Communication method and communication device

Abstract

The communication method comprises the steps that a first communication device receives a first request message from a second communication device, the first request message comprises a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext is first data subjected to security protection through a first security context, and the first indication information is used for indicating homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext; the first communication device receives the first security context, performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext, and sends the second ciphertext to the second network element, the first security context is determined by negotiation of the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports to be processed in a ciphertext state. In the communication method, the second network element can process the second ciphertext, the second communication device only needs to perform security protection on the data based on the first security context, and the second communication device does not need to execute homomorphic encryption. On the premise of reducing the encryption overhead of the second communication device, the core network processes the terminal ciphertext data.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communications, and more specifically, to a communication method and a communication device. Background Technology

[0002] Homomorphic encryption is an important technique in privacy-preserving computing. Using homomorphically encrypted data allows for computational processing even when the data is encrypted. One application of homomorphic encryption in communication networks involves the network sending a request message to the terminal, requesting data to be processed. After the terminal receives the original data, it can perform homomorphic encryption, allowing the network to process the encrypted data. This prevents the network from knowing the terminal's data, thus improving security.

[0003] However, the aforementioned homomorphic encryption methods require the terminal to perform homomorphic encryption processing on the data, which increases the terminal's encryption overhead. Therefore, how to enable the core network to process the terminal's encrypted data while reducing the terminal's encryption overhead has become an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a communication method that aims to enable the core network to process encrypted terminal data while reducing terminal encryption overhead.

[0005] Firstly, a communication method is provided. This method can be executed by a first communication device. Unless otherwise specified, the "first communication device" in this application can refer to a first communication equipment (e.g., a network device, network node, etc.), or a component within the first communication equipment (e.g., a processor, chip, or chip system, such as a circuit or chip in a network device responsible for communication functions (e.g., a modem chip, also known as a baseband chip, or a system-on-chip (SoC) chip containing a modem core, or a system-in-package (SIP) chip)). Alternatively, it can be a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the functions of the first communication device. For ease of description, the following explanation uses execution by a first communication device as an example.

[0006] The communication method includes: receiving a first request message from a second communication device, the first request message being used to request a first network element to process data, the first request message including a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data securely protected by a first security context, the first indication information being used to indicate homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext; homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext; and sending the second ciphertext to the second network element, wherein the first security context is a security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext state.

[0007] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device can homomorphically encrypt the received first ciphertext and send the homomorphically encrypted second ciphertext to the core network (e.g., a second network element). Since the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can be processed in ciphertext state, the second network element that receives the second ciphertext can process it. Moreover, in this technical solution, the second communication device with data processing needs can protect the data based on the first security context, without the second communication device performing homomorphic encryption. Instead, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption. Thus, this technical solution can enable the core network to process terminal ciphertext data while reducing the encryption overhead of the second communication device.

[0008] In one possible design, the method further includes: sending a second indication message to the second network element, the second indication message being used to indicate that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext.

[0009] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device can explicitly indicate through the second indication information that the second ciphertext sent to the second network element is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext, so that the second network element can know that the received second ciphertext has undergone homomorphic encryption processing.

[0010] In another possible design, the step of homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext includes: homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext based on the encryption key to generate the second ciphertext.

[0011] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext by: performing homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext based on the encryption key.

[0012] In another possible design, the method further includes sending the encryption key to the second network element.

[0013] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device sends the encryption key to the second network element, so that the second network element can perform symmetric decryption processing on the received second ciphertext based on the encryption key and the first security context mentioned above.

[0014] In another possible design, the method further includes: receiving a second request message, the second request message being used to request the generation of the encryption key, the second request message including a first identifier; generating the encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message, wherein the first identifier includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of the service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of the service area to which the first communication device belongs.

[0015] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device can generate an encryption key required for homomorphic encryption in response to the second request message. The encryption key can be at the granularity of the second communication device, for example, the data of the second communication device is homomorphically encrypted using the encryption key; or, the encryption key can be at the service granularity, for example, the data of the first service of the second communication device is homomorphically encrypted using the encryption key, where the first data belongs to the first service; or, the encryption key can be at the service area granularity, for example, the data of communication devices within the service area of ​​the first communication device is homomorphically encrypted using the encryption key.

[0016] In another possible design, the method further includes: sending a second request message for requesting the encryption key, the second request message including a first identifier; receiving the encryption key associated with the first identifier, wherein the first identifier includes at least one of the following: an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of the service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of the service area to which the first communication device belongs.

[0017] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device obtains the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption from other devices (such as control devices).

[0018] In another possible design, the second request message may also include third indication information and / or an identifier of the first algorithm, wherein the third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm used to generate the encryption key.

[0019] Based on the above technical solution, the second request message may carry an identifier of the algorithm for generating the encryption key, so that the first communication device or control device can generate the encryption key based on the algorithm.

[0020] In another possible design, the encryption key is contained in a second security context, which also includes a computation key, and the method further includes sending the computation key to the second network element, wherein the computation key is used to perform computation in the ciphertext state on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key.

[0021] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device can provide a computing key to the second network element, so that the second network element can perform calculations in the ciphertext state on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key.

[0022] In another possible design, the method further includes sending to the second network element an identifier of the second communication device and / or an identifier of a first algorithm, the identifier of the first algorithm indicating the algorithm used to generate the encryption key.

[0023] In another possible design, the first request message includes at least one container, the first ciphertext is carried in a first container within the at least one container, and the first request message also includes a data tag for indicating the first container.

[0024] Based on the above technical solution, the first request message may include at least one container, and the aforementioned first ciphertext is contained in one of the at least one containers (e.g., the first container). To ensure that the first communication device can explicitly know that homomorphic encryption is being performed on the first ciphertext carried in the first container of the first request message, information indicating the first container, such as a data tag, can be carried in the first request message. Additionally, the first request message may also include other containers besides the aforementioned first container. The first communication device does not perform homomorphic encryption on data in containers not indicated by the data tag.

[0025] In another possible design, the method further includes: receiving a first response message, the first response message including an identifier of the second communication device and a data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption; decrypting the data processing result to obtain a data processing result based on the first security context security protection; and sending the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device.

[0026] Based on the above technical solution, the data processing result sent by the second network element to the first communication device can also be encrypted using the above homomorphic encryption method. Moreover, the first communication device can encrypt the downlink data processing result, without the second communication device needing to perform homomorphic computation.

[0027] In another possible design, the first response message may also include a fourth indication message, which indicates that the data processing result has been homomorphically encrypted.

[0028] Based on the above technical solution, the first response message may include a fourth indication information indicating that the data processing result is homomorphically encrypted, so that the first communication device can clearly know whether the received data processing result needs to be encrypted based on the fourth indication information.

[0029] In another possible design, the first network element and the second network element are the same.

[0030] In another possible design, the first security context includes a non-access stratum security context.

[0031] In another possible design, the step of homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext includes: performing a decryption operation on the first ciphertext to obtain the second ciphertext, wherein the decryption operation includes the conversion between ciphertext in a non-homomorphic encryption state and ciphertext in a homomorphic encryption state.

[0032] Secondly, a communication method is provided. This method can be executed by a second network element. Unless otherwise specified, the "second network element" in this application can refer to the second network element itself (e.g., access and mobility management function (AMF), sensing function network element, data analysis function network element, analysis logic function network element, or model training logic function network element, etc.), or a component within the second network element (e.g., processor, chip, or chip system, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the functions of the second network element. For ease of description, the following explanation uses the execution by a second network element as an example.

[0033] The communication method includes: receiving a third request message from a first communication device, the third request message being used to request a first network element to process data, the third request message including a second ciphertext, the second ciphertext being a homomorphically encrypted ciphertext of a first ciphertext, the first ciphertext being first data securely protected by a first security context; decrypting the second ciphertext based on a first key to obtain a third ciphertext, the third ciphertext being the homomorphically encrypted first data, the first key being determined by homomorphically encrypting the first security context; obtaining a data processing result corresponding to the first data, the data processing result being determined based on the third ciphertext, wherein the first security context is a security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext state.

[0034] Based on the above technical solution, after receiving the second ciphertext, the second network element can perform symmetric decryption on the second ciphertext using the first key to obtain the homomorphically encrypted third ciphertext. Since the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can be processed in its ciphertext state, the third ciphertext can also be processed in its ciphertext state. In this technical solution, the second ciphertext is generated by the first communication device. The second communication device, which has data processing requirements, can securely protect the data based on the first security context. Homomorphic encryption is not performed by the second communication device; instead, it is performed by the first device. Therefore, this technical solution can enable the core network to process terminal ciphertext data while reducing terminal encryption overhead.

[0035] In one possible design, the first key is determined by homomorphically encrypting the first security context based on the encryption key, and the method further includes: receiving the encryption key from the first communication device; and homomorphically encrypting the first security context based on the encryption key to determine the first key.

[0036] Based on the above technical solution, the second network element can obtain the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption from the first communication device, and then perform homomorphic encryption on the first security context based on the encryption key to generate the aforementioned first key. This encryption key is the same as the encryption key used by the first communication device to perform homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext. The first communication device provides the required encryption key to the second network element so that the second network element can obtain the correct encryption key.

[0037] In another possible design, the encryption key is contained in a second security context, which also includes a computation key, and the method further includes: receiving the computation key from the first communication device; performing a computation on the third ciphertext in a ciphertext state based on the encryption key; or sending the third ciphertext and the computation key to the first network element.

[0038] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device can provide a computing key to the second network element, so that the second network element can perform calculations in the ciphertext state on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key.

[0039] In another possible design, obtaining the data processing result corresponding to the first data includes: determining the data processing result based on the third ciphertext; or, sending the third ciphertext to the first network element and receiving the data processing result from the first network element.

[0040] Based on the above technical solution, the second network element can determine the data processing result corresponding to the first data on its own, or the first network element can process the third ciphertext and provide the data processing result corresponding to the first data to the second network element, which can be applied to different network architectures.

[0041] In another possible design, the method further includes: receiving a fifth indication message from the second communication device, the fifth indication message indicating that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement; sending a second request message to the first communication device, the second request message being used to request the generation of an encryption key, the second request message including a first identifier, wherein the encryption key is used to implement the homomorphic encryption.

[0042] Based on the above technical solution, the second network element can instruct the first communication device to generate the encryption key required to perform homomorphic encryption based on the security protection requirements of the second communication device. That is, when the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption, it can instruct the generation of an encryption key. For devices that do not have a requirement for homomorphic encryption, it is not necessary to generate their corresponding keys, thereby reducing unnecessary resource overhead.

[0043] In another possible design, the second request message may also include third indication information and / or the identifier of the first algorithm, wherein the third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm used to generate the encryption key.

[0044] In another possible design, the method further includes: performing security protection processing on the data processing result based on a second key, wherein the second key is determined by homomorphic encryption of the first security context; and sending a first response message to the first communication device, wherein the first response message includes the identifier of the second communication device and the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption.

[0045] Based on the above technical solution, the data processing result sent by the second network element to the first communication device can also be encrypted using the above homomorphic encryption method. Moreover, the first communication device can encrypt the downlink data processing result, without the second communication device needing to perform homomorphic computation.

[0046] In another possible design, the first response message may also include a fourth indication message, which indicates that the data processing result has been homomorphically encrypted.

[0047] Based on the above technical solution, the first response message may include a fourth indication information indicating that the data processing result is homomorphically encrypted, so that the first communication device can clearly know whether the received data processing result needs to be encrypted based on the fourth indication information.

[0048] In another possible design, the method further includes: receiving a fourth request message from a third network element, the fourth request message being used to request the third ciphertext; and sending a fourth response message to the third network element, the fourth response message including the third ciphertext and an identifier of a first algorithm, the identifier of the first algorithm being used to indicate the algorithm of homomorphic computation.

[0049] Based on the above technical solution, homomorphically encrypted data can be made available to third parties (e.g., third network elements), so that third parties can obtain homomorphically encrypted data and related computation information (e.g., the algorithm identifier of homomorphic computation) from the core network side, while protecting the security of privacy data.

[0050] Thirdly, a communication method is provided. This method can be executed by a second communication device. Unless otherwise specified, the "second communication device" in this application can refer to the second communication device itself (e.g., a terminal device), or a component within the second communication device (e.g., a processor, chip, or chip system, such as a circuit or chip in a terminal device responsible for communication functions (e.g., a modem chip, also known as a baseband chip, or a SoC chip or SIP chip containing a modem core)), or it can be a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the functions of the second communication device. For ease of description, the following explanation uses execution by a second communication device as an example.

[0051] The communication method includes: sending a first request message to a first communication device, the first request message being used to request a first network element to process data, the first request message including a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data securely protected by a first security context, the first indication information being used to indicate homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext; receiving a data processing result from the first communication device based on the first security context, the data processing result being the data processing result corresponding to the first data, wherein the first security context is a non-access stratum security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext state.

[0052] Based on the above technical solution, the second communication device can instruct the first communication device to perform homomorphic encryption on the received first ciphertext via the first indication information. The homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can be processed in its ciphertext state. In this technical solution, the second communication device can protect the data based on the first security context, without needing to perform homomorphic encryption itself. This achieves core network processing of terminal ciphertext data while reducing terminal encryption overhead.

[0053] In one possible design, the first request message includes at least one container, the first ciphertext is carried in a first container within the at least one container, and the first request message also includes a data tag for indicating the first container.

[0054] Based on the above technical solution, the first request message may include at least one container, and the first ciphertext is contained in one of the at least one containers (e.g., the first container). In order to enable the first communication device to clearly know that the first ciphertext carried by the first container in the first request message is homomorphically encrypted, information indicating the first container, such as a data tag, may be carried in the first request message.

[0055] In another possible design, the method further includes: performing security verification on the data processing result protected by the first security context based on the first security context, and obtaining the data processing result.

[0056] In another possible design, the method further includes sending a fifth indication message to the second network element, the fifth indication message indicating that the second communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements.

[0057] Fourthly, this application provides a communication device that has the functions of implementing the first to third aspects described above. For example, the communication device includes modules, units, or means that perform the operations involved in the first to third aspects described above. The modules, units, or means can be implemented by software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware.

[0058] Fifthly, this application provides a communication device comprising at least one processor coupled to a memory. The memory stores part or all of the necessary computer programs or instructions for implementing the functions described in the first to third aspects. The at least one processor is capable of executing the computer programs or instructions, which, when executed, cause the communication device to implement the methods in any possible design or implementation of the first to third aspects.

[0059] In one possible design, the communication device may further include an interface circuit, wherein the processor is used to communicate with other devices or components through the interface circuit.

[0060] In one possible design, the communication device may further include the memory. Optionally, the memory and processor are integrated together.

[0061] The aforementioned communication device may be a device, or a communication module within a device, or a chip within a device responsible for communication functions, such as a modem chip (also known as a baseband chip) or a SoC or SIP chip containing a modem module.

[0062] Sixthly, this application provides a chip, which includes a processor and a communication interface. The processor reads instructions through the communication interface and executes the method provided by any one of the implementations of the first to third aspects described above.

[0063] In a seventh aspect, this application provides a communication system, including a first communication device for performing the method in the first aspect and a second network element for performing the method in the second aspect.

[0064] Optionally, the communication system further includes a second communication device for performing the method in the third aspect.

[0065] Eighthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-readable instructions that, when read and executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform any of the possible designs in the first to third aspects described above.

[0066] Ninthly, this application provides a computer program product that, when read and executed by a computer, causes the computer to perform any of the possible designs in the first to third aspects described above. Attached Figure Description

[0067] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the network architecture 100 provided in this application.

[0068] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a communication and sensing integration.

[0069] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the control plane protocol stack between a terminal device and an SMF.

[0070] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a NAS security setup process.

[0071] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic processing procedure.

[0072] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of homomorphic key generation.

[0073] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption process.

[0074] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic decryption process.

[0075] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic computation process.

[0076] Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption scheme.

[0077] Figure 11 This is a schematic flowchart of a communication method provided in this application.

[0078] Figure 12 This is a schematic flowchart of another communication method provided in this application.

[0079] Figure 13 This is a schematic flowchart of another communication method provided in this application.

[0080] Figure 14 This is a schematic block diagram of the communication device 10 provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0081] Figure 15 This is a schematic diagram of another communication device 20 provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0082] To facilitate understanding of the embodiments of this application, the following points will be explained first.

