Vehicle-mounted lightweight security communication system and method based on cloud quantum key pool

Abstract

The invention provides a vehicle-mounted lightweight security communication system and method based on a cloud quantum key pool, and relates to the field of Internet of Vehicles information security. The method comprises the following steps: presetting the same root key in a hardware security module of a cloud terminal and a hardware security module of a vehicle-mounted terminal, obtaining a key application request of a quantum session of the vehicle-mounted terminal, and distributing a quantum session key of the communication from a cloud quantum key pool; based on the root key, encrypting a quantum session key of the communication to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmitting the quantum key data packet to the vehicle-mounted terminal; and analyzing a session key based on the quantum key data packet in the hardware security module, and encrypting the sensitive data by using the session key through a hardware accelerated symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data, and decrypting and storing the encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data. The method is used in the communication process of the vehicle-mounted terminal and the cloud terminal, and solves the technical problem that the QKD is limited by a special optical fiber or precise sight distance free space optical communication in the mobile vehicle scene application.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of Internet of Vehicles information security, and in particular to a cloud quantum key pool-based vehicle lightweight security communication system and method. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the increasing data interaction between intelligent vehicles and cloud platforms, the sensitivity of data generated and transmitted by vehicles continues to increase, including vehicle state information, control instructions, and user privacy information. Once stolen or tampered with during wireless transmission, it not only may lead to personal privacy leakage, but also may cause incorrect vehicle control decisions and cause serious safety accidents. Existing vehicle-cloud communication usually relies on a public key infrastructure of an asymmetric cryptography system (such as an RSA encryption algorithm, Rivest Shamir Adleman) for identity authentication and key negotiation, and then combines a symmetric encryption algorithm for data encryption. However, with the development of quantum computing, traditional asymmetric cryptography algorithms based on large number factorization or discrete logarithm problems face the potential risk of being cracked, i.e., the “quantum computing threat”. Quantum key distribution (QKD) technology is based on quantum mechanics principles and can achieve information theory secure key distribution at the physical layer, which is immune to computing power, but traditional QKD is difficult to be directly applied in mobile vehicle scenarios and is limited by dedicated optical fibers or precise line-of-sight free-space optical communication. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a new type of secure communication architecture suitable for vehicle mobile scenarios to solve the technical problem that QKD is limited by dedicated optical fibers or precise line-of-sight free-space optical communication in mobile vehicle scenarios. SUMMARY

[0003] The present application provides a cloud quantum key pool-based vehicle lightweight security communication system and method, which solves the technical problem that QKD is limited by dedicated optical fibers or precise line-of-sight free-space optical communication in mobile vehicle scenarios.

[0004] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the present application adopts the following technical solutions: In a first aspect, a cloud quantum key pool-based vehicle lightweight security communication system is provided, comprising: a cloud quantum key service layer and a lightweight vehicle security execution layer; wherein the cloud quantum key service layer is linked with a national or regional quantum secure communication backbone network, is used for generating, storing, and managing quantum keys, and distributes key data packets based on a vehicle-end key application request; receives encrypted sensitive data uploaded by the lightweight vehicle security execution layer, and decrypts and stores the encrypted sensitive data; and the lightweight vehicle security execution layer is deployed at a vehicle end, and its core includes a hardware security module, which is used for securely parsing the key data packets to obtain quantum session keys, and using the keys to complete the encryption of sensitive data inside the module.

[0005] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the cloud quantum key service layer comprises: a cloud quantum key pool module, a cloud vehicle key management module, and a cloud data storage module; the cloud quantum key pool module is connected to the quantum key distribution network access device, and is configured to perform pool storage, indexing, and life cycle management on the original quantum key stream to form a shared quantum key pool; the cloud vehicle key management module is configured to verify a vehicle-mounted end key application request, and allocate a quantum session key to the vehicle-mounted end that passes the verification from the cloud quantum key pool module, and deliver the quantum session key to the vehicle-mounted end through a secure interface; and the cloud data storage module is configured to obtain encrypted sensitive data uploaded by the vehicle-mounted end, and decrypt and store the encrypted sensitive data.

[0006] In a possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the lightweight vehicle-mounted security execution layer comprises: a hardware security module and a cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine; the hardware security module is internally provided with a secure storage area protected by a physical tamper-proofing technology, and is configured to unpack, verify, and securely store a key data packet delivered by the cloud quantum key service layer; provide a secure key calling interface, so that a vehicle-mounted application cannot directly access a key plaintext; and perform encryption, decryption, signature verification, and other operations on vehicle-mounted sensitive data; and the cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine is configured to reduce the CPU occupancy of the vehicle-mounted end, and comprises: a symmetric encryption algorithm acceleration module, an asymmetric algorithm acceleration module, and an integrity verification algorithm acceleration module.

[0007] In a possible implementation of the first aspect, the same root key or seed information capable of deriving the same root key is pre-stored in the hardware security module and the cloud vehicle key management module.

[0008] The second aspect provides a vehicle-mounted lightweight security communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool, comprising the following steps: pre-storing the same root key in a cloud end and a hardware security module of a vehicle-mounted terminal, and obtaining a quantum session key application request of the vehicle-mounted terminal; the key application request is a key application request authenticated through digital signature; based on the key application request, a one-time quantum random number with a preset length is allocated from a cloud quantum key pool as a quantum session key for this communication; the quantum random number in the cloud quantum key pool is a quantum random number subjected to randomness extraction and enhancement processing; based on the root key, the quantum session key for this communication is encrypted to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmit the quantum key data packet to the vehicle-mounted terminal; in the hardware security module, the quantum session key is parsed from the quantum key data packet; in the hardware security module, the quantum session key is used to encrypt sensitive data through a hardware-accelerated symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data; and the encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data is uploaded to the cloud end for decryption and storage.

[0009] In a possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the one-time quantum random number of the preset length is allocated from the cloud quantum key pool based on the key application request, and is used as the quantum session key of the current communication, including: determining a target length of the quantum session key according to a service type, a data volume and / or a security level contained in the key application request; calling a quantum random number satisfying the target length from the cloud quantum key pool, the quantum random number being a random number generated by a physical noise source and processed through randomness extraction and entropy enhancement; marking the quantum random number as one-time use and logically removing the quantum random number from the key pool to form the quantum session key special for the current communication.

