Identity authentication control method and system for power monitoring system based on anti-quantum cryptography

Abstract

The application provides an anti-quantum-cipher-based power monitoring system identity authentication control method and system, and belongs to the technical field of authentication control, which comprises the following steps: step 1, initializing the anti-quantum-cipher-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system; step 2, the anti-quantum-cipher-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system registers the edge terminal device; and step 3, the anti-quantum-cipher-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system performs two-way identity authentication and key negotiation. The application aims to overcome the defects of the existing anti-quantum-cipher-based power monitoring system identity authentication scheme in performance adaptation, key security, authentication robustness and system compatibility, and provides an identity authentication control method and system meeting the high security, low delay and high reliability requirements of the power monitoring system.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The application belongs to the technical field of authentication control, and particularly relates to an identity authentication control method and system for a power monitoring system based on quantum-resistant cryptography. BACKGROUND

[0002] As the core nerve center of the smart grid, the power monitoring system is responsible for real-time collection of device state data in the whole link of power generation, power transmission and power distribution, and execution of remote dispatching control instructions, and its security is directly related to the stability of energy supply and the safety of national key infrastructure. With the rapid evolution of quantum computing technology, quantum attack means represented by Shor algorithm can break the traditional public key cryptography system (such as RSA, ECDSA) based on the large number factorization and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time, and the identity authentication mechanism widely deployed in the power monitoring system relies on such algorithms and faces serious quantum security threats.

[0003] To cope with the threat, existing technologies have begun to explore the introduction of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms into the power monitoring system, but there are still significant defects in practice:

[0004] Performance adaptability is insufficient: the power monitoring system contains a large number of edge terminal devices (such as FTU, smart meters), and their computing power, storage and energy consumption resources are limited, while most quantum-resistant algorithms (such as early lattice-based cryptography) have high computational complexity and large communication overhead, resulting in authentication delay exceeding the millisecond response requirement of the power system, making it difficult to deploy on resource-limited devices.

[0005] Insufficient authentication robustness: some schemes only implement one-way authentication and do not build a two-way trusted verification mechanism, which is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks; and do not design a fault-tolerant mechanism in combination with the business characteristics of the power monitoring system, which is easy to cause authentication failure and system interruption when there is transient interference in the communication channel.

[0006] Lack of system compatibility: most existing quantum-resistant authentication schemes require large-scale modification of the existing hardware and communication protocols of the power monitoring system, and have poor adaptability to power-specific protocols such as IEC61850, resulting in high deployment cost and great difficulty in upgrading.

[0007] Therefore, it is urgent to design an identity authentication control method and system for the power monitoring system that has quantum-resistant security, lightweight performance and good compatibility, in order to solve the bottleneck problem of the existing technology. SUMMARY

[0008] The present application aims to overcome the defects of existing identity authentication schemes for the power monitoring system based on quantum-resistant cryptography in terms of performance adaptation, key security, authentication robustness and system compatibility, and to provide an identity authentication control method and system that meets the high security, low delay and high reliability requirements of the power monitoring system.

[0009] The application uses the technical solutions as follows.

[0010] An anti-quantum password-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system, comprising:

[0011] A key management center KMC, a certificate authentication center CA, a power monitoring master station of the power monitoring system, an edge terminal device of the power monitoring system, and a quantum random number generator QRNG are connected in communication with each other;

[0012] The key management center KMC is configured to initialize the anti-quantum password-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system;

[0013] The edge terminal device of the power monitoring system is configured to register the edge terminal device, verify an authentication request, generate a random challenge code, calculate a session negotiation parameter, and generate an authentication response; the edge terminal device is configured to calculate a shared key negotiation value;

[0014] The power monitoring master station of the power monitoring system is configured to send an authentication request to the edge terminal device, verify a response message, and generate a confirmation message and send the confirmation message to the edge terminal device.

[0015] An anti-quantum password-based power monitoring system identity authentication control method, comprising:

[0016] Step 1: initializing the anti-quantum password-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system;

[0017] Step 2: the anti-quantum password-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system registers an edge terminal device;

[0018] Step 3: the anti-quantum password-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system performs bidirectional identity authentication and key negotiation.

[0019] Preferably, step 1 specifically comprises:

[0020] Step 1-1: the key management center KMC calls the quantum random number generator QRNG to generate a true random number seed , generates a system global key pair , based on an improved CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, wherein is a system public key, is a system private key, and the system global key pair is secretly stored by the key management center KMC;

[0021] Step 1-2: the key management center KMC generates system public parameters , wherein is a base point on an elliptic curve group over a finite field, is the order of the elliptic curve group, , are cryptographic hash functions, is a preset SLH-DSA algorithm parameter set;

[0022] Step 1-3: The key management center KMC synchronizes the system public parameters to the certificate authority center CA, the power monitoring master station and all edge terminal devices.

[0023] Preferably, step 1-1 specifically includes:

[0024] Step 1-1-1: Construct a multi-source true random number entropy pool;

[0025] Step 1-1-2: Generate a key pair based on distributed verification.

[0026] Preferably, step 1-1-1 specifically includes:

[0027] First, generate 3 types of independent entropy sources, including:

[0028] Quantum entropy source: quantum random number generator QRNG generates a true random number sequence , is a 256-bit true quantum random number, , ;

[0029] Physical environment entropy source: collect the physical parameters of the key management center KMC when running, and generate a time sequence of physical parameters through analog-digital conversion , is the 256-bit physical parameter value, which is used as a physical random number, , ;

[0030] Distributed node entropy source: the key management center KMC requests random number fragments from 3 independent trusted nodes respectively , and , forming a distributed sequence ;

[0031] Then, fuse the multi-source entropy through the quantum-resistant hash function SHA3-512: , wherein is the quantum-resistant hash function SHA3-512, is a 512-bit fusion seed pool, represents byte splicing.

[0032] Preferably, step 1-1-2 specifically includes:

[0033] Step 1-1-2-1: Key Management Center (KMC) from Extract as a seed for true random numbers 256-bit seed , To intercept The lower 256 bits are used to form The function will As input to the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, an initial key pair is generated. : ,in To call the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm A function that generates key pairs for input parameters;

[0034] Step 1-1-2-2: The Key Management Center (KMC) generates a verification request, which includes... and It is sent to three independent trusted nodes;

[0035] Steps 1-1-2-3: Independent trusted nodes use the same The CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm is run as input parameters. If the generated public key is consistent with... If they match, the Key Management Center (KMC) will return a valid signature confirmation, where the valid signature... , For the first A valid signature generated by an independent trusted node. For the first Each independent trusted node uses The private key generated by running the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm as input parameter For the first Each independent trusted node uses its own private key. For the initial public key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used to generate the signature;

[0036] Step 1-1-2-4: After the Key Management Center (KMC) collects ≥2 valid signatures, it confirms the key pair is legitimate and... Formal as a global key pair ( , ).

