Digital sharing management method and security authority control system for hospital archives

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of medical informatization, and discloses a digital sharing management method of hospital archives and a safety authority control system. The method comprises the following steps: carrying out digital modeling on an archive to generate a digital archive object containing an identifier, content data, an authority parameter and a log index; generating an authority control vector based on user identity recognition, wherein the authority control vector is used for limiting reading, editing, copying and printing operations; during high-risk operation, the system counts user operation frequency and judges a threshold value, and if the user operation frequency exceeds the threshold value, the operation is stopped and an alarm is triggered; all operations are recorded to the log index. The system comprises an archive management module, an identity recognition module, an authority strategy generation module, a behavior control module, an anti-leakage control module and a log auditing module. According to the scheme, refined authority control and whole-process behavior tracing of hospital archives are realized, and the security and compliance of data use are improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of medical informatization management, in particular to a digital sharing management method and a security permission control system for hospital archives, which belongs to the cross-technology category of electronic archive management, access control and information security protection, and is particularly suitable for the application scenario of digital management and secure sharing of medical archives in a multi-user, multi-role and multi-scene collaborative environment. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the continuous deepening of medical informatization construction, a large amount of structured and unstructured archive data is generated in various aspects of hospital services, such as diagnosis and treatment, nursing management, scientific research and teaching, and administrative operation. These archives not only include patient electronic medical records, examination and test reports, medical images, nursing records and other clinical document data, but also cover management systems, meeting records, consultation opinions, legal affairs and other comprehensive administrative files, with characteristics of large data volume, various types, frequent updates and high privacy sensitivity. Therefore, how to digitally process, centrally store and securely share the above archives has become an important part of hospital information system construction.

[0003] At present, a variety of hospital archive management systems based on databases or file servers have been widely applied. Such systems usually adopt centralized storage mode, unify the access of archive data from different sources and archive them in electronic form, to replace paper documents and solve the problems of high management cost and low query efficiency, and to a certain extent, improve data access efficiency and storage convenience.

[0004] However, in the actual use scenario of multi-user, multi-role and multi-department collaborative management, the existing hospital archive management system still has the following significant technical defects: 1. Coarse granularity of permission control, lack of behavior-level management capability Most existing systems only implement "whether viewable" permission judgment at the archive access level, with single authorization logic and lack of fine-grained control over specific operation behaviors (such as editing, copying, printing, etc.). Once a user is granted access permission, the system usually defaults to any processing operation, resulting in a loss of control risk during archive sharing and difficulty in meeting the high requirements of the medical industry for sensitive data security.

[0005] 2. Lack of real-time control mechanism for high-risk operations, with information leakage risks In practical applications, unauthorized printing, copying or exporting of archives to external storage media is the main risk point that causes patient privacy leakage and internal data outflow of the hospital. However, the traditional system is mostly in a static control state of "allow or prohibit" in the management of copying and printing behavior, lacks the frequency statistics and dynamic restriction mechanism of high-risk behavior, and is difficult to identify and intercept abnormal operations in time, which has obvious security risks.

[0006] 3. Lack of effective behavior audit and operation traceability mechanism Most current archive systems only record the basic login or access behavior of users, and do not systematically archive information such as specific operation type, execution result, operation time, target archive, etc. nor establish a structured log index, which makes it difficult to quickly locate the risk source or restore the operation path once a data leakage event occurs, seriously restricting the hospital's ability in security audit and responsibility tracing.

[0007] 4. Poor role and scene adaptability, unable to meet complex collaborative management needs With the refinement and specialization of internal positions in hospitals, the access purposes and operation permissions of doctors, nurses, auditors, managers and other types of users are significantly different. At the same time, the sensitivity levels of different departments or departments to documents are also different. However, the traditional system often only provides fixed role templates and lacks the ability to dynamically configure permissions and risk assessment based on role, department, archive level and other dimensions, which can meet the collaboration needs while easily causing permission overreach or security blind spots.

[0008] In summary, the current hospital archive management system has not yet built a full-process security protection mechanism covering "pre-access identity judgment, access behavior control, and post-access behavior traceability" when facing digital sharing use scenarios, and urgently needs a security sharing method and system that can realize identity recognition driven, permission parameter binding, operation behavior controllable, and log behavior traceable to ensure the effective use and compliant flow of medical archives in a multi-user environment. SUMMARY

[0009] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application proposes a technical solution for the digital management of hospital archives, which combines identity recognition, permission control, leakage prevention strategy and log audit mechanism to build a complete system architecture and method process. The following describes the technical means and functional implementation path of the present application through multiple possible implementation modes.

[0010] In one embodiment of the present application, a digital sharing management method for hospital archives is provided, which is applied to a hospital archive management system and includes the following steps: S1. Archival digitization modeling steps: Perform unified digitization processing on paper or electronic archives to generate corresponding digital archive objects D. The digital archive object D includes at least an archive identifier ID, archive content data C, a set of access control parameters P, and an operation log index L. S2. User identification and role mapping steps: Receive the access request from user U, and the system obtains the user identity parameter set U = {UID, R, S}, where UID is the user's unique identifier, R is the user's role type, and S is the department to which the user belongs; S3. Permission Parameter Generation and Binding Steps: The system generates a permission control vector P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p) based on the user identity parameters and the attributes of the file object D, and binds it to the file object D, where p_r represents read permission, p_w represents edit permission, p_c represents copy permission, p_p represents print permission, and p_i ∈ {0,1}, i ∈ {r,w,c,p}; S4. Operation behavior judgment and execution steps: When user U initiates an operation request O on file object D, the system judges the corresponding permission parameter p_T according to the operation type T. If p_T = 1, the operation is allowed to be executed; if p_T = 0, the operation is refused to be executed. S5. Leakage prevention constraint control steps: If the operation type T is copy or print, the system counts the cumulative number of operations N_o of the user within a preset time window and compares it with the safety threshold θ. If N_o>θ, the operation is rejected and a safety alarm is triggered. S6. Operation Log Recording and Traceability Steps: The system generates a log l_i ={UID, ID, T, t, Result} for each allowed or denied operation, where t is the timestamp and Result is the execution result, and stores the log in the operation log index L.

[0011] Furthermore, in this invention, the user role type R includes at least one or more of the following: doctor, nurse, administrator, and auditor. The system generates different sets of initial permission control parameters based on different roles.

[0012] Preferably, the access control vector P can be dynamically adjusted according to the file sensitivity level G. When the file sensitivity level G is higher than a preset threshold, the system automatically disables the copy permission p_c and the print permission p_p to prevent highly sensitive files from being exported or leaked without authorization.

