Data security protection method, device and system based on anti-quantum cryptography algorithm

Abstract

This application provides a data security protection method, device, and system based on quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. By setting up secure storage proxy nodes, the secure storage proxy nodes divide the original data into hot data or cold data according to the security level of the original data and the access data, and encrypt the hot data and cold data respectively using different encryption methods, thereby optimizing data processing performance while ensuring data security. In addition, by encrypting the data encryption key in fragments and adopting a separate secure storage method, the single point of failure risk of traditional "key escrow" is overcome, further improving data security. By using post-quantum encryption algorithms to encrypt the data encryption key in fragments, effective resistance to quantum attacks can be achieved, ensuring long-term data security.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of data security, and in particular to a data security protection method, device and system based on quantum cryptographic algorithms. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of datafication, the demand for data-related applications such as data circulation, data trading, and artificial intelligence (AI) model training has shown explosive growth.

[0003] For highly sensitive data in fields such as finance or healthcare, the security and confidentiality of the data are directly related to personal privacy and corporate interests during circulation, trading, and use in AI model training. Therefore, the reliance on data encryption technology is becoming increasingly strong.

[0004] Traditional encryption technology, as a core means of ensuring data security, has been widely used in data encryption protection in key areas such as finance and healthcare over the past few decades, providing important support for the stable operation of data-related applications.

[0005] However, with the rapid evolution of quantum computing technology, this traditional security paradigm is facing serious challenges. New encryption technologies capable of resisting quantum computing attacks have become a hot research topic. Summary of the Invention

[0006] In view of this, this application provides a data security protection method, device and system based on quantum cryptography-resistant algorithms.

[0007] Specifically, this application is implemented through the following technical solution:

[0008] According to a first aspect of the embodiments of this application, a data security protection method based on a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm is provided. The data security protection system based on the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm includes a secure storage proxy node, and the method includes:

[0009] The secure storage agent node determines the security level of the original data and classifies the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data.

[0010] The secure storage proxy node encrypts hot data using a first encryption algorithm based on a first data encryption key, fragments the first data encryption key, encrypts the fragments using a first post-quantum encryption algorithm, and performs separate secure storage of the ciphertext fragments of the first data encryption key; and,

[0011] The secure storage proxy node encrypts cold data using a second encryption algorithm based on a second data encryption key, fragments the second encryption key, encrypts the fragments using a second post-quantum encryption algorithm, and stores the ciphertext of the second data encryption key fragments separately in a secure manner. The encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one ciphertext of the second data encryption key fragment is higher than that of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext. The ciphertext data and the ciphertext key fragment ciphertext are stored separately in a secure manner.

[0012] Upon receiving a data access request, the secure storage proxy node obtains the encrypted data of the data to be accessed, as well as the encrypted fragments of the data encryption key. It then decrypts the obtained encrypted fragments of the data encryption key and reassembles the decrypted fragments to obtain the data encryption key. Finally, it uses the data encryption key to decrypt the encrypted data of the data to be accessed.

[0013] According to a second aspect of the embodiments of this application, a data security protection system based on a quantum cryptography-resistant algorithm is provided, comprising: a secure storage proxy node; wherein:

[0014] A secure storage agent node is used to determine the security level of the original data and, based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, classify the original data into hot data or cold data.

[0015] The secure storage proxy node is also used to encrypt hot data using a first encryption algorithm based on a first data encryption key, and to fragment the first data encryption key, and to encrypt the fragments of the first data encryption key using a first post-quantum encryption algorithm, and to perform separate secure storage of the ciphertext of the fragments of the first data encryption key.

[0016] The secure storage proxy node is further configured to encrypt cold data using a second encryption algorithm based on a second data encryption key, and to fragment the second encryption key. It then uses a second post-quantum encryption algorithm to encrypt the fragments of the second data encryption key, and performs separate secure storage of the ciphertext fragments of the second data encryption key. The encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one ciphertext fragment of the second data encryption key is higher than that of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext. The ciphertext data and the ciphertext key fragment ciphertext are stored separately securely.

[0017] The secure storage proxy node is also used to, upon receiving a data access request, obtain the encrypted data of the data to be accessed and the encrypted data encryption key fragment, decrypt the obtained encrypted data encryption key fragment, and reassemble the decrypted encrypted data encryption key fragment to obtain a data encryption key, and use the data encryption key to decrypt the obtained encrypted data of the data to be accessed.

[0018] According to a third aspect of the embodiments of this application, an electronic device is provided, including a processor and a memory, wherein:

[0019] Memory, used to store computer programs;

[0020] The processor, when executing a program stored in memory, implements the method provided in the first aspect above.

[0021] The data security protection method based on quantum-resistant cryptography in this application embodiment sets up a secure storage proxy node. This proxy node divides the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level of the original data and the access data, and encrypts the hot and cold data using different encryption methods respectively. This optimizes data processing performance while ensuring data security. Furthermore, by encrypting the data encryption key in fragments and using a separate secure storage method, the single-point risk of traditional "key escrow" is overcome, further improving data security. By using a post-quantum encryption algorithm to encrypt the data encryption key in fragments, effective resistance to quantum attacks can be achieved, ensuring long-term data security. Attached Figure Description

[0022] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary embodiment of a data security protection method based on a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm.

[0023] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating a key cyclic update mechanism as an exemplary embodiment of this application;

[0024] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an exemplary embodiment of the present application of a layered encryption of hot and cold data, as well as data access and key reassembly.

[0025] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a data security protection device based on a quantum cryptographic algorithm is shown as an exemplary embodiment of this application;

[0026] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device as illustrated in an exemplary embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0027] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application, and to make the above-mentioned objectives, features and advantages of the embodiments of this application more apparent and understandable, the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0028] Please see Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a data security protection method based on a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, provided in an embodiment of this application. The data security protection system based on the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm includes a secure storage proxy node, such as... Figure 1 As shown, this data security protection method based on quantum-resistant cryptography may include the following steps:

[0029] It should be noted that the secure storage agent node can be integrated into the data storage device or deployed independently.

[0030] Step S100: The secure storage agent node determines the security level of the original data and classifies the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data.

[0031] In this embodiment of the application, in order to improve the security of data storage, the secure storage agent node can encrypt the data in the data storage device.

[0032] For example, to improve the flexibility of data encryption, a secure storage agent node can divide data into cold data and hot data, and use different data encryption methods for cold data and hot data respectively.

[0033] For example, a secure storage agent node can classify raw data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the raw data.

[0034] For example, the security level of data can be determined based on the data type.

[0035] For example, the security levels of different types of data can be shown in Table 1 below:

[0036] Table 1

[0037]

[0038] Among them, the safety levels increase sequentially from L1 to L5.

[0039] For example, access data for raw data can be determined based on access information of raw data in other circulation stages (such as the data sharing stage), or historical access information of similar raw data.

[0040] In one example, the secure storage agent node classifies the original data into hot or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, which may include:

[0041] If the security level of the original data is higher than or equal to the preset first security level threshold, the security storage agent node determines that the original data is cold data.

[0042] If the security level of the original data is lower than the preset security level threshold, the security storage agent node determines whether the original data is hot data or cold data based on the access attributes of the original data.

[0043] For example, access attributes may include access frequency (such as the number of accesses within a preset statistical period) and / or access time period.

[0044] For example, taking a security level of 1 to 5 (e.g., corresponding to the above levels L1 to L5 respectively), if the security level of the original data is higher than or equal to level 4 (taking the preset first security level threshold as level 4 as an example), the original data can be identified as cold data.

[0045] If the security level of the original data is lower than level 4, the access frequency of the original data can be compared with the preset access frequency threshold, and it can be determined whether the access time period belongs to the system's busy business period. If the access frequency of the original data exceeds the preset access frequency threshold, or if the access time period belongs to the system's busy business period, the original data can be determined to be hot data; otherwise, the original data can be determined to be cold data.

[0046] Step S110: The secure storage agent node encrypts the hot data using the first encryption algorithm based on the first data encryption key, and segments the first data encryption key. It then uses the first post-quantum encryption algorithm to encrypt the segments of the first data encryption key, and performs separate secure storage of the ciphertext of the segments of the first data encryption key.

[0047] Step S120: The secure storage agent node encrypts the cold data using the second encryption algorithm based on the second data encryption key, and segments the second encryption key. It then uses the second post-quantum encryption algorithm to encrypt the segments of the second data encryption key, and stores the ciphertext of the second data encryption key segments separately in a secure manner. The encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one ciphertext of the second data encryption key segment is higher than that of the first data encryption key segment ciphertext. The ciphertext data and the ciphertext key segment ciphertext are stored separately in a secure manner.

[0048] In this embodiment, the secure storage agent node can use different encryption methods to encrypt cold data and hot data.

[0049] For example, the encryption security of cold data is higher than that of hot data.

[0050] In this embodiment of the application, in order to further improve data security, the secure storage agent node can use a multi-level key management architecture and key fragmentation storage method to protect key materials.

[0051] For example, a secure storage agent node can use a first data encryption key to encrypt hot data using a first encryption algorithm.

[0052] For a key fragment of the first data encryption key (which can be called the first data encryption key fragment), it can be encrypted using a post-quantum encryption algorithm (which can be called the first post-quantum encryption algorithm).

[0053] For example, a secure storage agent node can use a second data encryption key and a second encryption algorithm to encrypt hot data.

[0054] The key fragments of the second data encryption key (which can be called second data encryption key fragments) can be encrypted using a post-quantum encryption algorithm (which can be called second post-quantum encryption algorithm).

[0055] In one example, the first encryption algorithm can be a traditional encryption algorithm, such as the SM4-CTR algorithm (a block cipher algorithm), and the second encryption algorithm can be a post-quantum encryption algorithm, such as a high-strength ML_KEM (Machine Learning Key Encapsulation Mechanism) algorithm, like the Kyber-1024 algorithm.

