Quantum attack resistant ubiquitous network data security gateway

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of network data security, and discloses an anti-quantum-attack ubiquitous network data security gateway which comprises a communication interface module, a verification module, a strategy analysis module, an accumulator updating module, a second signature module and an output module. The verification module verifies signature authenticity and member consistency based on the terminal public key and the accumulator public key; the strategy analysis module dynamically screens fields according to a predefined editable strategy; the accumulator updating module performs efficient accumulation and witness updating on the subsets on the premise of not calling a private key; the second signature module adopts a lattice signature algorithm based on SIS hypothesis and combines bounded rejection sampling to complete re-signature; the output module safely issues the re-signed data packet to the user; in addition, threshold fragmentation and Chinese remainder theorem recombination are supported, and distributed privacy protection and reliable recovery of high-sensitivity fields are achieved. According to the method, balance is achieved between quantum security and editability, and re-signing and verification performance is controllable.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network data security technology, and in particular to a ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid deployment of ubiquitous networks such as the Internet of Things, the Internet of Vehicles, and satellite communications, real-time data generated by massive amounts of terminal devices has become a critical resource. Traditional network security perimeters are evolving towards a distributed, multi-layered approach, prompting the emergence of data security gateways, which undertake core functions such as message aggregation, identity authentication, access control, and data isolation. However, with the continuous advancement of quantum computing capabilities, mainstream public key cryptography algorithms such as RSA and ECC are at risk of being cracked by efficient quantum algorithms, jeopardizing the security foundation of traditional security gateways. To ensure data confidentiality, integrity, and auditability in the post-quantum era, researchers have begun integrating lattice-based post-quantum cryptography with network security gateway architectures, proposing quantum security gateway solutions based on the LWE (Learning With Errors) and SIS (Short Integer Solution) assumptions. Furthermore, to meet the needs of multi-party collaboration, cross-domain calls, and privacy protection, security gateways must not only verify data authenticity but also support content editing, granular access, and transparent auditing based on dynamic policies, providing flexible and reliable security for real-time data.

[0003] Existing quantum security gateway solutions focus primarily on authoritative signatures and encryption and decryption functions, and once generated, the signature results cannot be modified, making it difficult to meet the needs of data desensitization, log clipping, or multi-role hierarchical access. On the other hand, traditional research on editable signatures is mostly based on stand-alone environment designs, without considering the accumulator witness sharing and subset verification issues between cross-domain gateways in ubiquitous networks, resulting in low efficiency of re-edited signatures and high communication and computing overhead. Furthermore, existing solutions typically couple policy logic with signature algorithms, lacking a unified policy loading and parsing mechanism, making it difficult to flexibly update editing rules based on business needs, and do not support automatic invalidation and expiration deletion of signature content. To address these deficiencies, the present invention proposes a ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] (1) Technical problems solved: In response to the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks, solving the above-mentioned problems.

[0005] (2) Technical solution: To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks, characterized in that it includes: a communication interface module for receiving a first data packet from a terminal, wherein the first data packet at least includes an original message set, a first accumulator value, a first digital signature, and a witness set corresponding one-to-one to each message in the original message set.

[0006] A verification module is used to verify the authenticity of the first digital signature based on a pre-stored terminal public key, and to perform member consistency verification on the original message set, the witness set and the first accumulator value based on the accumulator public key; when any verification fails, the first data packet is discarded and a rejection result is output.

[0007] The policy parsing module is used to perform field screening on the original message set according to a preset editable policy to obtain a target message subset.

[0008] An accumulator update module is used to recalculate the second accumulator value based on the target message subset and update the corresponding witness set for each message in the target message subset.

[0009] The second signature module is used to adopt a post-quantum secure digital signature algorithm based on lattice cryptography, and use the accumulator private key held by this gateway to generate a second digital signature for the content to be signed that at least includes the second accumulator value.

[0010] An output module is used to generate a second data packet including the target message subset, the second accumulator value and the second digital signature, and send the second data packet to a data user.

