Nuclear power plant deployment method for coping with unmanned aerial vehicle attack, nuclear power plant, equipment and medium
By assessing the drone threat to nuclear power plants and adjusting their defense structures, combined with the design of drone interception systems, the ability of nuclear power plants to defend against drone attacks has been improved, addressing the problem of insufficient defense capabilities and enhancing safety.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202510770898.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-06-10
- Publication Date
- 2025-10-31
AI Technical Summary
Nuclear power plants lack sufficient defenses against drone attacks, and existing security measures are ineffective against drones' software evasion and physical penetration.
By acquiring drone information and original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, a drone threat assessment is conducted, the defense structure design is adjusted, and a drone interception system is configured to generate overall nuclear power plant design data to improve defense capabilities.
This enhances the physical protection structure of nuclear power plants against drone attacks, reduces the risk of drone attacks on nuclear power plants, and improves safety.
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Figure CN120875306A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of drone defense technology, and in particular to a nuclear power plant deployment method, nuclear power plant, equipment and medium for responding to drone attacks. Background Technology
[0002] With the continuous development of drone technology, the attack capabilities of drones are constantly improving, and the security risks to infrastructure from drone attacks are increasing. Nuclear power plants, as critical infrastructure, require extremely high levels of security protection. However, current security measures for nuclear power plants have limited defense against drones. Specifically, no-fly zones are typically established to restrict drone flights near nuclear power plants, but some drones can circumvent these restrictions using software. Furthermore, the current physical defense structures of nuclear power plants (such as barbed wire) lack designs specifically for drone defense and are easily breached. In conclusion, current nuclear power plants have a relatively poor defense against drone attacks.
[0003] Therefore, improving the ability of nuclear power plants to defend against drone attacks has become an urgent technical problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention
[0004] The main objective of this application is to propose a nuclear power plant deployment method, nuclear power plant, equipment, and medium for responding to drone attacks, aiming to improve the nuclear power plant's defense capabilities against drone attacks and thus enhance the safety of the nuclear power plant.
[0005] To achieve the above objectives, a first aspect of this application proposes a method for deploying nuclear power plants to counter drone attacks, the method comprising:
[0006] Obtain drone information;
[0007] Obtain the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data;
[0008] Based on the drone information and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, a drone threat assessment is performed to obtain the target drone threat level.
[0009] Based on the threat level of the target drone, the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data is adjusted to obtain the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data.
[0010] Based on the target drone threat level and the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data, the drone interception system configuration design is carried out to obtain the target drone interception system design data.
[0011] Based on the target nuclear power plant's defense structure design data and the target drone interception system design data, the overall design data of the nuclear power plant is generated, and the nuclear power plant is deployed according to the overall design data.
[0012] In some embodiments, the drone information includes drone attack methods, and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes original nuclear power plant wall structure data;
[0013] The step of adjusting the defense structure design of the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data according to the threat level of the target drone to obtain the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes:
[0014] Based on the target drone threat level, the drone attack method, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data, the thickness of the defensive structure is analyzed to obtain the target defensive structure thickness.
[0015] The thickness of the original nuclear power plant defense structure is updated based on the thickness of the target defense structure to obtain the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data is determined as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data.
[0016] In some embodiments, the drone information includes parameters of the explosives carried by the drone;
[0017] The process of analyzing the thickness of the defensive structure based on the threat level of the target drone, the attack method of the drone, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the thickness of the target defensive structure includes:
[0018] If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset first threat level threshold, and the drone attack method is an explosive attack, the explosive impact force is obtained by analyzing the explosive parameters carried by the drone and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data.
[0019] The thickness of the target defense structure is obtained by analyzing the wall thickness based on the explosive impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data.
[0020] In some embodiments, the drone information includes the drone's flight speed and weight;
[0021] The process of analyzing the thickness of the defensive structure based on the threat level of the target drone, the attack method of the drone, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the thickness of the target defensive structure includes:
[0022] If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset second threat level threshold, and the drone's attack method is an impact attack, the impact force is analyzed based on the drone's flight speed, the drone's weight, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the target impact force.
[0023] The thickness of the target defense structure is obtained by analyzing the wall thickness based on the target impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data.
[0024] In some embodiments, determining the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes:
[0025] The nuclear power plant corresponding to the first nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data is identified as the target nuclear power plant.
[0026] Obtain the construction status of the target nuclear power plant;
[0027] If the construction status is "built", the wall in the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data is reinforced according to the preset target wall reinforcement parameters to obtain the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data is determined as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data.
[0028] In some embodiments, the target wall reinforcement parameters include the target reinforcement layer thickness;
[0029] After performing reinforcement design on the walls in the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data according to preset target wall reinforcement parameters to obtain the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data, the method further includes:
[0030] If the target reinforcement layer thickness is greater than or equal to the preset reinforcement layer thickness threshold, obtain the wall thickness reduction percentage;
[0031] The wall thickness of the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data is reduced according to the wall thickness reduction percentage.
[0032] In some embodiments, after obtaining the construction status of the target nuclear power plant, the method further includes:
[0033] If the construction status is not constructed, the structural material of the first nuclear power plant's defense structure design data is updated according to the preset target defense material to obtain the third nuclear power plant's defense structure design data.
[0034] The design data of the defense structure of the third nuclear power plant is determined as the design data of the defense structure of the target nuclear power plant.
[0035] In some embodiments, the drone information includes the drone attack method and drone size, and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes the dimensions of the holes in the nuclear power plant defense structure;
[0036] The step of conducting a drone threat assessment based on the drone information and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data to obtain the target drone threat level includes:
[0037] A first drone threat assessment is performed based on the described drone attack method to obtain a first drone threat level.
[0038] Based on the size comparison between the drone size and the size of the opening in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, a second drone threat assessment is conducted to obtain a second drone threat level.
[0039] The threat level of the target drone is determined based on the first drone threat level and the second drone threat level.
[0040] In some embodiments, the second drone threat assessment, based on a size comparison between the drone size and the size of the openings in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, to obtain a second drone threat level, includes:
[0041] The dimensions of the UAV are compared with the dimensions of the holes in the nuclear power plant's defense structure to obtain the target size comparison result;
[0042] If the target size comparison result indicates that the size of the UAV is smaller than the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, the threat level of the second UAV is determined to be high threat level.
