Method, device and equipment for security recovery of ultra-high frequency RFID chip and medium

Abstract

The application relates to the technical field of radio frequency signal security, and provides a security recovery method and device for an ultrahigh frequency RFID chip, an electronic device and a medium.The method comprises the following steps: establishing wired communication connection between an RFID initial identification device and a hardware encryption machine; the RFID initial identification device does not have a wireless communication module; performing first security authentication, and after the authentication is passed, corresponding TID codes and chip secret keys are sent to the RFID initial identification device; the RFID initial identification device is in physical contact with an RFID chip to establish communication connection, and the RFID initial identification device is offline; performing second security authentication, and corresponding chip secret keys are written into the RFID chip corresponding to the TID codes.Based on the method, the closed loop of the key issued by the hardware encryption machine and the physical contact writing is realized, the legal resetting of the key is realized, the replacement cost is saved, the key is prevented from being intercepted or tampered with in the writing process, and the security of the resetting key is improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of radio frequency signal security, and in particular to a security recovery method and device for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, an electronic device, and a computer readable storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) electronic tags are a non-contact automatic identification technology that identifies target objects and obtains related data through radio frequency signals, and the identification work does not require human intervention. It is a wireless upgrade version of barcodes and two-dimensional codes. RFID technology has advantages such as waterproofness, anti-magnetism, high temperature resistance, long service life, and large reading distance, which barcodes do not have.

[0003] Chinese patent CN116669025A discloses a security anti-counterfeiting method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip. The TID code and chip key are built into the read-only memory block, and the TID code is set to be readable, and the chip key is set to be unreadable or copyable. This avoids the phenomenon of copying, counterfeiting, and tampering of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip. The TID code, chip key, and anti-counterfeiting random number are used to generate anti-counterfeiting ciphertext on the ultra-high frequency RFID chip. The hardware encryption machine and the hardware encryption machine obtain the anti-counterfeiting key through the TID code. The anti-counterfeiting key is used to decrypt the anti-counterfeiting ciphertext to obtain the anti-counterfeiting plaintext and compare it with the public anti-counterfeiting random number. This improves the security of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip, and it is difficult to counterfeit the anti-counterfeiting key and decrypt the anti-counterfeiting ciphertext during the anti-counterfeiting authentication process.

[0004] Chinese patent CN117062037A provides an RFID tag data processing method, device, base station, computer equipment, and medium. The method determines the target base station that matches the tag identification of the RFID tag during the RFID tag data processing process, then obtains the information of the RFID tag through the target base station, and finally obtains the processing result. Through specific target base stations for data processing, the data processing efficiency can be improved, and the accuracy of data processing can be ensured through double authentication.

[0005] Chinese patent CN117725954A acquires data from RFID tags and generates blocks. This method integrates RFID technology and blockchain technology, which can automate data collection, verification, and storage processes, reducing the risk of human error and improving the efficiency of supply chain management.

[0006] The RFID chip of the ultra-high frequency is a contact type RFID tag, which can realize communication by combining with the contact points of the identification device through exposed metal contact points, and can also realize over-the-air communication through radio frequency signals. The above three schemes are used in combination to improve the efficiency of data processing under the premise of ensuring the safety of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip, and to ensure that the data transmitted and stored in the supply chain is real and reliable, thereby enhancing the security and reliability of the entire supply chain management system.

[0007] When the asset (such as an industrial device or a logistics package) to which the RFID chip belongs changes ownership or the associated device such as a hardware encryption machine is upgraded, the RFID chip needs to use a new chip key to ensure that the authentication process remains effective. However, the chip key of the RFID chip is currently not readable or modifiable, and in the case of ownership transfer and device upgrade, the ultra-high frequency RFID chip will be completely scrapped, not only causing hardware cost loss, but also causing a chain of problems such as associated supply chain data disruption and asset traceability. However, if the chip key can be reset, there are two problems: one is that unauthorized RFID initial identification devices can tamper with the chip key, and the other is that there is a risk of leakage during the reset process. Therefore, a method for securely and reliably resetting the chip key of an ultra-high frequency RFID chip is needed. SUMMARY

[0008] The present application aims to provide a method for securely recovering an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, a secure recovery device, an electronic device, and a computer readable storage medium, which aims to solve the technical problem that the key of the existing ultra-high frequency RFID chip cannot be securely reset.

[0009] In a first aspect, the present application provides a method for securely recovering an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, comprising the following steps:

[0010] S100: Establishing a wired communication connection between an RFID initial identification device and a hardware encryption machine; wherein the RFID initial identification device does not have a wireless communication module;

[0011] S200: Performing a first security authentication, and after passing the authentication, the hardware encryption machine sends a corresponding TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device;

[0012] S300: The RFID initial identification device physically contacts the RFID chip to establish a communication connection, and the RFID initial identification device is offline;

[0013] S400: Performing a second security authentication, and after passing the authentication, the RFID initial identification device writes the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code.

[0014] In a second aspect, the present application provides a security recovery device for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, the device comprising:

[0015] a wired communication module for establishing a wired communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the hardware encryption machine, wherein the RFID initial identification device does not have a wireless communication module;

[0016] a sending module for performing a first security authentication and sending a corresponding TID code and chip secret key to the RFID initial identification device after the authentication is passed;

[0017] a contact communication module for establishing a physical contact communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip, wherein the RFID initial identification device is set offline;

[0018] a writing module for performing a second security authentication and writing a corresponding chip secret key into the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code after the authentication is passed.

[0019] In a third aspect, the present application provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the security recovery method for the ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to any one of the above aspects when executing the computer program.

[0020] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein the computer program is executable by a processor to implement the security recovery method for the ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to any one of the above aspects.

[0021] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising computer programs / instructions executable by a processor to implement the steps of the security recovery method for the ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to any one of the above aspects.

