Trusted measurement method and equipment for power utilization acquisition system terminal and power utilization acquisition system
By introducing a trusted hardware module into the power consumption data acquisition system terminal and performing trusted measurement, the problem of unassessed terminal security is solved, achieving a higher level of security protection and information security defense capabilities.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202511030361.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-07-25
- Publication Date
- 2025-12-05
AI Technical Summary
The existing power consumption data acquisition system terminals have low security protection levels, and the security and trustworthiness of the terminals have not been effectively assessed. Viruses and malicious code may exploit vulnerabilities to infiltrate information networks, and existing authentication methods cannot effectively improve security.
A trusted hardware module is introduced to obtain the terminal's current PCR value, combined information signature value, and metric event log through trusted connection requests. Log integrity verification and terminal security verification are performed, and the terminal's attribute compliance and security are evaluated using AIK signature and preset trusted metric policies.
It improves the security protection level of the power consumption data acquisition system, verifies the security status of the terminal through trusted measurement technology, enhances the information security defense capability of the terminal, and solves the security risks caused by the simple terminal structure and harsh deployment environment.
Smart Images
Figure CN121077702A_ABST
Abstract
Description
TECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of trusted measurement, in particular to a trusted measurement method, device and power collection system for power collection system terminals. BACKGROUND
[0002] With the continuous development of network technology, various power collection terminals have been widely used in the construction of smart grids. However, such terminals have many problems: not only are the structures relatively simple, but there is a lack of security control over user behavior, and the deployment environment is often harsh, which makes the terminal potentially have a large number of security risks. Viruses, worms and other malicious codes may use the vulnerabilities of the collection terminal to invade the information network, thereby threatening the security of the entire network.
[0003] Currently, the judgment standard for whether a terminal can access a network is only whether it holds a password or key required by the authentication protocol, but the security and trust state of the terminal itself is completely ignored. This method obviously cannot effectively improve the security protection level of the power collection system. SUMMARY
[0004] The embodiments of the present application provide a trusted measurement method, device and power collection system for power collection system terminals to solve the defect of low security protection level of the existing power collection system.
[0005] In a first aspect, the embodiments of the present application provide a trusted measurement method for power collection system terminals, applied to a master station, and the method comprises:
[0006] sending a trusted connection request to a terminal; wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirements;
[0007] receiving trusted verification data fed back by the terminal; wherein the trusted verification data includes a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, an AIK signed measurement event log and a terminal security attribute value, which are obtained by the terminal through a trusted hardware module in response to the trusted connection request; the combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key that meets the AIK requirements, on the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value;
[0008] performing log integrity verification based on the AIK signed measurement event log; performing attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy; and performing terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0009] In a second aspect, the embodiments of the present application provide a trusted measurement method for power collection system terminals, applied to a terminal, and the method comprises:
[0010] receiving a trusted connection request sent by a master station; wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirement;
[0011] In response to the trusted connection request, obtaining, based on a trusted hardware module, a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log with AIK signature, and a terminal security attribute value, and feeding back to the master station, so that the master station performs log integrity verification based on the measurement event log with AIK signature, performs attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy, and performs terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0012] The combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement, on the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value.
[0013] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a trusted measurement device for a terminal of a power consumption collection system, which is configured to perform the trusted measurement method for the terminal of the power consumption collection system according to any of the above embodiments.
[0014] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a trusted measurement method for a terminal of a power consumption collection system, which is applied to a power consumption collection system including a master station and a terminal, and includes the following steps.
[0015] The master station sends a trusted connection request to the terminal, and the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirement.
[0016] The terminal obtains trusted verification data based on a trusted hardware module in response to the trusted connection request, and feeds back the trusted verification data to the master station; wherein the trusted verification data includes a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log with AIK signature, and a terminal security attribute value; and the combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement, on the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value.
[0017] The master station performs log integrity verification based on the measurement event log with AIK signature, performs attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy, and performs terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0018] In a fifth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a power consumption collection system, which includes:
[0019] The main station is configured to send a trusted connection request to the terminal, wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirement.
