Blockchain-based ultra-high voltage equipment full-chain data trusted sharing system

Abstract

This invention discloses a blockchain-based trusted data sharing system for ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment across the entire chain, belonging to the field of power equipment data management technology. The invention includes: a distributed ledger data storage layer, comprising a data access and preprocessing module, a data hashing and metadata on-chain module, a secure block generation module, and a trusted consensus verification module; a data processing and privacy protection layer, comprising an intelligent data clustering analysis module and a privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module; and a data request and sharing management layer, used to receive request information from data requesters; to provide unique identifiers for participants at each stage and control data access permissions, sending request information to the data owner for verification; and to send the data corresponding to the requester's request information back to the requester after verification. This invention ensures the immutability of data at each stage of UHV equipment operation.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a blockchain-based trusted data sharing system for ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment across the entire chain, belonging to the field of power equipment data management technology. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous expansion of ultra-high voltage (UHV) power systems, the application of UHV equipment in power transmission and distribution is becoming increasingly widespread. UHV equipment generates a large amount of operational and management data throughout its entire lifecycle, including production, transportation, installation, operation, and maintenance. This data is crucial for equipment condition assessment, maintenance decisions, and fault analysis. However, in the supply chain and operation and maintenance management of UHV equipment, traditional data management systems face significant risks of data tampering, especially during data storage and transmission, where they are susceptible to human error or system vulnerabilities.

[0003] Blockchain technology, as a decentralized and distributed ledger technology, has significant characteristics such as decentralization and data immutability. However, how to combine blockchain technology with the full lifecycle management of ultra-high voltage equipment has become a problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention combines blockchain technology with the full lifecycle management of ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment, providing a blockchain-based trusted data sharing system for the entire UHV equipment chain. This system ensures the immutability of data at each stage of the equipment management process, achieving transparency, collaboration, and automation in equipment management.

[0005] The technical solution of this invention is:

[0006] A blockchain-based trusted data sharing system for ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment across the entire chain includes:

[0007] The distributed ledger data storage layer includes a data access and preprocessing module, a data hashing and metadata on-chain module, a secure block generation module, and a trusted consensus verification module. Specifically, the data access and preprocessing module receives data from ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment, preprocesses the data, and extracts key metadata; the data hashing and metadata on-chain module performs hash operations on the key metadata to generate fixed-length hash values ​​and packages the hash values ​​and associated key metadata into transactions; the secure block generation module aggregates the collected transactions, encapsulates them into new block headers to construct new blocks, and submits them to the trusted consensus verification module; and the trusted consensus verification module ensures that all participants agree on the order and content of the new blocks and verifies the validity, legality, and data integrity of the transactions.

[0008] The data processing and privacy protection layer includes an intelligent data clustering analysis module and a privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module. The intelligent data clustering analysis module is used to cluster the UHV equipment data to obtain clustering results after the trusted consensus verification module passes the verification. The privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module is used to encrypt the clustering results using a pairwise proxy re-encryption scheme.

[0009] The data request and sharing management layer is used to receive request information from data requesters; to provide unique identifiers for participants at each stage and control data access permissions; to send request information to the data owner for verification; and to send the data corresponding to the data requester's request information back to the data requester after verification.

[0010] Furthermore, the intelligent data clustering analysis module is used to perform clustering processing on the UHV equipment data using the K-means algorithm, after the trusted consensus verification module has passed the verification, to obtain the clustering results.

[0011] Furthermore, the pair-based proxy re-encryption scheme includes:

[0012] Generate basic common parameters;

[0013] Input the common parameters and execute the key generation algorithm to generate public and private keys for the data requester and data owner;

[0014] The data owner's plaintext is encrypted using a data encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext.

[0015] The data owner wants to authorize the data requester to decrypt their data. The data owner uses their private key and the data requester's public key to calculate the re-encryption key.

[0016] The proxy node that performs the proxy re-encryption operation is selected through a smart contract;

[0017] After receiving a re-encryption request, the proxy node uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the data owner, obtaining ciphertext that the data requester can decrypt.

[0018] The data requester receives the re-encrypted ciphertext, decrypts it using their private key, and obtains the plaintext.