[0010] In a possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the quantum session key of the current communication is encrypted based on the root key to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmit the quantum key data packet to the vehicle terminal, including: using the root key in combination with a current session identifier as a derivation factor to obtain a temporary encryption key of the quantum session of the current communication through an HKDF key derivation function; encrypting the quantum session key through an AES-256-GCM algorithm based on the temporary encryption key to obtain key ciphertext and a corresponding authentication tag; integrating the key ciphertext, the authentication tag, the session identifier and a time stamp to obtain the quantum key data packet and transmit the quantum key data packet to the vehicle terminal through encrypted transmission.

[0011] In a possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the quantum session key is parsed from the quantum key data packet in the hardware security module, including: the hardware security module receiving the quantum key data packet; deriving the same temporary encryption key as that of the cloud using a preset root key and a session identifier; decrypting the plaintext quantum session key after verifying the integrity of the key ciphertext based on the authentication tag in the quantum key data packet using the temporary encryption key, and securely storing the plaintext quantum session key in the hardware security module.

[0012] In a possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the quantum session key is parsed from the quantum key data packet in the hardware security module, including: the hardware security module receiving the quantum key data packet; deriving the same temporary encryption key as that of the cloud using a preset root key and a session identifier; decrypting the plaintext quantum session key after verifying the integrity of the key ciphertext based on the authentication tag in the quantum key data packet using the temporary encryption key, and securely storing the plaintext quantum session key in the hardware security module.

[0013] In a possible implementation manner of the second aspect, after the encrypted vehicle sensitive data is uploaded to the cloud and the encrypted vehicle sensitive data is decrypted to obtain the original data and store the original data, the method further includes: ending the current communication session and discarding the quantum session key.

[0014] The application provides a vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system and method based on a cloud quantum key pool. By constructing a cloud quantum key pool and a vehicle-mounted lightweight security execution mechanism, the application realizes the secure communication capability of high-strength quantum-level key protection without deploying quantum hardware on the vehicle side. The cloud generates and maintains high-entropy one-time quantum random numbers using a quantum random number source, and distributes them to the vehicle terminal after secure encapsulation of the root key, effectively avoiding the security risks of traditional public key systems based on RSA, ECC, etc. under the threat of quantum computing. The vehicle side only needs to rely on hardware-accelerated symmetric algorithms to complete high-speed encryption processing, and does not participate in complex key negotiation, effectively reducing the algorithm consumption and improving the system's feasibility. The key request is authenticated by digital signature, and the key transmission process has integrity and tamper-proof protection, ensuring the security of the session key in the entire process of issuance and use. The method realizes high-random, high-security, and low-algorithm consumption of vehicle-cloud data encryption transmission, and solves the technical problems of QKD in mobile vehicle scene application limited by special optical fiber or precise line-of-sight free space optical communication.

[0015] It should be understood that the description of technical features, technical solutions, advantages or similar language in this application does not imply that all features and advantages can be achieved in any single embodiment. On the contrary, it can be understood that the description of a feature or advantage means that the specific technical feature, technical solution or advantage is included in at least one embodiment. Therefore, the description of technical features, technical solutions or advantages in this specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Further, the technical features, technical solutions and advantages described in this embodiment can be combined in any appropriate manner. Those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments can be implemented without one or more specific technical features, technical solutions or advantages of a particular embodiment. In other embodiments, additional technical features and advantages can be identified in specific embodiments that do not embody all embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0016] Figure 1 A system architecture diagram of a vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on a cloud quantum key pool is provided for embodiments of the application; Figure 2 A system architecture deployment example diagram of a vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on a cloud quantum key pool is provided for embodiments of the application; Figure 3 A flowchart of a vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool is provided for embodiments of the application; Figure 4 A flowchart of another vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool is provided for embodiments of the application; Figure 5Another flowchart of a vehicle lightweight security communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool is provided in the embodiments of the present application. Figure 6 Another flowchart of a vehicle lightweight security communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool is provided in the embodiments of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0017] In the description of the present application, unless otherwise specified, " / " means "or", for example, A / B can mean A or B. "And / or" in this paper is only a description of the relationship between the associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, A and / or B, which can mean: A alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B alone. In addition, "at least one" means one or more, and "multiple" means two or more. "First", "second", etc. do not limit the quantity and execution order, and "first", "second", etc. do not necessarily mean different.

[0018] It should be noted that in the present application, "exemplary" or "for example" means to serve as an example, illustration or description. Any embodiment or design scheme described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the present application should not be interpreted as more preferred or more advantageous than other embodiments or design schemes. Rather, the use of "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concept in a specific manner.

[0019] The vehicle lightweight security communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool provided in the embodiments of the present application can be applied to a vehicle lightweight security communication system based on a cloud quantum key pool as shown in Figure 1 As shown in Figure 1 The system comprises a cloud quantum key service layer 101 and a lightweight vehicle security execution layer 102.

[0020] The cloud quantum key service layer 101 is linked with a national or regional quantum secure communication backbone network, used for generating, storing and managing quantum keys, and distributing key data packets based on vehicle end key application requests; receiving encrypted sensitive data uploaded by the lightweight vehicle security execution layer, and decrypting and storing the encrypted sensitive data; The lightweight vehicle security execution layer 102 is deployed on the vehicle end, used for completing encryption, signature verification and integrity check of vehicle sensitive data based on the key data packet, and uploading the data to the cloud quantum key service layer.

[0021] In one possible implementation, the cloud-based quantum key service layer includes: a cloud-based quantum key pool module, a cloud-based vehicle key management module, and a cloud-based data storage module. The cloud-based quantum key pool module, connected to the quantum key distribution network access device, is used for pooled storage, indexing, and lifecycle management of the original quantum key stream, forming a shared quantum key pool. The cloud-based vehicle key management module is used to verify key application requests from the vehicle-mounted terminal, allocate quantum session keys to verified vehicle-mounted terminals from the cloud-based quantum key pool module, and distribute these keys to the vehicle-mounted terminals via a secure interface. The cloud-based data storage module is used to acquire encrypted sensitive data uploaded by the vehicle-mounted terminals, decrypt and store the encrypted sensitive data.

[0022] As an example, in this embodiment of the application, the cloud-based quantum key service layer is the security cornerstone of the system, and can deploy software and hardware modules, including quantum key pool management, QKD network access devices, vehicle key management servers, and classical network interfaces (such as 5G core network interfaces) for communicating with vehicles.