[0011] Furthermore, the policy parsing module specifically includes: a policy acquisition unit, configured to acquire an editable policy file from a local storage or a remote management server.

[0012] The syntax parsing unit is used to perform hierarchical JSON syntax parsing on the editable policy file to extract field identifiers, role identifiers and data retention period information.

[0013] The role matching unit is used to generate a reserved field list and a deleted field list according to the corresponding relationship between the field identifier and the role identifier.

[0014] The period monitoring unit is used to monitor the data retention period and automatically add the corresponding field to the deletion field list when the period expires.

[0015] A field screening unit is used to delete the fields corresponding to the deleted field list in the original message set, assemble the remaining fields after deletion into a target message subset in the original order, and send the target message subset to the accumulator update module.

[0016] Furthermore, the accumulator update module specifically includes: a hash mapping unit, configured to map each message in the target message subset into a ring vector via a preset hash function.

[0017] The accumulator calculation unit is used to perform modular multiplication and accumulation operations on a pre-stored public random matrix and all mapped ring vectors to generate the second accumulator value.

[0018] The witness updating unit is configured to deduct the ring vector corresponding to the deleted message from the witness vector of each message in the target message subset without calling the accumulator private key to obtain an updated witness vector set.

[0019] Furthermore, the verification module uses a lattice signature algorithm based on the SIS assumption to verify the authenticity of the first digital signature, and the second signature module uses a lattice signature algorithm with the same SIS parameter set to generate the second digital signature, wherein the challenge value is obtained by hashing a random commitment vector and the second accumulator value.

[0020] Furthermore, the second signature module specifically includes: a sampling subunit, configured to sample and temporarily store signature vectors from a preset random distribution.

[0021] The rejection sampling subunit is used to detect the infinite norm of the response value corresponding to the temporarily stored signature vector, and trigger resampling if it exceeds a preset threshold until the norm constraint is met or the preset retry limit is reached.

[0022] The signature combination subunit is used to jointly hash the response vector that finally passes the rejection sampling test with the second accumulator value to generate a challenge value, and output a second digital signature.

[0023] Furthermore, it also includes a data user-end device that communicates with this gateway, and the data user-end device is configured with: an accumulator verification unit, which is used to perform member consistency verification on the target message subset, the second accumulator value and the corresponding witness vector received from the gateway based on the accumulator public key.

[0024] A signature verification unit is used to perform authenticity verification on the second digital signature based on the terminal public key.

[0025] The determination unit is configured to receive and store the target message subset only when both the member consistency verification and the authenticity verification are passed, and output a rejection result otherwise.

[0026] Furthermore, it also includes a fragmentation processing module, which is configured to: when it is detected that the original message set contains a high-sensitivity field, the corresponding ciphertext message is divided into two parts according to the threshold value. Split into Ciphertext fragments are sent to the nearest gateway. data units; assign different weights to each ciphertext fragment according to the distance between the source data unit of each fragment and the gateway; when a total of at least When there are ciphertext fragments from the same field, the Chinese remainder theorem is used to reorganize the ciphertext fragments to restore the original plaintext of the field; the restored original plaintext is merged with other target message subsets and provided to the accumulator update module for further processing.

[0027] (III) Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks, and has the following beneficial effects: 1. The ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks, directly performs modular multiplication and accumulation operations on a public random matrix and all mapped ring vectors in the accumulator update module, and only performs vector subtraction on the witness vector corresponding to the deleted message without re-calling the private key or rebuilding the entire accumulator. This solves the problem of low re-signing efficiency and high communication and computing overhead caused by the need to regenerate the entire message set or all witnesses during re-editing in the prior art, thereby achieving rapid aggregate verification and efficient re-signing of message subsets, and significantly improving real-time editing performance.

[0028] 2. This quantum-resistant ubiquitous network data security gateway performs infinite norm detection on the temporarily stored signature vector through the rejection sampling subunit in the second signature module. If the threshold is exceeded, a retry is triggered, and the system is safely terminated after the preset retry limit is reached. This solves the problems of signature delay or high failure rate caused by unlimited retries in the existing technology, thereby ensuring that the signature operation is completed reliably within a limited number of times, achieving dual guarantees of real-time performance and stability.

