An intelligent anti-misoperation control method for a power dispatch command digital interaction system

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of power system control, in particular to an intelligent anti-misoperation control method of a power dispatch command digital interaction system, extracts the permission level, equipment control level, time and order of instructions, generates an operation level comparison table, filters instructions with lower permissions than the equipment level, generates an over-control action identification sequence, collects equipment state changes, judges whether the threshold is exceeded, binds the equipment and instructions, generates a task set, marks the task intersection and opposite direction, merges the tasks, and forms a conflict control action list. The present application introduces a control permission and equipment level matching mechanism, associates the instructions and permission differences through time sequence numbering, constructs an instruction and equipment level mapping, identifies the risk of over-limit operation, forms a fluctuation identification combined with equipment state changes, fuses the opposite relationship between the task time period and the operation direction, extracts the time sequence intersection and conflict tasks, binds the risk instructions and writes them into the lock interval, realizes state limitation and delay, and improves the prevention and control capability and perception level.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power system control technology, and in particular to an intelligent anti-misoperation control method for a digital interactive system for power dispatching and command. Background Technology

[0002] The field of power system control technology encompasses the technical means and methods for coordinating and managing the entire process of power production, transmission, transformation, distribution, and consumption. Its core content lies in ensuring the safety, stability, economy, and efficiency of power grid operation. Specifically, it involves multiple aspects such as real-time monitoring of the power system, dispatch control, load forecasting, state estimation, power flow calculation, and power quality monitoring. In modern power systems, the trend of digitalization and intelligentization in dispatch and command is becoming increasingly apparent, which places higher demands on the integration, automation, and intelligence of system control technology. In particular, in preventing misoperation and ensuring the correct execution of operating instructions, it poses important technical requirements for system safety protection and intelligent identification.

[0003] One of the intelligent anti-misoperation control methods for a power dispatching and command digital interaction system refers to introducing a set of technical solutions into the power dispatching and interaction system to identify the correctness of operation instructions and control the execution of operations. It addresses the problem of misoperation during the execution of dispatching instructions and covers specific technical matters such as instruction semantic recognition, permission verification, logical relationship determination, and time series comparison. It mainly completes the identification and control of misoperation by establishing a digital rule base associated with the dispatching business process, using instruction verification logic based on rule matching, and combining the time information when the instruction is issued with the equipment status information for multi-dimensional cross-verification. Thus, it constructs an intelligent anti-misoperation control mechanism based on business logic and time series.

[0004] Existing technologies mainly rely on rule verification and static logic comparison, lacking structured analysis of the permission levels and device control levels in the instruction execution sequence. They cannot identify out-of-bounds behavior between operation instructions and target devices based on permission differences. In scheduling scenarios with overlapping tasks or frequent state fluctuations, the lack of a rate judgment mechanism for device state change trends makes it difficult to detect potential execution risks in a timely manner. Operation instructions may continue to advance without identifying state anomalies, leading to task conflict backlog or device control logic failure, which in turn affects the continuity and security of the scheduling execution process. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the technical problems existing in the prior art, embodiments of the present invention provide an intelligent anti-misoperation control method for a power dispatching and command digital interactive system. The technical solution is as follows:

[0006] A method for intelligent anti-misoperation control in a power dispatching and command digital interactive system includes the following steps:

[0007] S1: Extract the personnel permission level, equipment control level, control duration and sequence number of each instruction, establish the relationship between personnel permission level and time sequence number, sort and match the equipment control level, determine the hierarchy of duration and level distribution, and generate an operation level control comparison table.

[0008] S2: Based on the relationship between personnel permission level and equipment control level in the operation level control comparison table, filter instruction combinations with permissions lower than equipment level, extract personnel identifier, equipment number and action type, construct instruction sequence and action mapping, determine the difference between permission and equipment level, and generate over-control action identifier sequence;

[0009] S3: Call the target device in the over-control action identifier sequence, collect the device voltage, circuit breaker, remote signaling, and interlocking, record the device state change rate, determine whether it exceeds the set threshold, bind the relationship between the device and the control command, and generate a state fluctuation device task set;

[0010] S4: Based on the device number in the state fluctuation device task set, extract the incomplete and recently completed scheduling tasks, compare the task operation time, mark task pairs that have intersection and opposite directions, merge the tasks according to the device number and time period to form a conflict control action list.

[0011] As a further aspect of the present invention, the operation level control lookup table includes a permission level sequence number, an equipment level sorting structure, a duration level mapping, a control level landing point classification, and a level correspondence set. The over-control action identification sequence includes an over-control personnel identifier, a target equipment number, action type information, a permission level difference value, and an instruction sequence number. The state fluctuation equipment task set includes voltage change data, circuit breaker position records, remote signaling state change information, interlocking state indicators, and state change rate evaluation values. The conflict control action list includes equipment conflict number groups, task time intersection intervals, operation direction opposition markers, task conflict pair numbers, and task merging sections.

[0012] As a further aspect of the present invention, the step of obtaining the operation level control lookup table is as follows:

[0013] The steps for obtaining the operation level control lookup table are as follows:

[0014] S101: Obtain the personnel control permission level, equipment control level, control duration and sorting number of each instruction in the power dispatching and command digital interactive interface; extract the timestamp information and match the sorting number with the personnel permission level; arrange the target equipment control level according to the sorting number; and generate a list of permission number associations.

[0015] S102: Call the sorting number in the permission number association list and the mapping result of the device control level, extract the control duration of each instruction, determine the difference based on the relationship between the duration and the device control level, map the duration to the device control level range, and generate a continuous control level landing point group.

[0016] S103: Arrange the corresponding sequence according to the order of the permission number association list and the continuous control level landing point group, establish a corresponding list of personnel control permission level and equipment control level, extract the personnel permission level and equipment control level comparison information, merge the level landing points of control duration, and generate an operation level control comparison table.

