Cross-domain access method and system for decentralized control system, computer equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention provides a cross-domain access method and system for a decentralized control system, computer equipment and a storage medium, and belongs to the technical field of cross-domain access control. The method comprises the steps of dividing security domains of a unit plant and a public system; determining a security domain to which the cross-domain access service belongs and control node information; constructing a mapping relation between the alias points and the data source points and a privilege point list; registering cross-domain access service node information at the control node; creating a virtual data node in a security domain where the alias point is located so as to bind a real-time synchronization channel of the data source point; under the condition that a control node initiates a cross-domain request, a requester security domain identifier and a data point unique ID are added and sent to a cross-domain service node; and under the condition that the cross-domain service node verifies that the request security domain is valid, stripping the security domain identifier and executing the target operation. The problem of mutual operation between units caused by configuration errors is avoided, the stability and safety of the operation units are improved, and then the continuity of power plant production is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of cross-domain access control, and in particular relates to a distributed control system cross-domain access method, system, computer equipment and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] In an efficient power plant operation system, sharing power auxiliary facilities across multiple units is a key measure for improving energy efficiency. While the units have the foundation for physical interconnection, data isolation is essential to ensure safe and stable production and prevent interference between units. Distributed control system cross-domain access technology enables data exchange between units and the utility system, while maintaining strict data isolation, enabling dynamic resource allocation and collaborative control. This technology allows units to flexibly access utility resources based on actual needs, optimizing production processes and significantly improving the overall energy efficiency and production performance of the power plant. This is crucial for achieving efficient and stable power plant operation.

[0003] Currently, mainstream technology implements cross-domain data access configuration by dividing power plant units and utility systems into independent data domains. Implementation involves establishing logical connections between different data domains based on data transmission protocols. Data point mappings are defined to plan data transmission paths and interaction rules. When establishing a cross-domain access link, both the access subject (the unit or system initiating the data request) and the access object (the data domain where the target data resides) must be determined. Through bidirectional data point configuration, a corresponding relationship for data interaction is established, enabling cross-domain data transmission and control.

[0004] In existing cross-domain access methods, both parties involved in cross-domain access need to perform configuration modification, which is a core step. Since the configuration modifications of both the subject and the object are interrelated, the modification process is subject to multiple factors, and the configuration methods of each data domain are highly coupled. Once the configuration parameters of a data domain change, it is very easy to cause configuration conflicts in other related data domains. At the same time, in terms of data domain isolation mechanisms, there is a lack of effective technical protection measures, and it is impossible to eliminate the problem of mutual operation between units caused by configuration errors from a technical level. Especially when upgrading and renovating a single unit, this mutual operation may cause abnormal fluctuations in the parameters of the operating unit, seriously threatening the stability and safety of the operating unit, and greatly affecting the continuity of power plant production. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present invention provides a distributed control system cross-domain access method, system, computer equipment and storage medium to solve the problem of mutual operation between units caused by configuration errors in the prior art.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for cross-domain access of a distributed control system, comprising: Divide the safety zones of unit units and public systems; Determine the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs; Construct the mapping relationship between alias points and data source points and the privileged point list; Register cross-domain access service node information on the control node; Create a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point; When the control node initiates a cross-domain request, it adds the requesting party's security domain identifier and the data point's unique ID and sends it to the cross-domain service node; When the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid, it strips off the security domain identifier and performs the target operation; Among them, when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, the control node is allowed to perform cross-domain write operations; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, the cross-domain request in the debugging phase is directly forwarded to the data source point.

[0007] Optionally, the step of creating a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point includes: Parse the alias point configuration file, extract the unique identifier, data type and mapped data source point information of each alias point, create a corresponding virtual data node in the target security domain, and establish a real-time data synchronization channel with the data source point.

[0008] Optionally, when the control node initiates a cross-domain request, adding the requesting party security domain identifier and the data point unique ID and sending the request to the cross-domain service node includes: When the control node initiates a cross-domain request, it generates a request instruction for the local alias point, along with the operation type and permission identifier; After receiving the request, the cross-domain access server converts the operation on the alias point into the corresponding operation on the actual data source point according to the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point; After the target data source point responds, the acquired data is format-adapted and then returned to the control node through the alias point.