[0022] The method, device, electronic equipment, computer readable storage medium and computer program product have the following beneficial effects: the RFID initial identification device and the hardware encryption machine establish a secure wired communication connection, avoiding key leakage caused by wireless communication; after passing the first security authentication, the hardware encryption machine securely sends the corresponding TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device; the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip securely establish a communication connection through physical contact; after passing the second security authentication, the RFID initial identification device securely writes the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code; the method realizes legal resetting of the key through the closed loop of key authorization and physical contact writing by the hardware encryption machine, without the need to replace a new chip, wherein the RFID initial identification device is offline and does not have a wireless communication module, cutting off the network attack path, preventing the key from being intercepted or tampered with during the writing process, avoiding the risks of network phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks in offline operation compared with the traditional online writing method, solving the technical problem that the key of the existing ultra-high frequency RFID chip cannot be securely reset, thereby improving the security of the RFID chip key reset, and saving the cost of replacing the RFID chip. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0023] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or prior art description will be briefly introduced. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor.

[0024] Figure 1 The flowchart of the security recovery method of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in the figure.

[0025] Figure 2 The flowchart of step S200 of the security recovery method in the embodiments is shown in the figure.

[0026] Figure 3 The flowchart of step S300 of the security recovery method in the embodiments is shown in the figure.

[0027] Figure 4 The flowchart of step S400 of the security recovery method in the embodiments is shown in the figure.

[0028] Figure 5 The flowchart of step S410 of the security recovery method in the embodiments is shown in the figure.

[0029] Figure 6 The flowchart of step S420 of the security recovery method in the embodiments is shown in the figure.

[0030] Figure 7 A flowchart for steps S510-S540 of the security recovery method in the embodiment;

[0031] Figure 8 A structural diagram of the security recovery device of the UHF RFID chip in the embodiment;

[0032] Figure 9 A structural diagram of the electronic device in the embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0033] Embodiments of the present application are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the drawings, like reference numerals indicate like elements or elements having the same or similar function throughout the several views. The embodiments described below are exemplary and are intended to explain the present application, and are not to be understood as limiting the present application.

[0034] Reference throughout the specification to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the application. Thus, the appearance of the phrases "in one embodiment" or "in some embodiments" in various places throughout the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, or characteristics can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments.

[0035] Embodiment One

[0036] In combination with Figure 1 The security recovery method of the UHF RFID chip provided in the present application includes the following steps:

[0037] S100: Establish a wired communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the hardware encryption machine. The RFID identification device can be, but is not limited to, a handheld identification device or a fixed reader or terminal authentication device. Unlike traditional RFID identification devices, the RFID initial identification device in the present application does not have a wireless communication module, which eliminates the risk of wireless signal exposure from the hardware level and greatly reduces the probability of key leakage in the transmission link. Specifically, the RFID initial identification device has an interface and a slot for plugging in the RFID chip, and the interface of the RFID identification device is connected to the hardware encryption machine through a data line.

[0038] S200: Perform the first security authentication, and after passing the authentication, the hardware encryption machine sends the corresponding TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device, to avoid the key being stolen by illegal devices. Among them, the number of RFID chips to be reset can be one or multiple; in other words, the TID (Tag Identifier, Tag Identifier) code received by the RFID initial identification device can be one or multiple. Each TID code corresponds to a chip key. Optionally, if the authentication fails, the hardware encryption machine will list the RFID initial identification device in the blacklist.

[0039] For example, the hardware encryption machine after the ownership transfer defines a new chip key, cuts off the illegal access path of the previous owner, or the upgraded hardware encryption machine defines a new chip key, adapts to the technical specifications of the new encryption machine, and fixes the security vulnerabilities of the old system. The RFID chip does not need to be eliminated to be compatible with the new system. Specifically, after the RFID initial identification device receives the corresponding TID code and chip key, it disables the wired interface, that is, other devices cannot be connected to it for wired communication, and only allows physical contact to establish a communication connection to prevent key leakage.

[0040] S300: The RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip establish a communication connection through physical contact, and the RFID initial identification device is set offline. The communication range of physical contact is limited to the moment of physical contact, and the communication link is relatively closed, avoiding chip key leakage. Among them, the ultra-high frequency RFID chip is a contact type RFID tag, which can realize communication by adhering the exposed metal contact to the contact of the identification device, and can also communicate through radio frequency signals. The RFID chip includes EPC area, User area, Reserve area, and TID area. The TID code built-in TID area has global uniqueness and can be used as a medium for identifying the identity of the article, realizing one article one code. Specifically, the RFID chip has a physical contact that can be plugged into the slot of the RFID initial identification device to achieve physical contact. The RFID chip can be but is not limited to the C899 RFID chip developed by Changsha Yinchang Semiconductor Technology Co., Ltd. The TID code of the C899 RFID chip is 96 bits long.

[0041] S400: Perform a second security authentication, and after passing the authentication, the RFID initial identification device writes the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code. The second security authentication can prevent key miswriting or illegal writing. Specifically, the writing process only updates the chip key corresponding to the TID code, without changing the data in other storage areas in the chip, thus preserving the asset key data (such as production information and circulation records) stored in the EPC area and the User area. The new owner or the upgraded system can decrypt and read these data through the new key, thus ensuring the continuity of the supply chain data and avoiding the breakage of the asset traceability link. Specifically, the consistency of the TID code of the RFID chip and the issued TID code needs to be verified before writing, so as to prevent miswriting.

[0042] The method realizes legal resetting of the key through the closed loop of key issuance by the hardware encryption machine and physical contact writing, and does not need to replace the new chip. Only by updating the key through the safe process can the old chip adapt to the new scene. The RFID initial identification device is offline set, which cuts off the network attack path and prevents the key from being intercepted or tampered during the writing process. Compared with the traditional online writing mode, the offline operation can avoid the risks of phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks, thus improving the security of the RFID chip key resetting and saving the cost of replacing the RFID chip.

[0043] The RFID chip in the embodiment can be applied in food and drug safety traceability management, e-commerce packaging, civil aviation luggage, shoe and clothing retail, unmanned convenience store, supply chain logistics, enterprise asset management, or access control and attendance management, etc.

[0044] In some application scenarios of logistics, the ultra-high frequency RFID chip realizes automatic data collection of storage, quickly identifies and tracks the position, state and change of the goods, and improves the efficiency and accuracy of storage. The RFID chip can synchronize the inventory information of the entire warehouse to the management system in real time, reduces manual operation and manual counting time, improves work efficiency and accuracy, and saves cost. The RFID chip can also provide traceable data to help enterprises trace products and quality, effectively crack down on counterfeit and inferior goods, and accurately design production plans. Specifically, when a batch of RFID chips carrying goods information are transferred from company A to company B, the chips do not need to be replaced in batches, and only by resetting the key through the method can the chips access the supply chain system of company B, thus reducing the cost of RFID chip procurement.

