Cross-domain authentication method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, and provides a cross-domain authentication method and device, electronic equipment and a storage medium, and the method comprises the steps: receiving an access credential sent by a vehicle when the vehicle is in a coverage range of a road side unit; the access credential comprises a hash value of the identity credential; based on the hash value in the access credential, querying the distributed account book recording the hash value of the identity credential to obtain a query result; and verifying the authentication validity of the vehicle based on the query result. According to the method, multiple road side unit nodes form an alliance chain and jointly maintain a distributed account book of an identity certificate hash value, a decentralized unified trust foundation is constructed, and trusted transmission and verification of vehicle identities are achieved; by using the access credential only comprising the hash value, the storage overhead and the authentication delay on the chain are remarkably reduced, the single-point fault problem of the traditional public key infrastructure is avoided, the long-term identity information of the vehicle is effectively protected by means of the unidirectivity of the hash function, and privacy leakage is prevented.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to a cross-domain authentication method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] With the advancement of next-generation communication technologies and transportation infrastructure, a large number of vehicles frequently access different fields, and the uneven distribution of vehicles has gradually complicated the vehicle network topology. In this ubiquitous, dynamic, and heterogeneous distributed environment, providing cross-domain authentication and communication security for vehicles is a prominent research area in vehicle network security.

[0003] In existing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, when vehicles cross different management domains, they face problems such as low authentication efficiency, high risk of privacy leakage, and lack of a unified trust mechanism. For example, public key infrastructure (PKI)-based solutions suffer from single point of failure risk and high authentication latency; identity encryption-based solutions suffer from low key custody and computational efficiency; and some existing blockchain-based solutions face problems such as high storage overhead and complex authentication processes. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a cross-domain authentication method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium to address the shortcomings of existing technologies, such as low authentication efficiency, high risk of privacy leakage, and lack of a unified trust mechanism, when vehicles cross different management domains.

[0005] This invention provides a cross-domain authentication method, comprising the following steps: When a vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit, the system receives an access credential sent by the vehicle. The access credential is generated when the vehicle is registered, and it includes a hash value of an identity credential. The identity credential is a credential associated with the long-term identity of the vehicle. Based on the hash value in the access credential, a query is performed on the distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential to obtain the query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes. Based on the query results, verify the effectiveness of the vehicle's cross-domain authentication.

[0006] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, verifying the cross-domain authentication validity of the vehicle based on the query result includes: Based on the query results, it is confirmed that the access credential recorded on the distributed ledger is valid and has not expired; Based on the query results, the status of the pseudonym recorded on the distributed ledger and associated with the access credential is confirmed to be valid.

[0007] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, the method further includes: Verify the zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle to prove that the vehicle holds a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential; Verify that the hardware fingerprint information in the access credential matches the hardware fingerprint information bound to the identity credential.

[0008] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, the verification of the zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle includes: Obtain zero-knowledge proof data sent by the vehicle; The hash value of the identity credential in the access credential is used as a public verification anchor. A preset verification algorithm is invoked, taking the zero-knowledge proof data and the verification anchor as input, to perform cryptographic calculations on the proof data; If the cryptographic calculation result of the verification algorithm is true, it is determined that the vehicle possesses a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential, and the verification is successful. According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by this invention, the vehicle's real identity information included in the identity credential is encrypted and stored in an off-chain database outside the distributed ledger.

[0009] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, the method further includes: Receive the status update instruction of the identity credential broadcast by the distributed ledger; The status update instruction is generated after a multi-node authorization vote obtains the consent of more than a preset proportion of nodes, in order to authorize the decryption and access of the vehicle's real identity information in the off-chain database; The multi-node authorization voting is triggered by the distributed ledger after an authoritative institution initiates a retrospective request for the access credentials, and is participated in by multiple roadside unit nodes.

[0010] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, the method further includes an access credential updating step, the updating step comprising: The system receives an updated access credential sent by the vehicle. The updated access credential is generated by the authentication management system after the access credential expires. The system queries the distributed ledger based on the hash value of the identity credential in the update request of the access credential, and confirms the validity of the identity credential corresponding to the hash value in the distributed ledger. The update request was initiated by the vehicle.

[0011] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, both the access credential and the updated access credential include a pseudonym of the vehicle, and the pseudonym remains unchanged during the validity period of the identity credential.

[0012] According to a cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, the validity period of the identity credential is a first preset duration, and the validity period of the access credential is a second preset duration; the first preset duration is longer than the second preset duration.

[0013] The present invention also provides a cross-domain authentication device, comprising the following units: A receiving unit is configured to receive an access credential sent by the vehicle when the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​the roadside unit; the access credential is generated when the vehicle is registered, and the access credential includes a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with the long-term identity of the vehicle. The query unit is used to query the distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential based on the hash value in the access credential, and obtain the query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes; The verification unit is used to verify the cross-domain authentication validity of the vehicle based on the query results.

[0014] The present invention also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the program to implement any of the cross-domain authentication methods described above.

[0015] The present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the cross-domain authentication method as described above.

[0016] The present invention also provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements any of the cross-domain authentication methods described above.

[0017] The cross-domain authentication method, device, electronic device, and storage medium provided by this invention receive access credentials sent by a vehicle when the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit. The access credentials are generated during vehicle registration and include a hash value of an identity credential. The identity credential is a credential associated with the vehicle's long-term identity. Based on the hash value in the access credentials, a distributed ledger recording the hash values ​​of the identity credential is queried to obtain the query result. The distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain composed of multiple roadside unit nodes. Based on the query result, the authentication validity of the vehicle is verified. This method constructs a decentralized unified trust foundation by forming a consortium blockchain composed of multiple roadside unit nodes and jointly maintaining a distributed ledger of identity credential hash values, achieving trusted transmission and verification of vehicle identity. By using access credentials that only include hash values, it significantly reduces on-chain storage overhead and authentication latency, avoiding the single point of failure problem of traditional public key infrastructure. Furthermore, it effectively protects the vehicle's long-term identity information and prevents privacy leaks by leveraging the unidirectionality of hash functions. Ultimately, without the need for complex key escrow mechanisms, it achieves efficient, privacy-secure, and trust-unified cross-domain authentication, overcoming the shortcomings of complex authentication processes in most blockchain solutions. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained from these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention.

[0020] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the cross-domain authentication device provided by the present invention.

[0021] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0022] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the technical solutions of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this invention. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this invention without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0023] In related technologies, cross-domain vehicle authentication schemes must meet two basic requirements: accurately verifying the legitimacy of vehicles in new domains and the unique access of TAs (Trusted Authorities) to the true identity of vehicles.