[0009] Optionally, when the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid, stripping the security domain identifier and performing the target operation includes: If the permission type in the request data packet is write and the initiator control node has passed the basic identity authentication, the request is directly allowed to enter the subsequent processing flow and the data write operation will be executed according to the instruction; When the permission type is read but a write operation is actually initiated, the privilege point matching mechanism is triggered to retrieve the target data point from the privilege point configuration file read; If the target data point exists in the privileged point list, the write operation is allowed to continue; If the target data point does not exist in the privileged point list, the request is directly blocked, an error message is sent to the initiator, and the operation log is recorded.

[0010] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a distributed control system cross-domain access system, comprising: Partition module, used to divide the security domains of unit units and public systems; A determination module, used to determine the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs; A construction module is used to construct a mapping relationship between alias points and data source points and a privileged point list; A registration module is used to register cross-domain access service node information in the control node; The binding module is used to create a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point; An adding module is used to add the requesting party security domain identifier and the data point unique ID when the control node initiates a cross-domain request, and send them to the cross-domain service node; A stripping module, used to strip the security domain identifier and perform the target operation when the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid; Among them, when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, the control node is allowed to perform cross-domain write operations; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, the cross-domain request in the debugging phase is directly forwarded to the data source point.

[0011] Optionally, the binding module includes: The channel establishment unit is used to parse the alias point configuration file, extract the unique identifier, data type and mapping data source point information of each alias point, create a corresponding virtual data node in the target security domain, and establish a real-time data synchronization channel with the data source point.

[0012] Optionally, the adding module includes: A generating unit, configured to generate a request instruction for a local alias point when a control node initiates a cross-domain request, and to attach an operation type and an authority identifier; a conversion unit configured to convert an operation on the alias point into a corresponding operation on the actual data source point according to a mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point after the cross-domain access server receives the request; The format adaptation unit is used to adapt the format of the acquired data after the target data source point responds, and then return it to the control node through the alias point.

[0013] Optionally, the stripping module includes: The first writing unit is configured to directly allow the request to enter a subsequent processing flow and execute a data writing operation according to the instruction if the permission type in the request data packet is write and the initiator control node has passed the basic identity authentication; A retrieval unit is used to trigger a privilege point matching mechanism and retrieve a target data point from a read privilege point configuration file when the permission type is read but a write operation is actually initiated; a second writing unit, configured to allow the write operation to continue if the target data point exists in the privileged point list; The request blocking unit is used to directly block the request when the target data point does not exist in the privileged point list, send an error prompt to the initiator, and record the operation log.

[0014] In a third aspect, the present invention provides a computer device comprising a processor and a memory; wherein, when the processor executes a computer program stored in the memory, the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method described in the first aspect are implemented.

[0015] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program; when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method described in the first aspect are implemented.

[0016] The present invention provides a distributed control system cross-domain access method, system, computer equipment and storage medium, wherein the method includes dividing the security domain of the unit unit and the public system; determining the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs; constructing a mapping relationship between an alias point and a data source point and a privileged point list; registering the cross-domain access service node information at the control node; creating a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point; when the control node initiates a cross-domain request, adding the requester security domain identifier and the data point unique ID, and sending it to the cross-domain service node; when the cross-domain service node verifies that the request security domain is valid, stripping the security domain identifier and executing the target operation; when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, allowing the control node to perform a cross-domain write operation; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, directly forwarding the cross-domain request in the debugging phase to the data source point. The present invention adopts the above scheme to avoid the problem of mutual operation between units caused by configuration errors from a technical level, improve the stability and safety of the operating unit, and thus improve the continuity of power plant production. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0017] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solution of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are merely embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0018] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a cross-domain access method for a distributed control system provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the workflow of the data point registration module provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the workflow of the cross-domain forwarding communication management module provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the workflow of the alias forwarding communication management module provided in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 A schematic structural diagram of a cross-domain access system of a distributed control system provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] The following will provide a clear and complete description of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. All other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field based on the embodiments of the present invention without making any creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0020] Example 1 like Figure 1 As shown, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for cross-domain access of a distributed control system, including: Step 101: Divide the security domains of the unit units and the public system.

[0021] Step 102: Determine the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs.

[0022] Step 103: Construct a mapping relationship between alias points and data source points and a privileged point list.

[0023] Step 104: Register the cross-domain access service node information in the control node.

[0024] Step 105: Create a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point.

[0025] Step 106: When the control node initiates a cross-domain request, the security domain identifier of the requesting party and the unique ID of the data point are added and sent to the cross-domain service node.

