Humanoid robot safety communication method in industrial scene and related equipment

Abstract

The invention discloses a humanoid robot safety communication method in an industrial scene and related equipment, and relates to the technical field of robots, and the method comprises the steps: a robot end generates a corresponding robot private key and a robot public key, and distributes a robot certificate based on the robot public key to a control end through an industrial authentication center; a control end certificate distributed by the industrial authentication center is received through the robot end, and the control end certificate is generated based on the control end public key; presenting a three-dimensional graphic code of first signature information about the certificate of the control end through the robot end, wherein the three-dimensional graphic code is used for being read and verified by the control end; the robot end signs the test data through a robot private key, encrypts a control end certificate to generate test information, and sends the test information to the control end; and generating a session key based on key negotiation of the two parties. Physical layer verification security is enhanced through the three-dimensional graphic code, and in combination with an end-to-end encryption mechanism, the communication security problem of multi-robot cooperation in an industrial scene is solved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of robots, in particular to a humanoid robot secure communication method in an industrial scenario and related equipment. BACKGROUND

[0002] Humanoid robots are increasingly widely used in industrial scenarios such as high-precision assembly, dangerous environment operation (such as chemical industry, nuclear industry), warehouse logistics, etc. The safety, real-time performance and reliability of robot communication are extremely high in industrial scenarios: if the control command is tampered with or intercepted, it may cause production accidents (such as assembly precision error, equipment collision); when multiple robots cooperate, sensor data (such as force feedback, visual positioning information) leakage may cause process secret leakage; there are electromagnetic interference, multi-device signal conflict, etc. in industrial environment, and traditional encryption mechanism is easy to be disturbed, resulting in verification failure.

[0003] The prior art has the following defects: 1. Industrial robots mostly use simple key authentication, lack dynamic certificate management, and are difficult to cope with multi-node cooperation scenarios; 2. Physical layer verification means is single (such as two-dimensional code), easy to be copied, and the recognition rate is low in dust, oil and other industrial environments; 3. Session key generation does not combine with industrial scenario features (such as device identifier, timestamp), and the anti-replay attack capability is weak. SUMMARY

[0004] The main purpose of the embodiments of the present application is to propose a humanoid robot secure communication method in an industrial scenario and related equipment to improve the security of robot communication and realize the combination scheme of end-to-end encryption and physical layer strong verification.

[0005] To achieve the above purpose, one aspect of the embodiments of the present application proposes a humanoid robot secure communication method in an industrial scenario, which comprises the following steps: A corresponding robot private key and robot public key are generated by the robot end, and the robot public key and device unique identifier are submitted to an industrial authentication center to apply for a robot certificate; after verification by the industrial authentication center, the robot certificate is encrypted and distributed to the control end; The control end certificate distributed by the industrial authentication center is received by the robot end; wherein the control end certificate is generated based on the control end public key, and the control end public key and the corresponding control end private key are generated by the control end; A three-dimensional graphic code of the first signature information of the control end certificate is displayed by the robot end; the first signature information is obtained by reading the three-dimensional graphic code by the control end, and the first signature information obtained by reading is verified according to the control end public key; The robot end generates second signature information by signing test data according to the robot private key, and generates test information by encrypting the second signature information according to the control end certificate, and sends the test information to the control end; the control end decrypts the test information according to the control end private key, and verifies the data obtained after the test information is decrypted based on the robot certificate; After the first signature information and the data obtained after the test information is decrypted are both verified, the robot end negotiates with the control end to generate a session key based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control end public key and the control end private key; The robot communicates by using the session key.

[0006] In some embodiments, the verification of the first signature information obtained by reading according to the control end public key includes the following steps: The control end verifies the threshold matching degree of the spatial depth information and the legality of the color update frequency to complete the physical layer verification; wherein the first signature information includes the spatial depth information and dynamic color coding of the three-dimensional graphic code, the spatial depth information is bound with the industrial scene identification through a preset threshold range, the dynamic color coding is generated based on the random number of AES encryption and is updated once every set period, and the dynamic color coding is used for dynamic color update.