[0037] Preferably, step 2 specifically includes:

[0038] Step 2-1: Edge terminal device Generate SLH-DSA-based device key pairs locally. ,in For the first One edge terminal device, For edge terminal devices The device's private key, For edge terminal devices The device's public key;

[0039] Step 2-2: Edge terminal devices collect their own preset device identifiers. Equipment Model and hardware fingerprint Generate registration request and use This serves as the public key for the CRYSTALS-Kyber encryption algorithm, used to apply the CRYSTALS-Kyber encryption algorithm to the registration request. After encryption, it is sent to the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0040] Steps 2-3: Using a Certificate Authority (CA) This is used as the private key for the CRYSTALS-Kyber decapsulation algorithm, and is used to apply the CRYSTALS-Kyber decapsulation algorithm to the encrypted registration request. After decryption and verification that the device information is legitimate, based on... Use CA private key right and Perform a signature to generate a quantum-resistant identity certificate. and will resist quantum identity certificates Send to edge terminal device .

[0041] Preferably, step 2-1 specifically includes:

[0042] Step 2-1-1: Terminal pre-configuration and environment preparation;

[0043] Step 2-1-2: Execute the key pair generation process.

[0044] Preferably, step 2-1-1 specifically includes:

[0045] Preload system parameters: The edge terminal device obtains the common system parameters synchronized from the Key Management Center (KMC). Extract It is stored in a non-volatile memory connected to the edge terminal device;

[0046] Configure a hardware security environment: Edge terminal devices have integrated hardware security modules.

[0047] Preferably, step 2-1-2 specifically includes:

[0048] Phase 1: generating high-entropy seed, including: local physical entropy collection: collecting physical noise of edge terminal device runtime by mHSM, the physical noise including:

[0049] Voltage fluctuation of power module of edge terminal device ; instruction execution latency jitter of main CPU of edge terminal device ; temperature fluctuation of environmental temperature sensor ;

[0050] Master station assisted random number: edge terminal device requests 128-bit random number segment from power monitoring master station through encrypted channel ;

[0051] Seed fusion: fusing multi-source entropy by local lightweight hash function of edge terminal device to generate 256-bit seed :

[0052] ;

[0053] wherein is the hardware fingerprint of the edge terminal device, is the SHA3-256 function, is , , , and are sequentially spliced to form a byte string;

[0054] Phase 2: generating key pair based on SLH-DSA algorithm, i.e. calling SLH-DSA algorithm inside mHSM, inputting seed and , to generate key pair .

[0055] Preferably, in step 2-3, the method for verifying the legality of device information includes:

[0056] After decrypting the encrypted registration request by using the decapsulation algorithm of CRYSTALS-Kyber , obtaining , , and , then comparing the self-device identifier, device model and hardware fingerprint of each edge terminal device pre-stored by the certificate authority CA with , and obtained after decryption, if the self-device identifier, device model and hardware fingerprint of edge terminal device are not the same as those obtained after decryption, the device information is illegal , and If they are completely identical, the device information is judged to be illegitimate. If there are edge terminal devices... The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint, along with the decrypted data, are obtained. , and Completely identical, then... Perform verification, if If the number of bits is not 256, the device information is deemed invalid. Since it's 256 bits, the Certificate Authority (CA) will first... The CBOR decoding algorithm is applied to perform decoding to obtain the root hash and the hash algorithm identifier used by the edge terminal device when generating the root hash. If the length of the root hash is greater than or equal to the root hash... If the length of the root hash Root is inconsistent with the specified length, the device information is deemed invalid. The root length is consistent with the specified length. Then, the hash algorithm identifier obtained from decoding is compared with... The algorithm identifier of the pre-stored Merkle tree hash function is compared. If the hash algorithm identifier obtained from decoding matches... If the algorithm identifier of the pre-stored Merkle tree hash function is inconsistent, the device information is deemed invalid. If the hash algorithm identifier obtained through decoding is inconsistent with... The algorithm identifier of the pre-stored Merkle tree hash function is consistent. The Certificate Authority (CA) calls the SLH-DSA verification algorithm and uses... Verification edge terminal devices Terminal signature Its expression is ,in for , and A byte stream assembled sequentially. For the crypto_sign_verify function in the cryptography library, For edge terminal devices Will Used as a private key to apply the SLH-DSA algorithm The generated signature, if If the value is true, the device information is considered valid; otherwise, the device information is considered invalid.

[0057] Preferably, in steps 2-3, based on Use CA private key right and Perform a signature to generate a quantum-resistant identity certificate. The methods include:

[0058] based on Come with CA private key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. and Sign up. That is, using the CA private key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. and A function for signing the byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially. for and A byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially.

[0059] Preferably, step 3 specifically includes:

[0060] Step 3-1: Power Monitoring Master Station To edge terminal devices Send authentication request The authentication request includes the main site certificate. Random challenge code and current timestamp ;

[0061] Step 3-2: Edge terminal device Verify authentication request Once the verification is successful, proceed to step 3-3 for execution;

[0062] Step 3-3: Edge terminal equipment Generate random challenge code Calculate session negotiation parameters Generate an authentication response, which includes:

[0063] Signature value ,in For The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. , , and A function for signing the byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially. For use with edge terminal devices The temporary private key generated by the connected QRNG;

[0064] Response message and will Send to the power monitoring master station ,in the current timestamp of the edge terminal device ;

[0065] Step 3-4: the power monitoring master station verifies the response message ;

[0066] Step 3-5: the power monitoring master station generates a confirmation message and sends it to the edge terminal device , for the function of signing the byte stream formed by , , and in turn and in sequence by applying the SLH-DSA algorithm with as the private key;

[0067] Step 3-6: the edge terminal device calculates a shared key negotiation value , and the power monitoring master station and the edge terminal device generate a session key based on the shared key negotiation value by means of a key derivation function , wherein

[0068] is the key derivation function.

[0069] Preferably, step 3-2 specifically comprises: the edge terminal device extracts , and from ;

[0070] the edge terminal device invokes the SLH-DSA verification algorithm to confirm that is issued by the certificate authority CA;

[0071] after confirming that is issued by the certificate authority CA, the edge terminal device then calculates the time offset , is the current timestamp of the edge terminal device, if , it is determined that the authentication request is an expired message, and the authentication is rejected, otherwise it is confirmed that is valid, and then it goes to step 3-3 to execute.

[0072] Preferably, step 3-4 specifically comprises:

[0073]

[0073] verification and validity, check the freshness of the response message to determine whether the response message is verified successfully.

[0074] response message After the response message is verified successfully, a temporary private key is generated , and .

[0075] The beneficial effects of the present application are as follows compared with the prior art:

[0076] Extreme quantum resistance: The SLH-DSA quantum-resistant signature algorithm and the CRYSTALS-Kyber key exchange algorithm standardized by NIST are adopted to resist Shor algorithm and Grover algorithm attacks from a mathematical basis, and the certificate signature verification process has information theory security features, solving the quantum security threat of traditional schemes.