[0013] Optionally, the security threshold θ can be dynamically configured according to the hospital's workload, user role, or department type to adapt to the usage needs of different departments and improve the system's flexibility in adapting to access behavior.

[0014] Furthermore, the permission control vector P further includes an expiration time field p_exp, which is used to set the effective time window for a certain type of permission, thereby limiting the persistence of user access to files and improving the timeliness and flexibility of permission management.

[0015] Preferably, in the leakage prevention control step, the system can automatically adjust the statistical time window length T_w and the threshold θ based on the file sensitivity level G to realize a behavior restriction strategy driven by risk perception.

[0016] In another embodiment of the present invention, a digital sharing management and security access control system for hospital records is provided, comprising: The document digitization management module is used to digitize paper or electronic documents, generate and manage digital document objects (D); The user identity recognition module is used to obtain the user identity parameter set U and perform identity authentication; The permission policy generation module is used to generate a permission control vector P based on user identity parameters and file attributes and bind it to the file object D; The operation behavior control module is used to determine whether a user operation request O is allowed to be executed based on the permission parameter P; The leakage prevention control module is used to count the number of high-risk operations such as copying or printing and to determine thresholds. The log auditing and traceability module is used to record user operations on files and store them in the log index L; The modules mentioned above work together to realize core functions such as digital modeling of hospital records, access control, leak prevention management, and log traceability, supporting the complete execution process of the aforementioned methodology.

[0017] Furthermore, the log auditing module also includes a behavior risk scoring unit, which is used to calculate user risk scores based on indicators such as operation frequency and failure rate, so as to achieve intelligent identification of suspicious user behavior.

[0018] Preferably, the permission policy generation module is integrated with the hospital's single sign-on platform, enabling cross-system access control based on identity tokens and improving system integration and security authentication capabilities.

[0019] In one embodiment of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, on which a computer program is stored, which, when executed by a processor, is capable of implementing any of the above-described methods for digital sharing and management of hospital records.

[0020] In one possible implementation, a method for digital sharing and management of hospital records is provided, which is applied in a hospital record management system and includes the following steps: S1. Archival digitization modeling steps: uniformly digitize paper or electronic archives to generate corresponding digital archive objects D. The digital archive object D includes at least an archive identifier ID, archive content data C, a set of access control parameters P, and an operation log index L. S2. User identification and role mapping steps: Receive the access request from user U, and obtain the user identity parameter set U = {UID, R, S}, where UID is the user's unique identifier, R is the user's role type, and S is the department to which the user belongs; S3. Permission parameter generation and binding step: The system generates a permission control vector P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p) based on the user identity parameters and the attributes of the file object D, and binds it to the file object D, where p_r represents read permission, p_w represents edit permission, p_c represents copy permission, p_p represents print permission, and p_i ∈ {0,1}, i ∈ {r,w,c,p}; S4. Operation behavior judgment and execution steps: When user U initiates an operation request O on file object D, the system judges the corresponding permission parameter p_T according to the operation type T. If p_T = 1, the operation is allowed to be executed; if p_T = 0, the operation is refused to be executed. S5. Leakage prevention constraint control steps: If the operation type T is copy or print, the system counts the cumulative number of operations N_o of the user within a preset time window and compares it with the safety threshold θ. If N_o>θ, the operation is rejected and a safety alarm is triggered. S6. Operation log recording and traceability steps: The system generates a log l_i ={UID, ID, T, t, Result} for each allowed or denied operation, where t is the timestamp and Result is the execution result, and stores the log in the operation log index L.

[0021] In one possible implementation, the user role type R includes at least one or more of doctors, nurses, administrators, and auditors, and the system generates different initial permission control parameter sets according to different roles.

[0022] In one possible implementation, the access control vector P can be dynamically adjusted according to the file sensitivity level G. When the file sensitivity level G is higher than a preset threshold, the system automatically disables the copy permission p_c and the print permission p_p.

[0023] In one possible implementation, the security threshold θ can be dynamically configured based on the hospital's workload, user role, or department type to adapt to the usage needs of different departments.

[0024] In one possible implementation, a digital sharing management and security access control system for hospital records is provided, comprising: a record digitization management module for digitizing paper or electronic records, generating and managing digital record objects D; a user identification module for obtaining a user identity parameter set U and performing identity authentication; an access control policy generation module for generating an access control vector P based on user identity parameters and record attributes and binding it to the record object D; an operation behavior control module for determining whether a user operation request O is allowed to be executed based on the access parameter P; a leakage prevention control module for counting the number of high-risk operations such as copying or printing and determining thresholds; and a log auditing and traceability module for recording user operation behavior logs of the records and storing them in a log index L; the above modules cooperate to execute the method described in any one of claims 1 to 4.

[0025] In one possible implementation, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the hospital records digitization and sharing management method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

[0026] Based on the above technical solutions, the digital sharing management method and security access control system for hospital records provided by this invention are designed to meet the collaborative record management needs of modern hospitals involving multiple users, roles, and scenarios. Through a clearly structured, configurable, and controllable secure sharing mechanism, it achieves the comprehensive management goal of "accessibility, controllability, and traceability" throughout the entire lifecycle of medical records, and has the following significant technical effects: 1. Achieve a refined integration of file sharing and access control. This invention constructs a digital archive object D, integrating the archive's content data, permission parameters, and log index into a unified data structure. It also introduces a dynamic permission policy generation method based on user identity parameters (UID, role R, department S), achieving a dynamic mapping between "person-archive-permission." This mechanism effectively solves the problems of coarse-grained authorization and lack of role-based differentiated control in existing systems. Even with access permissions, users still need to be judged based on the specific operation type, thereby improving the precision and scalability of permission control.

[0027] 2. Construct a proactive security protection mechanism based on operational behavior. Unlike traditional permission systems that rely on "full authorization," this invention features a unique operation type identification and parameter matching mechanism. When a user initiates an operation request, the system determines the specific behavior based on a preset permission vector P. When the operation type is high-risk (such as copying or printing), a frequency statistics and threshold judgment model is further introduced to dynamically determine the risk level based on historical behavior and automatically trigger interception and alarm mechanisms. This solution represents a leap from "static permission control" to "dynamic behavior management," significantly enhancing the system's capabilities in abnormal behavior detection and leak prevention.

[0028] 3. Establish a log-driven operation traceability and accountability mechanism. To meet hospitals' compliance requirements for auditable and traceable use of sensitive medical records, this invention proposes a recording mechanism centered on "operation log index L + multi-field log object l_i". This mechanism generates a complete log for each operation, including fields such as operator, target file, behavior type, timestamp, and execution result, and supports subsequent retrieval by user / time / behavior type. This mechanism provides reliable technical support for medical institutions to conduct subsequent security audits, post-event accountability, and compliance reporting.