[0017] As a further aspect of the present invention, the step of obtaining the over-control action identifier sequence is as follows:

[0018] S201: Based on the correspondence between personnel control permissions and equipment control levels in the operation level control reference table, filter instructions with permissions lower than the target equipment control level, extract the corresponding personnel identifier, equipment number and action type, summarize and sort the numbers, and generate a permission over-limit screening list;

[0019] S202: Call the sorting number and device number in the permission over-limit screening list, extract the action type and personnel permission level of the instruction, calculate the level difference and determine whether it is greater than zero, mark the instruction with a value greater than zero as an over-limit item, and generate a level boundary offset record set;

[0020] S203: Sort the control-over items by number according to the control-over item number in the control-over offset record set, reorder the instructions by number, establish groups by equipment number and action type, classify and merge the control-over relationship information of personnel and equipment, and generate control-over action identifier sequence.

[0021] As a further aspect of the present invention, the step of obtaining the state fluctuation device task set is as follows:

[0022] S301: Call the device number in the over-control action identifier sequence, collect the current voltage, circuit breaker position, remote signaling status and interlocking information of the device, continuously record the device status according to the time sequence, and generate a time-series observation trajectory;

[0023] S302: Based on the voltage and remote signaling status in the time-series observation trajectory, calculate the rate of change of the status parameters, extract the change values ​​of adjacent time points and divide them by the time interval, determine whether the rate of change is continuously higher than the set threshold, and generate an abnormal rate maintenance interval.

[0024] S303: Call the device number in the abnormal rate maintenance interval, match it with the instruction number in the over-control action identifier sequence, extract the corresponding instruction number, device number and action type, group them according to the number to form a list of corresponding instructions and devices, and generate a state fluctuation device task set.

[0025] As a further aspect of the present invention, the step of obtaining the conflict control action list is as follows:

[0026] S401: Based on the device number in the state fluctuation device task set, extract the unfinished and just completed task records in the scheduling task list, associate the operation start and end times of the tasks, and generate an operation time task control group according to the device number.

[0027] S402: Based on the start and end times of the tasks in the operation time task control group, compare whether there is a time intersection between the tasks, extract the operation direction field, mark the tasks with intersection and opposite operation directions as logically opposed task items, and generate a time period opposed task combination set.

[0028] S403: Call the device number and task number in the set of opposing task combinations for the time period, group and merge tasks with time overlap by device number, extract the task number and operation direction information of each group, record the conflict combination, and generate a list of conflict control actions.

[0029] As a further aspect of the present invention, the method further includes:

[0030] S5: Call all task numbers and control targets in the conflict control action list, set over-control and fluctuation tasks as blocking tags, extract subsequent task time tags and target numbers, set delayed task operation status, write the control interface lock range and mark task operation restrictions, and generate anti-misoperation control execution results;

[0031] The results of the anti-misoperation control execution include the blocking task label, delayed execution status, locked time interval, control target restriction number, and task restriction condition classification identifier.

[0032] As a further aspect of the present invention, the step of obtaining the execution result of the anti-misoperation control is as follows:

[0033] S501: Call the task number and control target number in the conflict control action list, extract the matching over-control action identifier and status fluctuation device task data, filter the tasks that have both over-control identifier and status fluctuation status as blocking items, and generate a conflict blocking task set.

[0034] S502: Based on the task control target number in the conflict blocking task set, extract the subsequent task number and operation time tag in the task plan, identify the task set associated with the blocking task, set it to a delayed state, and generate a delayed pending control task list.

[0035] S503: Call the task number, control target number and delay status in the conflict blocking task set and the delayed control task list, write the operation status into the locking interval of the scheduling control interface according to the task number, identify the restriction conditions of the task operation, and generate the anti-misoperation control execution result.

[0036] Compared with the prior art, the advantages and positive effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0037] In this invention, a hierarchical matching mechanism between control permissions and device levels is introduced during instruction processing. By associating the instruction execution sequence with permission level differences through time sequence numbering, a level landing point mapping between instructions and devices is constructed. Based on permission differences, the risk of out-of-bounds operation is identified. After identifying out-of-control behavior, the status change characteristics are extracted by combining device voltage, circuit breaker status, and remote signaling information. A status fluctuation identifier is formed by rate judgment. Furthermore, the opposition relationship between task time period and operation direction is integrated to extract task pairs with temporal intersection and logical conflict. Finally, instructions with risk characteristics are bound to blocking tags and written into the locking interval to realize the status restriction and execution delay of subsequent tasks, thereby improving the dynamic prevention and control capabilities and scene perception level between task series. Attached Figure Description

[0038] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the method of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of obtaining the operation level control reference table for this invention.

[0040] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of obtaining the over-control action identifier sequence according to the present invention.

[0041] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of obtaining the task set for the state fluctuation device of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of obtaining the conflict control action list for this invention.

[0043] Figure 6 This is a flowchart of the process for obtaining the execution result of the error prevention control of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0044] The technical solution of the present invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0045] In embodiments of the present invention, words such as "exemplarily," "for example," etc., are used to indicate that something is an example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary" in the present invention should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of the word "exemplary" is intended to present the concept in a concrete manner. Furthermore, in embodiments of the present invention, the meaning expressed by "and / or" can be both, or either one.

[0046] In the embodiments of this invention, the terms "image" and "picture" may sometimes be used interchangeably. It should be noted that, without emphasizing the distinction between them, they convey the same meaning. Similarly, the terms "of," "corresponding (relevant)," and "corresponding" may sometimes be used interchangeably. It should be noted that, without emphasizing the distinction between them, they convey the same meaning.

[0047] In this embodiment of the invention, sometimes a subscript such as W1 may be written in a non-subscript form such as W1. When the difference is not emphasized, the meaning they express is the same.

[0048] To make the technical problems, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, a detailed description will be given below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

[0049] Please see Figure 1 This invention provides a technical solution: an intelligent anti-misoperation control method for a power dispatching and command digital interactive system, comprising the following steps:

[0050] S1: Obtain the personnel control permission level, target equipment control level, control duration and instruction sequence number associated with each instruction in the current instruction stream of the power dispatch and command digital interactive interface; extract the correspondence between the time sequence number of each instruction and the personnel control permission level; call the instruction sequence number to sort and match the target equipment control level; determine the hierarchical landing position between the control duration and the target equipment control level distribution; and summarize the matching results to obtain the operation level control comparison table.