[0020] The terminal is configured to obtain trusted verification data based on the trusted hardware module in response to the trusted connection request, and feed back the trusted verification data to the main station, wherein the trusted verification data comprises current PCR value of the terminal, combined information signature value, AIK signed measurement event log and terminal security attribute value; the combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement, and is obtained based on combined information of the random number and the current PCR value.
[0021] The main station is further configured to perform log integrity verification based on the AIK signed measurement event log, perform attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy, and perform terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0022] Compared with the prior art, the trusted measurement method, device and power consumption collection system provided by the embodiment of the present application firstly send a trusted connection request to the terminal by the main station, wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirement; then, the terminal obtains trusted verification data based on the trusted hardware module in response to the trusted connection request, and feeds back the trusted verification data to the main station, wherein the trusted verification data comprises current PCR value of the terminal, combined information signature value, AIK signed measurement event log and terminal security attribute value, and the combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement, and is obtained based on combined information of the random number and the current PCR value; finally, the main station performs log integrity verification based on the AIK signed measurement event log, performs attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy, and performs terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value. Therefore, the trusted measurement method provided by the embodiment of the present application measures the secure and trusted state of the terminal through the trusted hardware module configured for the terminal, provides the main station with trusted verification data, and performs security verification on the terminal by the main station according to the trusted verification data, thereby effectively improving the security protection level of the power consumption collection system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS
[0023] Figure 1 is a flowchart of a trusted measurement method for a terminal of a power consumption collection system provided by an embodiment of the present application;
[0024] Figure 2 is a trusted computing architecture platform schematic diagram suitable for a power consumption collection system provided by an embodiment of the present application;
[0025] Figure 3 is a flowchart of a trusted measurement operation and storage provided by an embodiment of the present application;
[0026] Figure 4 is a working principle diagram of a trusted measurement method for a power consumption collection system terminal provided by an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0027] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor fall within the scope of protection of the present application.
[0028] Referring to Figure 1 , an embodiment of the present application provides a trusted measurement method for a power consumption collection system terminal, which is applied to a master station and includes steps S1-S3:
[0029] S1, a trusted connection request is sent to a terminal; wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirements;
[0030] S2, trusted verification data fed back by the terminal is received; wherein the trusted verification data includes a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log with an AIK signature, and a terminal security attribute value, which are obtained by the terminal through a trusted hardware module in response to the trusted connection request; the combined information signature value is obtained by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirements to sign the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value;
[0031] S3, log integrity verification is performed based on the measurement event log with the AIK signature; attribute compliance verification of the terminal is performed based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy; terminal security verification is performed based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0032] It is worth noting that the terminal is a power consumption collection terminal. The platform architecture of the power consumption collection terminal is relatively simple at present, and the software itself is vulnerable to attacks, so the trusted problem of the computing platform cannot be effectively solved by using the operating system or the security software. An embodiment of the present application designs a terminal trusted platform, and the main design idea is to set a security chip (trusted hardware module) on the physical motherboard of the terminal as a security bottom module to protect the security of the host computer in cooperation with the system software. The trusted computing architecture platform suitable for the power consumption collection system is as followsFigure 2 As shown, this includes the underlying hardware structure (such as the terminal's Central Processing Unit (CPU), memory, trusted hardware modules, communication and acquisition modules, etc.), kernel and driver modules (such as the system kernel, bootloader, driver modules, etc.), and interfaces and software processes (such as application A, application B, system interfaces and processes, Trusted Service Manager (TSM) software stack, etc.). In the implementation rules of the Trusted Computing Platform Standard, a trusted terminal (i.e., a terminal with trusted attributes) should include the following four functions and attributes: First, ensuring the integrity / availability of the user's unique identity, permissions, and workspace; second, ensuring the integrity of the hardware environment configuration, operating system kernel, services, and applications; third, ensuring the security of key operations and storage; and fourth, ensuring the system has immunity capabilities, fundamentally preventing attacks from viruses and hackers.
