Interlocking control method, system, equipment and medium for shared gas supply valve of double-unit gas burning
Through remote control and multi-level safety protection of the dual-unit shared gas inlet valve, the problems of high equipment cost, complex operation and insufficient safety control of the dual-unit gas co-firing system have been solved, and the safety, reliability and stability of the system have been achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510757688.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-06-09
- Publication Date
- 2025-09-23
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
The existing dual-unit gas co-firing system has problems such as high equipment cost, complex operation, and insufficient safety control. In particular, it lacks an effective interlocking protection mechanism, which poses the risk of accidental start-up and leakage.
The dual units use a shared air supply inlet valve, which is hard-interlocked through software communication and hardware interlock communication to achieve remote control and multi-level safety protection, including interlocking function, self-locking function and strict manual unlocking operation, to ensure the safety and reliability of the system.
It reduces the system construction cost, simplifies the operation process, improves the safety and stability of the system, prevents the risk of accidental opening and leakage, and achieves the inherent safety effect of the system.
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Figure CN120686578A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of thermal power generation control technology, and in particular to an interlocking control method, system, equipment and medium for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas co-combustion. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of my country's power industry, supercritical and ultra-supercritical coal-fired generators have become the mainstream technology for thermal power generation. In modern thermal power plants, dual-unit configurations have become an important means of improving power generation efficiency and system reliability. To further enhance combustion efficiency and reduce pollutant emissions, gas co-firing technology is widely used in coal-fired units. By adding a gas co-firing device to the main burner, multi-fuel mixed combustion is achieved, effectively improving combustion characteristics.
[0003] In traditional dual-unit gas-fired systems, each unit's co-firing system requires its own complete gas supply infrastructure, including gas pipelines, shutoff valves, flame retardant valves, and other safety equipment. While this design ensures the independence of each unit, it presents challenges such as duplicate equipment investment, high construction costs, and a large footprint. Furthermore, independent gas supply systems are relatively complex to operate, requiring separate monitoring and control of each system, increasing the workload and operational risks.
[0004] Existing gas-fired systems also suffer from inadequate safety risk control. Due to the flammable and explosive nature of gas, system safety control requirements are extremely high. Traditional control solutions often lack effective interlocking protection mechanisms. A single system anomaly can impact the safe operation of the entire gas supply system. Furthermore, existing valve control methods often rely solely on software control, lacking hardware-level safety protection. This poses the risk of accidental opening and leakage in the event of a control system failure. Summary of the Invention
[0005] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention is proposed.
[0006] Therefore, the problem to be solved by the present invention is how to address the technical issues of high equipment cost, complex operation, and insufficient safety control in the existing dual-unit gas co-firing system. Specifically, this includes: addressing the high cost associated with the traditional solution of requiring independent gas supply equipment for each system; addressing the complex operation and lack of effective interlocking protection mechanisms; and addressing the risks of accidental opening and leakage, as well as delayed safety warnings. By providing a safety control method for a dual-unit shared gas supply inlet valve, the goals of reducing system construction costs, simplifying operational procedures, and improving system safety and stability are achieved.
[0007] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
[0008] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for gas co-firing of two coal-fired units, comprising: providing a shared gas supply inlet valve for gas co-firing of two coal-fired units, and incorporating the shared gas supply inlet valve into a first control unit for remote control;
[0009] Monitor the status of the second control unit and form hard interlocking through software communication and hardware interlocking communication;
[0010] When a single control unit stops operating, the interlock function is activated to keep the other control unit operating normally;
[0011] The self-locking function is activated after the dual control units are shut down to prevent the valve from opening by mistake;
[0012] Set the manual unlocking operation and start the combustion system after manual unlocking.
[0013] As a preferred solution of the interlock control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion of the present invention, monitoring the state of the second control unit includes:
[0014] Collect the operating parameters of the second control unit; determine the start and stop status of the second control unit; and detect the safety status of the second control unit.
[0015] As a preferred solution of the interlock control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion of the present invention, the hard interlock includes:
[0016] Establish a software communication link to transmit control unit status information; establish a hardware interlocking loop to perform interlocking actions independently of software communication; when an abnormal state is detected, directly close the common air supply inlet valve through the hardware interlocking loop.