[0029] 4. Supports collaborative applications across roles, departments, and scenarios. In the access control strategy, this invention introduces user role type R and organizational unit S. Combined with the actual division of labor in hospitals (such as doctors, nurses, auditors, administrators, etc.), initial permission parameters can be customized for different roles, and dynamic adjustments can be made according to the sensitivity level of the files G (such as automatically disabling copy / print permissions for highly sensitive files). This adapts to complex business processes and security level management needs, and is particularly suitable for multi-departmental collaboration scenarios such as inpatient medical records, consultation opinions, and nursing documents.

[0030] 5. Possesses strong system engineering implementation capabilities and deployment flexibility. The functional modules of this invention are designed based on the existing hospital information system architecture, are compatible with common databases, access control platforms, and log management tools, and have good engineering feasibility. They can be deployed on hospital intranet servers, private cloud platforms, or regional medical information sharing platforms, facilitating rapid deployment in medical institutions of different sizes and with varying security policy requirements, and possessing high engineering application value.

[0031] This invention addresses key technical problems commonly found in existing hospital record management systems, such as "coarse-grained permissions, lack of dynamic control over operational behavior, and untraceable behavior processes." It proposes a refined permission management mechanism centered on "digital record objects + operational-level permission control vectors." By deeply binding permission control parameters to record objects and dynamically verifying the matching relationship between user behavior and corresponding permissions before operation execution, it effectively avoids the risk of unauthorized access inherent in traditional "authorization equals full authority" systems.

[0032] Meanwhile, the system introduces a high-risk operation frequency control mechanism and a structured log audit system, and builds a closed-loop control process that covers the entire chain from user identification, permission generation, behavior judgment and log traceability, which significantly improves the controllability, security and compliance verifiability of file operations.

[0033] In summary, this invention, while ensuring efficient digital processing and multi-role sharing of hospital records, constructs an intelligent security control system with "identity recognition as the entry point, permission parameters as the core, operational behavior as the driver, and log recording as the support." This comprehensively enhances the hospital record management system's capabilities in terms of sharing, security, and compliance, demonstrating significant technological advancements and practical value. Attached Figure Description

[0034] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall process of a digital sharing and management method for hospital records according to the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the module structure of the hospital records digital sharing management system of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the logical judgment of the user operation behavior control process in this invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the threshold judgment for leakage prevention control in high-risk operations in this invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the logical structure of the digital archive object D in this invention; Figure 6 This is a diagram showing the mapping relationship between the permission control vector P and user roles and file attributes in this invention. Detailed Implementation

[0035] To better understand the technical solution and implementation process of this invention, the various components, operation flow, and system functions of this invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific examples. It should be noted that these embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical concept of this invention and do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention; various equivalent modifications or substitutions can be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the core idea of ​​this invention, and all such modifications or substitutions should be covered within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0036] I. General Description of Implementation Methods This invention provides a digital sharing management method and security access control system for hospital records, aiming to solve problems such as crude access control, uncontrollable operational behavior, and difficulty in tracing record leaks in the multi-user collaborative management of hospital records in existing technologies. The following detailed embodiments, in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, will describe in detail the system architecture, functional modules, operation flow, and data structure of this invention.

[0037] 1. Specific embodiments of the present invention illustrate the specific implementation process of the digital sharing management method and security access control system for hospital records described in the present invention. The embodiments include detailed explanations of the technical implementation of core functional modules and operation processes such as digital record modeling, user identification, access parameter generation, operation behavior judgment, leakage prevention constraints, and log traceability.

[0038] 2. It should be understood that, without departing from the basic technical concept of this invention, those skilled in the art can replace, adjust or optimize the specific parameter settings, module division structure, permission expression form and algorithm flow used in the implementation method according to actual business needs or system environment. All such equivalent transformations should fall within the protection scope of this invention.

[0039] 3. To facilitate understanding and support of the technical solutions of this invention, the following embodiments will be described step by step in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, including but not limited to: an overall flowchart of the method, a system functional structure diagram, a permission judgment logic diagram, a leakage prevention control flowchart, a digital archive object structure diagram, and a permission control mapping relationship diagram, etc. The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention.

[0040] II. Example 1: Overall Structure Example of Hospital Records Digital Sharing Management System (corresponding to) Figure 2 ) This embodiment provides a digital sharing management and security access control system for hospital records. The system consists of multiple functional modules and has functions such as digital modeling of records, user identification, access control policy generation, operation behavior control, leakage prevention constraints, and log traceability. The modules work together to achieve secure sharing and refined access management of hospital records in a multi-user environment.

[0041] 2.1 System Deployment Environment Description In this embodiment, the system is deployed within the hospital's internal information technology infrastructure, specifically including the following configuration methods: The system runs on the hospital's local server or private cloud platform and can be expanded into a virtualized cluster deployment according to the actual business scale, meeting the dual requirements of high concurrency and data security. Users access the system through the hospital's local area network (LAN) or an encrypted secure network (such as an SSL VPN), ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of data during transmission; The system supports access from multiple terminals, including doctor workstations, nurse station terminals, infection control management terminals, and audit management terminals. Different terminals automatically load the corresponding permission interfaces and functional modules based on user role types.

[0042] 2.2 System Functional Module Composition like Figure 2 As shown, the system includes the following six core functional modules: (1) Digital Archives Management Module This module receives paper or electronic medical records from within the hospital and completes digital modeling through OCR recognition, document parsing, and metadata extraction to form a unified format of digital archive objects (D). Each digital archive object contains archive content data (C), a unique identifier (ID), a set of access control parameters (P), and an operation log index (L), which are stored in a structured manner in the database to support subsequent access control and operation tracking.

[0043] (2) User identification module This module connects to the hospital's unified identity authentication system (such as LDAP, OA authentication, or HIS account management) to verify the identity of accessing users. The system extracts the user's unique identifier (UID), role type (R), and department information (S) from the user's information, forming a user identity parameter set U = {UID, R, S}, which serves as the core input data for permission judgment and behavior auditing.

[0044] (3) Permission policy generation module This module automatically generates an access control vector P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p) based on the user identity parameter set U and the attribute information of the target file D. These vectors correspond to read, edit, copy, and print permissions, respectively, with each permission value being either 0 or 1. When a file has a high sensitivity level or special access requirements, the system can introduce an additional parameter G (sensitivity level) to dynamically adjust the P vector and bind the final access control vector to the corresponding file object D.