[0043] In some embodiments, the step of designing the drone interception system configuration based on the target drone threat level and the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data, to obtain target drone interception system design data, includes:
[0044] If the threat level of the target drone is less than a preset third threat level threshold, the design data of the first candidate drone interception system is obtained; wherein, the first candidate drone interception system is used to intercept the drone without causing physical damage to the drone;
[0045] The design data of the first candidate drone interception system is determined as the design data of the target drone interception system;
[0046] If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the third threat level threshold, the design data of the first candidate drone interception system and the design data of the second candidate drone interception system are obtained; wherein, the second candidate drone interception system is used to cause physical damage to the drone to intercept it;
[0047] The design data of the target drone interception system is obtained by integrating the design data of the first candidate drone interception system and the design data of the second candidate drone interception system.
[0048] To achieve the above objectives, a second aspect of this application provides a nuclear power plant that is deployed according to the method described in the first aspect above.
[0049] To achieve the above objectives, a third aspect of this application provides an electronic device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the method described in the first aspect.
[0050] To achieve the above objectives, a fourth aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the first aspect.
[0051] This application proposes a method for deploying nuclear power plants, a nuclear power plant, equipment, and media to counter drone attacks. It acquires drone information and original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and conducts drone threat assessment to obtain the target drone threat level, thus quantifying the degree of threat posed by drones to the nuclear power plant. Based on the target drone threat level, the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data is adjusted. This allows for targeted design and adjustment of the nuclear power plant's defense structure to resist drone attacks, based on the degree of drone threat, thereby improving the physical protection structure's ability to defend against drone attacks. Simultaneously, a drone interception system is configured for the nuclear power plant based on the target drone threat level to generate target drone interception system design data. The target nuclear power plant defense structure design data and the target drone interception system design data are then combined to generate overall nuclear power plant design data for deployment. This reduces the risk of drone attacks on the nuclear power plant, improves its defense capabilities against drone attacks, and enhances the plant's security. Attached Figure Description
[0052] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks, provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0053] Figure 2 yes Figure 1 The flowchart for step 103 in the text;
[0054] Figure 3 yes Figure 2 The flowchart for step 202 in the document;
[0055] Figure 4 yes Figure 1 The flowchart for step 104 in the document;
[0056] Figure 5This is an embodiment provided by this application. Figure 4 The flowchart for step 401 in the document;
[0057] Figure 6 This is provided by another embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 The flowchart for step 401 in the document;
[0058] Figure 7 yes Figure 4 The flowchart for step 403 in the document;
[0059] Figure 8 This is a flowchart of a nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks, provided in another embodiment of this application;
[0060] Figure 9 This is a flowchart of a nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks, provided in another embodiment of this application;
[0061] Figure 10 yes Figure 1 The flowchart for step 105 in the document;
[0062] Figure 11 This is a flowchart illustrating an application example provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0063] Figure 12 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of the electronic device provided in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0064] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.
[0065] It should be noted that although functional modules are divided in the device schematic diagram and a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be performed in a different order than the module division in the device or the order in the flowchart. The terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and the aforementioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence.
[0066] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing embodiments of this application only and is not intended to limit this application.
[0067] First, let's analyze some of the terms used in this application:
[0068] Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a new technical science that studies and develops theories, methods, technologies, and application systems for simulating, extending, and expanding human intelligence. A branch of computer science, AI attempts to understand the essence of intelligence and produce intelligent machines that can react in a way similar to human intelligence. Research in this field includes robotics, speech recognition, image recognition, natural language processing, and expert systems. AI can be a simulation of the information processes of human consciousness and thought. It can also be the theory, methods, technologies, and application systems that use digital computers or machines controlled by digital computers to simulate, extend, and expand human intelligence, perceive the environment, acquire knowledge, and use that knowledge to obtain optimal results. Fundamental AI technologies generally include sensors, dedicated AI chips, cloud computing, distributed storage, big data processing technology, operating / interactive systems, and mechatronics. AI software technologies mainly include computer vision, robotics, biometrics, speech processing, natural language processing, and machine learning / deep learning. This application can acquire and process relevant data based on AI technology.
[0069] Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): Also known as an unmanned aerial vehicle, it is an unmanned aircraft controlled by radio remote control equipment and its own program control device. UAVs can be divided into unmanned fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, unmanned helicopters, and unmanned multi-rotor aircraft. Compared with manned aircraft, UAVs have advantages such as small size, low cost, and ease of use.
[0070] Nuclear power plants, also known as nuclear power plants, are facilities that convert nuclear energy into electrical energy through controlled nuclear fission reactions. The core principle of a nuclear power plant involves using nuclear fuel to undergo a chain fission reaction within a nuclear reactor to generate heat energy, which heats water into high-temperature steam. The steam then drives a generator to produce electricity.
[0071] With the continuous development of drone technology and the increasing destructive power of drone attacks, the probability of drones (such as civilian drones and drone swarms) maliciously attacking infrastructure is becoming more frequent, posing a security threat to infrastructure such as nuclear power plants. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that critical infrastructure has the capability to withstand drone attacks. Currently, drones can be restricted through flight permits, such as automatically banning drones from flying in areas where critical infrastructure such as airports and nuclear power plants are located. Nuclear power plants, as critical infrastructure, require paramount security protection. However, traditional security measures for nuclear power plants mainly target ground threats, offering limited defense against drones. Specifically, traditional nuclear power plant security measures primarily rely on radiation shielding and earthquake protection, lacking defensive designs against low-altitude small drones. For example, drones may carry explosives or enter the nuclear power plant through openings in the external walls, thereby damaging critical facilities. Current physical barriers in nuclear power plants (such as barbed wire) are insufficient to protect against high-speed drone penetration attacks. Furthermore, there is a lack of structural optimization schemes for drone attacks that address the structural characteristics of nuclear power facilities.
[0072] Based on this, the embodiments of this application propose a nuclear power plant deployment method, nuclear power plant, equipment and medium for responding to drone attacks, which can improve the nuclear power plant's defense capability against drone attacks, thereby improving the security protection level of the nuclear power plant in response to drone attacks.