[0051] S2: Based on the correspondence between personnel control authority level and target equipment control level in the operation level control comparison table, filter instruction combinations where personnel control authority level is lower than target equipment control level, extract personnel identifier, equipment number and action type from instruction combinations, and construct instruction sequence and action mapping group. Compare the level difference between personnel authority level and equipment control level in each group to determine whether there is behavior that exceeds the control boundary. Number and classify the scheduling instructions according to the order of arrangement in the instruction stream to obtain the over-control action identifier sequence.

[0052] S3: Call the target device in the over-control action identifier sequence, collect the voltage value, circuit breaker position, remote signaling status and interlocking information of the corresponding device in the current state, record the rate of change of the device state in a continuous time period, and determine whether the rate of change is continuously higher than the set threshold, bind the correspondence between the device number and the control command, and generate a set of status fluctuation device tasks.

[0053] S4: Based on the device number in the status fluctuation device task set, extract the incomplete and just completed tasks in the current scheduling tasks, call the start and end time of the task operation time for cross-comparison, mark the task pairs with time intersection and logically opposite operation directions, merge the overlapping task groups according to device number and time period to obtain the conflict control action list.

[0054] S5: Call all task numbers and control targets in the conflict control action list, set blocking tags for tasks with over-control indicators and status fluctuations, extract time tags and control target numbers of subsequent tasks in the task plan, set them as delayed task operation status, write them into the lock interval of the control interface, classify and mark the restriction conditions of each task operation, and generate the anti-misoperation control execution result.

[0055] The operation level control lookup table includes the permission level sequence number, equipment level sorting structure, duration hierarchy mapping, control level landing point classification, and level correspondence set. The over-control action identification sequence includes the over-control personnel identifier, target equipment number, action type information, permission level difference value, and instruction sequence number. The status fluctuation equipment task set includes voltage change data, circuit breaker position record, remote signaling status change information, interlocking status index, and status change rate evaluation value. The conflict control action list includes equipment conflict number group, task time intersection interval, operation direction opposition mark, task conflict pair number, and task merging segment. The anti-misoperation control execution result includes blocking task label, delayed execution status, locking time interval, control target restriction number, and task restriction condition classification identifier.

[0056] Please see Figure 2 The steps to obtain the operation level control reference table are as follows:

[0057] S101: Obtain the personnel control permission level, equipment control level, control duration and sorting number of each instruction in the power dispatching and command digital interactive interface; extract the timestamp information and match the sorting number with the personnel permission level; arrange the target equipment control level according to the sorting number; and generate a list of permission number associations.

[0058] Based on the real-time updated command stream in the power dispatching and command digital interactive interface, this command stream data is pushed by the SCADA system command queue interface. First, each command in the queue is atomically parsed to extract its four associated core attributes: personnel control permission level, target equipment control level, control duration, and command sequence number. For example, if the command stream contains four commands, for the command with sequence number 001, the personnel identifier is parsed as "Dispatcher A01". By accessing the personnel access management system interface and passing in "Dispatcher A01", its control permission level is returned as "Level 3". The target equipment number is parsed as "220kV-L1-CB1". By accessing the equipment asset management database and querying this number, its preset control level is returned as "Level 4", control duration as "10 minutes", and timestamp as "08:30:15". Similarly, for the command with sequence number 002... For instruction number 003, the personnel identifier "Dispatcher B02", permission level "Level 5", equipment number "110kV-T2-DS2", equipment level "Level 2", duration "5 minutes", and timestamp "08:31:00" are extracted. For instruction number 003, the personnel identifier "Dispatcher A01", permission level "Level 3", equipment number "35kV-B1-SW1", equipment level "Level 1", duration "3 minutes", and timestamp "08:31:45" are extracted. For instruction number 004, the personnel identifier "Shift Leader D01", permission level "Level 6", equipment number "220kV-L1-CB1", equipment level "Level 4", duration "2 minutes", and timestamp "08:32:10" are extracted. Then, the sequence number of each instruction is paired with its corresponding personnel control permission level to form a temporary key-value pair set, specifically:

[0059] [(001,3),(002,5),(003,3),(004,6)], then, according to the natural order of the instruction flow, that is, according to the order of instruction sorting numbers from smallest to largest (001,002,003,004), the target device control levels corresponding to all instructions are precisely arranged to obtain an ordered list of device control levels. Finally, the personnel permission pairing set, the device level list and all other extracted information are integrated to generate a structured permission number association list.

[0060] S102: Call the sorting number in the permission number association list and the mapping result of the device control level, extract the control duration of each instruction, determine the difference based on the relationship between the duration and the device control level, map the duration to the device control level range, and generate a continuous control level landing point group.

[0061] The process involves calling the permission number association list and iterating through the mapping results between the sequence number of each instruction and the control level of the target device. For example, for instruction sequence number 001, the target device control level is level 4; instruction 002's device level is level 2; instruction 003's device level is level 1; and instruction 004's device level is level 4. The control duration values ​​corresponding to each instruction are extracted, which are 10 minutes, 5 minutes, 3 minutes, and 2 minutes respectively. Next, a difference judgment is performed to map the specific control duration value to the corresponding target device control level value distribution range to determine its level placement. The interval division standard used in this mapping process is dynamically set through statistical analysis of the operation duration of devices of the same level in the historical database. Specifically, taking a level 4 device as an example, 1258 valid level 4 device operation records in the historical database are analyzed, and its average operation duration is calculated to be 8.2 minutes with a standard deviation of 1.5 minutes. Based on this, the level interval is set, with durations less than (8.2-1.5 minutes). The duration of 6.7 minutes is considered "low," those between 6.7 minutes and (8.2 + 1.5) = 9.7 minutes are considered "medium," and those greater than 9.7 minutes are considered "high." For instruction 001, the device level is 4, and the control duration of 10 minutes is greater than 9.7 minutes, so its level is "high." For instruction 002, the device level is 2. Assuming that the historical data analysis of this level of device yields an average of 4.5 minutes and a standard deviation of 1.0 minute, its 5-minute duration falls within the range [3.5, ...]. The "median" interval of [5.5] is defined as "medium". For instruction 003, the device is level 1. Assuming the historical average is 2.5 minutes and the standard deviation is 0.8 minutes, its 3-minute duration falls within the "median" interval of [1.7, 3.3], and the level is defined as "medium". For instruction 004, the device is also level 4, and its 2-minute duration is less than 6.7 minutes, so the level is defined as "low". The calculation results of all instructions [high, medium, medium, low] are summarized to generate a continuous control level landing point group.