[0083] First, in this application, "for indicating" can include both direct and indirect indication. When describing an indication message as indicating A, it can include whether the indication message directly indicates A or indirectly indicates A, but does not necessarily mean that the indication message carries A.

[0084] The information indicated by the instruction is called the information to be instructed. In the specific implementation process, there are many ways to indicate the information to be instructed, such as, but not limited to, directly indicating the information to be instructed, such as the information to be instructed itself or its index. It can also be indirectly indicated by indicating other information, where there is a relationship between the other information and the information to be instructed. It can also indicate only a part of the information to be indicated, while the other parts are known or pre-agreed upon. For example, the instruction of specific information can be achieved by using a pre-agreed (e.g., protocol-defined) arrangement of various pieces of information, thereby reducing instruction overhead to some extent. At the same time, common parts of various pieces of information can be identified and indicated uniformly to reduce the instruction overhead caused by individually indicating the same information.

[0085] Second, in this application, "at least one" refers to one or more, and "more than one" refers to two or more (including two). Furthermore, in the embodiments of this application, "first," "second," and various numerical designations (e.g., "#1," "#2," etc.) are merely for descriptive convenience and are not intended to limit the scope of the embodiments of this application. The sequence numbers of the processes below do not imply an order of execution; the execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application. It should be understood that the objects described in this way can be interchanged where appropriate to describe solutions other than those in the embodiments of this application. In addition, in the embodiments of this application, terms such as "S1110" are merely identifiers for descriptive convenience and do not limit the order of execution steps.

[0086] Third, in the embodiments of this application, the words "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate that they are examples, illustrations, or descriptions. Any embodiment or design that is described as "exemplary" or "for example" in this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design options. Specifically, the use of the words "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0087] Fourth, the term "storage" in the embodiments of this application can refer to storage in one or more memories. These memories can be separate installations or integrated into an encoder, decoder, processor, or communication device. Alternatively, some memories can be separately installed, while others can be integrated into the decoder, processor, or communication device. The type of memory can be any form of storage medium, and this application does not limit this.

[0088] Fifth, in the implementation of this application, "protocol" may refer to standard protocols in the field of communications, such as the NR protocol and related protocols applied in future communication systems, and this application does not limit it.

[0089] Sixth, in the embodiments of this application, the terms "of", "corresponding (relevant)", "corresponding", and "associate" can sometimes be used interchangeably. It should be noted that when their differences are not emphasized, their intended meanings are consistent.

[0090] Seventh, in the embodiments of this application, "under the circumstances", "when", and "if" can sometimes be used interchangeably. It should be noted that when the distinction is not emphasized, their intended meanings are consistent.

[0091] Eighth, the term "and / or" in this article is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. Additionally, the character " / " in this article generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects have an "or" relationship.

[0092] Ninth, in this article, "message", "information", or "information element (IE)" can be used interchangeably. There are no restrictions on the name of the message or information, as long as it can achieve the corresponding function.

[0093] Tenth, in this application, "send" and "receive" indicate the direction of signal transmission. For example, "send information to XX" can be understood as the destination of the information being XX, and "send information" can include direct transmission or indirect transmission through other units or modules. "Receive information from YY" can be understood as the source of the information being YY, and "receive information" can include direct reception from YY or indirect reception from YY through other units or modules. Besides air interface transmission or reception signals implemented at the system level, such as network devices or terminal devices, "send" can also be understood as the "output" of a chip interface, and "receive" can also be understood as the "input" of a chip interface. For example, a modem or system-on-a-chip (SoC) chip or system-in-package (SIP) chip transmits or receives signals. "Send" or "receive" can also be performed through device components, for example, by using buses, traces, or interfaces to transmit or receive signals through several parts, modules, or chips of a device.

[0094] The technical solutions in this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0095] The technical solutions of this application embodiment can be applied to various communication systems, such as: Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems, LTE Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) systems, LTE Time Division Duplex (TDD) systems, 5th Generation (5G) systems, or New Radio (NR) systems and future communication systems, vehicle-to-X (V2X) communication, where V2X can include vehicle-to-network (V2N), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), etc., Long Term Evolution-Vehicle (LTE-V) communication, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, machine-type communication (MTC), Internet of Things (IoT), Long Term Evolution-Machine (LTE-M) communication, machine-to-machine (M2M) communication, and wireless local area networks (WLANs). (network, WLAN, etc.)

[0096] In addition, the technical solution of this application can be applied to satellite communication systems, high altitude platform station (HAPS) communication, non-terrestrial network (NTN) systems such as UAVs, integrated communication and navigation (ICAN) systems, global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), and ultra-dense low-Earth orbit satellite communication systems.

[0097] For ease of description, this application will use a public land mobile network (PLMN) or a 5G network as examples in its embodiments.

[0098] Figure 1This is a schematic diagram of the communication system applicable to this application. Taking the 5G network architecture based on a service-oriented architecture in a non-roaming scenario as defined during the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standardization process as an example, as shown in the figure, this network architecture can include three parts: the terminal equipment part, the data network (DN), and the operator network PLMN part. The functions of the network elements in each part are briefly explained below.

[0099] The terminal equipment portion may include terminal equipment 110, which may also be referred to as user equipment (UE). The terminal equipment can access the aforementioned communication system and is a device or module with corresponding communication functions. Terminal equipment may also be referred to as user equipment (UE), terminal, user device, access terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station (MS), remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, terminal unit, terminal station, terminal device, wireless communication equipment, user agent, or user device. The terminal typically contains communication modules, circuits, or chips that perform the corresponding communication functions. The terminal may also be configured with program instructions for performing the corresponding communication functions.

[0100] For example, the terminal in this application embodiment can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA) computer, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, a drone, a computer with wireless transceiver capabilities, a machine-type communication (MTC) terminal, a virtual reality (VR) terminal, an augmented reality (AR) terminal, a point-of-sale (POS) machine, customer-premises equipment (CPE), a light user equipment (UE), a reduced capability user equipment (REDCAPUE), a wearable device (e.g., a smartwatch, smart bracelet, pedometer, smart glasses), an Internet of Things (IoT) terminal, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self-driving, a wireless terminal in remote medical care, a wireless terminal in a smart grid, or a transportation terminal. Wireless terminals in smart cities, smart homes (e.g., game consoles, smart TVs, smart speakers, smart refrigerators, and fitness equipment), transportation vehicles with wireless communication capabilities, communication modules, roadside units (RSUs) with terminal functions, and flying equipment (e.g., smart robots, hot air balloons, drones, and airplanes). Terminal devices can also be vehicle-mounted devices, such as complete vehicle units, vehicle-mounted modules, vehicle-mounted chips, on-board units (OBUs), or telematics boxes (T-BOXs).

[0101] The PLMN portion of the operator's network may include, but is not limited to, RAN 120 and the core network (CN) portion.

[0102] RAN 120 is the implementation system between service nodes and terminal equipment 110 in the operator network. For terminal equipment 110 to access the operator network, it first goes through RAN 120, and then can connect to service nodes in the operator network through RAN 120.

[0103] Access network equipment can be a network-side device with wireless transceiver capabilities. It can be a device within a radio access network (RAN) that provides wireless communication functionality to terminal devices, referred to as RAN equipment. RAN can be a cellular system related to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), such as a 5G mobile communication system, or a future-oriented evolution system (such as a next-generation mobile communication system). RAN can also be an open radio access network (O-RAN or ORAN), a cloud radio access network (CRAN), or a wireless fidelity (WiFi) system. For example, this access network equipment can be a base station, an evolved NodeB (eNodeB), a next-generation NodeB (gNB) in a 5G mobile communication system, a base station evolved later by 3GPP, a transmission reception point (TRP), an access node, a wireless relay node, or a wireless backhaul node in a WiFi system. In communication systems employing different radio access technologies (RATs), the names of devices with base station functions may differ. For example, in LTE systems, they may be called eNB or eNodeB, while in 5G or NR systems, they may be called gNB. This application does not limit the specific name of the base station. Access network equipment may include one or more co-located or non-co-located transmitting and receiving points. Furthermore, access network equipment may include at least one of the following: one or more central units (CUs), one or more distributed units (DUs), and one or more radio units (RUs). In different systems, CUs (or CU-CPs and CU-UPs), DUs, or RUs may also have different names, but those skilled in the art will understand their meaning. For example, in an open RAN (ORAN) system, a CU may also be called an O-CU (open CU), a DU may also be called an O-DU (open DU), a CU-CP may also be called an O-CU-CP, a CU-UP may also be called an O-CU-UP, and a RU may also be called an O-RU. Any of the CU (or CU-CP, CU-UP), DU and RU units in this application can be implemented through a software module, a hardware module, or a combination of software and hardware modules.For example, the functionality of a CU can be implemented by one entity or different entities. For instance, the CU's functionality can be further divided, separating the control plane and user plane and implementing them through different entities: a control plane CU entity (i.e., the CU-CP entity) and a user plane CU entity (i.e., the CU-UP entity). The CU-CP and CU-UP entities can be coupled with a DU to jointly complete the access network device's functionality. For example, the CU is responsible for handling non-real-time protocols and services, implementing the functions of radio resource control (RRC) and the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer. The DU is responsible for handling physical layer protocols and real-time services, implementing the functions of the radio link control (RLC) layer, the media access control (MAC) layer, and the physical (PHY) layer. In this way, some functions of the wireless access network device can be implemented through multiple network function entities. These network function entities can be network elements in hardware devices, software functions running on dedicated hardware, or virtualized functions instantiated on a platform (e.g., a cloud platform). The access network device can also include an active antenna unit (AAU). The AAU implements some physical layer processing functions, radio frequency processing, and related functions of the active antenna. Since RRC layer information ultimately becomes PHY layer information, or is derived from PHY layer information, in this architecture, higher-layer signaling, such as RRC layer signaling, can also be considered as being sent by the DU, or by the DU+AAU. It is understood that access network equipment can be one or more of the following: CU nodes, DU nodes, and AAU nodes. Furthermore, the CU can be classified as an access network device in the radio access network (RAN), or as an access network device in the core network (CN); this application does not limit this. For example, in V2X technology, access network equipment can be a roadside unit (RSU). Multiple access network devices in a communication system can be base stations of the same type or different types. Base stations can communicate with terminal devices directly, or they can communicate with terminal devices through relay stations. In this embodiment, the device for implementing the access network device function can be the access network device itself, or it can be a device that supports the access network device in implementing the function, such as a chip system or a combination of devices or components that can implement the access network device function. This device can be installed in the access network device. In this embodiment, the chip system can be composed of chips, or it can include chips and other discrete devices.

[0104] Additionally, as an example, the access network equipment in this application may also include service management and orchestration (SMO), wherein the SMO includes a RAN intelligent controller (RIC). Optionally, the RIC includes two types: a non-real-time radio intelligent controller (non-RT-RIC) and a near-real-time radio intelligent controller (near-RT-RIC).

[0105] The non-RT-RIC is deployed within the SMO, and its main responsibilities are: to provide policy and machine language (ML) model management, and a large amount of information to achieve intelligent RAN optimization; and to enable rApp functionality. rApp can collect information and take action through the A1, O1, O2, and open fronthaul management plane (Open FH M-Plane) interfaces to achieve RAN optimization. rApp is a portable, functional application.

[0106] The near-RT-RIC is deployed within the SMO, and its main responsibility is to provide near real-time (e.g., 10ms-1s) radio resource control and optimization to the base station based on data collected by the E2 nodes.

[0107] The CN component may include, but is not limited to, the following network functions (NFs): User plane function (UPF) 130, Network exposure function (NEF) 131, Network function repository function (NRF) 132, Policy control function (PCF) 133, Unified data management function (UDM) 134, Unified data repository function (UDR) 135, Network data analytics function (NWDAF) 136, Authentication server function (AUSF) 137, AMF 138, Session management function (SMF) 139, Application function (AF) 141, and Sensing function (SF) 142.

[0108] Data network DN 140, also known as packet data network (PDN), is typically a network located outside the operator's network, such as a third-party network. However, in some implementations, the DN can also be deployed by the operator, meaning the DN is part of a PLMN. This application does not restrict whether the DN belongs to a PLMN. An operator's PLMN can connect to multiple data networks DN 140. Various services can be deployed on the data network DN 140, providing data and / or voice services to terminal devices 110. For example, data network DN 140 can be a private network of a smart factory. Sensors installed in the workshop of the smart factory can be terminal devices 110. A control server for the sensors is deployed in the data network DN 140, providing services to the sensors. The sensors can communicate with the control server, obtain instructions from the control server, and transmit the collected sensor data to the control server according to the instructions. As another example, data network DN 140 can be an internal office network of a company. The mobile phones or computers of the company's employees can be terminal devices 110, and the employees' mobile phones or computers can access information and data resources on the company's internal office network. Terminal device 110 can establish a connection with the operator network through an interface (such as N1) provided by the operator network and use data and / or voice services provided by the operator network. Terminal device 110 can also access data network DN 140 through the operator network and use operator services deployed on data network DN 140, and / or services provided by third parties.

[0109] The following is a brief explanation of the NF functions included in CN.

[0110] 1. UPF 130 is a gateway provided by the operator, serving as the gateway for communication between the operator's network and the data network DN 140. UPF 130 includes user plane-related functions such as packet routing and transmission, packet inspection, service usage reporting, quality of service (QoS) processing, uplink packet inspection, and downlink packet storage.

[0111] 2. NEF 131 is a control plane function provided by the operator. It mainly enables third parties to use the services provided by the network, supports the network to open its capabilities, events and data analysis, provides security configuration information to the PLMN from external applications, converts information exchanged between the PLMN and external networks, provides the application programming interface (API) interface exposed by the operator network, and provides interaction between external servers and the internal operator network.

[0112] 3. NRF 132 is a control plane function provided by the operator, which can be used to maintain real-time information about network functions and services in the network. For example, it supports network service discovery, maintains the NF configuration data (NF profile) of NF instances to support services, supports service communication proxy (SCP) service discovery, maintains the SCP configuration data (SCP profile) of SCP instances, sends notifications about newly registered, deregistered, and updated NFs and SCPs, and maintains the health status of NFs and SCPs.

[0113] 4. PCF 133 is a control plane function provided by the operator. It supports a unified policy framework to govern network behavior, provide policy rules and subscription information related to policy decisions to other control functions, etc.

[0114] 5. UDM 134 is a control plane function provided by the operator, responsible for storing information such as the subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI), the generic public subscription identifier (GPSI), and credentials of subscribed users in the operator's network. The SUPI is protected for confidentiality during transmission; this confidential SUPI is called the subscription concealed identifier (SUCI). The information stored in UDM 134 can be used for authentication and authorization of terminal device 110 when accessing the operator's network. Specifically, the subscribed users of the aforementioned operator's network can be users of services provided by the operator's network, such as users using a subscriber identity module (SIM) card from operator A or operator B. The credentials of the subscribed users can be a long-term key stored in the SIM card or a small file containing information related to SIM card encryption, used for authentication and / or authorization. It should be noted that, for the sake of convenience, the permanent identifier, trust certificate, security context, authentication data (cookie), and token are not distinguished or limited in this application embodiment for the purpose of description.

[0115] 6. UDR 135 is a control plane function provided by the operator, which provides UDM with the ability to store and retrieve subscription data, PCF with the ability to store and retrieve policy data, and stores and retrieves user NF group identifier (group ID) information, etc.

[0116] 7. NWDAF 136 is a control plane function provided by the operator. Its main function is to collect data from NF, external application functions (AF), and operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) systems, and to provide NWDAF service registration, data access, and analysis data to NF and AF. In this application, NWDAF is mainly responsible for security-related data analysis. Therefore, in this application, NWDAF can also be understood as a network element with security analysis capabilities. The term NWDAF is just an example; other network element names may be used subsequently, and this application does not limit this.

[0117] 8. AUSF 137 is a control plane function provided by the operator, typically used for Level 1 authentication, i.e., authentication between terminal device 110 (the subscriber) and the operator's network. After receiving an authentication request from the subscriber, AUSF 137 can authenticate and / or authorize the subscriber using the authentication and / or authorization information stored in UDM 134, or generate the subscriber's authentication and / or authorization information using UDM 134. AUSF 137 can then send the authentication and / or authorization information back to the subscriber.

[0118] 9. AMF 138 is a control plane network function provided by the operator's network, which is responsible for access control and mobility management of terminal equipment 110 accessing the operator's network. This includes functions such as mobility state management, allocation of temporary user identity identifiers, authentication and authorization of users.

