Simulation and detection method and system of hard light blinding attack

By controlling equipment and optical devices to simulate strong light blinding attacks and recording receiver status information, the problem of detecting strong light blinding attacks in quantum communication systems is solved, and the system's security and defense capabilities are improved.

CN120601975APending Publication Date: 2025-09-05中电信量子信息科技集团有限公司
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202510895653.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-06-30
Publication Date
2025-09-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

There are difficulties in simulating and detecting strong light blinding attacks in existing quantum communication systems. Attackers use strong light to make the receiving detector enter linear mode and steal key information without being detected.

Method used

A control device is used to control the test light source to generate the original optical signal. The optical signal intensity is adjusted through an adjustable optical attenuator. Combined with an optical beam splitter and an optical power meter, a strong light blinding attack is simulated. Receiver status information, such as bit error rate and detector count, is recorded to establish a mapping relationship between light intensity and status information.

Benefits of technology

It has achieved effective simulation and detection of strong light blinding attacks, improved the defense capability and security of the quantum communication system, and users can more clearly understand the performance of the system when facing attacks.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention provides a simulation and detection method and system for a hard light blinding attack, and relates to the technical field of quantum communication. The control device controls the test light source to generate the original light signal, then controls the variable optical attenuator to attenuate the original light signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain the test light signal, and controls the attack intensity by adjusting the attenuation value of the variable optical attenuator and adjusting the intensity of the test light signal to realize the simulation of the hard light blinding attack; and then, after the quantum system is attacked, state information, such as bit error rate, detector counting, detector light current and the like, of a quantum key distribution equipment receiver is automatically recorded, so that a user can more clearly understand the performance of the quantum system in the face of'hard light blinding attack ', the defense capability of the quantum communication system is improved, and the overall security is improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of quantum communication technology, and in particular to a method and system for simulating and detecting strong light blinding attacks. Background Art

[0002] Quantum communication is a technology that uses the principles of quantum mechanics (such as quantum entanglement and quantum state transmission) to achieve information transmission. Among them, the most prominent feature of quantum communication is its extremely high security, which can theoretically achieve "unconditionally secure" communication. Although quantum communication is very secure in theory, there may be vulnerabilities in the actual system that can be exploited by hackers to steal distributed key information. Among them, the "strong light blinding attack" is a security threat to quantum detectors. The attacker sends strong light to the quantum communication system, causing the detector at the receiving end (such as an avalanche photodiode) to enter "linear mode", thereby losing its normal quantum detection ability. In this state, the attacker can tamper with the signal without being detected and steal the key information.

[0003] Therefore, how to simulate and detect strong light blinding attacks in quantum communication systems is a problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to address the deficiencies in the above-mentioned prior art and provide a method and system for simulating and detecting strong light blinding attacks, so as to realize the simulation and detection of strong light blinding attacks in quantum communication systems, so that users can more clearly understand the performance of quantum systems when facing "strong light blinding attacks", thereby improving equipment design and enhancing overall security.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solutions adopted in the embodiments of the present application are as follows:

[0006] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for simulating and detecting a blinding attack caused by strong light, which is applied to a control device in a simulation and detection system. The system includes: a control device, a test light source, an adjustable optical attenuator, a first optical beam splitter, a second optical beam splitter, and an optical power meter; the method includes:

[0007] Controlling the test light source to generate an original optical signal, and controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to an initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal, combining the test optical signal with a normal optical signal emitted by a transmitter in the quantum communication system into one optical path by the first optical beam splitter, and splitting the one optical path into two optical paths by the second optical beam splitter and inputting the two optical paths into a receiver in the quantum communication system and the optical power meter, respectively;

[0008] The attenuation value is reduced according to a preset step size to obtain a current attenuation value, and a current attack optical signal is output to the receiver and the optical power meter according to the current attenuation value to determine whether the receiver senses that it is being attacked by the current attack optical signal. If so, the optical power meter collects the light intensity of the current attack optical signal output by the second optical beam splitter at the current attenuation value, obtains the current state information of the receiver, and establishes a mapping relationship between the light intensity of the current attack optical signal and the current state information. The mapping relationship is used to indicate the actual state of the receiver when it is attacked by the current attack optical signal.