[0023] In one possible implementation, the lightweight in-vehicle security execution layer includes: a hardware security module and a cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine; the hardware security module has a built-in secure storage area protected by physical tamper-proof technology, used for unpacking, verifying, and securely storing key data packets issued by the cloud quantum key service layer; it provides a secure key access interface, preventing in-vehicle applications from directly accessing the plaintext key; and it performs encryption, decryption, and signature verification operations on sensitive in-vehicle data; the cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine is used to reduce the CPU usage of the in-vehicle terminal, including: a symmetric encryption algorithm acceleration module, an asymmetric algorithm acceleration module, and an integrity verification algorithm acceleration module.

[0024] As an example, in this embodiment of the application, the lightweight vehicle security execution layer is the implementation terminal of the system on the vehicle side. It can also be deployed with software and hardware. In addition to the functions provided by the system, it can also include a vehicle-grade 4G / 5G communication module, an automotive-grade computing unit or gateway with an integrated hardware security module (HSM) or a separate security chip (SE), and an interface with the vehicle's internal network.

[0025] For example, Figure 2 The deployment example diagram provided for the embodiments of this application is as follows: Figure 2As shown, the overall architecture of the system is divided into a cloud quantum key service layer and a lightweight vehicle-mounted security execution layer. The cloud layer is composed of a quantum key distribution network access device, a quantum key pool management server, and a vehicle key management server. Access the quantum secure communication backbone network through a dedicated optical fiber link, and use the 5G core network with a secure API to access the Internet and communicate with the vehicle layer. The core of the vehicle layer is a vehicle-grade vehicle-mounted computing unit integrated with a hardware security module, which establishes a connection with the cloud through a vehicle-mounted wireless communication module to ensure the security of the keys and data. The vehicle identity certificate, root key, and session key information are stored in the secure storage area. At the same time, a cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine is deployed to support encryption, decryption, signature authentication, and integrity verification. In the data center of the cloud service provider, a QKD receiver is deployed, connected to the quantum backbone network node through a dedicated optical fiber. A quantum key pool management server and a vehicle key management server cluster are deployed to ensure high availability. A secure firewall and API gateway are configured to provide key services externally. In the vehicle gateway or intelligent cockpit domain controller, a domestic vehicle-grade security microcontroller unit is selected as the main control chip. Ensure that its HSM function is enabled, and complete the peripheral circuit design, including clock, power supply, communication interface, etc. Complete the printed circuit board design, board fabrication, and welding, and perform environmental stress testing related to integrated circuit stress testing based on failure mechanism in automotive applications. Cloud system configuration: develop and deploy key pool management software, vehicle management background, and key distribution API services.

[0026] In one possible implementation, the same root key or seed information capable of deriving the same root key is preloaded in the hardware security module and the cloud vehicle key management module.

[0027] As an example, in the embodiments of the present application, root key preloading is a core step to establish an end-to-end trust chain. In a secure room at the end of the vehicle production line, a unique digital certificate for each vehicle and a root key shared with the cloud are securely injected into the secure storage area of the HSM through a dedicated device. At the same time, the registration of the vehicle information and the entry of the same root key are completed in the cloud key management server.

[0028] The embodiments of the present application centrally deploy and uniformly manage the quantum key pool in the cloud, complete the generation, storage, update, and life cycle management of quantum keys on the cloud side, and the vehicle end only serves as a secure user and caller of the key without integrating any special hardware devices such as quantum communication or quantum key generation. This architecture fully utilizes the centralized advantages of cloud computing power and quantum infrastructure, realizes on-demand distribution and dynamic scheduling of quantum keys, effectively reduces the hardware complexity, cost, and power consumption of vehicle-mounted terminals, and improves the scalability, maintainability, and deployment efficiency in large-scale vehicle access scenarios.

[0029] To solve the technical problem that the existing QKD is limited to special optical fiber or precise line-of-sight free space optical communication in the application of mobile vehicle scenarios, the embodiment of the application provides a vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication method based on a cloud quantum key pool, which comprises the following steps: presetting one or a pair of root keys and obtaining a key application request of a quantum session of a vehicle-mounted terminal; the key application request is a key application request authenticated by digital signature; based on the key application request, a one-time quantum random number with a preset length is allocated from the cloud quantum key pool as a quantum session key for this communication; the quantum random number in the cloud quantum key pool is a quantum random number subjected to randomness extraction and enhancement processing; based on the root key, the quantum session key for this communication is encrypted to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmit the quantum key data packet to the vehicle-mounted terminal; the vehicle-mounted terminal parses the session key based on the quantum key data packet, and uses the session key to encrypt sensitive data through the hardware-accelerated AES-256 algorithm to obtain encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data; the encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data is uploaded to the cloud, and the encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data is decrypted to obtain original data and store the original data.

[0030] Figure 3 A flowchart of the vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication method based on the cloud quantum key pool provided by the embodiment of the application is shown in FIG. 1. Figure 3 As shown in FIG. 1, the method comprises the following steps. S301, the same root key is preset in the cloud and the hardware security module of the vehicle-mounted terminal, and a key application request of a quantum session of the vehicle-mounted terminal is obtained.

[0031] The root key refers to a high-privilege symmetric key or key seed used to protect the session key, and the root key is securely injected into the secure storage area of the vehicle-mounted hardware security module and the cloud vehicle key management server; the key application request refers to a request message initiated by the vehicle-mounted terminal to the cloud for applying for the session key for this communication, and the request message is digitally signed by the private key of the vehicle-mounted terminal to prove its identity and message integrity.

[0032] In a possible implementation, when a vehicle is manufactured or activated for the first time, a unique root key or a seed capable of deriving the root key of each vehicle is injected into the protected storage area of the vehicle-mounted HSM using a special injection device at the end of the production line or in a controlled secure environment; at the same time, the cloud vehicle key management module creates a credential entry corresponding to the vehicle and stores the same root key or root key derivation information. When the vehicle-mounted terminal needs to apply for a session key, an application message containing device ID, timestamp, request purpose, expected key length and other fields is constructed, and the message is digitally signed using the private key in the HSM, and then the signed request is sent to the cloud vehicle key management server through the 5G control plane encryption channel.

[0033] It should be noted that the key application request is a key application request authenticated by digital signature. The root key is the root of the system trust chain and should be stored and used using a physically tamper-proof device, and the operation process and authority should be strictly controlled during injection, backup and restoration; the algorithm for digital signature authentication is selected according to the deployment area, and the signature private key should be permanently resident in the HSM, which cannot be exported externally to prevent key leakage from causing fraudulent or counterfeit requests.