[0026] Step 107: When the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid, it strips off the security domain identifier and executes the target operation.

[0027] Among them, when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, the control node is allowed to perform cross-domain write operations; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, the cross-domain request in the debugging phase is directly forwarded to the data source point.

[0028] In steps 101-103, if Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, cross-domain access in a distributed control system is achieved through a cross-domain access service, which is deployed on the host computer. The control nodes of unit 1, the public system, and unit 2 can all achieve cross-domain access through cross-domain access services 1 and 2.

[0029] The unit domains, public system domains, and cross-domain access services in the above deployment diagram can be increased. That is, the implementation method of this embodiment supports multiple units, multiple public systems, and multiple cross-domain access services.

[0030] In a thermal power plant's distributed control system, control nodes include controllers and host computers. Controllers are deployed within various security domains, such as boiler and turbine controllers within the unit safety domain, and ash handling and desulfurization controllers within the utility system safety domain. They are responsible for real-time data acquisition, equipment status monitoring, and closed-loop control. Based on preset control logic, each controller adjusts equipment with millisecond-level response speeds to ensure stable production processes. The host computer, located at the system management level and connected to each controller via a high-speed communication network, not only provides a visual interface for operations and maintenance personnel, enabling centralized monitoring of production parameters, alarm processing, and historical data query, but also handles global system scheduling and optimization.

[0031] By reading the security domain and control node configuration files of the distributed control system, the security domain to which the cross-domain access service belongs and the control nodes within the security domain are clearly defined. The configuration file specifies which security domains the cross-domain access server can access, as well as which controllers and host nodes are within each security domain.

[0032] Security domains are divided according to unit groups, and public systems are divided into security domains based on their business scope, which is different from unit groups.

[0033] The division of security domains adheres to the principles of functional independence and risk isolation: With a single generator set as the core, the core equipment that makes up a unit, such as the boiler, steam turbine, and generator, and their control systems, are integrated into independent security domains. Each unit security domain features a complete data processing and control closed loop. Data exchange between units is strictly limited to the domain boundaries, preventing interference with operating parameters and control command conflicts from the underlying architecture.

[0034] The public system divides security domains based on business functions. For example, different business types, such as ash removal, desulfurization, and denitrification, are divided into independent security domains. This division allows each business module of the public system to operate independently, ensuring professionalism and stability, while also enabling cross-domain data exchange with specific unit security domains when needed. When a unit needs to access common system resources, the cross-domain access server accurately identifies the request source and target security domain, enabling secure and efficient data exchange based on pre-set access policies and security rules. This division also reduces the complexity of data management and permission control within security domains, enhancing the overall security and maintainability of the system.

[0035] In step 104, the cross-domain access server and the alias point are registered with the distributed control system node through the data point registration module.

[0036] As the basic supporting unit for the distributed control system to achieve cross-domain access and data mapping, the data point registration module undertakes the two core functions of cross-domain access server registration and alias point registration, ensuring the accuracy and efficiency of system data interaction. The data point registration module is used to register two aspects of content in the control node: First, it is used to register the cross-domain access service node registration information of the control node in the security domain so that the control node can clearly request the destination when performing cross-domain access.

[0037] The cross-domain access service node registration information includes all security domains to which the service node belongs.

[0038] When cross-domain access service nodes belonging to different security domains are deployed on multiple host computers in a multi-unit unit, multiple cross-domain access service registration information exists on the control node. In this case, the control node guides the control node to which cross-domain access service node to initiate a request based on the different security domains to which the cross-domain access service nodes belong.

[0039] The second is to register the corresponding alias point in the domain where the alias point is located.

[0040] The domain where the alias point is located is different from the domain where the data source point is located. The alias point of a single unit can be a combination of data points from any other security domain.

[0041] In terms of cross-domain access server registration, the data point registration module establishes a unified cross-domain service addressing mechanism for control nodes within the security domain. The data point registration module of the cross-domain access server in the host computer of the multi-unit unit automatically obtains its IP address, port number, service protocol and other key information, and stores this information in the form of a service registration list in the registration list of each control node. When a control node initiates a cross-domain access request, it can directly retrieve the target server address from the registration list without the need for complex network addressing, significantly improving the response speed of cross-domain requests. For example, when the controller of unit A needs to access the thermal parameters of the public system B, it can quickly locate the cross-domain access server deployed between the two through registration information to achieve data interaction.

