present invention, unless otherwise specified or limited, the terms "disposed," "installed," and "connected" should be understood broadly. For example, they may refer to fixed, detachable, or integral connections; mechanical or electrical connections; and direct or indirect connections through an intermediary. Those skilled in the art will understand the specific meanings of these terms based on the specific circumstances.

[0046] The directions or positional relationships indicated by terms such as "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "front", "back", "top", "bottom", "inside" and "outside" are based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, or are the directions or positional relationships in which the inventive product is usually placed when in use. They are only for the convenience and simplification of description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific direction, be constructed and operate in a specific direction. Therefore, they should not be understood as limiting the present invention.

[0047] The terms "first," "second," "third," etc. are merely used to distinguish elements of similar nature and do not indicate or imply relative importance or a particular order.

[0048] The terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion of elements other than the listed elements and may also include additional elements not specifically listed.

[0049] First embodiment

[0050] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a vehicle-mounted network security authentication method, which is used on a vehicle side. The method includes:

[0051] Step S10: In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, an upgrade request for the vehicle is sent to the cloud and a quantum communication channel is established with the cloud;

[0052] Step S20: receiving, based on the quantum communication channel, a quantum key generated from the cloud in response to the upgrade request;

[0053] Step S30: collecting the user's real-time palmprint information, and generating a dynamic key based on the dynamic characteristics of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used for the current session of the upgrade request;

[0054] Step S40: combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and sending the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature;

[0055] Step S50: In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud that the digital signature has been verified, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

[0056] In this embodiment of the in-vehicle network security authentication method, quantum key distribution technology is used to generate an unclonable quantum key. This is combined with a unique dynamic key generated by the palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Due to the unclonable nature of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of key cracking is fundamentally eliminated, thereby improving the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, by binding the OTA upgrade operation to the user's dynamic palm print information, the fused quantum key prevents unauthorized remote manipulation of the vehicle upgrade, ensures the security of vehicle and user data, and effectively defends against common network attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0057] Step S10: In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, an upgrade request for the vehicle side is sent to the cloud and a quantum communication channel is established with the cloud.

[0058] Users can complete OTA upgrades by triggering system software update commands via the vehicle's central control screen, mobile app, or physical buttons. The system software can send an identity authentication request to the central control screen or mobile app. Only after confirming the user's identity as the vehicle owner through biometric verification such as palm print, face, or pupil, can the system software respond to the user's OTA upgrade operation and update the system software, ensuring the security and legality of the OTA upgrade operation. If the user fails identity authentication, the system software will not respond to the user's OTA upgrade operation.

[0059] The upgrade request contains information such as the vehicle identification number (VIN) and the security chip ID, the current software version, and hardware configuration information, and is configured as an upgrade data packet. This upgrade data packet can be sent to the cloud via a quantum channel to request the latest version of the software firmware, completing the upgrade request.

[0060] A quantum communication channel is a secure communication link established based on quantum key distribution technology. It leverages the quantum properties of photons to generate and distribute keys, ensuring unconditionally secure communication. By deploying a quantum transmitter in the cloud and a quantum receiver on the vehicle, a quantum communication channel based on quantum key distribution technology is established, leveraging the quantum properties of photons to generate and distribute keys. The vehicle can send an OTA update request to the cloud via the 5G network, along with the unique identifier of its quantum chip. After the cloud verifies the vehicle's identity using the quantum chip's unique identifier, it can establish a quantum communication channel with the vehicle.

[0061] By establishing a quantum communication channel, physical-layer security can be provided for quantum keys, protecting against quantum computing attacks. Furthermore, quantum communication channels are naturally immune to environmental noise, resulting in a low bit error rate and high resistance to interference from external signals, ensuring safe and stable OTA upgrades.

[0062] Step S20: receiving, based on the quantum communication channel, a quantum key generated from the cloud in response to the upgrade request.

[0063] The cloud receives the upgrade request from the vehicle side, and after verifying the identity of the vehicle side, it can respond to the upgrade request and generate the quantum key K Q and sends the key to the vehicle through a quantum communication channel.