[0033] To make the trust measurement of the terminal clearer, its basic principles are briefly introduced below:
[0034] 1. For trusted terminals, the core of trusted computing research is the issue of trust measurement. Trust measurement is a method to determine whether an object is trustworthy; it is a quantitative analysis of terminal security. In simple terms, trust measurement involves testing and analyzing the attributes of various component objects of the terminal according to predefined rules and standards, and matching the obtained measurement values with expected measurement values. If they meet the predefined standards, the terminal can be proven to be trustworthy. Its construction approach is as follows:
[0035] (1) Determine the expected standards. Ensure that the status, functions, behaviors, and results of the terminal platform always meet the user's expectations for the operation of the power consumption data acquisition terminal. Expected standards can be described in various forms, and the quality of the chosen measurement standard determines the accuracy of the terminal's trustworthiness assessment. For example, using the hash value stored in non-volatile memory as the standard value, the terminal's components can be authenticated and matched through an appropriate measurement strategy. If the two hash values obtained are consistent, the terminal can be determined to be trustworthy.
[0036] (2) Determine the measurement strategy. Conduct a comprehensive analysis of various factors affecting the terminal, and formulate a feasible trust measurement strategy to determine the trustworthiness of the terminal. In the application phase, it is necessary to propose a measurement strategy and standard, apply it to the measurement object, and obtain a set of measurement values.
[0037] (3) Conduct trust certification. Based on the different trust requirements of each measurement object, adopt an appropriate evaluation and measurement scheme to measure the integrity of each component.
[0038] 2. Calculation and storage procedures for trust metrics
[0039] The trust measurement process essentially involves using hash functions. Hash algorithms can transform data of arbitrary length from a power acquisition terminal into a fixed-length hash value. The trust measurement storage process involves saving the resulting hash value to the Trusted Computing Platform's Status Register (PCR). This process is the core method for data transmission between modules in the power acquisition terminal integrity measurement strategy.
[0040] The formula for expressing this is: New PCR Value = Digest (Old PCR Value || Extended Data). This means that the value obtained from the new metric is concatenated to the already generated PCR value, the merged new value is hashed, and finally, the new value replaces the old PCR value. The entire process is accomplished by calling the Tspi_TCM_PcrExtend function of the TSP layer, stored in trusted hardware modules (such as the Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM) and Trusted Platform Module (TPM)). This function extends the PCR value, and its mechanism involves calling the Tcsi_LogPcrEvent and Tcsi_Extend functions of the TCS layer through the trusted cryptography service to update the PCR value and record related event logs. The process is as follows: Figure 3 As shown.
[0041] Specifically, research on the integrity measurement of electricity consumption data acquisition terminals has gradually shifted towards practicality and scalability. Attribute-based trusted connections, as the most practical and efficient proof method currently available, can effectively ensure the authenticity and confidentiality of data during electricity consumption data acquisition and transmission when introduced into electricity consumption data acquisition terminals. Attribute-based proof measures the trusted attributes of the electricity consumption data acquisition terminal without measuring its specific configuration. The attribute-based trusted connection method model uses an intermediate medium to distinguish the trust levels of attributes and achieves this distinction by issuing attribute trust certificates. Figure 4 The diagram shown illustrates the working principle of a reliable measurement method for electricity consumption data acquisition system terminals. Figure 4 In this implementation, the measurement proxy module VP, relative to the measured terminal H, is a binary measurement platform. However, for the trusted measurement platform V, it is an attribute-based measured platform. In this implementation, the master station acts as the trusted measurement platform V, the terminal is the measured terminal H, and the trusted hardware module is TCM. A new module is configured on the master station to act as the measurement proxy module VP, and its working principle is as follows:
[0042] 1. V sends a trusted connection request to VP, the request including a random number n, an AIK certificate of a platform attribute (i.e. AIK requirement), and a trusted measurement policy TPv; where AIK is an English abbreviation of Attestation Identity Key.
[0043] 2. Upon receiving the request, VP sends n and AIK requirement to H in the form of Auth(n, AIK); where Auth(n, AIK) is an authentication mechanism based on "challenge-response" mode in trusted computing.