[0119] 10. SMF 139 is a control plane network function provided by the operator network, responsible for managing the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sessions of terminal equipment 110. A PDU session is a channel used to transmit PDUs; terminal equipment exchanges PDUs with the data network DN 140 through PDU sessions. SMF 139 is responsible for establishing, maintaining, and deleting PDU sessions. SMF 139 includes session management (e.g., session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between User Plane Functions UPF 130 and RAN 120), selection and control of UPF 130, service and session continuity (SSC) mode selection, roaming, and other session-related functions.

[0120] 11. AF 141 is a control plane network function provided by the operator's network. It is used to provide application layer information and can interact with the policy framework or directly with the policy framework to make policy decision requests through network open function elements. It can be located inside or outside the operator's network.

[0121] 12. SF 142 is used for network elements that process and compute sensed data. It can be any network element capable of computation, such as network data analysis function network elements, analysis logical function network elements (AnLF), model trains logical function network elements (MTLF) and other artificial intelligence (AI) function network elements, or location management function (LMF), as well as any future network elements with computational tasks.

[0122] In this application, the sensing control function (SF) can be deployed in the core network or in a non-core network, without limitation. The SF can utilize access network equipment and / or terminal equipment for sensing. The SF can be co-located with other network elements, or its functions can be implemented by other network elements, or the SF can be configured independently; this application does not limit this. Optionally, the SF can also be called a sensing control function (SCF) or other possible names.

[0123] For example, the SF can transmit sensing control signaling with access network equipment and / or terminal equipment through access and mobility management function network elements. The sensing measurement data acquired by the access network equipment and / or terminal equipment can be transmitted to the SF via the control plane or user plane. The user plane can be forwarded through user plane function network elements or directly transmitted to the SF. For example, the aforementioned communication interfaces (such as N1, N2, N5, or N8, etc.) can support the transmission of sensing service-related information, such as authentication information, sensing service type, sensing service quality requirements, sensing measurement data, or sensing information.

[0124] It is understandable that the aforementioned network elements or functions can be physical entities in hardware devices, software instances running on dedicated hardware, or virtualization functions instantiated on a shared platform (e.g., a cloud platform). Simply put, an NF can be implemented in hardware or software.

[0125] Figure 1Nnef, Nnrf, Npcf, Nudm, Nudr, Nnwdaf, Nausf, Namf, Nsmf, Nran, N1, N2, N3, N4, and N6 are interface sequence numbers. For example, the meaning of the above interface sequence numbers can be found in the 3GPP standard protocol, and this application does not limit the meaning of the above interface sequence numbers. It should be noted that the interface names between the various network functions in the figure are merely examples; in specific implementations, the interface names of this system architecture may be other names, and this application does not limit them. Furthermore, the names of the messages (or signaling) transmitted between the above network elements are also merely examples and do not constitute any limitation on the function of the messages themselves.

[0126] For ease of explanation, in this application embodiment, network functions (such as NEF 131…SMF139) are collectively referred to as NF, that is, the NF described below in this application embodiment can be replaced with any network function. Additionally, Figure 1 The network functions described below are only schematic representations and are not limited to the NFs described later. Figure 1 The network functions shown in the image.

[0127] It should be understood that the network architecture described above for the embodiments of this application is only a network architecture described from the perspective of service-oriented architecture. The network architecture applicable to the embodiments of this application is not limited to this, and any network architecture that can realize the functions of the above-described network elements is applicable to the embodiments of this application. For example, at least one of the network elements, access network devices, or terminal devices in this application can be deployed in NTN.

[0128] It should also be understood that AMF, SMF, UPF, NEF, AUSF, NRF, PCF, UDM, and SF shown in the diagram can be understood as network elements in the core network used to implement different functions, for example, they can be combined into network slices as needed. These core network elements can be independent devices or integrated into the same device to implement different functions. This application does not limit the specific form of the above network elements. Furthermore, Figure 1 The network architecture shown may also include other network elements, such as sensing function network elements, artificial intelligence logic function (e.g., model training logic function, analysis logic function) network elements, etc.

[0129] It should also be understood that the above naming is defined solely for the purpose of distinguishing different functions and should not constitute any limitation on this application. This application does not preclude the possibility of using other naming conventions in 5G networks and other future networks. For example, in future communication networks, some or all of the above-mentioned network elements may use the terminology from 5G, or they may use other names, etc.

[0130] By way of example and not limitation, the embodiments of this application can be applied to scenarios of integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). For example, it can be applied to scenarios where the terminal sends sensing data to the network side for processing, such as... Figure 2 As shown, it can be applied to scenarios where perception data assists in collision avoidance. Figure 2 As can be seen, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) A and UAV B, with the assistance of the "5G Sensing Service" provided by the network operator, fly to their destinations under the guidance of the unmanned traffic management (UTM) network element. For example, UAV A will fly towards a city center; the UTM requests the network operator's "5G Sensing Service" to provide sensing services for UAV A. The required sensing results include the flight environment along its flight path, such as the altitudes of nearby buildings, obstacles, and other drones. Similarly, UAV B will fly towards a rural area; the UTM requests the network operator's "5G Sensing Service" to provide sensing services for UAV B. The required sensing results include the flight environment along its route, such as obstacles, and other nearby drones.

[0131] The UTM requests reports about UAV A and UAV B. The base station can continuously send sensing signaling along the route of UAV A, and UE A on UAV A can use the 5G communication connection to send the 3GPP sensing data it has collected for its surrounding environment back to the RAN. The 5G network can then obtain comprehensive sensing results of UAV A's flight environment, such as building locations, heights, and other nearby moving objects (e.g., the relative positions, heights, angles of movement, and speeds of other UAVs relative to the UTM). The same sensing operation applies to UAV B. The 5G network periodically reports sensing results based on the UTM's requests. The UTM considers the received sensing results and other input information to adjust and guide the UAV's flight path.

[0132] It should be noted that the above Figure 1 and Figure 2 The embodiments of this application are merely illustrative of the scenarios in which they can be applied and do not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. The embodiments provided in this application can also be applied to other communication scenarios. For example, the SF network element mentioned above can also be other computing network elements used to process the data provided by the terminal. These will not be illustrated one by one here.

[0133] To facilitate understanding of the embodiments of this application, some basic concepts involved in this application are briefly explained. It should be understood that the basic concepts introduced below are illustrated using the basic concepts specified in the NR protocol as examples, but do not limit the embodiments of this application to be applied only to NR systems. Therefore, the standard names that appear when describing using an NR system as an example are functional descriptions, and the specific names are not limited, but only indicate the function of the device, which can be extended to other future systems.

[0134] 1. Privacy computation (or privacy computing): refers to a set of technologies that enable data analysis and computation while protecting the data itself from public disclosure, achieving the goal of making the data "usable but not visible"; and realizing the transformation and release of data value while fully protecting data and privacy security.

[0135] 2. Homomorphic Encryption: An important technique in privacy computing, homomorphically encrypted data allows for computational processing even when the data is in ciphertext. In this application, the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can be processed in its ciphertext state; or in other words, the data before and after homomorphic encryption have the same computational properties, meaning that both the data before and after homomorphic encryption are homomorphic.

[0136] 3. Non-Access Stratum (NAS) messages: These are messages sent between a terminal device and subsequent nodes via a wireless access node. Examples include messages sent from the terminal device to the core network via the access network equipment, or messages sent from the terminal device to the core network via the DU (Dedicated Node). Because the access node does not process these messages, they are called NAS messages. For ease of description, this application refers to all messages not processed by the access node as NAS (Non-Access Stratum) messages. However, it should be understood that the name of the messages is not limited in this application, and messages not processed by the access node may have other names (e.g., other possible names defined in future communication protocols).

[0137] 4. NAS Message Classification: Based on the different core network elements that send NAS messages, NAS messages can be classified into mobility management (MM) NAS messages, session management (SM) NAS messages, short messaging service (SMS) NAS messages, and call control (CC) NAS messages.

[0138] As one possible implementation, apart from MM NAS, other types of NAS messages are first sent by the UE to the Access and Mobility Management Function (NF) network element through the access network, and then routed to other NFs through the NF network element.

[0139] In the protocol stack, the RRC and Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) layers and the protocol layers below them are called the access layer, while the MM, SM, or CC layers above RRC and RANAP are called the non-access layer. The processes that the base station in the radio access layer needs to process are called access layer processes; the processes that only the UE and core network elements need to process, and where the radio access network base station only needs to process routing signaling, are called non-access layer processes.

[0140] For ease of understanding, combined with Figure 3 This section provides a brief overview of how access and mobility management network elements route session management NAS messages (NAS-SM). Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the control plane protocol stack between a terminal device and an SMF, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the NAS-SM protocol layer is the SM function of the NAS protocol, supporting the establishment, modification, and release of the PDU session user plane. The NAS-SM protocol layer supports session management between the UE and the session management function network element. NAS-SM signaling is transmitted through the access and mobility management function network element. The content of NAS-SM signaling is not parsed by the access and mobility management function network element. NAS-SM signaling is processed (created and processed) at the NAS-SM protocol layer between the UE and the session management function.

[0141] The NAS-MM protocol layer handles NAS-SM signaling in the following two ways:

[0142] 1) Transmitting NAS-SM signaling: The NAS MM protocol layer creates a NAS MM message, including a security header, an instruction to transmit NAS SM signaling, and information on how and where to forward the NAS SM signaling after receiving the NAS MM.

[0143] 2) Receive NAS-SM signaling: Upon receiving a NAS MM message, process the NAS MM part, i.e. perform integrity verification, parse information on how to forward the NAS SM signaling and where to forward it.

[0144] As another possible implementation, the UE and any network element (UE-any NF) can communicate directly. There is no need for an AMF to act as a transmission channel; different types of NAS messages are sent by the UE to different NFs via the access network. For example, MM NAS is sent by the UE to the AMF via the access network, and SM NAS is sent by the UE to the SMF via the access network, etc.

[0145] 5. NAS Security Setup: For ease of understanding, combined with... Figure 4 Explain the NAS security setup process defined by the existing protocol. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a NAS security setup process.

[0146] from Figure 4 As can be seen, establishing NAS security involves the following steps:

[0147] Step 1: The UE sends an initial NAS message to the access and mobility management function network element.

[0148] For example, if the UE does not have a NAS security context, the initial NAS message should only contain plaintext information elements (IEs), such as the subscription identifier (e.g., SUCI or Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI)), UE security capabilities, ngKSI, etc.

[0149] For example, if the UE has a NAS security context, the initial NAS message sent should include the aforementioned plaintext information elements, as well as the complete initial NAS message encrypted in an encrypted NAS container. If the initial NAS message is protected and the access and mobility management function (AMF) network element has the same security context, steps 2 to 4 below can be omitted, and in this case, the AMF network element should use the complete initial NAS message in the NAS container as the message to respond to.

[0150] Step 2: If the Access and Mobility Management (AMF) element cannot obtain the NAS security context locally or in the last visited AMF, or if the AMF fails to perform an integrity check on the received initial NAS message, the AMF element should initiate an authentication process with the UE (e.g., Figure 4 Step 2b is shown in the diagram. This application does not limit the specific authentication process, and will not elaborate on it here.

[0151] For example, if the access and mobility management function (AMU) network element obtains the old NAS security context from the AMU network element last accessed by the UE (e.g., Figure 4 In step 2a), as shown, if the AMF can decipher the NAS container with the same security context and obtain the initial NAS message, then steps 2b to 4 can be omitted. If the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) element obtains the new K_AMF from the last accessed AMF element (which received keyAmfChangeInd), then step 2b can be omitted.

[0152] Step 3: If UE authentication is successful, the access and mobility management function network element should send a NAS security mode command message (NAS SMC).

[0153] If the initial NAS message is protected but fails the integrity check (e.g., due to a MAC failure or the access and mobility management function (AM) element being unable to find the security context to use), or the AM element is unable to decrypt the complete initial NAS message in the NAS container (e.g., because "keyAmfChangeInd" was received from the last accessed AM element), then the AM element should include a flag in the NAS security mode command message requesting the UE to send the complete initial NAS message in the NAS security mode complete message.

[0154] Step 4: The UE should send a NAS secure mode completion message to the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMS) network element in response to the NAS secure mode command message. The NAS secure mode completion message should be encrypted and its integrity protected. Furthermore, if the AMS network element requested or the UE sent an unprotected initial NAS message, the NAS secure mode completion message should include the complete initial NAS message from the NAS container. The AMS network element should use the complete initial NAS message from the NAS container as the message to respond to.

[0155] Step 5: The Access and Mobility Management (AMS) network element should send a response to the initial NAS message. This message should be encrypted and its integrity protected.

[0156] 6. Homomorphic Encryption and Privacy Computation: Data is one of the five major factors of production in the digital society. With the convergence of communication and sensing, sensing, as an inherent capability of future communication networks, provides a wealth of data to intelligent networks by sensing the network's own state, surrounding environment, and user / device behavior. From the perspective of data value mining, the network is both a producer and provider of data, providing trusted data services for various intelligent applications, and a consumer of network data, improving network performance and operational efficiency through data-driven intelligent applications.

[0157] In future communication networks, computing resources will be distributed across various infrastructures, including central clouds, edge clouds, network devices, and even terminal devices. These computing resources, along with the artificial intelligence algorithms or specific functional applications attached to them, will not only serve the network or devices themselves to improve performance and optimize network operations, but will also be exposed to upper-layer applications through a unified interface. Nodes in the communication network infrastructure will provide additional computing capabilities in addition to basic connectivity.

[0158] With societal progress and increased awareness of data ownership, the requirements for data privacy protection are becoming increasingly stringent. Data processing and use must comply with relevant laws and regulations; otherwise, it could face serious security and privacy attacks from both internal and external entities, posing significant risks.

[0159] With the global smart application industry increasingly focusing on data security and privacy, and users demanding greater network autonomy, performance metrics will no longer be the sole focus for users. The demands for cost, security, privacy, and autonomy will gradually deepen, thus becoming new dimensions for evaluating service quality.

[0160] How to fully explore and realize the value of data while meeting high security and privacy requirements, and efficiently utilize communication and computing resources within the communication network? How to provide end-to-end data privacy and security protection technologies while realizing various new capabilities (such as intrinsic intelligence and ubiquitous sensing) and services (such as immersive extended reality (XR), digital twins, or cloud universes) in future networks? These issues indicate that communication networks need more robust privacy-enhancing technologies, and homomorphic encryption algorithms that provide privacy-preserving computing capabilities are of paramount importance.

[0161] Homomorphic encryption (HE) aims to perform computations on ciphertext data without exposing the plaintext, focusing on privacy-preserving computation. It is a technology that enables data value extraction while providing privacy protection.

[0162] Homomorphic encryption is based on basic encryption, but adds the ability to perform homomorphic computations on ciphertext. It allows computations to be performed directly on the encrypted ciphertext, and the result obtained after decrypting the ciphertext computation is consistent with the result obtained on the plaintext.

[0163] like Figure 5 As shown, plaintext data m is calculated using the plaintext calculation function f to obtain the plaintext result f(m), and plaintext data m is homomorphically encrypted to obtain ciphertext data c = E. pk (m), and this encrypted data is processed by the homomorphic computing circuit C. fAfter calculation, the ciphertext result is obtained. The ciphertext result can be decrypted using homomorphism to obtain the plaintext result f(m).

[0164] This application does not impose any restrictions on the encryption key used in the homomorphic encryption process. For example, homomorphic encryption can be fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and the encryption key can be either asymmetric public key encryption or symmetric encryption, as long as the ciphertext has a certain algebraic structure; or in other words, the ciphertext has homomorphic properties.

[0165] 7. Homomorphic Encryption Process: This includes homomorphic key generation (HE.Keygen), homomorphic encryption (HE.Enc), homomorphic decryption (HE.Dec), and homomorphic evaluation (HE.Eval). For example, homomorphic encryption can be abbreviated as HE = (HE.Keygen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval), meaning HE consists of four algorithmic parts.

[0166] To facilitate understanding, the following is a simple introduction to the various stages of the homomorphic encryption process, using an asymmetric encryption scheme as an example (where n is a security parameter):

[0167] (1) Key generation: (pk, evk, sk) ← HE.Keygen(1 n The function outputs a public key (pk), a homomorphic evaluation key (evk), and a private key (sk), where the public key is abbreviated as pk, and pk serves as the homomorphic encryption key K. enc =pk; Homomorphic evaluation key abbreviation K eval The homomorphic evaluation key can also be called the homomorphic computation key; the private key is abbreviated as sk, and sk serves as the homomorphic decryption key K. dec =sk.