[0042] In terms of the alias point registration function, the data point registration module performs registration operations within the security domain where the alias point is located based on the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point generated by the service configuration module. The specific process is as follows: the module parses the alias point configuration file, extracts the unique identifier, data type and mapping data source point information of each alias point, creates a corresponding virtual data node in the target domain, and establishes a real-time data synchronization channel with the data source point. For example, when the "main steam pressure monitoring point" in domain A needs to establish an alias point in domain B, the registration module will generate a virtual node in domain B and continuously synchronize the actual data of domain A to ensure that the control node in domain B can achieve secure access to cross-domain data through the local alias point while maintaining the security of data isolation.

[0043] In steps 105-107, cross-domain access to the controller is achieved by using a publish-subscribe model through a cross-domain forwarding communication management module.

[0044] The cross-domain forwarding communication management module is used to process the cross-domain access request of the controller and adopts the publish-subscribe mode.

[0045] like Figure 3 As shown, when a controller needs to reference data point information in other controllers and the controller in the current security domain cannot make the request, it sends a cross-domain access request to the corresponding cross-domain access server based on the registered cross-domain access server.

[0046] The cross-domain access request data packet initiated by the controller covers the basic information of the requested controller, including IP address, port number, service protocol, security domain where the controller is located, etc., so that the cross-domain access service node can clearly request the controller information.

[0047] The proxy forwarding communication management module in the cross-domain access service determines the validity of the request based on the security domain where the controller in the request data packet is located. When the cross-domain access server can directly access the security domain where the request data packet is located, the request is valid, otherwise the request is invalid.

[0048] If the request is valid, after receiving the access request from the controller, the cross-domain access server performs operations such as subscription, update, read, and write in the accessible control node of the cross-domain access server.

[0049] If the request is invalid, the cross-domain access request is rejected.

[0050] As the core component of a distributed control system to achieve secure and efficient cross-domain access, the cross-domain forwarding communication management module builds a data interaction system based on the publish-subscribe model, and performs full-process management and verification of the controller's cross-domain access requests. When the controller needs to obtain information about a data point in another security domain and the request cannot be completed within its own domain, it will send a targeted cross-domain access request based on the cross-domain access server information pre-stored by the data point registration module. The request packet generated by the controller contains rich identification information. In addition to the basic IP address, port number, and service protocol, it also clearly marks the security domain to which it belongs (such as "UnitA_SecurityDomain"), the unique identifier of the requested data point (such as "SteamPressure_01"), and the operation type (read / write / subscribe), ensuring that the cross-domain access server can accurately identify the source and intent of the request. When a cross-domain access server receives a request, its built-in proxy forwarding communication management module performs a double check: first, it checks the security domain identifier in the request packet against the server's own access permission list to determine whether the server has permission to directly access the target security domain. If the server has configured access permissions for the corresponding security domain, the request is considered valid. If the server exceeds the permission range, the request is immediately rejected and logged. For requests that pass validation, the cross-domain access server performs specific operations based on the request type within the scope of the accessible control nodes it manages: for "subscribe" requests, the server establishes a data push channel and synchronizes the status of the target data point in real time; for "read" requests, it quickly retrieves the target data point cache and returns the data with minimal latency; for "write" operations, the server verifies the operation permissions, forwards the instruction to the target controller, and monitors the operation execution results. Throughout this process, the server adopts an event-driven architecture to ensure efficient processing of multiple concurrent requests.

[0051] like Figure 2As shown, during the request initiation phase, when a controller within a security domain (such as the Unit 1 control node) needs to obtain data point information from another security domain (such as Public System 1) and cannot complete the request through resources within its own domain, the controller first obtains the pre-stored cross-domain access server address information through the data point registration module. The controller then generates a request packet containing a detailed identity. This packet not only includes basic information such as the IP address, port number, and service protocol, but also clearly identifies the security domain to which it belongs (such as "UnitA_SecurityDomain"), the unique identifier of the requested data point (such as "WaterFlow_B01"), and the operation type (read / write / subscribe). Finally, the controller sends this packet to the corresponding cross-domain access server, formally initiating the cross-domain access request. During the request verification phase, after the cross-domain access server receives the request data packet, its built-in proxy forwarding communication management module performs a double verification mechanism: Permission matching: The module compares the security domain identifier in the request data packet with the access permission list maintained by the server itself to check whether the server has the permission to access the target security domain.