[0024] Existing cross-domain authentication methods can be divided into three categories: cross-domain authentication based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), cross-domain authentication based on identity encryption, and cross-domain authentication based on blockchain. The first two belong to centralized architecture models, while the last is a decentralized model.

[0025] Cross-domain authentication schemes based on PKI manage digital certificates for identity verification. These certificates contain the vehicle's public key and identity information, requiring verification of a multi-layered certificate chain for cross-domain authentication. While widely used in traditional networks, this centralized architecture has significant limitations in the dynamic environment of connected vehicles. As a single anchor of trust, the CA is vulnerable to attack or system failure, paralyzing the entire authentication system and posing a serious single point of failure risk. Furthermore, certificate issuance, revocation, and renewal require network-wide synchronization, a complex and highly delayed process, especially in scenarios with frequent vehicle movement. The multi-layered certificate chain verification process incurs O(n) communication and computational overhead during cross-domain authentication, failing to meet the low-latency requirements of connected vehicles. Moreover, the direct binding of certificates to the vehicle's real identity increases the risk of identity information leakage and tracking. Even with the introduction of virtual identities in some schemes, complex calculations such as bilinear mapping further burden the system.

[0026] To address the aforementioned problems, this invention provides a cross-domain authentication method that can be executed by a Roadside Unit (RSU) deployed in road infrastructure. This RSU is not only a device for wireless communication with vehicles, but also a node in a consortium blockchain, jointly maintaining a distributed ledger with other RSUs. Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the cross-domain authentication method provided by the present invention, as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the method includes steps 110, 120 and 130.

[0027] Step 110: When the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​the roadside unit, receive the access credential sent by the vehicle; the access credential is generated when the vehicle is registered, and the access credential includes the hash value of the identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with the long-term identity of the vehicle.

[0028] Specifically, a vehicle that needs to access a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) system will first undergo a registration process. This registration process can be completed by an authentication management center or the management server of the initial domain. For example, when a new vehicle needs to join the V2X system, the vehicle will first initiate a registration request. Then, the authentication management center or the management server of the initial domain will respond to the vehicle's registration request, generating an identity credential associated with the vehicle's long-term identity, as well as an access credential for cross-domain authentication. The access credential includes a hash value of the identity credential.

[0029] Here, the registration request is a data packet that includes vehicle unique identification information, on-board unit (OBU) hardware information, vehicle owner information, etc., and this embodiment of the invention does not specifically limit this. The vehicle unique identification information can be a vehicle identification number (VIN), etc., and this embodiment of the invention does not specifically limit this.

[0030] Here, the registration request can be sent to the initial domain to which the vehicle belongs, such as a roadside unit or management server authorized by the traffic management department of the place where the vehicle was purchased or registered.

[0031] Upon receiving a registration request and verifying its legitimacy, two core digital credentials are generated for the vehicle: an identity credential and an access credential. The identity credential is a long-term digital certificate strongly associated with the vehicle's true identity information, with a relatively long validity period. An identity credential can be a digital certificate or a structured data object including a public / private key pair, basic vehicle attributes, and validity period. The core function of the identity credential is to serve as the vehicle's fundamental identity card within the system, used to prove its legitimate identity at critical moments, such as when the credential is updated or traced. It should be understood that the generation process of the identity credential is secure, ensuring its unique binding to the physical entity of the vehicle.

[0032] An access credential is a short-lived digital credential used for everyday communication and authentication. To protect vehicle privacy, the access credential does not directly contain the vehicle's true identity information. Instead, it includes a hash of the identity credential.

[0033] Specifically, after generating the identity credential, the system uses a cryptographic hash function to calculate all or key parts of the identity credential, generating a fixed-length, unique hash value. This hash value is then included as a data field in the access credential's data structure. The cryptographic hash function can be SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 256-bit), SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1), etc., and this embodiment of the invention does not impose a specific limitation on it.

[0034] When a vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit, the system receives access credentials sent by the vehicle. These access credentials include a hash value of an identity credential, which is a credential associated with the vehicle's long-term identity.

[0035] Understandably, access credentials include a hash of identity credentials, allowing any party receiving the access credentials to query related information using this hash, but not to deduce the original identity credential content from the hash itself, thus protecting the confidentiality of the identity credential.

[0036] Understandably, a vehicle's location changes constantly as it moves. When a vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit, it means that the vehicle may have moved from one management domain to another, for example, from the traffic network of city A to the traffic network of city B. Here, a new roadside unit refers to a roadside unit that is different from the one the vehicle previously interacted with, or that belongs to a different management domain. To establish secure communication with a new roadside unit, the vehicle actively sends it access credentials obtained during the registration phase; that is, when the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​the roadside unit, it receives the access credentials sent by the vehicle.

[0037] Step 120: Based on the hash value in the access credential, perform a query on the distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential to obtain the query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes.

[0038] Specifically, to establish a decentralized and trustworthy authentication system, this embodiment of the invention employs distributed ledger technology. That is, the hash value of the identity credential is recorded on a distributed ledger, where the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units serving as consensus nodes.

[0039] A consortium blockchain is a blockchain network jointly maintained by pre-selected and authorized nodes. In this embodiment of the invention, the nodes are specifically multiple Road-Side Unit (RSU) nodes deployed throughout the road. These RSU nodes may belong to different operators or management domains, but they collectively form an authentication consortium, jointly recording and verifying transactions. Compared to public blockchains, consortium blockchains offer higher transaction performance, lower energy consumption, and better privacy control, making them ideal for scenarios like connected vehicles where real-time performance and security are critical.

[0040] The specific process of recording the hash value of the identity credential on the consortium blockchain is as follows: First, a transaction is initiated. The transaction includes the hash value and related metadata, such as credential status and validity period. After consensus is reached among the various side-side unit nodes within the consortium blockchain, this transaction is packaged into a new block and linked to the blockchain. The consensus among the various side-side unit nodes can employ consensus algorithms such as PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) or Raft; this embodiment of the invention does not specifically limit the method used.

[0041] Due to the immutability and traceability of blockchain, once a record is successfully made, any node within the consortium blockchain can query and verify the existence of this hash value and its associated status, thus providing a unified and reliable data source for cross-domain authentication.

[0042] Furthermore, based on the hash value in the access credential, one can query the distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential to obtain the query result.