[0045] (4) Operation behavior control module When a user initiates an operation request O on a file, this module identifies the operation type T (such as read, edit, copy, print), reads the bound permission vector P, and matches it with the corresponding permission item p_T. If the value is 1, the operation is allowed; if it is 0, execution is denied, and a prompt message is returned. This module implements dynamic permission control based on operation granularity.

[0046] (5) Leakage prevention control module This module controls the frequency of high-risk operations such as copying and printing. When a user initiates a high-risk operation, the system automatically counts the number of related operations (N_o) within a preset time window and compares it with a system-defined security threshold (θ). If N_o > θ, the system interrupts the current operation and records a security alarm event to prevent data from being exported in bulk or disseminated illegally.

[0047] (6) Log auditing and traceability module This module records all allowed or denied user actions and generates a standardized log structure l_i ={UID, ID, T, t, Result}, which includes fields such as user identity, target file, operation type, timestamp, and result status. The log data is uniformly stored in the log index L, supporting subsequent multi-dimensional queries by user, operation type, time period, etc., for access behavior auditing and accountability.

[0048] 2.3 Inter-module collaboration relationships In this system, the modules communicate and transfer control logic through internal interfaces. The main collaboration process is as follows: The archive digitization management module first constructs a complete digital archive object D, which serves as the basic data source for other modules to call. The user identification module obtains the identity parameter U of the currently operating user and passes it to the permission policy generation module; After receiving U and D, the permission policy generation module calculates and outputs the permission control vector P, and then writes P into D. When a user initiates a specific operation request O, the operation behavior control module reads P from D, determines whether the operation type T is allowed to be executed, and triggers subsequent modules. If the operation is copying or printing, the system will synchronously call the leak prevention control module to determine the threshold. Ultimately, all operation results are recorded and archived by the log auditing and traceability module, forming a closed-loop behavior management chain.

[0049] This modular architecture has clear functional boundaries, good scalability and engineering feasibility, and supports on-demand deployment, role configuration and risk strategy customization. It is particularly suitable for various medical institutions to promote and apply in business scenarios where data sharing and information security are equally important.

[0050] III. Example 2: Basic Process Example of Hospital Records Digital Sharing Management Method (corresponding to) Figure 1 ) This embodiment combines Figure 1 The flowchart shown illustrates in detail the specific execution process of the hospital record digitization and sharing management method described in this invention. This method takes digital record objects as its core, and after a user access request is triggered, it sequentially completes operations such as identity verification, permission parameter generation, operation judgment, behavior control, and audit traceability, constructing a closed-loop management process from "record modeling" to "secure use."

[0051] 3.1 Archival Digitization Process In this embodiment, all types of hospital archival resources, including paper documents and existing electronic documents, are uniformly entered into a digital modeling process before archiving. The specific steps are as follows: A unified modeling approach for paper and electronic archives: Paper archives are digitized using high-precision scanning and OCR recognition technology, while existing electronic archives (such as Word, PDF, and image files) are directly parsed for their content and metadata. Regardless of the source type, the system converts them into a structured data model, forming a unified management format.

[0052] The system generates a globally unique identifier (ID) for each digital file. This ID can be automatically encoded based on the file's source, type, timestamp, and serial number, for example, in the format "HIS-20251201-000123". This ID is used for internal system retrieval and permission binding.

[0053] Data structure description of digital archive objects: Each digital archive object D includes at least four core fields: ``` D = {ID, C, P, L} ``` in: ID: Unique file number; C: Archive content data (including main text, metadata, attachments, etc.); P: Set of access control parameters (initialized to empty, generated by subsequent processes); L: Operation log index pointer, used to record and trace subsequent user behavior.

[0054] Through the above processing, the system establishes an identifiable, manageable, and scalable file entity, providing a unified data foundation for subsequent access control and operation judgment.

[0055] 3.2 User Access Request Process During the operation of the hospital information system, when users select and initiate access to or operation requests for target files through the operation interface on terminal devices (such as doctor workstations, nurse stations, etc.), the system response process is as follows: User access request triggering methods: Access requests can originate from user-initiated file retrieval, access to associated medical record information, task flow node triggering, etc. Operation request O must include at least user identifier, target file ID, and operation type T (such as read, edit, copy, print).

[0056] The process for obtaining user identity information: The system automatically identifies the login credentials of the currently operating user by connecting to the hospital's unified identity authentication module, and extracts its identity parameters from the user information database, including: UID: User's unique identifier; R: Role type (e.g., doctor, nurse, administrator, etc.); S: The organizational unit or department to which it belongs.

[0057] User identity parameter validity verification: The system verifies the validity of the UID to confirm its validity and checks whether the user's role and department have the basic access permissions for this type of file. After successful verification, the identity parameters U = {UID, R, S} are passed to the permission judgment module.

[0058] This stage ensures that the party initiating the file operation has a legitimate identity authorized by the system, and is the entry point and prerequisite for the entire access control process.

[0059] 3.3 Permission Parameter Generation and Binding Process After obtaining the valid identity parameter U, the system starts the permission policy generation module, which calculates the permission control parameters based on the dual attributes of the user and the file, as follows: The generation of access control parameters is based on the following dimensions for access control judgment: User role R; User's department: S; File type and sensitivity level G (if set); Hospital-wide access control policy configuration (such as blacklists, whitelists, and special exception settings).

[0060] The binding method between permission parameters and file objects: The system generates a permission vector P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p), representing read, edit, copy, and print permissions respectively, with each value being 0 (prohibited) or 1 (allowed). The generated permission vector will be directly written into the field P of the corresponding digital file object D, forming a "user-file-permission" ternary binding relationship.

[0061] Explanation of permission parameter storage location: Permission parameter P is stored inside the file object data structure D. It serves as the basis for determining the authorized behavior of the file during its current system lifecycle. Any operation on the file must read this parameter and perform a matching judgment in the permission judgment module.

[0062] Through this process, the system has implemented a fine-grained dynamic control mechanism for access control, which is based on "on-demand generation, file binding, and behavior judgment," laying the foundation for subsequent behavior execution and leak prevention control.

[0063] To improve the structure and dynamism of system access control, the access control vector P in this invention can be stored and transmitted using a standard data structure. The following is an example of the structure of an access control vector P: ``` P = { "read": true, "write": false, "copy": false, "print": true, "expire": "2025-12-31T23:59:59Z" } ``` In the above structure, `read`, `write`, `copy`, and `print` correspond to whether a user has read, edit, copy, and print permissions, respectively, and are represented by Boolean values. The `expire` field indicates the expiration time of the permission control vector, which is suitable for temporary access control policies for sensitive files. This structure not only facilitates the transfer and parsing of permission parameters between modules, but also provides a unified data foundation for leakage prevention strategies and log auditing mechanisms, possessing good scalability and operability.