[0052] Validity determination: If the server is configured with the access policy for the corresponding security domain, the request is deemed valid; if the server is not authorized to access the target security domain (for example, unit 3 is not in the server's permission list), the request is directly rejected. During the operation execution and data interaction phase, for requests that pass validity verification, the cross-domain access server will perform corresponding operations based on the request type within the scope of the accessible control nodes it manages: Subscription request: The server establishes a data push channel and synchronizes the target data point status to the controller that initiates the request in real time (such as continuously pushing the water level data of public system B to unit A).

[0053] Read request: The server quickly retrieves the target data point cache and returns the data to the requesting controller with low latency (for example, reading the real-time pressure data of utility system B and transmitting it back to unit A).

[0054] Write request: After verifying the operation authority, the server forwards the instruction to the target controller (such as sending the parameter adjustment instruction of unit A to public system B) and monitors the operation execution results. Throughout the entire process, the server uses an event-driven architecture to handle multiple concurrent requests, and ensures the security and integrity of cross-domain data interactions through data encryption and transmission verification mechanisms.

[0055] like Figure 4As shown, when the host computer performs cross-domain access, the Alias ​​Forwarding Communication Management Module is enabled to quickly process data points that were identified during the unit configuration phase and do not require permission management. When a cross-domain access request for such an alias point reaches the cross-domain access server, the module bypasses the normal permission verification process and directly forwards the request to the target data source based on the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point. By reducing the permission verification process, the access response speed of high-frequency, low-risk data points is significantly improved.

[0056] For example, during the alias point configuration phase, if the host computer needs to access data points in other security domains, operations personnel use the service configuration module to compile and save an alias point configuration file. This file details the mapping relationships between the target data points, including the security domain where the alias point resides, the alias point name, the security domain where the data source resides, and the data source point identifier. After reading this file, the service configuration module passes the mapping information to the data point registration module, triggering the subsequent registration process.

[0057] Cross-domain access server registration phase: The data point registration module performs dual-domain registration operations in the target cross-domain access server based on the alias point configuration information: Register the alias point in the security zone where the alias point is located and configure it as a virtual data node.

[0058] On the cross-domain access server corresponding to the domain where the data source resides, a mapping relationship is established between the alias point and the actual data source point, and access methods such as subscription, read, and write are bound. Through these operations, the cross-domain access server becomes the "translation hub" for data interaction, enabling conversion of data formats and access protocols across different security domains.

[0059] Cross-domain access execution phase: When the host computer initiates a cross-domain access request: Request encapsulation: The host computer only needs to generate a request instruction for the local alias point, and attach the operation type and permission identifier.

[0060] Server processing: After receiving the request, the cross-domain access server converts the operation on the alias point into the corresponding operation on the actual data source point based on the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point.

[0061] Data return: After the target data source responds, the server will adapt the format of the acquired data and then return it to the host computer through the alias point, completing the entire cross-domain access process.

[0062] Cross-domain access to privileged points of the host computer is achieved through the permission management module of the cross-domain access server.

[0063] During cross-domain access, to ensure data security and system stability, the host computer's assignment of cross-domain access points must be strictly controlled by the permission management module. This module is deeply integrated into the cross-domain access service and works in conjunction with the cross-domain forwarding communication management module. It adds permission determination nodes during the request verification and operation execution stages. The specific process is as follows: 1) Request initiation phase When the host computer needs to assign (write) a value to a cross-domain access point, it follows the same process as a normal controller request: it obtains the cross-domain access server address through the data point registration module and generates a request packet containing a permission type identifier. In addition to the original identity information (IP address, security domain identifier, etc.), the packet must clearly indicate the permission type as "read" or "write," for example, "AccessType: Write." The packet is then sent to the target cross-domain access server.

[0064] 2) Permission verification and request screening stage After the cross-domain access server receives the request from the host computer, the permission management module takes priority to intervene in the verification: Directly release write permission: If the permission type in the request data packet is "write" and the initiator's host computer has passed the basic identity authentication, the permission management module directly allows the request to enter the subsequent processing flow, and the cross-domain access server will execute the data write operation according to the instruction.

[0065] Secondary read permission verification: If the permission type is "read" but a write operation is actually initiated, the permission management module immediately triggers the privilege point matching mechanism and retrieves the target data point from the privilege point configuration file read by the service configuration module. If the data point exists in the privileged point list (such as emergency shutdown control nodes and key parameter calibration points), the write operation is allowed to proceed. If it is not in the list, the permission management module will directly block the request and return an "Insufficient Permissions" error message to the initiator, while also recording the operation log.