[0073] The nuclear power plant deployment method, nuclear power plant, equipment and medium for responding to drone attacks provided in this application are specifically described through the following embodiments. First, the nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks in this application embodiment is described.
[0074] Figure 1 This is an optional flowchart of a nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks provided in the embodiments of this application. Figure 1 The method may include, but is not limited to, steps 101 to 106.
[0075] Step 101: Obtain drone information;
[0076] Step 102: Obtain the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data;
[0077] Step 103: Based on the drone information and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, conduct a drone threat assessment to obtain the target drone threat level;
[0078] Step 104: Adjust the defense structure design of the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data according to the threat level of the target drone to obtain the defense structure design data of the target nuclear power plant.
[0079] Step 105: Based on the threat level of the target drone and the design data of the defense structure of the target nuclear power plant, design the configuration of the drone interception system to obtain the design data of the target drone interception system;
[0080] Step 106: Generate the overall design data of the nuclear power plant based on the design data of the target nuclear power plant's defense structure and the design data of the target drone interception system, so as to deploy the nuclear power plant according to the overall design data.
[0081] The beneficial effects of this application's embodiments include, but are not limited to: obtaining drone information and original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and conducting drone threat assessment to obtain the target drone threat level, thereby quantifying the degree of threat posed by drones to the nuclear power plant. Based on the target drone threat level, the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data is adjusted, allowing for targeted design and adjustment of the nuclear power plant's defense structure to resist drone attacks based on the degree of drone threat, thus improving the nuclear power plant's physical protection structure's ability to defend against drone attacks. Simultaneously, a drone interception system is configured for the nuclear power plant based on the target drone threat level to generate target drone interception system design data. The target nuclear power plant defense structure design data and the target drone interception system design data are then combined to generate the overall nuclear power plant design data for deployment, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear power plants facing drone attacks, improving the nuclear power plant's defense capabilities against drone attacks, and enhancing the safety of the nuclear power plant.
[0082] In step 101 of some embodiments, drone information refers to relevant information about a drone used to assess the potential threat posed by the drone to a nuclear power plant. For example, drone information may include any one or more of the following: drone attack methods (such as impact, explosive dropping, electromagnetic interference, etc.), drone explosive parameters, drone size, drone flight speed, and drone weight.
[0083] In some embodiments, the drone attack method can be a collision attack or an attack carrying explosives. For example, if the drone attack method is an attack carrying explosives, the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone can include the weight of the explosives that the drone can carry, the type of explosives, the explosive equivalent, etc.
[0084] In some embodiments, information on different types of drones can be obtained from a pre-defined drone database, yielding information on at least two drones. Alternatively, information on drone attacks can be obtained by analyzing historical drone attacks on nuclear power plants. In another embodiment, drone information can be obtained through other means, not limited to these.
[0085] In step 102 of some embodiments, the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data refers to the design data of the nuclear power plant's defense structure (such as the nuclear power plant's outer walls, dome, barbed wire, etc.). Specifically, the data type of the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data may include one or more of design drawings, design documents, and 3D modeling data.
[0086] In some embodiments, the original nuclear power plant defensive structure design data may include any one or more of the following: structural data of the nuclear power plant's defensive structure (such as the wall thickness and material parameters of the outer walls, the curvature of the dome), the size of the openings in the outer walls of the nuclear power plant, etc.
[0087] In some embodiments, the structural design data (i.e., the original nuclear power plant defensive structural design data) of a nuclear power plant can be obtained from a nuclear power plant building structure archive or a nuclear power plant building structure database.
[0088] In step 103 of some embodiments, the target drone threat level is used to characterize the degree of threat posed by the drone corresponding to the drone information to the nuclear power plant deployed based on the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data. Specifically, the target drone threat level may include any one of a low threat level, a medium threat level, and a high threat level.
[0089] In some embodiments, the destructive force of a drone on the nuclear power plant's defense structure can be calculated based on parameters such as the drone's speed, the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone (e.g., explosive weight), and the materials of the nuclear power plant's outer walls from the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, so as to determine the threat level of the target drone based on the destructive force. In another embodiment, the threat level of the target drone can also be determined by other methods, and is not limited to these.
[0090] In step 104 of some embodiments, if the target drone poses a high threat level, such as a high or medium threat level, adjustments can be made to the defensive structure (such as the outer wall of the nuclear power plant) in the original nuclear power plant defensive structure design data, such as thickening, material reinforcement, and physical structural strengthening. For example, when the target drone poses a high threat level, the material of the outer wall can be changed from ordinary concrete to high-toughness concrete, and a carbon fiber protective layer can be added to the outer wall, etc.
[0091] In some embodiments, the original nuclear power plant defensive structure design data includes structural design data for the exterior walls and / or the dome. For example, adjusting the original nuclear power plant defensive structure design data can involve optimizing the exterior walls (or dome) to have a streamlined shape, resulting in streamlined dome structural design data. Alternatively, the exterior wall's structural shape can be changed from a vertical plane to a sloping plane to obtain streamlined dome structural design data, thereby improving the impact resistance of the nuclear power plant's critical structures.
[0092] In some embodiments, adjusting the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data may include adding defensive structures to the original design data. Specifically, physical defense structures such as interceptor nets (also known as protective nets) and explosion-proof grids may be added to areas of the nuclear power plant with weak defenses against drone attacks, such as ventilation openings and holes in the plant's exterior walls. Other types of protective barriers may also be added. The interceptor net can be a flexible net composed of ring-shaped mesh panels, with multiple ring-shaped mesh panels arranged in a set of four to form the entire net. The ring-shaped mesh panels are made of steel wires (such as ultra-high-strength steel wire) coiled in a parallel or twisted manner, with the wires secured by clips. For example, the diameter of the ring-shaped mesh panels can be any value between 200 and 500 millimeters (mm). The diameter of the ring-shaped mesh panels can also be selected based on the size of the drone, and is not limited to this.
[0093] It should be noted that the target nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data refers to the adjusted original nuclear power plant defensive structure design data. Specifically, the target nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data and the original nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data have the same data type, such as electronic files and 3D modeling data.