[0043] Since the roadside unit is itself an authorized node in the consortium blockchain, it has read and write permissions to the entire distributed ledger. Therefore, the roadside unit uses the extracted hash value as a query key to retrieve records matching that hash value from the distributed ledger, either by storing it locally or by querying it over the network.

[0044] It is understandable that this query process is highly efficient, thanks to accessing a structured database that has reached node consensus. The purpose of the query is to obtain the on-chain state information associated with the hash value and return the query result accordingly. The query result may include whether the hash value exists, its corresponding credential status, validity period information, etc., but this embodiment of the invention does not specifically limit these details.

[0045] Step 130: Based on the query results, verify the validity of the vehicle's cross-domain authentication.

[0046] Specifically, after obtaining the query results, the validity of the vehicle's cross-domain authentication can be verified based on the query results.

[0047] For example, to verify the existence and status of a vehicle, firstly, it needs to be confirmed that the query result shows that the hash value already exists in the distributed ledger. If the hash value record is not found in the ledger, authentication fails. Secondly, it needs to be checked whether the current status of the credential corresponding to the hash value is valid. If its status is revoked or expired, authentication also fails.

[0048] For example, correlation checks can be performed, such as triggering more complex verification processes like pseudonym validity checks, zero-knowledge proofs, or hardware fingerprints. Specifically, it can be verified whether the pseudonyms contained in the access credentials match the set of valid pseudonyms recorded on the blockchain.

[0049] Only when all the above verifications are successfully completed will the roadside unit determine that the vehicle's authentication is valid and allow it to access the current domain network for subsequent vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication. Conversely, if any verification step fails, the roadside unit will reject the vehicle's access request.

[0050] The method provided in this invention receives an access credential sent by a vehicle when it is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit. The access credential is generated during vehicle registration and includes a hash value of an identity credential. The identity credential is a credential associated with the vehicle's long-term identity. Based on the hash value in the access credential, a distributed ledger containing the hash values ​​of the identity credential is queried to obtain the query result. The distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain composed of multiple roadside unit nodes. Based on the query result, the authentication validity of the vehicle is verified. This method constructs a decentralized unified trust foundation by using a consortium blockchain composed of multiple roadside unit nodes that jointly maintains the distributed ledger of the identity credential hash value, achieving trusted transmission and verification of vehicle identity. By using an access credential that only includes a hash, it significantly reduces on-chain storage overhead and authentication latency, avoiding the single point of failure problem of traditional public key infrastructure. Furthermore, it effectively protects the vehicle's long-term identity information and prevents privacy leaks by leveraging the unidirectionality of hash functions. Ultimately, without the need for a complex key escrow mechanism, it achieves efficient, privacy-secure, and trust-unified cross-domain authentication, overcoming the shortcomings of complex authentication processes in most blockchain solutions.

[0051] The method provided in this invention uses a consortium blockchain to replace the traditional CA, constructing a decentralized architecture where multiple RSU nodes jointly maintain the trust anchor, fundamentally eliminating the risk of single point of failure. A dual-token mechanism is introduced: the access token is valid for a short period, supporting fast cross-domain authentication with O(1) complexity, significantly reducing communication and computational overhead; the identity token is permanently stored on the blockchain, ensuring both identity traceability and anonymity in daily communication. A cross-domain reuse mechanism within the pseudonym's validity period reduces the number of times pseudonyms are repeatedly generated, lowering network load by 40%. The blockchain only stores token hashes; the vehicle's real information is encrypted and hosted off-chain, avoiding block bloat and balancing security and storage efficiency. This method, through architectural innovation and mechanism optimization, comprehensively solves the problems of centralization risk, inefficiency, and insufficient privacy protection associated with PKI-based solutions.

[0052] In related technologies, identity encryption schemes based on IBC (Identity-Based Cryptography) generate user public and private key pairs through a KGC (Key Generation Center), eliminating the need for certificate management and simplifying the identity authentication process to some extent. However, this scheme suffers from a serious key escrow problem: the KGC holds all user private keys, and any leakage or misuse would severely threaten user privacy. Furthermore, the scheme relies on time-consuming bilinear pairing operations, resulting in low computational efficiency and failing to meet the low-latency requirements of connected vehicles. Moreover, as a core node, the KGC is prone to becoming a performance bottleneck in large-scale dynamic vehicle networks, exhibiting extremely poor scalability and hindering its ability to support the rapid development of connected vehicles.

[0053] Based on the above embodiments, step 130 includes: Step 131: Based on the query results, confirm that the access credential recorded on the distributed ledger is valid and has not expired; Step 132: Based on the query results, confirm that the status of the pseudonym recorded on the distributed ledger and associated with the access credential is valid.

[0054] Specifically, based on the query results, the status of the access credential recorded on the distributed ledger is confirmed to be valid and not expired. It should be noted that the distributed ledger not only records the hash value of the identity credential but also records status information associated with the access credential. For example, when an access credential is issued, its status as valid and its expiration time can be recorded on the ledger. When the roadside unit queries, it checks the latest status corresponding to this access credential (or its associated pseudonym) on the ledger. If the record shows that the access credential has been revoked or has exceeded its lifespan, the roadside unit will refuse authentication even if the vehicle presents the access credential.

[0055] The query results can also confirm the validity of the pseudonym associated with the access credentials, recorded on the distributed ledger. To further enhance privacy, access credentials typically include a pseudonym used by the vehicle for external communications, instead of its real identity. This pseudonym can be linked to the access credentials. The distributed ledger also records the pseudonym's status. This step ensures that the pseudonym currently used by the vehicle is legitimate and not marked as invalid by the system. The pseudonym can be changed periodically to prevent long-term tracking.

[0056] Based on any of the above embodiments, the method further includes: Step 133: Verify the zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle to prove that the vehicle holds a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential; Step 134: Verify that the hardware fingerprint information in the access credential is consistent with the hardware fingerprint information bound to the identity credential.

[0057] Specifically, a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) provided by the vehicle can be verified to prove that the vehicle possesses a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential. Here, during the registration phase, a public-private key pair is created when the identity credential is generated. The public key is included in the identity credential (its hash value is recorded on-chain), while the private key is secretly stored by the vehicle's security module (such as a trusted platform module within the onboard unit). During authentication, the vehicle not only sends access credentials but also generates a zero-knowledge proof for this session. This proof confirms to the roadside unit that "I possess the private key associated with the identity credential corresponding to the hash value recorded on-chain," but the private key itself is not disclosed throughout the process. Upon receiving the zero-knowledge proof, the roadside unit can verify it using the public information. This effectively prevents replay attacks and the problem of stolen credentials being used on other devices. The public information can be the content of the access credentials and on-chain information.