[0066] 3) Operation execution and data interaction stage The write operation request that passes the permission check will be further processed by the proxy forwarding communication management module of the cross-domain access server. After verifying the accessibility of the target data point, the data write operation will be completed.

[0067] The hierarchical verification mechanism of the authority management module not only guarantees necessary emergency operations and special business needs, but also effectively prevents unauthorized cross-domain assignment behavior. From the authority control level, it eliminates the risk of mutual interference between units due to misoperation in the traditional configuration mode, and significantly improves the security and controllability of cross-domain data interaction in the distributed control system.

[0068] The cross-domain access information is displayed through the interface display module, including the node status information list, the cross-domain access point name list and the query point process tracking list.

[0069] To further improve operation and maintenance efficiency and operational transparency, this embodiment uses an interface display module to centrally display and deeply monitor cross-domain access information. Specifically, it covers three core functional modules: control node status information list, cross-domain access point name list, and query point process tracking list: 1) Control node status information list This list dynamically presents the operating data of all control nodes involved in cross-domain access in a table format, including: Basic information: controller node name (such as Unit1_Controller) and security domain ID (such as UnitA_SecurityDomain).

[0070] Access statistics: Cumulative cross-domain access points, real-time subscriptions, read operations, and write operations (e.g., "Subscriptions: 23, Reads: 15, Writes: 3"). This intuitive, quantitative data allows operations personnel to quickly assess the load status of each node, identify high-frequency access nodes or abnormal operation trends, and provide data support for system optimization.

[0071] 2) Cross-domain access point name list This module lists all registered cross-domain subscription point names (e.g., "SteamPressure_B01," "WaterFlow_C02") in the system, either in a tree-like directory or as a drop-down menu. Users can quickly locate the target data point by clicking on a specific name and then perform in-depth analysis based on other information in the list, such as filtering for frequently accessed key data nodes or troubleshooting unusual data interaction links.

[0072] 3) Query point process tracking list After the user selects the target data point in the cross-domain access point name list, the module will automatically trigger the full-link process tracking function: Key point marking: Set log output nodes in each core link of cross-domain access (request initiation, permission verification, server forwarding, target response).

[0073] Real-time information display: Detailed information including data flow, operation status, response results, etc. is output in the form of a timeline (such as "2024-10-01 14:23:15 The cross-domain request has passed the permission verification and is forwarded to the cross-domain access server 2"); abnormal warning: If a data point encounters abnormal conditions such as delay, error or permission blocking in a certain link, the system will highlight or pop up a prompt and mark the specific reason (such as "Insufficient permission: the write operation target point is not in the privileged point list"). Through the above-mentioned visualization mechanism, operation and maintenance personnel can quickly grasp the global status of cross-domain access, accurately locate data interaction bottlenecks or security risks, greatly improve the efficiency of system troubleshooting and operation and maintenance management, and provide visual decision-making support for the stable operation of distributed control systems.

[0074] In summary, this embodiment provides a cross-domain access method for a distributed control system. Through service configuration, data point registration, cross-domain forwarding communication management, permission management, and alias forwarding communication management, cross-domain access security control and data interoperability are achieved. Data domain access control is limited to the domain, rejecting non-domain requests and eliminating unit interoperability caused by configuration errors. Cross-domain access services only require modifying the request-side configuration, minimizing the scope of impact. A publish-subscribe model is adopted, supporting online and offline configuration, as well as expansion to multiple units and multiple public systems, improving system scalability.

[0075] Example 2

[0076] Based on the same inventive concept as Example 1, this embodiment provides a cross-domain access system for a distributed control system. Since the principle of solving the problem by this system is similar to the aforementioned cross-domain access method for a distributed control system, the implementation of this system can refer to the implementation of the cross-domain access method for a distributed control system.

[0077] like Figure 5 As shown, the distributed control system cross-domain access system includes: The division module 10 is used to divide the safety domains of the unit units and the public system.

[0078] The determination module 20 is configured to determine the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs.

[0079] The construction module 30 is used to construct a mapping relationship between alias points and data source points and a privileged point list.

[0080] The registration module 40 is configured to register the cross-domain access service node information in the control node.

[0081] The binding module 50 is used to create a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point.