[0017] As a preferred solution of the interlock control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion of the present invention, the interlock function includes:
[0018] Detect the operating status of the first control unit and the second control unit; when the first control unit stops operating, maintain the air supply channel of the second control unit; when the second control unit stops operating, maintain the air supply channel of the first control unit.
[0019] As a preferred solution of the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion of the present invention, the self-locking function includes:
[0020] Detect the simultaneous shutdown of dual control units; lock the common air supply inlet valve after the dual control units are shut down at the same time; and prevent the valve from being opened when it is not unlocked.
[0021] As a preferred solution of the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion of the present invention, the manual unlocking operation includes:
[0022] Verify operator authority; execute unlocking instructions; record the unlocking operation process.
[0023] As a preferred solution of the interlock control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas co-firing of the present invention, it includes: installing a pressure sensor and a flow sensor in the dual-coal-fired unit co-firing system;
[0024] Monitor the pressure and flow parameters of the participating combustion systems in real time; trigger emergency closure of the shared gas supply inlet valve when the pressure or flow parameters exceed the preset threshold; perform manual unlocking confirmation before the participating combustion systems are put into operation; record all operating processes and parameter changes.
[0025] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an interlock control system for a shared gas supply valve for gas co-firing of two coal-fired units, which includes a preset module, setting a shared gas supply inlet valve for gas co-firing of two coal-fired units, and incorporating the shared gas supply inlet valve into a first control unit for remote control;
[0026] A monitoring module monitors the status of the second control unit and forms a hard interlock through software communication and hardware interlock communication;
[0027] Single control module, when a single control unit stops operating, activates the interlock function to keep the other control unit operating normally;
[0028] The dual control module activates the self-locking function after the dual control units stop operating to prevent the valve from opening accidentally;
[0029] Set the module, set the manual unlocking operation, and start the combustion system after manual unlocking.
[0030] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: when the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, the steps of the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve of the dual-unit gas co-combustion are implemented as in the first aspect of the present invention.
[0031] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, wherein: when the computer program instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas co-combustion are implemented as in the first aspect of the present invention.
[0032] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: by setting up a common gas supply inlet valve for gas co-combustion of dual coal-fired units and incorporating it into the first control unit for remote control, the intensive configuration of hardware resources is achieved, which fundamentally solves the problem of repeated equipment investment caused by the need for each unit to independently configure complete gas supply facilities in the traditional solution, and significantly reduces the system construction cost and floor space; by establishing a hard interlocking mechanism formed by software communication and hardware interlocking communication, a dual safety guarantee system is achieved, in which software communication is responsible for precise control under normal working conditions, and hardware interlocking provides independent safety protection when the software system fails, breaking through the limitations of the traditional single software control method and achieving the intrinsic safety effect that meets the functional safety standards; by stopping the single control unit The interlocking function is activated at the same time to keep the other control unit operating normally, realizing the fault isolation and continuous operation capability of the system, avoiding the problem of the entire system shutting down due to a single fault, and greatly improving the system availability and power generation efficiency; by activating the self-locking function after the dual control units are shut down to prevent the valve from opening by mistake, comprehensive safety locking protection is achieved, effectively preventing gas leakage and safety accidents caused by human error, and providing a reliable safety barrier for the application of flammable and explosive media; by setting strict manual unlocking operations including authority verification, unlocking instruction execution and operation process recording, authorized safety management is achieved, ensuring that only personnel with corresponding qualifications can perform key operations, and establishing a complete safety responsibility traceability system. The entire technical solution not only solves the problems of high cost and complex operation of traditional solutions through multi-level safety interlocking mechanisms and intelligent control means, but more importantly, it achieves unexpected safety performance improvements, providing a complete solution for the dual-unit gas co-firing system that is both economical and safe. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0033] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.
[0034] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of the interlocking control method for the shared gas supply valve of two units with gas co-firing;
[0035] Figure 2 Computer equipment diagram for the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion;
[0036] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the shared gas supply inlet valve control strategy for the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion;
[0037] Figure 4This is a schematic diagram of the control strategy of system A for the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas co-firing;
[0038] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the control strategy of system B for the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0039] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0040] In the following description, many specific details are set forth to facilitate a full understanding of the present invention. However, the present invention may also be implemented in other ways different from those described herein. Those skilled in the art may make similar generalizations without violating the connotation of the present invention. Therefore, the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.