[0058] Finally, the hardware fingerprint information included in the access credential can be verified to match the hardware fingerprint information bound to the identity credential. To achieve one credential per vehicle, during registration, the unique hardware fingerprint information of the vehicle's on-board unit can be bound to the identity credential, and this binding relationship or the hash value of the hardware fingerprint information can be recorded on the blockchain. The access credential can also include the hardware fingerprint information of the current on-board unit when it is generated. During authentication, the roadside unit will compare whether the two hardware fingerprint information matches. This ensures that the digital credential is firmly bound to the physical device, and even if the access credential is stolen by a hacker, it cannot be authenticated on another device. The unique hardware fingerprint information can be the unique serial number of the TPM (Trusted Platform Module), the CPU ID (Central Processing Unit Identifier), or the response value of the PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) of the security chip, etc., and this embodiment of the invention does not specifically limit it.

[0059] The method provided in this invention significantly enhances the security of cross-domain authentication by introducing multiple verifications of credential status, pseudonym status, zero-knowledge proofs, and hardware fingerprints. It not only verifies the legitimacy of the credential but also the legitimacy of the credential user and the device used. Furthermore, it achieves real-time revocation and management of credentials through a status check mechanism, constructing a defense-in-depth security authentication system.

[0060] The method provided in this invention adopts a distributed key management model, which uses consortium blockchain nodes to collaboratively generate and verify keys, completely avoiding the risk of KGC centralized control of private keys. Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) technology is introduced to verify token validity without exposing vehicle identity information, effectively solving the privacy leakage problem caused by key escrow. By associating pseudonyms with the vehicle's hardware fingerprint (OBU unique identifier), dynamic pseudonym binding is achieved, significantly enhancing resistance to Sybil attacks. This method, through a distributed architecture and lightweight cryptographic technology, retains the advantage of IBC schemes that do not require certificate management, while solving their core problems of key escrow, low efficiency, and poor scalability, making it more suitable for the needs of connected vehicle scenarios.

[0061] Based on the above embodiments, the verification of the zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle includes: Obtain zero-knowledge proof data sent by the vehicle; The hash value of the identity credential in the access credential is used as a public verification anchor. A preset verification algorithm is invoked, taking the zero-knowledge proof data and the verification anchor as input, to perform cryptographic calculations on the proof data; If the cryptographic calculation result of the verification algorithm is true, it is determined that the vehicle holds a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential, and the verification is successful.

[0062] Specifically, this embodiment describes a typical cross-domain authentication scenario in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). A vehicle A, which has completed initial registration, leaves its home trusted domain (e.g., city A) and enters an unfamiliar trusted domain (e.g., city B) covered by a new roadside unit (RSU-B). RSU-B is a consensus node in the consortium blockchain of the region where city B is located. Vehicle A needs to prove the legitimacy of its identity to RSU-B in order to obtain permission to access services.

[0063] The entire process can be divided into a registration phase (one-time) and a cross-domain authentication phase (occurring each time). This embodiment focuses on describing the cross-domain authentication phase and elaborates on the verification steps involving zero-knowledge proofs.

[0064] Step 1: The vehicle generates and sends an authentication request. When the on-board unit (OBU) of vehicle A detects that it has entered the signal coverage area of ​​the roadside unit (RSU-B), it will proactively initiate an authentication request.

[0065] Vehicle A's OBU first needs to generate the zero-knowledge proof data required for this authentication. Internally, the OBU holds a long-term private key sk_LTI generated during the registration phase. It calls a pre-built zero-knowledge proof generation algorithm, using the private key sk_LTI as secret input, and combines it with some public information (such as a random challenge number or timestamp) to generate a zero-knowledge proof data, which we call Proof_data. This Proof_data can prove to the verifier that "I do indeed hold a private key associated with a certain public identity," but the private key sk_LTI itself will never be revealed throughout the entire process.

[0066] Meanwhile, the OBU of vehicle A prepares its current access credentials. This access credential is a data packet containing the hash value H (ID_LTI) of the identity credential generated and stored during the registration phase, as well as other information such as the credential validity period and the vehicle pseudonym.

[0067] Vehicle A sends an authentication request message containing access credentials and zero-knowledge proof data (Proof_data) to RSU-B via wireless communication.

[0068] Step 2: RSU-B verifies the legality of the vehicle's identity. Upon receiving the authentication request from vehicle A, the roadside unit RSU-B immediately initiates the verification procedure. This procedure is strictly executed according to the steps defined in the claims, as follows: RSU-B successfully retrieved the zero-knowledge proof data Proof_data sent by vehicle A from the received authentication request message, which was used to prove that it holds a specific secret (i.e., private key sk_LTI).

[0069] At the same time, RSU-B extracts the hash value H (ID_LTI) of the identity credential from the access credentials section of the request message. This hash value plays a crucial role in this verification, serving as a public and tamper-proof verification anchor.

[0070] RSU-B invokes an internally pre-defined verification algorithm paired with the algorithm used to generate vehicle A. This algorithm is an efficient cryptographic function. RSU-B takes the zero-knowledge proof data Proof_data obtained in the previous step and the verification anchor H (ID_LTI) as two core inputs to the verification algorithm.

[0071] The verification algorithm performs a series of complex cryptographic calculations on the two inputs. Essentially, this calculation checks whether a expected mathematical relationship exists between Proof_data and H(ID_LTI). This relationship is designed to be true only if the entity generating Proof_data actually possesses the private key sk_LTI corresponding to H(ID_LTI).

[0072] RSU-B determines that vehicle A has successfully proven it possesses a private key matching the identity credential hash value if and only if the verification algorithm outputs a Boolean value of "true". If the algorithm outputs "false", authentication immediately fails, and an unauthorized access attempt is recorded.

[0073] After the zero-knowledge proof verification is successful, RSU-B uses the hash value H (ID_LTI) as the verification anchor point to initiate a query on the consortium blockchain where it is a node.

[0074] The query aims to confirm whether the identity credential status recorded in the ledger and associated with H(ID_LTI) is valid and not expired, and whether the current pseudonym status associated with that credential is also valid. The immutability of the distributed ledger guarantees the authority of this status information.

[0075] Step 3: Complete authentication and grant access permissions If the zero-knowledge proof verification passes and all state query results on the distributed ledger are valid, then RSU-B will ultimately determine that vehicle A's cross-domain authentication is valid.