[0062] S103: Call the sorting number in the permission number association list and the mapping result of the device control level, extract the control duration of each instruction, determine the difference based on the relationship between the duration and the device control level, map the duration to the device control level range, and generate a continuous control level landing point group.

[0063] Based on the two sets of data—the permission number association list and the continuous control level landing point group—the instructions are arranged sequentially and mapped one-to-one according to their order numbers. A list containing the correspondence between personnel control permission levels and equipment control levels is established. This list integrates the instruction number, personnel information, permission level, equipment information, equipment level, and the control duration level landing point just calculated. For example, instruction 001 corresponds to [Dispatcher A01, Level 3, 220kV-L1-CB1, Level 4, High], instruction 002 corresponds to [Dispatcher B02, Level 5, 110kV-T2-DS2, Level 2, Medium], and so on. All instruction entries are sorted in descending order according to the equipment control level. Based on this, the personnel permission level and control level correspondence information for each instruction is extracted. Simultaneously, the control duration level landing point values ​​between each level are merged. Finally, a clearly structured and comprehensive data table is output, generating an operation level control correspondence table, as shown in Table 1.

[0064] Table 1. Operational Level Control Comparison Table

[0065]

[0066] As shown in Table 1, this table presents all relevant information in a structured manner and sorts them according to the equipment control level, providing a direct and organized data source for subsequent screening and judgment steps.

[0067] Please see Figure 3 The steps for obtaining the over-control action identifier sequence are as follows:

[0068] S201: Based on the correspondence between personnel control permissions and equipment control levels in the operation level control comparison table, filter instructions with permissions lower than the target equipment control level, extract the corresponding personnel identifier, equipment number and action type, summarize and sort the numbers, and generate a permission over-limit screening list;

[0069] Based on the detailed correspondence between personnel control authority levels and target equipment control levels recorded in the operation level control lookup table, an automated filtering program is initiated. This program iterates through the records in Table 1 one by one, performing a strict numerical comparison judgment on each record. The core filtering rule is that an instruction is considered to meet the condition only if the value of the "Personnel Control Authority Level" field is strictly less than the value of the "Target Equipment Control Level" field. Taking the data in Table 1 as an example, instruction 001 is judged; its personnel authority level is 3 and its equipment control level is 4, satisfying the condition that 3 is less than 4. Therefore, this instruction record is filtered out. For instruction 004, its personnel authority level is 6 and its equipment control level is 4, not satisfying the condition that 6 is less than 4, so this instruction is skipped. For instruction 002, the personnel permission level is 5 and the equipment control level is 2, which does not meet the condition that 5 is less than 2, so it is skipped. For instruction 003, the personnel permission level is 3 and the equipment control level is 1, which does not meet the condition that 3 is less than 1, so it is skipped. After completing the traversal and filtering of all entries, all key information corresponding to the instruction entry that uniquely meets the conditions (instruction 001) is extracted. Specifically, its personnel identifier "dispatcher A01", equipment number "220kV-L1-CB1", and action type defined in the original instruction are extracted. Assuming that the action of instruction 001 is "closing", the sorting numbers corresponding to all instructions that meet the filtering conditions (only 001) are summarized to form a list of included numbers, generating an access control screening list.

[0070] S202: Call the sort number and device number in the permission over-limit screening list, extract the action type and personnel permission level of the instruction, calculate the level difference and determine whether it is greater than zero, mark the instruction with a value greater than zero as an over-limit item, and generate a level boundary offset record set;

[0071] The access control violation screening list contains sort number 001 and the associated device number "220kV-L1-CB1". Based on this information, all data related to the instruction is precisely extracted from the operation level control lookup table, including its action type "closing", personnel access level value 3, and target device control level value 4. Next, the level difference between the two extracted level values ​​is calculated by subtracting the personnel access level value from the target device control level value (specifically, 4-3). This yields a level difference of 1 for the instruction. A judgment is then made based on this level difference value. Whether it is greater than zero, in this example, the calculation result 1 is greater than 0, so it is judged as true. Therefore, the instruction 001 is internally marked as a clear "over-control item". This mark, together with the sort number, personnel identifier, equipment number, level difference, and other information, is integrated into a structured record, such as [sort number: 001, personnel: dispatcher A01, equipment: 220kV-L1-CB1, level difference: 1, over-control mark: yes]. If there are multiple instructions in the permission over-limit screening list, the above calculation and judgment process will be repeated for each one. Finally, all records marked as over-control items are completely summarized to generate a level boundary offset record set.

[0072] S203: Sort the control-over items numbered according to the level boundary offset record set, reorder the instructions by number, establish groups by equipment number and action type, classify and merge the control-over relationship information of personnel and equipment, and generate a control-over action identifier sequence;

[0073] Based on the control violation item (instruction 001) recorded in the level boundary offset record set, all instruction records in the original instruction stream are rearranged or marked to ensure that all control violation items are arranged in ascending order according to their original sorting numbers and are highlighted. A grouped index sequence is established using the "equipment number" and "action type" fields as composite keys. This aims to aggregate all control violation instructions targeting the same equipment and performing similar or logically related actions together for analysis. Suppose that in another scenario, another control violation instruction 005 is identified, with the person being "dispatcher C03" and having level 2 authority, operating the equipment "220kV-L1-CB1", and the action being "shutdown". Command 001 (closing) and command 005 (opening) will be automatically grouped into the same logical group because they have the same equipment number "220kV-L1-CB1". Within this group, all related command numbers and corresponding personnel identifiers [dispatcher A01, dispatcher C03] are classified and merged. Through this aggregation, the potentially conflicting unauthorized control relationships between "dispatcher A01" and "dispatcher C03" on the equipment "220kV-L1-CB1" are clearly obtained. These commands are grouped by equipment and action type, and the set of commands that clearly reveals the unauthorized control relationship between personnel and equipment is generated into a structured data object, namely the unauthorized control action identifier sequence.