[0056] For example, since hot data is usually accessed frequently and requires a fast response, using a lightweight encryption algorithm with lower security can ensure security while avoiding the high computational overhead of high-security algorithms, thus ensuring the smoothness of high-frequency access.

[0057] Since cold data is typically accessed less frequently or has a higher security level, high-security encryption algorithms are used to ensure long-term security. Furthermore, because cold data is usually accessed less often, the performance impact of high-security algorithms is minimal.

[0058] For example, the first post-quantum cryptography algorithm can be the Kyber-768 algorithm, and the second post-quantum cryptography algorithm can be the Kyber-1024 algorithm.

[0059] For example, to further improve the security of the data encryption key, a high-security hardware cryptographic module can be used to encrypt the data encryption key fragments during the encryption process.

[0060] For example, different storage methods can be used to store ciphertext fragments with different keys.

[0061] It should be noted that the secure storage agent node can also store the encrypted original data (ciphertext data).

[0062] For example, to improve data security, the encrypted original data can be stored separately from the data encryption key (such as the data encryption key fragmented ciphertext mentioned above) and associated with it using a secure index.

[0063] It should be noted that, in the embodiments of this application, the hot data attributes or cold data attributes of the data may also change in the actual scenario. When the data is converted from hot data (or cold data) to cold data (or hot data), the stored data can be decrypted and re-encrypted and stored according to the encryption method of cold data (or hot data). The specific implementation is not described here.

[0064] Step S130: Upon receiving a data access request, the secure storage agent node obtains the encrypted data of the data to be accessed, as well as the encrypted fragment of the data encryption key. It decrypts the obtained encrypted fragment of the data encryption key and reassembles the decrypted encrypted fragment of the data encryption key to obtain the data encryption key. The encrypted data encryption key is then used to decrypt the obtained encrypted data of the data to be accessed.

[0065] In this embodiment of the application, when a secure storage proxy node receives a data access request, it can obtain the encrypted data of the data to be accessed, as well as the corresponding data encryption key.

[0066] For example, for any data to be accessed, multiple data encryption key fragments of ciphertext can be obtained from separate secure storage, the obtained data encryption key fragments of ciphertext can be decrypted, and the decrypted data encryption key fragments can be reassembled to obtain the data encryption key.

[0067] For example, when the data to be accessed is hot data, the secure storage agent node can obtain the ciphertext of each first data encryption key fragment of the split secure storage, and reassemble the decrypted first data encryption key fragments to obtain the first data encryption key.

[0068] For example, when the data to be accessed is cold data, the secure storage agent node can obtain the ciphertext of each second data encryption key fragment of the split secure storage, and reassemble the decrypted second data encryption key fragments to obtain the second data encryption key.

[0069] For example, a secure storage agent node can use a data encryption key to decrypt the encrypted data of the data to be accessed, obtain the decrypted data to be accessed, and return it to the access requester.

[0070] It can be seen that, in Figure 1 In the illustrated method, a secure storage proxy node is set up. Based on the security level of the original data and the access data, the secure storage proxy node divides the original data into hot data or cold data, and encrypts the hot data and cold data using different encryption methods respectively. This optimizes data processing performance while ensuring data security. In addition, by encrypting the data encryption key in fragments and using a separate secure storage method, the single point of failure risk of traditional "key custody" is overcome, further improving data security. By using a post-quantum encryption algorithm to encrypt the data encryption key in fragments, effective resistance to quantum attacks can be achieved, ensuring long-term data security.

[0071] In some embodiments, the secure storage agent node performs separate secure storage of the fragmented ciphertext of the first data encryption key, which may include:

[0072] A portion of the first data encryption key fragments are uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the first data encryption key fragments are stored in an online storage medium.

[0073] The secure storage agent node performs separate secure storage of the fragmented ciphertext of the second data encryption key, which may include:

[0074] A portion of the second data encryption key fragments are uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the second data encryption key fragments are stored in an offline vault.

[0075] The secure storage agent node obtains the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption key, decrypts the obtained ciphertext fragments, and reassembles the decrypted ciphertext fragments. This process may include:

[0076] When the data to be accessed is cold data, the secure storage agent node obtains a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed from the blockchain, and another portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext from the offline vault. The second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is then decrypted and the key is reassembled in a secure and trusted environment. The decryption of the other portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed is performed only after it has been confirmed to have passed manual review.

[0077] For example, to improve data storage security, the data encryption key can be fragmented for encryption, and different key fragments of the same data encryption key can be stored separately for secure storage.

[0078] For example, for the first data encryption key (the data encryption key for hot data), a portion of the key fragment ciphertext (which can be called the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext) can be uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext can be stored in an online storage medium, such as a data disk in this server or a network storage matrix belonging to the same cluster.

[0079] For the second data encryption key (the data encryption key for hot data), a portion of the key fragmented ciphertext (which can become the second data encryption key fragmented ciphertext) can be uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the second data encryption key fragmented ciphertext can be stored in an offline vault, such as a secure storage medium in a high-security area, to better ensure the security of cold data.

[0080] For example, the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext stored in an offline vault requires both manual and automatic approval during use.

[0081] For example, when a secure storage agent node receives a data access request and determines that the data to be accessed is cold data, it can, on the one hand, obtain a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed from the blockchain, and on the other hand, obtain another portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext from an offline vault, and then decrypt the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext and reassemble the key in a secure and trusted environment.

[0082] For example, the decryption of another portion of the data to be accessed, the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext, needs to be performed only after it has been determined to have passed human review.

[0083] For example, to retrieve the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext from an offline vault, an application needs to be submitted for approval by relevant personnel. If the approval is granted, the offline storage medium carrying the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is retrieved from the vault and taken to the key reassembly center, where key reassembly is completed in a secure and trusted environment.

[0084] In one example, the data security protection scheme based on quantum-resistant cryptography provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0085] The secure storage agent node uses a quantum signature chain to periodically audit the encrypted key fragments of the data stored in the blockchain;

[0086] Among them, the secure storage proxy node appends a quantum signature based on the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain, provided that the latest quantum signature audit has been passed.

[0087] Among them, quantum signatures can be obtained by signing based on the latest quantum signatures and audit information. The initial value of the quantum signature is generated by quantum signing a preset value, and the audit information is generated based on the user identifier, data hash and system timestamp.

[0088] For example, in order to further improve the security of the encrypted key fragments of data stored in the blockchain (including the first or second encrypted key fragments mentioned above), the secure storage agent node uses a quantum signature chain to periodically audit the encrypted key fragments of data stored in the blockchain.

[0089] For example, a secure storage agent node can build a traceable audit quantum signature chain, adding a quantum signature with each audit, forming a tree structure.

[0090] For example, an audited quantum signature chain can be generated as follows:

[0091]

[0092] Among them, Chain n For the nth chain node, Chain uses the SPHINCS+ signature algorithm. n-1 For the (n-1)th chain node, Audit n For audit information, "||" represents a join operation.

[0093] For example, the initial value of a quantum signature is generated by quantum signing a preset value.

[0094] For example, if Chain1 is generated using the formula above, Chain0 can be a preset value.

[0095] The audit information is generated based on user identifiers, data hashes, and system timestamps.

[0096] For example, Audit n It can be User_ID||Data_Hash||Timestamp; where User_ID is the user identifier, Data_Hash is the hash of incremental audit data (audit data added during this audit process), and Timestamp is the current system timestamp.

[0097] For example, a secure storage agent node can use a quantum-resistant zk-SNARKs (zero-knowledge concise non-interactive knowledge proof) protocol (such as the Ligero protocol) to store data encryption key fragments of ciphertext in the blockchain and periodically (such as weekly or monthly) use lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs to verify the integrity of the ciphertext.

[0098] For example, the audit formula can be as follows:

[0099]

[0100] Here, π represents the proof in zero-knowledge proof scenarios. It is a proof value generated after the zero-knowledge proof protocol is run, used to prove to the verifier that a statement is true, without revealing any other information besides the truth of the statement itself.

[0101] “ "Zero-knowledge concise non-interactive knowledge argumentation allows the prover to demonstrate to the verifier that a statement is true without revealing any additional information beyond that the statement being true."

[0102] “ "The ciphertext (such as key fragment ciphertext) is obtained by encrypting the original data (i.e., data, such as data encryption key fragment) using the public key (PK).

[0103] An HSM (Hardware Security Module) is a hardware device used to securely store keys and perform encryption operations.

[0104] It should be noted that during the auditing of the key fragmented encrypted text stored on the blockchain, if abnormal behavior (such as a brute-force attack attempt by Gekki) is detected, the decryption key can be erased, the sandbox instance (i.e., the data encrypted with the original key) can be destroyed, and a circuit breaker evidence package can be generated and uploaded to the regulatory chain.

[0105] In some embodiments, a data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms also includes a secure shared proxy node.

[0106] The data security protection scheme based on quantum cryptography algorithms provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0107] When a secure sharing proxy node receives a data sharing request, it sends the encrypted data to be shared to the requesting party. The encrypted data is generated by using a lattice-based attribute-based encryption method based on the access policy of the data to be shared. The access policy of the data to be shared is a logical combination of static attributes and dynamic risk values. The data to be shared includes data obtained by the business platform from the data storage device through the secure storage proxy node. If the static attributes of the requesting party match the static attributes in the access policy of the data to be shared, and the current dynamic risk value of the requesting party meets the dynamic risk value requirements of the access policy of the data to be shared, the permission verification is successful; otherwise, the permission verification fails.