[0007] In some embodiments, after the industrial authentication center verification is passed, the robot certificate is encrypted and distributed to the control end, including the following steps: The control end determines the ID of the robot certificate according to the device unique identifier of the robot end, and then obtains the robot certificate corresponding to the ID; wherein the device unique identifier binds the ID of the corresponding robot certificate and the ID of the control end certificate.

[0008] In some embodiments, the robot communicates by using the session key, including the following steps: The robot encrypts real-time collaboration instructions by using the session key and generates encrypted instructions; The robot sends the encrypted instructions to the control end or other robot end, wherein the encrypted instructions carry a timestamp and an instruction sequence number.

[0009] In some embodiments, the method further includes the following steps: The control end or the other robot end decrypts the encrypted instructions according to the session key, and verifies the timestamp and the instruction sequence number to prevent replay attacks.

[0010] In some embodiments, the generating, by the robot end, of the session key with the control end based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control end public key and the control end private key comprises the following steps: The generating, by the robot end, of the session key with the control end based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control end public key and the control end private key comprises the following steps: The expression of the improved DH algorithm is as follows: ; Wherein, The session key is K, The generating element is G, The prime number with a length of a set bit number is p, a is the robot private key, and b is the control end private key, The device unique identifier of the robot end is ID, The identifier of the control end is ID, The current timestamp is T, The SHA-256 hash function is SHA-256, The modulo operation on the prime number p is denoted as mod p. The modulo operation on the prime number p is denoted as mod p.

[0011] To achieve the above object, another aspect of the embodiment of the present application proposes a humanoid robot secure communication system in an industrial scene, which is used to implement the above-mentioned humanoid robot secure communication method in an industrial scene, and the system comprises: The robot end is configured to generate a robot private key and a robot public key, display a three-dimensional code of signature information about a control end certificate, and perform data signature and encryption. The control end is configured to generate a control end private key and a control end public key, read the three-dimensional code and verify the signature information, and decrypt and verify test information. The industrial authentication center is configured to generate a robot certificate based on the robot public key, distribute the robot certificate to the control end, generate a control end certificate based on the control end public key, distribute the control end certificate to the robot end, and manage a certificate revocation list.

[0012] In some embodiments, the robot end comprises: A key management module is configured to generate and store a robot private key and a robot public key, and negotiate a session key. A three-dimensional code generation module is configured to generate the three-dimensional code containing spatial depth information based on signature information of a control end certificate. An encrypted transmission module is configured to encrypt industrial collaboration data using the session key.

[0013] To achieve the above object, another aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the above method when executing the computer program.

[0014] To achieve the above object, another aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the above method.

[0015] To achieve the above object, another aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the above method.

[0016] The embodiments of the present application at least have the following beneficial effects: The present application provides a humanoid robot security communication method in an industrial scene and related equipment, and the present application scheme can generate a corresponding robot private key and robot public key through the robot end, and submit the robot public key and the device unique identifier to the industrial authentication center to apply for a robot certificate; after verification by the industrial authentication center, the robot certificate is encrypted and distributed to the control end; the control end certificate distributed through the industrial authentication center is received by the robot end; wherein the control end certificate is generated based on the control end public key, and the control end public key and the corresponding control end private key are generated by the control end; the first signature information of the control end certificate is displayed by the robot end through the three-dimensional graphic code; the first signature information is obtained by reading the three-dimensional graphic code through the control end, and the first signature information obtained by reading is verified according to the control end public key; the second signature information is generated by signing the test data according to the robot private key through the robot end, and the test information is generated by encrypting the second signature information according to the control end certificate, and the test information is sent to the control end; the test information is decrypted according to the control end private key through the control end, and the data obtained after the test information is decrypted is verified based on the robot certificate; after the first signature information and the data obtained after the test information is decrypted are verified, the session key is generated by negotiating with the control end based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control end public key and the control end private key through the robot end; the robot communicates by using the session key. The present application solves the problem of easy copying and low recognition rate of two-dimensional code in industrial environment through three-dimensional graphic code, and the physical layer verification strength is significantly improved; the session key generated by negotiation with the control end can improve the anti-replay attack ability; the present application also supports multi-robot Mesh network, realizes cross-factory cooperation through the certificate chain management of the industrial authentication center, and has scalability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0017] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description only represent some embodiments of the present application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can also be obtained without creative labor.