[0029] 3. The ubiquitous network data security gateway that resists quantum attacks processes ciphertexts of highly sensitive fields by means of a sharding processing module. The threshold secret sharing method is used to split and assign weights according to the gateway distance. After sharding, the Chinese remainder theorem is used to reconstruct and restore the original text, which solves the lack of decentralized storage and privacy protection of sensitive fields and cross-domain secret sharing functions in existing technologies, thereby realizing secure decentralized storage and reliable recovery of highly sensitive information in a multi-gateway collaborative environment. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall structure of the ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks provided by the present invention.

[0031] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the policy parsing module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks in the present invention.

[0032] Figure 3This is a structural diagram of the accumulator update module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention.

[0033] Figure 4 This is a structural diagram of the second signature module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention.

[0034] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the data user-end device of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention.

[0035] Figure 6 Schematic diagram of the sharding processing module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention.

[0036] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the experimental results of Example 1 of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0037] The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0038] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0039] Example 1: The ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks in this embodiment is deployed at the edge node between the terminal and the data user. A set of editable policy functions is predefined. (including the list of fields that are allowed to be hidden or retained and their roles and term constraints); then, the administrator selects and generates the public parameters required for lattice cryptography, including the polynomial ring Prime modulus in and dimensions , the introduced hash function , and rejection sampling parameters for the accumulator and signature, including the infinity norm threshold and maximum number of retries During the private key generation process, the pseudo-random number generator (PRG) is initialized for the signature module, and a seed is generated and protected by the system's secure random number source. , so that the subsequent sampling subunit can safely sample the temporary vector based on the PRG. Then, for the accumulator structure, a public random matrix is ​​generated And related accumulator parameters (such as Latin square parameters, dimension mapping rules). Finally, the administrator will all the above public parameters and PRG seeds The data is transmitted to the gateway and data users through the secure distribution of key generation, signing, editing and verification functions, which are invisible to the terminal.

[0040] See also Figure 1 , Figure 1 The overall structural diagram of the ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks provided by the present invention is characterized in that it includes: a communication interface module for receiving a first data packet from a terminal, wherein the first data packet at least includes an original message set, a first accumulator value, a first digital signature, and a witness set corresponding one-to-one to each message in the original message set.

[0041] Specifically, the communication interface module establishes a connection with the terminal through a TLS-based encrypted channel at the network layer of the gateway and continuously listens for incoming JSON format data packets on the pre-configured TCP port. The module first performs integrity verification on the received JSON message, including verifying the version number, terminal identifier and timestamp in the message header to prevent replay attacks; then, according to the field names defined in the briefing document, it parses the original message set at one time. , first accumulator value , the first digital signature and with collections News One-to-one corresponding witness vector set During the parsing process, the module and The length, format and type of the data are checked to ensure that all required fields have been received completely. ,and It is encapsulated as an internal structure object and pushed to the verification module for subsequent digital signature authenticity verification and accumulator member consistency verification.

[0042] A verification module is used to verify the authenticity of the first digital signature based on a pre-stored terminal public key, and to perform member consistency verification on the original message set, the witness set and the first accumulator value based on the accumulator public key; when any verification fails, the first data packet is discarded and a rejection result is output.

[0043] Specifically, the verification module receives the internal structure object encapsulated by the communication interface module and first uses the pre-stored terminal public key First digital signature and linked data Calling the lattice signature verification algorithm To ensure the authenticity of the signature; then, the module uses the accumulator public key right , Witness Collection and the accumulator value Call the accumulator member consistency verification algorithm to confirm all messages are all legal members of the original set. If any verification step fails, the verification module immediately discards the first data packet and outputs a rejection result; only after both verifications are successful, and It is also forwarded to the policy analysis module to ensure that the subsequent editing and re-signing processes are built on a trustworthy basis.