[0108] For example, to improve data security during the data sharing process, a secure sharing agent node can also be deployed in the system.

[0109] For example, to ensure the security of data sharing, a two-factor ABE (Attribute-Based Encryption) access control method can be used to verify the security of data sharing. By combining traditional static access control policies with real-time, dynamic security risk assessments, more refined and intelligent authorization decisions can be made.

[0110] For example, a two-factor approach may include a static factor and a dynamic factor, where the static factor is used to define the basic rules for access and the dynamic factor introduces real-time trust assessment.

[0111] In the two-factor ABE access control method, the access requester is deemed to have passed the permission verification only if both the static attributes and dynamic risk assessment results of the access requester meet the requirements.

[0112] For example, static factors can be used to build basic strategies based on attributes such as the security attributes of the data holder role, the security attributes of the data requester role, the data's geographical location and its flow location in the business system, and the security level in the quantum security label.

[0113] The security attributes of a role may include, but are not limited to, identity, group, role, permission, security and integrity level.

[0114] For example, dynamic factors can be determined in the following ways:

[0115] Risk_Score=α•Quantum_Threat +β•(100% - Device_Integrity)

[0116] Where: Risk_Score is the risk score.

[0117] Quantum_Threat represents the risk level of a quantum attack, for example, 0-10 (the higher the level, the greater the risk).

[0118] Device_Integrity is the endpoint security proof score, for example, 0-100% (the higher the score, the higher the security).

[0119] α and β are weighting coefficients, for example, α=0.6, β=0.4.

[0120] For example, the final access control policy is a logical fusion of static attributes and dynamic risk values.

[0121] For example, data holders can construct access control policies based on business needs and security requirements. These access control policies can be a logical fusion of static attributes and dynamic risk values.

[0122] For example, when a secure sharing agent node receives a data sharing request, it sends the encrypted data to be shared to the requesting party.

[0123] For example, the encrypted data to be shared can be generated by encrypting the data according to the access policy of the data to be shared using a lattice-based attribute base.

[0124] For example, data holders can perform lattice-based attribute-based encryption on data to be shared in the following ways:

[0125] Ciphertext=Enc PQ-ABE (Policy∧(Data Risk_Score≥80%)

[0126] Ciphertext is the encrypted data to be shared, and Enc PQ-ABE ( ) represents the post-quantum attribute-based encryption algorithm, policy represents the static attribute policy, Data Risk_Score represents the dynamic risk policy (the access condition attribute of the data itself), and "∧" represents the logical AND.

[0127] Among them, dynamic risk strategies require dynamic and real-time assessment, and the above formula requires that the risk score calculated during the decryption process be no less than 80%.

[0128] For example, a user's private key may include a static attribute key and a dynamic factor certificate.

[0129] Among them, static attribute keys can be generated based on lattice basis trapdoor functions and hardware cryptographic modules; dynamic factor certificates can be issued by a quantum-safe authentication system.

[0130] When the requesting party receives the encrypted data to be shared, it may need to determine whether the static attributes of its own device match the static attributes in the access policy of the data to be shared, and whether the current dynamic risk value meets the dynamic risk value requirements of the access policy of the data to be shared.

[0131] If the static attributes of the requesting party match the static attributes in the access policy of the data to be shared, and the current dynamic risk value of the requesting party meets the dynamic risk value requirements of the access policy of the data to be shared, then the permission verification is deemed successful; otherwise, the permission verification fails.

[0132] In one example, the data security protection scheme based on quantum-resistant cryptography provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0133] When the secure sharing agent node receives the re-encryption key for the data to be shared and confirms that the policy consistency verification has passed, it re-encrypts the encrypted data to be shared to obtain the re-encrypted data to be shared. The re-encryption key for the data to be shared is generated by the data owner when it is determined that the access policy for the data to be shared has been updated.

[0134] Secure shared agent nodes will record conversion operations to the blockchain.

[0135] For example, for any data to be shared, a re-encryption key for the data can be generated if the data owner determines that the access policy for the data to be shared has been updated.

[0136] For example, suppose the data owner (UserA) encrypts some data using policy_A. UserA authorizes another user (UserB) to access this data, and UserB's attribute set satisfies another policy_B. Then the data owner can generate a re-encryption key based on UserB's attributes.

[0137] For example, the data owner can send a request to the PQC-HSM (Post-Quantum Hardware Security Module) to generate a re-encryption key. The PQC-HSM can generate public key parameters using User A's private key and a target policy (such as Policy_B), and perform computation based on the mathematical structure of the RLWE (Ring Learning With Errors) problem to generate the re-encryption key. Wherein:

[0138]

[0139] Where GenRK() is the re-encryption key generation algorithm, and SK_A is UserA's private key. This is the re-encryption key.

[0140] For example, the above process is completed internally in PQC-HSM, and there is no risk of leakage of key materials.

[0141] For example, the data owner can send the re-encryption key to the secure shared agent node along with a zero-knowledge proof of the new policy (Policy_B).

[0142] After completing policy consistency verification, the secure shared agent node performs the operation of converting the original ABE ciphertext into the target user's ciphertext within the secure zone:

[0143]

[0144] Where ReEnc() is the re-encryption algorithm, CT A The ciphertext before re-encryption. This is the ciphertext after re-encryption.

[0145] For example, a secure shared agent node can record conversion operations to the blockchain.

[0146] For example, the evidence storage includes the ciphertext hash before and after conversion, the attribute certificate digest of user B, the threat level snapshot, etc.

[0147] In one example, the data security protection scheme based on quantum-resistant cryptography provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0148] If the security sharing agent node determines that the quantum attack risk level of the current system exceeds the preset risk level threshold, it will add a geofencing policy to the data to be shared, and if the security level of the data to be shared is lower than the preset second security level threshold, it will raise the security level of the data to be shared to be higher than or equal to the preset second security level threshold.

[0149] For example, in order to further improve the security of the data to be shared, if the current system’s quantum attack risk level is determined to exceed a preset risk level threshold, such as Quantum_Threat≥7, the secure sharing agent node can trigger a circuit breaker policy.

[0150] For example, a secure sharing agent node can add a geofencing policy to the data to be shared, restricting the use and decryption of the data to a high-security environment.

[0151] For example, if the security level of the data to be shared is lower than the preset second security level threshold, the secure sharing agent node can also raise the security level of the data to be shared to be higher than or equal to the preset second security level threshold.

[0152] For example, if the security level of the data to be shared is lower than level 4, the security level of the data to be shared can be upgraded to level 4 or higher.

[0153] In one example, the aforementioned data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography may also include a sandbox gateway node.

[0154] The data security protection scheme based on quantum cryptography algorithms provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0155] The sandbox gateway node receives the analysis script and the ABE attribute certificate; the analysis script is used to define the operations on the data to be shared; the ABE attribute certificate is used to prove the operation permissions for the data to be accessed.

[0156] The sandbox gateway node obtains the encrypted data to be shared from the secure shared agent node and verifies the validity of the dynamic risk certificate in the trusted execution environment;

[0157] Once the sandbox gateway node confirms the validity of the dynamic risk certificate, it decrypts the encrypted data to be shared into an isolated memory area. This allows the analysis script to call the limited interface of the secure isolated memory area to operate on the data in the secure isolated memory area, and then returns the de-identified output to the operation requester.

[0158] For example, to further enhance the security of shared data, the requesting party cannot obtain the decrypted plaintext data, and operations on the decrypted data need to be performed in a quantum-safe sandbox.

[0159] For example, if the sharing requester confirms that the permission verification has passed, it does not decrypt the encrypted data to be shared, but instead submits the analysis script and ABE attribute certificate to the sandbox gateway node.

[0160] The analysis script is used to define operations on the data to be shared, such as training models and calculating statistics.

[0161] ABE attribute certificates are used to prove that the requesting party has the permission to perform the above operations.

[0162] When the sandbox gateway node receives the analysis script and ABE attribute certificate, it can obtain the encrypted data to be shared from the secure sharing agent node and verify the validity of the dynamic risk certificate of the sharing requester within the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (ensuring that the user device or environment does not become insecure during the period from authorization to execution).

[0163] Once the sandbox gateway node confirms the validity of the dynamic risk certificate, it can decrypt the encrypted data to be shared to an isolated memory area, such as the isolated memory area of ​​the TEE. The analysis script submitted by the sharing requester is sent to the TEE for execution. However, the script cannot directly access the raw data. Instead, it needs to operate on the data in the secure isolated memory area through limited interfaces, such as the API (Application Programming Interface) whitelist provided by the sandbox.

[0164] For example, whitelisted APIs may include statistical and machine learning functions such as df.mean(), model.fit(), and np.sum().

[0165] For example, the raw results generated by the script execution are filtered by a filter (such as a sensitive information filter) before being returned to the sharing requester.

[0166] In some embodiments, the data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography may further include a secure transmission proxy node.

[0167] The data security protection scheme based on quantum cryptography algorithms provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0168] The secure transmission proxy node acquires the data collected from the source end and determines the security level of the data collected from the source end;

[0169] When the secure transmission proxy node determines that the security level of the data collected from the source end is higher than or equal to the preset third security level threshold, it performs fragmented encryption on the data collected from the source end and transmits the fragmented encrypted data to the secure transmission proxy node at the other end.

[0170] The peer-end secure transmission proxy node decrypts the received fragmented encrypted data to obtain the source-end collected data fragments, and obtains the original source-end collected data based on the source-end collected data fragments.

[0171] For example, to improve the security of data transmission, a secure transmission proxy node can be set up in the system. The secure transmission proxy node can protect the data transmitted from the client to the server.

[0172] For example, the client can be a data acquisition device, and the server can be a business platform or a storage device. Secure transport proxy nodes can be deployed at the boundary between the client and the server.