[0074] Please see Figure 4 The steps for obtaining the task set of the state fluctuation device are as follows:

[0075] S301: Call the device number in the over-control action identifier sequence, collect the current voltage, circuit breaker position, remote signaling status and interlocking information of the device, continuously record the device status according to the time sequence, and generate a time-series observation trajectory;

[0076] The system invokes all target device numbers recorded in the over-control action identifier sequence. The target device in this sequence is "220kV-L1-CB1". It then sends a high-priority real-time data acquisition request to the online monitoring unit (such as an RTU or smart terminal) of this device via the power grid automation interface. The request instructs the monitoring unit to collect key operating status parameters for the current and subsequent period. Specific data items to be collected include, but are not limited to, bus three-phase voltage values, circuit breaker main contact positions (open / closed / under maintenance), switch energy storage status remote signaling (energy stored / not stored), SF6 gas pressure remote signaling (normal / alarm / locked), and related electrical and mechanical interlocking circuit status information. The acquisition action is initiated with a single... A fixed high-frequency execution is performed, for example, by collecting all data points every 100 milliseconds, and attaching a high-precision timestamp to each frame of collected data. For instance, at 08:32:00.100, the A-phase voltage is 220.2kV, the circuit breaker position is "independent," the energy storage status is "energy stored," and the gas pressure is "normal." At 08:32:00.200, the A-phase voltage is 223.5kV, and the circuit breaker position is still "independent," and so on. These continuously collected, multi-dimensional state data with precise timestamps are organized into a multi-dimensional time series data matrix according to the chronological order of the time axis, generating a state time series observation trajectory, as shown in Table 2.

[0077] Table 2 Example of State-Time Sequence Observation Trajectory

[0078]

[0079] As shown in Table 2, this table lists a period of continuously collected status data, which clearly shows that the voltage of phase A changed significantly between 08:32:00.100 and 08:32:00.200, providing raw data for subsequent rate calculation.

[0080] S302: Based on the voltage and remote signaling status in the time-series observation trajectory, calculate the rate of change of the status parameters, extract the change values ​​of adjacent time points and divide them by the time interval, determine whether the rate of change is continuously higher than the set threshold, and generate an abnormal rate maintenance interval.

[0081] Based on the voltage values ​​and remote signaling state sequences recorded in the state time-series observation trajectory, the rate of change of various state parameters within a continuous time period is quantitatively calculated. Taking the A-phase voltage value as an example, the voltage values ​​of two adjacent time points are extracted from the data matrix, such as 223.5kV at 08:32:00.200 and 220.2kV at 08:32:00.100. First, the numerical difference between the two is calculated (223.5-220.2=3.3kV). Then, this difference is divided by the time interval between the two acquisition time points (0.200s-0.100s=0.1s), thus obtaining the voltage change rate within this 0.1-second time period as 3.3kV / 0.1s=33kV / s. Next, this calculated change rate is compared with a preset state change rate threshold, which is set based on the historical database of this type of circuit breaker. Statistical analysis was performed on the status data during more than 10,000 hours of stable operation and normal operation. The 3σ principle in statistical process control was applied, that is, the mean rate of change (Mean) plus three times the standard deviation (3σ) was taken as the threshold. According to the normal distribution characteristics, any rate of change exceeding this threshold can be regarded as an event with a probability of less than 0.14%, so that only a very few extremely violent fluctuations will be identified as abnormal. Assuming that after analyzing the historical data of 220kV circuit breaker using this method, its voltage change rate threshold is set to 2.0kV / s. Since the currently calculated change rate of 33kV / s is much greater than the threshold of 2.0kV / s, the time interval starting from 08:32:00.100 is marked as abnormal. If the rate in subsequent consecutive calculation cycles continues to be higher than this threshold, this abnormality mark will be maintained, generating an abnormal rate maintenance interval.

[0082] The rate of change of equipment voltage and remote signaling status is expressed by the following formula:

[0083] ;

[0084] Detailed explanation of the formula and calculation process:

[0085] 1. Parameter Description:

[0086] Voltage change rate, measured in volts per second (V / s), describes the rate at which voltage changes over time and is an important indicator of the system's dynamic response.

[0087] : No. The voltage value at any given time, measured in volts (V), is collected in real time by a voltage sensor in the power dispatching system.

[0088] : No. The voltage value at a given time, in volts (V), and Similarly, the voltage value is collected in real time by a voltage sensor, representing the voltage value at the previous moment;

[0089] : No. The remote signaling status value at any given time is dimensionless (e.g., 1 indicates on, 0 indicates off). The remote signaling signal is transmitted in the power system via digital signals, and its changes reflect the changes in the status of the equipment.

[0090] : No. The remote signaling status value at any given time, in dimensionless units;

[0091] The time interval, measured in seconds (s), is the time difference between two measurement moments and is usually calculated automatically by the system clock or scheduling system.

[0092] : No. The voltage change at time t, expressed in volts (V), represents the change in voltage at time t. The absolute magnitude of the voltage change at any given moment;

[0093] : No. The value of the change in remote signaling status at any time, in dimensionless form (0 or 1). This value indicates whether the remote signaling status has changed. If it has changed, the value is 1; if it has not changed, the value is 0.

[0094] : Sample number, in dimensionless form, represents the number of sampling points used to calculate the rate of change. Typically, the number of samples within a suitable time window is selected in actual monitoring.