[0018] Figure 1 A flowchart of a method for safe communication of a humanoid robot in an industrial scene provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 2 A structural diagram of a safe communication system of a humanoid robot in an industrial scene provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 3 An example architecture diagram of a safe communication system of a humanoid robot in an industrial scene provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 4 A flowchart of certificate initialization provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 5 A structural diagram of a three-dimensional graphic code provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 6 A negotiation timing diagram of a session key provided by an embodiment of the present application; Figure 7 A hardware structural diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the following will further describe the present application in combination with the drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and not to limit the present application. When the following description refers to the drawings, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements unless otherwise indicated. The implementation described in the following exemplary embodiments does not represent all the implementations consistent with the embodiments of the present application, but is only an example of devices and methods consistent with some aspects of the embodiments of the present application as described in the appended claims.

[0020] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which the present application belongs. The terms used herein are only for the purpose of describing the embodiments of the present application and are not intended to limit the present application.

[0021] Before the embodiments of the present application are described in detail, some related technologies involved in the embodiments of the present application will be described first, as follows: The embodiments of the present application aim to solve the three core problems of communication of a humanoid robot in an industrial scene: 1. Identity authentication security in multi-node cooperation; 2. Physical layer verification reliability in harsh industrial environment; 3. Encryption transmission and anti-attack ability of real-time cooperation data.

[0022] With reference Figure 1 The embodiment of the present application provides a kind of industrial scene human-shaped robot security communication method, which can include but not limited to including S100 to S150, as follows specifically: S100: corresponding robot private key and robot public key are generated by robot end, and the robot public key and equipment unique identification are submitted to industrial authentication center to apply for robot certificate;After passing the verification of the industrial authentication center, the robot certificate is encrypted and distributed to control end; S110: control end certificate distributed via the industrial authentication center is received by the robot end;Wherein, the control end certificate is generated based on control end public key, and the control end public key and corresponding control end private key are generated by the control end; S120: the first signature information of the control end certificate is displayed by the robot end three-dimensional graphic code;The first signature information is obtained by reading the three-dimensional graphic code by the control end, and the first signature information is verified according to the control end public key; S130: the second signature information is generated by signing test data according to the robot private key by the robot end, and the test information is generated by encrypting the second signature information according to the control end certificate, and the test information is sent to the control end;The test information is decrypted according to the control end private key by the control end, and the data obtained after the test information is decrypted is verified based on the robot certificate; S140: after the first signature information and the data obtained after the test information is decrypted are verified, the session key is generated by the robot end based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control end public key and the control end private key, and the control end is negotiated; S150: the robot communicates by using the session key.

[0023] Optionally, the first signature information obtained by reading is verified according to the control end public key, including the following steps: The threshold matching degree of the space depth information and the legality of the color update frequency are verified by the control terminal to complete the physical layer verification; wherein, the first signature information includes the space depth information and dynamic color coding of the three-dimensional graphic code, the space depth information is bound with the industrial scene identification through a preset threshold range, the dynamic color coding is generated based on the random number of AES encryption and is updated once every set period, and the dynamic color coding is used for dynamic color updating.

[0024] Optionally, after the industrial authentication center verification is passed, the robot certificate is encrypted and distributed to the control terminal, including the following steps: The ID of the robot certificate is determined by the control terminal according to the device unique identifier of the robot terminal, and then the robot certificate corresponding to the ID is obtained; wherein, the device unique identifier binds the ID of the corresponding robot certificate and the ID of the control terminal certificate.

[0025] Optionally, the robot communicates by using the session key, including the following steps: The real-time collaboration instruction is encrypted by the robot by using the session key to generate an encrypted instruction; The encrypted instruction is sent to the control terminal or other robot terminal by the robot, wherein the encrypted instruction carries a timestamp and an instruction sequence number.