[0044] 3. TCM extracts a corresponding PCR value for H;
[0045] 4. TCM signs the PCR value and n using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement to obtain Sign(PCR, n) (i.e. combined information signature value), and sends it to H;
[0046] 5. H provides the AIK-signed measurement event log log and Q value (i.e. terminal security attribute value) of TCM to VP;
[0047] 6. VP performs log integrity verification based on the AIK-signed measurement event log, attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to the trusted measurement policy TPv, and terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0048] In the above steps, the master station completes the trusted measurement of the terminal. Further, the following steps are performed:
[0049] 7. Attribute trust certificate is applied to PC (i.e. attribute trust certificate issuer); PC verifies the authenticity through TPv submitted by V, and issues the attribute trust certificate to H after passing the verification results of H.
[0050] In an embodiment, the trusted connection request is sent to the terminal, including: sending a first connection request to a network access control module of the master station, so that the network access control module sends a trusted connection request to the terminal based on the first connection request; wherein the first connection request carries the random number, the trusted measurement policy and the AIK requirement;
[0051] The trusted verification data fed back by the terminal is received, including: receiving the trusted verification data fed back by the terminal through a TNC client by the network access control module;
[0052] The log integrity verification, the attribute compliance verification and the terminal security verification are performed by the network access control module.
[0053] Exemplarily, in the electricity collection terminal, the trusted platform module and the related trust measurement structure and algorithm correspond to an integrity measurement collector (IMC) responsible for collecting and storing the internal integrity information of the electricity collection terminal. Since the system communication only involves the communication between the master station and the terminal, there can be only one module as the TNCC (i.e., the TNC client) in the electricity collection terminal, and this function can be added on the basis of the measurement software. On the master station side, the TNCS corresponding to the TNCC needs to be configured, and the TNCS is a network access control module that delivers decision information to the network access layer in the master station. The IMV is a platform information integrity detection component that stores the standard component prediction value, and uses an improved integrity detection method.
[0054] First, the terminal side and the master station side complete the initialization operation, then the terminal initiates a network access request to the master station, the terminal is authenticated by the master station, after the authentication, the electricity collection system enters the attribute-based integrity proof phase and the verification phase, the specific implementation steps of the integrity proof phase are as follows:
[0055] (1) The network access control module of the master station (as a measurement agent module VP) sends a trusted connection request to the terminal H, including a random number n, AIK requirements (such as attribute key requirements), and a trusted measurement policy TPv (from the master station as a trusted measurement platform V).
[0056] (2) The terminal H extracts the current PCR value (reflecting the real-time integrity state of the terminal) through the TCM, and generates a measurement event log log (recording the measurement sequence, hash value, etc. of each component).
[0057] (3) The TCM uses the private key satisfying the AIK requirement to sign the "PCR value + random number n" to obtain Sign(PCR, n), and generates a Q value (hash value of the terminal security attribute, such as security level, supported protocol), and AIK signs the measurement event log log to form the "measurement event log with AIK signature".
[0058] (4) The terminal H returns the following information to the network access control module of the master station through the TNCC: the measurement event log with AIK signature log, the Q value, Sign(PCR, n), etc.
[0059] The verification phase includes the following steps:
[0060] (5) The network access control module of the master station as the measurement agent module VP performs the following verification process:
[0061] The hash value of the metric event log log is recalculated, compared with the log signature (namely AIK signature) sent by the terminal, and it is confirmed that the metric event log log is not tampered (integrity verification) ;
[0062] It is verified whether the Q value meets the TPv standard (such as security level≥"medium") of the host station.
[0063] The Sign (PCR, n) is verified by the public key corresponding to the private key, and the authenticity of the PCR value and n is confirmed (anti-replay attack).