[0173] For example, to improve the flexibility of data security protection, secure transmission proxy nodes can adopt different security protection strategies for data with different security levels.

[0174] For example, a secure transmission proxy node can perform fragmented encryption on source data whose security level is higher than a preset security level threshold (which can be called a preset third security level threshold) based on the security level of the source data.

[0175] For example, each shard can be encrypted using an independent key.

[0176] For example, for source data collected at a security level of 4 or higher (such as L4 or L5), Reed-Solomon erasure coding fragmentation (such as 4 data fragments + 2 parity fragments) can be used, and each fragment can be encrypted and protected with an independent key.

[0177] It should be noted that for source data with a security level lower than the preset third security level threshold, other relatively less secure security protection strategies can be used for protection, such as using the traditional TLS1.3 protocol + Chinese cryptographic algorithm for secure transmission protection.

[0178] In one example, a secure transport proxy node performs fragmented encryption on the data collected from the source end and transmits the fragmented encrypted data to the peer secure transport proxy node, which may include:

[0179] The secure transmission proxy node generates a fragment encryption key for each data fragment collected from the source end based on the master key and the special meta-attribute fields of each data fragment collected from the source end; wherein, the special meta-attribute fields of the fragment include the fragment index and / or the fragment hash;

[0180] The secure transmission proxy node encrypts the corresponding source data fragments based on the fragment encryption key of each source data fragment.

[0181] The secure transmission proxy node transmits the encrypted master key and fragmented encrypted data to the peer secure transmission proxy node.

[0182] The remote secure transport proxy node decrypts the received fragmented encrypted data, which may include:

[0183] The peer secure transmission proxy node decrypts the encrypted master key to obtain the decrypted master key;

[0184] For any fragment of encrypted data, the peer secure transmission proxy node generates a fragment encryption key for that fragment based on the decrypted master key and the special meta-attribute field of that fragment;

[0185] The peer secure transmission proxy node decrypts the encrypted data of the fragment based on the fragment encryption key of the fragment.

[0186] For example, for any source-end data fragment, the secure transmission proxy node can generate a fragment encryption key for that source-end data fragment based on the master key and the special meta-attribute field of the source-end data fragment, and use the fragment encryption key to encrypt the source-end data fragment to obtain fragmented encrypted data.

[0187] For example, the master key mentioned above can be protected by a post-quantum encryption algorithm, such as the Keber1024 algorithm.

[0188] For any source data, if it has been fragmented and encrypted in the manner described above, the secure transmission proxy node can transmit the encrypted master key and the fragmented encrypted data to the peer secure transmission proxy node.

[0189] For example, when the peer secure transport proxy node receives the encrypted master key and fragmented encrypted data sent by the secure transport proxy node, it can decrypt the encrypted master key to obtain the decrypted master key.

[0190] For any fragment of encrypted data, the peer secure transmission proxy node can generate a fragment encryption key for that fragment based on the decrypted master key and the special meta-attribute field of that fragment, and decrypt the fragment encrypted data based on the fragment encryption key. Then, the source data can be reassembled from the decrypted source data fragments. The specific implementation can be explained in the following text with specific examples.

[0191] For example, when the peer secure transmission proxy node obtains the source-end collected data, it can securely store the source-end collected data through the secure storage proxy node; the specific implementation of the secure storage proxy node in securely storing the data can be found in the relevant description in the above embodiments, and will not be repeated here in the embodiments of this application.

[0192] In one example, the data security protection scheme based on quantum-resistant cryptography provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0193] The secure transmission agent node determines the quantum threat level and determines the corresponding key management strategy based on the quantum threat level; the security of the key management strategy is positively correlated with the quantum threat level.

[0194] For example, to further improve data transmission security, the secure transmission proxy node can perform quantum risk assessment on the real-time link and update the key management strategy according to the quantum threat level.

[0195] For example, secure transmission proxy nodes can connect to a quantum threat intelligence center to assess quantum risks in the link in real time and determine the quantum threat level.

[0196] For example, the information input to the threat intelligence center may include some or all of the information such as quantum attack characteristics, quantum bit breakthroughs, and quantum algorithm optimizations. The collection methods may include one or more of the following: connecting to third-party quantum cloud APIs, attack characteristic collection, analysis of the latest academic research results, and in-depth network traffic detection.

[0197] As an example, the secure transmission proxy node determines a corresponding key management strategy based on the quantum threat level, including:

[0198] When the quantum threat level is Level 1, configure a first key management policy, which includes the first key update cycle;

[0199] When the quantum threat level is Level 2, a second key management strategy is configured. The second key management strategy includes a second key update cycle that is shorter than the first key update cycle and a corresponding expansion of the capacity of the key pre-generation queue.

[0200] When the quantum threat level is level three, configure a third key management policy, which includes a third key update cycle shorter than the second key update cycle and enables a key backup mechanism.

[0201] When the quantum threat level is Level 4, configure a fourth key management policy, which includes a mandatory triggering of a security circuit breaker mechanism.

[0202] For example, the quantum threat level increases sequentially from level one to level four.

[0203] For example, suppose levels one through four correspond to low, medium, high, and severe threat levels, respectively. Then the key management strategies for different threat levels can be as follows:

[0204] In cases of low threat levels, the key update cycle is 60 minutes.

[0205] In the case of a high threat level, the key update cycle is 30 minutes, and the pre-generated queue capacity is expanded to 10 (for example, the initial queue capacity can be 5).

[0206] In cases of high threat levels, the key update cycle is shortened to 1 minute, and quantum key backup is enabled.

[0207] In cases of severe threat, a forced circuit breaker will be triggered, and all historical keys will be destroyed.

[0208] In some embodiments, the data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography may further include a data acquisition proxy node.

[0209] The data security protection scheme based on quantum cryptography algorithms provided in this application embodiment may further include:

[0210] The data acquisition agent node adds a quantum-safe tag to the data acquired from the source end. This quantum-safe tag includes the security level.

[0211] The data acquisition agent node performs layered encryption on the source-acquired data based on the security level of the source-acquired data.

[0212] For example, to improve the security of data collected at the source, the system may also include a data collection agent node to protect the data at the source.

[0213] For example, for data collected from the source, the data collection agent node can add a quantum-safe tag to the data collected from the source.

[0214] For example, the quantum safety label may include at least a security level.

[0215] For example, a quantum-safe tag may also include some or all of the following information: protocol version, data type, data holder, data requester, data validity period, data location information, encryption strategy hash, etc.

[0216] Data acquisition agent nodes can perform layered encryption on source data based on the security level of the source data. That is, different encryption strategies can be used for source data with different security levels.

[0217] In one example, the data acquisition proxy node performs layered encryption on the source-acquired data based on the security level of the source-acquired data, which may include:

[0218] If the security level of the data collected at the source is lower than the preset fourth security level threshold, the data collection agent node will skip the source encryption of the collected data.

[0219] When the security level of the data collected at the source is higher than or equal to the preset fourth security level threshold and lower than the preset fifth security level threshold, the data collection agent node encrypts the data collected at the source, encrypts the data encryption key using the third post-quantum encryption algorithm, and protects the integrity of the data collected at the source using the first integrity protection algorithm.

[0220] When the security level of the data collected at the source is higher than or equal to the preset fifth security level threshold, the data collection agent node encrypts the data collected at the source, encrypts the data encryption key using the fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm, and protects the integrity of the data collected at the source using the second integrity protection algorithm; wherein, the security of the fourth encryption algorithm is higher than that of the third encryption algorithm, and the security of the second integrity protection algorithm is higher than that of the first integrity protection algorithm.

[0221] For example, for source data with a low security level (such as a security level lower than the preset fourth security level threshold), the data acquisition agent node can skip the source data encryption process, that is, it does not perform source data encryption.

[0222] For source data with a high security level (such as a security level higher than or equal to the preset fourth security level threshold and lower than the preset fifth security level threshold), the data acquisition agent node can encrypt the source data, encrypt the data encryption key using a relatively low-security encryption algorithm (which can be called the third post-quantum encryption algorithm), and protect the integrity of the source data using a relatively low-security integrity protection algorithm (which can be called the first integrity protection algorithm).

[0223] For source data with a high security level (such as a security level higher than or equal to the preset fifth security level threshold), the data acquisition agent node can encrypt the source data using a relatively secure encryption algorithm (which can be called the fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm) and use a relatively secure integrity protection algorithm (which can be called the second integrity protection algorithm) to protect the integrity of the source data.

[0224] For example, the third post-quantum encryption algorithm can be the Kyber-768 algorithm; the fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm can be the Kyber-1024 algorithm.

[0225] The first integrity protection algorithm can be the HMAC-SM3 algorithm; the second integrity protection algorithm can be the Dilithium algorithm.

[0226] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are described below with reference to specific examples.

[0227] This embodiment provides a data security protection scheme based on quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, which solves the problems that sensitive data in big data, cloud computing and other scenarios cannot resist quantum attacks, and that security measures are single-point protection without dynamic strategy linkage, and builds a full life cycle quantum security solution covering data acquisition → transmission → storage → sharing.

[0228] The following sections explain the implementation of data security protection at each stage of data acquisition, transmission, storage, and sharing.

[0229] I. Data Acquisition: Quantum-Safe Edge Computing.

[0230] 1.1 Dynamic injection of quantum-safe tags.

[0231] For example, for data collected at the source, quantum-safe tags can be dynamically generated and embedded in the data packet header.

[0232] For example, the tag structure includes the protocol version, security level (L1-L5), data type, data holder, data requester, data validity period, data location information, and encryption policy hash.

[0233] Examples of data for different security levels can be found in Table 1 above.