[0064] IV. Example 3: Example of File Operation Behavior Control Based on Permission Parameters (corresponding to) Figure 3 ) This embodiment combines Figure 3 The flowchart shown illustrates the implementation process of the file operation behavior control mechanism in this invention. This process begins with a user-initiated file operation request. The system identifies the operation type, reads permission parameters, and performs matching judgments to achieve dynamic authorization and control response to user operations, thus constructing an execution logic of "restricted operation behavior and controllable permissions."

[0065] 4.1 Operation Type Recognition Mechanism In this invention, user requests for file operations are explicitly categorized into the following four basic behaviors: Read: The user opens the file and browses its contents; Edit (Write): Users modify, supplement, or update the content of the archive; Copy: The user copies the contents of a file to external media or a temporary cache; Print: Users output files as paper documents or export them as PDF or other formats.

[0066] For each user-initiated operation request O, the system first extracts the operation type T through the operation type recognition module and maps it to the corresponding permission item in the permission control vector P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p): Operation type T Corresponding permission item p_T Read p_r Edit p_w Copy p_c Print p_p The system determines the required permission item p_T based on T, which serves as the input parameter for the permission determination process.

[0067] 4.2 Permission Check Execution Flow After the operation type is identified, the system immediately enters the permission determination process and executes the following steps: Permission parameter reading method: The system extracts the permission control parameter P from the current file object D. This parameter is pre-calculated and bound by the permission policy generation module and stored in the DP field, which has integrity and uniqueness.

[0068] Permission judgment conditions: The system judges the permission of operation behavior based on the following logic: If p_T = 1, then the operation is allowed; If p_T = 0, then the operation is rejected.

[0069] Where p_T is the permission bit corresponding to operation type T, and the permission value is a boolean, indicating whether the user has the qualification to execute the action in the current context.

[0070] System response methods for allowing and denying operations: When the judgment result is "allowed", the system immediately calls the corresponding function interface to execute the requested operation; When the judgment result is "rejected", the system suspends the operation process and displays messages such as "No permission to perform this operation" or "This operation has been restricted" through the user interface, while generating a rejection log record.

[0071] This process implements a real-time permission verification and response mechanism for user operations, effectively preventing unauthorized or erroneous operations.

[0072] 4.3 Processing of Operation Results Based on the permission assessment result, the system processes and archives the final result of the operation, as follows: Processing flow when the operation is successfully executed: The system calls the corresponding module to execute user requests, such as reading files, writing content, and initiating print commands. After the operation is completed, a structured operation log l_i = {UID, ID, T, t, Result} is generated, where Result is "Allow", and written to the log index L; If the operation is a high-risk behavior (such as printing or copying), a call request is sent to the anti-leakage module to determine whether the operation threshold has been exceeded.

[0073] Handling procedures when an operation is rejected: The system immediately terminates the execution of subsequent operations; Return an explicit rejection response in the interface or API; Similarly, a corresponding log l_i is generated, where Result is “Deny”, for subsequent behavior auditing; An optional notification mechanism can be triggered to report abnormal attempts to the audit administrator or system administrator.

[0074] Through the above-mentioned operation result processing mechanism, the system achieves comprehensive recording of the execution status of behavior and subsequent traceability support, ensuring the compliance and supervision of the system usage process.

[0075] In embodiments of this invention, by constructing an access control vector and binding it to a digital archive object, the system can perform access control judgments for different operation types. This approach differs from the existing control mode that uses "whether access is allowed" as a single judgment condition, and achieves differentiated control over operations such as reading, editing, copying, and printing.

[0076] The resulting technical effect is that even if multiple users legally access the same file within the same time period, their executable operations are still dynamically constrained by permission parameters. This avoids unauthorized operations caused by overly coarse permission granularity at the system level, thereby improving the security and controllability in file sharing scenarios.

[0077] V. Example 4: Specific Implementation of Leakage Prevention Control Mechanism (corresponding to) Figure 4 ) To prevent digital archives from being illegally copied, exported, or printed in bulk during shared use, thus causing leaks, this embodiment provides a leakage prevention control mechanism based on high-risk operation identification and frequency limits. This mechanism improves the security control depth and real-time response of the archive management system by real-time identification, statistics, and threshold comparison of high-frequency user operations, automatically blocking operations and issuing alarms when limits are exceeded.

[0078] 5.1 High-Risk Operation Identification Rules In this invention, the system first defines the following two types of operations as high-risk behaviors: Copy operation: refers to the user copying file content or fragments to external systems (such as clipboard, temporary cache, third-party applications). Print operation: refers to the user outputting the contents of the file as a paper document or exporting it as a portable electronic format (such as PDF, XPS).

[0079] Upon receiving an operation request O, the system determines the current operation type T through the operation type identification module. If T ∈ {copy, print}, the leakage prevention control process is immediately triggered, and the current operation behavior is included in the risk management scope.

[0080] The timing for triggering the leak prevention mechanism is as follows: The permission check module returns "allowed" (i.e., *p_T = 1*). And the operation type is copy or print; At this point, the operation frequency statistics and threshold judgment process is initiated (see...). Figure 4 (Decision node S401).

[0081] 5.2 Method for Counting the Number of Operations After a high-risk operation is identified, the system needs to determine whether the user is in a state of frequent operation. To this end, a time window constraint and an operation count mechanism are introduced: The definition of the preset time window: The system administrator can configure the statistical period according to business needs. Common settings include the last 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 1 hour, etc. The time window is updated by sliding based on the timestamp of the operation event.

[0082] The method for counting the number of operations: The system maintains a corresponding counter N_o for each type of high-risk operation. Every time a user UID performs a valid copy or print operation, the counter is incremented by 1. The statistical logic is as follows: ``` N_o ← count(UID, T, TimeWindow) ``` Statistical isolation method for different users: The system constructs statistical dimensions based on "user level + operation type", that is, each user maintains an independent counter under each operation type, ensuring that frequency judgment has user isolation and operation independence, and preventing misjudgment.

[0083] 5.3 Threshold Judgment and Control Strategy To ensure that the system can prevent abnormal behavior without interfering with normal usage, this invention proposes a flexible and adjustable threshold judgment and control strategy, as follows: Principles for setting security thresholds: The default threshold θ can be preset by the system, for example, the copy threshold is 5 times / hour and the printing threshold is 3 times / hour; Administrators can configure differentiated threshold policies based on user roles (such as general doctors and administrators), file types (such as general records and highly sensitive files), or organizational levels to achieve dynamic protection; Threshold configuration supports strategy scripting and can be linked to risk level models.