[0041] Secondly, the term "one embodiment" or "embodiment" herein refers to a specific feature, structure, or characteristic that may be included in at least one implementation of the present invention. The phrase "in one embodiment" appearing in various places throughout this specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, nor does it constitute a separate or selective embodiment that is mutually exclusive with other embodiments.
[0042] Example 1
[0043] Reference Figures 1 and 2 , which is the first embodiment of the present invention, provides a method for interlocking control of a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion, including:
[0044] S100: Setting a common gas supply inlet valve for gas co-combustion of dual coal-fired units, and incorporating the common gas supply inlet valve into the first control unit for remote control;
[0045] S200: monitoring the status of the second control unit and forming a hard interlock through software communication and hardware interlock communication;
[0046] S300: When a single control unit stops operating, the interlock function is activated to keep the other control unit operating normally;
[0047] S400: The self-locking function is activated after the dual control unit stops operating to prevent the valve from opening accidentally;
[0048] S500: Set the manual unlocking operation and start the combustion system after manual unlocking.
[0049] The gas co-firing system of dual coal-fired units faces many technical challenges in actual operation. In traditional designs, each unit needs to be independently equipped with a complete gas supply system, including independent gas supply pipelines, shut-off valves, flame-retardant valves, etc. This configuration method leads to serious duplication of equipment investment and high construction costs. At the same time, the operational complexity of independent systems is reflected in the need to monitor and control each system separately. Operators need to master the operating procedures of multiple systems, which increases the risk of human operational errors. More critically, the existing technology lacks an effective interlocking protection mechanism. When a system malfunctions, it often affects the safe operation of the entire gas supply system, especially in the application scenario of flammable and explosive media such as gas. The safety risk is extremely high. In addition, traditional valve control mostly adopts a single software control method, lacks hardware-level safety protection, and there is a serious risk of mis-opening and leakage when the control system fails.
[0050] Through the complete technical solution of S100-S500, the present invention has constructed a complete interlocking control system for the shared gas supply valve of two units for gas co-combustion. S100 realizes the sharing and centralized control of hardware resources by setting a common gas supply inlet valve and incorporating it into the first control unit, fundamentally solving the problem of repeated equipment configuration. The dual soft and hard interlocking mechanism established by S200 ensures the safety and reliability of the system. Software communication provides normal control signal transmission, and hardware interlocking serves as an independent safety guarantee to ensure safety when the software system fails. The interlocking function of S300 ensures the normal operation of the other system when a single system is shut down, avoiding the shutdown of the entire system due to a single fault. The self-locking function of S400 is automatically activated after the shutdown of both systems, preventing safety accidents caused by human error. The manual unlocking operation of S500 establishes a strict authority management mechanism to ensure that only authorized personnel can perform key operations. The entire technical solution forms a complete closed loop from hardware configuration, safety control, fault isolation to manual intervention, effectively solving the core problems of traditional solutions such as high cost, complex operation, and high safety risks.
[0051] Example 2
[0052] Reference Figure 2-Figure 5 , which is the second embodiment of the present invention.
[0053] In the embodiment of the present application, setting a common gas supply inlet valve for gas co-combustion of dual coal-fired units in step S100 includes the following steps A1-A2:
[0054] A1: Determine the technical parameters and installation configuration of the common air supply inlet valve, including valve type selection, control accuracy setting and response time requirements;
[0055] A2: Establish a remote control connection architecture, including control signal path design, status feedback mechanism, and fault diagnosis function.
[0056] Specifically, in A1, determining the technical parameters of the shared gas inlet valve is fundamental to the overall system design. The valve type selection must consider the specific properties of coal gas, including its flammability and explosiveness, corrosiveness, and pressure rating requirements. Based on the operating characteristics of the dual units, electric control valves or pneumatic quick-closing valves are selected as the primary valve types. Valve specifications typically range from DN200 to DN400, with operating pressure ratings of PN16 to PN25 and an operating temperature range of -20°C to +200°C. Control accuracy is required to achieve an opening accuracy of ±1%, and the response time is required to complete the full stroke within 3 seconds. The valve material is corrosion-resistant stainless steel or a special alloy, with a Class VI sealing rating to ensure sealing reliability in the closed state. The valve configuration includes a complete set of components, including the valve body, actuator, position feedback device, and manual operating mechanism.