[0082] The adding module 60 is configured to add the requesting party security domain identifier and the data point unique ID when the control node initiates a cross-domain request, and send the ID to the cross-domain service node.

[0083] The stripping module 70 is configured to strip the security domain identifier and execute a target operation when the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid.

[0084] Among them, when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, the control node is allowed to perform cross-domain write operations; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, the cross-domain request in the debugging phase is directly forwarded to the data source point.

[0085] Exemplarily, the binding module includes: The channel establishment unit is used to parse the alias point configuration file, extract the unique identifier, data type and mapping data source point information of each alias point, create a corresponding virtual data node in the target security domain, and establish a real-time data synchronization channel with the data source point.

[0086] Exemplarily, the adding module includes: The generation unit is used to generate a request instruction for the local alias point when the control node initiates a cross-domain request, and to attach an operation type and an authority identifier.

[0087] The conversion unit is used to convert the operation on the alias point into the corresponding operation on the actual data source point according to the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point after the cross-domain access server receives the request.

[0088] The format adaptation unit is used to adapt the format of the acquired data after the target data source point responds, and then return it to the control node through the alias point.

[0089] Exemplarily, the stripping module includes: The first writing unit is used to directly allow the request to enter the subsequent processing flow and execute the data writing operation according to the instruction when the permission type in the request data packet is write and the initiator control node has passed the basic identity authentication.

[0090] The retrieval unit is used to trigger the privilege point matching mechanism and retrieve the target data point from the read privilege point configuration file when the permission type is read but a write operation is actually initiated.

[0091] The second writing unit is configured to allow the write operation to continue if the target data point exists in the privileged point list.

[0092] The request blocking unit is used to directly block the request when the target data point does not exist in the privileged point list, send an error prompt to the initiator, and record the operation log.

[0093] For more specific working processes of the above modules, please refer to the corresponding content disclosed in Example 1, which will not be repeated here.

[0094] Example 3 This embodiment provides a computer device, including a processor and a memory; wherein the processor implements the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method described in Example 1 when executing a computer program stored in the memory.

[0095] For more specific details about the above method, please refer to the corresponding content disclosed in Example 1, which will not be repeated here.

[0096] Example 4 This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program; when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method described in Example 1 are implemented.

[0097] For more specific details about the above method, please refer to the corresponding content disclosed in Example 1, which will not be repeated here.

[0098] Example 5 This embodiment provides a computer program product, including computer executable instructions or a computer program. When the computer executable instructions or the computer program are executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method described in Example 1 are implemented.

[0099] For more specific details about the above method, please refer to the corresponding content disclosed in Example 1, which will not be repeated here.

[0100] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from the other embodiments. References to the same or similar parts between the various embodiments will be sufficient. The systems, devices, storage media, and computer program products disclosed in the embodiments correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, so their descriptions are relatively simplified. For relevant details, refer to the method descriptions.

[0101] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that the techniques in the embodiments of the present invention can be implemented using software and a necessary general-purpose hardware platform. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, or the portion that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a storage medium such as ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and includes instructions for enabling a computer device (such as a personal computer, server, or network device) to execute the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention, or portions thereof.

[0102] In some embodiments, computer-executable instructions may be in the form of a program, software, software module, script, or code, written in any form of programming language (including compiled or interpreted languages, or declarative or procedural languages), and may be deployed in any form, including as a stand-alone program or as a module, component, subroutine, or other unit suitable for use in a computing environment.

[0103] As an example, computer-executable instructions may, but need not, correspond to a file in a file system, may be stored as part of a file that stores other programs or data, such as in one or more scripts in a HyperText Markup Language (HTML) document, in a single file dedicated to the program in question, or in multiple coordinating files (e.g., files storing one or more modules, subroutines, or code portions).

[0104] By way of example, computer-executable instructions may be deployed to be executed on one electronic device, or on multiple electronic devices located at one site, or on multiple electronic devices distributed across multiple sites and interconnected by a communication network.

[0105] The present invention has been described in detail above with reference to specific embodiments and exemplary examples. However, these descriptions should not be construed as limiting the present invention. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that various equivalent substitutions, modifications, or improvements may be made to the technical solutions and implementations of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, all of which fall within the scope of the present invention. The scope of protection of the present invention shall be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A cross-domain access method for a distributed control system, characterized in that: include: Divide the safety zones of unit units and public systems; Determine the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs; Construct the mapping relationship between alias points and data source points and the privileged point list; Register cross-domain access service node information on the control node; Create a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point; When the control node initiates a cross-domain request, it adds the requesting party's security domain identifier and the data point's unique ID and sends it to the cross-domain service node; When the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid, it strips off the security domain identifier and performs the target operation; Among them, when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, the control node is allowed to perform cross-domain write operations; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, the cross-domain request in the debugging phase is directly forwarded to the data source point.