[0084] The process of comparing the number of operations with the threshold: When a user triggers a high-risk operation, the system calls the statistics module to return the current operation count N_o and compares it with the configured threshold θ: ``` If N_o ≤ θ → the operation is allowed; If N_o>θ → Operation rejected + Alarm.

[0085] ``` Explanation of control measures when the threshold is exceeded: Interrupted operation: The system automatically blocks the current copy / print command and does not proceed to the subsequent execution stage; Trigger a security alert: Generate a security event log and push it to the management terminal or information security platform; Lock permissions (optional): For serious violations, the system can automatically and temporarily revoke the user's high-risk operation permissions, pending administrator approval; Archived analysis after multiple triggers: Frequently triggered behaviors are recorded as potential security events in the behavior model for post-event auditing or AI risk modeling.

[0086] Through the leakage prevention control mechanism provided in this embodiment, the system achieves dynamic monitoring, near real-time response, and strategic interception of high-risk operational behaviors, which greatly improves the hospital's record system's anti-leakage capability in a multi-user environment and meets the high standards of data security compliance required by the medical industry.

[0087] Building upon permission checks, this invention further introduces an operation frequency statistics and threshold judgment mechanism for high-risk operations such as copying and printing, enabling dynamic risk assessment of user behavior. By statistically analyzing the number of operations within a preset time window and comparing it with a security threshold, the system can apply secondary constraints to abnormally high-frequency operations, provided that permissions are permitted.

[0088] The technical effect of this solution is that the system can not only block unauthorized operations, but also intercept operations with permissions but with abnormal behavior trends in real time, thereby effectively preventing files from being exported in a centralized manner, copied in batches, or disseminated without authorization, and improving the proactive protection capability of the file management system in actual operation.

[0089] As can be seen from the above (2-4) implementation methods, the present invention does not simply adjust the business rules of the existing hospital record management process, but rather introduces a permission parameter binding mechanism with digital record objects as the core, which transforms permission control from the traditional "user-level authorization" to "operation-level and object-level control", significantly improving the precision of record access control from a technical perspective.

[0090] Compared with existing technologies, this invention directly binds permission control vectors to the file object, so that each operation must be matched and judged before execution. This avoids the problem that users can still perform high-risk operations without restriction after obtaining access rights, and effectively reduces the risk of loss of control of files during the sharing process.

[0091] VI. Example 5: Operation Log Recording and Audit Traceability Example To ensure controllable access and traceable operation of hospital records in a multi-user shared environment, this embodiment provides a structured operation log recording and audit traceability mechanism. Based on the principles of "complete log content, accurate recording nodes, and efficient audit retrieval," this mechanism constructs a behavior traceability system that runs through the entire process of record use, significantly improving the system's ability to visually monitor data usage risks.

[0092] 6.1 Composition of Operation Log Content The system generates a complete log record l_i for each file operation, and its field structure includes, but is not limited to, the following: Composition of log fields: ``` l_i = { UID, ID, T, t, Result, TerminalInfo, IP, ErrorCode} ``` The meanings of each field are as follows: UID: User's unique identifier; ID: A unique identifier for the target file; T: Operation type (read, edit, copy, print); t: Operation timestamp; Result: Execution result (success / failure); TerminalInfo: Terminal information (such as device number, workstation name); IP: Network address information; ErrorCode (optional): The error code or reason for rejection corresponding to the failed operation.

[0093] How user information is linked to profile information: Each log record is linked by the user's UID and the file ID as the core primary key, forming an audit chain that tracks "who performed what operation on which file, when, and what." This linkage structure allows for quick filtering of historical behavior by user or file dimension, facilitating categorized auditing and behavior tracing.

[0094] 6.2 Timing of Log Recording The system sets up multi-level logging points throughout the entire operation lifecycle to ensure that the entire operation process is reproducible. These mainly include the following two types of nodes: Record nodes before and after the operation: After an operation request is received, the system enters the permission assessment stage. If the permissions are insufficient, the system will immediately record a rejection log before rejecting the operation. If permissions permit, the system generates a corresponding success log after performing the operation, ensuring that every action is clearly recorded.

[0095] Differences in recording successful and failed operations: For successful operations, the Result field in the log is marked as "Allow", and information such as operation time and summary of returned results can be attached; For failed operations, mark them as "Deny" and record the reason for the failure (such as insufficient permissions, exceeding the frequency limit, network abnormality, etc.) for troubleshooting or monitoring of violations.

[0096] The system can optionally enable a "dual write strategy" to simultaneously synchronize high-risk operation logs to both the database and a third-party auditing system, thereby improving audit reliability.

[0097] 6.3 Log Query and Auditing Applications The system provides efficient and flexible log query and audit support, suitable for various scenarios such as hospital internal control, compliance inspection, and emergency tracing. Details are as follows: Log query methods: Supports queries based on multiple conditions, such as: by user UID, by file ID, by operation type T, and by time interval t; It supports aggregated analysis based on metrics such as user behavior frequency, failure rate, and operation density; Provides a visual reporting interface, which can export audit reports (supporting PDF, Excel and other formats).

[0098] Application scenarios of logs in security auditing: Abnormal behavior tracking: Quickly identify the person responsible for frequent copying or printing and the trigger time; Compliance inspection support: Provides verifiable evidence for hospital data security self-inspections or audits by higher-level authorities; Internal accountability: In the event of information leakage or security breach, logs serve as an important basis for internal accountability and incident analysis; Assisting AI modeling: Log data can also be used to build user behavior profiles and risk prediction models, laying the data foundation for the subsequent introduction of intelligent risk control systems.

[0099] Through the aforementioned log recording and auditing mechanisms, this invention ensures that the entire process of record usage is traceable, controllable, and visible, meeting the core demands of medical institutions in terms of data security, compliant operation, and attribution of responsibility.

[0100] In an embodiment of the present invention, a structured log record is generated for each file operation, and user identity information is associated with and stored with file identifiers, so that the access and use of files have complete traceability.

[0101] Compared with existing technologies that only record login or simple access logs, this invention can accurately reconstruct the specific operations performed by a user on a specific file at a specific point in time. In the event of an anomaly or security incident, the responsible party can be quickly located and the operation path can be reconstructed, thereby improving the hospital's technical support capabilities in information security auditing and compliance management.