[0009] Optionally, controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to an initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal includes:

[0010] A. controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to a preset attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal;

[0011] B. Determine whether the light intensity of the test optical signal is less than or equal to a preset threshold; if so, use the preset attenuation value as the initial attenuation value, and control the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal; if not, adjust the preset attenuation value to obtain a new preset attenuation value, and execute A again.

[0012] Optionally, determining whether the receiver senses an attack includes:

[0013] It is determined whether the receiver senses an attack according to the system alarm and the detector count of the receiver.

[0014] Optionally, determining whether the receiver senses an attack based on a system alarm and a detector count of the receiver includes:

[0015] If a system alarm exists in the receiver and the detector count is not 0, it is determined that the receiver senses an attack.

[0016] Optionally, after determining whether the receiver senses being attacked by the attack optical signal, the method further includes:

[0017] If the receiver does not have a system alarm and the current attenuation value is not 0, the attenuation value is continuously reduced according to the preset step size to obtain a new current attenuation value.

[0018] Optionally, controlling the test light source to emit an original light signal includes:

[0019] A test light generation instruction is generated and sent to the test light source to control the test light source to generate the original light signal according to the test light generation instruction. The original light signal includes: a continuous light signal or a pulse light signal.

[0020] Optionally, the status information of the receiver includes: operating status, bit error rate, detector count and detector photocurrent.

[0021] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present application further provides a simulation and detection system for a strong light blinding attack, the system comprising: a control device, a test light source, an adjustable optical attenuator, a first optical beam splitter, a second optical beam splitter, and an optical power meter;

[0022] The test light source is used to generate an original light signal;

[0023] The adjustable attenuator is used to attenuate the original optical signal;

[0024] The first optical beam splitter is used to combine the attenuated light output by the adjustable attenuator and the light emitted by the transmitter in the quantum communication system into one light path;

[0025] The second optical beam splitter is used to split the light beam and input the light beams into the receiver in the quantum communication system and the optical power meter respectively;

[0026] The optical power meter is used to collect the light intensity of the light output by the second optical beam splitter;

[0027] The control device is used to execute the method steps provided in the first aspect above.

[0028] Optionally, a splitting ratio between the first optical beam splitter and the second optical beam splitter is 1:1;

[0029] Optionally, the adjustable optical attenuator is used to attenuate the original optical signal according to the attenuation value sent by the control device.

[0030] The beneficial effects of this application are:

[0031] The present application provides a method and system for simulating and detecting a strong light blinding attack. In the present application, a control device is used to control a test light source to generate an original light signal, and then an adjustable optical attenuator is controlled to attenuate the original light signal according to an initial attenuation value to obtain a test light signal. When the test light signal is less than a set value, the attenuation value of the adjustable optical attenuator is continuously adjusted to continuously adjust the intensity of the test light signal based on the adjusted attenuation value to control the intensity of the attack and achieve a simulation of a strong light blinding attack. Then, after the quantum system is attacked, the status information of the quantum key distribution device receiver, such as the bit error rate, detector count, and detector photocurrent, is automatically recorded so that the user can more clearly understand the performance of the quantum system in the face of a "strong light blinding attack", thereby improving the defense capability of the quantum communication system and enhancing the overall security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0032] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. It should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate certain embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other relevant drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0033] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a system for simulating and detecting a blinding light attack provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0034] Figure 2 A flowchart of a method for simulating and detecting a blinding light attack provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0035] Figure 3 A flowchart of another method for simulating and detecting a blinding light attack provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0036] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the overall process of a method for simulating and detecting a blinding light attack provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0037] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a control device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0038] Icons: 1-control device; 2-test light source; 3-adjustable optical attenuator; 4-first optical beam splitter; 5-second optical beam splitter; 6-optical power meter. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the drawings in the present application only serve the purpose of illustration and description and are not used to limit the scope of protection of the present application. In addition, it should be understood that the schematic drawings are not drawn to scale. The flowcharts used in this application illustrate the operations implemented according to some embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the operations of the flowcharts can be implemented out of sequence, and steps without logical context can be reversed or implemented simultaneously. In addition, those skilled in the art, under the guidance of the contents of this application, can add one or more other operations to the flowchart, or remove one or more operations from the flowchart.

[0040] In addition, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all of the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application generally described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various configurations. Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the claimed application, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments of the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0041] It should be noted that the term "comprising" will be used in the embodiments of the present application to indicate the existence of the features declared thereafter, but does not exclude the addition of other features.

[0042] First, the professional terms involved in this application are explained.