[0076] RSU-B will then return a successful authentication response to vehicle A and allocate temporary network resources or service permissions to it, allowing it to conduct normal vehicle-road cooperative communication in the current area.

[0077] Based on the above embodiments, the vehicle's real identity information included in the identity credential is encrypted and stored in an off-chain database outside the distributed ledger.

[0078] Specifically, while hash references protect the identity credential itself, the credential may still contain sensitive information directly related to the vehicle's true identity, such as the VIN code and license plate number. Storing this type of information directly or encrypting it before storing it on the consortium blockchain still poses certain privacy risks.

[0079] Therefore, in this embodiment of the invention, the vehicle's real identity information included in the identity credential is encrypted and stored in an off-chain database outside the distributed ledger.

[0080] The specific implementation method is as follows: During the registration phase, the vehicle's true identity information (such as the VIN code) is separated from the main data of the identity certificate. This true identity information is then encrypted using a strong encryption algorithm. The encrypted data block is then stored in an off-chain database. This off-chain database can be a distributed database maintained by a certification consortium, or a centralized database managed by an authoritative institution; this embodiment of the invention does not specifically limit this.

[0081] Meanwhile, the distributed ledger only records an index or pointer to this off-chain encrypted data, along with access control policies. Thus, the blockchain itself only carries non-sensitive data required for authentication and verification, such as hash values, credential status, and pseudonyms, while highly sensitive real identity information is isolated off-chain and stored in encrypted form.

[0082] The method provided in this invention encrypts the vehicle's true identity information included in the identity credential and stores it in an off-chain database outside the distributed ledger. This method employs a collaborative on-chain and off-chain storage strategy, effectively resolving the conflict between blockchain transparency and data privacy. It leverages the immutability and decentralization of blockchain to ensure the trustworthiness of the authentication logic while protecting the core vehicle identity information through off-chain storage, achieving a higher level of privacy protection.

[0083] In related technologies, existing blockchain cross-domain authentication schemes utilize the immutability of blockchain to store pseudonyms or certificates, attempting to build a decentralized trust system. However, these schemes generally suffer from high storage overhead; large amounts of pseudonym or certificate data are directly stored on the blockchain, leading to rapid block expansion and impacting system performance. During cross-domain authentication, pseudonyms need to be regenerated, increasing computational and communication latency and making it difficult to adapt to dynamic scenarios involving high-speed vehicle movement. Furthermore, vehicles need to establish trust relationships with multiple blockchain nodes and CAs, resulting in complex trust dependencies. Some schemes, by introducing cloud storage, also introduce data leakage risks and fail to consider the subsequent processing of pseudonyms after cross-domain authentication, leading to insufficient system integrity and security.

[0084] Based on the above embodiments, the method further includes: Step 210: Receive the status update instruction of the identity credential broadcast by the distributed ledger; The status update instruction is generated after a multi-node authorization vote obtains the consent of more than a preset proportion of nodes, in order to authorize the decryption and access of the vehicle's real identity information in the off-chain database; The multi-node authorization voting is triggered by the distributed ledger after an authoritative institution initiates a retrospective request for the access credentials, and is participated in by multiple roadside unit nodes.

[0085] Specifically, it can receive state update instructions broadcast by the distributed ledger. That is, after a traceability process is triggered and completed, the roadside unit will receive a state update instruction from the distributed ledger network in which it acts as a node. The state update instruction can be a specific transaction or an event issued by a smart contract.

[0086] The purpose of a status update command is to notify all or some nodes in the network that a significant change has occurred in the status of identity credentials. For example, a status update command might instruct a roadside unit to mark a vehicle as monitored or to record a retrospective event in its local log. Upon receiving this status update command, the roadside unit will execute the corresponding local policy.

[0087] To better understand the background of this step, the generation mechanism of the state update instruction is explained below. This mechanism is not initiated by the roadside unit performing this step, but the roadside unit is a participant in the mechanism and the receiver of the result.

[0088] The generation process of state update instructions is part of the system's high-level governance, and it is automatically generated after the following series of preconditions are met: First, an accredited authority will submit a request to the system to trace the access credentials.

[0089] Subsequently, the traceability request will be verified and processed by a smart contract on the distributed ledger, automatically triggering a multi-node authorization vote. The goal of this multi-node authorization vote is to determine whether to grant access to the vehicle's true identity information.

[0090] Before voting, each participating RSU node verifies the legitimacy of the retroactive request according to a preset strategy, such as verifying the digital signature of an authoritative institution. After confirming the legitimacy of the retroactive request, the node automatically casts a vote of approval or disapproval according to the rules set by the smart contract.

[0091] The vote is considered successful once the smart contract calculates that the number of nodes voting in favor exceeds a preset percentage (e.g., two-thirds of the total number of nodes). This successful vote signifies that the system has officially authorized the decryption and access to the vehicle's true identity information in the off-chain database.

[0092] As one of the final results of this series of processes, the distributed ledger generates and broadcasts the aforementioned state update instructions to the network to ensure that all relevant nodes are aware of and synchronize the result of this traceability request.

[0093] The method provided in this invention receives a state update instruction for an identity credential broadcast by a distributed ledger. This state update instruction is generated after a multi-node authorization vote obtains the consent of more than a preset proportion of nodes, authorizing the decryption and access to the vehicle's real identity information in an off-chain database. The multi-node authorization vote is triggered by the distributed ledger after an authoritative institution initiates a tracing request for the access credential, and involves multiple roadside unit nodes. Therefore, by binding the generation of the state update instruction to a multi-node authorization vote based on distributed consensus, it ensures that any tracing of the vehicle's anonymous identity and state change operations must be legally authorized by a majority of nodes within the network. This achieves the ability to collaboratively govern and protect the privacy of sensitive vehicle identity information in a distributed vehicle network environment lacking a centralized trusted entity, preventing unilateral abuse of authority by a single node or authoritative institution while ensuring a trustworthy process for identity tracing under legal and compliant conditions.

[0094] The method provided in this invention adopts a hierarchical storage architecture, storing only token digests and verification rules on the blockchain, while the vehicle's true identity information is encrypted and hosted locally by the RSU, significantly reducing the storage pressure on the blockchain. It implements a conditional privacy protection mechanism, ensuring complete anonymity for vehicles during daily communication, with identity information only decrypted by the TA when necessary, balancing privacy protection and regulatory requirements. This method optimizes the storage and authentication process of the blockchain, simplifies trust relationships, and solves the problems of high storage overhead, low authentication efficiency, and complex trust dependencies in existing blockchain solutions, thereby improving the overall performance of cross-domain authentication.