[0057] It should be noted that the technical parameters of the shared gas inlet valve directly impact the control accuracy and safety performance of the entire system. Precise parameter settings and strict quality requirements ensure the valve's reliable operation under various operating conditions. The valve's rapid response is a key technical indicator for ensuring timely shutoff of the gas supply in emergencies.
[0058] In an optional embodiment, the valve configuration in step S100 can also adopt a dual-valve parallel redundant design. By installing two valves of the same specification in parallel, when one of the valves fails, the other valve can still ensure the normal operation of the system, thereby improving the reliability of the system.
[0059] In another optional embodiment, a valve online detection function can also be configured in step S100. By installing an online leakage detection device and a valve performance monitoring device, the sealing performance and action characteristics of the valve can be monitored in real time, early signs of valve failure can be discovered in time, and data support can be provided for preventive maintenance.
[0060] Specifically, in A2, the establishment of the remote control connection architecture includes technical implementations at multiple levels. The control signal path adopts a redundant design. The main path uses 4-20mA analog signal transmission, and the backup path uses digital communication protocols such as ModbusRTU or Profibus DP to ensure that the control function can still be maintained when the main path fails. The signal transmission cable uses armored shielded cable, the length of which is controlled within 200 meters, and there are no joints in the middle to ensure the reliability of signal transmission. The status feedback mechanism includes multiple signal types such as valve opening feedback, limit switch feedback, and fault status feedback. The feedback signal is transmitted using an independent cable to avoid interference with the control signal. The fault diagnosis function automatically identifies the valve's operating status and fault type by monitoring parameters such as valve action time, torque change, and position deviation.
[0061] Exemplarily, the specific implementation method of the control connection is: the control signal is powered by a DC24V power supply, the signal range is 4~20mA, corresponding to the valve opening of 0-100%; the status feedback signal includes dry contact signals such as full open limit, full close limit, intermediate position, fault alarm, etc.; the communication interface adopts the RS485 standard, the communication rate is set to 9600bps, the data format is 8 data bits, 1 stop bit, and no check bit; the fault diagnosis cycle is set to 1 second, and the fault information is reported immediately when an abnormality is detected.
[0062] It should be noted that reliable remote control connections are the technical foundation for achieving centralized control. Redundant design and multiple protections ensure stable control performance even in harsh industrial environments. Fault diagnostics provide important technical support for system maintenance and troubleshooting.
[0063] In the embodiment of the present application, monitoring the state of the second control unit in step S200 includes the following steps B1-B2:
[0064] B1: Monitoring the status of the second control unit includes:
[0065] Collect the operating parameters of the second control unit; determine the start and stop status of the second control unit; and detect the safety status of the second control unit.
[0066] Specifically, in B1, the implementation of monitoring the status of the second control unit includes information collection at multiple levels. Operational parameter collection includes process parameters such as gas flow, pressure, and temperature, as well as electrical parameters such as equipment operating current and voltage. Start-stop status detection determines the start-stop status of the entire combustion system by monitoring the operating status of key equipment, such as fans, feeders, and ignition devices. Safety status monitoring includes safety-related parameters such as flame detection, gas leak detection, and over-temperature and over-pressure detection.
[0067] It should be noted that comprehensive monitoring of the second control unit is a prerequisite for reliable interlocking. Through real-time monitoring, the first control unit can accurately grasp the operating status of the second control unit, providing accurate data for subsequent interlocking decisions. The real-time and accuracy of monitoring information directly affects the reliability of the entire interlocking system.
[0068] In an optional embodiment, step S200 may further include establishing a redundant monitoring mechanism to improve the reliability of monitoring information through multi-channel signal acquisition and cross-validation, thereby avoiding misjudgment caused by a single sensor failure.
[0069] In another optional embodiment, step S200 may further include setting up a historical storage and trend analysis function for monitoring information, so as to provide an early warning of possible equipment failure or abnormal status by analyzing the trend of changes in historical data.
[0070] B2: Hard interlock includes:
[0071] Establish a software communication link to transmit control unit status information; establish a hardware interlocking loop to perform interlocking actions independently of software communication; when an abnormal state is detected, directly close the common air supply inlet valve through the hardware interlocking loop.