[0094] In step 105 of some embodiments, the target drone interception system design data is the design data for a defense system (i.e., a drone interception system) used to intercept drones. For example, the drone interception system may include one or more interception devices of either of the following two device types: soft-kill interception type devices, including radio jamming devices, drone navigation jamming devices, electromagnetic pulse interception network devices, etc.; and hard-kill interception type devices, including laser interceptors, etc. In another embodiment, the drone interception system may also include detection type devices, such as phased array radar (PAR), millimeter-wave radar, infrared imagers, acoustic arrays, etc.
[0095] In some embodiments, the design data for the target drone interception system may specifically include parameters such as the positional layout of the aforementioned interception devices, the number and type of each interception device, etc. For example, the detection radius of the millimeter-wave radar may be less than or equal to 5 kilometers (km), the temperature resolution of the infrared thermal imager may be less than or equal to 0.1 degrees Celsius, the frequency range of the acoustic array may be 20-80 kHz, the field strength of the electromagnetic pulse interception network device may be 30-50 kV / m, and the power density of the laser jammer may be greater than or equal to 1 kW / cm². 2 This allows for the deployment of a drone interception system with layered detection and interception capabilities, enabling the detection, identification, and interception of drones, thereby enhancing the defense capabilities against drone attacks on nuclear power plants.
[0096] In step 106 of some embodiments, the overall design data of the nuclear power plant may include the design data of the target nuclear power plant's defense structure and the design data of the target drone interception system. Specifically, deploying the nuclear power plant based on the overall design data may involve constructing an physical nuclear power plant based on the overall design data. This application embodiment, by constructing a comprehensive, multi-layered composite defense system for the nuclear power plant, can effectively resist attacks from drone swarms.
[0097] In some embodiments, the overall design data for a nuclear power plant may also include sensor design data. Sensor design data may include the type, location, and quantity of sensors. For example, based on the sensor design data, radar, photoelectric sensors, acoustic sensors, etc., can be deployed around the nuclear power plant (within a predetermined geographical area) to construct a comprehensive, multi-layered drone detection system. This system can identify drones even when the nuclear power plant cannot avoid drone attacks, allowing for subsequent countermeasures.
[0098] In some embodiments, contingency plans for drone attacks can be developed and regularly practiced. Specifically, the contingency plan may include nuclear power plant response measures in the event of a drone (or drone swarm) attack. For example, nuclear power plant response measures may include early warning activation, countermeasure activation, and response measures in the event of a drone collision or an attack carrying explosives. In another embodiment, the contingency plan may also include response measures such as personnel evacuation and fire extinguishing.
[0099] Please see Figure 2 In some embodiments, the drone information includes the drone attack method and drone size, and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes the size of the holes in the nuclear power plant defense structure.
[0100] Step 103 may include, but is not limited to, steps 201 through 203:
[0101] Step 201: Conduct a first drone threat assessment based on the drone attack method to obtain the first drone threat level;
[0102] Step 202: Based on the size comparison between the drone size and the size of the openings in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, a second drone threat assessment is conducted to obtain the second drone threat level;
[0103] Step 203: Determine the threat level of the target drone based on the first drone threat level and the second drone threat level.
[0104] The advantage of this embodiment lies in its ability to comprehensively assess threat levels based on the drone attack method and the dimensional relationship between the drone size and the size of openings in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, thereby improving the comprehensiveness of drone threat level assessment. Specifically, a first drone threat level is assessed based on the drone attack method (such as impact or explosive device dropping), and a second drone threat level is assessed based on whether the drone size is smaller than the size of the openings in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, in order to analyze the risk of drones intruding into the nuclear power plant through the openings. Then, the target drone threat level is generated by combining the first and second drone threat levels. This allows for a thorough assessment of the threat level of drones to the nuclear power plant's defense structure under different scenarios, thereby improving the comprehensiveness of drone threat level assessment and ultimately enhancing the reliability of nuclear power plant defense designs against drone attack threats.
[0105] In step 201 of some embodiments, the first drone threat level is an assessment of the drone threat level based on the drone attack method. For example, if the drone attack method is an attack with explosives, the first drone threat level is a high threat level (or a medium threat level). As another example, if the drone attack method is a collision attack, the threat is relatively low because the impact energy of a direct drone collision is limited; in this case, the first drone threat level is a low threat level.
[0106] In step 202 of some embodiments, the second drone threat level is assessed based on whether the drone's size is sufficient to pass through a hole in the nuclear power plant's defensive structure. The second drone threat level reflects the likelihood of a drone intruding into the nuclear power plant facility. For example, if the drone's size is smaller than the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defensive structure, the second drone threat level is high, indicating a higher likelihood of the drone intruding into the nuclear power plant facility. Conversely, if the drone's size is greater than or equal to the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defensive structure, the second drone threat level is low, indicating a lower likelihood of the drone intruding into the nuclear power plant facility.
[0107] In step 203 of some embodiments, the target drone threat level can be jointly determined based on the first drone threat level and the second drone threat level according to preset multi-level judgment rules. For example, if the first drone threat level and the second drone threat level have the same value, such as both being low threat levels, then the first drone threat level (or the second drone threat level) can be directly determined as the target drone threat level. As another example, if either the first drone threat level or the second drone threat level is a high threat level, then the target drone threat level is a medium threat level. In another embodiment, the target drone threat level can also be determined in other ways, and is not limited to these.
[0108] Please see Figure 3 In some embodiments, step 202 may include, but is not limited to, steps 301 to 302:
[0109] Step 301: Compare the dimensions of the UAV with the dimensions of the holes in the nuclear power plant's defense structure to obtain the target size comparison results;
[0110] Step 302: If the target size comparison result indicates that the size of the UAV is smaller than the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, the threat level of the second UAV is determined to be high threat level.
[0111] The advantage of this embodiment lies in its ability to determine whether a drone has the potential to infiltrate the nuclear power plant through a hole by comparing its geometric parameters (such as length, width, and height) with the dimensions of the openings in the nuclear power plant's defense structure (such as the hole radius). If a drone smaller than the opening size is detected, the second drone threat level is determined to be high, allowing subsequent adjustments to the nuclear power plant's defense structure design to specifically address the opening design, such as reducing the opening size or adding protective netting. This reduces the risk of drone attacks on internal facilities of the nuclear power plant and improves the plant's defense capabilities against drone attacks.
[0112] In step 301 of some embodiments, the target size comparison result may be that the size of the UAV is smaller than the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, or that the size of the UAV is greater than or equal to the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defense structure.