[0019] Furthermore, the input public parameters are used to execute a key generation algorithm to generate public and private keys for the data requester and data owner, expressed as:

[0020] Data owner: Randomly selects private key Calculate the public key ;

[0021] Data requester: Randomly selects private key Calculate the public key ;

[0022] in, Refers to a set , The largest prime number in the common parameters; The order in the common parameters is cyclic subgroups; It is a cyclic subgroup Generators; These represent the private keys of the data owner and the data requester, respectively. , These represent the public keys of the data owner and the data requester, respectively; that is, the public key returned by the key generation algorithm to the data owner. and private key and the public key of the data requester and private key .

[0023] Furthermore, the step of performing a data encryption algorithm on the plaintext of the data owner to generate ciphertext specifically involves:

[0024] Select random number Calculate ciphertext :

[0025] ;

[0026] in, ; ; It is a bilinear mapping; The order in the common parameters is The target group.

[0027] Furthermore, after receiving the re-encryption request, the proxy node uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the data owner, obtaining ciphertext that the data requester can decrypt, expressed as:

[0028] ;

[0029] in, , ; It is a bilinear mapping.

[0030] Furthermore, the data request and sharing management layer specifically includes:

[0031] The receiving module receives various data access request information from data requesters through a standardized interface; and forwards the request information to the decentralized authentication and permission management module.

[0032] The decentralized identity verification and permission management module is used for each participant to register a unique identity identifier through the decentralized identity system; and to issue verifiable credentials for each participant based on their role and permissions; when a data requester needs to access UHV equipment data, it sends a data sharing request to the system, which includes the data requester's identity identifier and verifiable credentials; upon receiving the data request, the system's smart contract begins permission verification and parses the permission information carried in the verifiable credentials; the smart contract performs permission matching and control on the data request according to the fine-grained access strategy preset in the smart contract: if the identity identifier and verifiable credentials are verified and the permission matching is successful, the smart contract will authorize the data request, and then the system will notify the data owner that the request has been authorized and trigger the proxy re-encryption process described in the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module;

[0033] The secure data sharing and transmission module is used to generate re-encrypted ciphertext after the permission verification in the decentralized identity verification and permission management module is completed and the ciphertext re-encryption operation in the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module is successfully generated. The proxy node then transmits the re-encrypted ciphertext to the data requester through a secure communication channel.

[0034] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: The blockchain-based end-to-end data trust-sharing system provided by this invention ensures the immutability of data throughout the entire lifecycle management of UHV equipment, effectively solving problems such as data tampering and low collaborative efficiency in existing equipment management systems, and effectively guaranteeing the trustworthy sharing of UHV equipment data across the entire chain. Simultaneously, it promotes the development of intelligent equipment management and digital operation and maintenance, possessing significant technical and economic value, and is suitable for transparent traceability of UHV equipment supply chain and operation and maintenance data. Attached Figure Description

[0035] Figure 1 This is a system block diagram of the present invention.

[0036] Figure 2 The results are based on the K-means clustering of ultra-high voltage equipment data provided in the embodiments of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0037] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of this application can be arbitrarily combined with each other.

[0038] Example 1: As Figures 1-2 As shown, a blockchain-based, end-to-end data trust-sharing system for ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment includes:

[0039] The distributed ledger data storage layer includes a data access and preprocessing module, a data hashing and metadata on-chain module, a secure block generation module, and a trusted consensus verification module. Specifically, the data access and preprocessing module receives data from ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment, preprocesses the data, and extracts key metadata; the data hashing and metadata on-chain module performs hash operations on the key metadata to generate fixed-length hash values ​​and packages the hash values ​​and associated key metadata into transactions; the secure block generation module aggregates the collected transactions, encapsulates them into new block headers to construct new blocks, and submits them to the trusted consensus verification module; and the trusted consensus verification module ensures that all participants agree on the order and content of the new blocks and verifies the validity, legality, and data integrity of the transactions.

[0040] The data processing and privacy protection layer includes an intelligent data clustering analysis module and a privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module. The intelligent data clustering analysis module is used to cluster the UHV equipment data to obtain clustering results after the trusted consensus verification module passes the verification. The privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module is used to encrypt the clustering results using a pairwise proxy re-encryption scheme.