[0034] For example, in a secure room of a car manufacturing plant, the certificate and root key seed of the vehicle are written into the vehicle HSM through a special programming fixture, and a registration record is generated for the vehicle in the cloud key management console; when the vehicle needs to upload the ECG fingerprint during road operation, the vehicle communication middleware generates an application message and signs it with the HSM, and then sends the application to the cloud, and the cloud verifies the signature and certificate chain after receiving the signature request.

[0035] This step can establish an end-to-end trust root and an undeniable identity authentication mechanism by preinstalling a root key in a secure environment and authenticating key application requests with digital signatures, reducing the risk of counterfeit devices, replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks, and providing reliable identity and integrity protection for the secure distribution of subsequent session keys.

[0036] S302, based on the key application request, a one-time quantum random number of a preset length is allocated from a cloud quantum key pool as a quantum session key for this communication.

[0037] Among them, the quantum random number in the cloud quantum key pool refers to the original high-entropy bit stream generated by the quantum random source or high-quality physical noise source accessed by the cloud, and the random bit sequence after random extractor and entropy enhancement processing; one-time use refers to that the random number segment is only used in a single communication session, and should be discarded immediately after use and cannot be allocated again.

[0038] In one possible implementation, the cloud quantum key service layer maintains a distributed key pool, and the key pool continuously receives original random bit streams from the accessed QKD or high-quality true random number generator (TRNG, True Random Number Generator) device, and performs real-time extraction, error correction and entropy evaluation on the arriving original data; when the vehicle applies for a key and the application is legal, the key management module selects a random number segment that meets the length and entropy requirements from the pool according to the target length and security level specified in the request, marks it as "to be allocated", and removes it logically after issuing or marks it as "used".

[0039] It should be noted that the key used by the embodiments of the present application is derived from a quantum random number generation mechanism, and a high-entropy random key is generated relying on the unpredictability of quantum physics, thereby avoiding the predictability risk of traditional pseudo-random algorithms in a quantum computing scenario from the source, and having anti-quantum security characteristics. Since quantum random numbers do not depend on mathematical complexity assumptions, their randomness cannot be effectively inferred or restored by a classical computer or a quantum computer, so that the key generated based on the random source still has high security when facing quantum algorithm attacks, thereby providing long-term and robust security protection for system communication.

[0040] Based on the above steps, in this step, high-quality quantum random numbers are centrally managed by a cloud key pool and one-time session keys are distributed on demand, so that the system not only guarantees the high entropy and unpredictability of the key, but also realizes the sharing and on-demand supply of key resources for a large number of vehicles, thereby improving the scalability and operation and maintenance efficiency of the overall system.

[0041] S303, based on the root key, encrypting the quantum session key of this communication to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmitting the quantum key data packet to the vehicle terminal.

[0042] The quantum key data packet refers to an encapsulated message containing session ciphertext, session identifier, timestamp, session key authentication tag, and necessary integrity check code; the temporary encryption key is an intermediate key generated by a key derivation function from the root key and session identifier and the like and is used only for encrypting the session key this time.

[0043] In one possible implementation, after selecting the session key, the cloud vehicle key management module derives a temporary encryption key for session key encapsulation by calling HKDF (with the root key, session identifier, and context information as inputs), then encrypts the session key using AES-256-GCM to generate key ciphertext and an authentication tag. Then, the session key authentication tag is obtained by performing a deterministic irreversible digest calculation on the random bit string corresponding to the session key, and the key ciphertext, authentication tag, session identifier, timestamp, and necessary protocol version field are encapsulated into a quantum key data packet, which is transmitted to the vehicle terminal through an encrypted control channel.

[0044] It should be noted that, in order to prevent key replay or be attacked by a man-in-the-middle, the data packet should contain an anti-replay field and be signed by the cloud or enable end-to-end authentication at the transmission layer; the temporary encryption key should not be included in the data packet, and the vehicle terminal should derive the same temporary key locally by using the same root key and session identifier to complete decryption, so as to ensure that the high-privilege key is not issued in plaintext or reversible form.

[0045] Based on the above steps, this step is based on the root key encapsulating the session key and carrying the authentication tag and timing information, which can provide strong integrity protection and anti-replay capability while ensuring the confidentiality of the session key; The mechanism makes the key distribution safe and efficient, and the vehicle end can complete the session key recovery and verification without complex calculation.

[0046] S304, in the hardware security module, the quantum session key is parsed based on the quantum key data packet.

[0047] In a possible implementation, the hardware security module receives the quantum key data packet; uses the preset root key and session identifier to derive a temporary encryption key same as that of the cloud; uses the temporary encryption key to verify the integrity of the key ciphertext based on the authentication tag in the quantum key data packet, and then decrypts to obtain the plaintext quantum session key and stores it in the hardware security module.

[0048] S305, in the hardware security module, the quantum session key is parsed based on the quantum key data packet.

[0049] Among them, the vehicle sensitive data refers to the original data of the vehicle end that needs to be protected, such as driver biological characteristics, vehicle control commands, high-definition positioning track and high-precision map slice, etc.; The hardware accelerated AES-256 module refers to the symmetric encryption accelerator implemented in the vehicle-grade HSM or special encryption coprocessor, which is used to complete the key scheduling and data grouping encryption operation at the hardware level.

[0050] In a possible implementation, after the vehicle terminal receives the quantum key data packet, it first performs integrity and authentication tag verification in the HSM, then derives a temporary decryption key in the HSM using the root key and session identifier and decrypts to obtain the session key, and immediately saves the plaintext session key in the protected memory of the HSM for one-time use. The sensitive data plaintext to be uploaded is submitted to the HSM, and the HSM calls the built-in AES-256 hardware accelerator to block encrypt the data, generates the ciphertext and returns it to the vehicle communication module for subsequent transmission.

[0051] It should be noted that, in order to avoid key leakage in the vehicle system, all session key plaintexts are only kept in the protected memory of the HSM and have a very short life cycle; The HSM and the main control should use a protected internal bus or a trusted API, and other modules cannot directly access the key plaintext.

[0052] It should be noted that before the vehicle terminal parses the session key based on the quantum key data packet and uses the session key to encrypt the sensitive data through the hardware-accelerated AES-256 algorithm to obtain the encrypted vehicle sensitive data, the method further comprises: checking the integrity of the quantum key data packet, including a first check result based on a message authentication code generated based on the root key and a second check result based on a quantum authentication tag, and if any check fails, the key data packet is rejected.