[0026] Optionally, the method further includes the following steps: The encrypted instruction is decrypted by the control terminal or the other robot terminal according to the session key, and the timestamp and the instruction sequence number are verified to prevent replay attacks.

[0027] Optionally, the session key is generated by the robot terminal based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control terminal public key and the control terminal private key, and the control terminal is negotiated, including the following steps: The session key is generated by the robot terminal based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control terminal public key and the control terminal private key, and the control terminal is negotiated according to the improved DH algorithm; The expression of the improved DH algorithm is: ; Wherein, The session key is, The generation is, The length of the prime number is set to a certain number of bits, a is the robot private key, b is the control terminal private key, The device unique identifier of the robot terminal is, The identification of the control terminal is, is a current timestamp, is a SHA-256 hash function, represents a prime number modulo operation.

[0028] Next, some optional embodiments of the present application will be described in detail with reference to specific application examples.

[0029] The embodiment relates to the field of industrial robot safety communication, and discloses an industrial-scene humanoid robot safety communication method and system, the method comprising: generating a corresponding robot private key and a robot public key by a robot end, and distributing a robot certificate based on the robot public key to a control end via an industrial authentication center; receiving a control end certificate distributed via the industrial authentication center by the robot end, wherein the control end certificate is generated based on a control end public key; presenting a three-dimensional code of first signature information about the control end certificate by the robot end, the three-dimensional code being used for reading and verifying by the control end; generating test information by signing test data by the robot private key and encrypting by the control end certificate, and sending the test information to the control end by the robot end; and generating a session key based on mutual key negotiation. The application strengthens the security of the physical layer by the three-dimensional code, and solves the communication security problem of multi-robot cooperation in the industrial scene in combination with an end-to-end encryption mechanism, and is suitable for high-precision assembly, dangerous environment operation and other industrial scenes.

[0030] Specifically, the embodiment provides an industrial-scene humanoid robot safety communication method, the method comprising the following steps: generating a corresponding robot private key (P) ) and a robot public key (Pu ) by a robot end, and submitting the robot public key (Pu ) and a device identifier (ID ) to an industrial authentication center to apply for a robot certificate (C ); after verification by the industrial authentication center, encrypting and distributing the robot certificate (C ) to a control end; receiving a control end certificate (C ) distributed via the industrial authentication center by the robot end, wherein the control end certificate (C ) is generated based on a control end public key (Pu ), and the control end public key (Pu ) and a corresponding control end private key (P ) are generated by the control end; presenting a three-dimensional code of first signature information (Sig1) about the control end certificate (C ) by the robot end, the three-dimensional code being used for reading and verifying by the control end through the control end public key (Pu Verify the first signature information (Sig1); The robot uses the robot's private key ( ) test data ( The second signature information (Sig2) is generated by signing the control terminal certificate and then passed through the control terminal certificate. ) Encrypt the second signature information (Sig2) to generate test information ( ), will test information ( ) is sent to the control terminal, where the test information ( The control terminal uses the control terminal's private key ( Decryption, and based on the robot certificate ( Verify the decrypted data; Based on the robot's private key (by the robot) Robot public key ( ), control terminal public key ( ) and control terminal private key ( The session key is generated through negotiation with the control terminal using an improved DH algorithm. ).

[0031] Furthermore, the spatial depth information of the 3D graphic code is compared with industrial scene identifiers within a preset threshold range (0-255mm). The binding is based on AES encrypted random numbers generated and updated every 100±10ms. The control end completes physical layer verification by verifying the depth information threshold matching degree and the legality of the color update frequency.

[0032] Furthermore, robot certificates are distributed to the control terminal. )include: The control terminal uses the robot's unique device identifier ( Determine the ID of the robot certificate. ), and obtain a robot certificate in this way ( ), of which, the device's unique identifier ( ) Bind the corresponding robot certificate ID ( ) and the ID of the control terminal certificate ( ).