[0113] In step 302 of some embodiments, if the target size comparison result indicates that the size of the drone is smaller than the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, it means that the drone can enter the interior of the nuclear power plant through the hole. Therefore, the drone poses a high threat to the nuclear power plant, and the second drone threat level is determined to be a high threat level.
[0114] In some embodiments, the size of the openings in the nuclear power plant's defensive structure can be that of holes in the outer wall of the nuclear power plant. Protective netting can be deployed at the openings of these holes to intercept drone attacks.
[0115] Please see Figure 4 In some embodiments, the drone information includes the drone attack method, and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes the original nuclear power plant wall structure data.
[0116] Step 104 may include, but is not limited to, steps 401 to 402:
[0117] Step 401: Analyze the thickness of the defensive structure based on the target drone threat level, drone attack method, and original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the thickness of the target defensive structure.
[0118] Step 402: Update the thickness of the original nuclear power plant defense structure according to the thickness of the target defense structure to obtain the design data of the first nuclear power plant defense structure, and determine the design data of the first nuclear power plant defense structure as the design data of the target nuclear power plant defense structure.
[0119] The advantage of this embodiment lies in its ability to analyze and determine the thickness of the nuclear power plant's wall structure based on the target drone's threat level, attack method, and original nuclear power plant defense structure design data. This allows for a more accurate analysis of the drone's threat level and attack method, leading to adjustments in the wall thickness. For example, when the drone attack involves explosives, the thickness of the nuclear power plant's defense structure can be dynamically updated to meet blast resistance requirements. This enhances the flexibility of design optimization for the nuclear power plant's defense structure design data, thereby improving the effectiveness of nuclear power facilities in defending against drone attacks.
[0120] In step 401 of some embodiments, for example, when the target drone threat level is high, the thickness of the target defense structure can be increased based on the thickness data in the original nuclear power plant wall structure data. As another example, when the target drone threat level is greater than low (e.g., medium or high threat level), if the drone attack method is an explosive attack, the thickness data in the original nuclear power plant wall structure data (e.g., 0.5 meters) can be increased by 15% to obtain the target defense structure thickness; if the drone attack method is an impact attack, the thickness data in the original nuclear power plant wall structure data can be increased by 5% to obtain the target defense structure thickness.
[0121] In some embodiments, if the walls in the original nuclear power plant wall structure data are multi-layered, the target defense structure thickness may include the thickness of each layer in the wall. For example, assuming that the wall represented by the original nuclear power plant defense structure data consists of two vertical steel plates and concrete, the target defense structure thickness may include the thickness of the concrete layer (e.g., any value between 0.5 meters and 2 meters) and the thickness of each steel plate (e.g., any value between 10 millimeters and 50 millimeters).
[0122] In step 402 of some embodiments, the thickness data in the first nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data is the target defensive structure thickness. For example, assuming the first nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data represents the design data of the nuclear power plant's outer wall, then the thickness of that outer wall is the target defensive structure thickness.
[0123] Please see Figure 5 In some embodiments, the drone information includes parameters of the explosives carried by the drone;
[0124] Step 401 may include, but is not limited to, steps 501 to 502:
[0125] Step 501: If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset first threat level threshold and the drone attack method is an attack with explosives, the explosive impact force is analyzed based on the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the explosive impact force.
[0126] Step 502: Analyze the wall thickness based on the explosive impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the target defense structure thickness.
[0127] The advantage of this embodiment is that if the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to a preset first threat level threshold, and the drone attack method is an explosive attack, then the explosive impact force corresponding to the parameters of the explosive carried by the drone is analyzed, and then the wall thickness is analyzed based on the explosive impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data. This ensures that the wall's blast resistance is adapted to the drone attack yield, improving the nuclear power plant's defense capability against drone attacks.
[0128] In step 501 of some embodiments, the first threat level threshold can be a medium threat level or a high threat level. For example, assuming the first threat level threshold is a medium threat level and the target drone threat level is a high threat level, then the target drone threat level is greater than the first threat level threshold.
[0129] In some embodiments, the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone may include the type of explosives that the drone can carry, the weight of the explosives, and the explosive yield. It should be noted that the destructive force (i.e., the explosive impact force) of an attack by a drone carrying explosives is related to parameters such as the explosive yield in the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone.
[0130] In step 502 of some embodiments, it should be noted that the target defensive structure thickness is the thickness of the wall capable of withstanding the impact force (such as the impact force of an explosion) of a drone attack. In some embodiments, for example, the target defensive structure thickness can be obtained by analyzing the wall thickness using a preset impact simulation model based on the explosion impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data. Alternatively, a structural failure mode relationship curve model can be established based on parameters such as the explosion impact force, the original nuclear power plant wall structure data, and the explosive equivalent in the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone, to analyze and obtain a suitable wall thickness. In another embodiment, other methods can also be used to calculate the target defensive structure thickness, and this is not limited to these.
[0131] Please see Figure 6 In some embodiments, the drone information includes the drone's flight speed and weight;
[0132] Step 401 may include, but is not limited to, steps 601 to 602:
[0133] Step 601: If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset second threat level threshold and the drone attack method is an impact attack, the impact force is analyzed based on the drone's flight speed, drone weight, and original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the target impact force.
[0134] Step 602: Analyze the wall thickness based on the target impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the target defense structure thickness.
[0135] The advantage of this embodiment is that, when the threat level of the target drone exceeds a preset threshold and the drone's attack method is an impact attack, the target impact force is analyzed specifically based on the drone's flight speed and weight. This allows for the precise quantification of the drone's impact energy's potential to damage the nuclear power plant's defense structure. Then, by analyzing the thickness of the nuclear power plant's wall structure based on the target impact force, the plant's resistance to drone impact damage can be improved.
[0136] In step 601 of some embodiments, the second threat level threshold can be a low threat level. It should be noted that the target impact force refers to the force generated when the drone, corresponding to the drone information, impacts the wall represented by the original nuclear power plant wall structure data. Specifically, the target impact force can be obtained by analyzing the drone's flight speed and weight using a preset impact dynamics model or empirical formula. Other methods can also be used to calculate the target impact force, and are not limited to these.