[0045] In some application scenarios of tourism, ultra-high frequency (UHF) RFID technology enables unprecedented levels of personalization in the tourism industry by integrating UHF RFID chips into all aspects of the journey, from ticketing to attractions, providing customized experiences, simplifying management, and improving security protocols. Real-time tracking provided by RFID enables local governments to effectively manage crowds and enhance the tourist experience. The non-contact nature of RFID provides a safe and healthy environment for all travelers. The integration of UHF RFID technology goes beyond traditional tourism, transforming it into a comprehensive, immersive, and intelligent journey. Specifically, after upgrading the ticketing system, the key can still be reset through the original TID code to trace the past use of the chip, ensuring that the data chain is not interrupted.

[0046] In some application scenarios of international trade, UHF RFID chips enable automated collection of import and export cargo information, improve customs inspection efficiency and accuracy, and provide real-time support for cargo tracking and data management. RFID chips can be integrated into transportation tools and shipping containers to help customs quickly identify and track cargo, reduce customs clearance time and manual deletion, and improve cargo security and circulation efficiency. At the same time, RFID can also provide reliable quality traceability and reverse traceability data for goods, effectively preventing counterfeiting and accountability issues, and enhancing trade credibility.

[0047] In some application scenarios of agriculture, by strategically deploying RFID chips on crops and livestock, each agricultural operation can be accurately tracked, thereby improving crop yields, optimizing resource use, and promptly identifying potential problems. In addition, UHF RFID technology also improves the efficiency of rural community management. It makes important contributions to logistics and agricultural product traceability, ensuring the safety and quality of goods, and improving the efficiency of rural community management. Overall, UHF RFID is an important technology that actively promotes agricultural modernization, improves the efficiency of rural community management, and enriches rural tourism experiences.

[0048] In some embodiments, in combination Figure 2 Step S200 includes the following steps:

[0049] S210: The RFID initial identification device initiates a first security authentication to the hardware encryption machine, and the first security authentication includes verifying the initial device identification. The initial device identification can be a device SN (Serial Number) code or a factory record number. Only a legitimate RFID initial identification device can initiate a key application to the hardware encryption machine, thereby eliminating the possibility of illegally obtaining a TID code and chip key from the source.

[0050] S220: The hardware encryption machine verifies whether the first security authentication is qualified, including verifying whether the initial device identification is in the list of legitimate devices.

[0051] S230: When the first security authentication is qualified, the hardware encryption machine returns the TID code and the chip key to the RFID initial identification device.

[0052] S240: When the first security authentication is not qualified, the hardware encryption machine disconnects with the RFID initial identification device. Specifically, the initial device identification is listed in the blacklist.

[0053] Based on this, once the device identification is detected as illegal, the hardware encryption machine directly terminates the communication, and does not give the illegal device the opportunity to attempt again or send attack instructions.

[0054] In one embodiment, the first security authentication further includes a digital certificate of the RFID initial identification device, further strengthening the security and uniqueness of the authentication.

[0055] In one embodiment, the first security authentication further includes personnel permission authentication, which includes face information and / or voice information, increasing the control dimension of the legality of the operation subject, and further reducing the risk of key leakage caused by theft and misuse of the RFID initial identification device. Specifically, with the help of multi-modal biometric recognition technology (such as face recognition and voiceprint recognition), the personnel identity information is confirmed. For example, the face image of the operator is collected by the camera, and then the face feature comparison and identity verification are completed by relying on the convolutional neural network (CNN, Convolutional Neural Network). For example, the voice signal of the operator is collected by the microphone, and the personalized features in the voice are extracted by the voiceprint recognition algorithm, and then the personnel identity is confirmed.

[0056] In one specific embodiment, step S220 includes the following steps:

[0057] S221: The face information and voice information of the personnel are input into the first neural network model. The face information refers to the face image captured by the camera, and the voice information can be obtained from the voice command collected by the microphone array. The first neural network model is a deep learning model for identity recognition, which includes a face recognition model and a voiceprint recognition model. The first neural network model is installed in the hardware encryption machine.

[0058] S222: For face information, features are extracted and matched by convolutional neural network. For example, a pre-trained CNN model (such as ResNet, VGG) is used to extract face features, which are then compared with the face information of known personnel to determine the identity. Optionally, step S222 further includes pre-processing the face information before inputting it into the face recognition model, such as noise reduction, enhancement, cropping, etc.

[0059] In one possible example, step S222 includes the following steps:

[0060] S2221: Extract low-level convolutional features based on a convolutional neural network. Specifically, in the first step, the photographed face image is input to a low-level convolutional neural network composed of 3 layers, the first layer uses a 3x3 convolution (64 convolution kernels), sets the step to 1 and the padding to 1, and cooperates with a ReLU nonlinear activation function to generate a 512x512 pixel feature map. In the second step, the second layer performs 2x2 maximum pooling (with a step set to 2) to compress the feature map size to a 256x256 pixel feature map. In the third step, the third layer performs a 3x3 convolution (128 convolution kernels), sets the step to 1 and the padding to 1, and cooperates with a ReLU nonlinear activation function to obtain a 128x128 pixel low-level convolutional feature. Based on this, through the combination of the above 3-layer convolution operation and ReLU nonlinear activation, the model can autonomously learn the tolerance to noise, light fluctuation and local blur. Among them, the low-level convolutional features weaken the noise by means of the local aggregation of convolution kernels, while retaining the real texture details, color gradients and brightness changes of the face, thereby improving the stability of feature extraction.

[0061] S2222: Extract edge features of the face image. Specifically, the following steps are included:

[0062] In the first step, the Sobel operator covering 0°, 45°, 90° and 135° is selected to capture edge information at different angles, and the convolution template is:

[0063] .

[0064] In the second step, the preprocessed face image is denoted as Ismooth, and the Sobel operator in each direction is convolved with the image to obtain the gradient response value in the corresponding direction:

[0065] , , , .