[0041] The data request and sharing management layer is used to receive request information from data requesters; to provide unique identifiers for participants at each stage and control data access permissions; to send request information to the data owner for verification; and to send the data corresponding to the data requester's request information back to the data requester after verification.

[0042] Furthermore, the distributed ledger data storage layer includes:

[0043] Data access and preprocessing module: This module receives data from UHV equipment (such as data from the entire lifecycle of production, testing, transportation, installation, operation, maintenance, and scrapping), then performs data cleaning, standardization, and format conversion preprocessing on the UHV equipment data, and extracts key metadata.

[0044] Data hashing and metadata on-chain module: Used to perform SHA-256 cryptographic hashing on key metadata to generate fixed-length hash values; package the hash values ​​and associated key metadata (such as device ID, data type, timestamp, data owner DID, off-chain storage location index, etc.) into a transaction.

[0045] Secure Block Generation Module: This module aggregates the collected transactions, generates a Merkle root by constructing a Merkle tree, and encapsulates the Merkle root, the hash value of the previous block, the timestamp, and the block sequence number into a new block header to construct a new block, which is then submitted to the Trusted Consensus Verification Module.

[0046] Trusted Consensus Verification Module: Used with the PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) consensus algorithm to ensure that all participants agree on the order and content of new blocks, and to verify the validity, legality and data integrity of transactions, thus guaranteeing the eventual consistency of on-chain data state.

[0047] Furthermore, the intelligent data clustering analysis module is used to perform clustering processing on the UHV equipment data using the K-means algorithm, after the trusted consensus verification module has passed the verification, to obtain the clustering results. The specific formula is:

[0048] ;

[0049] in, It is the sum of the squares of the Euclidean distances from all data points to the centroid of their respective clusters. It is the number of clusters; It is the first The th cluster One data point; It is the first The centroid of a cluster; It is the first The number of data points in each cluster; Data points To the cluster center The square of the Euclidean distance.

[0050] The specific process is as follows: initialize the centroids, then allocate data points. For each data point, assign it to the centroid closest to it. The cluster in which it belongs. That is, for each data point turn up:

[0051] ;

[0052] in, It is an index of all clusters. It is the centroid of the corresponding cluster.

[0053] Update the centroids and recalculate the centroids of each cluster. :

[0054] ;

[0055] in, It is the first The set of data points in each cluster It is the first The size of a cluster (i.e., the number of data points).

[0056] Then continue to allocate data points and update the centroid until the centroid stops changing, changes very little, or reaches the maximum number of iterations.

[0057] Furthermore, the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module is used to encrypt the clustering results using a pairwise proxy re-encryption scheme.

[0058] Furthermore, the specific workflow of the pair-based proxy re-encryption scheme is as follows:

[0059] Initialization: Run the common parameter generation algorithm Generate basic common parameters ,in, It is a large prime number. Is the order as cyclic subgroups Is the order as Target group It is a bilinear mapping. yes The generators. All participants can access and use these public parameters.

[0060] The specific process is as follows:

[0061] First, enter a security parameter. This safety parameter This determines the overall security strength of the scheme. Based on this security parameter, a finite domain is selected. (in It is a large prime number whose number of digits is determined by... (Decision), and define an elliptic curve for bilinear pair computation. Then in the elliptic curve group In the middle, identify and construct a prime number of order large. cyclic subgroups ,in The size is also determined by safety parameters. Decisions to ensure the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is solved in cyclic subgroups. The computational difficulty in the process. Then from the cyclic subgroup. Randomly select a generator At the same time, define an order as target group The target group is usually a finite extended domain. ,in Let be the embedding degree of the curve. Finally, the algorithm constructs a bilinear mapping that satisfies the properties of bilinearity, non-degeneracy, and computability: The final output is the common parameters. .

[0062] (2) Key generation: Input public parameters and execute the key generation algorithm KeyGen(pub). The key generation algorithm is responsible for generating the public and private keys of the data requester and the data owner.

[0063] Data owner A: Randomly selects a private key Calculate the public key .

[0064] Data requester B: Randomly selects a private key Calculate the public key .