[0137] In step 602 of some embodiments, it should be noted that the target defense structure thickness is the thickness of the wall capable of withstanding the impact force (such as target impact force) of a drone attack. The target defense structure thickness can be obtained by analyzing the target impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data (including parameters such as wall material) using a preset impact simulation model. Other methods can also be used to calculate the target defense structure thickness, and this is not limited to these.
[0138] Please see Figure 7 In some embodiments, step 403 may include, but is not limited to, steps 701 to 703:
[0139] Step 701: Identify the nuclear power plant corresponding to the first nuclear power plant's defense structure design data as the target nuclear power plant;
[0140] Step 702: Obtain the construction status of the target nuclear power plant;
[0141] Step 703: If the construction status is "built", the wall in the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data is reinforced according to the preset target wall reinforcement parameters to obtain the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data is determined as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data.
[0142] The advantage of this embodiment lies in its ability to differentiate between the design adjustment needs of existing and non-existent nuclear power plants by analyzing whether the nuclear power plant corresponding to the first nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data has already been constructed. This allows for differentiated processing of the nuclear power plant's defensive structure design. If the nuclear power plant has already been constructed, a reinforcement layer can be added to the walls based on the existing nuclear power plant building structure. This non-destructive reinforcement process eliminates the need for design solutions requiring demolition and reconstruction, such as modifying the overall wall material. This enhances the nuclear power plant's defense capabilities against drone attacks and reduces the cost of adjusting the nuclear power plant's defensive structure.
[0143] In step 701 of some embodiments, the target nuclear power plant refers to a nuclear power plant designed based on the defense structure design data of the first nuclear power plant.
[0144] In step 702 of some embodiments, the construction status of the target nuclear power plant can be any of the three states: built, under construction, or not built. Specifically, "built" means that the civil construction of the target nuclear power plant has been completed.
[0145] In step 703 of some embodiments, the target wall reinforcement parameters may include the type of reinforcement material, the reinforcement method, and the target reinforcement layer thickness. For example, the reinforcement material type may be a polyurea coating, and the reinforcement method may be to spray polyurea onto the back of the wall to form a coating. The thickness of the polyurea coating (i.e., the target reinforcement layer thickness) may be any value between 5 and 50 millimeters (mm). As another example, the reinforcement material type may be a steel plate, and the reinforcement method may be to install a steel plate on the wall surface. The thickness of the steel plate (i.e., the target reinforcement layer thickness) may be any value between 5 and 50 mm. It should be noted that when the reinforcement material type is a coating, the specific reinforcement material type may also be other anti-corrosion, waterproof, or wear-resistant coatings besides polyurea, and is not limited to this.
[0146] Please see Figure 8 In some embodiments, the target wall reinforcement parameters include the target reinforcement layer thickness;
[0147] Following step 703, the deployment method for nuclear power plants to counter drone attacks may also include, but is not limited to, steps 801 to 802:
[0148] Step 801: If the target reinforcement layer thickness is greater than or equal to the preset reinforcement layer thickness threshold, obtain the wall thickness reduction percentage.
[0149] Step 802: Perform thickness reduction processing on the wall thickness of the defensive structure design data of the second nuclear power plant according to the wall thickness reduction percentage.
[0150] The advantage of this embodiment is that when a large target reinforcement layer thickness is detected, such as greater than or equal to a preset reinforcement layer thickness threshold, it indicates that the wall's impact resistance performance meets the standard. At this point, the overall wall thickness can be appropriately reduced according to the wall thickness reduction percentage to reduce the amount of building materials used, thereby reducing the cost of nuclear power plant deployment while ensuring the wall's impact resistance performance.
[0151] In step 801 of some embodiments, the target wall reinforcement parameters include the type of reinforcement material and the target reinforcement layer thickness, with the target reinforcement layer thickness corresponding to the type of reinforcement material. For example, assuming the reinforcement material type in the target wall reinforcement parameters is polyurea coating, the reinforcement layer thickness threshold can be 10 mm. Assuming the reinforcement material type in the target wall reinforcement parameters is steel plate, the reinforcement layer thickness threshold can be any value between 10 and 30 mm.
[0152] In some embodiments, the reinforcement layer thickness threshold can be any value from 5 to 50 millimeters (mm). For example, the reinforcement layer thickness threshold can be 5 mm, 10 mm, or 50 mm.
[0153] In some embodiments, the wall thickness reduction percentage corresponding to the reinforcement material type can be obtained based on the reinforcement material type in the target wall reinforcement parameters. For example, assuming the reinforcement material type in the target wall reinforcement parameters is polyurea, and the thickness of the polyurea is greater than or equal to the reinforcement layer thickness threshold (e.g., 10 mm), then the wall thickness reduction percentage can be any value between 10% and 15%. As another example, assuming the reinforcement material type in the target wall reinforcement parameters is steel plate, and the thickness of the steel plate is greater than or equal to the reinforcement layer thickness threshold (e.g., 20 mm), then the wall thickness reduction percentage can be any value between 15% and 25%.
[0154] In another embodiment, the wall thickness reduction percentage can also be obtained in other ways, such as a preset percentage, such as any value between 10% and 30%, and is not limited thereto.
[0155] In step 802 of some embodiments, the wall thickness in the nuclear power plant defense structure design data after thickness reduction is equal to the wall thickness in the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data * (1 - wall thickness reduction percentage).
[0156] Please see Figure 9 In some embodiments, after step 702, the nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks may also include, but is not limited to, steps 901 to 902:
[0157] Step 901: If the construction status is not constructed, update the structural material of the first nuclear power plant's defense structure design data according to the preset target defense material to obtain the third nuclear power plant's defense structure design data.
[0158] Step 902: Determine the defensive structure design data of the third nuclear power plant as the defensive structure design data of the target nuclear power plant.
[0159] The advantage of this embodiment lies in its ability to differentiate the design adjustment needs between unbuilt and built facilities by determining the construction status of the nuclear power plant, thereby enabling differentiated processing of the nuclear power plant's defensive structure design. Specifically, if the nuclear power plant is under construction (i.e., in the design phase), the original materials (such as concrete) in the first nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data can be optimized to target defensive materials (such as steel plate concrete, carbon fiber concrete, etc.). This allows for the selection of materials with better defensive performance, achieving compatibility between the nuclear power plant's defensive materials and the drone threat level during the design phase. This minimizes the structural modification costs of subsequent renovations to existing nuclear power plants and improves the nuclear power plant's defensive structure's ability to defend against drone attacks.