[0064] Quantum keys are session keys generated through quantum communication channels. They have a one-time pad property and are derived from quantum random numbers. They are resistant to eavesdropping and forgeability. Any third-party eavesdropping would disrupt the quantum state and be detected by both communicating parties. Furthermore, the quantum state cannot be accurately replicated, ensuring that the key is legally held only by the vehicle and the cloud. As long as key generation and use adhere to information theory principles, absolute security is theoretically guaranteed.

[0065] Step S30: collecting the user's real-time palmprint information, and generating a dynamic key based on the dynamic characteristics of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used for the current session of the upgrade request.

[0066] The vehicle's central control screen is equipped with an on-board palmprint module, which can collect the user's real-time palmprint information. The real-time palmprint information includes static geometric features such as pattern breakpoints and bifurcation points, as well as dynamic features such as pressing pressure distribution, temperature field changes, and contact time series. A dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information.

[0067] Dynamic features refer to the biometric characteristics of the palm print that change over time during the pressing process, including pressure time series features, temperature field distribution, and palm print deformation features. The pressure time series feature is the curve of the pressure value gradually increasing from 0 to 5N within 0.5 seconds from contact to full pressing; the temperature field distribution is the gradient distribution of the palm core temperature and the edge temperature; and the palm print deformation feature is the elastic deformation coefficient of the palm print during pressing. It is understood that the collection duration and pressure change threshold of the pressure time series feature can be adaptively adjusted according to needs.

[0068] The on-board palmprint module integrates a pressure sensor array, an infrared temperature sensor, and a capacitive pattern detector. The pressure sensor array can collect the pressure value when the user presses in real time and record the duration of the palmprint contacting the pressure sensor array. The pressure time series characteristics can be obtained based on the duration and pressure value. The infrared sensor can obtain the temperature field distribution of the palmprint area in real time. The capacitive pattern detector can accurately obtain the palmprint geometry information by sensing the capacitance changes formed by the palmprint and the detector surface. Because different palmprint patterns will cause different changes in capacitance when in contact with the detector, the palmprint deformation characteristics can be extracted by analyzing and processing these capacitance changes.

[0069] The dynamic key is a one-time session key generated based on the dynamic characteristics of the real-time palm print. It is 256 bits long and valid only during the current OTA upgrade session. Each time the user presses the key, a different key is generated due to changes in the duration and location of the press, as well as the temperature of the palm. The generation process is unpredictable and non-reproducible.

[0070] In order to effectively prevent the risk of biometric data leakage, this embodiment converts the dynamic features of the palmprint into a high-strength symmetric key through a combination of SM3 hashing and SM4 encryption.

[0071] Furthermore, the generating of the dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information specifically includes: processing the real-time palmprint information using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value of the first digit; taking the first two digits of the hash value as the SM4 symmetric key, and generating the dynamic key based on the SM4 symmetric key; the second digit is half of the first digit.

[0072] The SM3 hash algorithm is a cryptographic hash algorithm issued by the China National Cryptography Administration. It outputs a 32-byte, 256-bit hash value based on real-time palmprint information. This means the first digit is 256 and the second digit is 128. It is understood that the values of the first and second digits can be adaptively adjusted according to industry standards.

[0073] Before processing the real-time palmprint information through the SM3 hash algorithm, the pressure time series characteristics, temperature field distribution and palmprint deformation characteristics must first be encoded into a unified byte stream, and then the data of the unified byte stream are fused to obtain the processed real-time palmprint information.

[0074] The method of using the SM3 hash algorithm to process the real-time palmprint information to generate a hash value of the first digit specifically includes: padding the total length of the real-time palmprint information to M×N bits and obtaining padded palmprint data; the value of M is twice the value of the first digit; N is a positive integer; dividing the padded palmprint data into N M-digit message blocks; initializing an intermediate hash value, taking the message block as input, and iteratively updating the intermediate hash value according to a preset compression function; and when the iteration is completed, taking the intermediate hash value of the final iteration and splicing it into the hash value of the first digit.