[0053] Based on the above steps, this step uses the HSM to derive and temporarily save the session key and then calls the hardware-accelerated encryption, which not only improves the encryption operation performance and meets the real-time requirements, but also minimizes the risk of key exposure; this step ensures that the uploaded sensitive data is in a strong protection state before being transmitted over the link, and both performance and security are taken into account.

[0054] S306, upload the encrypted vehicle sensitive data to the cloud for decryption and storage.

[0055] In one possible implementation, after the cloud receives the encrypted vehicle sensitive data, the ciphertext is decrypted and the integrity is verified in a protected execution environment, and once the verification is passed, the plaintext data is stored after being classified and encrypted and controlled access is provided as necessary.

[0056] It should be noted that, in order to avoid key leakage or misuse, the cloud should use a controlled hardware security environment when storing the session key and performing decryption operations; the cloud's key access should record audit logs and have a minimum permission policy; when processing sensitive personal data, relevant privacy protection regulations such as desensitization, minimization of storage, access control and retention policy should also be met.

[0057] It should be noted that after uploading the encrypted vehicle sensitive data to the cloud and decrypting the encrypted vehicle sensitive data to obtain the original data and storing it, the method further comprises: ending the current communication session and discarding the quantum session key for this time.

[0058] Based on the above steps, this step realizes centralized security governance and compliance management of uploaded sensitive data through centralized decryption and secure storage in the cloud; through the controlled decryption environment and verification, the confidentiality and integrity of the data can be guaranteed, and traceability can be provided for subsequent data processing and security audit, thereby improving the overall security, manageability and compliance of the system.

[0059] It should be noted that in steps S301 to S305, the embodiment of the application adopts a lightweight architecture design idea, and complex quantum key management and scheduling capabilities are centrally deployed in the cloud, and the vehicle-mounted end only needs to be configured with an HSM module and an AES hardware acceleration unit to complete secure communication and data encryption and decryption processing. By simplifying the security hardware structure of the vehicle-mounted side to the maximum extent, the deployment of quantum communication or special quantum devices is avoided, and the requirements of the vehicle-mounted terminal for computing power, storage, power and hardware cost are effectively reduced. The design is suitable for mobile application scenarios with limited resources and high requirements for power consumption and real-time performance, which not only facilitates rapid integration and large-scale promotion on the existing vehicle-mounted electronic architecture, but also improves the overall stability, maintainability and cross-model and cross-platform adaptation capability of the system on the premise of ensuring the strength of communication security.

[0060] The application ensures the security of end-to-end data transmission and prevents eavesdropping, tampering and replay attacks by constructing an end-to-end secure vehicle-cloud communication system. Through the one-time quantum session key and root key derivation encryption mechanism, high security of key management and use is realized. Combined with the vehicle-end hardware accelerated symmetric encryption scheme, the calculation efficiency and real-time performance are guaranteed while ensuring security. At the same time, the cloud centrally manages the keys and the vehicle-end is deployed in a lightweight manner, improving the scalability and feasibility of large-scale application of the system, forming a complete trust chain and session lifecycle management mechanism, and providing a solid and reliable technical guarantee for the secure transmission of sensitive data of intelligent networked vehicles, solving the technical problems of existing QKD in mobile vehicle scenarios, which are limited by special optical fibers or precise line-of-sight free-space optical communication.

[0061] In a possible implementation manner of the embodiment of the application, the cloud server is configured to Figure 3 As shown in Figure 4 S203 can be implemented through the following S401, S402 and S403, which will be described in detail below. S401, according to the service type, data volume and / or security level contained in the key application request, determining the target length of the quantum session key.

[0062] The target length of the quantum session key is used to represent the number of bits of the one-time key material required for this communication, and its size depends on the security requirements of the specific service. For example, remote control type services usually require higher strength encryption keys, while state reporting type services require relatively smaller key lengths. The service type, data volume and security level can be dynamically determined based on the task description, protocol information and cloud policy of the vehicle-mounted terminal.

[0063] In a possible implementation, the cloud vehicle key management module first parses the key application request, extracts the service identifier, the expected transmission data size, and the security level field. The key management module sets the corresponding target key length range for different service scenarios based on the preset key allocation strategy table, for example, 256-512 bits for control type services, 1-2 kbits for video stream encryption, and 128 bit level keys for ordinary telemetry type data. The module fine-tunes the target key length according to the actual data volume and the security level, and finally generates the target length parameter of the session key.

[0064] It should be noted that the determination of the target key length does not depend on the vehicle local computing power, but is decided by the cloud according to a unified strategy, so as to prevent the problem of inconsistent security levels of different vehicles due to differences in vehicle-side resources. In addition, the target length will not exceed the maximum available segment length that can be provided by the cloud quantum key pool. If the target length is large, the system will automatically start the key fragmentation combination strategy.

[0065] As an example, if the service submitted by the vehicle terminal is "automatic driving control instruction upload", the data volume is less than 1 KB and the security level is "high", the cloud vehicle key management module will determine the target quantum session key length as 512 bits according to the strategy table, to meet the needs of high-level services against quantum attacks.

[0066] Based on the above steps, this step can achieve more refined key resource scheduling, avoid insufficient encryption strength caused by insufficient key length, and also prevent waste of quantum random number materials caused by allocation of too long keys, thereby improving the utilization efficiency of the quantum key pool and enhancing the overall security of the system.

[0067] S402, call the quantum random number satisfying the target length from the cloud quantum key pool.

[0068] The quantum random number refers to the continuous key material indexed from the quantum key pool according to the target length, and the original source is the key stream generated by the quantum random number generator or the quantum key distribution link. After random extraction and entropy enhancement processing, it can be ensured that each bit of the key meets the high-quality randomness of the information theory level.

[0069] In a possible implementation, the cloud quantum key pool module first searches for available random number segments that meet the length condition in the internal key pool index table according to the target length parameter. The key pool performs an extraction algorithm to remove physical noise non-idealities after writing the original quantum random number, and improves the uniformity and unpredictability of the final key segment through entropy enhancement. Finally, the continuous random number segment that meets the target length is sliced and prepared for this session call.

[0070] It should be noted that the internal storage structure of the quantum key pool is a segmented pooling structure, with each segment carrying a lifecycle tag and a usage status marker to ensure that key segments are not redistributed. If the key pool is temporarily unable to provide consecutive segments, the system can automatically execute a segment splicing mechanism, but will ensure that there are no predictable correlations between the spliced ​​segments.

[0071] As an example, when the target length is set to 512 bits, the quantum key pool module selects a continuous 512-bit key material from its internal 2kbit quantum random number buffer and outputs the key to the key management process through the internal API, while retaining randomness audit records.