[0077] Lightweight performance adaptation: Through the efficient signature verification characteristics (only a small number of hash operations) of the SLH-DSA algorithm and the ECC hybrid key agreement mechanism, combined with the lightweight code design on the terminal side, the authentication delay is reduced to the level of 30 ms, and the CPU occupancy rate is controlled within 15%, perfectly adapting to the resource-limited characteristics of power edge terminals.

[0078] Key security enhancement: Based on QRNG, a true random number entropy source is provided, and a three-level key system of temporary key + session key + dynamic update is adopted to realize forward security (past session keys do not affect current communication security), and through a double-driven update strategy, the key leakage risk is reduced by more than 90%.

[0079] High-robustness authentication mechanism: A two-way identity authentication process is constructed, combined with timestamp freshness check and quantum random challenge code, effectively resisting common threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks, and the authentication success rate remains 100% when the channel error rate is ≤0.5%, improving system operation reliability.

[0080] Good system compatibility: Based on the IEC61850 standard extension message, the existing power communication hardware does not need to be modified, and can be directly deployed in the stock system, reducing the upgrade cost by more than 80%, solving the compatibility bottleneck of existing schemes. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0081] Figure 1 is the overall structure diagram of the identity authentication control system of the power monitoring system based on quantum-resistant cryptography in the present application;

[0082] Figure 2 ​is a flow chart of an anti-quantum cryptography-based power monitoring system identity authentication control method in the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0083] To make the objects, technical solutions, and advantages of the present application clearer, the technical solutions of the present application will be described below in connection with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. The embodiments expressed in the present application are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, but not all the embodiments. According to the spirit of the present application, other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without any creative labor are within the protection scope of the present application.

[0084] As shown in Figure 1 , an anti-quantum cryptography-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system according to the present application comprises:

[0085] a key management center KMC, a certificate authentication center CA, a power monitoring master station of a power monitoring system, an edge terminal device (such as a feeder automation terminal and a smart meter) of the power monitoring system, and a quantum random number generator QRNG, which are in communication with each other;

[0086] The key management center KMC is used to initialize the anti-quantum cryptography-based power monitoring system identity authentication control system.

[0087] The edge terminal device of the power monitoring system is used to register the edge terminal device, verify an authentication request, generate a random challenge code, calculate session negotiation parameters, and generate an authentication response. The edge terminal device is used to calculate a shared key negotiation value.

[0088] The power monitoring master station of the power monitoring system is used to send an authentication request to the edge terminal device, verify a response message, and generate a confirmation message and send the confirmation message to the edge terminal device.

[0089] The power monitoring master station can be a computer or an industrial computer.

[0090] The edge terminal device of the power monitoring system is a data acquisition and control execution unit directly deployed in power generation, power transmission, power distribution, and power consumption sites, and is mainly responsible for real-time acquisition of device state data and execution of control instructions issued by the power monitoring master station of the power monitoring system. The specific types are as follows:

[0091] According to different links (power generation, power transmission, power distribution, and power consumption) of the power system, the edge terminal device can be divided into the following categories, covering the whole chain monitoring from energy production to the user side:

[0092] 1. Power generation link terminal device

[0093] RTU: Deployed in thermal power, hydro power, new energy power plants, collect key operation data such as generator output power, turbine speed, boiler pressure, upload to power plant monitoring master station, and receive start / stop and load adjustment instructions from master station.

[0094] New energy inverter monitoring unit: for photovoltaic power stations and wind farms, collect inverter output voltage, current, and power generation data, monitor grid-connected state, and support master station remote control of inverter grid connection / disconnection operation.

[0095] Energy storage system monitoring terminal: connects energy storage battery pack and PCS (energy storage converter), collects battery SOC (remaining capacity), charging and discharging power, and temperature data, and cooperates with master station to realize energy storage charging and discharging scheduling.

[0096] 2. Transmission link terminal equipment

[0097] TTU: installed on transmission towers or lines, collects line current, voltage, ice thickness, dancing amplitude, and environmental temperature and humidity data, uploads to transmission monitoring master station, and warns of line fault risk.

[0098] Substation automation terminal (interval layer equipment): includes line protection devices, transformer protection devices, bus protection devices, etc., collects the position state of circuit breakers and disconnectors in the substation, realizes fault tripping and reclosing control, and communicates with the substation monitoring master station.

[0099] 3. Distribution link terminal equipment (most core and largest quantity)

[0100] FTU: deployed in switch stations and ring network cabinets of distribution lines, collects line current, voltage, and power factor data, monitors line faults (such as short circuit and grounding), supports master station remote control of switch opening and closing, realizes fault isolation and self-healing.

[0101] Distribution transformer monitoring terminal (TTU): installed beside distribution transformers (distribution transformers), collects transformer three-phase current, voltage, oil temperature, and load rate data, uploads to distribution master station, and warns of abnormal overloading and oil leakage.

[0102] Pole-mounted switch monitoring terminal: for pole-mounted circuit breakers and load switches of overhead distribution lines, collects switch state and line current data, supports master station remote operation of switches, and shortens fault repair time.

[0103] 4. Electricity consumption link terminal equipment

[0104] Smart meter (SM): deployed on the user side (residents / commercial users), collects user real-time power consumption, voltage, current, power data, uploads to the power information collection master station through power carrier or wireless communication, supports remote meter reading, fee control trip.

[0105] EMS terminal for industrial and commercial users: used for factories, shopping malls and other large users, collects the power load of each workshop in the user and the photovoltaic self-use data, and realizes demand response (such as load reduction during peak period) in cooperation with the master station.

[0106] Charging pile monitoring terminal: deployed in public / private charging piles, collects charging power, charging capacity and gun head state data, uploads to the charging operation master station, and supports remote start / stop and fee settlement.

[0107] As shown in Figure 2 , the identity authentication control method of the power monitoring system based on the anti-quantum password comprises:

[0108] The method comprises three steps of system initialization, device registration, two-way identity authentication and key negotiation, and the specific process is as follows:

[0109] Step 1: initialize the identity authentication control system of the anti-quantum password power monitoring system;

[0110] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present application, step 1 specifically comprises:

[0111] Step 1-1: the key management center KMC calls the quantum random number generator QRNG to generate a true random number seed , generates a system global key pair , based on the improved CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, wherein is a system public key, is a system private key, which is secretly stored by the key management center KMC; the secret storage method can be that the key management center KMC stores in the hardware security module HSM connected with the key management center KMC.