[0095] Based on the above embodiments, the method further includes an access credential update step, the update step including: Step 310: Receive the updated access credential sent by the vehicle; the updated access credential is generated by the authentication management system after the access credential expires, based on the hash value of the identity credential in the update request of the access credential, querying the distributed ledger, and confirming the validity of the identity credential corresponding to the hash value in the distributed ledger. The update request was initiated by the vehicle.

[0096] Specifically, in order to maintain the long-term security and privacy of the system, the access credentials in this embodiment of the invention have a short validity period. Therefore, the access credentials can be dynamically updated, and correspondingly, updated access credentials sent by the vehicle can be received.

[0097] The roadside unit will receive and cache the updated access credentials for subsequent authentication interactions, replacing old credentials that have expired or are about to expire.

[0098] Similarly, to better understand this step, the following explains how the vehicle obtains this updated access credential. This acquisition process is not completed by the roadside unit performing this step.

[0099] The updated access credentials are generated by a centralized, high-privilege authentication management system, and the generation process is as follows: First, when the vehicle's onboard unit (OBU) detects that its current access credentials are about to expire or have already expired, it automatically initiates an access credential update request. This update request is sent to the authentication management system via a secure network channel. To prove its legitimate identity, the update request must include the hash value of its long-term valid identity credentials. The update request is initiated by the vehicle.

[0100] Upon receiving an update request, the authentication management system extracts the hash value and queries the distributed ledger like a regular node. After confirming the validity of the identity credential corresponding to the hash value in the distributed ledger, it generates an update for the vehicle. If the identity credential has been revoked or expired, the authentication management system will reject the update request.

[0101] After confirming the validity of the identity credentials, the authentication management system will generate a new access credential for the vehicle with a new validity period and a new pseudonym—this is called an updated access credential—and issue it to the vehicle through a secure channel. Once received, the vehicle can use the updated access credential during subsequent driving.

[0102] The method provided in this invention receives an updated access credential sent by a vehicle. The updated access credential is generated for the vehicle after the original access credential has expired. The authentication management system queries the distributed ledger based on the hash value of the identity credential in the update request, and confirms the validity of the identity credential corresponding to the hash value in the distributed ledger. This method establishes an access credential update mechanism based on the latest global state by requiring the authentication management system to query the distributed ledger based on the hash value of the identity credential provided by the vehicle to confirm its validity before issuing a new updated access credential. This ensures that even during the access credential renewal process, the vehicle's anonymous identity remains under the collaborative supervision of the distributed network, effectively preventing vehicles whose access credentials have been marked as abnormal or revoked from regaining legitimate access rights through the renewal process, thus guaranteeing the security and continuity of the entire vehicle network access control system.

[0103] Based on the above embodiments, both the access credential and the updated access credential include the pseudonym of the vehicle, and the pseudonym remains unchanged during the validity period of the identity credential.

[0104] Specifically, both the access credential and the updated access credential include a pseudonym for the vehicle, and the pseudonym remains unchanged throughout the validity period of the identity credential.

[0105] Under this design, although access credentials are short-term and require periodic updates, the pseudonym used by the vehicle for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication remains stable throughout the entire validity period of the identity credential. The advantage of this mechanism is that it can establish and maintain a long-term reputation file for the pseudonym while ensuring the privacy of the vehicle's true identity is not compromised.

[0106] For example, a vehicle with a consistently good track record can continuously accumulate a positive reputation score through its stable pseudonym. Even if its short-term access credentials are changed multiple times, all reputation data can still be accurately linked to the unchanging pseudonym, thus supporting trust and incentive mechanisms based on long-term behavior.

[0107] In this embodiment of the invention, a smart contract can be used to automatically perform a pseudonym validity check, avoiding the repeated generation of invalid pseudonyms and reducing unnecessary computation and communication overhead.

[0108] The method provided in this invention includes a pseudonym for the vehicle in both the access credential and the updated access credential, and the pseudonym remains unchanged throughout the validity period of the identity credential. By maintaining the stability of the pseudonym within the long-term validity period of the identity credential in short-term rotating access credentials and updated access credentials, this method achieves a balance between short-term anonymity and long-term identifiability of the vehicle during communication. This allows the vehicle to participate in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interactions with a consistently stable pseudonym without revealing its true identity, thus providing a foundation for establishing long-term behavioral records, reputation assessments, and service continuity based on this stable pseudonym.

[0109] Based on the above embodiments, the validity period of the identity credential is a first preset duration, and the validity period of the access credential is a second preset duration; the first preset duration is longer than the second preset duration.

[0110] Specifically, the validity period of the identity credential is a first preset duration, and the validity period of the access credential is a second preset duration, wherein the first preset duration is longer than the second preset duration.

[0111] The first preset duration is a relatively long time span. For example, it can be set to 1 year, 5 years, or even the expected lifespan of the vehicle. This is because the identity certificate represents the fundamental legality of the vehicle, and its issuance and verification process is relatively strict and should not be changed frequently.

[0112] The second preset duration is a relatively short time span. It can be flexibly set according to security requirements and application scenarios. For example, in congested urban areas, it can be set to 5 minutes to minimize the risk of trajectory tracking; in scenarios such as highways, it can be set to 1 hour to reduce update overhead, etc. This embodiment of the invention does not impose specific limitations on this.

[0113] Understandably, the design of having a first preset duration longer than the second preset duration offers a technological advantage in achieving triple protection of security, privacy, and efficiency. In terms of security, short-term valid access credentials significantly shorten the attack window after a single credential is stolen; once expired, they become invalid, thus significantly reducing the systemic risk caused by credential leakage. Regarding privacy, frequent credential updates effectively sever the correlation of vehicle behavior data across different times and spaces, preventing long-term tracking and strongly protecting user trajectory privacy. In terms of efficiency, long-term stable identity credentials avoid the need for vehicles to frequently undergo costly full identity authentication, ensuring that vehicles only need to update their fundamental identity over a period of several years. In daily operation, a lightweight credential renewal process is relied upon, thereby improving management efficiency while ensuring system performance.

[0114] Based on any of the above embodiments, the steps of the cross-domain authentication method are as follows: First, during the initialization and trust anchor establishment phase of the consortium blockchain network, the consortium blockchain is constructed using the PBFT consensus algorithm by multiple qualified RSU nodes. A distributed key generation protocol is used to collaboratively generate global public key parameters to avoid single point of leakage risk. At the same time, smart contracts are deployed to manage authentication rules, access control (such as traceability requiring multi-node signature authorization), and data format (such as storing only hash digests), laying the foundation for distributed trust in the system.