[0043] 1. Quantum key distribution (QKD): In a quantum communication system, the transmitter and receiver of a quantum key distribution device generate symmetric keys by transmitting quantum states, which provides information-theoretic security at the theoretical protocol level.

[0044] 2. Strong light blinding attack is a security threat to quantum detectors. The attacker will send strong light to the quantum communication system, causing the detector at the receiving end (such as an avalanche photodiode) to enter "linear mode", thereby losing its normal quantum detection capability. In this state, the attacker can tamper with the signal without being discovered and steal key information.

[0045] Before describing the technical solution provided in this application in detail, the application scenarios of the simulation and detection method of strong light blinding attack involved in this application are briefly described.

[0046] refer to Figure 1As shown in FIG, it is a structural diagram of the simulation and detection system of the strong light blinding attack provided by the embodiment of the present application; Figure 1 As shown, the system includes: a control device 1 , a test light source 2 , an adjustable optical attenuator 3 , a first optical beam splitter 4 , a second optical beam splitter 5 and an optical power meter 6 .

[0047] For example, the control device 1 may be a host computer having data processing, display and control functions.

[0048] The test light source is used to generate an original light signal; for example, the original light signal can be continuous light or pulsed light. Specifically, the control device 1 can send a test light generation instruction to the test light source 2. Based on the received test light instruction, the test light source 2 actively generates a strong light signal to simulate a real attack scenario.

[0049] The adjustable attenuator is used to attenuate the original optical signal. This means that by continuously adjusting the attenuation value of the adjustable attenuator, the original optical signal is attenuated to varying degrees based on the adjusted attenuation value, resulting in test optical signals with varying intensities. Therefore, in this application, the adjustable attenuator is used to increase or decrease the intensity of the test optical signal, thereby adjusting the intensity of the attack.

[0050] The first optical beam splitter is used to combine the test light output by the adjustable attenuator and the normal optical signal emitted by the transmitter in the quantum communication system into one light path; that is, the first optical beam splitter can be used to mix the normal optical signal emitted by the transmitter in the quantum communication system and the test light output by the adjustable attenuator into one light path.

[0051] The second optical beam splitter is used to split one light beam and input it into a receiver and an optical power meter in the quantum communication system respectively; that is, the second optical beam splitter is used to split the mixed light beam into two light beams, and input them into the receiver and the optical power meter respectively.

[0052] The optical power meter is used to collect the intensity of the attack light output by the second optical beam splitter, that is, the optical power meter is used to monitor the intensity of the attack light input to the receiver.

[0053] The control device is used to execute the steps of the simulation and detection method for strong light blinding attacks provided in the following embodiments. Therefore, the simulation and detection system for strong light blinding attacks provided by this application can simulate strong light blinding attacks in quantum communication systems and automatically record the status information of the quantum key distribution device receiver after the quantum system is attacked, such as bit error rate, detector count, detector photocurrent, etc., so that users can more clearly understand the performance of the quantum system when facing a "strong light blinding attack", thereby improving the defense capability of the quantum communication system and enhancing the overall security.

[0054] Optionally, a splitting ratio between the first optical beam splitter and the second optical beam splitter is 1:1.

[0055] In one achievable method, the splitting ratios of the first and second optical beam splitters are known, for example, a 1:1 splitting ratio, meaning the light entering the optical power meter and the light entering the QKD device receiver are both identical in intensity. At the same time, the light intensity at the QKD device transmitter's output is a set value. Therefore, based on the light intensity collected by the optical power meter, the splitting ratios of the first and second optical beam splitters, and the light intensity at the QKD device transmitter's output, the intensity of the attenuated test optical signal entering the first optical beam splitter, i.e., the intensity of the attacking light source, can be determined. Therefore, an optical power meter can be used to monitor the intensity of the light entering the QKD device receiver in real time.

[0056] Optionally, the adjustable optical attenuator is used to attenuate the original optical signal according to the attenuation value sent by the control device.

[0057] Exemplarily, the attenuation value sent by the control device is A, and the adjustable optical attenuator attenuates the original optical signal based on the attenuation value A to obtain an attenuated optical signal, ie, a test optical signal.

[0058] Optionally, the simulation and detection method of the strong light blinding attack involved in this application will be specifically introduced through the following examples.