[0033] Furthermore, this embodiment also includes: Using session keys ( Encrypting real-time collaboration commands to generate encrypted commands; Send encrypted commands to the control terminal or other robot terminals, wherein the encrypted commands carry a timestamp ( ) and instruction serial number ( ).

[0034] Furthermore, it also includes: The receiving end uses the session key ( Decrypt the encrypted command and verify the timestamp. ) and instruction serial number ( To prevent replay attacks.

[0035] Furthermore, the expression for the improved DH algorithm is: ; in, It is a generator (2≤g≤p-2); is a large prime number (length ≥ 2048 bits); a is the robot's private key (1 ≤ a ≤ p-2); b is the control terminal's private key (1 ≤ b ≤ p-2). A unique identifier for robot equipment; For control terminal identification; This is the current timestamp; Use the SHA-256 hash function; For large prime numbers Modulo operation.

[0036] To achieve the above objectives, this embodiment provides a safe communication method for humanoid robots in industrial scenarios, including the following steps: Step 1: Key Generation and Certificate Distribution The robot generates a public / private key pair. , Submit to the Industrial Certification Center and equipment identification ( Obtain a robot certificate ( ); The control terminal generates a public / private key pair. , ), obtain the control terminal certificate through the industrial certification center ( ); Industrial Certification Center will and Distributed to both the control terminal and the robot terminal via an encrypted channel, with certificate binding. and .

[0037] Step 2: Bidirectional physical layer verification: Robot-side analysis Extract the first signature information (Sig1=Sign( , + Generate 3D graphic codes: The xy plane of the three-dimensional graphic code is a two-dimensional code matrix containing the hash value of Sig1; z-axis depth information encoding (industrial scene unique identifier); Dynamic color layer generates random color scale over time, improving anti-copying ability.

[0038] The control end reads the three-dimensional code through the depth camera, verifies the consistency of Sig1 and the local , and returns verification confirmation information if it passes.

[0039] Step 3: Test data encryption transmission: The robot end generates random test data ( ), generates Sig2=Sign( , ) through signature; Use in encryption (Sig2+ ) to generate , send to the control end; The control end decrypts using , verifies Sig2 through , and confirms the legitimacy of the robot identity.

[0040] Step 4: Session key agreement and communication: The expression of based on the improved DH algorithm can refer to the above embodiment; The robot end and the control end use to encrypt industrial collaboration data (such as assembly instructions, sensor data), and the transmission packet carries (serial number) and , preventing replay attacks.

[0041] Beneficial effects: High security: three-dimensional code combined with depth information and dynamic color, solves the problem of easy copying and low recognition rate of two-dimensional code in industrial environment, and the physical layer verification strength is significantly improved.

[0042] Scenario adaptability: The improved DH algorithm introduces device identification and timestamp, and the anti-replay attack ability is significantly better than the traditional algorithm, meeting the real-time requirements of industry (delay ≤ 50ms).

[0043] Scalability: Supports multi-robot Mesh network, realizes cross-factory collaboration through certificate chain management of industrial authentication center, and the certificate revocation response time is ≤1s.

[0044] Referring to Figure 2 , the embodiment of the application also provides a human-shaped robot secure communication system in an industrial scene, the system comprising: The robot end is configured to generate a robot private key and a robot public key, display a three-dimensional graphical code about signature information of a control end certificate, and perform data signature and encryption. The control end is configured to generate a control end private key and a control end public key, read and verify the three-dimensional graphical code and the signature information, and decrypt and verify test information. The industrial authentication center is configured to generate a robot certificate based on the robot public key, distribute the robot certificate to the control end, generate a control end certificate based on the control end public key, distribute the control end certificate to the robot end, and manage a certificate revocation list.

[0045] In some embodiments, the robot end comprises: a key management module configured to generate and store a robot private key and a robot public key, and negotiate a session key; a three-dimensional graphical code generation module configured to generate the three-dimensional graphical code containing spatial depth information based on signature information of a control end certificate; an encrypted transmission module configured to encrypt industrial collaboration data using the session key.