[0112] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present application, step 1-1 specifically comprises:

[0113] The traditional method of directly generating a global key pair based on the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm has the following defects:

[0114] Single source random number dependence risk: only As a key seed, if the quantum random number generator QRNG causes the entropy value of the random number to decrease due to hardware failure (such as photon detector offset) or physical attack (such as quantum state intervention), the quantum security of the global key pair will be directly affected;

[0115] The key generation process is not verifiable: the key generation of the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm is a black box process, and the key pair generated inside the key management center KMC cannot be verified by a third party (such as a regulatory node) for randomness and correctness, and there is a trust risk of maliciously generating weak keys;

[0116] After improving the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, a triple mechanism of multi-source entropy fusion + distributed verification + key fragment update is introduced, and the method for generating a global key pair by the improved CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm system is as follows:

[0117] Step 1-1-1: Construct a multi-source true random number entropy pool;

[0118] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiments of the application, step 1-1-1 specifically includes:

[0119] The key management center KMC integrates three types of independent entropy sources to generate a high-redundancy seed pool through an anti-quantum hash function, avoiding the risk of single-source failure:

[0120] First, three types of independent entropy sources are generated, including:

[0121] Quantum entropy source: a quantum random number generator QRNG generates a true random number sequence , which is a 256-bit true quantum random number , ;

[0122] Physical environment entropy source: collect physical parameters (such as CPU temperature T of the key management center KMC by a temperature sensor connected to the KMC and transmitted to the KMC, power supply noise V of the key management center KMC by a noise sensor connected to the KMC and transmitted to the KMC, or fan speed R of the key management center KMC by a speed sensor connected to the KMC and transmitted to the KMC) when the key management center KMC is running, and generate a time series of physical parameters through analog-to-digital conversion , which is the th 256-bit physical parameter value, which is a physical random number , ;

[0123] Distributed node entropy source: the key management center KMC requests random number segments from three independent trusted nodes (the three independent trusted nodes can be, for example, three off-site backup KMCs or three third-party supervision nodes, the off-site backup KMC is an off-site key management center KMC and is in communication connection with the key management center KMC integrating three independent entropy sources, the third-party supervision node can be a node deployed by an authority (such as the energy supervision bureau or the state cryptography administration designated agency) independent of the power system operator, which does not participate in business communication and is only responsible for security audit and key operation supervision, and the node is in communication connection with the key management center KMC integrating three independent entropy sources, and the independent trusted node is also in communication connection with another quantum random number generator QRNG) , and (each segment is 256 bits, generated by the QRNG connected with the independent trusted node), to form a distributed sequence ;

[0124] Then, the multiple-source entropy is fused through the quantum-resistant hash function SHA3-512: , wherein is the quantum-resistant hash function SHA3-512, is a 512-bit fusion seed pool, represents byte splicing, that is, the bytes are sequentially connected to form a continuous byte sequence, ensuring that the single entropy source fails to maintain a high entropy value. , and

[0125] Step 1-1-2: Generate a key pair based on distributed verification.

[0126] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the application, step 1-1-2 specifically includes:

[0127] The KMC local generation + multi-node verification mode is adopted to ensure the correctness and quantum resistance of the key pair:

[0128] Step 1-1-2-1: The key management center KMC extracts a 256-bit seed from as a true random number seed , is a function of intercepting the lower 256 bits of to form , and is input into the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm to generate an initial key pair : , wherein is the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm ​A function for generating a key pair for an input parameter;

[0129] Step 1-1-2-2: The key management center KMC generates a verification request, the verification request contains and , and is sent to three independent trusted nodes;

[0130] Step 1-1-2-3: The independent trusted nodes run the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm using the same as the input parameter, and if the generated public key is consistent with , the independent trusted nodes return a valid signature confirmation to the key management center KMC, wherein the valid signature , is the valid signature generated by the first independent trusted node, is the private key generated by the first independent trusted node by running the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm using as the input parameter, is the private key of the first independent trusted node, applies the SLH-DSA algorithm to the initial public key to form a signature;

[0131] Step 1-1-2-4: After the number of valid signatures collected by the key management center KMC is greater than or equal to 2, the key pair is confirmed to be legal, and is officially used as the global key pair , , otherwise, step 1 is re-executed until the key pair is confirmed to be legal.

[0132] The technical effect of the improved CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm for generating a system global key pair is:

[0133] Strong quantum resistance: The multi-source entropy fusion increases the seed pool entropy value to much higher than 256 bits of a single QRNG, even if a single entropy source is attacked, the anti-quantum cracking ability of the key pair can still be guaranteed, and quantum side channel attacks and random number manipulation attacks can be resisted;

[0134] Trust mechanism transparency: The distributed verification mechanism cross-checks through third-party nodes to ensure that the key pair generation process is traceable and tamper-proof, solves the single-point risk of KMC self-generation and self-trust, and meets the regulatory compliance requirements of the power system;

[0135] Compatibility and scalability: The core is still based on the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm (NIST standardized anti-quantum algorithm), which is compatible with the original system public parameter Param, and does not need to modify the key verification logic of the terminal device, with low upgrade cost.

[0136] Through the above improvements, the global key pair generation process achieves triple protection of high entropy, verifiability, and leakage resistance, laying a more reliable foundation of trust for quantum-resistant identity authentication in power monitoring systems.

[0137] Step 1-2: Key Management Center (KMC) generates common system parameters. ,in Let be a base point on the elliptic curve group over a finite field (this base point is a special point of order with a large prime number). Let be the order of the elliptic curve group. , All are cryptographic hash functions (SHA-3, where It can be SHA3-256. (Can be SHA3-512) This is a preset set of SLH-DSA algorithm parameters;

[0138] Steps 1-3: The Key Management Center (KMC) will transfer the system's common parameters. Synchronize with the Certificate Authority (CA), the power monitoring master station, and all edge terminal devices.

[0139] Step 2: The quantum-resistant power monitoring system's identity authentication control system registers edge terminal devices;

[0140] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present invention, step 2 specifically includes:

[0141] Step 2-1: Edge terminal device Generate SLH-DSA-based device key pairs locally. ,in For the first One edge terminal device, For edge terminal devices The device's private key (locally and securely stored; the secure storage method can be provided to edge terminal devices) Will Stored with edge terminal devices (within the connected hardware security module HSM) For edge terminal devices The device's public key;

[0142] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present invention, step 2-1 specifically includes:

[0143] Edge terminal devices (Such as FTU, smart meters) need to generate SLH-DSA-based device key pairs locally. But limited by terminal computing power, storage and power consumption resources, a lightweight, low-energy generation method needs to be adopted, while ensuring the quantum security of the key pair. Specifically as follows:

[0144] Step 2-1-1, generation premise: terminal pre-configuration and environment preparation;

[0145] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the application, step 2-1-1 specifically includes:

[0146] Preloading system parameters: edge terminal device obtains system public parameters synchronized from key management center KMC , and extracts (SLH-DSA parameter set, such as Level 1 configuration: security level 1, hash function SHA3-256, Merkle tree height 16, etc.), and stores in non-volatile memory (such as Flash) connected with edge terminal device;

[0147] Configure hardware security environment: edge terminal device integrates micro hardware security module (mHSM, such as security core with ARM TrustZone), which is used for key generation, storage and signature operation, and physically isolates the key from the main CPU of the edge terminal device, resisting side channel attacks (such as power analysis).