[0072] Specifically, in B2, the establishment of a dual software and hardware communication mechanism is the core technical feature of this invention. The software communication link uses industrial Ethernet or fieldbus technology to enable data exchange and command transmission between control units. The communication protocol can adopt Modbus, Profinet, or a custom protocol to ensure real-time and reliable communication. The hardware interlock circuit is implemented using relay logic or a safety PLC, operating independently of the software communication system, ensuring the normal execution of the interlock function even in the event of a software system failure.
[0073] For example, the specific parameters of software communication are set as follows: the communication rate is set to 100Mbps, the data refresh cycle is 100ms, and the communication timeout is 500ms; the response time of the hardware interlocking loop does not exceed 50ms, it has a fault self-diagnosis function, and the interlocking action has a priority setting.
[0074] It should be noted that the dual software and hardware communication mechanism provides dual security. Software communication is responsible for information exchange and control command transmission under normal circumstances, while hardware interlocking provides reliable safety protection in emergency situations. This design concept meets the requirements of functional safety standards and ensures the inherent safety of the system.
[0075] In the embodiment of the present application, in step S300, when a single control unit stops operating, the interlock function is activated, including the following steps C1-C2:
[0076] C1: Interlocking functions include:
[0077] Detect the operating status of the first control unit and the second control unit; when the first control unit stops operating, maintain the air supply channel of the second control unit; when the second control unit stops operating, maintain the air supply channel of the first control unit.
[0078] Specifically, in C1, unit operating status is detected using a multi-parameter comprehensive assessment. Key parameters include the control unit's power status, the operating status of key actuators, and the changing trends of key process parameters. The assessment logic combines AND and OR logic to avoid misjudgments caused by fluctuations in a single parameter. The detection cycle is set to 1 second to ensure timely detection of status changes.
[0079] It should be noted that accurate status detection is key to achieving reliable interlocking. Comprehensive multi-parameter judgment can effectively distinguish between different shutdown modes, such as normal shutdown, fault shutdown, and planned maintenance, providing accurate judgment basis for subsequent control strategies. The speed and accuracy of status detection directly affect the response speed and reliability of the interlocking function.
[0080] In an optional implementation, step S300 may further include setting a delayed confirmation mechanism for state changes. By setting an appropriate delay time, frequent switching due to instantaneous state fluctuations can be avoided, thereby improving the stability of system operation.
[0081] In another optional embodiment, step S300 may also include establishing an alarm and recording mechanism for state changes. When a unit state change is detected, an audible and visual alarm signal is promptly issued, and the time, cause and processing of the state change are recorded.
[0082] C2: Implement selective gas supply control to ensure that the gas supply to the shutdown units is cut off and the gas supply to the running units is maintained.
[0083] Specifically, in C2, selective air supply control relies on precise valve control and flow regulation. When the system detects a shutdown of the first control unit, it automatically closes the air supply valve to the first control unit while keeping the air supply valve to the second control unit open. During the air supply switching process, pressure balancing and flow redistribution must be considered to avoid shocks to the operating units caused by sudden flow changes.
[0084] Exemplarily, the execution process of selective gas supply control is as follows: after detecting the shutdown signal, delay 5 seconds for confirmation; after confirming the shutdown status, complete the gas supply cut-off of the shutdown unit within 10 seconds; at the same time, monitor the gas supply pressure of the running unit and adjust the pressure when necessary; the total time of the entire switching process is controlled within 30 seconds.
[0085] It should be noted that selective gas supply control ensures the system's continuous operation, preventing system outages caused by single-unit failures. This design improves system availability and economic efficiency, maximizing power generation capacity, especially under high grid load conditions.
[0086] In the embodiment of the present application, in step S400, the self-locking function is activated after the dual control units are shut down, including the following steps D1-D2:
[0087] D1: Self-locking functions include:
[0088] Detect the simultaneous shutdown of dual control units; lock the common air supply inlet valve after the dual control units are shut down at the same time; and prevent the valve from being opened when it is not unlocked.