2. The cross-domain access method of a distributed control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step of creating a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point includes: Parse the alias point configuration file, extract the unique identifier, data type and mapped data source point information of each alias point, create a corresponding virtual data node in the target security domain, and establish a real-time data synchronization channel with the data source point.

3. The cross-domain access method of a distributed control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the control node initiates a cross-domain request, the security domain identifier of the requesting party and the unique ID of the data point are added and sent to the cross-domain service node, including: When the control node initiates a cross-domain request, it generates a request instruction for the local alias point, along with the operation type and permission identifier; After receiving the request, the cross-domain access server converts the operation on the alias point into the corresponding operation on the actual data source point according to the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point; After the target data source point responds, the acquired data is format-adapted and then returned to the control node through the alias point.

4. The cross-domain access method of a distributed control system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step of stripping the security domain identifier and performing the target operation when the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid includes: If the permission type in the request data packet is write and the initiator control node has passed the basic identity authentication, the request is directly allowed to enter the subsequent processing flow and the data write operation will be executed according to the instruction; When the permission type is read but a write operation is actually initiated, the privilege point matching mechanism is triggered to retrieve the target data point from the privilege point configuration file read; If the target data point exists in the privileged point list, the write operation is allowed to continue; If the target data point does not exist in the privileged point list, the request is directly blocked, an error message is sent to the initiator, and the operation log is recorded.

5. A distributed control system cross-domain access system, characterized in that: include: Partition module, used to divide the security domains of unit units and public systems; A determination module, used to determine the security domain and control node information to which the cross-domain access service belongs; A construction module is used to construct a mapping relationship between alias points and data source points and a privileged point list; A registration module is used to register cross-domain access service node information in the control node; The binding module is used to create a virtual data node in the security domain where the alias point is located to bind the real-time synchronization channel of the data source point; An adding module is used to add the requesting party security domain identifier and the data point unique ID when the control node initiates a cross-domain request, and send them to the cross-domain service node; A stripping module, used to strip the security domain identifier and perform the target operation when the cross-domain service node verifies that the requested security domain is valid; Among them, when the access type is write or the target point is a privileged point, and the login authority is greater than or equal to the cross-domain service node authority and the password is consistent, the control node is allowed to perform cross-domain write operations; through the mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point, the cross-domain request in the debugging phase is directly forwarded to the data source point.

6. The distributed control system cross-domain access system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The binding module includes: The channel establishment unit is used to parse the alias point configuration file, extract the unique identifier, data type and mapping data source point information of each alias point, create a corresponding virtual data node in the target security domain, and establish a real-time data synchronization channel with the data source point.

7. The distributed control system cross-domain access system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The adding module includes: A generating unit, configured to generate a request instruction for a local alias point when a control node initiates a cross-domain request, and to attach an operation type and an authority identifier; a conversion unit configured to convert an operation on the alias point into a corresponding operation on the actual data source point according to a mapping relationship between the alias point and the data source point after the cross-domain access server receives the request; The format adaptation unit is used to adapt the format of the acquired data after the target data source point responds, and then return it to the control node through the alias point.

8. The distributed control system cross-domain access system according to claim 5, characterized in that: The stripping module includes: The first writing unit is configured to directly allow the request to enter a subsequent processing flow and execute a data writing operation according to the instruction if the permission type in the request data packet is write and the initiator control node has passed the basic identity authentication; A retrieval unit is used to trigger a privilege point matching mechanism and retrieve a target data point from a read privilege point configuration file when the permission type is read but a write operation is actually initiated; a second writing unit, configured to allow the write operation to continue if the target data point exists in the privileged point list; The request blocking unit is used to directly block the request when the target data point does not exist in the privileged point list, send an error prompt to the initiator, and record the operation log.

9. A computer device, characterized in that: The method comprises a processor and a memory; wherein, when the processor executes the computer program stored in the memory, the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that Used to store computer programs; when the computer programs are executed by a processor, the steps of the distributed control system cross-domain access method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.

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