[0148] Step 2-1-2, execute key pair generation process (in 2 stages);

[0149] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the application, step 2-1-2 specifically includes:

[0150] Phase 1: Generate high-entropy seed (depend on mixed entropy source), which includes: edge terminal device is limited and cannot deploy independent QRNG, adopts local physical entropy + master station auxiliary random number to generate seed, and ensures randomness:

[0151] Local physical entropy collection: collect physical noise of edge terminal device running through mHSM, which includes:

[0152] Voltage fluctuation of power module of edge terminal device (128 bits); instruction execution delay jitter of main CPU of edge terminal device (64 bits); temperature fluctuation of environment temperature sensor (64 bits);

[0153] Voltage fluctuation of power module of edge terminal device The acquisition method is:

[0154] A voltage sensor is arranged at the output end of the power module of the edge terminal device, the voltage sensor is connected with the edge terminal device through a 16-bit ADC, the voltage sensor continuously samples at a sampling rate of 10 kHz, after 32 times of continuous sampling, the sampled voltage signals are sequentially passed through the 16-bit ADC to obtain 32 16-bit voltage values, the 32 16-bit voltage values are recorded as , then the difference values of adjacent voltage values are calculated , , then are sequentially spliced to form a 31*16=496-bit binary stream, the low 128 bits of the binary stream are taken as and stored in the mHSM.

[0155] The temperature fluctuation of the environmental temperature sensor is obtained by the following method:

[0156] A temperature sensor is arranged beside the edge terminal device, the temperature sensor is connected with the edge terminal device through a 16-bit ADC, the temperature sensor continuously samples at a sampling rate of 10 kHz, after 32 times of continuous sampling, the sampled temperature signals are sequentially passed through the 16-bit ADC to obtain 32 16-bit temperature values, the 32 16-bit temperature values are recorded as , then the difference values of adjacent temperature values are calculated , , then are sequentially spliced to form a 31*16=496-bit binary stream, the low 64 bits of the binary stream are taken as and stored in the mHSM.

[0157] The instruction execution time delay jitter of the main CPU of the edge terminal device :

[0158] Time delay calculation: a preset instruction is executed in the main CPU of the edge terminal device, and a timer built in the main CPU is started at the same time as the execution of the preset instruction, the timer records the starting time of the execution of the preset instruction and the termination time of the end of the execution of the preset instruction, and the actual execution time is calculated; the time delay calculation is continuously repeated for 30 times to sequentially obtain , wherein is the actual execution time obtained by the time delay calculation, the average value of the 30 actual execution times is calculated , each value is converted into an offset relative to , and , ,... The low 64 bits of the sequentially spliced byte string are taken as the seed and stored in the mHSM.

[0159] Master station auxiliary random number: the edge terminal device requests a 128-bit random number segment from the power monitoring master station through an encrypted channel (the encrypted channel can be an encrypted channel based on IEC 61850) The 128-bit true quantum random number generated by the quantum random number generator QRNG connected to the power monitoring master station is obtained for the power monitoring master station, and is returned to the power monitoring master station through an encrypted channel

[0160] Seed fusion: the multi-source entropy is fused by a local lightweight hash function (such as SHA3-256) of the edge terminal device to generate a 256-bit seed

[0161]

[0162] wherein is a unique hardware fingerprint (such as a chip serial number, ensuring the uniqueness of the seed) of the edge terminal device, is a SHA3-256 function, is , , , and is a byte string formed by sequentially splicing them;

[0163] Phase 2: generating a key pair based on the SLH-DSA algorithm, i.e. calling the SLH-DSA algorithm inside the mHSM, inputting the seed and to generate a key pair . The core steps are:

[0164] Master seed expansion: using in which can be a SHAKE256 hash function to expand into a sub-seed set required by the algorithm , which are respectively used for Merkle tree generation, one-time signature (OTS) and public key calculation;

[0165] Merkle tree construction: based on the tree height (16) and tree width (64 bytes) in the sub-seed and , a Merkle tree for aggregating OTS algorithm operations on is constructed to generate a tree root hash Root ​​​​

[0166] Public key calculation: generate a device public key by hashing the tree root hash Root of the Merkle tree and the identity of the edge terminal device

[0167] wherein is a SHA3-256 hash function;

[0168] Private key encapsulation: the private key contains a Merkle tree of the main seed and path information, the tree height of the Merkle tree of the path information, the tree width of the Merkle tree of the path information, the tree root hash of the path information, and a state counter (initial value 0, recording the number of OTS signatures), and the private key is stored in the mHSM.

[0169] The technical effect of step 2-1-2 is:

[0170] Quantum resistance: the generated SLH-DSA algorithm based, resist quantum computing attacks, and seed entropy value ≥ 256 bits, to avoid weak key risk.

[0171] Resource adaptability: through hybrid entropy source and lightweight optimization, the CPU occupancy rate of the key generation process is ≤ 10%, and the time consumption is ≤ 100 ms, which meets the computing power and real-time requirements of edge terminal devices (such as FTU).

[0172] Key secrecy: Stored in the mHSM, resist key extraction attack after terminal disassembly.

[0173] Plug and play: preloading parameters + local generation mode makes edge terminal devices not need to rely on real-time interaction with key management center KMC, supports on-site rapid deployment (such as plug and play of new smart meters). This method balances the resource limitations and quantum resistance requirements of edge terminal devices, and provides a trusted identity basis for edge terminal devices to access the power monitoring system.

[0174] Step 2-2: The edge terminal device collects the preset device identity , device model and hardware fingerprint , generates a registration request , and uses as the public key of the CRYSTALS-Kyber encryption algorithm, and then applies the CRYSTALS-Kyber encryption algorithm to encrypt the registration request and sends it to the certificate authentication center CA;

[0175] ​​​​​Steps 2-3: Using a Certificate Authority (CA) (Should The key management center (KMC) transmits the encrypted data to the certificate authority (CA) via an encrypted channel (which can be based on IEC 61850) for decryption. This decryption is then used as the private key for the CRYSTALS-Kyber decryption algorithm. The CRYSTALS-Kyber decryption algorithm is then applied to the encrypted registration request. After decryption and verification that the device information is legitimate, based on... Use CA private key right and Perform a signature to generate a quantum-resistant identity certificate. and will resist quantum identity certificates Send to edge terminal device .