[0044] The policy parsing module is used to filter the fields of the original message set according to the preset editable policy to obtain the target message subset; for further information, please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 The schematic diagram of the structure of the policy parsing module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway against quantum attacks of the present invention is shown. The policy parsing module specifically includes: a policy acquisition unit for acquiring an editable policy file from a local storage or remote management server; specifically, the policy acquisition unit receives the policy file forwarded by the verification module. and After that, it first checks the version number and update timestamp of the local policy cache. If the local policy file is still valid and consistent with the version number issued during the initialization phase, it directly loads the cached JSON-formatted policy file from the local file system. Otherwise, the policy acquisition unit initiates a GET request to the remote management server via the pre-configured HTTPS interface to obtain the latest policy. After the download is complete, it immediately verifies the digital signature attached to the file. After confirming the source and integrity of the file, it writes it to the local cache and updates the version number and timestamp. Regardless of whether it is loaded locally or pulled remotely, the policy acquisition unit will ultimately hand over the latest, formatted JSON policy document to the subsequent syntax parsing unit.

[0045] The parsing unit is responsible for performing hierarchical JSON parsing of the editable policy file to extract field identifiers, role identifiers, and data retention period information. Specifically, upon receiving the JSON document from the policy acquisition unit, the parsing unit first calls a standard JSON parsing library to convert the text into an in-memory object tree. Then, using the top-level "policies" array as the entry point, it iterates through each policy entry, reading the field identifier corresponding to the "field_id" field, the list of role identifiers in the "roles" array, and the data retention period in the "retain_period" field. During the parsing process, the module verifies that each policy entry must contain the three-tuple information. Otherwise, the non-compliant entry is logged and skipped. The "retain_period" is converted to a millisecond timestamp for internal gateway use. After parsing, the parsing unit encapsulates all valid (field_id, roles_ids, retain_deadline) triples into a policy mapping table and passes it to the role matching unit to support subsequent field filtering and expiration monitoring mechanisms.

[0046] The role matching unit is used to generate a reserved field list and a deleted field list according to the correspondence between the field identifier and the role identifier; specifically, the role matching unit receives the policy mapping table provided by the grammar parsing unit And the role identifier of the current data user , and traverse each strategy triple in the mapping table: for each field identifier ,if And the current time has not exceeded the corresponding retention period , then the field Add it to the list of retained fields; otherwise, add it to the list of deleted fields. After the process is completed, the unit will also check the original message set The role matching unit checks for fields not declared in any policy entry and places these "undeclared" fields on a deletion list to ensure secure isolation. Finally, the role matching unit outputs a categorized list of retained fields and a list of deleted fields, which are then passed to the deadline monitoring unit and field screening unit for further processing.

[0047] The deadline monitoring unit is used to monitor the data retention period and automatically put the corresponding field into the deletion field list when it expires; specifically, after the role matching unit outputs the retention field list and the deletion field list, the deadline monitoring unit immediately puts the two and the corresponding retention deadline into the list. Inject the internal scheduler and start the scheduled inspection task. The scheduler scans all reserved fields at a fixed frequency The deadline, when the system current time Exceeding the retention period of a field When a field is deleted, the monitoring unit automatically removes the field from the retention list and adds it to the deleted field list, while recording the timestamp and trigger reason of the change operation for subsequent auditing. For expired fields, the monitoring unit also triggers a callback notification to the field screening unit to ensure that the field is correctly eliminated in the next round of screening. This method enables the system to automatically expire expired fields in real time and accurately according to the retention period preset in the policy, solving the problem that manual or static policy updates are difficult to take effect in a timely manner.

[0048] A field screening unit is used to delete the fields corresponding to the deleted field list in the original message set, assemble the remaining fields after deletion into a target message subset in the original order, and send the target message subset to the accumulator update module.

[0049] Specifically, the field screening unit receives the original message set and a list of deleted fields from the role matching and deadline monitoring units, for each message Process one by one: First, traverse the key-value pairs of the message in the order of the internal fields, delete the fields whose key names belong to the deletion field list, and keep the remaining fields in the original order and copy them to the new message object; after completing the removal of fields in all messages, reorganize the processed message set into the target message subset , and encapsulate it together with the corresponding subset index information, and finally Pushed to the accumulator update module.