[0064] It is worth noting that the TNCC in the terminal sends the integrity information stored in the trusted platform module and the content of the metric storage log to the network access control module of the host station according to the pre-agreed protocol. The network access control module processes the information and then submits it to the IMV for integrity judgment. At this time, the TNCC can also communicate with the TNCC according to specific needs and require the terminal to submit other integrity information. This series of operations collectively constitute the trusted reporting process in integrity detection. In the trusted report, the integrity information composed of the metric event log and the PCR value of the terminal is provided to the host station in a trusted connection manner. After completing the integrity check, the network access control module will execute the final result by the network access layer.
[0065] In one embodiment, the log integrity verification based on the AIK signed metric event log includes: recalculating a hash value based on the metric event log to obtain verification information; and comparing the verification information with the AIK signature to obtain a log integrity verification result.
[0066] The terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value includes: using an AIK public key corresponding to the AIK private key to decrypt the combined information signature value to obtain decrypted data.
[0067] The decrypted data is compared with the current PCR value sent by the terminal and the random number of the trusted connection request to obtain a terminal security verification result.
[0068] Specifically, the specific steps of log integrity verification and terminal security verification can be seen in the verification stage related steps in the previous embodiment, which will not be repeated here.
[0069] In one embodiment, the sending of the trusted connection request to the terminal is performed after the identity verification of the terminal in the perspective of the communication company and the perspective of the power company is passed. The identity verification is as follows:
[0070] Based on the network access layer module of the host station, the network access request initiated by the terminal through the communication channel device is received, and the identity of the terminal in the perspective of the communication company is verified.
[0071] After the terminal's identity is verified by the communication company, the network access control module of the main station receives the platform identity provided by the terminal through the trusted hardware module to verify the terminal's identity from the perspective of the power company.
[0072] Specifically, before the integrity verification phase of the previous embodiment, an access request and identity authentication phase is also included. The specific implementation steps of this phase are as follows:
[0073] (1) The terminal H initiates a network access request to the communication channel device through an existing access authentication method (such as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS)).
[0074] (2) The communication channel device forwards the request to the network access layer module (measurer role) of the main station, which processes in the order of "user identity authentication → platform identity authentication → integrity check". The specific user identity authentication occurs between the terminal and the network access layer module, while the platform identity authentication and integrity check occur between the terminal and the network access control module.
[0075] User identity authentication: The terminal H interacts with the network access layer module to verify the terminal's identity from the perspective of the communication company (such as Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) information), and then proceeds to the next step.
[0076] Platform identity authentication: The terminal TNCC communicates with the network access control module (TNCS, corresponding to VP) of the main station. The terminal provides platform identity (such as EK built-in key) through TCM, and the main station verifies its identity from the perspective of the power company (based on the State Grid CA mechanism) to ensure that the identity is legal. The English full name of CA is Certificate Authority, and the Chinese name is Certificate Authority. The English full name of EK is Endorsement Key, and the Chinese name is Endorsement Key.
[0077] It is worth mentioning that, taking the power consumption collection terminal communicating through GPRS as an example, the user identity represents the identity of the terminal in the perspective of the communication provider, and it is the user as a communication party; the platform identity represents the identity of the terminal in the perspective of the power company, and it is the participating platform of the collection system business. Although the terminal itself has such two identities, and they are also one-to-one corresponding in structure, they cannot be confused or misused. The platform identity should be established under the CA mechanism of State Grid, and the EK is placed in the trusted platform module during production, and then the corresponding temporary identity certificate is generated according to the trusted connection method. The platform will not be exposed to the communication provider, and the user identity is known to both the power company and the communication provider. The platform identity authentication can develop different strategies according to the specific business needs, and the certificate mechanism or the direct anonymous authentication method is used for protection purposes. The former can use EK to generate AIK certificate for trusted platform module for trusted party, and the latter can use direct anonymous authentication or improved algorithm. The performance of these algorithms is more suitable for the computing power of the collection terminal, and has the function of privacy protection. After the platform identity authentication is completed, the collection terminal and the master station need to complete the platform integrity submission and platform integrity detection respectively, and then enter the specific verification process.
[0078] In an embodiment, the current PCR value and the measurement event log of the terminal are obtained by the terminal before initiating the network access request, completing local integrity detection; and the master station completes the initialization operation corresponding to the terminal before receiving the network access request.