[0176] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present invention, the method for verifying the legality of device information in steps 2-3 includes:

[0177] The encrypted registration request is processed using the CRYSTALS-Kyber decapsulation algorithm. After decryption, obtain , , and Next, the Certificate Authority (CA) will pre-store the data on each edge terminal device. The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint are respectively compared with those obtained after decryption. , and In comparison, without edge terminal devices The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint, along with the decrypted data, are obtained. , and If they are completely identical, the device information is judged to be illegitimate. If there are edge terminal devices... The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint, along with the decrypted data, are obtained. , and Completely identical, then... Perform verification, if If the number of bits is not 256, the device information is deemed invalid. It has 256 bits. CBOR (Compact Binary Object Representation) encoding is typically used to save space, so the Certificate Authority (CA) needs to first... The CBOR decoding algorithm is applied to perform decoding to obtain a tree root hash Root and a hash algorithm identifier used by the edge terminal device to generate the tree root hash Root, and if the length of the tree root hash Root is inconsistent with the tree root length specified in the , it is determined that the device information is not legal, and if the length of the tree root hash Root is consistent with the tree root length specified in the , the hash algorithm identifier obtained by decoding is compared with the algorithm identifier of the Merkle tree hash function pre-stored in the , and if the hash algorithm identifier obtained by decoding is inconsistent with the algorithm identifier of the Merkle tree hash function pre-stored in the , it is determined that the device information is not legal, and if the hash algorithm identifier obtained by decoding is consistent with the algorithm identifier of the Merkle tree hash function pre-stored in the , the certificate authority CA calls the SLH-DSA verification algorithm (the SLH-DSA verification algorithm is the SLH-DSA public key verification algorithm, which can be implemented by the crypto_sign_verify in the cryptography library), and verifies the terminal signature of the edge terminal device , and the expression is , wherein is a byte stream sequentially spliced by , the crypto_sign_verify function in the cryptography library, , the SLH-DSA algorithm is applied to the signature of generated by taking as a private key, and the signature is transmitted to the certificate authority CA through an encrypted channel (the encrypted channel can be an encrypted channel based on IEC 61850), and then decrypted, and if the value of is true, it is determined that the device information is legal, otherwise it is determined that the device information is not legal.

[0178] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the application, in step 2-3, based on , the CA private key is used to sign and to generate the anti-quantum identity certificate , and the method comprises the following steps:

[0179] based on ​​​​​​​​Come with CA private key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. and For signing, the security level and algorithm details of the SLH-DSA algorithm are determined by the parameter set. set up, That is, using the CA private key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. and A function that signs a byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially. for and A byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially.

[0180] CA private key With CA public key The method of obtaining it is:

[0181] The Certificate Authority (CA) generates a 256-bit (32-byte) high-entropy random number using a connected quantum random number generator (QRNG) as the master seed. Using the SHA3-256 hash function, from the master seed one Derived One-Time Signature (OTS) Subseed 1 : ,in It uses the SHA3-256 hash function. To be in sequence The "ots" string is appended to the key to distinguish its purpose and avoid confusion with other keys. ,in This is a counter (the counter record is indexed using a one-time signature OTS). Stored in the hardware security module HSM connected to the Certificate Authority (CA), plaintext exposure is prohibited; Derive an OTS public key , Where 0 is the OTS index, To be in sequence Concatenated with 0, this public key is used as the unique leaf of the Merkle tree. for It is formed by sequentially concatenating the certificate identifiers of the preset Certificate Authority (CA), and can be serialized into binary (such as CBOR) for easy transmission and storage.

[0182] Step 3: The quantum-resistant power monitoring system's identity authentication control system performs two-way identity authentication and key negotiation;

[0183] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present application, step 3 specifically comprises:

[0184] Step 3-1: Power monitoring master station to the edge terminal device sends an authentication request , which contains a master station certificate , a random challenge code (the random challenge code is a 256-bit random number generated by a quantum random number generator QRNG connected to the power monitoring master station and a current timestamp , that is ;

[0185] The master station certificate is an anti-quantum certificate issued by a certificate authority CA to prove the identity and legality of the public key of the power monitoring master station. The generation process needs to follow the trust chain logic of key generation -> identity registration -> CA signature, which is as follows:

[0186] The power monitoring master station generates a key pair, which includes a master station private key and a master station public key :

[0187] The power monitoring master station generates a 256-bit (32-byte) high-entropy random number through a quantum random number generator QRNG connected to it as a master seed two , and uses the SHA3-256 hash function to derive a one-time signature (OTS) sub-seed two from the master seed two : , where is the SHA3-256 hash function, is the concatenation of and "ots" in order, and the additional string "ots" is to distinguish the purpose and avoid confusion with other keys; , where is a counter (which records the used one-time signature OTS index), is stored in a hardware security module HSM connected to the power monitoring master station and is prohibited from being exposed in plaintext; and derives an OTS public key , , where 0 is the OTS index, is the concatenation of and 0 in order, and the public key is used as the only leaf of the Merkle tree, is The preset power monitoring master station The certificate identification is sequentially spliced, and can be serialized into binary (such as CBOR) for transmission and storage.

[0188] After the power monitoring master station generates a key pair, the power monitoring master station submits a registration request to the certificate authority center CA The preset power monitoring master station The unique identification , the type of the power monitoring master station (such as the power monitoring master station of the control master station type), the master station public key and the master station self-signature , , , That is, the SLH-DSA algorithm is applied to the byte stream formed by sequentially splicing and with the master station private key as the private key to sign the function;

[0189] Then the certificate authority center CA accepts and issues the master station certificate , and the process is as follows:

[0190] The certificate authority center CA verifies the legality (such as belongs to the legal whitelist in the certificate authority center, and can also be verified by a method similar to verifying the legality of device information ) is legal, and then the certificate authority center CA generates a certificate signature with its own private key : , wherein is the timestamp when the master station certificate is currently issued, is a function of applying the SLH-DSA algorithm to the byte stream formed by sequentially splicing , and with as the private key to sign the function; The master station certificate

[0191] issued by the certificate authority center CA to the power monitoring master station contains , , , the identification of the preset certificate authority center CA, the effective time interval of the certificate, and the certificate signature generated by the certificate authority center CA ​​SLH-DSA parameter set used at the time.

[0192] Step 3-2: Edge terminal device Verifying the authentication request and going to Step 3-3 for execution after verification is passed.

[0193] In a preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present application, Step 3-2 specifically includes:

[0194] Edge terminal device extracts from , , , and ;

[0195] Edge terminal device invokes SLH-DSA verification algorithm to confirm issued by the certificate authority center CA; the specific process is as follows:

[0196] splices , and in sequence to form a message ;

[0197] Edge terminal device uses the verification signature transmitted from the certificate authority center CA, and the calculation formula is:

[0198] ;

[0199] If , it is determined that forged or tampered with, thereby rejecting the authentication; and confirming that issued by the certificate authority center CA.

[0200] After confirming that issued by the certificate authority center CA, the time offset , is then calculated, which is the current timestamp of the edge terminal device . If , it is determined that the authentication request is an expired message (possibly a replay attack), and the authentication is rejected; otherwise, it is confirmed that is valid, that is, the verification is passed, and then goes to Step 3-3 for execution.