[0075] Since the length of the real-time palmprint information collected each time is different, in order to ensure the consistency and compatibility of the hash results, the real-time palmprint information needs to be padded so that the real-time palmprint information of any length input is converted to a standard block size to avoid boundary loopholes. For example, if the original length of the real-time palmprint information is L bits, it needs to be padded with one bit 1 and k bits 0 so that the total number of bits of the padded data is 512 (M=512). The padded palmprint data with a total length of 512×N bits is obtained through 64-bit binary representation. The padded data is then divided into n 64-byte 512-bit message blocks M1, M2, ..., M n Initialize the intermediate hash value V0 for each message block M i Perform 64 rounds of iterations through the compression function, update the intermediate hash value in each round, and take the last intermediate hash value V n The final 256-bit SM3 hash value is obtained by concatenating the 32 bytes of the . The compression function is expressed as:

[0076] V i =CF(V i-1 ,M i )

[0077] Among them, V i is the intermediate hash value of the i-th iteration, V i-1 is the intermediate hash value of the (i-1)th round of iteration. When i=1, V i-1 =V0, CF represents the compression function, M i Represents the i-th message block.

[0078] The first two digits of the hash value are taken as the SM4 symmetric key. For example, the SM3 algorithm is used to perform hash calculation on the pre-processed feature data to generate a 256-bit hash value H, which is a 32-byte array: [h0,h1,…,h 31]. Then take the first 128 bits (16 bytes) of the hash value as the SM4 symmetric key: K SM4 =[h0,h1,…,h 15 ], dynamic key K SM4 Directly as the dynamic key K B Used for encryption.

[0079] The hash value obtained by the SM3 hash algorithm can provide 256-bit collision resistance, with a collision probability of approximately 2 -128 , with high security and ensure the integrity of feature data. By intercepting 128 bits as the SM4 key, it complies with the national standard algorithm standard.

[0080] Step S40: combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and sending the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature.

[0081] The fusion of quantum keys has the characteristics of dynamic keys being non-replicable and quantum keys being unpredictable. Attackers cannot forge new session data by intercepting old keys, fundamentally eliminating the possibility of keys being cracked and improving the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades.

[0082] When encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data package, encryption and signing use independent encryption keys and signature keys respectively. The leakage of the encryption key does not affect the validity of the signature, and the leakage of the signature key does not endanger the confidentiality of the data. This disperses the risks and strongly ensures the security of the vehicle software during the OTA upgrade process.

[0083] Furthermore, combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, and encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key specifically includes: combining the dynamic key with the quantum key based on a key derivation function to generate a third-digit fused quantum key; the third-digit is equal to the first-digit in value; splitting the fused quantum key into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, the sum of the fourth-digit and the fifth-digit in value being equal to the third-digit; encrypting the upgrade data packet based on the encryption key, and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the signature key.

[0084] The key derivation function is an algorithm used to combine a dynamic key with a quantum key to generate a high-strength fused quantum key. This embodiment uses the HMAC-SM3 algorithm. The specific expression of the key derivation function is:

[0085] where K Fusionis the fusion quantum key; HMAC-SM3 represents the HMAC-SM3 algorithm; K Q is the quantum key; K B is a dynamic key; Y is a salt value, which is determined by the hash value of the vehicle VIN; Represents an exclusive OR operation, ensuring that the dynamic key and quantum key contribute equally to avoid dominance of a single key.

[0086] The 256-bit (third digit) fusion quantum key K can be generated by the HMAC-SM3 algorithm Fusion , then take the first 128 bits (the fourth digit) of the fused quantum key as the encryption key, and take the last 128 bits (the fifth digit) of the fused quantum key as the signature key.

[0087] When encrypting the upgrade data packet, it is encrypted in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode using the encryption key, and an initial intermediate hash value V0 is appended to ensure that the same plaintext generates different ciphertext. In CBC mode, each plaintext block is XORed with the previous ciphertext block before encryption, and the first plaintext block is XORed with an initial intermediate hash value. This process makes each ciphertext block dependent not only on the current plaintext block, but also on the previous plaintext block, increasing the difficulty of cryptanalysis.

[0088] When signing the update data package, the signature key is used as the private key, and the signature function in the SM2 algorithm is used to sign it. This generates a digital signature that conforms to the SM2 standard format. The digital signature can be used to verify the integrity of the data and the authenticity of the source. During the subsequent verification process, the cloud uses the public key corresponding to the private key, combined with the received data and signature, to verify the validity of the digital signature. If the verification is successful, it means that the data has not been tampered with during transmission and indeed comes from the vehicle holding the corresponding private key.