[0095] 2. Calculation process:

[0096] Calculation of voltage changes: Obtain continuous voltage data points from the system. and These data are provided by voltage sensors in the power dispatching system, and are obtained by calculating the absolute change value. This allows us to obtain the magnitude of voltage change at each moment. Let's assume at a certain moment... and The voltage values ​​are 240V and 245V respectively, and the voltage changes are as follows:

[0097] ;

[0098] Calculation of changes in remote signaling status: Similarly, obtain signal values ​​from the remote signaling equipment. and Changes in remote signaling signals (such as the on or off status of equipment) can be calculated by comparing the status values ​​at adjacent times. For example, if at a certain time... and The remote signaling states are 1 and 0 respectively, and the state changes are as follows:

[0099] ;

[0100] Obtaining the time interval: Time interval It is the time difference between two measurement moments, usually calculated automatically by a scheduling system or sensor clock. In one example, assume the time interval between the two data points is 10 seconds;

[0101] ;

[0102] Calculation of the rate of change: Substituting the voltage and remote signaling changes and the time interval into the formula, the sum of the voltage change and the remote signaling change is:

[0103] ;

[0104] The rate of change is:

[0105] ;

[0106] The sum of squares of the changing parameters is calculated by summing the squares of the changes in voltage and remote signaling status, assuming the changes over the next 5 sampling points are:

[0107] ;

[0108] ;

[0109] The sum of squares at each sampling point is:

[0110] ;

[0111] Divide this value by the number of samples :

[0112] ;

[0113] Take the square root of the result:

[0114] ;

[0115] Final rate of change calculation: Substitute the above calculation results into the formula to obtain the final rate of change:

[0116] ;

[0117] 3. Results Explanation:

[0118] Voltage change rate The value is 1.914V / s, which means that the rate of change of voltage and remote signaling status reached this value during the monitoring period. This rate of change reflects the response rate of the equipment and indicates the rate of fluctuation of voltage and remote signaling status within a given time. Based on this rate, it is possible to analyze whether there are abnormal fluctuations or potential equipment failures and take appropriate control measures.

[0119] S303: Call the device number in the abnormal rate maintenance interval, match it with the instruction number in the over-control action identifier sequence, extract the corresponding instruction number, device number and action type, group them by number to form a list of corresponding instructions and devices, and generate a state fluctuation device task set;

[0120] The system retrieves the device ID information explicitly marked within the abnormal rate maintenance interval, specifically device "220kV-L1-CB1". Using this device ID as the query key, it performs a precise match against records in the over-control action identifier sequence. A record containing device ID "220kV-L1-CB1" is successfully found in the over-control action identifier sequence, and the corresponding instruction ID is confirmed to be 001. Through this association operation, a direct and traceable causal link is established between the real-time status anomaly at the device level and the previously identified unauthorized human operation instructions at the management level. Extraction data is then performed from these two data sources. This involves matching the instruction number "001", the device number "220kV-L1-CB1", and the action type "closing" of the instruction with a strong correspondence. This information is then combined into a new, more informative task entry. This entry clearly indicates a specific operational task that poses both a risk of exceeding operational authority and causes severe abnormal fluctuations in the device's status at the physical level. If multiple devices or instructions simultaneously meet this condition, they are paired and extracted one by one, and then categorized and combined according to the instruction number or device number to form a list, generating a set of tasks for devices with fluctuating status.

[0121] Please see Figure 5 Please see Figure 5 The steps to obtain the conflict control action list are as follows:

[0122] S401: Based on the device number in the status fluctuation device task set, extract the incomplete and recently completed task records from the scheduling task list, associate the operation start and end times of the tasks, and generate an operation time task control group according to the device number.

[0123] Based on the device number "220kV-L1-CB1" contained in the status fluctuation device task set, immediately access the current global scheduling task list database and perform a filtering query. The filtering criteria are that the target device field of the task exactly matches "220kV-L1-CB1", and the current status field of the task is "incomplete" or "just completed". Assume the query returns two relevant task records: Task A (generated by instruction 001): "Execute 220kV-L1-CB1 circuit breaker closing operation", status is "incomplete", and the planned operation time window is from 08:30 to 08: 40. Task B: "Process work permits and confirm that the 220kV-L1-CB1 circuit breaker is in the open and locked state to cooperate with on-site maintenance," the status is also "incomplete," and the planned operation time window is 08:35 to 09:00. Extract the start time and end time fields of the operation from these two task records to form two tuples containing task identifiers and time intervals: [Task A, 08:30, 08:40] and [Task B, 08:35, 09:00]. Closely associate these extracted time information with the detailed attributes of the task itself to generate an operation time task control group.

[0124] S402: Based on the start and end times of the tasks in the operation time task control group, compare whether there is a time overlap between the tasks, extract the operation direction field, mark the tasks with overlap and opposite operation directions as logically opposed task items, and generate a time period opposed task combination set.

[0125] Based on the start and end times of each pair of tasks in the operation time task control group, a time interval cross-comparison algorithm is initiated. Taking the time intervals of task A [08:30, 08:40] and task B [08:35, 09:00] as an example, by comparing the endpoints of the two intervals, it is determined that the start time of task B, 08:35, falls within the time interval of task A. Therefore, it is confirmed that the operation times of these two tasks overlap, and the specific intersection period is calculated to be [08:35, 08:40]. After confirming the time overlap, the operation direction field content of these two tasks is extracted and analyzed. For this purpose, a set of operation direction quantification standards is built-in, which defines "closing" or "power off" as the circuit's... The operation of turning on is quantified as the value "+1", and the operation of "opening", "disconnecting", or "keeping the circuit open" is quantified as the value "-1". The operation of "closing" in task A is quantified as +1, and the operation of "keeping the circuit open" in task B is quantified as -1. Comparing the values ​​of these two operation directions, we find that their sum is zero (+1+(-1)=0). Therefore, we determine that these two tasks are completely opposed in terms of operation logic. Since task A and task B satisfy the two judgment conditions of "intersection of operation time" and "opposition of operation direction logic", the task pair [task A, task B] formed by these two tasks is marked as a logically opposed task item, and a time period opposed task combination set is generated.