[0201] Step 3-3: Edge terminal device generates a random challenge code and calculates the session negotiation parameter ( For the QRNG generated by the edge terminal device connected to generate a 256-bit temporary private key, ), generate an authentication response, the authentication response includes:

[0202] signature value , wherein is the function of signing as a private key and applying the SLH-DSA algorithm to , , and byte stream formed by concatenating in turn sequence;

[0203] response message , and send to the power monitoring master station , wherein is the current timestamp of the edge terminal device ;

[0204] random challenge code is a 256-bit (32-byte) true random number generated by the QRNG connected to the edge terminal device :

[0205] Step 3-4: The power monitoring master station verifies the response message ;

[0206] In the preferred but non-limiting embodiment of the present application, step 3-4 specifically includes:

[0207] verify and validity, check freshness, so as to determine whether the response message is verified;

[0208] After the response message is verified, a temporary private key is generated, and is calculated.

[0209] verify and validity, check freshness method includes:

[0210] The structure of usually is CBOR encoding, the power monitoring master station applies CBOR decoding algorithm to obtain , and the power monitoring master station needs to confirm issued by a certificate authority CA, and the edge terminal device is legitimate:

[0211] The structure is usually CBOR encoding, the power monitoring master station to apply the CBOR decoding algorithm to obtain , , and wherein is a timestamp when the certificate authority CA is issued by the certificate authority CA, is a CA signature issued by the certificate authority CA ;

[0212] concatenate , and in sequence to form a byte stream , and then perform the following calculation formula:

[0213] ;

[0214] If , determine forgery, refuse authentication, otherwise determine valid, then concatenate , , and in sequence to form a byte stream , and then perform the following calculation formula:

[0215] ;

[0216] If , determine tampered, refuse authentication, otherwise calculate the time deviation two , if , determine expired message (may be a replay attack), refuse authentication, otherwise determine that the response message is verified.

[0217] Step 3-5: the power monitoring master station generates a confirmation message , and sends to the edge terminal device , is to apply the SLH-DSA algorithm to , , and a function of signing a byte stream formed by sequentially concatenating the data in the order;

[0218] Step 3-6: Edge terminal device calculating a shared key negotiation value , a power monitoring master station and the edge terminal device based on the shared key negotiation value generating a session key through a key derivation function , wherein is a key derivation function, and subsequently, when the power monitoring master station and the edge terminal device communicate, the communication data is encrypted through a symmetric encryption algorithm such as an AES-GCM encryption algorithm and the is used as a key of the encryption algorithm to encrypt the communication data of the power monitoring master station and the edge terminal device .

[0219] The beneficial effects of the present application are as follows compared with the prior art:

[0220] Extreme quantum resistance: The SLH-DSA anti-quantum signature algorithm and the CRYSTALS-Kyber key exchange algorithm standardized by NIST are used to resist Shor algorithm and Grover algorithm attacks from a mathematical basis, and the certificate signature verification process has information theory security features, solving the quantum security threat of traditional solutions.

[0221] Lightweight performance adaptation: Through the efficient signature verification characteristics (only a small number of hash operations) of the SLH-DSA algorithm and the ECC hybrid key negotiation mechanism, combined with lightweight code design on the terminal side, the authentication delay is reduced to the 30ms level, and the CPU occupancy rate is controlled within 15%, perfectly adapting to the resource-limited characteristics of the power edge terminal.

[0222] Key security enhancement: Based on QRNG, a true random number entropy source is provided, and a three-level key system of temporary key + session key + dynamic update is adopted to realize forward security (past session keys do not affect current communication security), and through a double-drive update strategy, the key leakage risk is reduced by more than 90%.

[0223] High-robustness authentication mechanism: A bidirectional identity authentication process is constructed, combined with timestamp freshness checking and quantum random challenge codes, effectively resisting common threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks, with an authentication success rate of 100% when the channel error rate is ≤0.5%, improving system operation reliability.

[0224] Good system compatibility: based on IEC61850 standard extended message, without changing the existing power communication hardware, can be directly deployed in inventory system, reduce the upgrade cost of more than 80%, solve the compatibility bottleneck of the existing scheme.

[0225] Finally, it should be noted that the above examples are used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application rather than limit them. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the above examples, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent replacements can still be made to the specific embodiments of the present application without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application, and any modifications or equivalent replacements should be covered within the protection scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for identity authentication control in a power monitoring system based on quantum-resistant cryptography, characterized in that, include: Step 1: Initialize the quantum-resistant power monitoring system's identity authentication control system; Step 2: The quantum-resistant power monitoring system's identity authentication control system registers edge terminal devices; Step 3: The quantum-resistant power monitoring system's identity authentication control system performs two-way identity authentication and key negotiation; Step 1 specifically includes: Step 1-1: The Key Management Center (KMC) calls the quantum random number generator (QRNG) to generate a true random number seed. The system generates global key pairs based on the improved CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm. , ),in For the system public key, For the system private key, Secretly stored by the Key Management Center (KMC); Step 1-2: Key Management Center (KMC) generates common system parameters. ,in Let be a base point on the elliptic curve group over a finite field. Let be the order of the elliptic curve group. , All are cryptographic hash functions. This is a preset set of SLH-DSA algorithm parameters; Steps 1-3: The Key Management Center (KMC) will transfer the system's common parameters. Synchronize with the Certificate Authority (CA), the power monitoring master station, and all edge terminal devices; Step 1-1 specifically includes: Step 1-1-1: Construct a multi-source true random number entropy pool; Step 1-1-2: Generate a key pair based on distributed verification; Step 1-1-1 specifically includes: First, three types of independent entropy sources are generated, including: Quantum entropy source: Quantum random number generator (QRNG) generates truly random number sequences. , It is a 256-bit true quantum random number. , ; Physical environment entropy source: Collects physical parameters during the operation of the Key Management Center (KMC), and generates a time series of physical parameters through analog-to-digital conversion. , For the first A 256-bit physical parameter value, which is used as a physical random number. , ; Distributed node entropy source: The Key Management Center (KMC) requests random number fragments from three independent trusted nodes. , and , forming a distributed sequence ; Next, multi-source entropy is fused using the quantum-resistant hash function SHA3-512: ,in, To resist the quantum hash function SHA3-512, For a 512-bit fusion seed pool, Indicates byte concatenation; Step 1-1-2 specifically includes: Step 1-1-2-1: Key Management Center (KMC) from Extract as a seed for true random numbers 256-bit seed , To intercept The lower 256 bits are used to form The function will As input to the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm, an initial key pair is generated. : ,in To call the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm A function that generates key pairs for input parameters; Step 1-1-2-2: The Key Management Center (KMC) generates a verification request, which includes... and It is sent to three independent trusted nodes; Steps 1-1-2-3: Independent trusted nodes use the same The CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm is run as input parameters. If the generated public key is consistent with... If they match, the Key Management Center (KMC) will return a valid signature confirmation, where the valid signature... , For the first A valid signature generated by an independent trusted node. For the first Each independent trusted node uses The private key generated by running the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm as input parameter For the first Each independent trusted node uses its own private key. For the initial public key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used to generate the signature; Step 1-1-2-4: After the Key Management Center (KMC) collects ≥2 valid signatures, it confirms the key pair is legitimate and... Formal as a global key pair ( , ).