[0050] An accumulator update module is used to recalculate the second accumulator value based on the target message subset and update the corresponding witness set for each message in the target message subset.

[0051] For further information, see Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the accumulator update module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention. The accumulator update module specifically includes: a hash mapping unit for mapping each message in the target message subset into a ring vector through a preset hash function; specifically, the hash mapping unit first loads the polynomial ring parameters distributed during the system initialization phase. And the preset hash function For the received target message subset , the module will each message Serialize into a fixed-length binary string (first UTF-8 encoding and then padded to a fixed block size), and then input the binary string into the hash function , directly output a length of Integer vector of This vector is considered as a ring element in the basis The coefficients below indicate that all operations are performed on the modulus After the mapping is completed, the hash mapping unit will generate a ring vector set Pack the messages in order of index and push them to the accumulator computing unit.

[0052] The accumulator calculation unit is configured to perform modular multiplication of the pre-stored public random matrix and the second auxiliary vector to generate the second accumulator value; specifically, the accumulator calculation unit receives the ring vector set packaged by the hash mapping unit. After that, first load the public random matrix generated and distributed during the system initialization phase and modulus For each vector , the module performs matrix-vector multiplication to calculate the intermediate vector , then all Accumulate element by element and perform modulo operation on the sum vector to get the final second accumulator value: , the operation is completely within the predefined loop The calculation is performed under the same parameters as the first accumulator value, ensuring the same structure and security. After the calculation is completed, the accumulator calculation unit will Encapsulates it with the subset index and passes it to the witness update unit.

[0053] The witness updating unit is configured to deduct the ring vector corresponding to the deleted message from the witness vector of each message in the target message subset without calling the accumulator private key, thereby obtaining an updated witness vector set.

[0054] Specifically, the witness update unit receives the original witness set , subset index information and the public random matrix output by the accumulator calculation unit and the ring vector set of deleted messages and the ring vector set of deleted messages After that, the witness update can be completed based on linear algebra operations without calling the accumulator private key: the module first updates each deleted message Calculate its vector contribution: ; Then for the target subset The original witness corresponding to each remaining message in Perform vector subtraction: , to remove the impact of deleted messages on the accumulator value. The above operation is performed on the same modulus The new witness set obtained after the update is It is encapsulated and sent to the second signature module, realizing efficient private key-free witness maintenance of the message subset.

[0055] The second signature module is used to generate a second digital signature for the content to be signed containing at least the second accumulator value using the accumulator private key held by the gateway using a post-quantum secure digital signature algorithm based on lattice cryptography; further, please refer to Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a structural diagram of the second signature module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention; the second signature module specifically includes: a sampling subunit, which is used to sample and temporarily store signature vectors from a first preset random distribution; specifically, the sampling subunit loads the pseudo-random number generator (PRG) seed distributed during the system initialization phase, and calls the PRG to output a pseudo-random bit string, and converts the bit string into the same modulus according to a predefined method. The lower length is Integer vector of As a temporary signature vector; this process does not require access to the private key and only relies on the public PRG parameters. Passed to the rejection sampling subunit for subsequent norm detection and signature combination.

[0056] The rejection sampling subunit is used to detect the infinite norm of the response value corresponding to the temporary signature vector. If it exceeds the preset threshold, it is judged as rejection and resampling is triggered. Specifically, the rejection sampling subunit has loaded the preset infinite norm threshold in the system initialization stage. and maximum number of retries When the sampling subunit generates a temporary signature vector After passing it in, the rejection sampling subunit first calculates its infinite norm and with the threshold For comparison: If , the sub-unit sends a rejection signal to the sampling sub-unit to request resampling, and increases the retry count by one; when the retry count reaches the upper limit When , the sub-unit stops retrying and reports the failure status to the second signature module to trigger the re-signing strategy or exception handling; only when If the number of retries is within the limit, the sampling sub-unit will reject the compliant Forwarded to the signature combination subunit to ensure that the signature input meets the security distribution constraints and the signing process is controllable.