[0072] Based on the above steps, this step ensures that the key material used in the vehicle-mounted session originates from true quantum randomness, possessing resistance to quantum attacks, high unpredictability, and non-reproducibility, thus fundamentally guaranteeing the security of subsequent communication.

[0073] S403. Mark the quantum random number as a one-time use and logically remove it from the key pool to form a quantum session key dedicated to this communication.

[0074] The one-time use tag refers to changing the state of a selected random number segment so that it cannot be logically invoked again, satisfying the one-time pad principle. Logical removal does not immediately delete the key entity, but rather prevents repeated access through methods such as setting index bits.

[0075] In one possible implementation, after successfully slicing a quantum random number of the target length, the cloud-based quantum key pool module marks the key segment as "assigned" using its internal state marking mechanism, and simultaneously removes its corresponding index from the available queue. The module can then move the key segment into a temporary "session key area," which remains there until the current quantum session concludes, at which point a key destruction or cold backup archiving strategy is triggered. The vehicle-mounted terminal cannot access this internal state; it can only receive the encrypted key material.

[0076] It should be noted that one-time use marking is a crucial mechanism for ensuring the one-time pad property of quantum keys. If a key is reused, information security will be compromised. Therefore, the system employs an irreversible logical removal mechanism and is equipped with logging to meet high-level security requirements.

[0077] It should also be noted that, regarding the key usage mechanism, this application's embodiments introduce a one-time key security design concept. Once the session ends or the key is used, it immediately becomes invalid and is securely destroyed, and cannot be reused. Through this one-time key mechanism, even if individual session keys are leaked, it only affects a single, one-way communication process, preventing a chain reaction of risks to historical or subsequent communications. This reduces the security risks associated with key reuse, enhances the system's protection against eavesdropping, replay attacks, and long-term key analysis attacks, and improves the overall security and reliability of the communication system.

[0078] As an example, in a session, the system allocates a 512-bit segment A from the quantum key pool. The module immediately updates the status of segment A from "unused" to "used" in the index table, and records the session ID, allocation time, and hash authentication tag of the quantum random number in the session tracking table to ensure that the subsequent audit and destruction process is traceable.

[0079] Based on the above steps, this step ensures that each quantum random number strictly adheres to the one-time pad principle, effectively preventing potential security risks caused by key reuse, while maintaining the controllability of the key distribution process, so that the key management of the entire vehicle-cloud communication system reaches the information theory level security standard.

[0080] This application precisely determines the target length of the quantum session key based on the business type, data volume, and security level included in the key request, ensuring that the key length matches the actual security requirements and avoiding resource waste or insufficient security. A quantum random number meeting the target length is retrieved from the cloud-based quantum key pool and subjected to randomness extraction and entropy enhancement processing to guarantee high-quality randomness and unpredictability of the key. The retrieved quantum random number is marked as a one-time use key and logically removed from the key pool, forming a dedicated quantum session key for this communication. This implements a "one-time pad" security policy, ensuring that each session key is independent and highly random, improving resistance to attacks. By allocating resources on demand and optimizing resource usage, system scalability is enhanced, fundamentally guaranteeing the security and reliability of sensitive data transmission between the vehicle and the cloud.

[0081] In one possible implementation of the embodiments of this application, combined with Figure 3 ,like Figure 5 As shown, the above S303 can be specifically implemented through the following S501 to S504, which are explained in detail below: S501. Combine the root key with the current session identifier as a derivative factor, and process it through the HKDF key derivation function to obtain the temporary encryption key for the quantum session of this communication.

[0082] Wherein, HKDF (HMAC-based Key Derivation Function) is a secure key derivation algorithm based on HMAC, which is used to generate a length-controllable and purpose-specific derived key from the base key material.

[0083] In a possible implementation, the cloud vehicle key management module takes the root key as the input key material of HKDF, and takes the session identifier as the salt value or context information input into HKDF. Two stages of HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand are executed, and a temporary session encryption key meeting the encryption requirement of AES-256-GCM is generated through HMAC-SHA256 or HMAC-SHA384. The key does not directly participate in communication encryption, but is specifically used to encrypt the quantum session key itself.

[0084] It should be noted that the derived temporary encryption key is only valid in the current session, and will not be written back to the long-term storage area of the hardware security module to reduce the risk of key exposure. At the same time, the HKDF derivation process does not leak the root key information, so that the root key will not be affected due to the leakage of the session key.

[0085] Based on the above steps, this step can realize the session-level key isolation mechanism, ensure that different session encryption keys are used for each session, avoid affecting other communication sessions due to single session key leakage, and strengthen the key security system of the system

[0086] S502, based on the temporary encryption key, the quantum session key is encrypted through the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain the key ciphertext and the corresponding authentication tag.

[0087] In a possible implementation, the temporary encryption key is used as the master key of AES-256-GCM, a one-time random number is generated as the initialization vector, and the quantum session key is input as plaintext. The system performs AES-256-GCM encryption operation to generate key ciphertext and authentication tag, which together constitute a verifiable encryption data structure. This process can effectively prevent the quantum session key from being eavesdropped, replaced or forged during transmission.

[0088] It should be noted that the authentication tag of AES-256-GCM must be stored or transmitted together with the ciphertext, otherwise the vehicle-mounted end cannot verify the authenticity of the data packet. In addition, the initialization vector must not be reused, and can be directly issued as data packet metadata to avoid replay attacks between keys.

[0089] Based on the above steps, this step ensures that the quantum session key is encapsulated in a strong security level, so that it has anti-quantum attack ability and non-tamperability during transmission, and improves the security and reliability of the session key distribution.

[0090] S503, integrate the key ciphertext, the authentication tag, the session identification and the timestamp to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmit to the vehicle terminal through an encrypted transmission mode.

[0091] In a possible implementation, when the cloud quantum key pool module executes the AES-256-GCM encryption algorithm, the algorithm automatically calculates and generates an authentication tag based on the temporary encryption key, the initialization vector and the plaintext data (i.e., the quantum session key) while outputting the key ciphertext. The authentication tag is a standard output component of the AES-256-GCM algorithm, which is used to verify whether the key ciphertext is tampered during transmission when decryption, to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the data.

[0092] It should be noted that the authentication tag is generated by a standard encryption algorithm without additional custom hash operations. The vehicle terminal must use the same temporary encryption key and authentication tag for verification when subsequent decryption, and only after verification can the integrity of the key ciphertext be confirmed and decryption operation can be continued.