[0115] Next, during the vehicle registration and dual-token generation phase, the vehicle's OBU submits a registration request containing a hardware fingerprint to the local RSU. After the RSU verifies the request, it generates the core dual-token credentials: the identity token serves as a long-term root credential, with the structure {hardware fingerprint hash, encrypted real identity hash, long-term validity period (e.g., 1 year), RSU signature}. The SHA-256 hash value of this token is stored on the blockchain, while the vehicle's real identity information associated with it is encrypted by the RSU and stored in an off-chain database. Simultaneously, the generated access token serves as a short-term session credential, with the structure {pseudonym, short-term validity period (e.g., 1 hour), identity token hash reference, RSU signature}. This token is assigned to the vehicle for daily communication and authentication.

[0116] Subsequently, in the cross-domain authentication process, when a vehicle enters a new domain, the RSU within that domain quickly verifies the validity of the submitted access token by querying the consortium blockchain (checking the hash and signature that are alive on the chain) and the pseudonym status. It also uses technologies such as zero-knowledge proofs to verify the vehicle's ownership of the identity token, thereby achieving efficient cross-domain authentication without exposing the real identity. If the access token expires, the vehicle can apply for an update with a valid identity token hash reference, ensuring that its pseudonym remains stable within the validity period of the identity token to support long-term behavior tracking and reputation accumulation.

[0117] When a specific security event triggers identity tracing and anomaly handling, the system requires the TA to obtain authorization through a multi-node authorization vote managed by the consortium blockchain smart contract (e.g., ≥2 / 3 of the nodes must agree) before it can decrypt the real identity information stored off-chain and synchronize the tracing results to update the token status on-chain, thus achieving strict conditional privacy protection.

[0118] The system also uses smart contracts to automatically manage the lifecycle of tokens and pseudonyms, including regular updates, key rotation, and data compression. Based on continuous performance monitoring of indicators such as authentication latency and storage growth rate, it dynamically adjusts network parameters and resources to ensure that the system balances security, privacy, and efficiency throughout its entire operating cycle.

[0119] The method provided in this invention, through a decentralized consortium blockchain architecture, completely solves the single point of failure and key escrow problems of traditional PKI and IBC solutions. Multiple RSU nodes jointly maintain the trust anchor, enhancing the system's resistance to attacks. The dual-token mechanism reduces the complexity of cross-domain authentication from O(n) to O(1), and combined with pseudonym reuse technology, significantly reduces communication and computational overhead, meeting the low-latency requirements of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0120] The tiered storage architecture stores only token hashes on-chain and real information off-chain, reducing on-chain data volume by more than 50% compared to existing blockchain solutions and avoiding block bloat. The conditional privacy protection mechanism achieves a balance between daily anonymity and controllable traceability through zero-knowledge proofs and permission management contracts, offering superior privacy protection granularity compared to existing solutions.

[0121] Dynamic lifecycle management and automated smart contract operations reduce human intervention and improve system scalability, supporting large-scale dynamic networks of millions of vehicles. Compared with existing solutions, it significantly improves authentication efficiency, storage costs, and privacy security.

[0122] The cross-domain authentication device provided by the present invention is described below. The cross-domain authentication device described below can be referred to in correspondence with the cross-domain authentication method described above.

[0123] Based on any of the above embodiments, the present invention provides a cross-domain authentication device. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the cross-domain authentication device provided by the present invention, as shown below. Figure 2 As shown, the device includes: The receiving unit 210 is configured to receive an access credential sent by the vehicle when the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​the roadside unit; the access credential is generated when the vehicle is registered, and the access credential includes a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with the long-term identity of the vehicle. The query unit 220 is used to perform a query on a distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential based on the hash value in the access credential, and obtain a query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes; Verification unit 230 is used to verify the cross-domain authentication validity of the vehicle based on the query result.

[0124] The apparatus provided in this invention receives an access credential sent by a vehicle when the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit. The access credential is generated during vehicle registration and includes a hash value of an identity credential. The identity credential is a credential associated with the vehicle's long-term identity. Based on the hash value in the access credential, a distributed ledger containing the hash values ​​of the identity credential is queried to obtain the query result. The distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain composed of multiple roadside unit nodes. Based on the query result, the validity of the vehicle's authentication is verified. This method constructs a decentralized unified trust foundation by having multiple roadside unit nodes form a consortium blockchain and jointly maintain a distributed ledger containing the hash values ​​of the identity credential, thus achieving trusted transmission and verification of vehicle identity. By using an access credential that only includes a hash value, it significantly reduces on-chain storage overhead and authentication latency, avoiding the single point of failure problem of traditional public key infrastructure. Furthermore, it effectively protects the vehicle's long-term identity information and prevents privacy leaks by leveraging the unidirectionality of hash functions. Ultimately, without the need for a complex key escrow mechanism, it achieves efficient, privacy-secure, and trust-unified cross-domain authentication, overcoming the shortcomings of complex authentication processes in most blockchain solutions.

[0125] Based on any of the above embodiments, the verification unit 230 is specifically used for: Based on the query results, it is confirmed that the access credential recorded on the distributed ledger is valid and has not expired; Based on the query results, the status of the pseudonym recorded on the distributed ledger and associated with the access credential is confirmed to be valid.

[0126] Based on any of the above embodiments, a proof unit is further included, wherein the proof unit specifically includes: A zero-knowledge proof unit is used to verify the zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle to prove that the vehicle holds a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential. The fingerprint information verification unit is used to verify that the hardware fingerprint information in the access credential is consistent with the hardware fingerprint information bound to the identity credential.

[0127] Based on any of the above embodiments, the zero-knowledge proof unit is specifically used for: Obtain zero-knowledge proof data sent by the vehicle; The hash value of the identity credential in the access credential is used as a public verification anchor. A preset verification algorithm is invoked, taking the zero-knowledge proof data and the verification anchor as input, to perform cryptographic calculations on the proof data; If the cryptographic calculation result of the verification algorithm is true, it is determined that the vehicle holds a private key that matches the hash value of the identity credential, and the verification is successful.

[0128] Based on any of the above embodiments, the vehicle's real identity information included in the identity credential is encrypted and stored in an off-chain database outside the distributed ledger.