[0065] in, Refers to a set ; These represent the private keys of data owner A and data requester B, respectively. , These represent the public keys of data owner A and data requester B, respectively; that is, the public key of data owner A returned by the key generation algorithm. and private key and the public key of data requester B. and private key .

[0066] (3) Data encryption: Plaintext encryption of data owner A Execute the data encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext. (Assuming) ).

[0067] Select random number Calculate the ciphertext:

[0068] ;

[0069] in, ; ; It is a bilinear mapping, and the same applies to subsequent ones.

[0070] (4) Re-encryption key generation: Data owner A wants to authorize data requester B to decrypt its data. Data owner A uses its private key. and the public key of data requester B Calculate the re-encryption key .

[0071] (5) Proxy node selection: The proxy node to perform the proxy re-encryption operation is selected through the smart contract. .

[0072] ;

[0073] in, The block height difference refers to the number of blocks added to the blockchain since the last proxy node selection; The block timestamp refers to the timestamp of the current block. This represents the total number of available proxy nodes. This formula aims to select proxy nodes dynamically and fairly using on-chain information.

[0074] (6) Ciphertext Re-encryption: After receiving the re-encryption request, the agent node uses the re-encryption key. Ciphertext encrypted for data owner A Re-encrypt to obtain ciphertext that data requester B can decrypt. .

[0075] The ;in: ; .

[0076] (7) Re-encryption and decryption: Data requester B receives the re-encrypted ciphertext Using its private key Decrypt to obtain plaintext .

[0077] The specific steps for determining the correctness of decrypting the re-encrypted ciphertext are as follows:

[0078] Data requester B uses private key Decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext According to the re-encryption process:

[0079] ;

[0080] ;

[0081] Substitution , , :

[0082] ;

[0083] Now use the decryption formula from data requester B. get:

[0084] ;

[0085] As can be seen from the above, the result is consistent with the original plaintext. The same result proves that the decryption and re-encryption of the ciphertext is correct.

[0086] The specific steps for determining the correctness of the ciphertext conversion are as follows:

[0087] The core of the proxy re-encryption scheme lies in the fact that the proxy node can encrypt the ciphertext sent to data owner A without obtaining the plaintext and the data owner's private key. Converted into ciphertext that can be decrypted by data requester B. The following will formally verify the correctness of this conversion process.

[0088] This invention aims to achieve the desired result through proxy re-encryption operations. Convert to , making It is the public key of data requester B. plaintext The result of encryption. That is, the expected outcome. It must meet the following form:

[0089] ;

[0090] ;

[0091] Next, we will verify how the proxy node utilizes the re-encryption key. This conversion is achieved using known public key information.

[0092] Re-encrypt input:

[0093] The encrypted ciphertext by data owner A Re-encryption key Common parameters Public key and (Proxy nodes can access this public information).

[0094] Re-encryption operation (performed by the proxy node):

[0095] Proxy node receives It will As The first component, namely .for The second component The proxy node needs to be built as .

[0096] The proxy node performs the following calculations:

[0097] ;

[0098] Therefore, the re-encrypted ciphertext for:

[0099] ;

[0100] ;

[0101] This is exactly the plain text Using the public key of data requester B The encrypted standard form. During this process, the proxy node only performs group operations and does not acquire or recover the plaintext. This ensures the confidentiality of the data by preventing any information from being leaked.

[0102] The data request and sharing management layer specifically includes:

[0103] The receiving module receives various data access request information from data requesters through a standardized interface; and forwards the request information to the decentralized authentication and permission management module. The request information typically includes the data requester's decentralized identity identifier (DID), verifiable credentials (VCs) used to prove their identity and permissions, and the specific data identifier (data cluster ID, hash value) requested for access.

[0104] The decentralized identity verification and permission management module is used for each participant to register a unique identity through the decentralized identity system; and to issue verifiable credentials (VCs) for each participant based on their role and permissions. These VCs contain specific attributes and permission information associated with the participant's DID. When a data requester needs to access UHV equipment data, it sends a data sharing request to the system. This request contains the data requester's identity and the relevant verifiable credentials used to prove its identity and permissions. Upon receiving the data request, the system's smart contract begins permission verification, specifically verifying the validity of the requester's DID, the authenticity and completeness of the VCs, and parsing the permission information carried in the verifiable credentials. Based on a fine-grained access strategy preset in the smart contract, the smart contract performs permission matching and control on the data request: if the identity and verifiable credentials are verified and the permission matching is successful, the smart contract will authorize the data request. Subsequently, the system will notify the data owner that the request has been authorized and trigger the proxy re-encryption process described in the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module.