[0059] Optionally, refer to Figure 2 As shown, this method is applied to the above Figure 1 The control device in the embodiment of the present invention comprises:

[0060] S201. Control a test light source to generate an original optical signal, and control an adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to an initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal. A first optical beam splitter combines the test optical signal with a normal optical signal emitted by a transmitter in a quantum communication system into one optical path. A second optical beam splitter splits the optical path into two beams and inputs the two beams into a receiver and an optical power meter in the quantum communication system, respectively.

[0061] Among them, the transmitter is the QKD device transmitter in the quantum communication system. It is one of the core components of the entire quantum communication system. It is mainly responsible for preparing and sending photon signals carrying quantum information. It is the first step to achieve secure communication in the QKD protocol. Its performance directly affects the security and efficiency of key generation.

[0062] The receiver is the QKD device receiver of the quantum communication system and is one of the core components of the entire quantum communication system. It is mainly responsible for receiving, detecting and decoding the quantum signals sent by the sender (Alice), and converting these signals into classical information to generate shared keys.

[0063] In one feasible manner, a control device controls a test light source signal to emit an original optical signal, which may be a continuous optical signal or a pulsed optical signal. The control device then controls an adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to an initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal, such as when the initial attenuation value is A and the intensity of the test optical signal obtained at this time is less than or equal to -60 dBm. Then, a first optical beam splitter combines the test optical signal and a normal optical signal emitted by a transmitter in a quantum communication system into one optical path, and a second optical beam splitter splits the one optical path into two optical paths, namely, a first optical signal and a second optical signal. The first optical signal is input into a receiver in the quantum communication system, and the second optical signal is input into an optical power meter.

[0064] S202. Reduce the attenuation value according to a preset step size to obtain a current attenuation value, and output an attack optical signal to the receiver and the optical power meter according to the current attenuation value to determine whether the receiver senses that it is being attacked by the attack optical signal. If so, collect the light intensity of the current attack optical signal output by the second optical beam splitter at the current attenuation value through the optical power meter, obtain the current state information of the receiver, and establish a mapping relationship between the light intensity of the current attack optical signal and the current state information.

[0065] The mapping relationship is used to indicate the actual state of the receiver when it is attacked by the current attack optical signal.

[0066] Exemplarily, the preset step size may be 2, 4, 5, 10, etc.

[0067] In one feasible method, the attenuation value can be gradually reduced using a preset step size to obtain a current attenuation value, such as A3, and the original optical signal is attenuated according to the current attenuation value to obtain a current test optical signal. That is, by continuously adjusting the intensity of the test optical signal, the intensity of the attack can be controlled to achieve a simulation of blinding caused by a strong attack; the normal optical signal emitted by the transmitter and the current test optical signal are input into the first optical beam splitter, the first optical beam splitter combines the normal optical signal and the current test optical signal into one light path, and the second optical beam splitter splits the combined light path into two beam paths and inputs them into the receiver respectively. And the optical power meter, that is, the optical signal input to the receiver and the optical power meter is the current attack optical signal; then, it is determined whether the receiver senses that it is attacked by the current attack optical signal. If so, the optical power meter is used to collect the light intensity of the current attack optical signal, and read and display the operating status, bit error rate, photocurrent and other operating parameters of the receiver, and establish a mapping relationship between the light intensity of the current attack optical signal and the status information of the receiver, so that users can more clearly understand the performance of the quantum system when facing the "strong light blinding attack", thereby improving the defense capability of the quantum communication system and enhancing the overall security.

[0068] In summary, the embodiments of the present application provide a method for simulating and detecting strong light blinding attacks. In the present application, a control device is used to control a test light source to generate an original light signal, and then the adjustable optical attenuator is controlled to attenuate the original light signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain a test light signal. When the test light signal is less than the set value, the attenuation value of the adjustable optical attenuator is continuously adjusted to continuously adjust the intensity of the test light signal based on the adjusted attenuation value to control the intensity of the attack and realize the simulation of blinding caused by a strong attack; then, after the quantum system is attacked, the status information of the receiver of the quantum key distribution device is automatically recorded, such as the bit error rate, detector count, detector photocurrent, etc., so that the user can more clearly understand the performance of the quantum system in the face of a "strong light blinding attack", thereby improving the defense capability of the quantum communication system and enhancing the overall security.

[0069] Optionally, refer to Figure 3 As shown, in the above step S202, controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain the test optical signal includes:

[0070] S301: Control an adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate an original optical signal according to a preset attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal.