[0057] The signature combination subunit is used to jointly hash the response value that finally passes the rejection sampling test with the second accumulator value to generate a challenge value, and output a second digital signature.

[0058] Specifically, the signature combination subunit receives the temporary signature vector that passes the rejection sampling test The second accumulator value output by the sum accumulator calculation unit Then, first input the two into the hash function according to the predefined splicing rules , calculate the challenge value: .

[0059] The unit then calls the signature private key held by the gateway , perform linear combination as required by the lattice signature algorithm to generate the response vector: .

[0060] Finally, the signature combination subunit will Encapsulated as a second digital signature , and Target message subset and Pass it to the output module together to complete the last step of the re-signing process.

[0061] An output module is used to generate a second data packet including the target message subset, the second accumulator value and the second digital signature, and send the second data packet to a data user.

[0062] Specifically, the output module first subsets the target message , the second accumulator value With the second digital signature The second data packet is assembled according to the predefined JSON message template, in which the field names "messages", "accumulator_value" and "signature" correspond to , and appends a version number, gateway identifier, and timestamp to the message header to support downstream anti-replay mechanisms. Once assembled, the module pushes the JSON packet to the preset remote data user address via the TLS encrypted channel configured during system initialization. During the delivery process, the output module confirms and retries the delivery result to ensure reliable delivery despite network fluctuations or temporary failures. If retries fail after the preset number of attempts, an error log is recorded and an alarm mechanism is triggered.

[0063] For further information, see Figure 5 , Figure 5 Schematic diagram of the structure of the data user terminal device of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention; it also includes a data user terminal device communicating with the gateway, and the data user terminal device is configured with: an accumulator verification unit for performing member consistency verification on the target message subset, the second accumulator value and the corresponding witness vector received from the gateway based on the accumulator public key; specifically, the accumulator verification unit first loads the accumulator public key distributed during the system initialization phase, that is, the public random matrix and modulus For the received target message subset , the module processes each message in turn Calling the hash function Generate ring vector , and calculate the intermediate vector . The verification unit then sets all Accumulate element by element and modulo Operation to get the aggregate value: ; and add it to the second accumulator value received If the two are not equal, the verification is considered to have failed. If the aggregate values ​​match, the module further checks each pair Verify the member witness relationship by checking Is it true to ensure that the proof vector With Message Only when the aggregate verification and all witness verifications pass, the accumulator verification unit forwards a pass signal to the signature verification unit, otherwise it directly outputs a rejection result and discards the data packet.

[0064] The signature verification unit is used to perform authenticity verification on the second digital signature based on the terminal public key; specifically, the signature verification unit first loads the terminal public key distributed during the system initialization phase. , and parse the target message subset from the received second data packet , the second accumulator value With the second digital signature The module uses the same pre-set hash function as the signature combination subunit. right and Calculate the challenge value after serialization splicing: and included in the signature Compare; if , then it is judged as verification failure and the data packet is discarded. If the two are consistent, the module further calls the grid signature verification algorithm based on the SIS assumption to verify and Perform integrity checks to ensure the proof vector With public key , accumulator value The mathematical relationship between the signatures is satisfied. Only when both the hash comparison and signature verification are passed does the signature verification unit output a pass signal; otherwise, it will be rejected immediately and an exception will be recorded.

[0065] The determination unit is configured to receive and store the target message subset only when both the member consistency verification and the authenticity verification are passed, and output a rejection result otherwise.

[0066] Specifically, the determination unit receives the member consistency verification result flag from the accumulator verification unit and the authenticity verification result flag from the signature verification unit If and only if and When the decision unit sets the target message subset The data packet and its related metadata (such as timestamp, version number and policy identifier) ​​are written into the local secure storage engine or pushed to the back-end database for subsequent business processing; otherwise, the judgment unit immediately generates a rejection response and notifies the upstream module through the output interface to discard the data packet, and records the rejection reason ("accumulator verification failed" or "signature verification failed") for audit tracking, thereby ensuring that only data that passes all security checks is accepted and stored by the system.