[0234] It should be noted that, in order to reduce data transmission latency, quantum-safe tags can be dynamically generated for the data and embedded in the data packet header within a millisecond-level window of data generation.

[0235] 1.2 Adaptive encryption strategy.

[0236] For example, the policy hash is pre-stored on the blockchain, and the device parses the security level field in the tag in real time to verify the policy's timeliness through a lightweight Merkle Proof.

[0237] The adaptive encryption strategy engine performs layered encryption on data with different security levels.

[0238] For example, L1 and L2 level data do not use source-side encryption strategies.

[0239] Level 3 data is encrypted using the SM4 CTR algorithm and protected for integrity using the HMAC-SM3 algorithm. The key is protected using the Kyber-768 algorithm.

[0240] Level 4 and Level 5 data are encrypted using the SM4 CTR algorithm, the encryption key is protected by the Kyber-1024 algorithm, and the integrity of Level 4 and Level 5 data is protected by digital signature using the Dilithium algorithm.

[0241] For example, in L4 and L5 level data processing, the private key for digital signatures is generated in a secure area protected by PUF+QRNG, and the private key components are stored in a distributed manner.

[0242] For example, an integrity value can be calculated on the original data plus a quantum-safe tag. Key operations are performed within a PQC-TEE (a trust chain of the TEE reconstructed based on post-quantum cryptography algorithms), defending against physical side-channel attacks.

[0243] It is evident that by designing a five-dimensional dynamic label model (security level / data type / timeliness / geofencing / risk coefficient), end-to-end adaptive protection can be driven.

[0244] II. Data transmission: fragmented encryption and key rotation.

[0245] 2.1 Sensitive data is encrypted in segments.

[0246] For example, for data with security labels of L1-L3, the traditional TLS1.3 protocol plus Chinese cryptographic algorithms are used for secure transmission protection.

[0247] For data with security labels at levels L4 and L5, Reed-Solomon erasure coding is used to fragment the data (e.g., 4 data fragments + 2 parity fragments), and each fragment is encrypted with an independent key.

[0248] For example, the fragmentation encryption process can be as follows:

[0249] 1) The input data uses Reed-Solomon erasure coding (n, k), which generates a total of 6 fragments after encoding. Among them, there are 4 original data fragments (D0, D1, D2, D3) and 2 redundancy check fragments (P0, P1).

[0250] 2) Data fragments D0-D3 and parity fragments P0-P1 are encrypted using SM4-GCM. Each fragment key uses the PBKDF2 function, which derives the encryption key for that fragment from the input master key and each fragment's unique metadata field. The master key is protected by the Keber1024 algorithm, and the fragment's unique metadata fields include the fragment index and fragment hash.

[0251] 3) Output encrypted fragment group: {E(D0), E(D1), E(D2), E(D3), E(P0), E(P1)}.

[0252] For example, the receiving end (such as the peer secure transport proxy node) can recover the decryption process as follows:

[0253] 1) Obtain any 4 valid encrypted fragments.

[0254] 2) Decrypt the master key using the Keber1024 algorithm. Using the same PBKDF2 function, derive the encryption key for each fragment by inputting the master key and the special meta-attribute field of each fragment. Decrypt these four encrypted fragments to obtain four decrypted fragments. Then, decode them using Reed-Solomon erasure coding (n, k) to recover the original data fragments.

[0255] 3) Reassemble the original data fragments to obtain the original data.

[0256] 2.2 Key cyclic update mechanism.

[0257] For example, it can be connected to a quantum threat intelligence center to assess real-time link risks and trigger corresponding key circuit breakers and update mechanisms. A schematic diagram can be shown below. Figure 2 As shown. Wherein:

[0258] 1) Session Key Recycle Pool: This is a framework for the entire key management system, used to manage operations such as the recycling of session keys.

[0259] 2) Active Key (Key in Use): The key currently in use, whose Key_ID is marked as K_n.

[0260] For example, the active key can be powered by a QRNG entropy source, leveraging the randomness of a quantum random number generator to enhance the key's security and unpredictability. Because QRNG entropy sources are based on quantum mechanics principles and can generate truly random numbers, the generated active key possesses high security.

[0261] 3) Key queue to be updated: This queue contains keys that will be used for subsequent updates. The queue contains K_(n+1) to K_(n+5) keys (the initial capacity can be 5).

[0262] For example, the queue of keys to be updated can be generated by PQC-KEM (post-quantum cryptography key encapsulation mechanism); where post-quantum cryptography is designed to defend against the threats that quantum computers may pose, and keys generated by this mechanism can remain secure in a quantum computing environment.

[0263] 4) Quantum Threat Intelligence Driven: The entire session key loop pool operation, including the updating of active keys and the generation of the key queue to be updated, is based on quantum threat intelligence. That is, when quantum threat intelligence indicates the existence of specific risks or meets certain conditions, corresponding key updates will be triggered to ensure the security of the key system.

[0264] For example, the types of intelligence input to the threat intelligence center may include quantum attack characteristics, quantum bit breakthroughs, quantum algorithm optimizations, etc., and the collection methods may include connecting to third-party quantum cloud APIs, attack characteristic collection, analysis of the latest academic research results, and in-depth network traffic detection, etc.

[0265] For example, the key management strategies corresponding to different threat levels can be as follows:

[0266] In cases of low threat levels, the key update cycle is 60 minutes.

[0267] In the case of a high threat level, the key update cycle is 30 minutes, and the pre-generated queue capacity is expanded to 10 (for example, the initial queue capacity can be 5).

[0268] In cases of high threat levels, the key update cycle is shortened to 1 minute, and quantum key backup is enabled.

[0269] In cases of severe threat, a forced circuit breaker will be triggered, and all historical keys will be destroyed.

[0270] For example, the circuit breaker and backup process can be as follows:

[0271] 1) The intelligence center detected quantum attack characteristics (such as abnormal lattice query traffic).

[0272] 2) Key update mechanism execution.

[0273] For example, all fragments in transmission can be re-encrypted using a new PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) key, risky keys in the current key pool can be discarded, and key backup links (such as QKD (Quantum Key Distribution)) can be activated to achieve self-healing of the encryption link.

[0274] It is evident that by designing a cross-algorithm sharding encryption model, even if a certain PQC is cracked by quantum computing, the complete data cannot be recovered. Furthermore, it mitigates the risk of data loss. Based on threat intelligence, the key update cycle and circuit breaker mechanism are dynamically adjusted to achieve an optimal balance between performance degradation and security strength.

[0275] III. Data storage: Distributed encrypted storage.

[0276] 3.1. Cold and hot data are encrypted in layers.

[0277] For example, the hot and cold data classification engine analyzes the raw data and the quantum safety tag in the header. Data with a security level of 4 or higher is forcibly classified as cold data. The remaining data (security level below 4) is then judged as hot data based on its daily access attributes (such as whether the number of accesses within a data period reaches a certain threshold, or whether the access time frequency falls within the system's peak business hours). The remaining data is classified as cold data, and the hot and cold data classification tags are written to the metadata database. This process can be protected within the PQC-TEE secure execution environment.

[0278] For example, the encryption implementation of hot and cold data can be as follows:

[0279] 1) Hot data (such as real-time business data) is encrypted using SM4-CTR, the key material is generated by quantum random numbers, and a multi-level key management architecture and key shard storage are used to protect the key material.

[0280] For example, the data key is fragmented and reassembled by a key sharding engine into fragment 1 and fragment 2 (taking a division into two fragments as an example). Each fragment is encrypted using the ML-KEM algorithm (such as Kyber-768) by a high-security hardware cryptographic module. The ciphertext of fragment 1 is uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage and is isolated from the ciphertext data encrypted by the key material and stored in cloud storage, and is associated with it using a secure index. The ciphertext of fragment 2 is stored in online storage media, such as the data disk in this server or the network storage matrix belonging to the same cluster.

[0281] 2) Cold data (such as offline archived data or extremely sensitive data) is encrypted using a high-strength ML-KEM algorithm such as Kyber-1024. The private key is fragmented and reassembled by a key sharding engine, resulting in fragment 1 and fragment 2. Both fragments are then encrypted using the ML-KEM algorithm (such as Kyber-1024) through a high-security hardware cryptographic module. The ciphertext of fragment 1 is uploaded to the blockchain for notarization and is isolated from the ciphertext data encrypted with the key material and stored in cloud storage, linked using a secure index. The ciphertext of fragment 2 is stored in an offline vault, such as secure storage media within a high-security area, requiring both manual and automated approval for its use.

[0282] For example, a key fragmentation generation algorithm can be as follows:

[0283] Shard_A⊕Shard_B=Kpriv⊕(OTP||HMAC SPHINCS +(Kpub))

[0284] Where Shard_A and Shard_B are key shards, Kpriv is the private key, Kpub is the public key, OTP is the time-based random factor, and HMAC is the random factor. SPHINCSThis is the HMAC algorithm based on quantum algorithms.

[0285] 3.2 Data access and key reassembly.

[0286] 3.2.1 Hot data access.

[0287] 1) Cloud storage returns the ciphertext and key index.

[0288] 2) Send a reorganization request to the key reorganization engine.

[0289] 3) Pull the ciphertext Shard_A from the blockchain (the integrity of SPHINCS needs to be verified), request the ciphertext Shard_B from the online storage medium, and after successful verification, use the hardware cryptographic module to decrypt the sharded plaintext, and finally reassemble it into a data key to decrypt the ciphertext data.

[0290] 3.2.2 Cold data access.

[0291] 1) Cloud storage returns the ciphertext and key index.

[0292] 2) Send a reorganization request to the key reorganization engine.

[0293] 3) Pull the ciphertext Shard_A from the blockchain (the integrity of SPHINCS needs to be verified).