[0102] VII. Example 6: Comprehensive Application Example (Typical Business Scenarios) This embodiment further illustrates the specific application effects of the digital sharing management method and security access control system for hospital records described in this invention in practical applications such as multi-user, multi-role, and highly sensitive record management. The following three scenarios demonstrate the capabilities of this invention in collaborative viewing, collaborative editing, and leak prevention control.

[0103] 7.1 Multi-user collaborative viewing of the implementation example In clinical multidisciplinary team (MDT) consultations or collaborative ward rounds between medical staff, there are situations where multiple users (such as attending physicians, head nurses, and consulting experts) simultaneously view the same patient's medical record.

[0104] The process of multiple users viewing the same file simultaneously: Each user initiates a file viewing request through the system interface on their work terminal; The system performs an independent "read permission" judgment for each user based on their identity parameter U = {UID, R, S} and the permission control parameter P bound in the file object D; If the condition p_r = 1 is met, viewing is allowed, and the system loads the file content for the user to browse without affecting the original user.

[0105] Access control restricts viewing behavior in the following ways: If a user does not have file reading permissions (such as an unauthorized surgeon accessing internal medicine documents), the system will directly reject the request and generate a rejection operation log; The system can set additional restrictions on viewing behavior, such as allowing only read-only mode, prohibiting full-text search, prohibiting screenshots or export, etc., to ensure that the file content is controllable but not leaked during collaborative viewing.

[0106] This mechanism ensures that, under the premise of team collaboration, user access to files remains under access control, balancing efficiency and security.

[0107] 7.2 Example of Multi-User Collaborative Editing In scenarios such as medical document co-signing and collaborative nursing plan development, users in different positions may need to collaboratively edit the same file content.

[0108] Multi-user editing permission configuration: The system supports configuring edit permissions with p_w = 1 for multiple user roles, such as attending physician, responsible nurse, and superior reviewer; Within the same time period, the system determines whether a user has the right to edit and execute based on the operation priority, current lock status, or role priority.

[0109] Basic methods for handling editing conflicts: If multiple users initiate editing operations on the same file object, the system will grant the first user to enter the editing state "lock editing rights" first, and the remaining users will enter the "read-only" or "waiting to edit" state. Once editing is complete, the system automatically unlocks, allowing the next authorized user to continue the operation; This mechanism avoids issues such as data overwriting, write conflicts, and document version confusion, ensuring editing consistency and information integrity.

[0110] Through collaborative editing permission management, the system of this invention can support asynchronous editing and sequential signing by multiple people in complex medical business scenarios, improving document processing efficiency and system controllability.

[0111] 7.3 Examples of Sensitive File Leakage Prevention Certain special documents, such as AIDS medical history, genetic disease records, and forensic appraisal reports, are highly sensitive archives, and stricter leak prevention strategies must be implemented during their access and use.

[0112] Permission configuration for highly sensitive files: The system can set a sensitivity level G for the file during the file modeling stage. Once the file level exceeds the preset threshold, the system will automatically adjust its access control vector P. By default, p_c (copy permission) and p_p (print permission) are disabled, and only p_r or limited p_w permissions are retained; Special permissions (such as printing paper copies) must be granted through manual approval, dual authorization, or time-limited authorization.

[0113] Explanation of the actual effectiveness of leak prevention control: Even if a user has viewing permissions, the system will still perform leak prevention statistics on the high-risk behaviors they perform; If a user attempts to copy or print files that the system deems highly sensitive within a short period of time, the system will trigger frequency over-limit control, immediately stop the operation, and generate a security alarm event. All actions are fully recorded for use in post-event audits or risk analyses.

[0114] This embodiment illustrates the ability of the present invention to process highly sensitive data. It not only relies on prior access control but also combines dynamic behavior monitoring and frequency control strategies to form a multi-layered protection mechanism, significantly improving the level of information security.

[0115] As can be seen from the above implementation examples of several typical business scenarios, the hospital record digitization and sharing management method and system proposed in this invention have the ability to flexibly adapt to multiple scenarios. While ensuring the efficiency of business collaboration, it builds a security control closed loop covering the entire chain of user identity, permission logic, operation behavior and log auditing, effectively improving the hospital's information construction level and compliance operation capabilities.

[0116] VIII. Explanation of the Scalability of the Implementation Method To accommodate the varying levels of IT sophistication, data management strategies, and security compliance requirements of different hospitals, the digital sharing management method and security access control system for hospital records described in this invention are designed with scalability and flexible deployment capabilities in mind, ensuring the system continues to perform effectively in the future despite technological advancements or business changes. Specific scalability details are as follows: 1. Extensibility of permission parameter types In the current implementation, the access control parameter vector P consists of four basic access items: ``` P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p) ``` These correspond to read, write, copy, and print permissions, respectively.

[0117] In the system design of this invention, the permission parameters adopt a structured data storage method, supporting the addition, modification, or combination of more permission types, such as: p_d (download permission); p_s (share / forward permission); p_v (view permissions of the original version); p_e (export structured data permission), etc.

[0118] The extended permission parameters can be expressed in the form of JSON structure, database field or permission bitmask, and dynamically mapped with operation type T to adapt to more file operation forms and permission control needs in the future.

[0119] The access control module provides an open interface, supporting integration with third-party access control platforms or identity management systems to further enhance cross-platform collaboration capabilities.

[0120] 2. Configurability of leakage prevention threshold rules The system's leakage prevention mechanism employs a combined strategy of "operation frequency + time window + safety threshold" to achieve dynamic behavioral constraints. Under the current scheme, the security threshold θ is a static configuration parameter based on user role and file type. In scalable designs, the following dynamic parameters can be used as inputs for threshold calculation: User historical behavior patterns (such as abnormal density); Sensitivity rating of file content; Time period risk weighting (e.g., increased vigilance when operating at night); Temporary policies for specific scenarios (such as automatically tightening permissions during major events); Administrators can adjust the default thresholds, behavior tolerance ranges, and alarm trigger levels for various operations through the system configuration platform to implement a hierarchical leakage protection strategy on demand.

[0121] In addition, the threshold rule engine supports the integration of AI analysis modules, which will enable adaptive policy adjustments based on user profiles in the future, further improving the level of intelligent protection.

[0122] 3. System module adaptability to different hospital sizes Considering the differences in scale, information system complexity, and budget among different hospitals, the system architecture provided by this invention features high modularity and deployment flexibility: Small hospitals or primary healthcare institutions: The core functional modules of the system of the present invention, such as digital file management, basic access control, and operation log recording, can be selected for standalone or lightweight deployment; Run on a local server or LAN environment to meet basic requirements for compliant use of archives.