[0105] The secure data sharing and transmission module is used to ensure that after the permission verification in the decentralized authentication and permission management module is completed and the ciphertext re-encryption operation in the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module is successful, the re-encrypted ciphertext is generated. The proxy node then transmits the re-encrypted ciphertext to the data requester through a secure communication channel, such as using a peer-to-peer network transmission protocol or a distributed file system (IPFS) for efficient and reliable transmission. After the data requester receives the re-encrypted ciphertext, the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module uses its private key to decrypt it and recover the original plaintext.

[0106] The following simulation further illustrates this point:

[0107] I. Data Background:

[0108] A critical transformer (equipment ID: UHV-TR-001) in the UHVDC transmission system of a power grid company under China Southern Power Grid recently experienced slight fluctuations in its temperature sensor data, leading the operation and maintenance center to suspect a potential risk of localized overheating. To conduct in-depth fault diagnosis and lifespan assessment, the operation and maintenance center (as data owner A) decided to share the transformer's high-precision operating data and diagnostic logs from the past month with a professional power science research institute (as data requester B). This data contains critical operating parameters and sensitive maintenance information, and the confidentiality, integrity, and traceability of the data must be ensured during the sharing process. Furthermore, the immutability of blockchain technology should be utilized during data sharing to ensure the transparency of all operational records.

[0109] 1.1 System Participants:

[0110] Data owner A (DAO): A maintenance center of China Southern Power Grid, possessing detailed operating data for transformer UHV-TR-001.

[0111] Data Requester B (DRQ): A power science research institute that needs to analyze the operating data of UHV-TR-001 to provide diagnostic suggestions.

[0112] Agent Node (PN): As an authorized computing node, it is responsible for performing the ciphertext re-encryption operation.

[0113] The third-party verification body (TVI) is the Ultra-High Voltage Equipment Quality Supervision Center, which is responsible for verifying the authenticity of the data uploaded to the blockchain.

[0114] 1.2 Data Scenario:

[0115] Operating data: Hourly sensor readings of winding temperature, oil temperature, current, voltage, vibration frequency, etc. for UHV-TR-001 transformer.

[0116] Diagnostic logs: Manual inspection records, alarm information, preliminary diagnostic reports, etc. generated by the operations and maintenance center.

[0117] Asset information: UHV-TR-001 serial number, manufacturer, commissioning date, design parameters, etc.

[0118] II. Implementation Process:

[0119] 2.1 Data Access and K-means Clustering.

[0120] Clustering was performed on the continuous operating temperature data of transformer UHV-TR-001 over the past week (168 hours) to identify potential operating modes or abnormal states. The identification results are as follows: Figure 2 As shown in the scatter plot of K-means clustering, the X-axis represents winding temperature and the Y-axis represents oil temperature.

[0121] Cluster 1: The center of mass is approximately around (75°C, 68°C), representing the stable operating state of the transformer under normal load. Cluster 2: The center of mass is approximately around (77°C, 70°C), representing the operating state of the transformer under slightly higher load or ambient temperature. Cluster 3: The center of mass is approximately around (80°C, 72°C), representing potentially abnormal or high-load operating conditions.

[0122] 2.2 Key initialization and generation.

[0123] Generate public and private key pairs for data owner A (Operations and Maintenance Center) and data requester B (Electric Power Research Institute), and initialize public parameters as shown in Table 1.

[0124] Table 1 Common Parameters

[0125]

[0126] 2.3 Data encryption, as shown in Table 2.

[0127] Data owner A uses their public key Encrypted plaintext .

[0128] plain text : Assume plaintext This is a key summary of a diagnostic log, such as "Transformer winding local overheating risk level: Medium". In actual paired-base encryption, It will be encoded into An element in the target group.

[0129] Table 2 Ciphertext and On-Chain Records

[0130]

[0131] Data owner A encrypted ciphertext And the encrypted original diagnostic logs are stored in IPFS, and The hash value (and IPFS address) is recorded on the running data chain. Third-party verification agencies can verify the authenticity of the hash value.