[0294] 4) To retrieve the ciphertext Shard_B fragment from the offline vault, an application needs to be submitted for approval by the relevant personnel. If the approval is granted, the offline storage medium carrying the Shard_B fragment is retrieved from the vault and taken to the key reassembly center, where key reassembly is completed in a secure and trusted environment.

[0295] An exemplary schematic diagram illustrating the implementation of layered encryption for hot and cold data, as well as data access and key reassembly, can be shown as follows: Figure 3 As shown.

[0296] 2.3 Security Audit.

[0297] For example, the integrity of the ciphertext is verified weekly or monthly using lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs. Quantum-resistant zk-SNARKs (such as the Ligero protocol) are used for blockchain notarization, and the auditing formula is as follows:

[0298]

[0299] Construct a traceable audit quantum signature chain, adding a quantum signature with each audit, forming a tree structure:

[0300]

[0301] For example, during the auditing of the key fragmented encrypted text stored on the blockchain, if abnormal behavior (such as a brute-force attack attempt by a geek) is detected, the decryption key can be erased, the sandbox instance (i.e., the data encrypted with the original key) can be destroyed, and a circuit breaker evidence package can be generated and uploaded to the regulatory chain.

[0302] It is evident that by constructing a four-element distributed storage model consisting of encrypted data, key sharding, HSM master key, and blockchain credentials, it is possible to resist network attacks, prevent physical theft, and provide verifiable non-repudiation, thus overcoming the single point of failure risk inherent in traditional "key escrow" systems. Cold and hot data are handled through a dual-channel algorithm to address security and performance bottlenecks.

[0303] Furthermore, a quantum-safe data lineage chain is constructed, with all data operations generating lightweight quantum signatures based on SPHINCS+. Quantum-resistant zk-SNARKs are used to compress the proof size during blockchain notarization, achieving a leap in non-repudiation and traceability efficiency in a quantum environment.

[0304] IV. Data Sharing: Quantum-Safe Zero-Trust Sharing.

[0305] 4.1 Two-factor ABE access control.

[0306] Static factors: Basic policies are constructed based on attributes such as the security attributes of the data holder role, the security attributes of the data requester role, the data's geographical location and its flow within the business system, and the security level in the quantum security tag. Among these, the security attributes of the roles include, but are not limited to, identity, group, role, permission, security, and integrity levels.

[0307] Dynamic factor: Risk_Score = α•Quantum_Threat + β•(100% - Device_Integrity)

[0308] Quantum_Threat represents the quantum attack risk level, for example, 0-10 (the higher the level, the greater the risk).

[0309] Device_Integrity is the endpoint security proof score, for example, 0-100% (the higher the score, the higher the security).

[0310] For example, the final access control policy is a logical fusion of static attributes and dynamic risk values.

[0311] 4.2. Lattice-based attribute base encryption.

[0312] Data holders can perform lattice-based attribute-based encryption on their data in the following ways:

[0313] Ciphertext=Enc PQ-ABE(Policy∧(Data Risk_Score≥80%)

[0314] For example, a user's private key may include a static attribute key and a dynamic factor certificate.

[0315] Among them, static attribute keys can be generated based on lattice basis trapdoor functions and hardware cryptographic modules; dynamic factor certificates can be issued by a quantum-safe authentication system.

[0316] 4.3 Circuit Breaker Strategy.

[0317] If the quantum attack risk level of the current system exceeds a preset risk level threshold (e.g., Quantum_Threat ≥ 7), the secure shared proxy node can trigger a circuit breaker policy. If the security level of the data to be shared is lower than level 4, the security level of the data to be shared can be raised to level 4 or higher.

[0318] 4.4. Agent re-encryption service.

[0319] 1) Key rotation: Based on the RLWE problem, a re-encryption algorithm is used to perform key conversion. The conversion process is completed within PQC-HSM, effectively preventing the leakage of key materials.

[0320]

[0321] 2. Re-encryption process: The data owner sends the re-encryption key to the proxy node. , with zero-knowledge proof of strategy B.

[0322] After the proxy node verifies the policy consistency, it executes the conversion of the original ABE ciphertext into the target user's ciphertext within the secure zone:

[0323]

[0324] For example, the conversion operation can be recorded on the blockchain. The evidence stored includes the encrypted hashes before and after the conversion, the attribute certificate digest of user B, and a threat level snapshot, etc.

[0325] 4.5 Quantum-safe sandbox mechanism.

[0326] For example, to further enhance the security of shared data, the requesting party cannot obtain the decrypted plaintext data, and operations on the decrypted data need to be performed in a quantum-safe sandbox.

[0327] The mechanism for implementing a quantum-safe sandbox can be summarized in Table 2 below:

[0328] Table 2

[0329]

[0330] 4.6 Data Usage.

[0331] 1) The sandbox gateway node receives the analysis script and the ABE attribute certificate; the analysis script is used to define the operations on the data to be shared; the ABE attribute certificate is used to prove the operation permissions on the data to be accessed.

[0332] 2) The sandbox gateway node obtains the re-encrypted ciphertext CT from the proxy node. B And verify the validity of dynamic risk certificates in a trusted execution environment;

[0333] 3) When the sandbox gateway node confirms that the dynamic risk certificate is valid, it decrypts the data to the isolated memory area so that the analysis script can call the limited interface of the secure isolated memory area to operate on the data in the secure isolated memory area, and returns the output results to the operation requester after anonymization.

[0334] As can be seen, access control and encryption are achieved through a two-factor ABE approach, combining data attributes with real-time quantum security risk assessment. Real-time monitoring of quantum threat levels automatically tightens policies and triggers hot policy updates when the threat level is high. This triple protection—dynamic policy, proxy re-encryption, and sandbox execution—ensures secure data sharing that is "usable but not visible."

[0335] The method provided in this application has been described above. The apparatus provided in this application is described below:

[0336] Please see Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a data security protection device based on a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm provided in an embodiment of this application. It is deployed in a secure storage proxy node within a data security protection system based on a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm. Figure 4 As shown, the data security protection device based on quantum-resistant cryptography may include:

[0337] A partitioning unit is used to determine the security level of the original data and, based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, partition the original data into hot data or cold data.

[0338] The encryption processing unit is used to encrypt hot data using a first encryption algorithm based on a first data encryption key, and to segment the first data encryption key, and to encrypt the segmented first data encryption key using a first post-quantum encryption algorithm, and to separately and securely store the ciphertext of the segmented first data encryption key.

[0339] The encryption processing unit is further configured to encrypt cold data using a second encryption algorithm based on a second data encryption key, and to fragment the second encryption key, then encrypt the fragments of the second data encryption key using a second post-quantum encryption algorithm, and to perform separate secure storage of the ciphertext fragments of the second data encryption key; wherein the encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one ciphertext fragment of the second data encryption key is higher than that of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext; the ciphertext data and the ciphertext key fragment ciphertext are stored separately securely.

[0340] The decryption processing unit is used to, upon receiving a data access request, obtain the ciphertext data of the data to be accessed and the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption key, decrypt the obtained ciphertext fragments of the data encryption key, reassemble the decrypted data encryption key fragments to obtain the data encryption key, and use the data encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext data of the obtained data to be accessed.

[0341] In some embodiments, the partitioning unit divides the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, including:

[0342] If the security level of the original data is higher than or equal to the preset first security level threshold, the original data is determined to be cold data.

[0343] If the security level of the original data is lower than the preset security level threshold, the original data is determined to be either hot data or cold data based on its access attributes.

[0344] In some embodiments, the encryption processing unit performs separate secure storage of the fragmented ciphertext of the first data encryption key, including:

[0345] A portion of the first data encryption key fragments are uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the first data encryption key fragments are stored in an online storage medium.

[0346] The encryption processing unit performs separate secure storage of the fragmented ciphertext of the second data encryption key, including:

[0347] A portion of the second data encryption key fragments are uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the second data encryption key fragments are stored in an offline vault.

[0348] The decryption processing unit acquires the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption key, decrypts the acquired ciphertext fragments, and reassembles the decrypted data encryption key fragments, including:

[0349] In the case of cold data to be accessed, a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed is obtained from the blockchain, and another portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is obtained from the offline vault. The second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is then decrypted and the key is reassembled in a secure and trusted environment. The decryption of the other portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed is performed only after it has been confirmed to have passed manual review.

[0350] In some embodiments, the encryption processing unit is further configured to periodically audit the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption keys stored in the blockchain using a quantum signature chain.

[0351] Wherein, the secure storage proxy node appends a quantum signature based on the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain, provided that the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain has passed audit.

[0352] The quantum signature can be obtained by signing based on the latest quantum signature and audit information. The initial value of the quantum signature is generated by quantum signing a preset value, and the audit information is generated based on the user identifier, data hash and system timestamp.

[0353] This application also provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store computer programs; and the processor is used to execute the programs stored in the memory to implement the data security protection method based on quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms described above.

[0354] Please see Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the hardware structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. The electronic device may include a processor 501 and a memory 502 storing machine-executable instructions. The processor 501 and the memory 502 can communicate via a system bus 503. Furthermore, by reading and executing the machine-executable instructions in the memory 502 corresponding to the data security protection logic based on quantum-resistant cryptography, the processor 501 can execute the data security protection method based on quantum-resistant cryptography described above.

[0355] The memory 502 mentioned in this document can be any electronic, magnetic, optical, or other physical storage device that can contain or store information such as executable instructions, data, etc. For example, machine-readable storage media can be: RAM (Random Access Memory), volatile memory, non-volatile memory, flash memory, storage drives (such as hard disk drives), solid-state drives, any type of storage disk (such as optical discs, DVDs, etc.), or similar storage media, or combinations thereof.