[0046] Exemplarily, as shown in Figure 3 , the embodiment provides a humanoid robot secure communication system in an industrial scenario, which comprises: a robot end: an edge computing unit carried by a humanoid robot, comprising a key management module, a three-dimensional graphical code generation module, and an encrypted transmission module; a control end: an industrial control host or a portable operation panel, equipped with a depth camera (commonly available on the market, such as OBI Zhongguang) and an encryption chip; an industrial authentication center: deployed in an industrial private cloud, responsible for certificate issuance, revocation, and key management, and supports high concurrency (≥1000 nodes / second).

[0047] The detailed implementation steps of the system of the embodiment include: 1. Certificate initialization (see Figure 4 ): When the robot end is started, the key management module generates a 2048-bit RSA public-private key pair through a hardware security module (HSM), and stores Sk_robot in the HSM, which cannot be exported; The industrial authentication center verifies the physical identity of the robot (such as reading the robot's built-in security chip through NFC), issues , and sets the validity period to 90 days (recommended period in an industrial scenario); The control end logs in to the industrial authentication center through a USB Key, obtains , and binds a workshop number (such as “W1-F3-001”).

[0048] 2. 3D graphical code verification (see Figure 5 ) : 3D graphical code generation module parameters: 2D code version: Version 4 (33x33 matrix); Spatial depth information: 8-bit grayscale value encoding (0-255 corresponding to scene ID); Color dynamic: update the color scale every 100 ms, based on AES encryption of random number generation.

[0049] Control terminal verification process: Depth camera captures 3D graphical code, extracts x-y plane data to decode Sig1 hash; Parse z-axis depth information, compare with preset Compare; Verify color dynamicity according to expected rules, if all pass, proceed to next step.

[0050] 3. Session key generation and application (see Figure 6 ) : Improved DH algorithm execution process: Robot end generates a (random private key), calculates A= , sends A to control end; Control end generates b (random private key), calculates B= , sends B to robot end; Both sides calculate K= and K= , generate session key through formula = (K, , , ).

[0051] Application scenario example (car polishing workshop) : Robot end encrypts polishing parameters (current = 50A, time = 0.5s) through , adds = 1001, = 1620000000; Control end verifies continuity (prevent missing) and validity (validity period ± 5s) after decryption, confirms and executes instructions.

[0052] Anti-attack performance test comparison results are shown in Table 1:

[0053] Table 1 The embodiment of the present application further provides an electronic device, which comprises a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to realize the method of the embodiment of the present application. The electronic device can be any intelligent terminal, such as a tablet computer or a vehicle-mounted computer.

[0054] It can be understood that the contents in the method embodiments are applicable to the device embodiments, the device embodiments specifically realize the functions of the method of the present application, and achieve the same beneficial effects as the method of the present application.

[0055] Please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 The hardware structure of the electronic device of another embodiment is illustrated, and the electronic device comprises: The processor 701 can be implemented in a general-purpose CPU (Central Processing Unit), a microprocessor, an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), or one or more integrated circuits, and is used to execute related programs to realize the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application. The memory 702 can be implemented in the form of a ROM (Read Only Memory), a static storage device, a dynamic storage device, or a RAM (Random Access Memory). The memory 702 can store an operating system and other application programs. When the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application are implemented by software or firmware, the related program codes are stored in the memory 702 and are called and executed by the processor 701 to realize the method of the embodiments of the present application. The input / output interface 703 is used to realize information input and output. The communication interface 704 is used to realize the communication interaction between the device and other devices. The communication can be realized by a wired manner (for example, a USB, a network cable, etc.) or a wireless manner (for example, a mobile network, WIFI, Bluetooth, etc.). The bus 705 is used to transmit information between various components (for example, the processor 701, the memory 702, the input / output interface 703, and the communication interface 704) of the device. The processor 701, the memory 702, the input / output interface 703, and the communication interface 704 are connected to each other through the bus 705 to realize the communication connection between them in the device.

[0056] The embodiment of the present application further provides a computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to realize the method of the present application.

[0057] It can be understood that the contents in the method embodiments described above are applicable to the storage medium embodiments, the storage medium embodiments specifically realize the functions of the method embodiments described above, and achieve the same beneficial effects as the method embodiments described above.