[0129] Based on any of the above embodiments, a state update unit is further included, wherein the state update unit is specifically used for: Receive the status update instruction of the identity credential broadcast by the distributed ledger; The status update instruction is generated after a multi-node authorization vote obtains the consent of more than a preset proportion of nodes, in order to authorize the decryption and access of the vehicle's real identity information in the off-chain database; The multi-node authorization voting is triggered by the distributed ledger after an authoritative institution initiates a retrospective request for the access credentials, and is participated in by multiple roadside unit nodes.

[0130] Based on any of the above embodiments, a credential updating unit is further included, wherein the credential updating unit is specifically used for: The system receives an updated access credential sent by the vehicle. The updated access credential is generated by the authentication management system after the access credential expires. The system queries the distributed ledger based on the hash value of the identity credential in the update request of the access credential, and confirms the validity of the identity credential corresponding to the hash value in the distributed ledger. The update request was initiated by the vehicle.

[0131] Based on any of the above embodiments, both the access credential and the updated access credential include the pseudonym of the vehicle, and the pseudonym remains unchanged during the validity period of the identity credential.

[0132] Based on any of the above embodiments, the validity period of the identity credential is a first preset duration, and the validity period of the access credential is a second preset duration; the first preset duration is longer than the second preset duration.

[0133] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic device provided by the present invention, such as... Figure 3As shown, the electronic device may include a processor 310, a communications interface 320, a memory 330, and a communication bus 340, wherein the processor 310, communications interface 320, and memory 330 communicate with each other via the communication bus 340. The processor 310 can invoke logical instructions in the memory 330 to execute a cross-domain authentication method. This method includes: when the vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit, receiving an access credential sent by the vehicle; the access credential is generated during vehicle registration and includes a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with the vehicle's long-term identity; based on the hash value in the access credential, querying a distributed ledger that records the hash values ​​of the identity credential to obtain a query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes; and based on the query result, verifying the validity of the vehicle's cross-domain authentication.

[0134] Furthermore, the logical instructions in the aforementioned memory 330 can be implemented as software functional units and, when sold or used as independent products, can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, essentially, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0135] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program that can be stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer is able to execute the cross-domain authentication method provided by the above methods. The method includes: when a vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit, receiving an access credential sent by the vehicle; the access credential is generated when the vehicle is registered, and the access credential includes a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with the long-term identity of the vehicle; based on the hash value in the access credential, querying a distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential to obtain a query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes; and based on the query result, verifying the cross-domain authentication validity of the vehicle.

[0136] In another aspect, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, is implemented to perform the cross-domain authentication method provided by the methods described above. The method includes: when a vehicle is within the coverage area of ​​a roadside unit, receiving an access credential sent by the vehicle; the access credential is generated when the vehicle is registered, and the access credential includes a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with the long-term identity of the vehicle; based on the hash value in the access credential, querying a distributed ledger that records the hash value of the identity credential to obtain a query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium blockchain with multiple roadside units as consensus nodes; and based on the query result, verifying the validity of the cross-domain authentication of the vehicle.

[0137] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without any creative effort.

[0138] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.

[0139] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A cross-domain authentication method, characterized by, The method comprises: receiving an access credential sent by a vehicle when the vehicle is in the coverage of a road side unit; the access credential is generated by the vehicle when registering, and the access credential comprises a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with a long-term identity of the vehicle; based on the hash value in the access credential, querying a distributed ledger in which the hash value of the identity credential is recorded to obtain a query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium chain with multiple road side units as consensus nodes; based on the query result, verifying the validity of cross-domain authentication of the vehicle.

2. The cross-domain authentication method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises: based on the query result, confirming that the state of the access credential recorded in the distributed ledger is valid and not expired; based on the query result, confirming that the state of a pseudonym associated with the access credential recorded in the distributed ledger is valid.

3. The cross-domain authentication method of claim 2, wherein, The method further comprises: verifying a zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle, the zero-knowledge proof proving that the vehicle holds a private key matching the hash value of the identity credential; verifying that the hardware fingerprint information carried by the access credential is consistent with the hardware fingerprint information bound to the identity credential.

4. The cross-domain authentication method of claim 3, wherein, The verification of the zero-knowledge proof provided by the vehicle comprises: obtaining zero-knowledge proof data sent by the vehicle; taking the hash value of the identity credential in the access credential as a public verification anchor point; calling a preset verification algorithm, taking the zero-knowledge proof data and the verification anchor point as inputs, and performing a cryptographic calculation on the proof data; if the result of the cryptographic calculation of the verification algorithm is true, it is determined that the vehicle holds a private key matching the hash value of the identity credential, and the verification is passed.

5. The cross-domain authentication method of claim 1, wherein, The vehicle real identity information included in the identity credential is encrypted and stored in an off-chain database other than the distributed ledger.

6. The cross-domain authentication method of claim 5, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving a state update instruction of the identity credential broadcast by the distributed ledger; the state update instruction is generated for authorized decryption and access to the vehicle real identity information in the off-chain database after a multi-node authorization vote obtains more than a preset proportion of node agreement; the multi-node authorization vote is triggered by the distributed ledger after an authoritative institution initiates a trace application for the access credential, and is participated by multiple road side unit nodes.

7. The cross-domain authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, The method further comprises an update step of the access credential, the update step comprising: receiving an updated access credential sent by the vehicle; the updated access credential is generated by an authentication management system based on the hash value of the identity credential in an update request for the access credential after the access credential expires, and the identity credential state corresponding to the hash value is confirmed to be valid in the distributed ledger; the update request is initiated by the vehicle.

8. The cross-domain authentication method of claim 7, wherein, The access credential and the updated access credential both include a pseudonym of the vehicle, and the pseudonym remains unchanged within the validity period of the identity credential.

9. The cross-domain authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, The identity credential has a validity period of a first preset time length, and the access credential has a validity period of a second preset time length; the first preset time length is greater than the second preset time length.

10. A cross-domain authentication apparatus characterized by comprising: Comprise: A receiving unit configured to receive an access credential sent by a vehicle when the vehicle is in a coverage range of a road side unit; The access credential is generated by the vehicle when registering, and the access credential comprises a hash value of an identity credential; the identity credential is a credential associated with a long-term identity of the vehicle; A querying unit configured to query a distributed ledger on which the hash values of the identity credentials are recorded based on the hash value in the access credential to obtain a query result; the distributed ledger is a consortium chain with a plurality of road side units as consensus nodes; A verifying unit configured to verify validity of cross-domain authentication of the vehicle based on the query result.

11. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that, The processor executes the computer program to implement the cross-domain authentication method of any one of claims 1 to 9. 12.A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the cross-domain authentication method of any one of claims 1 to 9.

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