[0093] Based on the above steps, this step specifies that the standard authentication encryption algorithm is used to provide integrity protection, so that the vehicle terminal can quickly identify whether there is tampering or replacement through the built-in verification mechanism of the algorithm, and the security and reliability of the key distribution link are improved.

[0094] The root key is combined with the session identification in this application, and a temporary encryption key is generated through the HKDF key derivation function, to ensure that the encryption key of the session key is independent and bound to the session each time, and the anti-replay attack capability is enhanced. The quantum session key is encrypted by using the AES-256-GCM algorithm, which not only ensures the key confidentiality, but also provides built-in integrity verification to prevent tampering during transmission. The key ciphertext, the session key authentication tag, the session identification and the timestamp are integrated to form a quantum key data packet, which is transmitted to the vehicle terminal through encrypted transmission, to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the data transmission process, and to build a high-strength, traceable and tamper-resistant vehicle-cloud security communication system.

[0095] In a possible implementation of the embodiment of the application, the root key is combined with the session identification to generate the temporary encryption key through the HKDF key derivation function. Figure 3 As shown in FIG. 6, the above S304 can be implemented through the following S601 to S603, which will be specifically described below. Figure 6 S601, the vehicle terminal parses the quantum session key of this communication based on the root key and the quantum key data packet.

[0096] ​In a possible implementation, the hardware security module of the vehicle terminal receives the quantum key data packet issued by the cloud, parses the key ciphertext by using the built-in root key, binds through the session identifier, extracts the plaintext quantum session key, and stores in the internal secure storage area of the HSM.

[0097] It should be noted that the quantum session key is only valid for this session, and the vehicle application cannot directly access the plaintext key, thereby ensuring the confidentiality and security of the key usage.

[0098] Based on the above steps, the session key is parsed by combining the root key and the quantum key data packet in this step, which reduces the key management complexity of the vehicle terminal and ensures the confidentiality of the high-security level and one-time session key.

[0099] S602, based on the quantum session key, the sensitive data to be transmitted is symmetrically encrypted by using the hardware-accelerated symmetric encryption algorithm, and the encrypted vehicle sensitive data is generated.

[0100] In a possible implementation, the HSM of the vehicle terminal calls the built-in AES-256 hardware acceleration module, uses the quantum session key as the encryption key, encrypts the real-time collected data stream, and outputs the encrypted data block, so that the encryption process is completed under the condition of low delay.

[0101] It should be noted that the hardware-accelerated AES-256 encryption not only improves the calculation efficiency, but also avoids the risk of exposing the key in the software.

[0102] Based on the above steps, the confidentiality and real-time performance of the sensitive data in the transmission process are ensured, and the CPU load is reduced, thereby improving the overall performance of the vehicle terminal.

[0103] S603, after the encrypted vehicle sensitive data and the session identifier of the quantum key data packet are associated and encapsulated, the encrypted vehicle sensitive data packet is obtained.

[0104] In a possible implementation, the vehicle HSM encapsulates the encrypted data and the session identifier in the corresponding quantum key data packet into a single data structure, and sends it to the cloud through the secure communication protocol, so that the cloud can retrieve the corresponding key for decryption through the session identifier.

[0105] It should be noted that the encapsulation mechanism can prevent cross-session data from being illegally decrypted, and supports replay attack protection and data integrity verification.

[0106] Based on the above steps, the end-to-end data integrity and session isolation are realized by binding and encapsulating the encrypted data and the session identifier, thereby improving the security and traceability of the entire communication system.

[0107] The preset root key and the quantum key data packet are parsed to obtain the quantum session key of the current communication, so as to ensure that the session key is only available at the legal vehicle end, and effectively prevent key leakage or illegal tampering. The sensitive data is symmetrically encrypted by using the hardware accelerated AES-256, so as to improve the encryption efficiency, and ensure the confidentiality and anti-eavesdropping ability of the data in the transmission process. The encrypted data and the session identifier of the quantum key data packet are associated and encapsulated, so as to realize one-to-one correspondence between the data and the key, facilitate cloud decryption and session tracking, prevent session confusion or replay attack, and provide stable security guarantee for vehicle-cloud communication.

[0108] The above describes the scheme of the embodiment of the application mainly from the perspective of device implementation. It can be understood that each device, for example, the vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on the cloud quantum key pool, contains at least one of the corresponding hardware structure and software module for executing each function in order to implement the above functions. Those skilled in the art should easily realize that, in combination with the units and algorithm steps of each example described in the embodiments disclosed herein, the application can be realized in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a certain function is executed in the form of hardware or computer software driven hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional technicians can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of the application.

[0109] The embodiment of the application can divide the functional units of the vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on the cloud quantum key pool according to the above method examples, for example, each functional unit can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated in one processing unit. The integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or software functional unit. It should be noted that the division of units in the embodiment of the application is illustrative, and is only a logical functional division. There can be another division method in actual implementation.

[0110] The processor in the present application can include, but is not limited to, at least one of the following: a central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, a digital signal processor (DSP), a microcontroller unit (MCU), or an artificial intelligence processor, and various computing devices running software, each of which can include one or more cores for executing software instructions to perform operations or processing. The processor can be a separate semiconductor chip, or can be integrated with other circuits as a semiconductor chip, for example, it can be integrated with other circuits (such as coding and decoding circuits, hardware acceleration circuits, or various bus and interface circuits) to form a SoC (system on chip), or it can be integrated as a built-in processor in an ASIC. The ASIC integrated with the processor can be packaged separately or packaged together with other circuits. In addition to including cores for executing software instructions to perform operations or processing, the processor can further include necessary hardware accelerators, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), PLDs (programmable logic devices), or logic circuits that implement special logic operations.

[0111] The memory in the embodiments of the present application can include at least one of the following types: read-only memory (ROM) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM) or other types of dynamic storage devices that can store information and instructions, and electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM). In some scenarios, the memory can also be a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, optical disc storage (including compact discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage medium or other magnetic storage device, or any other medium capable of carrying or storing desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and capable of being accessed by a computer, but not limited to.

[0112] In the above embodiments, implementation can be achieved, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software programs, implementation can be, in whole or in part, in the form of a computer program product. This computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the flow or function according to the embodiments of this application is generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium accessible to a computer or a data storage device containing one or more servers, data centers, etc., that can be integrated with the medium. The available media can be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., DVDs), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid-state disks (SSDs)).