[0058] The embodiment of the present application further provides a computer program product, which comprises a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to realize the method described above.

[0059] The memory is a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, and can be used to store a non-transitory software program and a non-transitory computer executable program. In addition, the memory can comprise a high-speed random access memory, and can also comprise a non-transitory memory, for example, at least one magnetic disk storage device, a flash memory device or other non-transitory solid-state memory device. In some embodiments, the memory can optionally comprise a memory remotely arranged relative to the processor, and the remote memory can be connected to the processor through a network. Examples of the network include but are not limited to the Internet, an intranet, a local area network, a mobile communication network and a combination thereof.

[0060] The embodiments described in the embodiments of the present application are used to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application. Those skilled in the art can know that, with the evolution of technology and the appearance of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0061] Those skilled in the art can understand that the technical solutions shown in the figures do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of the present application, and can comprise more or fewer steps than the figures shown, or combine certain steps, or different steps.

[0062] The device embodiments described above are only schematic, and the units described as separate components can or can not be physically separate, that is, can be located in one place, or can be distributed on multiple network units. Part or all of the modules can be selected according to actual needs to realize the purposes of the embodiments of the present application.

[0063] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or some of the steps in the method disclosed above, the functional modules / units in the system and the device can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware and their appropriate combinations.

[0064] The terms "first", "second", "third", "fourth", and the like in the description and in the claims of this application, if any, are used for distinguishing between similar elements and not necessarily for describing a particular sequential or chronological order. It is to be understood that the use of the terms so termed is interchangeable under appropriate circumstances such that the embodiments of the application described herein are, for example, capable of orderly or chronological mundane operation, reverse order operation, based on circuitry availability, based on stated preference or the like, and that "default" or other orderings are thus permissible. Further, the terms "comprise", "comprising", "include", "including", and the like, are specifically intended to be open-ended. That is, references to individual steps and the like do not suhstantially exclude the presence of two or more of a given step or its integral presence in the process, method, system, article, or apparatus having been made with a wider scope. The use of notation such as "first", "second", "third", etc. does not generally limit the areas, but can be used for clarity, and merely establishes the order unless otherwise stated below.

[0065] It should be understood that, in the application, "at least one" means one or more, and "multiple" means two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, "A and / or B" can mean that there are only A, only B, and A and B at the same time, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally represents an "or" relationship between the associated objects. "At least one of the following" or the like means any combination of these items, including any combination of single or multiple items. For example, at least one of a, b or c can mean a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0066] In several embodiments provided in the application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the division of the above units is only a logical function division, and actual implementation can have another division manner, for example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be omitted or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the displayed or discussed objects can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0067] The units described above as separate components can or can not be physically separate, and the components shown as units can or can not be physical units, i.e. they can be located in one place or distributed on a plurality of network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiment.

[0068] In addition, each function unit in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can be physically present separately, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or in the form of a software function unit.

[0069] When the integrated unit is realized in the form of a software function unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the present application, essentially or in part, or all or part of the technical solutions can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium, and includes multiple instructions used to cause a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods in the embodiments of the present application. The foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and various other media that can store programs.

[0070] The preferred embodiments of the embodiments of the present application are described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, and are not limited to the scope of the embodiments of the present application. Any modifications, equivalent replacements and improvements made by those skilled in the art without departing from the scope and essence of the embodiments of the present application shall be within the scope of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A safe communication method for humanoid robots in industrial scenarios, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: The robot generates a corresponding private key and public key, and submits the robot public key and the device's unique identifier to the industrial certification center to apply for a robot certificate. After the industrial certification center verifies the certificate, it is encrypted and distributed to the control terminal. The robot receives a control terminal certificate distributed by the industrial certification center; wherein the control terminal certificate is generated based on the control terminal public key, and the control terminal public key and the corresponding control terminal private key are generated by the control terminal. The robot displays a 3D graphic code containing the first signature information of the control terminal certificate; the control terminal reads the 3D graphic code to obtain the first signature information, and verifies the first signature information obtained by reading it based on the control terminal's public key. The robot terminal signs the test data using the robot's private key to generate a second signature, and encrypts the second signature using the control terminal certificate to generate test information, which is then sent to the control terminal. The control terminal decrypts the test information using its private key and verifies the decrypted data based on the robot certificate. After the data obtained after decrypting the first signature information and the test information have been verified, the robot terminal negotiates with the control terminal to generate a session key based on the robot private key, the robot public key, the control terminal public key and the control terminal private key; The robot communicates using the session key.