[0089] Specifically, in D1, detecting a dual-unit outage requires simultaneous monitoring of the status information of both control units. The detection logic is as follows: when the operating status signals of both the first and second control units simultaneously change to an outage state, and the duration exceeds a preset threshold, a dual-unit outage is determined. The preset threshold is typically set at 30 seconds to avoid misjudgments due to transient state changes. Communication failures must also be considered during the detection process. In the event of a communication interruption, the system should handle the situation in a fail-safe manner.
[0090] It should be noted that accurate identification of a dual-unit shutdown is a prerequisite for activating the self-locking function. Since a dual-unit shutdown typically means a complete shutdown of the entire combustion system, it is imperative to ensure a complete lockout of the gas supply system to prevent any gas leaks or misoperation. The reliability of the detection mechanism is directly related to system safety.
[0091] In an optional embodiment, step S400 may further include setting a hierarchical outage detection mechanism to distinguish between planned outages and fault outages, adopting different self-locking strategies for different outage modes, and improving the refinement of system control.
[0092] In another optional embodiment, step S400 may also include establishing an external confirmation mechanism for the outage status, which can be confirmed by an operator or a superior system to increase the reliability of the outage judgment and avoid misjudgment due to control system failure.
[0093] D2: Perform a comprehensive gas supply system lockout, including main valve lockout, branch valve lockout, and safe state maintenance.
[0094] Specifically, in D2, comprehensive gas supply system lockout includes multiple levels of safety measures. Main valve lockout involves closing and locking the common gas supply inlet valve in the closed position, either mechanically or electrically. Branch valve lockout involves closing all branch valves leading to each unit, ensuring complete isolation of the entire gas supply system. Maintaining a safe state involves maintaining the normal operation of all safety monitoring equipment, such as gas leak detectors and flame detectors, to ensure timely detection of safety hazards during outages.
[0095] For example, the execution sequence of locking the gas supply system is: first close each branch valve to cut off the gas supply to each unit; then close the main gas supply valve to cut off the total gas supply; finally, perform the valve locking operation to prevent accidental opening; the execution time of the entire locking process is controlled within 60 seconds, and the maintenance of the locked state is the responsibility of an independent safety system.
[0096] It should be noted that comprehensive gas supply system lockout ensures system safety in the event of a dual-unit outage. Through layered lockout and multiple protections, the risk of gas leaks and safety incidents is minimized. Maintaining and monitoring the lockout status is crucial for long-term safety.
[0097] In the embodiment of the present application, the manual unlocking operation is set in step S500, including the following steps E1-E2:
[0098] E1: Manual unlocking operations include:
[0099] Verify operator authority; execute unlocking instructions; record the unlocking operation process.
[0100] E2: Includes: installing pressure sensors and flow sensors in the dual coal-fired unit co-firing system;
[0101] Monitor the pressure and flow parameters of the participating combustion systems in real time; trigger emergency closure of the shared gas supply inlet valve when the pressure or flow parameters exceed the preset threshold; perform manual unlocking confirmation before the participating combustion systems are put into operation; record all operating processes and parameter changes.
[0102] Specifically, in E1, a strict permission management system is crucial for ensuring the security of unlocking operations. Multi-level permissions are divided into four levels based on the importance and risk level of the operation: Level 1 is general operator privilege, limited to routine monitoring and recording; Level 2 is team leader privilege, allowing general operations and adjustments; Level 3 is shift leader privilege, allowing for important operational decisions; and Level 4 is the factory director or chief engineer privilege, granting the highest level of operational authorization. Unlocking operations require authorization from at least Level 3 personnel, with confirmation from Level 4 personnel required in emergencies. The identity authentication process utilizes multi-factor authentication technology, including work ID passwords, fingerprint recognition, facial recognition, and other authentication methods, to ensure the authenticity and uniqueness of identities. The operation authorization process includes four steps: application, review, approval, and execution. Each step has clear responsibilities and time limits, and all operational processes are recorded and archived in detail.
[0103] It should be noted that strict permission management and identity verification are important technical means to prevent unauthorized operations. Multi-level permissions and multi-factor authentication effectively prevent misuse and malicious operations, ensuring that only personnel with the appropriate qualifications and permissions can perform critical operations.
[0104] In an optional implementation, the authority management in step S500 may also be combined with time control and location control to limit the unlocking operation to a specific time period and a specific location, thereby further improving the security and controllability of the operation.