[0067] Example 2: Please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 Schematic diagram of the fragmentation processing module of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention; based on the technical solution of Example 1, this embodiment further includes a fragmentation processing module, which is configured to: perform weighted secret sharing splitting when a high-sensitivity field is detected in the original message set, and divide the field into two parts according to the threshold value. Split into The ciphertext is fragmented and sent to multiple similar data security gateways respectively; specifically, the fragment processing module receives the target message subset Then, the high-sensitivity field set Detect one by one: When the ciphertext corresponding to a certain field is found When it belongs to a high-sensitivity field, the module will Call the secret sharing algorithm to convert the ciphertext Split into Ciphertext fragments The module then measures the network distance to similar data security gateways in the surrounding area and selects the closest one. gateway, each shard and its corresponding distance weight are sent to the corresponding gateway.

[0068] When the gateway receives at least When the ciphertext fragments from the same field are received, the Chinese remainder theorem is used to reassemble the ciphertext fragments to recover the original plaintext of the field; specifically, when the fragment processing module receives at least Ciphertext fragments After that, the module first extracts the corresponding module bases of these fragments And verify that they are pairwise relatively prime, and then calculate the total modulus internally: ; and construct auxiliary values ​​for each shard in turn: ; Next, the module applies the standard Chinese remainder theorem to restructure the formula: ; The original plaintext of the field can be directly restored through the above process The process is completed entirely on the gateway without access to any private keys, and due to the selected module base , the original text can be accurately reconstructed. After the recovery is completed, the fragment processing module will convert the plaintext of this field It is merged with the remaining non-sensitive fields in the original order to form a new message object and passed to the accumulator update module to provide complete subset data for subsequent security aggregation and signature recalculation.

[0069] The recovered original plaintext together with the remaining target message subsets are provided to the accumulator update module for further processing.

[0070] Specifically, the fragment processing module recovers the plaintext of the high-sensitivity field After that, it will traverse the previously generated target message subset , locate the corresponding message object , and replace the original ciphertext field with plaintext in the object , while keeping other fields and their order unchanged; if there are multiple high-sensitivity fields, replace them one by one according to the index. After the replacement is completed, the module re-aggregates all messages into a new complete subset , and attach an index identifier and associated policy metadata to the subset, and finally pass it to the internal interface Pushed to the accumulator update module to perform recalculation and witness update of the second accumulator value based on the latest message set.

[0071] The embodiments of the present invention have achieved some positive results during the development or use process, and indeed have great advantages over the existing technology. The following content describes them in conjunction with data, charts, etc. from the experimental process.

[0072] like Figure 7 As shown, Figure 7This is a schematic diagram of the experimental results of Example 1 of the ubiquitous network data security gateway provided by the present invention. The present invention conducted performance tests on the four operations of key generation, signing, re-editing, and verification under different numbers of edit fields. The key generation time of the present invention remained at approximately 160ms, barely changing with the number of edit fields, verifying the efficiency of the one-time configuration of initialization parameters. Signing and verification times, on the other hand, increased nearly linearly with the number of fields to be processed: when the number of edit fields increased from 2 to 14, the signing time increased from approximately 380ms to 1800ms, and the verification time increased from approximately 350ms to 1750ms. This is primarily because the system requires an additional accumulator aggregation and signing or verification operation with each additional field. In contrast, the time curve for the second signing operation was always slightly lower than the signature curve, and the two showed the same increasing trend with the number of fields, indicating that the re-editing module only needs to perform a partial update of the subset witness, without having to redo all accumulator operations. Therefore, it has a significant efficiency advantage over traditional full re-signing. Through this experimental data, it can be seen that the present invention achieves predictable and controllable re-signature and verification performance while ensuring quantum security and editability, meeting the dual requirements of real-time performance and reliability in ubiquitous network scenarios.

[0073] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as first and second, etc., are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply the existence of any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article, or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or device. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or device comprising the element.