[0079] Specifically, before the access request and identity authentication stage of the previous embodiment, an initialization stage is further included, in which the terminal completes local integrity detection, successfully starts and runs, and the master station completes the integrity verification platform initialization operation corresponding to the terminal. After initialization, the terminal initiates an access request to the communication channel device through the existing access authentication mode of the underlying layer. The specific implementation of the initialization stage is as follows:
[0080] Terminal side: the terminal H completes local integrity detection (such as the hash measurement of Bootloader, kernel and other components when starting, generates initial PCR value and measurement event log log), starts the trusted hardware module (such as TCM) and TNCC.
[0081] Master station side: the master station completes the integrity verification platform initialization, the IMV (integrity detection component) loads the preset standard integrity value (such as the expected hash value of each component), and the network access control module (TNCS, corresponding to VP) loads the trusted measurement strategy TPv.
[0082] In an embodiment, it further includes:
[0083] After the log integrity verification passes, the attribute compliance verification passes and the terminal security verification passes, the network access control module of the host station submits the trust measurement policy provided by the host station to an attribute trust certificate issuer, so that the attribute trust certificate issuer verifies that the terminal meets the trusted standard according to the trust measurement policy, and sends an attribute trust certificate of the terminal to the network access control module of the host station;
[0084] Based on the network access control module of the host station, the attribute trust certificate, the log integrity verification result, the attribute compliance verification result and the terminal security verification result are sent to the network access layer module of the host station, so that the network access layer module allows the terminal to access the trusted network when the log integrity verification passes, the attribute compliance verification passes and the terminal security verification passes.
[0085] Specifically, the method further includes a certificate issuing phase and a network access decision phase, which specifically implement the following steps:
[0086] Certificate issuing phase:
[0087] (1) After the verifications of the terminal pass, the network access control module TNCS of the host station applies for an attribute trust certificate to the attribute trust certificate issuer PC as a measurement agent module VP, and submits the verification result and TPv.
[0088] (2) The PC verifies that the terminal meets the trusted standard according to the TPv of V, and issues an attribute trust certificate to the terminal H.
[0089] Network access decision phase:
[0090] (3) The network access control module of the host station sends the certificate issued by the PC and the integrity judgment result (such as the matching of the PCR value and the IMV standard value) of the IMV to the network access layer module.
[0091] (4) The network access layer module performs a final decision: allowing the collection terminal H to access the trusted network; if the verification fails, access is refused.
[0092] The embodiment of the application further provides another trusted measurement method for a terminal of a power collection system, applied to a terminal, and the method includes:
[0093] Receiving a trusted connection request sent by a host station; wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and an AIK requirement;
[0094] In response to the trusted connection request, a current PCR value, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log signed with an AIK, and a terminal security attribute value of the terminal are obtained based on a trusted hardware module, and are fed back to the host station, so that the host station performs log integrity verification based on the measurement event log signed with the AIK, performs attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy, and performs terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0095] The combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement, and is obtained based on the random number and the current PCR value.
[0096] It should be noted that the specific flow steps of the trusted measurement method for the terminal of the electricity collection system according to the embodiments of the present application can refer to the trusted measurement method for the terminal of the electricity collection system according to any of the above embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0097] The embodiments of the present application also provide a trusted measurement method for a terminal of an electricity collection system, which is applied to an electricity collection system including a host station and a terminal, and includes the following steps.
[0098] The host station sends a trusted connection request to the terminal, and the trusted connection request carries a random number and an AIK requirement.
[0099] In response to the trusted connection request, the terminal obtains trusted verification data based on a trusted hardware module, and feeds back the trusted verification data to the host station, wherein the trusted verification data includes a current PCR value, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log signed with an AIK, and a terminal security attribute value of the terminal; the combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement, and is obtained based on the random number and the current PCR value.