[0126] S403: Call the device number and task number in the time period conflict task combination set, group and merge tasks with time intersection by device number, extract the task number and operation direction information of each group, record the conflict combination, and generate a conflict control action list.

[0127] The system retrieves the device and task numbers recorded in the time-segment conflict task combination set, specifically the unique identifiers of device "220kV-L1-CB1" and tasks A and B. It then groups and aggregates all logically conflicting task items according to their device numbers, grouping all conflicting task items involving "220kV-L1-CB1" (in this example, there is only one combination) into one group. Next, within this device group, the task combinations are merged based on the calculated overlapping time interval [08:35, 08:40]. All task numbers are extracted from these combinations, i.e., [Task A, Task B], along with their respective operation direction classification information, i.e., [Closing (+1), Opening (-1)]. A unique internal index number is assigned to this combination representing a specific, confirmed conflicting operation, such as "Conflict Group 01." The system also records the detailed attributes of all conflicting tasks contained within this group in a structured format, such as:

[0128] [Conflict Group 01: Equipment-220kV-L1-CB1, Conflict Task-{Task A, Task B}, Operation Direction-{+1,-1}, Conflict Time Period-{08:35,08:45}];

[0129] Summarize all records of such conflict combinations to generate a conflict control action list, as shown in Table 3:

[0130] Table 3 List of Conflict Control Actions

[0131]

[0132] Referring to Table 3, which presents the test results of the embodiments, the identified conflicting actions are summarized, and the equipment where the conflict occurred, the tasks involved, the opposing operation directions, and the time intersection are clarified, providing a decision-making basis for the final anti-misoperation control execution.

[0133] Please see Figure 6 The steps for obtaining the execution result of the error prevention control are as follows:

[0134] S501: Call the task number and control target number in the conflict control action list, extract the matching over-control action identifier and status fluctuation device task data, filter the tasks that have both over-control identifier and status fluctuation status as blocking items, and generate a conflict blocking task set.

[0135] The system invokes all task numbers and control target numbers contained in the conflict control action list (in this example, task A and task B, and their common control target device "220kV-L1-CB1"). A linked verification procedure is then initiated to perform multi-source data cross-validation on task A. The source command number 001 of task A is searched in the over-control action identifier sequence; a match is found, confirming the existence of the over-control identifier. The device "220kV-L1-CB1" related to task A is searched in the state fluctuation device task set; a match is also found, confirming the existence of state fluctuation. Finally, the conflict control action list is confirmed to contain all task numbers and control target numbers. Task A itself is part of the conflict. According to the built-in risk escalation rules, if a task simultaneously possesses the three high-risk attributes of "unauthorized operation," "state fluctuation," and "operational conflict," its risk level is assessed as the highest and it must be screened as a blocking item. Task A fully meets this condition and is therefore screened out. Subsequently, in the task database of the scheduling system, the record status field of Task A is updated and a "blocked" tag is written. At the same time, the remarks field indicates that the blocking reason is "unauthorized operation, equipment state fluctuation, and logical conflict." All tasks marked in this way are summarized to generate a conflict blocking task set.

[0136] S502: Based on the task control target number in the conflict blocking task set, extract the subsequent task number and operation time tag in the task plan, identify the task set associated with the blocking task, set it to a delayed state, and generate a list of delayed pending control tasks.

[0137] Based on the task records in the conflict blocking task set, specifically task A marked as "blocking" and its control target "220kV-L1-CB1", the task dependency analysis program is automatically triggered. This program scans all tasks in the entire scheduling task plan database that are in the "pending execution" or "planned" state and analyzes their pre-dependent conditions. Assuming there is a task C in the task plan, described as: "Initiating the synchronization closing procedure of the substation opposite to 220kV line L1", with a planned operation time of 08:45, by analyzing the execution logic of task C, a key pre-dependent condition is found to be "Confirming 220kV- "L1-CB1 has been successfully closed and the line is energized." Since Task A, "Closing 220kV-L1-CB1," has been set to the blocking state and cannot be executed as planned, this core prerequisite for Task C cannot be met in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Task C is identified as a subsequent task that has a direct control target associated with the blocked Task A. Subsequently, a "delayed" status mark is set on the record of Task C, and the following description is automatically added: "Due to the blocking of the preceding task (Task A), this task has been automatically delayed and awaits manual intervention." All subsequent tasks marked in this way are collected to generate a list of delayed pending control tasks.

[0138] S503: Call the task number, control target number and delay status in the conflict blocking task set and the delayed control task list, write the operation status into the locking interval of the scheduling control interface according to the task number, identify the restriction conditions of the task operation, and generate the anti-misoperation control execution result.

[0139] The system retrieves all task information from the conflict blocking task set and the delayed pending control task list, specifically including the task A number, the control target "220kV-L1-CB1" and its "blocking" status, and the task C number, control target and its "delay" status. This information is formatted according to a predefined interface protocol and written line by line into a dedicated functional module of the power dispatching and command digital interactive interface, namely the "Locking and Alarm Section" module. On the user interface of this module, the visual status of the operation controls associated with task A (such as the "Execute Closing" button) is forcibly changed to gray and unavailable, with a red locking padlock icon superimposed next to it. When the dispatcher... When the mouse hovers over the icon, a tooltip pops up, displaying detailed restrictions: "The operation has been automatically blocked due to unauthorized access, status fluctuations, and operational conflicts." For task C, its status in the task list will be displayed as a yellow "delayed" state, and its restriction will also be indicated as "The preceding task 'closing 220kV-L1-CB1' has been blocked, awaiting manual intervention." In this way, the anti-misoperation control decisions derived from the backend analysis are solidified in real time and forcibly onto the front-end operation interface, directly limiting the dispatcher's risky operations at the physical level, and providing clear and explicit risk warnings and handling guidelines, generating the final anti-misoperation control execution result.