[0168] like Figure 6 As shown, the key generation device generates the key required for homomorphic encryption based on the parameters required for homomorphic key generation and the key generator. The parameters required for homomorphic key generation can be referred to as key materials, such as... Figure 6 As shown, the key generator inputs or generates key materials to the key generator, and outputs or stores the key (e.g., ...). Figure 6 The homomorphic encryption key K shownenc Decryption key K dec and compute key K eval ).

[0169] Specifically, homomorphic key generation device A generates homomorphic encryption key K. enc Homomorphic computation key K eval Homomorphic decryption key K dec Among them, the homomorphic encryption key K enc Send the homomorphic computing key K to homomorphic encryption device B. eval Homomorphic decryption key K is sent to homomorphic computing device C. dec Send to homomorphic decryption device D.

[0170] In a homomorphic encryption task, multiple homomorphic encryption devices can encrypt data from different sources, multiple homomorphic computing devices can execute homomorphic computing circuits, and there can be single-hop or multi-hop homomorphic computing devices. A homomorphic encryption task can also have multiple homomorphic decryption devices, and the decryption result can be given to multiple data-using devices. Depending on the key deployment, the homomorphic decryption device and the data-using device can be the same or different entities. The keys of multiple homomorphic encryption devices in a homomorphic encryption task can be the same or different.

[0171] (2) Homomorphic encryption: c←HE.Enc pk (m). Homomorphic encryption devices use homomorphic encryption keys K. enc =pk, encrypts a single bit plaintext message m∈{0,1} into ciphertext c.

[0172] like Figure 7 As shown, the homomorphic encryption device is based on the homomorphic encryption key K. enc Encrypt plaintext m into ciphertext c, such as Figure 7 As shown, input or generate plaintext m, and then use homomorphic encryption key K. enc Encrypt the text and output the ciphertext c.

[0173] (3) Homomorphic decryption: m←HE.Dec sk (c) The homomorphic decryption device uses the homomorphic decryption key K. dec =sk, decrypts the ciphertext c back to the plaintext message m∈{0,1}.

[0174] like Figure 8 As shown, the homomorphic decryption device is based on the decryption key K. dec Restore the ciphertext c to plaintext m, such as Figure 8 As shown, input ciphertext c, and decrypt using key K. dec Decrypt the data and output or use the plaintext m.

[0175] (4) Homomorphic evaluation: c f ←HE.Eval evk (f,c1,…,c l This can also be called homomorphic computation. Based on the input ciphertext c1,…,c… l Homomorphic computation key K eval Homomorphic computing devices (which may be called HEcalc or HEeval) perform homomorphic computation of the function f: {0,1} under ciphertext. l →{0,1}, obtain the output ciphertext c of the homomorphic computation. f .

[0176] like Figure 9 As shown, the homomorphic computing device is based on the computing key K eval The input ciphertexts c1, ..., c l Homomorphic computation yields c f ,like Figure 9 As shown, the input ciphertext c1,…,c l By calculating the key K eval Calculation and processing, output ciphertext c f .

[0177] The homomorphic computation function f described above represents an arithmetic circuit with addition and multiplication gates over a finite field (galois field, GF). Generally, homomorphic computation HE.Eval is decomposed into multiple fundamental operators, such as homomorphic addition c. add ←HE.Add evk (c1,c2) ​​and homomorphic multiplication c mult ←HE.Mult evk (c1,c2).

[0178] For example, the entire homomorphic encryption scheme HE = (HE.Keygen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval) is as follows: Figure 10 As shown, the ciphertext calculation result, after decryption, is equivalent to the plaintext calculation result.

[0179] 8. Characteristics of homomorphic encryption: Currently, the industry-standard fully homomorphic encryption algorithms are basically based on lattice construction. Their security is mostly based on the fault-tolerant learning problem (LWE) or the ring error learning problem (RLWE) in lattice cryptography.

[0180] random vector as key A positive integer n represents the vector dimension, q represents the ciphertext modulus, and the set... It is a uniformly distributed random matrix, N>n. Noise e∈χ N Let the noise distribution χ=χ(n) be the set of distributions on Z, which can be a discrete Gaussian distribution, and set an upper limit for noise |χ|≤B. Then the ciphertext after homomorphic encryption can be c=(a,b), where b=[A·s+m+e] q , where m is the plaintext message to be encrypted.

[0181] A key characteristic of fully homomorphic encryption schemes is the addition of a random "noise" component, *e*, during the encryption process. Homomorphic computations on the ciphertext amplify this noise. When multiple ciphertexts are combined for homomorphic computation, the noise inherent in each ciphertext is amplified. In particular, the noise growth caused by homomorphic multiplication can reach exponential levels, and there may be overlapping terms between the noise and the ciphertext. When the noise is within a controllable range, the decryption algorithm can easily recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. If only simple calculations are performed on the ciphertext, the accumulated noise remains within an acceptable range. However, if the ciphertext calculations are overly complex, once the noise exceeds a critical value, it will completely overwrite the original plaintext, causing homomorphic decryption to fail.

[0182] 9. Bootstrapping Key: Bootstrapping is a special technique for processing ciphertext. After processing, it can "refresh" ciphertext with near-critical noise into a new ciphertext with very low noise. The main method is to transform a high-noise ciphertext... Re-encrypt using the new key k2 to create another fully homomorphic ciphertext. Use the new key k2 to encrypt the old key k1 into ciphertext as well. This refers to the bootstrapping key (BSK). The homomorphic computing device then uses homomorphic computation to establish the corresponding homomorphic decryption circuit. By decrypting the inner ciphertext and restoring it to plaintext, we can obtain a brand new low-noise FHE ciphertext under a new key.

[0183] Bootstrap keys, as a type of homomorphic computation key, need to be generated by a key generation device and distributed to homomorphic computation devices. Besides bootstrap keys, another type of homomorphic computation key is the keyswitching key (KSK). Taking the RLWE homomorphic encryption scheme with a one-party key as an example, assuming the ciphertext... The corresponding key is Homomorphic computation of multiplication of two ciphertexts ct and ct' The corresponding key is After ciphertext multiplication, not only does the ciphertext size expand, but the key also exhibits exponential cross terms. After each ciphertext computation, a relinearization key (i.e., a key transformation key) is needed to convert the ciphertext product into a new ciphertext with the same dimension as the original ciphertext, and eliminate the corresponding key cross terms before proceeding to the next layer of circuit computation.

[0184] 10. Trans-chipper Operation: The trans-chipper operation involved in this application can be understood as converting ciphertext in a non-homomorphic encryption state into ciphertext in a homomorphic encryption state; or, converting ciphertext in a homomorphic encryption state into ciphertext in a non-homomorphic encryption state. For example, the process by which the first communication device in the following embodiments homomorphically encrypts the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext can be called a trans-chipper operation, wherein the first ciphertext is ciphertext protected by the first security context and belongs to the non-homomorphic encryption state, and the second ciphertext is ciphertext encrypted by homomorphism and belongs to the homomorphic encryption state; as another example, the process by which the first communication device in the following embodiments homomorphically decrypts the data processing result to obtain the data processing result based on the first security context can be called a trans-chipper operation, wherein the data processing result is ciphertext of the data processing result protected by the first security context and homomorphically encrypted and belongs to the homomorphic encryption state, and the data processing result based on the first security context is ciphertext protected by the first security context and belongs to the non-homomorphic encryption state.

[0185] It should be understood that the above-described conversion operation between ciphertext in a non-homomorphic encryption state and ciphertext in a homomorphic encryption state is called a ciphertext conversion operation, which is only an example and does not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. For example, it can also be called proxy re-encryption (PRE), conversion operation between non-homomorphic encrypted ciphertext and homomorphic encrypted ciphertext, ciphertext conversion, or first operation, etc.

[0186] The above text combined Figure 1 and Figure 2 This paper briefly introduces the scenarios in which the communication method provided in the embodiments of this application can be applied, and introduces the basic concepts that may be involved in the embodiments of this application. Among the basic concepts, the homomorphic encryption process and the security of homomorphic encryption are introduced. As can be seen from the above, homomorphic encryption technology can support the calculation and processing of data and the generation of results even when the data is encrypted.

[0187] One method for processing sensitive user data based on homomorphic encryption technology is as follows: The network side sends a data statistics request to request data. After receiving the request, the UE determines the original data to be counted, encrypts the original data based on the homomorphic encryption algorithm, and provides the encrypted data to the network side. The network side calculates the encrypted data and publishes the data to the requesting party (the publisher or consumer needs to obtain the relevant homomorphic key and decrypt the result to obtain the plaintext statistical result).

[0188] However, this method for processing sensitive data based on homomorphic encryption has the following problems:

[0189] 1) Due to the high complexity of homomorphic algorithms, directly performing homomorphic encryption on the UE will increase the encryption overhead significantly.

[0190] 2) Due to the homomorphic algorithm, the transmitted user data will usually experience ciphertext inflation, meaning that the length of the ciphertext will increase several times compared to the plaintext. If homomorphic ciphertext data is transmitted directly, it will significantly increase the burden of air interface transmission.

[0191] Another method for handling confidential data based on homomorphic encryption is as follows: The system log generator, after encrypting these system logs with a symmetric encryption key, sends them to the system log analyzer, along with the symmetric encryption key in parallel with the homomorphic encryption system's public key. The system log analyzer performs a cryptographic transformation on these logs and then processes them in the homomorphic domain. The result of the homomorphic processing is then sent to a security center, or even directly to the system log generator for decryption. The security center can then prepare a security report or propose countermeasures before sending a security report in symmetric-key-encrypted form to the system log generator.

[0192] The method for processing confidential data based on homomorphic encryption still has the aforementioned problems, namely, the terminal still needs to support homomorphic algorithms and transmit homomorphic ciphertext, which is quite difficult for the terminal.

[0193] Furthermore, as described above regarding homomorphic encryption, it is an execution method. Therefore, other security protection operations can be performed on this execution method. For example, symmetric encryption and decryption operations can be performed under homomorphic encryption, such as performing encryption and decryption operations according to the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Therefore, "hybrid encryption operations" can be performed, that is, superimposing symmetric encryption and decryption operations on the ciphertext state of homomorphic encryption.

[0194] Specifically, the hybrid encryption operation process includes the following steps:

[0195] Step 1: The user uses symmetric encryption to encrypt the user data, uses homomorphic encryption to encrypt the symmetric key, and uploads it.

[0196] Step 2: In the homomorphic encryption algorithm, input the symmetric key encrypted using homomorphic encryption and the ciphertext encrypted using symmetric encryption. Perform homomorphic encryption algorithm calculations and output the homomorphically encrypted and symmetrically encrypted ciphertexts.

[0197] Step 3: Input the homomorphically encrypted and symmetrically encrypted ciphertexts, along with the homomorphically encrypted symmetric key. Perform symmetric decryption calculations under homomorphic encryption to generate homomorphically encrypted ciphertexts.

[0198] Step 4: Perform homomorphic encryption computation.

[0199] Step 5: Return the calculation result, and the user performs decryption.

[0200] However, this hybrid encryption process has the following problems:

[0201] 1) It is not applicable to communication protocol stacks such as NAS because the network side of 5G or future networks has the original symmetric key. Both the network side and the terminal side hold the original symmetric key. If a dishonest network element is involved, it may directly calculate the key without performing homomorphic encryption, and the UE will have no way of knowing it.

[0202] 2) The UE still needs to support homomorphic algorithms, which have complex overhead and are difficult for many UEs to support. Furthermore, the UE still needs to upload the homomorphic ciphertext of the symmetric key to the server, which may still incur significant overhead over the air interface depending on the ciphertext inflation factor.

[0203] To address the problems existing in the aforementioned methods for processing sensitive user data based on homomorphic encryption technology, this application provides a communication method that can achieve confidential data processing while reducing terminal complexity.

[0204] It should be understood that the embodiments shown below do not particularly limit the specific structure of the execution subject of the method provided in the embodiments of this application, as long as it is possible to communicate according to the method provided in the embodiments of this application by running a program that records the code of the method provided in the embodiments of this application. For example, the execution subject of the method provided in the embodiments of this application may be a network element or device; or, it may be a functional module in a network element or device that can call and execute a program.

[0205] Figure 11 This is a schematic flowchart illustrating a communication method provided in this application. It includes the following steps:

[0206] S1110, the second communication device sends a first request message to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the first request message from the second communication device.

[0207] For example, the second communication device can be a terminal device or a component within a terminal device. This application does not impose any specific limitations on the form of the second communication device, as long as it achieves the corresponding function.

[0208] For example, the first communication device can be an access network device or a component within an access network device; alternatively, the first communication device can be a network node or a component within a network node. This application does not impose any specific limitations on the form of the first communication device, as long as it achieves the corresponding function.

[0209] Specifically, the first request message is used to request a first network element to process data. This first network element can be a network element used for processing and calculating sensed data. For example, the first network element can be a sensing function network element, a network data analysis function network element, an analysis logic function network element, a model training logic function network element, or a positioning management function network element, etc., capable of data processing. This application does not impose any limitations on the specific form of the first network element, as long as it can achieve the corresponding function. For example, the first network element can perform operations such as data analysis and / or processing.

[0210] The aforementioned first request message includes first ciphertext and first instruction information. The first ciphertext is first data securely protected by a first security context, and the first instruction information is used to instruct the first ciphertext to be homomorphically encrypted. The first data being securely protected by the first security context can be achieved through encryption and / or integrity protection based on the first security context.

[0211] For example, the first data includes, but is not limited to: AI perception data, point cloud data, UAV data, or computational data.

[0212] This application does not limit the specific type of the first data. It can be data that the second communication device requests the first network element to process. The first data has high security protection requirements in order to achieve data processing without the network side knowing about the first data.

[0213] Optionally, the inclusion of the first ciphertext in the first request message can be: the first request message includes a NAS container, where the NAS container can be understood as any protocol stack that needs to be processed by the core network, such as data plane messages. This NAS container includes the first ciphertext; for example, a certain NAS container in the first request message carries the first ciphertext, which is first data securely protected by a first security context. This first security context can be a symmetric security context, and the NAS container can be called a symmetric encrypted ciphertext container.

[0214] For example, the NAS container included in the first request message in this application may be referred to as a field, information, or payload, etc.

[0215] For example, the first request message includes at least one container, and the first ciphertext is carried in the first container within the at least one container. In order for the first communication device to be able to clearly obtain the first ciphertext that needs to be homomorphically encrypted after receiving the first request message, the first request message also includes a data tag, which is used to indicate the first container.

[0216] For example, the second communication device is a terminal device, the first communication device is an access network device, the first request message is an access stratum (AS) message, and the first ciphertext can be understood as the content of the NAS message carried in the AS message. Since the access network device does not read the specific content of the NAS message, it can use data tags to instruct the access network device to perform homomorphic encryption processing on part of the NAS message in the AS message.

[0217] For example, a data tag is added to the AS message in the signaling radio bearer (SRB) of the second communication device. This data tag instructs the access network device to perform homomorphic encryption on some or all NAS messages. Optionally, the data tag and NAS container generated by the second communication device are shown in Table 1 below:

[0218] Table 1

[0219]

[0220]

[0221] As shown in Table 1, the NAS message includes NAS container 1, NAS container 2, and NAS container 3. The encrypted data 1 in NAS container 1 can be motion management control data protected by NAS security context; the encrypted data 2 in NAS container 2 can be point cloud data protected by NAS security context; and the encrypted data 3 in NAS container 3 can be session data protected by NAS security context. Specifically, the encrypted data 1 and encrypted data 2 are not homomorphically encrypted, while encrypted data 2 requires homomorphic encryption. Therefore, the AS message also includes a data tag, which indicates NAS container 2. For example, the data tag can be the address 2 of NAS container 2, or other information that can indicate NAS container 2. Here, NAS container can be referred to as a field, and different NAS containers can have different fields.

[0222] For example, the first instruction information mentioned above, which instructs the first ciphertext to be homomorphically encrypted, can be understood as: the first instruction information instructs the first communication device to perform homomorphic encryption on the received first ciphertext, or the first instruction information instructs the first ciphertext to have a homomorphic encryption requirement, etc. In this application, no specific instruction content of the first instruction information is limited, as long as it can instruct the first ciphertext to be homomorphically encrypted.