[0100] The host station performs log integrity verification based on the measurement event log signed with the AIK, performs attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement strategy, and performs terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0101] It should be noted that the specific flow steps of the trusted measurement method for the terminal of the electricity collection system according to the embodiments of the present application can refer to the trusted measurement method for the terminal of the electricity collection system according to any of the above embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0102] The embodiment of the present application further provides a trust measurement device for a terminal of an electricity consumption collection system, which is used to execute the trust measurement method for the terminal of the electricity consumption collection system according to any one of the above embodiments. It can be understood that the device can be a master station or a terminal.
[0103] It should be noted that the working process of the trust measurement device for the terminal of the electricity consumption collection system according to the embodiment of the present application can refer to the trust measurement method for the terminal of the electricity consumption collection system according to any one of the above embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0104] The embodiment of the present application further provides an electricity consumption collection system, which comprises:
[0105] A master station is configured to send a trusted connection request to a terminal, wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirement.
[0106] The terminal is configured to, in response to the trusted connection request, acquire trusted verification data based on a trusted hardware module, and feed back the trusted verification data to the master station, wherein the trusted verification data comprises a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, an AIK signed measurement event log and a terminal security attribute value; the combined information signature value is obtained by signing the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value by the trusted hardware module using a private key meeting the AIK requirement.
[0107] The master station is further configured to perform log integrity verification based on the AIK signed measurement event log, perform attribute compliance verification of the terminal according to the terminal security attribute value based on a preset trust measurement strategy, and perform terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
[0108] It should be noted that the working process of the electricity consumption collection system according to the embodiment of the present application can refer to the trust measurement method for the terminal of the electricity consumption collection system according to any one of the above embodiments, which will not be repeated here.
[0109] Compared with the prior art, the credibility measurement method, device and electricity collection system provided by the embodiment of the application introduce the trusted computing technology into the construction of the electricity collection system, introduce the remote attribute proof scheme based on the trusted hardware module in the credibility measurement link of the terminal, add the measurement agent module in the scheme, and thus the security attribute of the sending platform can be used to prove the credibility of the platform, without directly sending the specific configuration of the platform to the verifier, so that the privacy of the verified platform is not exposed to the verifier. For the maintenance of the platform, whether the platform hardware is updated or the software is upgraded, as long as the updated platform can still meet the requirements of the verifier security attribute, so that the verifier only needs to verify the attribute security level and does not need to save the specific configuration of various trusted platforms, thereby solving the scalability problem of the platform; and effectively improving the problems of low efficiency of binary trusted connection, easy leakage of configuration privacy and the like, improving the active defense ability of the terminal information security, and improving the security protection ability of the electricity collection system.
Claims
1. A trust measurement method for a power consumption collection system terminal, characterized by, Applied to a master station, comprising: sending a trusted connection request to a terminal; wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and an AIK requirement; receiving trusted verification data fed back by the terminal; wherein the trusted verification data includes a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log with an AIK signature, and a terminal security attribute value, which are obtained by the terminal through a trusted hardware module in response to the trusted connection request; the combined information signature value is obtained by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement to sign the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value; performing log integrity verification based on the measurement event log with the AIK signature, performing attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on a preset trusted measurement policy according to the terminal security attribute value, and performing terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
2. The trust measurement method for the power consumption collection system terminal according to claim 1, wherein, The sending of the trusted connection request to the terminal comprises sending a first connection request to a network access control module of the master station, so that the network access control module sends a trusted connection request to the terminal based on the first connection request; wherein the first connection request carries the random number, the trusted measurement policy, and the AIK requirement. The receiving of the trusted verification data fed back by the terminal comprises receiving, by the network access control module, the trusted verification data fed back by the terminal through a TNC client. The log integrity verification, the attribute compliance verification, and the terminal security verification are performed by the network access control module.
3. The trust measurement method for the power consumption collection system terminal according to claim 1, wherein, The log integrity verification based on the measurement event log with the AIK signature comprises recalculating a hash value based on the measurement event log to obtain to-be-verified information, and comparing the to-be-verified information with the AIK signature to obtain a log integrity verification result. The terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value comprises decrypting the combined information signature value using a public key corresponding to the private key to obtain decrypted data. The decrypted data is compared with the current PCR value sent by the terminal and the random number of the trusted connection request to obtain a terminal security verification result.