[0356] In some embodiments, a machine-readable storage medium, such as Figure 5 The memory 502 in the machine-readable storage medium stores machine-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the data security protection method based on quantum-resistant cryptography described above. For example, the machine-readable storage medium can be ROM, RAM, CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, and optical data storage devices, etc.

[0357] This application also provides a computer program product that stores a computer program, and when a processor executes the computer program, it causes the processor to execute the data security protection method based on the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm described above.

[0358] This application also provides a data security protection system based on quantum cryptography algorithms, including: a secure storage proxy node; wherein:

[0359] A secure storage agent node is used to determine the security level of the original data and, based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, classify the original data into hot data or cold data.

[0360] The secure storage proxy node is also used to encrypt hot data using a first encryption algorithm based on a first data encryption key, and to fragment the first data encryption key, and to encrypt the fragments of the first data encryption key using a first post-quantum encryption algorithm, and to perform separate secure storage of the ciphertext of the fragments of the first data encryption key.

[0361] The secure storage proxy node is further configured to encrypt cold data using a second encryption algorithm based on a second data encryption key, and to fragment the second encryption key. It then uses a second post-quantum encryption algorithm to encrypt the fragments of the second data encryption key, and performs separate secure storage of the ciphertext fragments of the second data encryption key. The encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one ciphertext fragment of the second data encryption key is higher than that of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext. The ciphertext data and the ciphertext key fragment ciphertext are stored separately securely.

[0362] The secure storage proxy node is also used to, upon receiving a data access request, obtain the encrypted data of the data to be accessed and the encrypted data encryption key fragment, decrypt the obtained encrypted data encryption key fragment, and reassemble the decrypted encrypted data encryption key fragment to obtain a data encryption key, and use the data encryption key to decrypt the obtained encrypted data of the data to be accessed.

[0363] In some embodiments, the secure storage proxy node divides the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, including:

[0364] If the security level of the original data is higher than or equal to the preset first security level threshold, the original data is determined to be cold data.

[0365] If the security level of the original data is lower than the preset security level threshold, the original data is determined to be either hot data or cold data based on its access attributes.

[0366] In some embodiments, the secure storage proxy node performs separate secure storage of the fragmented ciphertext of the first data encryption key, including:

[0367] A portion of the first data encryption key fragments are uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the first data encryption key fragments are stored in an online storage medium.

[0368] The secure storage proxy node performs separate secure storage of the fragmented ciphertext of the second data encryption key, including:

[0369] A portion of the second data encryption key fragments are uploaded to the blockchain for evidence storage, while another portion of the second data encryption key fragments are stored in an offline vault.

[0370] The secure storage proxy node acquires the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption key, decrypts the acquired ciphertext fragments, and reassembles the decrypted ciphertext fragments, including:

[0371] In the case of cold data to be accessed, a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed is obtained from the blockchain, and another portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is obtained from the offline vault. The second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is then decrypted and the key is reassembled in a secure and trusted environment. The decryption of the other portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed is performed only after it has been confirmed to have passed manual review.

[0372] In some embodiments, the secure storage proxy node is further configured to periodically audit the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption keys stored in the blockchain using a quantum signature chain.

[0373] Specifically, if the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain has passed audit, the quantum signature will be appended based on the latest quantum signature.

[0374] The quantum signature can be obtained by signing based on the latest quantum signature and audit information. The initial value of the quantum signature is generated by quantum signing a preset value, and the audit information is generated based on the user identifier, data hash and system timestamp.

[0375] In some embodiments, the data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography further includes: a secure shared proxy node; wherein:

[0376] The secure sharing proxy node, upon receiving a data sharing request, sends encrypted data to the requesting party. The encrypted data is generated by performing lattice-based attribute encryption on the data according to its access policy. The access policy is a logical combination of static attributes and dynamic risk values. The data includes data obtained by the business platform from the data storage device through the secure storage proxy node. If the static attributes of the requesting party match the static attributes in the access policy of the data to be shared, and the current dynamic risk value of the requesting party meets the dynamic risk value requirements of the access policy, the permission verification is successful; otherwise, the permission verification fails.

[0377] In some embodiments, the secure sharing proxy node is further configured to re-encrypt the encrypted data to be shared upon receiving a re-encryption key for the data to be shared and determining that the policy consistency verification has passed, thereby obtaining re-encrypted data to be shared; wherein the re-encryption key for the data to be shared is generated by the data owner upon determining that the access policy of the data to be shared has been updated; and the conversion operation is recorded to the blockchain.

[0378] In some embodiments, the secure sharing proxy node is further configured to, when determining that the quantum attack risk level of the current system exceeds a preset risk level threshold, add a geofencing policy to the data to be shared, and when the security level of the data to be shared is lower than a preset second security level threshold, raise the security level of the data to be shared to be higher than or equal to the preset second security level threshold.

[0379] In some embodiments, the data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography further includes: a sandbox gateway node; wherein:

[0380] The sandbox gateway node is used to receive the analysis script and the ABE attribute certificate; wherein, the analysis script is used to define the operation on the data to be shared; the ABE attribute certificate is used to prove the operation permission on the data to be accessed; the encrypted data to be shared is obtained from the secure sharing proxy node, and the validity of the dynamic risk certificate is verified in the trusted execution environment; if the dynamic risk certificate is found to be valid, the encrypted data to be shared is decrypted to the isolated memory area, so that the analysis script can call the limited interface of the secure isolated memory area to operate on the data in the secure isolated memory area, and the output result is de-identified and returned to the operation requester.

[0381] In some embodiments, the data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography further includes: a secure transmission proxy node; wherein:

[0382] The secure transmission proxy node is used to acquire source-end collected data and determine the security level of the source-end collected data; if the security level of the source-end collected data is determined to be higher than or equal to a preset third security level threshold, the source-end collected data is fragmented and encrypted, and the fragmented encrypted data is transmitted to the peer secure transmission proxy node.

[0383] The secure transmission proxy node is also used to decrypt the received fragmented encrypted data to obtain the source-end collected data fragments, and to obtain the original source-end collected data based on the source-end collected data fragments.

[0384] In some embodiments, the secure transmission proxy node performs fragmented encryption on the source-end collected data and transmits the fragmented encrypted data to the peer-end secure transmission proxy node, including:

[0385] Based on the master key and the special meta-attribute fields of each source data fragment, a fragment encryption key for each source data fragment is generated; wherein, the special meta-attribute fields of the fragment include the fragment index and / or the fragment hash;

[0386] Encrypt the corresponding source-end collected data fragments according to the fragment encryption key of each source-end collected data fragment;

[0387] The encrypted master key and fragmented encrypted data are transmitted to the secure storage proxy node;

[0388] The peer-end secure transmission proxy node decrypts the received fragmented encrypted data, including:

[0389] Decrypt the encrypted master key to obtain the decrypted master key;

[0390] For any fragment of encrypted data, a fragment encryption key is generated based on the decrypted master key and the special meta-attribute field of the fragment.

[0391] The encrypted data of the fragment is decrypted based on the fragment encryption key of the fragment.

[0392] In some embodiments, the secure transmission proxy node is further configured to determine the quantum threat level and determine a corresponding key management strategy based on the quantum threat level; wherein the security of the key management strategy is positively correlated with the quantum threat level.

[0393] In some embodiments, the secure transmission proxy node determines a corresponding key management strategy based on the quantum threat level, including:

[0394] When the quantum threat level is Level 1, a first key management policy is configured, which includes a first key update cycle.

[0395] When the quantum threat level is level two, a second key management strategy is configured. The second key management strategy includes a second key update cycle that is shorter than the first key update cycle and correspondingly expands the capacity of the key pre-generation queue.

[0396] When the quantum threat level is level three, a third key management strategy is configured, which includes a third key update cycle shorter than the second key update cycle and enables a key backup mechanism.

[0397] When the quantum threat level is level four, a fourth key management strategy is configured, which includes a mandatory triggering of a security circuit breaker mechanism.

[0398] In some embodiments, the data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography further includes: a data acquisition proxy node; wherein:

[0399] The data acquisition agent node is used to add quantum-safe tags to the source-end acquired data, and the quantum-safe tags include a security level; the source-end acquired data is then encrypted in layers according to the security level of the source-end acquired data.

[0400] In some embodiments, the data acquisition proxy node performs layered encryption on the source-end acquired data based on the security level of the source-end acquired data, including:

[0401] If the security level of the data collected from the source is lower than the preset fourth security level threshold, skip the source encryption of the collected data.

[0402] When the security level of the data collected at the source is higher than or equal to the preset fourth security level threshold and lower than the preset fifth security level threshold, the data collected at the source is encrypted, the data encryption key is encrypted using the third post-quantum encryption algorithm, and the integrity of the data collected at the source is protected using the first integrity protection algorithm.

[0403] When the security level of the data collected at the source is higher than or equal to the preset fifth security level threshold, the data collected at the source is encrypted, the data encryption key is encrypted using the fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm, and the integrity of the data collected at the source is protected using the second integrity protection algorithm; wherein, the security of the fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm is higher than that of the third post-quantum encryption algorithm, and the security of the second integrity protection algorithm is higher than that of the first integrity protection algorithm.