[0160] In step 901 of some embodiments, it should be noted that the impact resistance of the structural material (also known as the original defense material) in the design data of the first nuclear power plant's defense structure is lower than that of the target defense material. For example, the original defense material may be cement concrete, i.e., ordinary concrete, which has poor defense capabilities against high-threat drones (such as drones capable of carrying explosives). The target defense material may include any one or more of steel plate concrete and carbon fiber concrete, or other high-strength, high-toughness concrete materials. The impact resistance of the nuclear power plant's critical defense structures (such as external walls) can be improved by replacing the original defense material in the design data of the first nuclear power plant's defense structure with the target defense material.
[0161] In step 902 of some embodiments, when the construction status is "not under construction", the design data of the target nuclear power plant's defense structure is the design data of the defense structure of the third nuclear power plant.
[0162] Please see Figure 10 In some embodiments, step 105 may include, but is not limited to, steps 1001 to 1004:
[0163] Step 1001: If the threat level of the target drone is less than the preset third threat level threshold, obtain the design data of the first candidate drone interception system; wherein, the first candidate drone interception system is used to intercept the drone without causing physical damage to the drone;
[0164] Step 1002: Determine the design data of the first candidate UAV interception system as the design data of the target UAV interception system;
[0165] Step 1003: If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the third threat level threshold, obtain the design data of the first candidate drone interception system and the design data of the second candidate drone interception system; wherein, the second candidate drone interception system is used to cause physical damage to the drone to intercept it.
[0166] Step 1004: Integrate the design data of the first candidate UAV interception system and the design data of the second candidate UAV interception system to obtain the design data of the target UAV interception system.
[0167] The advantage of this embodiment lies in that it designs and configures the corresponding drone interception system based on whether the threat level of the target drone exceeds a preset third threat level threshold (hereinafter referred to as the preset threshold). When the threat level of the target drone is less than the preset threshold (e.g., medium to high threat level), it indicates that the drone poses a relatively low threat, and only the first candidate drone interception system is configured. This allows the drone to be driven away through non-physical damage, employing a passive defense strategy that avoids collateral damage and reduces energy consumption. When the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset threshold, it indicates that the drone poses a relatively high threat. Therefore, both the first and second candidate drone interception systems are configured simultaneously, thereby intercepting the drone by causing physical damage. This combined active and passive defense strategy improves the flexibility of nuclear power plant defense structure design in response to drone attacks.
[0168] In step 1001 of some embodiments, the third threat level threshold can be a medium threat level or a high threat level. It should be noted that the first candidate drone interception system refers to a system that drives away drones through non-physical damage methods, i.e., a drone interception system employing soft-kill methods. For example, the first candidate drone interception system may include one or more of the following devices: radio jamming devices, GPS (Global Positioning System) jamming devices, drone navigation jamming devices, etc. The first candidate drone interception system can force a drone to land or return by interfering with its navigation or communication.
[0169] In step 1002 of some embodiments, when the threat level of the target drone is less than the third threat level threshold, the target drone interception system design data is the first candidate drone interception system.
[0170] In step 1003 of some embodiments, it should be noted that the second candidate drone interception system refers to a system that physically destroys the drone to intercept it, that is, a drone interception system that employs hard-kill methods. For example, the second candidate drone interception system may include one or more of the following devices: laser weapons, microwave weapons, etc.
[0171] In step 1004 of some embodiments, when the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the third threat level threshold, the target drone interception system design data includes a first candidate drone interception system and a second candidate drone interception system. Specifically, during the design data integration process, the device positions of the devices in the first candidate drone interception system and / or the second candidate drone interception system can be adjusted to avoid conflicts in the deployment positions of the various devices.
[0172] Please see Figure 11 In one application example, to defend against drone attacks, the structure of a nuclear power plant can be designed using the following steps. First, a threat assessment of drones is conducted to analyze potential drone threats and evaluate whether drones pose a threat to the nuclear power plant under different scenarios. If drones do not pose a threat, no further analysis or protection is needed. If drones do pose a threat, the structure of the nuclear power plant can be designed, and sensors can be deployed around the plant, along with the configuration of a drone interception system. Then, contingency plans can be developed for drone attack scenarios.
[0173] This application also provides a nuclear power plant, which is deployed according to the above-described nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks.
[0174] The specific implementation method of this nuclear power plant is basically the same as the specific implementation method of the nuclear power plant deployment method for dealing with drone attacks described above, and will not be repeated here.
[0175] This application also provides an electronic device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the aforementioned nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks. This electronic device can include any smart terminal such as a tablet computer or in-vehicle computer.
[0176] Please see Figure 12 , Figure 12 The hardware structure of an electronic device according to another embodiment is illustrated. The electronic device includes:
[0177] The processor 1101 can be implemented using a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), microprocessor, application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits, and is used to execute relevant programs to implement the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application.
[0178] The memory 1102 can be implemented as a read-only memory (ROM), static storage device, dynamic storage device, or random access memory (RAM). The memory 1102 can store the operating system and other applications. When the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this specification are implemented through software or firmware, the relevant program code is stored in the memory 1102 and is called and executed by the processor 1101 to execute the nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks according to the embodiments of this application.
[0179] Input / output interface 1103 is used to implement information input and output;
[0180] The communication interface 1104 is used to enable communication and interaction between this device and other devices. Communication can be achieved through wired means (such as USB, network cable, etc.) or wireless means (such as mobile network, WIFI, Bluetooth, etc.).
[0181] Bus 1105 transmits information between various components of the device (e.g., processor 1101, memory 1102, input / output interface 1103, and communication interface 1104);
[0182] The processor 1101, memory 1102, input / output interface 1103 and communication interface 1104 are connected to each other within the device via bus 1105.
[0183] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described nuclear power plant deployment method for responding to drone attacks.
[0184] Memory, as a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store non-transitory software programs and non-transitory computer-executable programs. Furthermore, memory may include high-speed random access memory, and may also include non-transitory memory, such as at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-transitory solid-state storage device. In some embodiments, memory may optionally include memory remotely located relative to the processor, and these remote memories can be connected to the processor via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.