[0089] The two are combined using the HMAC-SM3 algorithm to generate a 256-bit fused quantum key. Its total entropy approaches the theoretical upper limit of 256 bits, theoretically capable of withstanding a brute force attack requiring 2256 operations and a quantum attack requiring 2128 operations. When encrypting the upgrade data packet, the encryption key and signature key are generated independently. Even if one key is compromised, the other remains secure. A leak of the encryption key does not affect the validity of the signature, and a leak of the signature key does not compromise data confidentiality, ensuring the security of the vehicle's software during OTA updates.

[0090] In addition, since the CAN / LIN bus signal transmission delay between different ECUs (electronic control units) is affected by physical parameters such as wiring harness length and connector impedance, and exhibits slight dynamic fluctuations with vehicle vibration and temperature changes, a topology delay measurement session can be initiated in response to the user's OTA upgrade operation. The main controller sends synchronization pulses to each ECU, records the time difference of the return response, and generates a topology delay fingerprint K. T , based on the key derivation function, the dynamic key K B , quantum key K Q and the topological delay fingerprint K T Combine and generate the fusion quantum key K Fusion , the specific expression of the key derivation function is: By utilizing the inherent physical characteristics of vehicle hardware to generate dynamic topological delay fingerprints, it can resist ECU counterfeiting attacks. As the wiring harness ages and other factors occur, the topological delay can slowly change with the vehicle's usage cycle and automatically trigger the key update mechanism to adapt to long-term security needs.

[0091] When generating the topological delay fingerprint, the topological delay between each ECU is collected to form a delay matrix. The mean value of the delay matrix is then used as the initial value (x0, y0). The initial value is input into the chaotic mapping function and iterated 16 times to generate a 256-bit chaotic sequence. The chaotic sequence is then binary-encoded to obtain the topological delay fingerprint. The expression of the chaotic mapping function is:

[0092]

[0093] Among them, (x n+1 ,y n+1 ) is the (n+1)th chaotic sequence value, (x n ,y n ) is the nth chaotic sequence value, a and b are sequence parameters, and a=1.4,b=0.3.

[0094] Step S50: In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud that the digital signature has been verified, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

[0095] After receiving the encrypted and signed update data packet, the cloud also decrypts it using CBC mode and verifies the digital signature using the SM2 algorithm. Once verification is successful, it sends an authorization command to the vehicle, allowing it to decrypt the update data packet and perform the OTA update of the vehicle's software.

[0096] To prevent the authorization command from being altered, upon receiving it, the vehicle verifies the digital signature using the cloud public key stored in the vehicle's security chip, ensuring it has not been tampered with and originates from a legitimate cloud. Furthermore, to ensure the command matches the current upgrade session, the vehicle verifies the timestamp and session ID in the authorization command to prevent external replay attacks. The session ID is a unique number assigned by the cloud after receiving the upgrade request from the vehicle, based on the order in which the update requests were sent to the server.

[0097] During an OTA upgrade, the decrypted upgrade package is written to a dedicated upgrade partition within the vehicle's ECU to prevent disruption to the running vehicle system. A mechanism is employed where the upgrade package is written to the new partition before switching the boot pointer. If the upgrade process is interrupted, the system automatically boots from the backup partition, preventing system failure due to data errors. After the software upgrade is complete, a copy of the previous firmware version is retained for 72 hours. If an anomaly is detected during this period, the system automatically rolls back to the previous version to prevent system malfunctions.

[0098] After executing the OTA upgrade operation, the system also includes: upon completion of the OTA upgrade operation, destroying the quantum key, the dynamic key, and the fused quantum key. When the vehicle software upgrade is complete, the security chip erases and destroys all memory copies of the quantum key, the dynamic key, and the fused quantum key through hardware instructions, ensuring that the key for each session is used only for the current session. The next time the key is regenerated, a new key combination is generated for each upgrade. Attackers cannot forge data using historical keys or biometric templates, ensuring the security of vehicle and user data and effectively defending against common network attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0099] In summary, the in-vehicle network security authentication method of this embodiment utilizes quantum key distribution technology to generate an unclonable quantum key, which is then combined with a unique dynamic key generated by the palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Based on the unclonable nature of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, this fundamentally eliminates the possibility of key cracking, thereby improving the security of the in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, upon completion of the in-vehicle software upgrade, all memory copies of the quantum key, dynamic key, and fused quantum key are erased and destroyed, ensuring that the key used for each session is only used for the current session. This prevents attackers from forging data using historical keys or biometric templates, safeguarding the security of vehicle and user data and effectively defending against common network attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0100] Second embodiment