[0066] In the third step, the gradient amplitude of the image is solved based on the gradient response value in each direction, and the corresponding calculation formula is:

[0067] (1)

[0068] In the fourth step, an improved OTSU-Canny operator is used to extract edge features, where the OTSU algorithm is used to adaptively determine the threshold, and the formula is as follows:

[0069] (2)

[0070] where w0, w1 are the foreground and background pixel ratio, u0, u1 are the foreground and background average gray, u T is the global average gray.

[0071] Fifth, traverse the gray value t in the range of 1 to M one by one, when the gray value is t, the inter-class variance reaches the maximum value, at this time t is the optimal segmentation threshold, the image is segmented using the threshold to obtain clear edges; after performing normalization processing on the extracted edge features, input the 1x1 convolution layer with 128 convolution kernels to adjust the channel number, and finally output the edge features of 128x128 pixels.

[0072] S2223: Perform weighted residual fusion on the low-level convolutional features and edge features. Specifically, the following steps are included: first, send the low-level convolutional features and edge features into a 1x1 convolution layer (64 convolution kernels) respectively, compress the channel number of both to 64 to obtain the compressed features F CNN and F trad . Second, perform mean calculation on F trad along the channel dimension to obtain the single-channel edge saliency map M, and then generate the attention map W through the Sigmoid activation function. Third, perform weighted residual fusion on F CNN and F trad using the attention map W, thereby completing the extraction of facial features. The specific formula is as follows:

[0073]

[0074] (3)

[0075] (4)

[0076] represents pixel-level operation, i.e., pixel-by-pixel multiplication; the residual term ensures that the details of the convolutional features are not lost, and W and (1-W) are responsible for allocating the weights of the two types of features: in the low-contrast area, the edge prior is more significant, at this time W is small, and the fusion is dominated by (1-W), which strengthens the edge signal; in the high-contrast area, the texture feature of F

[0077] S223: For sound information, feature extraction and matching are completed by using a deep learning model (such as a voiceprint recognition model based on Transformer). For example, voice features are extracted by a pre-trained voiceprint recognition model, and then compared with known voiceprint features to confirm the identity. Optionally, step S223 further includes pre-processing the collected sound information before processing, including noise reduction, enhancement, and segmentation.

[0078] In summary, the method can accurately determine the identity of a person by collecting and processing image and sound information, combined with the identity recognition technology of the first neural network model.

[0079] Specifically, before step S221, the following steps are further included:

[0080] S224: Collect the sound source position and face position of the person. Optionally, the sound source position refers to the physical coordinates of the person when giving voice instructions, which is calculated by using beamforming technology or time difference positioning algorithm (TDOA) after collecting sound information by a microphone array. For example, sound information is captured by a microphone array, and the physical position of the sound source is accurately determined by analyzing the time difference of the sound source reaching different microphones. The face position can be captured by a camera or a depth sensor, and then the real-time position of the head is located by relying on computer vision technology (such as OpenPose, MediaPipe framework). For example, the head key node coordinates are identified by the OpenPose algorithm, and then the complete head position information is calculated.

[0081] S225: Input the sound source position and face position into the second neural network model to generate a fusion feature. The second neural network model refers to a deep learning model for fusing sound source position and face position information, which can specifically use models such as multi-modal Transformer architecture or graph neural network (GNN). During model operation, the second neural network model will first align the sound source position and face position in space-time dimension, then complete the fusion in feature level, and finally generate a joint feature representation with both kinds of position information, which is the fusion feature.

[0082] S226: Determine whether the identity of the person meets the preset rules according to the fusion feature. The core of the preset rules includes that the sound source position and face position need to meet the spatial consistency condition. If the two positions do not match in space, the corresponding identity recognition is not qualified, and steps S221-S223 do not need to be performed; if the two positions match in space, steps S221-S223 are performed.

[0083] Therefore, by performing multi-modal feature fusion and rule determination on the sound source position and face position, the reliability and security of identity recognition are further improved.

[0084] In some embodiments, the binding Figure 3 The step S300 further comprises the following steps:

[0085] S310: The RFID chip is inserted into the RFID initial identification device to realize physical contact of the two, communication only occurs in the moment of physical contact, the link is immediately interrupted after the contact is removed, which can prevent illegal personnel from establishing a connection with the chip through a remote control device, further strengthening the security of the link.

[0086] S320: The RFID initial identification device senses the environmental characteristic parameters of the RFID chip. Optionally, the RFID initial identification device is integrated with environmental sensors, including but not limited to Hall sensors for sensing magnetic fields and stress sensors for sensing pressures.

[0087] S330: Based on the environmental characteristic parameters, the working parameters of the RFID initial identification device are determined.

[0088] Different manufacturers and different batches of RFID chips have different requirements for working parameters (such as voltage and communication rate). The RFID initial identification device automatically matches the corresponding working parameters by sensing the environmental characteristic parameters of the RFID chip (which can be associated with the RFID chip model information), without the need for manual setting by the operator, which not only improves the operation efficiency, but also avoids key writing failures caused by incorrect parameter settings. Based on this, the method can not only guarantee the stability of the communication link, but also reduce the risk of key writing errors through environmental adaptation.

[0089] In one embodiment, the environmental characteristic parameters include electromagnetic interference intensity. Based on the electromagnetic interference intensity, the radio frequency power of the RFID initial identification device or the signal modulation mode is determined, which reduces the influence of interference on key transmission and avoids key writing errors caused by signal distortion. Specifically, if the electromagnetic interference intensity in the environment is high, fixed radio frequency power may be interrupted (such as data packet loss) or erroneous (such as bit flipping) due to signal interference, resulting in key writing failure. By sensing the electromagnetic interference intensity in real time and adjusting the power. When the interference is strong, the radio frequency power is automatically increased to enhance the signal anti-interference ability and ensure the complete transmission of the key data; when the interference is weak, the low-power transmission is maintained to completely confine the signal within the physical contact link between the device and the chip, thereby reducing the possibility of illegal interception of the key from the transmission layer.

[0090] Optionally, if it is sensed that the surrounding electromagnetic interference is strong, the encoding mode of the key transmission can be adjusted, for example, from Manchester encoding to differential encoding, to reduce the bit error rate caused by interference.