[0132] 2.4 Data sharing request and re-encryption key generation, as shown in Table 3.

[0133] Data requester B (a power science research institute) initiates a data sharing request, and data owner A authorizes and generates a re-encryption key.

[0134] Table 3 Summary of Re-encryption Keys

[0135]

[0136] Re-encryption key It is securely sent to the proxy node.

[0137] 2.5 Proxy node selection and ciphertext re-encryption are shown in Table 4.

[0138] The proxy node is selected dynamically and fairly through a smart contract according to the proxy node selection rules in the patent. Upon receiving a re-encryption request, the selected proxy node performs a re-encryption operation using the re-encryption key based on the ciphertext. right Perform re-encryption to generate ciphertext that data requester B can decrypt. .

[0139] Table 4. Ciphertext after re-encryption

[0140]

[0141] This result It is exactly the plain text Using the public key of data requester B The encrypted standard form. The proxy node did not obtain or recover the plaintext during this process. This ensures the confidentiality of the data.

[0142] 2.6 Data Decryption: Data requester B uses his private key Decryption Obtain plaintext Ultimately, data requester B successfully decrypted the original plaintext. The risk level of local overheating in the transformer winding is: medium.

[0143] III. Results Analysis and System Advantages

[0144] The above results clearly demonstrate the operational logic and advantages of the blockchain-based UHV equipment full-chain data trusted sharing system in real-world scenarios:

[0145] Data Insights and On-Chain Integration: K-means clustering can automatically discover potential patterns from massive amounts of operational data, such as identifying abnormal operating states of transformers. These high-value analytical results, along with the hash values ​​of their original data storage addresses, are securely recorded on the operational data chain, providing tamper-proof evidence for subsequent traceability and auditing.

[0146] Fine-grained access control: The smart contract layer ensures that only authorized data requesters (a power research institute) can access specific data. On-demand data sharing is achieved through proactive authorization by data owner A (the operations and maintenance center).

[0147] Confidentiality and Secure Sharing: The proxy-based re-encryption scheme ensures the confidentiality of sensitive diagnostic data during transmission and storage. Data is encrypted upon leaving the operations and maintenance center; proxy nodes cannot access the plaintext content when converting ciphertext, and only an authorized power research institute (B) can ultimately decrypt the data. This eliminates the risks of data tampering and leakage inherent in traditional data sharing.

[0148] Decentralization and Trusted Verification: The selection of proxy nodes is completed on the blockchain through smart contracts, ensuring decentralization and transparency. Third-party verification agencies can verify the authenticity of the data uploaded to the blockchain, enhancing the overall credibility of the data.

[0149] Full lifecycle traceability: Combined with the asset registration chain, the digital twin file of the UHV-TR-001 transformer, along with its production, operation and maintenance, and diagnostic data throughout its entire lifecycle, are linked together to form a complete and reliable data chain. When a power science research institute B obtains diagnostic data, its analysis results can also be added to the chain as new data, enriching the equipment file and achieving closed-loop data management.

[0150] The specific embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail above with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. Within the scope of knowledge possessed by those skilled in the art, various changes can be made without departing from the spirit of the present invention.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based trusted data sharing system for ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment across the entire chain, characterized in that: include: The distributed ledger data storage layer includes a data access and preprocessing module, a data hashing and metadata on-chain module, a secure block generation module, and a trusted consensus verification module. Specifically, the data access and preprocessing module receives data from ultra-high voltage (UHV) equipment, preprocesses the data, and extracts key metadata; the data hashing and metadata on-chain module performs hash operations on the key metadata to generate fixed-length hash values ​​and packages the hash values ​​and associated key metadata into transactions; the secure block generation module aggregates the collected transactions, encapsulates them into new block headers to construct new blocks, and submits them to the trusted consensus verification module; and the trusted consensus verification module ensures that all participants agree on the order and content of the new blocks and verifies the validity, legality, and data integrity of the transactions. The data processing and privacy protection layer includes an intelligent data clustering analysis module and a privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module. The intelligent data clustering analysis module is used to cluster the UHV equipment data to obtain clustering results after the trusted consensus verification module passes the verification. The privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module is used to encrypt the clustering results using a pairwise proxy re-encryption scheme. The data request and sharing management layer is used to receive request information from data requesters; to provide unique identifiers for participants at each stage and control data access permissions; to send request information to the data owner for verification; and to send the data corresponding to the data requester's request information back to the data requester after verification. The pair-based proxy re-encryption scheme includes: Generate basic common parameters; Input the common parameters and execute the key generation algorithm to generate public and private keys for the data requester and data owner; The data owner's plaintext is encrypted using a data encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext. The data owner wants to authorize the data requester to decrypt their data. The data owner uses their private key and the data requester's public key to calculate the re-encryption key. The proxy node that performs the proxy re-encryption operation is selected through a smart contract; After receiving a re-encryption request, the proxy node uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the data owner, obtaining ciphertext that the data requester can decrypt. The data requester receives the re-encrypted ciphertext, decrypts it using their private key, and obtains the plaintext.