[0140] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An intelligent anti-misoperation control method for a digital interactive system for power dispatching and command, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1: Extract the personnel permission level, equipment control level, control duration and sequence number of each instruction, establish the relationship between personnel permission level and time sequence number, sort and match the equipment control level, determine the hierarchy of duration and level distribution, and generate an operation level control comparison table. The steps for obtaining the operation level control lookup table are as follows: S101: Obtain the personnel control permission level, equipment control level, control duration and sorting number of each instruction in the power dispatching and command digital interactive interface; extract the timestamp information and match the sorting number with the personnel permission level; arrange the target equipment control level according to the sorting number; and generate a list of permission number associations. S102: Call the sorting number in the permission number association list and the mapping result of the device control level, extract the control duration of each instruction, determine the difference based on the relationship between the duration and the device control level, map the duration to the device control level range, and generate a continuous control level landing point group. S103: Arrange the corresponding sequence according to the order of the permission number association list and the continuous control level landing point group, establish a corresponding list of personnel control permission level and equipment control level, extract the personnel permission level and equipment control level comparison information, merge the level landing points of control duration, and generate an operation level control comparison table. S2: Based on the relationship between personnel permission level and equipment control level in the operation level control comparison table, filter instruction combinations with permissions lower than equipment level, extract personnel identifier, equipment number and action type, construct instruction sequence and action mapping, determine the difference between permission and equipment level, and generate over-control action identifier sequence; S3: Call the target device in the over-control action identifier sequence, collect the device voltage, circuit breaker, remote signaling, and interlocking, record the device state change rate, determine whether it exceeds the set threshold, bind the relationship between the device and the control command, and generate a state fluctuation device task set; S4: Based on the device number in the state fluctuation device task set, extract the incomplete and recently completed scheduling tasks, compare the task operation time, mark task pairs that have intersection and opposite directions, merge the tasks by device number and time period to form a conflict control action list.

2. The intelligent anti-misoperation control method for the power dispatching and command digital interactive system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The operation level control lookup table includes the permission level sequence number, equipment level sorting structure, duration level mapping, control level landing point classification, and level correspondence set. The over-control action identification sequence includes the over-control personnel identifier, target equipment number, action type information, permission level difference value, and instruction sequence number. The status fluctuation equipment task set includes voltage change data, circuit breaker position record, remote signaling status change information, interlocking status index, and status change rate evaluation value. The conflict control action list includes equipment conflict number group, task time intersection interval, operation direction opposition mark, task conflict pair number, and task merging segment.

3. The intelligent anti-misoperation control method for the power dispatching and command digital interactive system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The steps for obtaining the over-control action identifier sequence are as follows: S201: Based on the correspondence between personnel control permissions and equipment control levels in the operation level control lookup table, filter instructions with permissions lower than the target equipment control level, extract the corresponding personnel identifier, equipment number and action type, summarize and sort the numbers, and generate a permission over-limit screening list; S202: Call the sorting number and device number in the permission over-limit screening list, extract the action type and personnel permission level of the instruction, calculate the level difference and determine whether it is greater than zero, mark the instruction with a value greater than zero as an over-limit item, and generate a level boundary offset record set; S203: Sort the control-over items by number according to the control-over item number in the control-over offset record set, reorder the instructions by number, establish groups by equipment number and action type, classify and merge the control-over relationship information of personnel and equipment, and generate control-over action identifier sequence.

4. The intelligent anti-misoperation control method for the power dispatching and command digital interactive system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The steps for obtaining the state fluctuation device task set are as follows: S301: Call the device number in the over-control action identifier sequence, collect the current voltage, circuit breaker position, remote signaling status and interlocking information of the device, continuously record the device status according to the time sequence, and generate a time-series observation trajectory; S302: Based on the voltage and remote signaling status in the time-series observation trajectory, calculate the rate of change of the status parameters, extract the change values ​​of adjacent time points and divide them by the time interval, determine whether the rate of change is continuously higher than the set threshold, and generate an abnormal rate maintenance interval. S303: Call the device number in the abnormal rate maintenance interval, match it with the instruction number in the over-control action identifier sequence, extract the corresponding instruction number, device number and action type, group them according to the number to form a list of corresponding instructions and devices, and generate a state fluctuation device task set.

5. The intelligent anti-misoperation control method for the power dispatching and command digital interactive system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The steps for obtaining the conflict control action list are as follows: S401: Based on the device number in the state fluctuation device task set, extract the unfinished and just completed task records in the scheduling task list, associate the operation start and end times of the tasks, and generate an operation time task control group according to the device number. S402: Based on the start and end times of the tasks in the operation time task control group, compare whether there is a time intersection between the tasks, extract the operation direction field, mark the tasks with intersection and opposite operation directions as logically opposed task items, and generate a time period opposed task combination set. S403: Call the device number and task number in the set of opposing task combinations for the time period, group and merge tasks with time overlap by device number, extract the task number and operation direction information of each group, record the conflict combination, and generate a list of conflict control actions.

6. The intelligent anti-misoperation control method for the power dispatching and command digital interactive system according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further includes: S5: Call all task numbers and control targets in the conflict control action list, set over-control and fluctuation tasks as blocking tags, extract subsequent task time tags and target numbers, set delayed task operation status, write the control interface lock range and mark task operation restrictions, and generate anti-misoperation control execution results; The results of the anti-misoperation control execution include the blocking task label, delayed execution status, locked time interval, control target restriction number, and task restriction condition classification identifier.

7. The intelligent anti-misoperation control method for the power dispatching and command digital interactive system according to claim 6, characterized in that: The steps for obtaining the execution result of the error prevention control are as follows: S501: Call the task number and control target number in the conflict control action list, extract the matching over-control action identifier and status fluctuation device task data, filter the tasks that have both over-control identifier and status fluctuation status as blocking items, and generate a conflict blocking task set. S502: Based on the task control target number in the conflict blocking task set, extract the subsequent task number and operation time tag in the task plan, identify the task set associated with the blocking task, set it to a delayed state, and generate a delayed pending control task list. S503: Call the task number, control target number and delay status in the conflict blocking task set and the delayed control task list, write the operation status into the locking interval of the scheduling control interface according to the task number, identify the restriction conditions of the task operation, and generate the anti-misoperation control execution result.

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