[0223] In this application, the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in its ciphertext state; in other words, the data before and after homomorphically encrypted data have the same computational properties. For example, the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext of data 'a' is denoted as HE(a). This HE(a) supports processing, meaning that a data processing device can process HE(a) to obtain the data processing result of data 'a'. The property that supports processing in its ciphertext state can be called homomorphism.

[0224] It should be noted that the term "homomorphic encryption" used in this application to describe the homomorphic encryption method is merely an example and does not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. For example, homomorphic encryption can also be called first encryption, privacy encryption, or computational encryption, etc.

[0225] Furthermore, the homomorphic encryption involved in this application can be fully homomorphic encryption or non-fully homomorphic encryption (e.g., partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) or leveled fully homomorphic encryption, etc.), and no specific homomorphic encryption method is limited.

[0226] For example, the homomorphic encryption algorithms involved in this application include, but are not limited to:

[0227] The following algorithms are used: RSA, ElGamal, Paillier, Boneh-Goh-Nissim, Gentry, BGV, BFV, GSW, THEW, Fast HEM Cryptosystem with Worst-case to Average-case Reductions (FHEW), and the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song Homomorphic Encryption Scheme (CKKS). This application does not limit the homomorphic algorithm upon which the homomorphic encryption is based; for ease of description, the CKKS algorithm will be used as an example below.

[0228] Optionally, the first indication information may be a field carried in the first request message. For example, the first indication information may be specific control bits, parameters, or bits in the first request message used to indicate homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext.

[0229] Optionally, the first indication information may be the name of the first request message. For example, if the first request message is a ciphertext request message, then after receiving the first request message, the first communication device can know to perform homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext based on the name of the first request message.

[0230] It should be understood that this application does not impose any limitations on the form of the first instruction information, and all information that can instruct the homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext is within the protection scope of this application.

[0231] Specifically, the aforementioned first security context is a security context negotiated and determined between the second communication device and the second network element. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0232] S1101, the second communication device and the second network element negotiate to determine the first security context.

[0233] Optionally, the second network element can be a NAS network element, such as NAS NF, which is a network element capable of establishing a secure NAS connection with the second communication device. The first security context can be a non-access stratum security context, such as NAS security context, where the first ciphertext is the NAS key in the NAS security context (e.g., the NAS key can be denoted as K). NAS K AMF 、or K SF The ciphertext (etc.) is encrypted, and the first security context is stored in the second communication device and the second network element.

[0234] As one possible implementation, the second network element can be the first network element mentioned above. For example, the second communication device can establish a NAS secure connection with the first network element and negotiate to determine the first security context.

[0235] As another possible implementation, the second network element is different from the first network element mentioned above. For example, the second network element can be an access and mobility management function network element, and the second communication device can establish a NAS secure connection with the second network element to negotiate and determine the first security context.

[0236] For example, the negotiation between the second communication device and the second network element to determine the first security context can be:

[0237] The second network element sends a NAS SMC to the second communication device, which then selects a suitable key generation algorithm and key parameters. Alternatively, the second network element can also indirectly negotiate a key with the second communication device through other network elements (such as the RAN). The purpose of key negotiation is to ensure that both the second communication device and the second network element have the same key for symmetric encryption (such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), ZUChongji (ZUC), or Snow encryption) of the data from the second communication device.

[0238] After the second network element and the second communication device negotiate and determine the key generation algorithm and key parameters, the second network element and the second communication device can generate the first security context.

[0239] For example, the second communication device generates a symmetric key as the first security context based on the negotiated parameters. One possible symmetric key generation method is: Symmetric key = KDF(downlink count, Alg ID, Kamf), where Kamf represents the upper-level key, Alg ID represents the algorithm ID, and downlink count represents the count value. KDF is a key derivation function.

[0240] For example, the second network element may obtain the first security context in the following ways:

[0241] The second network element can generate a symmetric key as the first security context based on the negotiated parameters. The method by which the second network element generates the first security context can be the same as the method used by the second communication device to generate the first security context, and will not be repeated here; or...

[0242] The second network element can provide the parameters required to generate the first security context to other network elements, which will then generate the first security context and provide it to the second network element.

[0243] It should be understood that the process of negotiating and determining the first security context between the second communication device and the core network element (e.g., the first network element or the second network element) can be referred to the description of NAS security establishment in the basic concepts above, and will not be repeated here.

[0244] Furthermore, after receiving the aforementioned first request message, the first communication device can determine, based on the first indication information in the first request message, that the received first ciphertext needs to be homomorphically encrypted. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0245] S1120, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext.

[0246] Specifically, the method by which the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext is determined based on the selected homomorphic encryption algorithm. For example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext based on the CKKS algorithm, and the generated second ciphertext is denoted as c, where c = HE(m), and m is the first ciphertext, and HE() represents the homomorphic encryption process.

[0247] For example, suppose m is the encoded input polynomial, i.e., m is the first ciphertext. We sample υ from χ′, and e0 and e1 from χ. Then the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext c = υ·pk + (m + e0, e1) mod q L The ciphertext obtained through encryption is always q. L The layers are defined as follows: χ represents the noise distribution, which is a discrete Gaussian distribution on the ring R related to the safety level λ, and χ′ is a uniform random distribution on the ring R.

[0248] It should be understood that this application does not impose any limitations on the specific process of homomorphic encryption, and reference can be made to descriptions of homomorphic encryption in current or future related technologies.

[0249] For example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext, including:

[0250] The first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext based on the encryption key to generate the second ciphertext. The encryption key is the key required to perform homomorphic encryption in a homomorphic security context; for example, the encryption key can be a homomorphic public key.

[0251] As described above, during the homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext by the first communication device, homomorphic encryption can be achieved based on the encryption key. This can be understood as the first communication device knowing the encryption key before performing homomorphic encryption. In this application, the first communication device can obtain the encryption key in the following ways:

[0252] Method 1: The first communication device can generate the required encryption key on its own.

[0253] Optionally, in the implementation shown in Method 1, the first communication device can generate the encryption key based on the triggering of the second network element or the second communication device.

[0254] Method 1.1: The first communication device generates an encryption key based on the triggering of the second communication device.

[0255] In the case shown in method 1.1, Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes the following steps:

[0256] S1102, the second communication device sends a second request message to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the second request message from the second communication device.

[0257] The second request message is used to request the generation of an encryption key, and the second request message includes a first identifier. For distinction, the second request message in the case shown in Method 1.1 can be referred to as the second request message #1.

[0258] For example, the first identifier can be at least one of the following identifiers:

[0259] The identifier of the second communication device, the identifier of the service corresponding to the first data, or the identifier of the service area to which the first communication device belongs.

[0260] If the first identifier is the identifier of the second communication device, it can be understood that the encryption key is at the granularity of the second communication device. For example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption on data from the second communication device based on the encryption key. The identifier of the second communication device can be its subscription concealed identifier (SUCI), globally unique temporary identifier (GUTI), SUPI, or other information used to identify the second communication device.

[0261] If the first identifier is the identifier of the service corresponding to the first data, it can be understood that the encryption key is at the service granularity of the second communication device. For example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption processing on the data received from the second communication device's computing service, AI service, sensing service, or UAV service, etc., based on the encryption key. Here, the identifier of the service corresponding to the first data can be the service ID.

[0262] If the first identifier is the identifier of the service area to which the first communication device belongs, it can be understood that the encryption key is at the service area granularity. For example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption processing on data from devices within the service area of ​​the first communication device based on the encryption key.

[0263] It should be understood that the above-mentioned possible forms of the first identifier are merely examples and do not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. The first identifier may also be in other forms. For example, the first identifier may be an identifier of the type of the second communication device, and the data identifying a certain type of device needs to be homomorphically encrypted.

[0264] Optionally, in the case shown in mode 1.1, the second request message #1 can be the same message as the first request message described above. For example, after the first communication device receives the first request message described above, it learns from the first indication information in the first request message that the first ciphertext needs to be homomorphically encrypted, and then learns from the first request message that an encryption key needs to be generated.

[0265] For example, the second request message #1 also includes third indication information and / or the identifier of the first algorithm. The third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm used to generate the encryption key. For example, the identifier of the first algorithm may be the ID of the first algorithm, information about the first algorithm, or indication information of the first algorithm, etc., which can be used to identify the first algorithm. This application does not limit the specific form of the identifier of the first algorithm.

[0266] In the case shown in Method 1.1, the second communication device may also recommend a homomorphic algorithm on which the encryption key is based by carrying the identifier of the first algorithm in the second request message. For example, the second request message carries the identifier of the CKKS algorithm (e.g., the identifier of the CKKS algorithm can be identified by numbers such as 0, 1, 2, etc.), indicating that the second communication device can generate an encryption key based on the CKKS algorithm.

[0267] In addition, the second communication device may carry third indication information in the second request message #1, indicating that the first communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements.

[0268] Optionally, the third indication information may be a field carried in the second request message #1. For example, the second indication information may be specific information in the second request message, such as control bits, parameters, or bits used to indicate homomorphic encryption requirements for the first communication device.

[0269] Optionally, the third indication information may be the name of the second request message #1. For example, if the second request message is a encryption request message, then after receiving the second request message #1, the first communication device may know that the first communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements based on the name of the second request message #1.

[0270] It should be understood that this application does not impose any limitations on the form of the third instruction information, and all information that can instruct the first communication device to have homomorphic encryption requirements is within the protection scope of this application.

[0271] S1103, the first communication device generates an encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message #1.

[0272] Specifically, the first communication device generates a homomorphic security context according to the instructions of the second communication device. The homomorphic security context includes a homomorphic public key, a homomorphic private key, or a computation key. The encryption key can be a homomorphic public key, or a homomorphic private key, or a key derived based on the homomorphic public key and / or the homomorphic private key.

[0273] Optionally, the homomorphic algorithm on which the first communication device generates the encryption key may be a homomorphic algorithm suggested by the first communication device, such as the first communication device selecting the homomorphic algorithm on which the encryption key is generated based on the identifier of the first algorithm carried in the second request message #1; or,

[0274] The first communication device can negotiate with the second communication device to determine the homomorphic algorithm on which the encryption key is based; or,

[0275] The first communication device can independently determine the homomorphic algorithm on which the encryption key is based.

[0276] It should be understood that this application does not impose any limitations on the homomorphic algorithm on which the first communication device generates the encryption key.

[0277] This application does not impose any limitations on the method by which the first communication device generates a homomorphic security context; reference can be made to the descriptions in current or future homomorphic encryption-related technologies.

[0278] For example, one generation method based on the homomorphic algorithm CKKS is as follows:

[0279] Assume the noise distribution χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on ring R that is related to the security level λ, and χ′ is a uniform random distribution on ring R. S is obtained by sampling from the noise χ, then the homomorphic private key sk = (1, s). Then, a and a′ are sampled from χ′, and e and e′ are sampled from χ, calculating the homomorphic public key pk = (b = -as + e, a), and the auxiliary key evk = -a′s + e′ + Ps. 2 modP·q L , where P is a large number.

[0280] It should be understood that the above-described method of generating homomorphic security context by the first communication device is merely an example and does not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. The first communication device can also generate homomorphic security context through other homomorphic algorithms, which will not be illustrated here.

[0281] Method 1.2: The first communication device generates an encryption key based on the triggering of the second network element.

[0282] In the scenario described in Method 1.2, the second network element can learn about the security protection requirements of the second communication device based on the instructions of the second communication device or the registration information of the second communication device, and instruct the first communication device to generate an encryption key. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes the following steps:

[0283] S1104, the second network element determines that the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption.

[0284] As one possible implementation, the second network element learns about the security protection requirements of the second communication device by querying or storing information of the second communication device locally, and determines that the data of the second communication device has the requirement of homomorphic encryption based on the security protection requirements of the second communication device.

[0285] For example, the security protection requirements of the second communication device may be at least one of the following:

[0286] The core network side processes data from the second communication device in encrypted form, provides advanced privacy protection for the second communication device, or provides advanced privacy protection in specific services (such as computing services, AI services, sensing services, or UAV services). This can be understood as the security protection requirements for the second communication device being either the security requirements of the second communication device itself or the security protection requirements of the service.

[0287] The second network element determines that the data of the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption based on the security protection requirements of the second communication device. This can be achieved by the second network element determining that the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic privacy computation based on the security protection requirements of the second communication device, that is, the second network element needs to process the data in the encrypted state subsequently.

[0288] As another possible implementation, the second network element can learn about the security protection requirements of the second communication device based on the instructions of the second communication device.

[0289] In this implementation, the second network element learns the security protection requirements of the second communication device in the following two ways:

[0290] Method 1.2.1: The second network element is the same as the first network element described above, that is, the second network element is the network element that performs the processing. Then, the second network element can learn about the security protection requirements of the second communication device based on the instructions of the second communication device, including the following steps one and two:

[0291] Step 1: The second communication device sends a fifth indication message to the second network element. The fifth indication message indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0292] For example, the second communication device sends a service request message to the second network element. This service request message requests the second network element to perform a corresponding task and provide data processing results. The service request message includes service type information and a fifth instruction, wherein the service type information instructs the second network element to perform processing for a certain type of service and provide data processing results. For example, the service request message could be an ISAC task request or other service requests; this application does not impose any limitations on this.

[0293] Optionally, the fifth instruction information may be the security requirements of the service or the security requirements of the second communication device.

[0294] Optionally, the fifth indication information may explicitly or implicitly indicate that the second communication device requires homomorphic encryption. For example, the fifth indication information may be a message name or a parameter carried in the message.

[0295] Optionally, the second communication device may not carry the fifth indication information. By default, the network side will enable homomorphic encryption for all or some of the services of the second communication device according to the pre-configured policy. For example, the network side may confirm that the second communication device is a certain type of device (e.g., a device with a security requirement level higher than a preset threshold), and by default, all services related to the second communication device will use homomorphic encryption.

[0296] Step 2: The second network element determines that the second communication device requires homomorphic encryption based on the indication information of the second communication device.

[0297] Method 1.2.2: The second network element differs from the first network element described above. Specifically, the first network element is the network element performing processing, while the second network element is a NAS network element (e.g., Access and Mobility Management function or other NAS network elements). In this case, the second network element can obtain the security protection requirements of the second communication device based on the instructions of the first network element, including the following steps A, B, and C:

[0298] Step A: The second communication device sends a fifth indication message to the first network element. The fifth indication message indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0299] For example, the second communication device sends a fifth indication message to the first network element through the second network element. The specific sending method can be found in the description of the second communication device sending the fifth indication message to the second network element in step one above, and will not be repeated here.

[0300] Step B: The first network element sends indication information #1 to the second network element. This indication information #1 indicates that the second communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements. Indication information #1 can be the same as the fifth indication information mentioned above, indicating that the second communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements.

[0301] Optionally, before the first network element sends the instruction information #1 to the second network element, the identifier of the second network element can be determined, for example, by querying the UDM through the identifier of the second communication device to obtain the identifier of the second network element.

[0302] Optionally, the first network element may also send an identifier of the first algorithm to the second network element to indicate the homomorphic algorithm recommended by the first network element.

[0303] Step C: The second network element determines that the second communication device has homomorphic encryption requirements based on the instruction of the first network element.

[0304] Optionally, the second network element can determine, based on the above-mentioned indication information #1 and the security protection requirements of the second communication device, whether access layer homomorphic encryption is required for the second communication device.

[0305] It should be understood that the above-mentioned method by which the second network element learns that the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption is merely an example and does not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. The second network element may also learn whether the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption through other means, such as based on historical communication data, etc., which will not be listed here.

[0306] Furthermore, if the second network element learns that the second communication device requires homomorphic encryption, the second network element can trigger the first communication device to generate the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption through a second request message. In the case shown in method 1.2, Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes the following steps:

[0307] S1105, the second network element sends a second request message to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the second request message from the second network element.

[0308] The second request message is used to request the generation of an encryption key, and this second request message includes a first identifier. For distinction, the second request message in the case shown in method 1.2 can be referred to as second request message #2. For details regarding the first identifier, please refer to the description of the first identifier in step S1102 above; it will not be repeated here.

[0309] For example, the second request message #2 also includes third indication information and / or the identifier of the first algorithm. The third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm used to generate the encryption key. For a detailed description of the third indication information and the identifier of the first algorithm, please refer to the description of the third indication information and the identifier of the first algorithm in step S1102 above, which will not be repeated here.