[0074] While embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations may be made to these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, and that the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A ubiquitous network data security gateway that is resistant to quantum attacks, characterized by: include: a communication interface module, configured to receive a first data packet from a terminal, the first data packet comprising at least an original message set, a first accumulator value, a first digital signature, and a witness set corresponding one-to-one to each message in the original message set; a verification module, configured to verify the authenticity of the first digital signature based on a pre-stored terminal public key, and perform membership consistency verification on the original message set, the witness set, and the first accumulator value based on an accumulator public key; and discard the first data packet and output a rejection result when any verification fails; A policy parsing module, configured to filter the fields of the original message set according to a preset editable policy to obtain a target message subset; an accumulator update module, configured to recalculate a second accumulator value based on the target message subset and update a corresponding witness set for each message in the target message subset; The second signature module is used to adopt a post-quantum secure digital signature algorithm based on lattice cryptography, and use the accumulator private key held by this gateway to generate a second digital signature for the content to be signed that at least includes the second accumulator value; the output module is used to generate a second data packet including the target message subset, the second accumulator value and the second digital signature, and send the second data packet to the data user.

2. The ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: The policy parsing module specifically includes: a policy acquisition unit, which is used to obtain an editable policy file from local storage or a remote management server; a syntax parsing unit, which is used to perform hierarchical JSON syntax parsing on the editable policy file to extract field identifiers, role identifiers and data retention period information; a role matching unit, which is used to generate a retained field list and a deleted field list based on the correspondence between the field identifiers and the role identifiers; a period monitoring unit, which is used to monitor the data retention period and automatically include the corresponding fields in the deleted field list when the period expires; a field screening unit, which is used to delete the fields corresponding to the deleted field list in the original message set, and assemble the remaining fields after the deletion into a target message subset in the original order, and send the target message subset to the accumulator update module.

3. The ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: The accumulator update module specifically includes: a hash mapping unit, used to map each message in the target message subset into a ring vector using a preset hash function; an accumulator calculation unit, used to perform modular multiplication and accumulation operations on a pre-stored public random matrix and all mapped ring vectors to generate the second accumulator value; and a witness update unit, used to deduct the ring vector corresponding to the deleted message from the witness vector of each message in the target message subset without calling the accumulator private key, to obtain an updated witness vector set.

4. The ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: The verification module uses a lattice signature algorithm based on the SIS assumption to verify the authenticity of the first digital signature, and the second signature module uses a lattice signature algorithm with the same SIS parameter set to generate the second digital signature, where the challenge value is obtained by a joint hash calculation of a random commitment vector and the second accumulator value.

5. The ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 4, characterized in that: The second signature module specifically includes: a sampling subunit, used to sample a temporary signature vector from a preset random distribution; a rejection sampling subunit, used to detect the infinite norm of the response value corresponding to the temporary signature vector, and trigger resampling if it exceeds a preset threshold until the norm constraint is met or the preset retry limit is reached; a signature combination subunit, used to jointly hash the response vector that ultimately passes the rejection sampling test with the second accumulator value to generate a challenge value, and output a second digital signature.

6. The ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: It also includes a data user-end device that communicates with this gateway, and the data user-end device is configured with: an accumulator verification unit, which is used to perform member consistency verification on the target message subset received from the gateway, the second accumulator value and the corresponding witness vector based on the accumulator public key; a signature verification unit, which is used to perform authenticity verification on the second digital signature based on the terminal public key; and a judgment unit, which is used to receive and store the target message subset only when both the member consistency verification and the authenticity verification are passed, otherwise output a rejection result.

7. The ubiquitous network data security gateway resistant to quantum attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that: The module also includes a fragmentation processing module, which is configured to: when it is detected that the original message set contains a high-sensitivity field, the corresponding ciphertext message is divided into two parts according to the threshold value. Split into Ciphertext fragments are sent to the nearest gateway. data units; assign different weights to each ciphertext fragment according to the distance between the source data unit of each fragment and the gateway; when a total of at least When two ciphertext fragments originate from the same field, the Chinese remainder theorem is used to reassemble the ciphertext fragments to restore the original plaintext of the field. After the restored original plaintext is combined with other target message subsets, the result is provided to the accumulator update module for further processing.

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