[0105] In another optional implementation, a remote supervision mechanism for the unlocking operation may be established in step S500, allowing senior management personnel to supervise and guide the unlocking operation process in real time through video monitoring, voice calls, etc.
[0106] Specifically, in E2, comprehensive safety inspections and system pre-processing are the technical foundation for ensuring safe unlocking and smooth commissioning. Equipment status inspections include a comprehensive inspection of all key equipment, including the mechanical condition of valves, the insulation status of the electrical system, the functional status of the control system, and the working status of the safety protection system. Inspection methods include visual inspections, instrument testing, functional testing, and other methods to ensure that all equipment is in good working condition. Environmental safety assessments include a comprehensive evaluation of the operating environment, including gas concentration testing, oxygen concentration testing, toxic and hazardous gas testing, static grounding checks, and firefighting equipment inspections. Assessment standards are implemented in accordance with relevant safety regulations, and unlocking operations are only permitted when all environmental indicators meet safety requirements. System pre-startup preparations include a systematic inspection and pre-processing of the entire gas supply system, including a leak-tightness check of the piping system, a pressure resistance test of the pressure system, a linkage test of the control system, and a functional test of the safety system.
[0107] Exemplarily, the specific process of security inspection and system preprocessing is as follows: first, an automatic inspection of the equipment status is carried out, and the control system automatically detects the status signal of each device; then an on-site manual inspection is carried out, and professional technicians confirm the equipment status on site; then an environmental safety test is carried out, and special testing instruments are used to detect environmental parameters; finally, a system function test is carried out to simulate normal operation to verify the system function; after all inspection items are completed and passed, a safety confirmation report is generated as the basis for the unlocking operation; the entire inspection process usually takes 2 to 4 hours.
[0108] It should be noted that comprehensive safety checks and system pre-processing ensured the safety of the unlocking operation and subsequent commissioning. Through systematic inspections and strict standards, potential safety hazards were effectively identified and eliminated, providing a reliable guarantee for safe commissioning. The integrity and rigor of the inspection procedures are key technical measures to ensure operational safety.
[0109] like Figure 1 The figure below is the overall flow chart of the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion, which clearly shows the complete technical process from the setting of the shared gas supply valve to the manual unlocking operation and the logical relationship between each step. Figure 2 The figure shows the computer equipment architecture diagram of the interlocking control method of the shared gas supply valve for the dual-unit gas co-combustion, which shows in detail the composition structure of the hardware platform, including key components such as the central processing unit, storage system, input and output interfaces, and communication modules. Figure 3-Figure 5The specific implementation methods and connection relationships of each control module are demonstrated in detail, providing an intuitive reference for the actual implementation of the technical solution.
[0110] In summary, the present invention forms a complete dual-unit gas co-combustion safety control system by setting up a common gas supply inlet valve, establishing a soft and hard dual interlocking mechanism, realizing unit interlocking and dual-element self-locking, and configuring a strict manual unlocking procedure. This system not only solves the problems of high equipment cost and complex operation in traditional solutions, but more importantly, through multiple safety protection mechanisms, it greatly improves the safety and reliability of the system, providing effective protection for the safe operation of the dual-unit gas co-combustion system. The entire technical solution has good engineering practicality and promotion and application value, and can effectively improve the operating efficiency and safety level of thermal power plants.
[0111] Example 3
[0112] The above is a schematic diagram of a method for interlocking and controlling a shared gas supply valve for co-firing two units of gas. It should be noted that the technical solution of the interlocking and controlling system for co-firing two units of gas and shared gas supply valves is the same as the technical solution of the interlocking and controlling method for co-firing two units of gas and shared gas supply valves. For details not described in detail in the technical solution of the interlocking and controlling system for co-firing two units of gas and shared gas supply valves in this embodiment, please refer to the description of the technical solution of the interlocking and controlling method for co-firing two units of gas and shared gas supply valves.