[0310] Optionally, the second network element may independently determine the first communication device providing services to the second communication device, or may obtain information about the first communication device providing services to the second communication device from other network elements. For example, the second network element may trigger a downlink service request by directly paging the first communication device, or may determine the access network device where the second communication device is currently or previously located by paging operations through other network elements (such as the AMF).

[0311] S1106, the first communication device generates an encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message #2.

[0312] The description of step S1106 can be found in the description of step S1103 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0313] Method 2: The first communication device can obtain the required encryption key from the control device.

[0314] Optionally, in this implementation, the first communication device can request an encryption key from the control device via a second request message. For example, a key management center is deployed in the communication system, which can be referred to as a control device, control equipment, key control device, or key management device.

[0315] For example, the control device in this application can be deployed in the SMO framework of the access network equipment, such as a non-RT-RIC or near-RT-RIC deployed in the communication system for unified storage and retrieval of keys.

[0316] In the case shown in method 2, Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes the following steps:

[0317] S1107, the first communication device sends a second request message to the control device, and correspondingly, the control device receives the second request message from the first communication device.

[0318] The second request message is used to request the encryption key, and it includes a first identifier. For distinction, the second request message in the case shown in Method 2 can be referred to as second request message #3. For details regarding the first identifier, please refer to the description of the first identifier in step S1102 above; it will not be repeated here.

[0319] For example, the second request message #3 also includes third indication information and / or the identifier of the first algorithm. The third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has a requirement for homomorphic encryption, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm used to generate the encryption key. For a description of the third indication information and the identifier of the first algorithm, please refer to the description of the third indication information and the identifier of the first algorithm in step S1102 above, which will not be repeated here.

[0320] S1108, the control device sends an encryption key to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the encryption key from the control device.

[0321] It should be understood that the above implementation methods 1 and 2 are merely examples to illustrate possible ways for the first communication device to obtain the encryption key, and do not constitute any limitation on the scope of protection of this application. For example, the first communication device may obtain the encryption key based on historical communication data (e.g., the first communication device has already obtained and stored the encryption key during historical communication).

[0322] For example, after obtaining the encryption key, the first communication device can provide the encryption key to the second network element, so that the second network element can process the ciphertext received from the first communication device. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0323] S1121, the first communication device sends an encryption key to the second network element, and correspondingly, the second network element receives the encryption key from the first communication device.

[0324] Specifically, the encryption key is used by the second network element to generate a first security context after homomorphic encryption. For example, the encryption key is used by the second network element to generate a symmetric key after homomorphic encryption.

[0325] For example, corresponding to the above method 2.2, after the first communication device receives the second request message #2 from the second network element, it generates an encryption key in response to the second request message #2. Then, the first communication device can send a second response message #2 to the second network element. The second response message #2 is used to respond to the second request message #2, and the second response message #2 includes the encryption key.

[0326] Optionally, the second response message #2 may also include at least one of the following:

[0327] The identifier of the second communication device, the identifier of the first algorithm, or the calculation key.

[0328] The identifier of the second communication device is used to associate encryption keys. For example, if the second network element receives multiple encryption keys, and different encryption keys are used to process data from different second communication devices, then the identifier of the second communication device can be used to associate different encryption keys with different second communication devices. Optionally, the identifier of the second communication device may not be carried in the second response message #2. For example, the second network element may automatically associate different encryption keys with different second communication devices according to pre-configured rules.

[0329] The identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the homomorphic algorithm on which the encryption key is based. Optionally, the identifier of the first algorithm may not be carried in the second response message #2. For example, if the identifier of the first algorithm is carried in the second request message #2 mentioned above, then the identifier of the first algorithm may be carried in the second response message #2 for secondary confirmation, or it may not be carried.

[0330] The computation key is used for homomorphic computation in the ciphertext state. For example, some homomorphic algorithms require homomorphic computation based on the computation key during the computation process. For instance, the encryption key is contained in a second security context, which also includes the computation key, and the first communication device can also provide the computation key to the second network element. The second security context can be called a homomorphic security context, and the computation key is used to perform computation in the ciphertext state on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key. Optionally, if the selected homomorphic algorithm does not require homomorphic computation, i.e., it does not require homomorphic computation based on the computation key, the second response message #2 may not carry the computation key.

[0331] As can be seen from the above, the second network element and the first network element can be the same network element or different network elements. If the first network element and the second network element are different network elements, then after the second network element receives the computation key and / or the identifier of the first algorithm, it can forward the computation key and / or the identifier of the first algorithm to the first network element to support the first network element in subsequently performing homomorphic computation in the ciphertext state. Figure 11 The method flow shown may also include:

[0332] S1122, the second network element sends a computing key and / or the identifier of the first algorithm to the first network element, and correspondingly, the first network element receives the computing key and / or the identifier of the first algorithm from the second network element.

[0333] Furthermore, after the first communication device generates the second ciphertext, it can send a third request message to the second network element, that is, forward the data processing request of the second communication device to the second network element. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0334] For example, the second network element can determine the first security context under homomorphism based on the encryption key received in step S1121 and the first security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0335] S1123, the second network element determines the first key.

[0336] The first key is determined by homomorphically encrypting the first security context. For example, the first key is determined by homomorphically encrypting the first security context based on the encryption key.

[0337] For example, the second network element negotiates and determines a first security context (e.g., an AES key) for symmetric encryption with the second communication device through the above step S1101, and then receives the encryption key through the above step S1121, thereby using the encryption key to encrypt the AES key and obtaining the homomorphically encrypted AES key, i.e., the first key.

[0338] For example, the second network element performs homomorphic encryption on the AES key based on the CKKS algorithm, and the generated first key is denoted as k, where k = HE(k1), k1 is the AES key, and HE() represents homomorphic encryption processing.

[0339] For example, suppose m is the encoded input polynomial, i.e., m is the AES key. We obtain υ by sampling from χ′, and e0 and e1 by sampling from χ. Then, the first key after homomorphic encryption is c = υ·pk + (m + e0, e1) mod q. L The encryption key is q. L The layers are defined as follows: χ represents the noise distribution, which is a discrete Gaussian distribution on the ring R related to the safety level λ, and χ′ is a uniform random distribution on the ring R.

[0340] S1130, the first communication device sends a third request message to the second network element, and correspondingly, the second network element receives the third request message from the first communication device.

[0341] The third request message is used to request the first network element to process data. Specifically, the third request message includes a second ciphertext.

[0342] For example, the third request message also includes second indication information, which indicates that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext. This second indication information may be the same as or different from the first indication information carried in the first request message. For instance, the second indication information may be a field carried in the third request message, such as control bits, parameters, or bit positions specifically used in the third request message to indicate that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext. Alternatively, for example, the second indication information may be the name of the third request message. For instance, if the third request message is a ciphertext transfer message, then after receiving the third request message, the second network element can determine that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext based on the name of the third request message.

[0343] Specifically, after the second network element receives the third request message and obtains the second ciphertext, it can perform symmetric decryption computation on the second ciphertext in a homomorphic state. It should be understood that performing symmetric decryption computation on the second ciphertext in a homomorphic state in this application can also be understood as processing the second ciphertext in its ciphertext state; that is, symmetric decryption computation performed in a homomorphic state can be understood as a type of processing in the ciphertext state. In this application, the data before homomorphic encryption and the data after homomorphic encryption have the same computational characteristics (e.g., homomorphism), therefore the second ciphertext can be subjected to symmetric decryption operations.

[0344] It should be understood that the timing relationship between steps S1121 and S1130 is not limited. The first communication device may provide the encryption key to the second network element after sending the third request message; or, the first communication device may send the encryption key to the second network element before sending the third request message; or, the first communication device may carry the encryption key in the third request message. Furthermore, the timing relationship between steps S1123 and S1130 is not limited, nor is the timing relationship between steps S1123 and S1122.

[0345] Furthermore, after the second network element determines the first key, it can perform a symmetric decryption calculation on the aforementioned second ciphertext in a homomorphic manner based on the first key to generate the third ciphertext. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0346] S1131, the second network element decrypts the second ciphertext based on the first key to obtain the third ciphertext.

[0347] The third ciphertext is the first data that has been homomorphically encrypted.

[0348] This application does not impose any restrictions on the specific method by which the second network element decrypts the second ciphertext based on the first key. It can be understood that the first key is the first security context after homomorphic encryption, and the second ciphertext is the first ciphertext after homomorphic encryption. That is, both the first key and the second ciphertext are in a homomorphic state and support processing. Performing symmetric decryption calculation can be understood as a form of processing.

[0349] For example, the decryption process can be understood as follows: There is an algorithm box. The first key and the second ciphertext are input into the algorithm box. The AES decryption process is executed in the algorithm box, and finally the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext (i.e., the third ciphertext) is output.

[0350] Optionally, if the first network element and the second network element are different in this application, the second network element can send the parameters required for performing the symmetric decryption operation (e.g., the first security context, the encryption key, and the second ciphertext) to the first network element. The second network element acts as a pass-through between the first communication device and the first network element, without processing the received ciphertext, and the first network element performs the symmetric decryption operation. After obtaining the first security context and the encryption key, the first network element can determine the aforementioned first key and symmetrically decrypt the second ciphertext based on the first key to obtain the third ciphertext. This embodiment mainly describes the scenario where both the symmetric decryption operation and the data processing operation are performed by the second network element (e.g., the first network element and the second network element are the same), or where the first network element and the second network element are different, with the symmetric decryption operation performed by the second network element and the data analysis operation performed by the first network element. The scenario where the second network element acts as a pass-through will not be described in detail later.

[0351] Specifically, the third ciphertext obtained by the second network element in this application is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext, meaning that the third ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext state. The network side can directly process the third ciphertext to obtain data processing results, which are homomorphically encrypted. These data processing results can also be referred to as data analysis results, processing results, or analysis results, etc.

[0352] For example, the data processing result obtained by the second network element corresponding to the first data in this application includes the following two possible implementation methods:

[0353] As one possible implementation, the second network element and the first network element are the same network element. In this case, the second network element can process the third ciphertext to obtain the data processing result. In this method, both the symmetric decryption operation and the data processing operation are implemented by the second network element.

[0354] In this implementation, Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0355] S1141, the second network element determines the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

[0356] As can be seen from the above, the third ciphertext is a homomorphically encrypted ciphertext. This third ciphertext supports processing in its ciphertext state. Therefore, the second network element can process the third ciphertext to obtain the data processing result.

[0357] As another possible implementation, the second network element differs from the first network element; the second network element is a NAS network element (e.g., AMF), and the first network element processes the third ciphertext. In this approach, the symmetric decryption operation is implemented by the second network element, while the data processing operation is implemented by the first network element.

[0358] In this implementation, Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0359] S1151, the second network element sends the third ciphertext to the first network element.

[0360] For example, the second network element sends a data processing request message to the first network element. The data processing request message includes a third ciphertext, such as a homomorphic ciphertext container that includes the third ciphertext.

[0361] S1152, the first network element determines the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

[0362] The description of step S1152 can be found in the description of step S1141 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0363] S1153, the first network element provides the data processing result to the second network element. Exemplarily, the data processing result includes, but is not limited to, the following two possible implementations:

[0364] As one possible implementation, the data processing results are used to determine a business instruction. This business instruction does not require homomorphic operation.

[0365] For example, the third ciphertext could be the ciphertext of perceptual data homomorphic encryption, as this embodiment can be applied to the above. Figure 2 In the integrated communication and sensing scenario shown, the second network element can determine the collision and driving commands of the UAV based on the data processing results of the third encrypted text.

[0366] For example, the third ciphertext could be AI data. In this embodiment, it could be applied to federated learning with other data, where the calculated data is gradients, and the average of these gradients is performed after encryption. Alternatively, it could be a geofencing operation, using encrypted geographic location information to determine whether a specified geofence has been entered.

[0367] It should be understood that this application does not impose any restrictions on the specific type of the third ciphertext, as long as it supports processing in ciphertext state.

[0368] Optionally, if the second network element determines the data processing result on its own, the second network element can generate a specific service instruction as a response based on the data processing result and other control information.

[0369] Business instructions include, but are not limited to:

[0370] UAV control commands, training model information, or geofencing information, etc.

[0371] Optionally, the service indication can be encrypted; for example, the second network element can encrypt the service indication based on the first security context.

[0372] Optionally, if the data processing result is determined by the first network element, the first network element can provide the data processing result to the second network element, which will then determine the service instruction; or,

[0373] The first network element can provide the data processing results to other network elements, which then generate service instruction information and send it to the second network element. In this case, the service instruction can be sent to the second network element from a network element other than the first network element; or...

[0374] After determining the service instruction based on the data processing result, the first network element can provide the service instruction to the second network element. For example, the first network element obtains homomorphically encrypted point cloud data and a calculation key. The first network element can initiate calculation on the homomorphically encrypted point cloud data according to the calculation key to generate a specific obstacle avoidance instruction as a service instruction, and then send it to the second network element. The second network element can encrypt the specific obstacle avoidance instruction information based on a first security context and then send it to the second communication device.

[0375] As another possible implementation, the data processing result includes a portion of the original data (e.g., part of the point cloud data as a geofence). Since the first network element processes the third ciphertext in ciphertext mode, the result obtained is a homomorphically encrypted result, and point cloud data without homomorphic encryption cannot be obtained because the first network element does not have plaintext point cloud data. If the data processing result after homomorphic computation includes a portion of the data transmitted from the second communication device to the first network element, the downlink is also in a homomorphic ciphertext state because the uplink uses homomorphic ciphertext. In this application, "uplink" is understood as the second communication device sending information to the first network element through the first communication device and the second network element, while "downlink" can be understood as the first network element sending information to the second communication device through the first communication device and the second network element.

[0376] For ease of understanding, the following text will combine... Figure 12 This section details how homomorphic encryption is performed on the downlink.

[0377] For example, after the second network element obtains the service instruction or downlink feedback in the manner described above, it can send the service instruction or downlink feedback to the second communication device through the first communication device via the first response message. Figure 11 The method flow shown also includes:

[0378] S1140, the second network element sends a first response message to the second communication device, and correspondingly, the second communication device receives the first response message from the second network element.

[0379] Alternatively, the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can be provided to a third party; for example, the aforementioned third ciphertext can be provided to a third party. Optionally, Figure 11 The method flow shown may also include:

[0380] S1160, the third network element sends a fourth request message to the first network element, and correspondingly, the first network element receives the fourth request message from the third network element.

[0381] The fourth request message is used to request the provision of a third ciphertext. This fourth request message can be called a business data open request message. The third network element is a network element with data requirements. For example, the third network element can be AF.

[0382] Specifically, the fourth request message includes a sixth instruction message, which is used to indicate the service data required by the third network element. For example, the sixth instruction message can be called a requirement description.

[0383] Optionally, the sixth instruction information may indicate the need for certain specific open data, such as point cloud data. For ease of description, let's take the example of a third network element requesting to obtain the aforementioned third ciphertext via a fourth request message. For instance, the third ciphertext is the ciphertext of homomorphically encrypted point cloud data.

[0384] Furthermore, after receiving the fourth request message from the third network element, the first network element can determine, according to the data openness rules, that the business data required by the third network element can be opened as homomorphically encrypted data. For example, the data openness rules include allowing the opening of homomorphically encrypted ciphertext of point cloud data, i.e., the third ciphertext, for point cloud data.

[0385] If the first network element has not yet collected the homomorphically encrypted data (e.g., the third ciphertext) before receiving the fourth request message, the first network element can respond to the request of the third network element and collect the service data required by the third network element. For example, the first network element dynamically requests data from the second communication device according to the needs of the third network element. For instance, the first network element sends a homomorphic data request message to the second communication device, which is used to request the acquisition of the aforementioned third ciphertext. The second communication device sends a NAS message, and the first network element receives the homomorphically encrypted data (e.g., the third ciphertext) through the NAS message, that is, it executes the above-described process of acquiring the third ciphertext, which will not be elaborated here.

[0386] Specifically, the first network element determines the homomorphically encrypted data (e.g., third ciphertext) that can be sent to the third network element, and associates the homomorphically encrypted data with open data types or identifiers (e.g., PDU session, connection ID, etc.).

[0387] As can be seen from the above process of obtaining the third ciphertext, the first communication device generates a homomorphic security context based on the first algorithm. The homomorphic security context may include a homomorphic public key, a homomorphic private key, and a computation key. The homomorphic public key and the computation key can be transmitted to the first network element through a message, and the identifier of the homomorphic algorithm (such as the aforementioned first algorithm) on which the homomorphic security context is based can be transmitted to the first network element.