[0101] like Figure 2 As shown, corresponding to the vehicle network security authentication method in the first embodiment, this embodiment also provides a vehicle network security authentication method for the cloud, the method comprising:

[0102] Step S10: receiving an upgrade request from the vehicle end and establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle end;

[0103] Step S20: generating a quantum key in response to the upgrade request, and distributing the quantum key to the vehicle end through the quantum communication channel;

[0104] Step S30: receiving the upgrade data packet sent by the vehicle end, and verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and a pre-stored biometric template; the fused quantum key is a combination of the quantum key and a dynamic key; the dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the user's real-time palm print information and is only used for the current session of the upgrade request; the upgrade data packet is encrypted and digitally signed by the fused quantum key;

[0105] Step S40: If the digital signature passes verification, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle end; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle end to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform the OTA upgrade operation based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

[0106] In this embodiment of the in-vehicle network security authentication method, quantum key distribution technology is used to generate an unclonable quantum key. This is combined with a unique dynamic key generated by the palm print to generate a fused quantum key. Due to the unclonable nature of the fused quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key, the possibility of key cracking is fundamentally eliminated, thereby improving the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, by binding the OTA upgrade operation to the user's dynamic palm print information, the fused quantum key prevents unauthorized remote manipulation of the vehicle upgrade, ensures the security of vehicle and user data, and effectively defends against common network attacks such as replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0107] Step S10: receiving an upgrade request from the vehicle side and establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle side.

[0108] After receiving the upgrade request from the vehicle, the cloud negotiates quantum communication parameters with the vehicle through a classical communication channel and establishes a quantum communication channel. The specific steps for establishing a quantum communication channel can be found in the first embodiment.

[0109] In order to determine the legitimacy of the vehicle end, the identity of the vehicle end needs to be further confirmed before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle end to filter out illegal requests.

[0110] Before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle end, the method further includes: obtaining identity identification information of the vehicle corresponding to the vehicle end, and performing vehicle identity authentication on the vehicle end based on the identity identification information; when the vehicle end fails to perform vehicle identity authentication, canceling the establishment of the quantum communication channel with the vehicle end.

[0111] The identity information is the vehicle's unique identifier (VIN). The authenticity and legitimacy of the identity information are confirmed by checking whether the VIN length, character set, and check digit algorithm match the vehicle file stored in the cloud. If the vehicle identity authentication fails, the quantum communication channel with the vehicle is canceled, and illegal requests are filtered before the quantum channel is established.

[0112] Step S20: generating a quantum key in response to the upgrade request, and distributing the quantum key to the vehicle end through the quantum communication channel.

[0113] The cloud randomly generates a polarization state sequence through a single-photon transmitter, exchanges basis vector selection information with the vehicle through a classical channel, retains only the photon data with consistent basis vectors to form the original key, performs error correction encoding and privacy amplification on the original key, generates a quantum key and distributes it to the vehicle.

[0114] Step S30: Receive the upgrade data packet sent by the vehicle end, and verify the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template.

[0115] The upgrade data packet contains the upgrade content encrypted using the fused quantum key, a digital signature generated using the fused quantum key, and a session ID associated with the current OTA session.

[0116] When the vehicle sends the upgrade data package, it simultaneously collects dynamic features from the user's palm print, extracts static features, and generates a static feature hash value from the static features. The cloud receives the static feature hash value sent by the vehicle and compares it with the pre-stored biometric template hash value for similarity. If the similarity exceeds the threshold, the user is deemed legitimate and dynamic key generation is allowed; otherwise, it is not allowed. The vehicle's identity information is further verified using the biometric template to ensure that the operator is legitimate and prevent identity forgery.

[0117] When verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet, it is necessary to decrypt the upgrade data packet using the CBC mode for the fused quantum key and verify the digital signature using the SM2 algorithm. For details, please refer to the first embodiment.