[0071] Exemplarily, the preset attenuation value may be A0, that is, after receiving the original optical signal emitted by the test light source, the original optical signal is attenuated based on the preset attenuation value to obtain the test optical signal.

[0072] S302: Determine whether the light intensity of the test light signal is less than or equal to a preset threshold.

[0073] Exemplarily, the preset threshold is ≤-60dBm.

[0074] S303: If yes, use the preset attenuation value as the initial attenuation value, and control the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal.

[0075] In one feasible method, it is determined whether the intensity of the test optical signal is less than or equal to -60dBm. If so, the control device controls the adjustable optical attenuator to increase the intensity of the output test optical signal. Before the attenuation value drops to 0, it is checked whether the system reports an abnormality. If no abnormality is reported, a test report is output.

[0076] S304: If not, adjust the preset attenuation value to obtain a new preset attenuation value, and re-execute step S301.

[0077] In another feasible method, if the light intensity of the test optical signal is greater than -60dBm, the preset attenuation value A0 is continuously adjusted until the original optical signal is attenuated based on the new preset attenuation value and the light intensity of the test optical signal is less than or equal to -60dBm, then the adjustment of the preset attenuation value is suspended, and the adjusted new preset attenuation value is used as the final new attenuation value.

[0078] Optionally, determining whether the receiver senses an attack includes:

[0079] The receiver determines whether it has detected an attack based on the receiver's system alarms and detector counts.

[0080] Among them, if the system alarms, it means that the current operating status of the system is abnormal.

[0081] Detector count refers to the number of detection responses from a single photon detector (SPD) in the receiver. These photons are typically sent by the sender (Alice) through a quantum channel and measured by the receiver (Bob) using a detector.

[0082] Among them, if the detector count is 0, it means that the receiver has not detected the photon; if the detector count is not 0, it means that the receiver has detected the photon. For example, in a certain quantum communication, the transmitter sent a total of 1,000 light pulses, and the receiver's detector count was 100 (90 of which were correctly measured and 10 were incorrectly measured). That is, the detector count is the statistical result of photon events in unit time.

[0083] Optionally, in this embodiment, the two pieces of information, system alarm and detector count of the receiver, may be combined to comprehensively determine whether the receiver senses an attack.

[0084] Optionally, determining whether the receiver senses an attack based on a system alarm and a detector count of the receiver includes:

[0085] If the receiver has a system alarm and the detector count is not 0, it is determined that the receiver has sensed an attack.

[0086] In one achievable manner, if the receiver has a system alarm and the detector count is not 0, that is, the detector has not been "blinded by strong light" and has issued an alarm, it can be determined that the receiver has sensed an attack.

[0087] Optionally, after determining whether the receiver senses being attacked by the attack optical signal, the method further includes:

[0088] If the receiver does not have a system alarm and the current attenuation value is not 0, the attenuation value is further reduced according to the preset step size to obtain a new current attenuation value.

[0089] In another feasible method, if there is no system alarm in the receiver and the current attenuation value is not 0, it means that the intensity of the current test optical signal has not caused a strong light blinding attack on the receiver, and the intensity of the current test optical signal needs to be increased, that is, the attenuation value is continued to be reduced according to the preset step size to obtain a new current attenuation value, and based on the new current attenuation value, the light intensity of the output test optical signal is increased.

[0090] Optionally, controlling the test light source to emit an original light signal includes:

[0091] A test light generation instruction is generated and sent to the test light source to control the test light source to generate the original light signal according to the test light generation instruction. The original light signal includes: a continuous light signal or a pulse light signal.

[0092] A continuous light signal is one in which the light source emits light continuously, with the intensity remaining stable over time. A pulsed light signal is one in which the light source emits brief light signals at specific intervals. Therefore, depending on the application scenario, the test light source's driver circuit or internal parameters can be adjusted to switch between different emission modes, emitting either continuous or pulsed light signals, thereby simulating continuous and pulsed light blinding attacks.

[0093] In one feasible manner, the control device sends a test light generation instruction to the test light source, and controls the test light source to generate an original light signal according to the test light generation instruction, wherein the test light generation instruction includes: a light emission mode (continuous light or pulsed light) and related parameters (such as light intensity, frequency, etc.).

[0094] For example, the current lighting mode of the test light source is in the continuous light mode, and the control device may switch the current lighting mode of the test light source to the pulse light mode, and set the pulse frequency to 1 kHz.