[0113] Although this application has been described herein in conjunction with various embodiments, those skilled in the art, by reviewing the accompanying drawings, disclosure, and appended claims, will understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments in carrying out the claimed application. In the claims, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude multiple instances. A single processor or other unit can implement several functions listed in the claims. While different dependent claims may recite certain measures, this does not mean that these measures cannot be combined to produce good results.

[0114] Although this application has been described in conjunction with specific features and embodiments, it is obvious that various modifications and combinations can be made thereto without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Accordingly, this specification and drawings are merely exemplary illustrations of this application as defined by the appended claims, and are considered to cover any and all modifications, variations, combinations, or equivalents within the scope of this application. Clearly, those skilled in the art can make various alterations and modifications to this application without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Thus, if such modifications and modifications of this application fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents, this application is also intended to include such modifications and modifications.

Claims

1. A lightweight, secure vehicle-mounted communication system based on a cloud-based quantum key pool, characterized in that, include: Cloud-based quantum key distribution layer and lightweight in-vehicle security execution layer; The cloud-based quantum key service layer is linked to a national or regional quantum secure communication backbone network. It is used to generate, store, and manage quantum keys, and distribute key data packets based on key application requests from the vehicle-mounted terminal. It also receives encrypted sensitive data uploaded by the lightweight vehicle-mounted security execution layer and decrypts and stores the encrypted sensitive data. The lightweight vehicle-mounted security execution layer is deployed on the vehicle and its core includes a hardware security module, which is used to securely parse the key data packet to obtain the quantum session key and use the key to encrypt sensitive data within the module.

2. The vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on a cloud-based quantum key pool according to claim 1, characterized in that, The cloud-based quantum key service layer includes: a cloud-based quantum key pool module, a cloud-based vehicle key management module, and a cloud-based data storage module; The cloud-based quantum key pool module is connected to the quantum key distribution network access device and is used to perform pooled storage, indexing, and lifecycle management of the original quantum key stream to form a shared quantum key pool. The cloud-based vehicle key management module is used to verify the vehicle terminal key application request, allocate a quantum session key to the verified vehicle terminal from the cloud-based quantum key pool module, and send it to the vehicle terminal through a secure interface; The cloud data storage module is used to acquire encrypted sensitive data uploaded by the vehicle terminal, and to decrypt and store the encrypted sensitive data.

3. The vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on a cloud-based quantum key pool according to claim 1, characterized in that, The lightweight vehicle security execution layer includes: a hardware security module and a cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine; The hardware security module has a built-in secure storage area protected by physical tamper-proof technology, used to unpack, verify, and securely store key data packets issued by the cloud quantum key service layer; it provides a secure key access interface, preventing in-vehicle applications from directly accessing the plaintext key; and it performs encryption, decryption, and signature verification operations on sensitive in-vehicle data. The cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine is designed to reduce the CPU usage of the vehicle-mounted system. It includes: a symmetric encryption algorithm acceleration module, an asymmetric algorithm acceleration module, and an integrity verification algorithm acceleration module.

4. The vehicle-mounted lightweight secure communication system based on a cloud-based quantum key pool according to claim 3, characterized in that, The hardware security module and the cloud-based vehicle key management module are pre-set with the same root key or seed information that can derive the same root key.

5. A lightweight secure vehicle communication method based on a cloud-based quantum key pool, applied to the lightweight secure vehicle communication system based on a cloud-based quantum key pool as described in claim 4, characterized in that... include: The same root key is pre-set in the hardware security modules of the cloud and the vehicle terminal, and the key request request of the quantum session of the vehicle terminal is obtained; the key request request is a key request request authenticated by digital signature. Based on the key request, a one-time quantum random number of a preset length is allocated from the cloud quantum key pool as the quantum session key for this communication; the quantum random number in the cloud quantum key pool is a quantum random number that has undergone randomness extraction and enhancement processing; Based on the root key, the quantum session key for this communication is encrypted to obtain a quantum key data packet, which is then transmitted to the vehicle terminal. Within the hardware security module, the quantum session key is parsed from the quantum key data packet; Within the hardware security module, the quantum session key is used to encrypt sensitive data using a hardware-accelerated symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data. The encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data is uploaded to the cloud for decryption and storage.

6. The lightweight secure communication method for vehicles based on a cloud-based quantum key pool according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of allocating a one-time quantum random number of a preset length from the cloud quantum key pool based on the key application request, as the quantum session key for this communication, includes: The target length of the quantum session key is determined based on the business type, data volume, and / or security level included in the key request request; A quantum random number that meets the target length is retrieved from the cloud quantum key pool. The quantum random number is a random number generated by a physical noise source and then subjected to random extraction and entropy enhancement. The quantum random number is marked as a one-time use and logically removed from the key pool to form a quantum session key dedicated to this communication.

7. The lightweight secure communication method for vehicles based on a cloud-based quantum key pool according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of encrypting the quantum session key for this communication based on the root key to obtain a quantum key data packet and transmitting it to the vehicle terminal includes: The root key is combined with the current session identifier as a derivative factor and processed by the HKDF key derivation function to obtain the temporary encryption key for the quantum session of this communication. Based on the temporary encryption key, the quantum session key is encrypted using the AES-256-GCM algorithm to obtain the key ciphertext and the corresponding authentication tag; The key ciphertext, the authentication tag, the session identifier, and the timestamp are integrated to obtain a quantum key data packet, which is then transmitted to the vehicle terminal via encrypted transmission.

8. The method according to claim 5 or 7, characterized in that, The step of resolving the quantum session key based on the quantum key data packet within the hardware security module includes: The hardware security module receives the quantum key data packet; Use the pre-set root key and session identifier to derive the same temporary encryption key as in the cloud; Using the temporary encryption key, after verifying the integrity of the key ciphertext based on the authentication tag in the quantum key data packet, the plaintext quantum session key is decrypted and stored inside the hardware security module.

9. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, Within the hardware security module, the quantum session key is used to encrypt sensitive data using a hardware-accelerated symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data, including: The hardware security module invokes its internal cryptographic algorithm hardware acceleration engine; Using the quantum session key, the AES-256-GCM algorithm is executed through the hardware acceleration engine to encrypt the sensitive data to be transmitted, generating encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data and its authentication tag.

10. The lightweight secure communication method for vehicles based on a cloud-based quantum key pool according to claim 5, characterized in that, After uploading the encrypted vehicle-mounted sensitive data to the cloud for decryption and storage, the method further includes: ending the current communication session and discarding the quantum session key.

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