[0113] This embodiment also provides a dual-unit gas co-firing shared gas supply valve interlock control system, including:
[0114] The preset module sets a shared gas inlet valve for gas co-combustion of dual coal-fired units, and incorporates the shared gas inlet valve into the first control unit for remote control;
[0115] A monitoring module monitors the status of the second control unit and forms a hard interlock through software communication and hardware interlock communication;
[0116] Single control module, when a single control unit stops operating, activates the interlock function to keep the other control unit operating normally;
[0117] The dual control module activates the self-locking function after the dual control units stop operating to prevent the valve from opening accidentally;
[0118] Set the module, set the manual unlocking operation, and start the combustion system after manual unlocking.
[0119] This embodiment also provides an electronic device suitable for the interlocking control of a shared gas supply valve for the co-combustion of two units of gas, including: a memory and a processor; the memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute computer-executable instructions to implement the interlocking control method of a shared gas supply valve for the co-combustion of two units of gas as proposed in the above embodiment.
[0120] This embodiment also provides a storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the interlocking control method for realizing the shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas co-combustion proposed in the above embodiment is implemented.
[0121] The storage medium proposed in this embodiment and the interlocking control method for realizing the shared gas supply valve of dual-unit gas combustion proposed in the above embodiment belong to the same inventive concept. The technical details not fully described in this embodiment can be referred to the above embodiment, and this embodiment has the same beneficial effects as the above embodiment.
[0122] Through the above description of the implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the present invention can be implemented with the help of software and necessary general hardware, and of course can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as a computer floppy disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), flash memory (FLASH), hard disk or optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods of various embodiments of the present invention.
[0123] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present invention may be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the present invention, which should all be included in the scope of the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for controlling the interlocking of a shared gas supply valve for two units of gas combustion, characterized in that: This includes setting up a common gas supply inlet valve for gas co-combustion of dual coal-fired units, and incorporating the common gas supply inlet valve into the first control unit for remote control; Monitor the status of the second control unit and form hard interlocking through software communication and hardware interlocking communication; When a single control unit stops operating, the interlock function is activated to keep the other control unit operating normally; The self-locking function is activated after the dual control units are shut down to prevent the valve from opening by mistake; Set the manual unlocking operation and start the combustion system after manual unlocking.
2. The interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Monitoring the status of the second control unit includes: Collect the operating parameters of the second control unit; determine the start and stop status of the second control unit; and detect the safety status of the second control unit.
3. The interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: Hard interlocking includes: Establish a software communication link to transmit control unit status information; establish a hardware interlocking loop to perform interlocking actions independently of software communication; when an abnormal state is detected, directly close the common air supply inlet valve through the hardware interlocking loop.
4. The interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: Interlock functions include: Detect the operating status of the first control unit and the second control unit; when the first control unit stops operating, maintain the air supply channel of the second control unit; when the second control unit stops operating, maintain the air supply channel of the first control unit.
5. The interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: Self-locking features include: Detect the simultaneous shutdown of dual control units; lock the common air supply inlet valve after the dual control units are shut down at the same time; and prevent the valve from being opened when it is not unlocked.
6. The interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: Manual unlocking operations include: Verify operator authority; execute unlocking instructions; record the unlocking operation process.
7. The interlock control method for a shared gas supply valve for dual-unit gas combustion as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that: include: Install pressure sensors and flow sensors in the dual coal-fired unit co-firing system; Real-time monitoring of the pressure and flow parameters of the combustion system; When the pressure parameter or flow parameter exceeds the preset threshold, the emergency closure of the common air supply inlet valve is triggered; Manual unlocking confirmation is performed before the combustion system is put into operation; Record all operating procedures and parameter changes.
8. A dual-unit gas co-firing shared gas supply valve interlock control system, based on the dual-unit gas co-firing shared gas supply valve interlock control method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: It also includes a preset module, setting a shared gas supply inlet valve for gas co-firing of dual coal-fired units, and incorporating the shared gas supply inlet valve into the first control unit for remote control; A monitoring module monitors the status of the second control unit and forms a hard interlock through software communication and hardware interlock communication; Single control module, when a single control unit stops operating, activates the interlock function to keep the other control unit operating normally; The dual control module activates the self-locking function after the dual control units stop operating to prevent the valve from opening accidentally; Set the module, set the manual unlocking operation, and start the combustion system after manual unlocking.
9. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the interlocking control method for the shared gas supply valve of the dual-unit gas co-combustion are implemented as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the interlocking control method for the shared gas supply valve of a dual-unit gas co-combustion system according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.