2. The blockchain-based UHV equipment full-chain trusted data sharing system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The intelligent data clustering analysis module is used to perform clustering processing on UHV equipment data using the K-means algorithm, after the trusted consensus verification module has passed the verification, to obtain the clustering results.

3. The blockchain-based UHV equipment full-chain trusted data sharing system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The input public parameters are used to execute a key generation algorithm to generate public and private keys for the data requester and data owner, as expressed in the following expression: Data owner: Randomly selects private key Calculate the public key ; Data requester: Randomly selects private key Calculate the public key ; in, Refers to a set , The largest prime number in the common parameters; The order in the common parameters is cyclic subgroups; It is a cyclic subgroup Generators; These represent the private keys of the data owner and the data requester, respectively. , These represent the public keys of the data owner and the data requester, respectively.

4. The blockchain-based UHV equipment full-chain trusted data sharing system according to claim 3, characterized in that, The process of executing a data encryption algorithm on the plaintext of the data owner to generate ciphertext is as follows: Select random number Calculate ciphertext : ； in, ; ; It is a bilinear mapping; The order in the common parameters is The target group.

5. The blockchain-based UHV equipment full-chain trusted data sharing system according to claim 4, characterized in that, After receiving the re-encryption request, the proxy node uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the data owner, obtaining ciphertext that the data requester can decrypt, expressed as: ； in, , ; It is a bilinear mapping.

6. The blockchain-based UHV equipment full-chain trusted data sharing system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data request and sharing management layer specifically includes: The receiving module receives various data access request information from data requesters through a standardized interface; and forwards the request information to the decentralized authentication and permission management module. The decentralized identity verification and permission management module is used for each participant to register a unique identity identifier through the decentralized identity system; and to issue verifiable credentials for each participant based on their role and permissions; when a data requester needs to access UHV equipment data, it sends a data sharing request to the system, which includes the data requester's identity identifier and verifiable credentials; upon receiving the data request, the system's smart contract begins permission verification and parses the permission information carried in the verifiable credentials; the smart contract performs permission matching and control on the data request according to the fine-grained access strategy preset in the smart contract: if the identity identifier and verifiable credentials are verified and the permission matching is successful, the smart contract will authorize the data request, and then the system will notify the data owner that the request has been authorized and trigger the proxy re-encryption process described in the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module; The secure data sharing and transmission module is used to complete the permission verification in the decentralized identity verification and permission management module, and to successfully generate the re-encrypted ciphertext in the privacy encryption and proxy re-encryption module. The proxy node then transmits the re-encrypted ciphertext to the data requester through a secure communication channel. The pair-based proxy re-encryption scheme includes: Generate basic common parameters; Input the common parameters and execute the key generation algorithm to generate public and private keys for the data requester and data owner; The data owner's plaintext is encrypted using a data encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext. The data owner wants to authorize the data requester to decrypt their data. The data owner uses their private key and the data requester's public key to calculate the re-encryption key. The proxy node that performs the proxy re-encryption operation is selected through a smart contract; After receiving a re-encryption request, the proxy node uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the data owner, obtaining ciphertext that the data requester can decrypt. The data requester receives the re-encrypted ciphertext, decrypts it using their private key, and obtains the plaintext.

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