[0091] In one embodiment, the environmental characteristic parameter comprises a contact pressure value. Based on the contact pressure value, a contact current of the RFID initial identification device is determined. When the pressure is too small, the current is automatically reduced (to avoid overheating); when the pressure is too large, a low current within a safe range is maintained (to reduce contact load); only when the pressure is in the optimal interval of close fitting and no overload, the normal current transmission is adopted. Optionally, the RFID initial identification device is internally provided with a motor and a contact spring, and the RFID initial identification device is in elastic abutment conduction with the contact spring and the RFID chip through the contact spring, to ensure stable physical contact. Further, an output end of the motor is used to apply pressure to the contact spring, so as to change the abutment pressure of the contact spring and the contact spring. The RFID initial identification device adjusts the extension amount of the output end of the motor to adjust the abutment pressure of the contact spring and the contact spring.

[0092] In some embodiments, in combination Figure 4 , step S400 comprises the following steps:

[0093] S410: The RFID initial identification device performs a second security authentication with the RFID chip, and the second security authentication comprises verifying whether the TID codes are consistent.

[0094] S420: When the second security authentication is qualified, the RFID initial identification device resets the chip key of the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code. Only when the TID codes are completely matched, the resetting link is entered, so as to fundamentally eliminate the risk of wrong writing.

[0095] S430: When the second security authentication is unqualified, the RFID initial identification device is disconnected with the RFID chip. Specifically, the RFID chip reports illegal access of the RFID initial identification device.

[0096] Based on this, the method can not only avoid the risk of key writing error, but also quickly intercept illegal operations, simplify verification logic, and balance security and operation efficiency.

[0097] In one embodiment, in combination Figure 5 , step S410 further comprises the following steps:

[0098] S411: Reading the TID code of the RFID chip.

[0099] S412: Verifying whether the TID code of the RFID chip is consistent with the TID code stored in the RFID initial identification device. Only when the two are completely consistent, the subsequent key resetting is allowed, so as to fundamentally eliminate the risk of mismatch. If the real TID code of the counterfeit chip is not in the storage list of the RFID initial identification device, the verification fails, and the key writing is directly blocked.

[0100] In one embodiment, in combination Figure 6Step S420 includes the following steps:

[0101] S421: The RFID initial identification device sends a write request to the RFID chip. The write request is generated by the hardware encryption machine using the chip key and TID code through an encryption algorithm. The encryption and decryption algorithm in the hardware encryption machine can be selected from, but not limited to, symmetric encryption and decryption algorithms SM1, SM4, SM7, ZUC, SSF33, RC4, DES, DES2, DES3, or AES, and asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithms SM2, RSA, or ECC.

[0102] S422: The RFID chip calls the built-in decryption algorithm to verify whether the TID code is consistent. The hardware encryption machine and the chip share an algorithm key of a unique encryption and decryption algorithm in advance. The hardware encryption machine encrypts the TID code using the algorithm key and sends the request. Even if an illegal person intercepts the request, he or she cannot forge the encrypted TID code or tamper with the new chip key in the request because he or she does not share the algorithm key.

[0103] S423: The TID code is verified to be consistent, and the RFID chip allows the chip key to be reset. The RFID chip actively verifies the TID consistency. Only when the TID is completely consistent, the chip key is allowed to be reset.

[0104] In some embodiments, in combination with Figure 7 Before step S300, the following steps are further included:

[0105] S510: Collect the communication connection structure of the RFID chip. The communication connection structure can indicate the communication topology relationship of the RFID chip and other communication components. The other communication components can be RFID readers, smart devices, etc. If the topology collection is skipped and only the visible direct communication connection components are isolated, hidden indirect communication links may be missed. For example, if an RFID chip is connected to a workshop reader and a warehouse management terminal at the same time, isolating only the reader will cause the terminal to still send data to the RFID chip. These unisolated components will send interference signals when the chip key is reset, causing write failure or data disorder. Through topology analysis, all associated components can be covered by 100%, providing an interference-free environment for key reset.

[0106] S520: Check the communication connection structure to obtain the communication link association of the RFID chip.

[0107] S530: According to the communication link association, extract the associated communication components connected to the RFID chip to be reset, so as to improve the isolation efficiency and avoid business impact caused by misjudgment.

[0108] S540: Send an isolation instruction to the associated communication components to cut off the communication link with the RFID chip to be reset.

[0109] Based on this, from the perspective of interference, after disconnecting the connection of associated communication components such as readers and intelligent terminals, the RFID chip will no longer receive external data requests (such as real-time inventory query instructions), avoiding conflicts between these instructions and chip key writing signals, resulting in writing interruption or bit error. For example, a chip key may be interrupted when resetting and receiving a query signal from a reader, resulting in half of the chip key being written and the chip being in an abnormal state. From the security perspective, after isolating all associated communication components, the chip key is only transmitted in the physical contact link, and there is no external link to intercept the signal, completely eliminating the risk of chip key theft during writing.

[0110] It should be noted that although the steps S5100-S5400 are many, they are automatically implemented by algorithms, and the total implementation time is controlled within 1s.

[0111] In one embodiment, step S510 includes the following steps:

[0112] S511: Extract the communication position of the RFID chip. Specifically, the communication position can be based on the communication area where the RFID reader receives the RFID chip signal, or based on the GPS coordinates of the smart device bound to the RFID chip, which is not limited here.

[0113] S512: Obtain the network information set of the RFID chip according to the communication position. The network information set of the RFID chip refers to the network information of all network nodes (such as RFID readers, smart devices) that interact with the communication position data. For example, the network information of the RFID reader includes IP address, subnet mask, gateway address, switch / router ID, RFID reader device number in the Internet of Things, etc.; for example, the network information of the smart device includes GPS coordinates, network connection state (Wi-Fi / cellular network), device IP or MAC address, network domain, etc. Among them, the communication of the RFID chip only depends on the short distance radio frequency link of the RFID reader or the bound smart device, and the communication range is usually 1-10 meters, and the interaction logic is initiated by the RFID reader or the bound smart device, and the chip is passively responded, therefore, based on the communication position, the readers and smart devices within 15 meters are screened, that is, all network nodes are obtained, and then the network information set is obtained.

[0114] S513: According to the network information set, the communication topology relationship including the RFID chip is obtained, and a communication connection structure is obtained. Specifically, according to the network information of the reader, it is judged whether the RFID chip is identified by the reader, for example, whether the "TID code-reader IP-communication time" is recorded in the log information, so as to obtain the communication connection relationship between the RFID chip and the reader. Specifically, according to the network information of the intelligent device, the configuration file of the intelligent device is checked, and the binding relationship between the RFID chip and the intelligent device is obtained.