[0118] After verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template, it also includes: verifying the validity of the timestamp and random number factor of the upgrade data packet; if the upgrade data packet fails the validity verification, canceling the authorization instruction sent to the vehicle end.

[0119] The timestamp is the system time recorded by the vehicle when the upgrade data package is generated, which is used to identify the moment the data was generated. The timestamp field is extracted from the metadata of the upgrade data package and converted to a local time format timestamp. The difference between the current system time and the local time format timestamp is then calculated. If the difference is greater than a preset threshold (such as 300 seconds), the timestamp is deemed invalid and the authorization instruction sent to the vehicle is canceled, thereby rejecting the vehicle's upgrade request.

[0120] The random factor is a unique random value generated during each communication session, used to prevent replay attacks and ensure that the same plaintext generates different ciphertext. A random number field is extracted from the upgrade data packet as the random factor. Its length and format are verified for compliance, and the local random number cache is queried to check whether the random factor has already been used. If the random factor already exists, it is considered a replay attack, and the authorization instruction sent to the vehicle is canceled, thereby rejecting the vehicle's upgrade request. If the random factor does not exist, the random number is stored in the local random number cache, and an expiration time is set for the random factor. If the random factor is not used after the expiration time, it is considered to already exist.

[0121] Step S40: If the digital signature passes verification, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle end; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle end to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform the OTA upgrade operation based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

[0122] If the digital signature verification is successful, the cloud generates an authorization instruction containing the session authorization information, and uses the cloud private key to perform SM2 signature, and sends the authorization instruction to the vehicle through the quantum communication channel.

[0123] In summary, the in-vehicle network security authentication method of this embodiment utilizes quantum key distribution technology to generate an unclonable quantum key, which is then combined with a unique dynamic key generated by palm prints to generate a fused quantum key. This fusion of the unclonable quantum key and the uniqueness of the dynamic key fundamentally eliminates the possibility of key cracking, thereby enhancing the security of in-vehicle software during OTA upgrades. Furthermore, before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle, the vehicle's identity is further confirmed using identification information to filter out illegal requests.

[0124] Based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiments, this embodiment also provides an in-vehicle network security authentication system, including a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the computer program is used by the processor to load and execute the in-vehicle network security authentication method as described in any one of the first embodiments and / or any one of the second embodiments.

[0125] like Figure 3As shown, based on the same inventive concept as the above embodiment, this embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores instructions, and the instructions are used by the processor to load and execute the above-mentioned vehicle network security authentication method.

[0126] In the embodiments of the mobile terminal and computer-readable storage medium provided in this application, all technical features of the above-mentioned control method embodiments are included. The expanded and explained contents of the specification are basically the same as those of the above-mentioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0127] An embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, which includes computer program code. When the computer program code runs on a computer, the computer executes the methods in the various possible implementation modes described above.

[0128] An embodiment of the present application also provides a chip, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store computer programs, and the processor is used to call and run the computer programs from the memory, so that a device equipped with the chip executes the methods in the various possible implementation modes as described above.

[0129] The serial numbers of the above embodiments of the present application are for description only and do not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.

[0130] In this application, the same or similar terminology, technical solutions and / or application scenario descriptions are generally only described in detail the first time they appear. When they appear again later, they are generally not repeated for the sake of brevity. When understanding the technical solutions and other contents of this application, for the same or similar terminology, technical solutions and / or application scenario descriptions that are not described in detail later, you can refer to the previous relevant detailed descriptions.

[0131] In this application, the description of each embodiment has its own focus. For parts that are not described or recorded in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant description of other embodiments.

[0132] The various technical features of the technical solution of this application can be combined arbitrarily. In order to make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the various technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this application.

[0133] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by means of software plus the necessary general hardware platform, and of course by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium as above, including a number of instructions for enabling a terminal device to execute the method of each embodiment of the present application. The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present application, and does not limit the patent scope of the present application. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the contents of the description and drawings of this application, or directly or indirectly used in other related technical fields, is similarly included in the patent protection scope of the present application.

[0134] It should be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same and similar parts between the various embodiments can be referenced to each other.