2. The method for safe communication of humanoid robots in industrial scenarios according to claim 1, characterized in that, The verification of the first signature information read based on the public key of the control terminal includes the following steps: The physical layer verification is completed by verifying the threshold matching degree of the spatial depth information and the legality of the color update frequency through the control terminal; wherein, the first signature information includes the spatial depth information and dynamic color encoding of the three-dimensional graphic code, the spatial depth information is bound to the industrial scene identifier through a preset threshold range, the dynamic color encoding is generated based on AES encrypted random numbers and is updated once every set period, and the dynamic color encoding is used to dynamically update the color.

3. The method for safe communication of humanoid robots in industrial scenarios according to claim 1, characterized in that, After verification by the industrial certification center, the robot certificate is encrypted and distributed to the control terminal, which includes the following steps: The control terminal determines the robot certificate ID based on the unique device identifier of the robot terminal, and then obtains the robot certificate corresponding to the ID; wherein, the unique device identifier is bound to the ID of the corresponding robot certificate and the ID of the control terminal certificate.

4. The method for safe communication of humanoid robots in industrial scenarios according to claim 1, characterized in that, The communication via the robot using the session key includes the following steps: The robot uses the session key to encrypt real-time collaboration instructions and generate encrypted instructions. The encrypted command is sent from the robot to the control terminal or other robot terminals, wherein the encrypted command carries a timestamp and a command sequence number.

5. A safe communication method for humanoid robots in industrial scenarios according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method further includes the following steps: The encrypted instruction is decrypted using the session key by the control terminal or the other robot terminal, and the timestamp and instruction sequence number are verified to prevent replay attacks.

6. A safe communication method for humanoid robots in industrial scenarios according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, The step of negotiating and generating a session key with the control terminal based on the robot's private key, the robot's public key, the control terminal's public key, and the control terminal's private key includes the following steps: The robot terminal negotiates and generates the session key with the control terminal based on the robot's private key, the robot's public key, the control terminal's public key, and the control terminal's private key, according to the improved DH algorithm. The expression for the improved DH algorithm is: ； in, This is the session key. For generators, Let 'a' be a prime number with a set number of digits and 'b' be the private key of the robot and the private key of the control terminal. This serves as the unique identifier for the device on the robot's end. This is the identifier for the control terminal. This is the current timestamp. The SHA-256 hash function is used. Represents prime numbers Modulo operation.

7. A safe communication system for humanoid robots in industrial settings, characterized in that, The system is used to implement a safe communication method for humanoid robots in an industrial setting as described in any one of claims 1 to 6, the system comprising: On the robot side, it generates the robot's private and public keys; displays a 3D graphical code containing signature information about the control terminal certificate; and performs data signing and encryption. The control terminal is used to generate a control terminal private key and a control terminal public key; read the three-dimensional graphic code and verify the signature information; and decrypt and verify the test information. An industrial certification center is used to generate robot certificates based on the robot's public key and distribute the robot certificates to the control terminal; generate control terminal certificates based on the control terminal's public key and distribute the control terminal certificates to the robot terminal; and manage the certificate revocation list.

8. A safe communication system for humanoid robots in industrial settings according to claim 7, characterized in that, The robot end includes: The key management module is used to generate and store robot private keys and robot public keys; and to negotiate session keys. A 3D graphic code generation module is used to generate the 3D graphic code containing spatial depth information based on the signature information of the control terminal certificate. An encrypted transmission module is used to encrypt industrial collaborative data using the session key.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that, The electronic device includes a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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