2. The method for identity authentication control of a power monitoring system based on quantum-resistant cryptography as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2 specifically includes: Step 2-1: Edge terminal device Generate SLH-DSA-based device key pairs locally. ,in For the first One edge terminal device, For edge terminal devices The device's private key, For edge terminal devices The device's public key; Step 2-2: Edge terminal devices collect their own preset device identifiers. Equipment Model and hardware fingerprint Generate registration request and use This serves as the public key for the CRYSTALS-Kyber encryption algorithm, used to apply the CRYSTALS-Kyber encryption algorithm to the registration request. After encryption, it is sent to the Certificate Authority (CA). Steps 2-3: Using a Certificate Authority (CA) This is used as the private key for the CRYSTALS-Kyber decapsulation algorithm, and is used to apply the CRYSTALS-Kyber decapsulation algorithm to the encrypted registration request. After decryption and verification that the device information is legitimate, based on... Use CA private key right and Perform a signature to generate a quantum-resistant identity certificate. and will resist quantum identity certificates Send to edge terminal device .

3. The method for identity authentication control in a power monitoring system based on quantum cryptography according to claim 2, characterized in that, Step 2-1 specifically includes: Step 2-1-1: Terminal pre-configuration and environment preparation; Step 2-1-2: Execute the key pair generation process; Step 2-1-1 specifically includes: Preload system parameters: The edge terminal device obtains the common system parameters synchronized from the Key Management Center (KMC). Extract It is stored in a non-volatile memory connected to the edge terminal device; Configure a hardware security environment: The edge terminal device integrates a hardware security module; Step 2-1-2 specifically includes: Phase 1: Generating high-entropy seeds, which includes: Local physical entropy acquisition: acquiring physical noise during the operation of edge terminal devices via mHSM, which includes: Voltage fluctuations in the power module of edge terminal devices Jitter in instruction execution latency of the main CPU of edge terminal devices Temperature fluctuations from the ambient temperature sensor ; Master station auxiliary random number: Edge terminal devices request a 128-bit random number fragment from the power monitoring master station via an encrypted channel. ; Seed fusion: Multi-source entropy is fused using a local lightweight hash function on the edge terminal device to generate a 256-bit seed. : ； in For the hardware fingerprint of edge terminal devices, For SHA3-256 functions, for , , , and A string of bytes formed by concatenating bytes sequentially. Phase 2: Generate key pairs based on the SLH-DSA algorithm, i.e., call the SLH-DSA algorithm internally within the mHSM, with the seed input. and Generate key pairs ; In steps 2-3, the method for verifying the legality of device information includes: The encrypted registration request is processed using the CRYSTALS-Kyber decapsulation algorithm. After decryption, obtain , , and Next, the Certificate Authority (CA) will pre-store the data on each edge terminal device. The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint are respectively compared with those obtained after decryption. , and In comparison, without edge terminal devices The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint, along with the decrypted data, are obtained. , and If they are completely identical, the device information is judged to be illegitimate. If there are edge terminal devices... The device's own identifier, device model, and hardware fingerprint, along with the decrypted data, are obtained. , and Completely identical, then... Perform verification, if If the number of bits is not 256, the device information is deemed invalid. Since it's 256 bits, the Certificate Authority (CA) will first... The CBOR decoding algorithm is applied to perform decoding to obtain the root hash and the hash algorithm identifier used by the edge terminal device when generating the root hash. If the length of the root hash is greater than or equal to the root hash, then the root hash is determined by the CBOR decoding algorithm. If the length of the root hash Root is inconsistent with the specified length, the device information is deemed invalid. The root length is consistent with the specified length. Then, the hash algorithm identifier obtained from decoding is compared with... The algorithm identifier of the pre-stored Merkle tree hash function is compared. If the hash algorithm identifier obtained from decoding matches... If the algorithm identifier of the pre-stored Merkle tree hash function is inconsistent, the device information is deemed invalid. If the hash algorithm identifier obtained through decoding is inconsistent with... The algorithm identifier of the pre-stored Merkle tree hash function is consistent. The Certificate Authority (CA) calls the SLH-DSA verification algorithm and uses... Verification edge terminal devices Terminal signature Its expression is ,in for , and A byte stream assembled sequentially. For the crypto_sign_verify function in the cryptography library, For edge terminal devices Will Used as a private key to apply the SLH-DSA algorithm The generated signature, if If the value is true, the device information is considered valid; otherwise, the device information is considered invalid.

4. The identity authentication control method for a power monitoring system based on quantum cryptography according to claim 3, characterized in that, In steps 2-3, based on Use CA private key right and Perform a signature to generate a quantum-resistant identity certificate. The methods include: based on Come with CA private key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. and Sign up. That is, using the CA private key The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. and A function that signs a byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially. for and A byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially.

5. The method for identity authentication control of a power monitoring system based on quantum cryptography according to claim 4, characterized in that, Step 3 specifically includes: Step 3-1: Power Monitoring Master Station To edge terminal devices Send authentication request The authentication request includes the main site certificate. Random challenge code and current timestamp ; Step 3-2: Edge terminal device Verify authentication request Once the verification is successful, proceed to step 3-3 for execution; Step 3-3: Edge terminal equipment Generate random challenge code Calculate session negotiation parameters Generate an authentication response, which includes: Signature value ,in For The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. , , and A function that signs a byte stream formed by concatenating bytes sequentially. For use with edge terminal devices The temporary private key generated by the connected QRNG; Response message and will Send to the power monitoring master station ,in For edge terminal devices The current timestamp; Steps 3-4: Power Monitoring Master Station Verification response message ; Steps 3-5: Power Monitoring Master Station Generate confirmation message , and will Send to edge terminal device , For The SLH-DSA algorithm is used as a private key. , and A function for signing the byte stream formed by concatenating bytes in sequence; Steps 3-6: Edge terminal devices Calculate the shared key negotiation value Power monitoring master station With edge terminal devices Both parties negotiated the value based on the shared key. Generate session keys using key derivation functions. ,in This is a function derived from the key.

6. The method for identity authentication control in a power monitoring system based on quantum cryptography according to claim 5, characterized in that, Step 3-2 specifically includes: Edge terminal devices from Extract , , and ; Edge terminal devices Call the SLH-DSA verification algorithm to confirm. Issued by a Certificate Authority (CA); confirm After being issued by the Certificate Authority (CA), the time deviation is then calculated. , For edge terminal devices The current timestamp, if Determine the authentication request This message is expired; verification will be rejected. Otherwise, confirm. If it works, proceed to step 3-3 to execute.

7. The method for identity authentication control of a power monitoring system based on quantum cryptography according to claim 6, characterized in that, Steps 3-4 specifically include: verify and Validity, inspection The freshness of the response message is used to judge its effectiveness. Has the verification passed? Response message After successful verification, a temporary private key is generated. ,calculate .

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