4. The trust measurement method for the power consumption collection system terminal according to claim 1, wherein, The sending of the trusted connection request to the terminal is performed after identity verification of the terminal in the perspective of a communication company and the perspective of a power company is passed, and the identity verification is performed in the following manner: receiving, based on a network access layer module of the master station, a network access request initiated by the terminal through a communication channel device, and verifying the identity of the terminal in the perspective of the communication company; after the identity verification of the terminal in the perspective of the communication company is passed, receiving, based on a network access control module of the master station, a platform identity provided by the trusted hardware module of the terminal, to verify the identity of the terminal in the perspective of the power company.
5. The trust measurement method for the power consumption collection system terminal according to claim 4, wherein, The current PCR value and the measurement event log of the terminal are obtained by the terminal through local integrity detection before the network access request is initiated, and the master station completes an initialization operation corresponding to the terminal before receiving the network access request.
6. The trust measurement method for the power consumption oriented collection system terminal according to claim 1, wherein, Further comprising: After the log integrity verification passes, the attribute compliance verification passes and the terminal security verification passes, the network access control module of the host station submits the trusted measurement policy provided by the host station to an attribute trust certificate issuer, so that the attribute trust certificate issuer verifies whether the terminal meets a trusted standard according to the trusted measurement policy, and sends an attribute trust certificate of the terminal to the network access control module of the host station; The network access control module of the host station sends the attribute trust certificate, the log integrity verification result, the attribute compliance verification result and the terminal security verification result to the network access layer module of the host station, so that the network access layer module allows the terminal to access a trusted network when the log integrity verification passes, the attribute compliance verification passes and the terminal security verification passes.
7. A trust measurement method for a power consumption collection system terminal, characterized by, Applied to a terminal, comprising: Receiving a trusted connection request sent by a host station; wherein the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirements; In response to the trusted connection request, obtaining, based on a trusted hardware module, a current PCR value, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log with AIK signature and a terminal security attribute value of the terminal, and feeding back to the host station, so that the host station performs log integrity verification based on the measurement event log with AIK signature; performing attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement policy; and performing terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value. The combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key meeting the AIK requirements on the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value.
8. A trust measurement method for a power consumption collection system terminal, characterized by, Applied to a power collection system, the power collection system comprising a host station and a terminal, the method comprising: The host station sends a trusted connection request to the terminal, and the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirements; In response to the trusted connection request, the terminal obtains trusted verification data based on a trusted hardware module, and feeds back the trusted verification data to the host station; wherein the trusted verification data comprises a current PCR value, a combined information signature value, a measurement event log with AIK signature and a terminal security attribute value of the terminal; the combined information signature value is signed by the trusted hardware module using a private key meeting the AIK requirements on the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value; The host station performs log integrity verification based on the measurement event log with AIK signature; performs attribute compliance verification of the terminal based on the terminal security attribute value according to a preset trusted measurement policy; and performs terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.
9. A trust measurement device for a power consumption collection system terminal, characterized by, The device is used to execute the trusted measurement method for the terminal of the power collection system as claimed in any one of claims 1-7.
10. A power harvesting system comprising: Comprising: The host station is used to send a trusted connection request to the terminal, and the trusted connection request carries a random number and AIK requirements; The terminal is configured to, in response to the trusted connection request, obtain trusted verification data based on the trusted hardware module, and feed back the trusted verification data to the host station. The trusted verification data includes a current PCR value of the terminal, a combined information signature value, an AIK signed measurement event log, and a terminal security attribute value. The combined information signature value is obtained by signing the combined information of the random number and the current PCR value by the trusted hardware module using a private key satisfying the AIK requirement. The host station is further configured to perform log integrity verification based on the AIK signed measurement event log, perform attribute compliance verification of the terminal according to the terminal security attribute value based on a preset trusted measurement strategy, and perform terminal security verification based on the current PCR value and the combined information signature value.