[0095] Optionally, the status information of the receiver includes: operating status, bit error rate, detector count and detector photocurrent.

[0096] Among them, the receiver's operating status, bit error rate data, detector count and detector photocurrent are important indicators for measuring equipment performance and communication quality.

[0097] The operating status of the receiver reflects the receiver's ability and stability to detect photon signals in the quantum channel; the bit error rate refers to the probability that the quantum state measured by the receiver is inconsistent with the quantum state actually sent by the sender.

[0098] A detector count refers to the number of light pulses received by a detector per unit time. A detector photocurrent refers to the electrical current generated when a photon is absorbed by a detector in a receiver. It is a key indicator of whether the detector has successfully detected the photon. If the avalanche detector in a receiver receives strong light, its internal photocurrent increases rapidly. This strong light can cause the detector's avalanche multiplication effect to fail, degrading the detector from Geiger mode to linear mode, thereby blinding the receiver.

[0099] Optionally, refer to Figure 4 As shown in FIG, it is a schematic diagram of the overall process of the simulation and detection method of the strong light blinding attack provided in the embodiment of the present application, as shown in FIG. Figure 4 As shown, the method includes:

[0100] Step 1: Start the strong light blinding attack detection. The control device will automatically connect to the device under test, the test light source, the variable optical attenuator, and the optical power meter.

[0101] The devices under test include: QKD device transmitter and QKD device receiver.

[0102] Among them, reference Figure 1 As shown, the control device is communicatively connected with the QKD device transmitter, QKD device receiver, test light source, adjustable optical attenuator and optical power meter, that is, the control device can send control instructions to the QKD device transmitter, QKD device receiver, test light source, adjustable optical attenuator and optical power meter, and can also receive collected data sent by the QKD device transmitter, QKD device receiver, test light source, adjustable optical attenuator and optical power meter.

[0103] Step 2: Use the control device to control the test light source to generate the original optical signal.

[0104] The original optical signal may be continuous light or pulsed light, that is, the light emission mode of the test light source may be switched according to the actual application scenario.

[0105] Step 3: Control the variable optical attenuator through the control device to increase or decrease the intensity of the output test optical signal.

[0106] Among them, the adjustable optical attenuator can be used to increase or decrease the light intensity of the test optical signal, adjust the attack strength on the receiver, and simulate the strong light blinding attack.

[0107] Step 4: Use an optical power meter to collect the light intensity after passing through the adjustable optical attenuator in real time and feed the light intensity value back to the control device. The control device determines whether the light intensity value is not greater than the set value.

[0108] For example, whether the light intensity value is ≤-60dBm, if >-60dBm, proceed to step 3; if ≤-60dBm, proceed to step 5;

[0109] Among them, the light intensity of the test light signal can be monitored in real time through an optical power meter until the light intensity of the test light signal meets the preset light intensity value, and then the simulation and detection of the strong light blinding attack can be started.

[0110] Step 5: Use the control device to control the variable optical attenuator to increase the intensity of the output test optical signal. Before the attenuation value drops to 0, check whether the receiver has a system alarm. If not, output a test report. If so, proceed to step 6.

[0111] Step 6: Obtain the detector count through the control device and determine whether the detector count is 0. If it is 0, output the test report; if not, proceed to step 7;

[0112] Step 7: Use the optical power meter to collect the intensity of the current attack optical signal and report it to the detector for counting, then proceed to step 8;

[0113] The splitting ratios of the first and second optical beam splitters are known, for example, a 50:50 splitting ratio, and the light intensity at the QKD device transmitter's exit is a set value. Therefore, based on the light intensity collected by the optical power meter, the splitting ratios of the first and second optical beam splitters, and the light intensity at the QKD device transmitter's exit, the intensity of the attenuated test optical signal entering the first optical beam splitter, i.e., the intensity of the attacking light source, can be determined.

[0114] Step 8: Collect the operating status, bit error rate, detector count, detector photocurrent, etc. of the QKD device receiver through the control device;

[0115] Step 9: The control device establishes a mapping relationship between the intensity of the current attack optical signal and the current state information, and outputs a test report.

[0116] The test report records multiple attack optical signals and status information of receivers corresponding to the attack optical signals, and the light intensities of the attack optical signals are different from each other.

[0117] Figure 5 A structural diagram of a control device provided in an embodiment of the present application, which may be deployed on a computing device with data processing capabilities.