[0388] If the identifier of the first algorithm is not transmitted to the first network element during the aforementioned process of obtaining the third ciphertext, the first network element may send a homomorphic algorithm information request message to the second network element and / or the first communication device. The homomorphic algorithm information request message is used to request the acquisition of the identifier of the first algorithm.

[0389] Specifically, the homomorphic algorithm information request message includes an open data type or identifier, which is associated with the third ciphertext, so that the second network element and / or the first communication device can provide the first network element with an accurate identifier of the algorithm associated with the third ciphertext. For example, the second network element and / or the first communication device can determine the identifier of the first algorithm by associating the open data type or identifier with relevant first communication device response information, and provide the identifier of the first algorithm to the first network element through the homomorphic algorithm information response message.

[0390] Furthermore, after the first network element obtains the third ciphertext and the identifier of the first algorithm, it can provide the third ciphertext and the identifier of the first algorithm to the third network element through the fourth response message. Figure 11 The method flow shown may also include:

[0391] S1170, the first network element sends a fourth response message to the third network element, and correspondingly, the third network element receives the fourth response message from the first network element.

[0392] The fourth response message includes a third ciphertext and an identifier for the first algorithm, which indicates the algorithm used for homomorphic computation. It should be understood that this first algorithm is a homomorphic algorithm capable of being used for the aforementioned homomorphic encryption and homomorphic computation.

[0393] Optionally, the fourth response message may also include a computation key used for homomorphic computation of the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext.

[0394] As can be seen from the above steps S1132 and S1133, in this application, the third network element can obtain homomorphically encrypted data and related calculation information (such as calculation key, identifier of the first algorithm) from the first network element side, supporting data openness and calculation, while protecting the data of the second communication device from being known by the network side.

[0395] Figure 11 In the communication method shown, the first communication device can homomorphically encrypt the received first ciphertext and send the homomorphically encrypted second ciphertext to the core network (e.g., a second network element). Since the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can be processed in ciphertext state, the second network element that receives the second ciphertext can process it. Moreover, in this technical solution, the second communication device with data processing needs can protect the data based on the first security context, without the second communication device performing homomorphic encryption itself. Instead, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption. Thus, this technical solution can enable the core network to process terminal ciphertext data while reducing the encryption overhead of the second communication device.

[0396] Figure 12 This is a schematic flowchart of a communication method provided in this application. Taking the first network element and the second network element as examples, the method includes the following steps:

[0397] S1210, the first network element determines the data processing result.

[0398] Specifically, the first network element processes the third key in encrypted form to obtain the data processing result. For example, based on the computation key, the first network element performs homomorphic computation on homomorphically encrypted point cloud data and generates downlink homomorphic encrypted service information. This downlink homomorphic encrypted service information is used by the second communication device to process and execute subsequent service steps (e.g., the downlink homomorphic encrypted service information is point cloud data that may become a UAV obstacle avoidance identifier after processing).

[0399] It should be understood that Figure 12 The communication method shown can be used in conjunction with the previous text. Figure 11The communication methods shown are combined, for example, the first network element is based on the above. Figure 11 The method and flow shown determine the data processing results.

[0400] S1220, the first network element sends message #1 to the second network element.

[0401] Message #1 includes the data processing result and a seventh instruction, which indicates that the data processing result needs to be homomorphically decrypted. The data processing result includes downlink homomorphic ciphertext service information that requires homomorphic decryption.

[0402] Optionally, the seventh indication information may be a field carried in message #1. For example, the seventh indication information may be specific information in message #1, such as control bits, parameters, or bits used to indicate homomorphic decryption of the data processing result.

[0403] Optionally, the seventh indication information can be the name of message #1. For example, if message #1 is a cipher request message, then after receiving message #1, the first communication device can determine the data processing result based on the name of message #1 and perform homomorphic decryption.

[0404] It should be understood that this application does not impose any limitations on the form of the seventh instruction information, and all information that can enable the instruction to perform homomorphic decryption of the data processing results is within the protection scope of this application.

[0405] S1230, the second network element performs security protection processing on the data processing results based on the second key.

[0406] The second key is determined by homomorphic encryption of the first security context. Optionally, the method for generating the second key can refer to the description of how the second network element determines the first key above, which will not be repeated here.

[0407] For example, the second key may be the same as the first key mentioned above, for example, the second network element may store the first key and use it in the downlink process; or, the second key may be different from the first key mentioned above, for example, the parameters in the homomorphic encryption process of the first security context may be different.

[0408] Specifically, the second network element's security protection processing of the data processing result based on the second key can be understood as the reverse operation of the second network element obtaining the third ciphertext in step S1131 above. The second key is the first security context after homomorphic encryption, and the data processing result is the information of the homomorphic encryption state. That is, the second key and the data processing result are both in homomorphic state and support processing. Performing symmetric encryption calculation can be understood as a form of processing.

[0409] For example, there exists a computation box with a selected homomorphic algorithm, in which free computation of homomorphic ciphertext can be performed, a second key and the data processing result are input, and then, in the homomorphic algorithm computation box, a symmetric encryption algorithm is executed to generate a first security context security protection and a homomorphically encrypted data processing result.

[0410] For example, after the second network element generates the data processing result with first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption, it can send the data processing result to the first communication device currently providing services to the second communication device. As an example, and not a limitation, depending on whether a base station handover occurs, the second network element can send the data processing result in the following two ways:

[0411] Method 1: No base station handover occurred. The first communication device currently providing services to the second communication device is the source first communication device. For example, after the second communication device sends uplink data to the first network element through the source first communication device, no movement occurs; or, for another example, after the second communication device sends uplink data to the first network element through the source first communication device, it moves, but remains within the service range of the source first communication device after the movement.

[0412] In the case shown in Method 1, Figure 12 The method flow shown also includes:

[0413] S1241, the second network element sends a first response message to the source first communication device.

[0414] The first response message includes the identifier of the second communication device and the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption. The identifier of the second communication device is used to allow the source first communication device to identify the second communication device.

[0415] S1251, the first communication device performs a encryption operation.

[0416] Specifically, the first communication device performs homomorphic decryption on the data processing result protected by the first security context and homomorphic encryption based on the decryption key, thereby obtaining the data processing result protected by the first security context. The process of homomorphically decrypting the data processing result protected by the first security context and homomorphic encryption to obtain the data processing result protected by the first security context can be called a encryption operation.

[0417] For example, the first response message includes multiple NAS containers. For one of the NAS containers, the homomorphic security context is used to process it according to the access layer homomorphic ciphertext indication information, and the original container is replaced.

[0418] S1261, the first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device.

[0419] For example, the target first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device via a downlink NAS message.

[0420] Method 2: Base station handover occurs. The first communication device currently providing services to the second communication device is the target first communication device. For example, after the second communication device sends uplink data to the first network element through the source first communication device, it moves and is now within the service range of the target first communication device.

[0421] Optionally, the second network element may determine the target first communication device whose service range covers the second communication device by initiating a downlink paging to determine the target first communication device where the second communication device is located, or by determining the target first communication device where the second communication device is located based on the current connection with the first communication device.

[0422] In the case shown in Method 2, Figure 12 The method flow shown also includes:

[0423] S1240, the second network element sends a first response message to the target first communication device.

[0424] The first response message includes the identifier of the second communication device and the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption. The identifier of the second communication device is used by the first communication device to identify the second communication device.

[0425] Optionally, the first response message may also include a fourth indication, which indicates that the data processing result has been homomorphically encrypted. This fourth indication can be understood as an access layer homomorphic ciphertext indication, and its function is the same as described above. Figure 11 The data tag in the first request message is used to inform the first communication device that it should perform a decryption operation on the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption.

[0426] For example, the data processing result based on the first security context protection and homomorphic encryption is located at the NAS layer, and the fourth indication information is carried in the access network control information, used to enable the first communication device to obtain and process the data processing result based on the first security context protection and homomorphic encryption. Optionally, the second network element can also request other network elements to add the access network control information, such as by adding the access network control information through the operation administration and maintenance (OAM) equipment of the first communication device.

[0427] After receiving the first response message, the target first communication device can know that a homomorphic decryption operation is required on the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption. In this embodiment, the target first communication device may not have stored the decryption key required for the homomorphic decryption operation locally. In the case that the target first communication device does not have stored the decryption key locally, the target first communication device can perform the following operation:

[0428] As one possible implementation, the target first communication device obtains the decryption key. Then... Figure 12 The method flow shown includes:

[0429] S1250, the target first communication device obtains the decryption key.

[0430] Specifically, the target first communication device determines whether it has a decryption key to perform homomorphic decryption based on the identifier of the second communication device and the fourth instruction information.

[0431] It should be understood that, due to the mobility of the second communication device, the first communication device currently serving the second communication device may not have the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device, and it is necessary to obtain the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device.

[0432] As one possible implementation, the first communication device can obtain the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device from the source first communication device. The source first communication device can be a communication device that provided services to the second communication device before the second communication device moved to the target first communication device. For example, the source first communication device could be one of the devices mentioned above. Figure 11 The first communication device shown.

[0433] For example, in this implementation, if the target first communication device knows the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can request the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device from the source first communication device through a homomorphic security context transfer request message. This homomorphic security context transfer request message includes the identifier of the second communication device.

[0434] For example, in this implementation, if the target first communication device does not know the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can request the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device from the second network element through a homomorphic security context transfer request message.

[0435] The source first communication device and / or the second network element send a homomorphic security context transfer response message to the target first communication device. The homomorphic security context transfer response message includes the decryption key (e.g., homomorphic private key) and / or key factor required to perform homomorphic decryption.

[0436] Optionally, the second network element can obtain a homomorphic security context, including a homomorphic private key, from the source first communication device and directly send the homomorphic security context to the target first communication device.

[0437] Optionally, the target first communication device obtains the key factor of the homomorphic security context, such as intermediate parameters for generating the homomorphic security context. The target first communication device has other pre-configured parameters and generates the homomorphic security context itself based on the key factor. For example, taking CKKS as an example, assume that the noise distribution χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on ring R related to the security level λ, and χ′ is a uniform random distribution on ring R. S is obtained by sampling from the noise χ, then the homomorphic private key sk = (1, s). The noise distribution can be pre-configured by the target first communication device, and the sampled data can be transmitted to the target first communication device as a key factor, allowing the target first communication device to sample S from the noise χ using this information, thus obtaining the private key sk = (1, s).

[0438] Optionally, if the second network element forwards the homomorphic security context from the source first communication device to the target first communication device, the source first communication device and the target first communication device can be pre-configured with a shared security protection key to protect the transmitted homomorphic security context and prevent network elements other than the first communication device from knowing the security context information.

[0439] Optionally, there can be a unified security key center, such as a non-RIC or near-RIC network element, to uniformly store and retrieve keys. The target first communication device can obtain the decryption key from the security key center.

[0440] As another possible implementation, the target first communication device requests the source first communication device to perform a encryption operation. Figure 12 The method flow shown includes:

[0441] S1260, the target first communication device sends a first response message to the source first communication device.

[0442] If the target first communication device knows the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can directly send a first response message to the source first communication device, which will then perform homomorphic decryption processing; or...

[0443] If the target first communication device does not know the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can send a first response message to the source first communication device through other network elements (such as the second network element), and the source first communication device will perform homomorphic decryption processing.

[0444] S1270, the first communication device performs a encryption operation.

[0445] Specifically, the first communication device performs homomorphic decryption on the data processing result protected by the first security context and homomorphic encryption based on the decryption key, thereby obtaining the data processing result protected by the first security context. The process of homomorphically decrypting the data processing result protected by the first security context and homomorphic encryption to obtain the data processing result protected by the first security context can be called a encryption operation.

[0446] For example, the first response message includes multiple NAS containers. For one of the NAS containers, the homomorphic security context is used to process it according to the access layer homomorphic ciphertext indication information, and the original container is replaced.

[0447] S1280, the source first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the target first communication device.

[0448] Furthermore, after the target first communication device obtains the decryption key and / or the target first communication device locally stores the decryption key required for the transcryption operation, Figure 12 The method flow shown also includes:

[0449] S1290, the target first communication device performs a cipher operation.

[0450] Referring to the description of the first communication device performing the encryption operation in step S1270 above, it will not be repeated here.

[0451] It should be understood that the target first communication device locally storing the decryption key required for homomorphic decryption can be achieved as follows: During the process of the second communication device switching from the source first communication device to the target first communication device, the homomorphic security context has been migrated to the target first communication device via a handover message, and the target first communication device stores the homomorphic security context locally. The key migrated during the handover process may be a key or a key factor, which can be used to determine the aforementioned decryption key.

[0452] S1291, the target first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device.

[0453] For example, the target first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device via a downlink NAS message.

[0454] Furthermore, the second communication device can use the first security context to decrypt NAS messages and determine the current service operation based on the received downlink service information, such as identifying no-fly zones and taking evasive action.

[0455] Figure 12 In the communication method shown, the downlink data processing result is in a homomorphic encrypted state. The first communication device performs homomorphic decryption on the downlink data processing result, eliminating the need for the second communication device to perform homomorphic computation and reducing the decryption overhead of the second communication device.

[0456] To facilitate understanding, a specific example is provided below to illustrate the technical solution of this application. In this example, the first network element and the second network element mentioned above are different. The first network element is represented by SF, and the second network element is represented by NAS NF. The first communication device is an access network device, represented by RAN, and the second communication device is a terminal device, represented by UE. In addition, RAN can generate encryption keys through the above method 1.2, and the symmetric decryption operation is implemented by NAS NF, while the data processing operation is implemented by SF.

[0457] Figure 13 This is a schematic flowchart of another communication method provided in this application. It includes the following steps: S1301, the UE and the NAS NF negotiate to determine a first security context.

[0458] The description of step S1301 can be found in the description of step S1101 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0459] S1302, the UE sends a service request message to the SF via the NAS NF.

[0460] The description of step S1302 can be found in the description of step A in method 1.2.2 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0461] S1303, SF sends instruction message #1 to NAS NF.

[0462] The description of step S1303 can be found in step B of method 1.2.2 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0463] S1304, NAS NF determines that the UE has homomorphic encryption requirements.

[0464] The description of step S1304 can be found in step C of method 1.2.2 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0465] S1305, NAS NF sends a second request message #2 to RAN.

[0466] The description of step S1305 can be found in the description of step S1105 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0467] S1306, RAN generates encryption key.

[0468] The description of step S1306 can be found in the description of step S1106 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0469] S1307, RAN sends the encryption key to NAS NF.

[0470] The description of step S1307 can be found in the description of step S1121 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0471] S1308, NAS NF determines the first key.

[0472] The description of step S1308 can be found in the description of step S1123 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0473] S1309, NAS NF sends the computation key and / or the identifier of the first algorithm to SF.

[0474] The description of step S1309 can be found in the description of step S1122 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0475] S1310, SF sends a service response message to UE via NAS NF.

[0476] S1311, UE generates NAS container and data tag.

[0477] Specifically, the NAS container includes a first ciphertext. For a description of the first ciphertext and the data tag, please refer to the description of the parameters carried in the first request message in step S1110, which will not be repeated here.

[0478] S1312, the UE sends a first request message to the RAN.

[0479] The description of step S1312 can be found in the description of step S1110 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0480] S1313, RAN generates the second ciphertext.

[0481] The description of step S1313 can be found in the description of step S1120 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0482] S1314, RAN sends a third request message to NAS NF.

[0483] The description of step S1314 can be found in the description of step S1130 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0484] S1315, NAS NF obtains the third ciphertext.

[0485] The description of step S1315 can be found in the description of step S1131 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0486] S1316, NAS NF sends a third ciphertext to SF.

[0487] The description of step S1315 can be found in the description of step S1131 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0488] S1317, SF determines the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

[0489] S1318, SF sends the first response message to UE via NAS NF.

[0490] Optionally, during the process of the SF sending the first response message to the UE via NAS NF, if the data processing result after homomorphic computation includes a portion of uplink data, the downlink will also be in a homomorphic cipher state because the uplink homomorphic ciphertext was used. The downlink homomorphic ciphertext transmission and transcryption process can be referred to the above. Figure 12 The description will not be repeated here.

[0491] Figure 13 For ease of understanding only, this application does not constitute any limitation on its scope of protection. For example, Figure 13 The NAS NF does not exist in the data, so symmetric decryption and data processing operations can be performed by SF; for example... Figure 13 The execution order of each step can be adjusted. For example, step S1308 can be performed after step S1314, etc., which will not be elaborated here.