[0115] In one embodiment, step S520 includes the following steps:

[0116] S521: If the communication connection structure is multiple, compare the multiple communication connection structures, and calculate the inspection result. Specifically, the communication connection structure of the RFID chip may have multiple versions due to factors such as collection time, data source, and environmental changes.

[0117] S522: If the inspection result shows that all communication connection structures are consistent, select one communication connection structure as the communication link association of the RFID chip. Specifically, the difference between multiple topologies is quantified by a graph similarity algorithm, and the specific process is as follows: first, each communication connection structure is abstracted into a "node-edge" graph model (the node is a component, and the edge is a connection relationship); second, the edit distance (such as the number of operations of adding / deleting nodes, modifying edge attributes) or node embedding similarity (the node is converted into a vector by Graph Embedding, and the cosine similarity is calculated) between graphs is calculated; third, according to the preset threshold (such as edit distance ≤ 3, similarity ≥ 0.9), the inspection result (consistent / inconsistent) is output.

[0118] S523: If the inspection result shows that there are two inconsistent communication connection structures, all communication topology relationships in all different communication connection structures are calculated. If there is a significant difference (such as one topology contains reader A and the other contains reader B), it means that there may be an associated link that is not completely covered, and the information of all topologies needs to be integrated (such as merging nodes and connection relationships) to ensure that no potential associated components are missed in subsequent isolation.

[0119] Based on this, through the hierarchical processing of multi-source comparison error elimination, consistent topology efficiency improvement, and difference topology full integration, the credibility problem of multi-source topology is solved, and the security and efficiency are balanced, ensuring that the associated communication components selected based on the connection relationship are accurate, complete, and risk-free, providing a solid foundation for the isolation operation before key reset.

[0120] In one embodiment, step S540 includes the following steps:

[0121] S541: If there are multiple associated communication components, group at least one target component group, and the number of associated communication components in different target component groups is different. When the number of associated communication components is large (such as containing multiple readers and smart devices), if the isolation instruction is sent at the same time, it may cause the network bandwidth to be occupied too high at the moment; the components are disconnected at the same time, causing the system to oscillate at the moment. Each group of components receives the instruction in turn to avoid network congestion and ensure that each isolation instruction can be accurately received and executed.

[0122] S542: According to the number of associated communication components in the target component group, the order of sending instructions to all associated communication components is determined. The target component group containing a small number of components has a fast isolation speed and a small influence range, and is processed first to quickly establish a local safe environment; the target component group containing multiple components takes a long time to isolate and may involve more business links, so it is processed later to reserve buffer time for the system.

[0123] S543: Based on the instruction sending order, the isolation instruction is sent to the associated communication components in turn. The reader can receive the isolation instruction through MQTT, CoAP and other protocols, and the smart device can trigger the disconnection through Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and other channels.

[0124] Based on this, the accuracy and stability of the isolation operation are guaranteed, the interference on normal business is minimized, and the flexibility of traceability and rollback is given to the isolation process, which is especially suitable for chip security recovery scenarios in large-scale and high-complexity RFID systems.

[0125] Embodiment two

[0126] In combination Figure 8 , the application provides a security recovery device for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, comprising:

[0127] A wired communication module 21 is used to establish a wired communication connection between an RFID initial identification device and a hardware encryption machine. The RFID initial identification device does not have a wireless communication module.

[0128] A sending module 22 is used to perform first security authentication and send corresponding TID codes and chip keys to the RFID initial identification device after passing the authentication.

[0129] A contact communication module 23 is used to establish a physical contact communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip, wherein the RFID initial identification device is set offline, the network attack path is cut off, and the key is prevented from being intercepted or tampered with during the writing process. Compared with the traditional online writing method, offline operation can avoid the risks of phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks, thereby improving the security of the RFID chip key reset.

[0130] The writing module 24 is configured to perform the second security authentication, and write the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code after the authentication is passed, so that the old chip can be adapted to the new scene by updating the key through the security process without replacing the new chip. In this way, the cost of replacing the RFID chip is saved.

[0131] In some embodiments, the sending module 22 includes a first authentication unit, a first verification unit, and a returning unit. The first authentication unit is configured to initiate the first security authentication by the RFID initial identification device to the hardware encryption machine, and the first security authentication includes verifying the initial device identification. The first verification unit is configured to verify whether the first security authentication is passed by the hardware encryption machine, including verifying whether the initial device identification is in the legal device list. When the first security authentication is passed, the hardware encryption machine returns the TID code and the chip key to the RFID initial identification device. When the first security authentication is not passed, the returning unit is configured to disconnect the hardware encryption machine and the RFID initial identification device.

[0132] In some embodiments, the contact communication module 23 includes a physical contact unit, an environment identification unit, and a parameter determination unit. The physical contact unit is configured to insert the RFID chip into the RFID initial identification device to realize the physical contact between the two. The environment identification unit is configured to identify the environmental characteristic parameters of the RFID chip by the RFID initial identification device. The parameter determination unit is configured to determine the working parameters of the RFID initial identification device based on the environmental characteristic parameters.

[0133] In some embodiments, the writing module 24 includes a second authentication unit, a second verification unit, and a disconnecting unit. The second authentication unit is configured to perform the second security authentication by the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip, and the second security authentication includes verifying whether the TID code is consistent. When the second security authentication is passed, the second verification unit is configured to reset the chip key of the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code by the RFID initial identification device. When the second security authentication is not passed, the disconnecting unit is configured to disconnect the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip. Specifically, the writing module 24 is configured to read the TID code of the RFID chip, and verify whether the TID code of the RFID chip is consistent with the TID code stored in the RFID initial identification device. Specifically, the writing module 24 is configured to send a write request to the RFID chip by the RFID initial identification device, verify whether the TID code is consistent by the RFID chip calling the built-in decryption algorithm, and allow the RFID chip to reset the chip key when the TID code is consistent.

[0134] In some embodiments, the device further comprises an isolation module, the isolation module comprising a collection unit, an inspection unit, an extraction unit and an isolation unit, the collection unit being configured to collect a communication connection structure of the RFID chip; the inspection unit being configured to inspect the communication connection structure to obtain a communication link association of the RFID chip; the extraction unit being configured to extract, according to the communication link association, an associated communication component in communication connection with the RFID chip to be reset; and the isolation unit being configured to send an isolation instruction to the associated communication component to cut off the communication link with the RFID chip to be reset.