[0118] The control device includes: a processor 501 and a memory 502 .

[0119] The memory 502 is used to store programs, and the processor 501 calls the programs stored in the memory 502 to execute the above method embodiment. The specific implementation method and technical effects are similar and will not be repeated here.

[0120] Optionally, the present invention further provides a program product, such as a computer-readable storage medium, comprising a program, which is used to perform the above method embodiment when executed by a processor.

[0121] In the several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of the units is merely a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0122] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0123] In addition, the functional units in various embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into a single processing unit, each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a single unit. The aforementioned integrated units may be implemented in the form of hardware or hardware plus software functional units.

[0124] The above-mentioned integrated unit implemented in the form of a software functional unit can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The above-mentioned software functional unit is stored in a storage medium and includes a number of instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) or a processor (English: processor) to perform some steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (English: Read-Only Memory, abbreviated: ROM), a random access memory (English: Random Access Memory, abbreviated: RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and other media that can store program code.

Claims

1. A method for simulating and detecting a strong light blinding attack, characterized in that: A control device used in an attack simulation and detection system, the system comprising: a control device, a test light source, an adjustable optical attenuator, a first optical beam splitter, a second optical beam splitter, and an optical power meter; the method comprising: Controlling the test light source to generate an original optical signal, and controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to an initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal, combining the test optical signal with a normal optical signal emitted by a transmitter in the quantum communication system into one optical path by the first optical beam splitter, and splitting the one optical path into two optical paths by the second optical beam splitter and inputting the two optical paths into a receiver in the quantum communication system and the optical power meter, respectively; The attenuation value is reduced according to a preset step size to obtain a current attenuation value, and a current attack optical signal is output to the receiver and the optical power meter according to the current attenuation value to determine whether the receiver senses that it is being attacked by the current attack optical signal. If so, the optical power meter collects the light intensity of the current attack optical signal output by the second optical beam splitter at the current attenuation value, obtains the current state information of the receiver, and establishes a mapping relationship between the light intensity of the current attack optical signal and the current state information. The mapping relationship is used to indicate the actual state of the receiver when it is attacked by the current attack optical signal.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal includes: A. controlling the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to a preset attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal; B. Determine whether the light intensity of the test optical signal is less than or equal to a preset threshold; if so, use the preset attenuation value as the initial attenuation value, and control the adjustable optical attenuator to attenuate the original optical signal according to the initial attenuation value to obtain a test optical signal; if not, adjust the preset attenuation value to obtain a new preset attenuation value, and execute A again.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The determining whether the receiver senses an attack includes: It is determined whether the receiver senses an attack according to the system alarm and the detector count of the receiver.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The determining, based on the system alarm and the detector count of the receiver, whether the receiver senses an attack includes: If a system alarm exists in the receiver and the detector count is not 0, it is determined that the receiver senses an attack.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein After determining whether the receiver senses being attacked by the attack optical signal, the method further includes: If the receiver does not have a system alarm and the current attenuation value is not 0, the attenuation value is continuously reduced according to the preset step size to obtain a new current attenuation value.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein The controlling the test light source to emit the original light signal comprises: A test light generation instruction is generated and sent to the test light source to control the test light source to generate the original light signal according to the test light generation instruction. The original light signal includes: a continuous light signal or a pulse light signal.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The status information of the receiver includes: operating status, bit error rate, detector count and detector photocurrent.

8. A simulation and detection system for strong light blinding attack, characterized in that: The system includes: a control device, a test light source, an adjustable optical attenuator, a first optical beam splitter, a second optical beam splitter, and an optical power meter; The test light source is used to generate an original light signal; The adjustable attenuator is used to attenuate the original optical signal; The first optical beam splitter is used to combine the attenuated light output by the adjustable attenuator and the light emitted by the transmitter in the quantum communication system into one light path; The second optical beam splitter is used to split the light beam and input the light beams into the receiver in the quantum communication system and the optical power meter respectively; The optical power meter is used to collect the light intensity of the light output by the second optical beam splitter; The control device is used to execute the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

9. The system according to claim 8, characterized in that The splitting ratio between the first optical beam splitter and the second optical beam splitter is 1:

1.

10. The system according to claim 9, characterized in that The adjustable optical attenuator is used to attenuate the original optical signal according to the attenuation value sent by the control device.

Citation Information

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