[0185] It should be noted that the software tools or components not belonging to our company that appear in the embodiments of this application are merely examples and do not represent actual use.
[0186] The embodiments described in this application are intended to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application. Those skilled in the art will know that with the evolution of technology and the emergence of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.
[0187] Those skilled in the art will understand that the technical solutions shown in the figures do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of this application, and may include more or fewer steps than shown, or combine certain steps, or different steps.
[0188] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or some of the steps in the methods disclosed above, as well as the functional modules / units in the systems and devices, can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, or suitable combinations thereof.
[0189] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” “fourth,” etc. (if present) in the specification and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms “comprising” and “having,” and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.
[0190] It should be understood that in this application, "at least one (item)" means one or more, and "more than" means two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent three cases: only A exists, only B exists, and both A and B exist simultaneously, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one (item) of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one (item) of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.
[0191] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of the units described above is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. The coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the shown or discussed units may be through some interfaces, or indirect coupling or communication connection between the apparatus or units, and may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.
[0192] The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.
[0193] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.
[0194] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes multiple instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing programs, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.
[0195] The preferred embodiments of the present application have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, but this does not limit the scope of the claims of the present application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and substance of the embodiments of the present application shall be within the scope of the claims of the present application.
Claims
1. A method for deploying nuclear power plants to counter drone attacks, characterized in that, The method includes: Obtain drone information; Obtain the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data; Based on the drone information and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data, a drone threat assessment is performed to obtain the target drone threat level. Based on the threat level of the target drone, the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data is adjusted to obtain the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data. Based on the target drone threat level and the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data, the drone interception system configuration design is carried out to obtain the target drone interception system design data. Based on the target nuclear power plant's defense structure design data and the target drone interception system design data, the overall design data of the nuclear power plant is generated, and the nuclear power plant is deployed according to the overall design data.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The drone information includes drone attack methods, and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes original nuclear power plant wall structure data. The step of adjusting the defense structure design of the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data according to the threat level of the target drone to obtain the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes: Based on the target drone threat level, the drone attack method, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data, the thickness of the defensive structure is analyzed to obtain the target defensive structure thickness. The thickness of the original nuclear power plant defense structure is updated based on the thickness of the target defense structure to obtain the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data is determined as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The drone information includes parameters of the explosives carried by the drone; The process of analyzing the thickness of the defensive structure based on the threat level of the target drone, the attack method of the drone, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the thickness of the target defensive structure includes: If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset first threat level threshold, and the drone attack method is an attack with explosives, the explosive impact force is obtained by analyzing the parameters of the explosives carried by the drone and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data. The thickness of the target defense structure is obtained by analyzing the wall thickness based on the explosive impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data.
4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The drone information includes the drone's flight speed and weight; The process of analyzing the thickness of the defensive structure based on the threat level of the target drone, the attack method of the drone, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the thickness of the target defensive structure includes: If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the preset second threat level threshold, and the drone's attack method is an impact attack, the impact force is analyzed based on the drone's flight speed, the drone's weight, and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data to obtain the target impact force. The thickness of the target defense structure is obtained by analyzing the wall thickness based on the target impact force and the original nuclear power plant wall structure data.
5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of determining the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes: The nuclear power plant corresponding to the first nuclear power plant's defensive structure design data is identified as the target nuclear power plant. Obtain the construction status of the target nuclear power plant; If the construction status is "built", the wall in the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data is reinforced according to the preset target wall reinforcement parameters to obtain the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data, and the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data is determined as the target nuclear power plant defense structure design data.
6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The target wall reinforcement parameters include the target reinforcement layer thickness; After performing reinforcement design on the walls in the first nuclear power plant defense structure design data according to preset target wall reinforcement parameters to obtain the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data, the method further includes: If the target reinforcement layer thickness is greater than or equal to the preset reinforcement layer thickness threshold, obtain the wall thickness reduction percentage; The wall thickness of the second nuclear power plant defense structure design data is reduced according to the wall thickness reduction percentage.
7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, After obtaining the construction status of the target nuclear power plant, the method further includes: If the construction status is not constructed, the structural material of the first nuclear power plant's defense structure design data is updated according to the preset target defense material to obtain the third nuclear power plant's defense structure design data. The design data of the defense structure of the third nuclear power plant is determined as the design data of the defense structure of the target nuclear power plant.
8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, The drone information includes the drone attack method and drone size, and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data includes the size of the holes in the nuclear power plant defense structure. The step of conducting a drone threat assessment based on the drone information and the original nuclear power plant defense structure design data to obtain the target drone threat level includes: A first drone threat assessment is performed based on the described drone attack method to obtain a first drone threat level. Based on the size comparison between the drone size and the size of the opening in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, a second drone threat assessment is conducted to obtain a second drone threat level. The threat level of the target drone is determined based on the first drone threat level and the second drone threat level.
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The second drone threat assessment is performed based on the size comparison between the drone size and the size of the openings in the nuclear power plant's defense structure to obtain a second drone threat level, including: The dimensions of the UAV are compared with the dimensions of the holes in the nuclear power plant's defense structure to obtain the target size comparison result; If the target size comparison result indicates that the size of the UAV is smaller than the size of the hole in the nuclear power plant's defense structure, the threat level of the second UAV is determined to be high threat level.
10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that, The step involves designing a drone interception system configuration based on the target drone threat level and the target nuclear power plant's defense structure design data, resulting in target drone interception system design data, including: If the threat level of the target drone is less than a preset third threat level threshold, the design data of the first candidate drone interception system is obtained; wherein, the first candidate drone interception system is used to intercept the drone without causing physical damage to the drone; The design data of the first candidate drone interception system is determined as the design data of the target drone interception system; If the threat level of the target drone is greater than or equal to the third threat level threshold, the design data of the first candidate drone interception system and the design data of the second candidate drone interception system are obtained; wherein, the second candidate drone interception system is used to cause physical damage to the drone to intercept it; The design data of the target drone interception system is obtained by integrating the design data of the first candidate drone interception system and the design data of the second candidate drone interception system.
11. A nuclear power plant, characterized in that, The nuclear power plant is deployed according to the method described in any one of claims 1 to 10.
12. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.
13. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.