[0135] Specifically, the collection unit is configured to extract a communication position of the RFID chip; to obtain, according to the communication position, a communication connection set in communication with the communication position; and to obtain, according to the communication connection set, a communication topology relationship including the RFID chip to obtain the communication connection structure.

[0136] Specifically, the inspection unit is configured to compare the plurality of communication connection structures to calculate an inspection result if the communication connection structure is a plurality of communication connection structures; to select one communication connection structure as the communication link association of the RFID chip if the inspection result shows that all communication connection structures are consistent; and to calculate all communication topology relationships in all different communication connection structures if the inspection result shows that there are two inconsistent communication connection structures.

[0137] Specifically, the isolation unit is configured to group at least one target component group if there are a plurality of associated communication components, the number of associated communication components in different target component groups being different; to determine the instruction sending order of all associated communication components according to the number of associated communication components in the target component group; and to send the isolation instruction to the associated communication components in turn based on the instruction sending order.

[0138] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, only the division of the above functional units and modules is exemplified, and in actual application, the above functions can be completed by different functional units or modules according to needs, that is, the internal structure of the device is divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. Each functional unit or module in the embodiment can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit, and the integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or software. In addition, the specific name of each functional unit or module is only for easy distinction, and does not limit the protection scope of the present application.

[0139] Embodiment three

[0140] In combination Figure 9An electronic device 1 comprises a memory 11, a processor 10, and a computer program 12 stored in the memory 11 and executable on the processor 10, wherein the processor 10 implements the security recovery method of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to any one of the embodiments when executing the computer program 12.

[0141] For example, the computer program 12 can be divided into one or more units, which are stored in the memory 11 and executed by the processor 10 to complete the present application. The one or more units can be a series of computer program instruction segments capable of completing a specific function, which are used to describe the execution process of the computer program 12 in the electronic device 1.

[0142] The electronic device 1 can be any electronic device with a control function. The electronic device 1 can include, but is not limited to, the processor 10 and the memory 11. Those skilled in the art can understand that Figure 9 The electronic device 1 is only an example and does not constitute a limitation on the electronic device 1, which can include more or fewer components than shown, or combine certain components, or different components, for example, the electronic device 1 can also include an input / output device, a network access device, a bus, etc.

[0143] The processor 10 can be a central processing unit (CPU), and can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or the processor can also be any conventional processor.

[0144] The memory 11 can be an internal storage unit of the electronic device 1, such as a hard disk or a memory of the electronic device 1. The memory 11 can also be an external storage device of the electronic device 1, such as a plug-in hard disk, a smart media card (SMC), a secure digital (SD) card, a flash card, etc. equipped on the electronic device 1. Further, the memory 11 can include both the internal storage unit and the external storage device of the electronic device 1. The memory 11 is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by the terminal device. The memory 11 can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.

[0145] Embodiment Four

[0146] The application also provides a computer readable storage medium. The computer readable storage medium stores a computer program, and the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the security recovery method of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to any one of the embodiments.

[0147] For example, the instructions can perform the following steps: establishing a wired communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the hardware encryption machine; performing first security authentication, and after the authentication is passed, the hardware encryption machine sends the corresponding TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device; the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip are physically contacted to establish a communication connection, and the RFID initial identification device is offline; performing second security authentication, and after the authentication is passed, the RFID initial identification device writes the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code.

[0148] For example, the instructions can perform the following steps: the RFID initial identification device initiates first security authentication to the hardware encryption machine, and the first security authentication includes verifying the initial device identification; the hardware encryption machine verifies whether the first security authentication is qualified, including verifying whether the initial device identification is in the legal device list; when the first security authentication is qualified, the hardware encryption machine returns the TID code and the chip key to the RFID initial identification device; when the first security authentication is not qualified, the hardware encryption machine is disconnected with the RFID initial identification device.

[0149] The specific implementation of each operation can refer to the foregoing embodiments, which will not be described here.

[0150] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the steps in the various methods of the above embodiments can be completed by instructions, or by controlling related hardware by instructions, the instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium and loaded and executed by a processor.

[0151] The computer readable storage medium can include a read only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, etc.

[0152] The computer readable storage medium stores instructions, and the instructions can be executed to perform the steps of any of the safety recovery methods provided by the embodiments of the present application. Therefore, the beneficial effects of any of the safety recovery methods provided by the embodiments of the present application can be achieved. Details are described in the foregoing embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0153] Embodiment five

[0154] The present application also provides a computer program product including computer programs / instructions. The computer programs / instructions are executed by a processor to implement the steps of the safety recovery method of the ultra-high frequency RFID chip in any of the embodiments of the present application. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files or some intermediate forms, etc.

[0155] In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own focus, and the parts not described or recorded in detail in a certain embodiment can be referred to the related description of other embodiments.

[0156] Those skilled in the art can understand that the units and algorithm steps of the examples described in combination with the embodiments disclosed herein can be realized by electronic hardware or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether the functions are realized in hardware or software mode depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solutions. The skilled person can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of the present application.

[0157] In the embodiments provided by the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus / terminal device and method can be implemented by other ways. For example, the above-mentioned apparatus / terminal device embodiments are only schematic, and the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division, and there can be another division way in actual implementation. For example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the displayed or discussed mutual couplings or direct couplings or communication connections between the units can be indirect couplings or communication connections through some interfaces, devices or units, and can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0158] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, i.e. may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Part or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiment.

[0159] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

[0160] If the integrated module / unit is realized in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can also be completed by a computer program instructing related hardware, and the computer program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. The computer program can be executed by a processor to implement the steps of each method embodiment. The computer readable medium can include any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code, recording medium, U disk, mobile hard disk, magnetic disk, optical disk, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electric carrier wave signal, telecommunication signal, and software distribution medium, etc. It should be noted that the content included in the computer readable medium can be appropriately increased or decreased according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice in the jurisdiction, for example, in some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, the computer readable medium does not include electric carrier wave signal and telecommunication signal.