[0492] It should be understood that the sequence number of each process does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0493] It should also be understood that, unless otherwise specified or logically conflicting, the terminology and / or descriptions in the various embodiments of this application are consistent and can be referenced interchangeably. Furthermore, technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments based on their inherent logical relationships.

[0494] The above, combined with Figures 11 to 13 The communication method provided in the embodiments of this application is described in detail. The above communication method is mainly described from the perspective of interaction between various entities. It is understood that, in order to realize the above functions, the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device include hardware structures and / or software modules corresponding to the execution of each function.

[0495] Those skilled in the art will recognize that, based on the units and algorithm steps described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein, this application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is implemented in hardware or by computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0496] The following combination Figure 14 and Figure 15 The communication device provided in this application is described in detail. It should be understood that the description of the device embodiments corresponds to the description of the method embodiments. Therefore, for details not described in detail, please refer to the method embodiments above; for brevity, some details are omitted.

[0497] This application embodiment can divide the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device into functional modules according to the above method example. For example, each function can be divided into its own functional modules, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The integrated modules can be implemented in hardware or as software functional modules. It should be noted that the module division in this application embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division; other division methods may be used in actual implementation. The following description uses the division of functional modules according to each function as an example.

[0498] Figure 14 This is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 10 provided in an embodiment of this application. The device 10 includes a transceiver unit 11 and a processing unit 12. The transceiver unit 11 can implement corresponding communication functions, and the processing unit 12 is used for data processing. In other words, the transceiver unit 11 is used to perform operations related to receiving and sending, and the processing unit 12 is used to perform other operations besides receiving and sending. The transceiver unit 11 can also be referred to as a communication interface or a communication unit.

[0499] Optionally, the device 10 may further include a storage unit 13, which may be used to store instructions and / or data. The processing unit 12 may read the instructions and / or data in the storage unit so that the device can perform the operation of the device in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0500] In one design, the device 10 may correspond to the first communication device in the above method embodiments, or to a component of the first communication device (such as a chip).

[0501] The device 10 can implement the steps or processes corresponding to those performed by the first communication device in the above method embodiment. The transceiver unit 11 can be used to perform the transceiver-related operations of the first communication device in the above method embodiment, and the processing unit 12 can be used to perform the processing-related operations of the first communication device in the above method embodiment.

[0502] In one possible implementation, transceiver unit 11 is configured to receive a first request message from a second communication device. The first request message requests a first network element to process data. The first request message includes first ciphertext and first indication information. The first ciphertext is first data securely protected by a first security context, and the first indication information indicates that the first ciphertext should be homomorphically encrypted. Processing unit 12 is configured to homomorphically encrypt the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext. Transceiver unit 11 is further configured to send the second ciphertext to the second network element, wherein the first security context is a security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext state.

[0503] Wherein, when the device 10 is used to perform Figure 11 When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1110, S1102, S1105, S1107, S1108, S1121, S1122 and S1130; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1103, S1106 and S1120.

[0504] When the device 10 is used to perform Figure 12 When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1240, S1260, S1280 and S1291; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1250, S1270 and S1290.

[0505] When the device 10 is used to perform Figure 13When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1305, S1307, S1310, S1312, S1314 and S1318; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1306 and S1313.

[0506] It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0507] In another design, the device 10 may correspond to the second network element in the above method embodiment, or a component of the second network element (such as a chip).

[0508] The device 10 can implement the steps or processes corresponding to the second network element in the above method embodiment. The transceiver unit 11 can be used to perform the transceiver-related operations of the second network element in the above method embodiment, and the processing unit 12 can be used to perform the processing-related operations of the second network element in the above method embodiment.

[0509] In one possible implementation, transceiver unit 11 is configured to receive a third request message from a first communication device, the third request message being used to request a first network element to process data. The third request message includes a second ciphertext, which is a homomorphically encrypted version of the first ciphertext. The first ciphertext is first data protected by a first security context. Processing unit 12 is configured to decrypt the second ciphertext based on a first key to obtain a third ciphertext, the third ciphertext being the homomorphically encrypted first data. The first key is determined by homomorphically encrypting the first security context. Transceiver unit 11 is configured to obtain a data processing result corresponding to the first data, the data processing result being determined based on the third ciphertext. The first security context is a security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext mode.

[0510] Wherein, when the device 10 is used to perform Figure 11 When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1105, S1121, S1122, S1130, S1151, S1153 and S1140; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1104, S1123, S1131 and S1141.

[0511] When the device 10 is used to perform Figure 12When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1220 and S1240; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S1230.

[0512] When the device 10 is used to perform Figure 13 When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1302, S1305, S1307, S1314 and S1316; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1304, S1308 and S1315.

[0513] It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0514] In another design, the device 10 may correspond to the second communication device in the above method embodiments, or to a component of the second communication device (such as a chip).

[0515] The device 10 can implement the steps or processes corresponding to those performed by the second communication device in the above method embodiments. The transceiver unit 11 can be used to perform transceiver-related operations of the second communication device in the above method embodiments, and the processing unit 12 can be used to perform processing-related operations of the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0516] In one possible implementation, transceiver unit 11 is configured to send a first request message to a first communication device. The first request message requests a first network element to process data. The first request message includes first ciphertext and first indication information. The first ciphertext is first data securely protected by a first security context. The first indication information indicates that the first ciphertext should be homomorphically encrypted. Transceiver unit 11 is also configured to receive a data processing result from the first communication device based on the first security context. The data processing result is the data processing result corresponding to the first data. The first security context is a non-access stratum security context negotiated and determined by the second communication device and the second network element. The homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports processing in ciphertext state.

[0517] Wherein, when the device 10 is used to perform Figure 11 When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1110, S1102 and S1140; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method.

[0518] When the device 10 is used to perform Figure 12When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as step S1291; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method.

[0519] When the device 10 is used to perform Figure 13 When the method is in use, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1302, S1310, S1312 and S1318; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps in the method, such as step S1311.

[0520] It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0521] It should also be understood that the device 10 here is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "unit" here can refer to an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), electronic circuitry, a processor (e.g., a shared processor, a proprietary processor, or a group processor, etc.) and memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, integrated logic circuitry, and / or other suitable components supporting the described functions. In an alternative example, those skilled in the art will understand that device 10 may specifically be a mobility management network element in the above embodiments, and may be used to execute the various processes and / or steps corresponding to the mobility management network element in the above method embodiments; or, device 10 may specifically be a terminal device in the above embodiments, and may be used to execute the various processes and / or steps corresponding to the terminal device in the above method embodiments. To avoid repetition, further details are omitted here.

[0522] The apparatus 10 of each of the above-described schemes has the function of implementing the corresponding steps performed by the entities (such as the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the security network element) in the above-described methods. This function can be implemented by hardware or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more units corresponding to the above-described functions; for example, the transceiver unit can be replaced by a transceiver (for example, the transmitting unit in the transceiver unit can be replaced by a transmitter, and the receiving unit in the transceiver unit can be replaced by a receiver), and other units, such as processing units, can be replaced by processors, which respectively execute the transceiver operations and related processing operations in each method embodiment.

[0523] In addition, the transceiver unit 11 can also be a transceiver circuit (for example, it may include a receiving circuit and a transmitting circuit), and the processing unit can be a processing circuit.

[0524] Figure 15This is a schematic diagram of another communication device 20 provided in an embodiment of this application. The device 20 includes a processor 21, which is used to execute computer programs or instructions stored in a memory 22, or to read data / signaling stored in the memory 22, to perform the methods in the above-described method embodiments. Optionally, there may be one or more processors 21.

[0525] Optionally, such as Figure 15 As shown, the device 20 also includes a memory 22 for storing computer programs or instructions and / or data. The memory 22 may be integrated with the processor 21 or may be disposed separately. Optionally, there may be one or more memories 22.

[0526] Optionally, such as Figure 15 As shown, the device 20 also includes a transceiver 23 for receiving and / or transmitting signals. For example, the processor 21 controls the transceiver 23 to receive and / or transmit signals.

[0527] As one approach, the device 20 is used to implement the operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the various method embodiments described above.

[0528] It should be understood that the processor mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be a central processing unit (CPU), or it can be one or more combinations of other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), microprocessor units (MPUs), microcontroller units (MCUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), artificial intelligence processors (AI processors), or neural processing units (NPUs); or, the processor mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be an ASIC or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, etc. A general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0529] It should also be understood that the memory mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can be cache or random access memory (RAM). For example, RAM can be used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, RAM includes the following forms: static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous linked dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DRRAM).

[0530] It should be noted that when the processor is a general-purpose processor, DSP, ASIC, FPGA, or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, or discrete hardware component, the memory (storage module) can be integrated into the processor.

[0531] It should also be noted that the memory described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0532] This application also provides a chip system (or processing system) including logic circuits and input / output interfaces.

[0533] The logic circuit can be a processing circuit in the chip system. The logic circuit can be coupled to a memory cell, calling instructions from the memory cell, enabling the chip system to implement the methods and functions of the embodiments of this application. The input / output interface can be an input / output circuit in the chip system, outputting processed information or inputting data or signaling information to be processed into the chip system for processing.

[0534] As one approach, the chip system is used to implement the operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the various method embodiments described above.

[0535] For example, the logic circuit is used to implement the processing-related operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the above method embodiments; the input / output interface is used to implement the sending and / or receiving-related operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0536] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for implementing the methods executed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the above-described method embodiments.

[0537] For example, when the computer program is executed by a computer, the computer can implement the methods executed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the various embodiments of the above methods.

[0538] This application also provides a computer program product comprising instructions that, when executed by a computer, implement the methods performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the above-described method embodiments.

[0539] This application also provides a communication system, including the aforementioned first network element and second network element. Optionally, the communication system further includes the aforementioned first communication device. Optionally, the communication system further includes the aforementioned second communication device.

[0540] The explanations and beneficial effects of the relevant contents in any of the devices provided above can be found in the corresponding method embodiments provided above, and will not be repeated here.

[0541] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0542] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0543] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of apparatus or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0544] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0545] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit.

[0546] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0547] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A communication method characterized by comprising: The method applied to a first communication device comprises: receiving a first request message from a second communication device, the first request message being used for requesting a first network element to process data, the first request message comprising a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data secured by a first security context, and the first indication information being used for indicating that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted; homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext; sending the second ciphertext to a second network element, wherein the first security context is a security context determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises: sending second indication information to the second network element, the second indication information being used for indicating that the second ciphertext is a homomorphically encrypted ciphertext.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext comprises: homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext based on an encryption key to generate the second ciphertext.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The method further comprises: sending the encryption key to the second network element.

5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that, The method further comprises: receiving a second request message, the second request message being used for requesting to generate the encryption key, the second request message comprising a first identifier; generating the encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message, wherein the first identifier comprises at least one of the following: an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

6. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that, The method further comprises: sending a second request message, the second request message being used for requesting to obtain the encryption key, the second request message comprising a first identifier; receiving the encryption key associated with the first identifier, wherein the first identifier comprises at least one of the following: an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

7. The method according to claim 5 or 6, characterized in that, The second request message further comprises third indication information and / or an identifier of a first algorithm, the third indication information being used for indicating that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identifier of the first algorithm being used for indicating an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

8. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 7, characterized in that, The encryption key is contained in a second security context, the second security context further comprising a calculation key, and the method further comprises: sending the calculation key to the second network element, wherein the calculation key is used for performing calculation on a ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key in a ciphertext state.

9. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 8, characterized in that, The method further comprises: sending an identifier of the second communication device and / or an identifier of a first algorithm to the second network element, the identifier of the first algorithm being used for indicating an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that, The first request message comprises at least one container, the first ciphertext being carried in a first container in the at least one container, and the first request message further comprises a data label, the data label being used for indicating the first container.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that, The method further comprises: receiving a first response message, wherein the first response message comprises an identity of the second communication device and a data processing result based on the first security context and homomorphic encryption; performing homomorphic decryption on the data processing result to obtain a data processing result based on the first security context; sending the data processing result based on the first security context to the second communication device.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein, The first response message further comprises fourth indication information, and the fourth indication information indicates that the data processing result is homomorphic encrypted.

13. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 12, characterized in that, The first network element and the second network element are the same.

14. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, characterized in that, The first security context comprises a non-access stratum security context.

15. A method of communication, comprising: The method is applied to a second network element, and the method comprises: receiving a third request message from a first communication device, wherein the third request message is used to request a first network element to perform data processing, and the third request message comprises second ciphertext, the second ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by performing homomorphic encryption on first ciphertext, and the first ciphertext is first data of a second communication device that is protected by a first security context; decrypting the second ciphertext based on a first key to obtain third ciphertext, the third ciphertext is the first data that is homomorphic encrypted, obtaining a data processing result corresponding to the first data, wherein the data processing result is determined based on the third ciphertext, wherein the first security context is a security context determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein, The first key is determined based on an encryption key homomorphic encryption on the first security context, and the method further comprises: receiving the encryption key from the first communication device; performing homomorphic encryption on the first security context based on the encryption key to determine the first key.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein, The encryption key is contained in a second security context, and the second security context further comprises a calculation key, and the method further comprises: receiving the calculation key from the first communication device; performing calculation on the third ciphertext in a ciphertext state based on the encryption key, or sending the third ciphertext and the calculation key to the first network element.

18. The method of any one of claims 15-17, wherein, The obtaining of the data processing result corresponding to the first data comprises: determining the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

19. The method of any one of claims 15-17, wherein, The obtaining of the data processing result corresponding to the first data comprises: sending the third ciphertext to the first network element; receiving the data processing result from the first network element.

20. The method of any one of claims 15-19, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving fifth indication information from the second communication device, wherein the fifth indication information indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement; sending a second request message to the first communication device, wherein the second request message is used to request generation of an encryption key, and the second request message comprises a first identity, wherein the encryption key is used to implement the homomorphic encryption, and the first identity comprises at least one of the following: an identity of the second communication device, an identity of a service to which the first data corresponds, or an identity of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

21. The method of claim 20, wherein, The second request message further comprises third indication information and / or an identity of a first algorithm, the third indication information being used to indicate that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identity of the first algorithm being used to indicate an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

22. The method of any one of claims 15-21, wherein, The method further comprises: performing secure protection processing on the data processing result based on a second key, the second key being determined by homomorphic encryption on the first security context; sending a first response message to the first communication device, the first response message comprising an identity of the second communication device and the data processing result that is securely protected based on the first security context and homomorphic encryption.

23. The method of any one of claims 15-22, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving a fourth request message from a third network element, the fourth request message being used to request the third ciphertext; sending a fourth response message to the third network element, the fourth response message comprising the third ciphertext and an identity of a first algorithm, the identity of the first algorithm being used to indicate a homomorphic computation algorithm.

24. A method of communication, comprising: The method applied to a second communication device comprises: sending a first request message to a first communication device, the first request message being used to request a first network element to perform data processing, the first request message comprising a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data that is securely protected by a first security context, and the first indication information being used to indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted; receiving a data processing result from the first communication device, the data processing result being a data processing result corresponding to the first data and being securely protected based on the first security context, wherein the first security context is a non-access stratum security context that is determined by negotiation between the second communication device and a second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

25. The method of claim 24, wherein, The first request message comprises at least one container, the first ciphertext being carried in a first container in the at least one container, and the first request message further comprises a data label, the data label being used to indicate the first container.

26. The method of claim 24 or 25, wherein, The method further comprises: sending fifth indication information to the second network element, the fifth indication information indicating that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

27. A communications device, characterized by one or more functional modules for performing the method of any one of claims 1 to 14, or one or more functional modules for performing the method of any one of claims 15 to 23, or one or more functional modules for performing the method of any one of claims 24 to 26. comprise at least one processor coupled to a memory, the at least one processor being configured to execute a computer program in the memory to cause the apparatus to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 14, or to cause the apparatus to perform the method of any one of claims 15 to 26, or to cause the apparatus to perform the method of any one of claims 24 to 26.

28. A communications device, characterized by ​ 29. A computer program product, characterised in that, The computer program product comprises instructions for performing the method of any one of claims 1 to 26.

30. A computer-readable storage medium, comprising: comprises: The computer readable storage medium stores a computer program; the computer program, when running on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 26.

31. A chip, characterized by The chip is installed in a communication device, the chip comprises a processor and a communication interface, the processor reads instructions through the communication interface and runs, so that the communication device performs the method of any one of claims 1 to 26.

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