[0123] Large tertiary hospitals or medical groups: It can deploy all modules and integrate leakage prevention control, behavior analysis, role mapping extension and third-party log platform integration; Supports distributed deployment architecture and is compatible with private cloud environments, microservice systems, and heterogeneous platform access. The system can be deeply integrated with unified identity management platforms (such as LDAP and SSO) and hospital information platforms (such as HIS, EMR, and PACS).

[0124] Regional medical collaboration platform: This system also supports cross-institutional sharing scenarios. Through standardized interfaces (such as FHIR and HL7) and data platform architecture design, it enables synchronization of file permissions and joint review of logs among hospitals, thereby improving the level of regional medical data governance.

[0125] In summary, this invention has good scalability and configurability in terms of permission model, leakage prevention control and system deployment. It can adapt to the flexible application needs of medical institutions at different stages of development and under different information security levels, and has high engineering feasibility and promotion value.

[0126] IX. Summary and Explanation of Implementation Methods As can be seen from the detailed description of the foregoing embodiments, the digital sharing management method and security access control system for hospital records provided by the present invention establishes a full-chain management mechanism that is identity-driven, precisely controlled in terms of permissions, traceable in terms of behavior, and controllable in terms of risk in terms of technical solutions. This solves key problems of existing hospital record systems, such as easy leakage, loose permissions, and difficulty in auditing in multi-user environments.

[0127] This invention constructs a systematic and secure sharing architecture through core implementation methods such as digital modeling of archives, user identification, generation of permission parameters, control of operational behavior, leakage prevention constraints, and log auditing and traceability, thereby realizing dynamic management and control of hospital archives throughout the entire process.

[0128] The proposed technical solution, while ensuring the feasibility of the project and the flexibility of system deployment, significantly improves the security, controllability and compliance of archives during use, and is applicable to the daily operation, security supervision and data governance requirements of various medical institutions.

[0129] This invention has excellent adaptability to business scenarios, and can support collaborative office work, document management and protection of highly sensitive data among multiple departments, positions and roles. It is applicable to digital file management in multiple business links in the medical industry, including outpatient, inpatient, nursing, consultation and auditing.

[0130] As can be seen from the above embodiments, this invention organically combines identity recognition, permission parameter binding, operation behavior control, leakage prevention constraints, and log traceability mechanisms to form a complete technical solution for hospital record sharing scenarios. This solution significantly improves the security, controllability, and auditability of record management from the perspectives of system structure and execution logic, while ensuring normal record sharing and efficient business collaboration.

[0131] This invention does not address a single management problem, but rather proposes an improved solution with clear technical means and achievable technical effects to address the technical shortcomings of existing hospital record systems in multi-user environments, such as insufficient granularity of permissions, uncontrollable operational behavior, and difficulty in tracing responsibility.

[0132] It should be noted that the above embodiments are merely preferred examples of the present invention, intended to help those skilled in the art better understand and implement the present invention. For those skilled in the art, various equivalent substitutions or modifications can be made to the specific structures, processes, parameters, etc., without departing from the spirit and essence of the present invention, and all such modifications should be covered within the scope of protection claimed by the present invention.

[0133] The scope of protection of this invention shall be determined by the appended claims. The embodiments in the specification are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of this invention and do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention.

Claims

1. A method for digital sharing and management of hospital records, characterized in that, When applied to a hospital records management system, the following steps are included: S1. Archival digitization modeling steps: Perform unified digitization processing on paper or electronic archives to generate corresponding digital archive objects D. The digital archive object D includes at least an archive identifier ID, archive content data C, a set of access control parameters P, and an operation log index L. S2. User identification and role mapping steps: Receive the access request from user U, and the system obtains the user identity parameter set U = {UID, R, S}, where UID is the user's unique identifier, R is the user's role type, and S is the department to which the user belongs; S3. Permission parameter generation and binding steps: The system generates a permission control vector P = (p_r, p_w, p_c, p_p) based on the user identity parameters and the attributes of the file object D, and binds it to the file object D, where p_r represents read permission, p_w represents edit permission, p_c represents copy permission, p_p represents print permission, and p_i ∈ {0,1}, i ∈ {r,w,c,p}; S4. Operation behavior judgment and execution steps: When user U initiates an operation request O on file object D, the system judges the corresponding permission parameter p_T according to the operation type T. If p_T = 1, the operation is allowed to be executed; if p_T = 0, the operation is refused to be executed. S5. Leakage prevention constraint control steps: If the operation type T is copy or print, the system counts the cumulative number of operations N_o of the user within a preset time window and compares it with the safety threshold θ. If N_o > θ, the operation is rejected and a safety alarm is triggered. S6. Operation Log Recording and Traceability Steps: The system generates a log l_i ={UID, ID, T, t, Result} for each allowed or denied operation, where t is the timestamp and Result is the execution result, and stores the log in the operation log index L.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The user role type R includes at least one or more of the following: doctor, nurse, administrator, and auditor. The system generates different sets of initial permission control parameters based on different roles.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The access control vector P can be dynamically adjusted according to the file sensitivity level G. When the file sensitivity level G is higher than the preset threshold, the system automatically disables the copy permission p_c and the print permission p_p.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security threshold θ can be dynamically configured according to the hospital's workload, user role, or department type to adapt to the usage needs of different departments.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The permission control vector P further includes an expiration time field p_exp, which is used to set the effective time window for a certain type of permission.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In the leakage prevention control steps, the system automatically adjusts the statistical time window length T_w and the threshold θ based on the file sensitivity level G.

7. A digital sharing management and security access control system for hospital records, characterized in that, include: The document digitization management module is used to digitize paper or electronic documents, generate and manage digital document objects (D); The user identity recognition module is used to obtain the user identity parameter set U and perform identity authentication. The permission policy generation module is used to generate a permission control vector P based on user identity parameters and file attributes and bind it to the file object D. The operation behavior control module is used to determine whether the user operation request O is allowed to be executed based on the permission parameter P; The leakage prevention control module is used to count the number of high-risk operations such as copying or printing and to determine thresholds. The log auditing and traceability module is used to record user operations on files and store them in the log index L; The modules described above work together to execute the method described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

8. The system according to claim 7, characterized in that, The log auditing module also includes a behavior risk scoring unit, which is used to calculate user risk scores based on indicators such as operation frequency and failure rate.

9. The system according to claim 8, characterized in that, The permission policy generation module interfaces with the hospital's single sign-on platform to implement access control based on identity tokens.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, the program, when executed by a processor, implementing the hospital records digital sharing management method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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