Claims

1. A data security protection method based on quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, characterized in that, A data security protection system based on quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms includes a secure storage proxy node, and the method includes: The secure storage agent node determines the security level of the original data and classifies the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data. The secure storage proxy node encrypts hot data using a first encryption algorithm based on a first data encryption key, fragments the first data encryption key, encrypts the fragments using a first post-quantum encryption algorithm, uploads a portion of the first data encryption key fragments to the blockchain for evidence storage, and stores the other portion of the first data encryption key fragments on an online storage medium; and, The secure storage proxy node encrypts cold data using a second encryption algorithm based on a second data encryption key, fragments the second data encryption key, encrypts the fragments using a second post-quantum encryption algorithm, uploads a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext to the blockchain for notarization, and stores another portion of the second data encryption key fragments in an offline vault; wherein, the encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is higher than that of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext; the ciphertext data and the ciphertext key fragment ciphertext are stored separately in a secure manner; Upon receiving a data access request, the secure storage proxy node obtains the encrypted data of the data to be accessed, as well as the encrypted data encryption key fragments. It then decrypts the obtained encrypted data encryption key fragments and reassembles the decrypted data encryption key fragments to obtain the data encryption key. Finally, it uses the data encryption key to decrypt the encrypted data of the data to be accessed. The method further includes: The secure storage proxy node uses a quantum signature chain to periodically audit the encrypted key fragments of the data stored in the blockchain. Wherein, the secure storage proxy node appends a quantum signature based on the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain, provided that the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain has passed audit. The quantum signature can be obtained by signing based on the latest quantum signature and audit information. The initial value of the quantum signature is generated by quantum signing a preset value. The audit information is generated based on the user identifier, the hash of incremental audit data, and the system timestamp.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The secure storage proxy node classifies the original data into hot data or cold data based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, including: If the security level of the original data is higher than or equal to the preset first security level threshold, the security storage agent node determines that the original data is cold data. If the security level of the original data is lower than the preset first security level threshold, the secure storage agent node determines whether the original data is hot data or cold data based on the access attributes of the original data.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The secure storage proxy node acquires the ciphertext fragments of the data encryption key, decrypts the acquired ciphertext fragments, and reassembles the decrypted ciphertext fragments, including: When the data to be accessed is cold data, the secure storage proxy node obtains a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed from the blockchain, and another portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext from the offline vault. The second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is then decrypted and the key is reassembled in a secure and trusted environment. The decryption of the other portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext of the data to be accessed is performed only after it has been confirmed to have passed manual review.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms further includes secure shared proxy nodes; the method further includes: Upon receiving a data sharing request, the secure sharing proxy node sends the encrypted data to be shared to the requesting party. The encrypted data is generated by performing lattice-based attribute encryption on the data according to its access policy. The access policy is a logical combination of static attributes and dynamic risk values. The data to be shared includes data obtained by the business platform from the data storage device through the secure storage proxy node. If the static attributes of the requesting party match the static attributes in the access policy of the data to be shared, and the current dynamic risk value of the requesting party meets the dynamic risk value requirements of the access policy, the permission verification is successful; otherwise, the permission verification fails.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method further includes: Upon receiving the re-encryption key for the data to be shared and confirming that the policy consistency verification has passed, the secure sharing proxy node re-encrypts the encrypted data to be shared to obtain the re-encrypted data to be shared; wherein, the re-encryption key for the data to be shared is generated by the data owner when it is determined that the access policy for the data to be shared has been updated; The secure shared agent node will record the conversion operation to the blockchain; And / or, The method further includes: When the secure sharing proxy node determines that the quantum attack risk level of the current system exceeds the preset risk level threshold, it adds a geofencing policy to the data to be shared, and when the security level of the data to be shared is lower than the preset second security level threshold, it raises the security level of the data to be shared to be higher than or equal to the preset second security level threshold. And / or, The data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms further includes a sandbox gateway node; the method further includes: The sandbox gateway node receives an analysis script and an ABE attribute certificate; wherein, the analysis script is used to define operations on the data to be shared; and the ABE attribute certificate is used to prove the operation permissions for the data to be accessed. The sandbox gateway node obtains the encrypted data to be shared from the secure shared proxy node and verifies the validity of the dynamic risk certificate in the trusted execution environment; When the sandbox gateway node determines that the dynamic risk certificate is valid, it decrypts the encrypted data to be shared to the isolated memory area, so that the analysis script can call the limited interface of the secure isolated memory area to operate on the data in the secure isolated memory area, and return the output results to the operation requester after anonymization.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms further includes a secure transmission proxy node; the method further includes: The secure transmission proxy node acquires the data collected from the source end and determines the security level of the data collected from the source end; When the secure transmission proxy node determines that the security level of the source-end collected data is higher than or equal to the preset third security level threshold, it performs fragmented encryption on the source-end collected data and transmits the fragmented encrypted data to the peer secure transmission proxy node. The peer-end secure transmission proxy node decrypts the received fragmented encrypted data to obtain the source-end collected data fragments, and obtains the original source-end collected data based on the source-end collected data fragments.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The secure transmission proxy node performs fragmented encryption on the source-end collected data and transmits the fragmented encrypted data to the peer-end secure transmission proxy node, including: The secure transmission proxy node generates a fragment encryption key for each data fragment collected from the source end based on the master key and the special meta-attribute fields of each data fragment collected from the source end; wherein, the special meta-attribute fields of the fragment include the fragment index and / or the fragment hash; The secure transmission proxy node encrypts the corresponding source-end collected data fragments according to the fragment encryption key of each source-end collected data fragment; The secure transmission proxy node transmits the encrypted master key and fragmented encrypted data to the peer secure transmission proxy node. The peer-end secure transmission proxy node decrypts the received fragmented encrypted data, including: The peer secure transmission proxy node decrypts the encrypted master key to obtain the decrypted master key; For any fragment of encrypted data, the peer secure transmission proxy node generates a fragment encryption key for that fragment based on the decrypted master key and the special meta-attribute field of that fragment. The peer secure transmission proxy node decrypts the encrypted data of the fragment based on the fragment encryption key of the fragment.

8. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The method further includes: The secure transmission proxy node determines the quantum threat level and determines the corresponding key management strategy based on the quantum threat level; wherein, the security of the key management strategy is positively correlated with the quantum threat level; The secure transmission proxy node determines the corresponding key management strategy based on the quantum threat level, including: When the quantum threat level is Level 1, a first key management policy is configured, which includes a first key update cycle. When the quantum threat level is level two, a second key management strategy is configured. The second key management strategy includes a second key update cycle that is shorter than the first key update cycle and correspondingly expands the capacity of the key pre-generation queue. When the quantum threat level is level three, a third key management strategy is configured, which includes a third key update cycle shorter than the second key update cycle and enables a key backup mechanism. When the quantum threat level is level four, a fourth key management strategy is configured, which includes a mandatory triggering of a security circuit breaker mechanism.

9. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, The data security system based on quantum-resistant cryptography algorithms further includes a data acquisition proxy node; the method further includes: The data acquisition agent node adds a quantum-safe tag to the data acquired from the source end, and the quantum-safe tag includes a security level; The data acquisition agent node performs layered encryption on the source-end acquired data according to the security level of the source-end acquired data. The data acquisition proxy node performs layered encryption on the source-end acquired data based on the security level of the source-end acquired data, including: If the security level of the data collected at the source is lower than the preset fourth security level threshold, the data collection agent node skips the source encryption of the collected data. When the security level of the data collected at the source is higher than or equal to the preset fourth security level threshold and lower than the preset fifth security level threshold, the data collection agent node encrypts the data collected at the source, encrypts the data encryption key using the third post-quantum encryption algorithm, and protects the integrity of the data collected at the source using the first integrity protection algorithm. When the security level of the data collected at the source is higher than or equal to the preset fifth security level threshold, the data collection agent node encrypts the data collected at the source, encrypts the data encryption key using a fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm, and protects the integrity of the data collected at the source using a second integrity protection algorithm; wherein, the security of the fourth post-quantum encryption algorithm is higher than that of the third post-quantum encryption algorithm, and the security of the second integrity protection algorithm is higher than that of the first integrity protection algorithm.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: Processor and memory, wherein: The memory is used to store computer programs; When the processor executes a program stored in the memory, it implements the method described in any one of claims 1-9.

11. A data security protection system based on quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, characterized in that, include: Secure storage agent node; where: A secure storage agent node is used to determine the security level of the original data and, based on the security level and access attributes of the original data, classify the original data into hot data or cold data. The secure storage proxy node is also used to encrypt hot data using a first encryption algorithm based on a first data encryption key, and to fragment the first data encryption key, and to encrypt the fragments of the first data encryption key using a first post-quantum encryption algorithm, and to upload a portion of the encrypted first data encryption key fragments to the blockchain for evidence storage, and to store another portion of the first data encryption key fragments to an online storage medium. The secure storage proxy node is further configured to encrypt cold data using a second encryption algorithm based on a second data encryption key, fragment the second data encryption key, encrypt the fragments of the second data encryption key using a second post-quantum encryption algorithm, upload a portion of the second data encryption key fragment ciphertext to the blockchain for evidence storage, and store another portion of the second data encryption key fragments in an offline vault; wherein, the encryption security of the cold data is higher than that of the hot data, and the storage security of at least one second data encryption key fragment ciphertext is higher than that of the first data encryption key fragment ciphertext; the ciphertext data and the ciphertext key fragment ciphertext are stored separately in a secure manner; The secure storage proxy node is also used to, upon receiving a data access request, obtain the encrypted data of the data to be accessed and the encrypted data encryption key fragment, decrypt the obtained encrypted data encryption key fragment, and reassemble the decrypted encrypted data encryption key fragment to obtain a data encryption key, and use the data encryption key to decrypt the encrypted data of the data to be accessed. The secure storage proxy node is also used to periodically audit the encrypted key fragments of the data stored in the blockchain using a quantum signature chain. Specifically, if the latest quantum signature in the quantum signature chain has passed audit, the quantum signature will be appended based on the latest quantum signature. The quantum signature can be obtained by signing based on the latest quantum signature and audit information. The initial value of the quantum signature is generated by quantum signing a preset value. The audit information is generated based on the user identifier, the hash of incremental audit data, and the system timestamp.

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