[0161] It should be understood that the size of the serial number of each step in the above-mentioned embodiments does not mean the order of execution, the execution order of each process should be determined according to its function and inherent logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0162] The above only describes the preferred embodiments of the present application and does not limit the present application. Any modification, equivalent replacement and improvement made within the spirit and principle of the present application shall be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S100: Establish a wired communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the hardware encryption device; wherein, the RFID initial identification device does not have a wireless communication module; S200: Perform the first security authentication, and after successful authentication, the hardware encryption device sends the corresponding TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device; Step S200 includes the following steps: S210: The RFID initial identification device initiates the first security authentication to the hardware encryption device, the first security authentication including verifying the initial device identifier; S220: The hardware encryption device verifies whether the first security authentication is successful, including verifying whether the initial device identifier is in the list of legitimate devices; S230: When the first security authentication is successful, the hardware encryption device returns the TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device; S240: When the first security authentication fails, the hardware encryption device disconnects from the RFID initial identification device; S300: The RFID initial identification device establishes a communication connection with the physical contact of the RFID chip, and the RFID initial identification device is set up offline; S400: Perform a second security authentication, and after successful authentication, the RFID initial identification device writes the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code; Step S400 includes the following steps: S410: The RFID initial identification device performs a second security authentication with the RFID chip, the second security authentication including verifying whether the TID codes are consistent; S420: When the second security authentication is successful, the RFID initial identification device resets the chip key of the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code; S430: When the second security authentication fails, the RFID initial identification device disconnects from the RFID chip.

2. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first security authentication also includes personnel access authentication, and step S220 includes the following steps: S221: Input the facial and voice information of the personnel into the first neural network model; S222: For the facial information, extract and match features using a convolutional neural network; S223: For the aforementioned sound information, feature extraction and matching are performed using a deep learning model.

3. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 2, characterized in that, Before step S221, the following steps are also included: S224: Location of the sound source and the location of the face of the person collecting the data; S225: Input the sound source location and the face location into the second neural network model to generate fused features; S226: Determine whether the person's identity conforms to the preset rules based on the fusion features.

4. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S410 also includes the following steps: S411: Read the TID code of the RFID chip; S412: Verify whether the TID code of the RFID chip is consistent with the TID code stored in the RFID initial identification device.

5. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S420 includes the following steps: S421: The RFID initial identification device sends a write request to the RFID chip; the write request is generated by the hardware encryption machine using an encryption algorithm to encrypt the chip key and TID code. S422: The RFID chip calls the built-in decryption algorithm to verify whether the TID code is consistent; S423: The TID code verification is consistent, and the RFID chip allows the chip key to be reset.

6. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before step S300, the following steps are also included: S510: Collect the communication connection structure of the RFID chip; S520: Check the communication connection structure to obtain the communication link association of the RFID chip; S530: Based on the communication link association, extract the associated communication component that is connected to the RFID chip; S540: Send an isolation command to the associated communication component to disconnect the communication link with the RFID chip to be reset.

7. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 6, characterized in that: Step S510 includes the following steps: extracting the communication location of the RFID chip; obtaining the network information set of the RFID chip based on the communication location; and obtaining the communication topology relationship including the RFID chip based on the network information set to obtain the communication connection structure.

8. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 6, characterized in that: Step S520 includes the following steps: if there are multiple communication connection structures, compare the multiple communication connection structures and calculate the inspection result; if the inspection result shows that all the communication connection structures are consistent, select one of the communication connection structures as the communication link association of the RFID chip; if the inspection result shows that there are two inconsistent communication connection structures, calculate all the communication topology relationships among all the different communication connection structures.

9. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 6, characterized in that: Step S540 includes the following steps: if there are multiple associated communication components, group at least one target component group; sort according to the number of associated communication components in the target component group to determine the instruction sending order of all associated communication components; based on the instruction sending order, send isolation instructions to the associated communication components in sequence.

10. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that: Step S300 also includes the following steps: S310: The RFID chip is inserted into the RFID initial identification device to achieve physical contact between the two; S320: The RFID initial identification device senses the environmental characteristic parameters of the RFID chip; S330: Based on the environmental characteristic parameters, determine the operating parameters of the RFID initial identification device.

11. The secure recovery method for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip according to claim 10, characterized in that: The environmental characteristic parameters include electromagnetic interference intensity, and the radio frequency power of the RFID initial identification device is determined based on the electromagnetic interference intensity. And / or, the environmental characteristic parameters include a contact pressure value, and the contact current of the RFID initial identification device is determined based on the contact pressure value.

12. A secure recovery device for an ultra-high frequency RFID chip, characterized in that, The device includes: A wired communication module is used to establish a wired communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the hardware encryption device; wherein, the RFID initial identification device does not have a wireless communication module. The sending module is used to perform the first security authentication and, after successful authentication, send the corresponding TID code and chip key to the RFID initial identification device. Specifically, the sending module is used for the RFID initial identification device to initiate a first security authentication to the hardware encryption device, the first security authentication including verifying the initial device identifier; for the hardware encryption device to verify whether the first security authentication is qualified, including verifying whether the initial device identifier is in the list of legitimate devices; for the hardware encryption device to return a TID code and a chip key to the RFID initial identification device when the first security authentication is qualified; and for the hardware encryption device to disconnect from the RFID initial identification device when the first security authentication is unqualified. A contact communication module is used to establish a physical contact communication connection between the RFID initial identification device and the RFID chip, wherein the RFID initial identification device is set up offline; A writing module is used to perform a second security authentication and, upon successful authentication, write the corresponding chip key to the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code. The writing module includes a second authentication unit, a second verification unit, and a disconnection unit. The second authentication unit is used for the RFID initial identification device to perform a second security authentication with the RFID chip, the second security authentication including verifying whether the TID code is consistent. The second verification unit is used for the RFID initial identification device to reset the chip key of the RFID chip corresponding to the TID code when the second security authentication is successful. The disconnection unit is used for the RFID initial identification device to disconnect from the RFID chip when the second security authentication is unsuccessful.

13. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the secure recovery method for the UHF RFID chip as described in any one of claims 1 to 11.

14. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the secure recovery method for the UHF RFID chip as described in any one of claims 1 to 11.

15. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that, When the computer program / instruction is executed by the processor, it implements the steps in the secure recovery method for the UHF RFID chip according to any one of claims 1 to 11.

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