[0135] The foregoing description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any modifications or substitutions that can be readily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed herein are intended to be encompassed within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention shall be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A vehicle network security authentication method, characterized in that: For the vehicle side, the method includes: In response to the user's OTA upgrade operation, sending an upgrade request for the vehicle to the cloud and establishing a quantum communication channel with the cloud; receiving, based on the quantum communication channel, a quantum key generated from the cloud in response to the upgrade request; Collecting the user's real-time palmprint information and generating a dynamic key based on the dynamic characteristics of the real-time palmprint information; the dynamic key is only used for the current session of the upgrade request; Combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, and sending the encrypted upgrade data packet to the cloud for verification of the digital signature; In response to the authorization instruction sent from the cloud that the digital signature has been verified, the upgrade data packet is decrypted based on the quantum key and the dynamic key, and an OTA upgrade operation is performed.

2. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The generating of a dynamic key based on the dynamic features of the real-time palmprint information specifically includes: Processing the real-time palmprint information using the SM3 hash algorithm to generate a hash value for the first digit; The first second digit of the hash value is taken as the SM4 symmetric key, and the dynamic key is generated according to the SM4 symmetric key; the second digit is half of the first digit.

3. The vehicle network security authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The SM3 hash algorithm is used to process the real-time palmprint information to generate a hash value of the first digit, specifically including: Filling the total length of the real-time palmprint information to M×N bits and obtaining filled palmprint data; the value of M is twice the value of the first digit; and N is a positive integer; Dividing the padded palmprint data into N M-digit message blocks; Initializing an intermediate hash value, taking the message block as input, and iteratively updating the intermediate hash value according to a preset compression function; When the iteration is completed, the intermediate hash values of the final iteration are taken and concatenated to form the hash value of the first digit.

4. The vehicle-mounted network security authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step of combining the dynamic key with the quantum key to generate a fused quantum key, and encrypting and digitally signing the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key, specifically includes: Combining the dynamic key with the quantum key based on a key derivation function to generate a fused quantum key of a third digit; the third digit is equal to the value of the first digit; Splitting the fused quantum key into a fourth-digit encryption key and a fifth-digit signature key, where the sum of the fourth-digit and the fifth-digit values is equal to the third-digit value; The upgrade data package is encrypted based on the encryption key, and the upgrade data package is digitally signed based on the signature key.

5. The vehicle-mounted network security authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: After performing the OTA upgrade operation, it also includes: When the OTA upgrade operation is completed, the quantum key, the dynamic key and the fused quantum key are destroyed.

6. A vehicle-mounted network security authentication method, characterized in that: For use in the cloud, the method includes: Receiving an upgrade request from a vehicle and establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle; generating a quantum key in response to the upgrade request, and distributing the quantum key to the vehicle end through the quantum communication channel; receiving an upgrade data packet sent by the vehicle, and verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on a fused quantum key and a pre-stored biometric template; the fused quantum key is a combination of the quantum key and a dynamic key; the dynamic key is generated based on the dynamic features of the user's real-time palm print information and is only used for the current session of the upgrade request; the upgrade data packet is encrypted and digitally signed by the fused quantum key; If the digital signature is verified, an authorization instruction is sent to the vehicle end; the authorization instruction allows the vehicle end to decrypt the upgrade data packet and perform the OTA upgrade operation based on the quantum key and the dynamic key.

7. The vehicle-mounted network security authentication method according to claim 6, characterized in that: Before establishing a quantum communication channel with the vehicle, the method further includes: Obtaining the vehicle identification information corresponding to the vehicle on the vehicle side, and performing vehicle identity authentication on the vehicle side based on the identity identification information; When the vehicle end fails to perform vehicle identity authentication, the quantum communication channel with the vehicle end is canceled.

8. The vehicle-mounted network security authentication method according to claim 6 or 7, characterized in that: After verifying the digital signature of the upgrade data packet based on the fused quantum key and the pre-stored biometric template, the method further includes: Verifying the validity of the timestamp and random number factor of the upgrade data packet; If the upgrade data package does not pass the validity verification, the authorization instruction sent to the vehicle end is canceled.

9. A vehicle-mounted network security authentication system, characterized in that: It comprises a processor and a memory; wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the computer program is used to be loaded by the processor and execute the vehicle network security authentication method as described in any one of claims 1-5 and / or any one of claims 6-8.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and the instructions are used for a processor to load and execute the vehicle network security authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 and / or any one of claims 6 to 8.

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