A power grid data-based anti-leakage encryption system and method

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of based on power grid data anti-leakage encryption system and method, it is related to power grid data security encryption technical field, including according to power grid data sensitive grade division encryption level and matching algorithm;In business operation, based on real-time scene generation dynamic key seed, and it is bound with data stream transfer node information to generate initial dynamic key;Monitoring user authority change, when meeting condition, automatically update key according to the latest role and node information;Using corresponding algorithm and dynamic key, each level data is encrypted, and ciphertext is formed;When accessing, carry out authority verification, according to authorized decryption level, use corresponding key and algorithm to decrypt ciphertext.The method realizes the real-time linkage of encryption protection and data flow state, user authority change, so that security mechanism can dynamically adapt to business scene change, enhance the active defense capability of power grid data anti-leakage and the instant effectiveness of authority control.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of power grid data security encryption technology, specifically a power grid data anti-leakage encryption system and method. Background Technology

[0002] In the construction of power system information systems, power grid business data flows continuously throughout the entire process of collection, transmission, storage, and use. Existing data encryption schemes typically employ static or fixed-strategy-based encryption methods, such as pre-setting encryption algorithms for data with different sensitivity levels or updating keys according to time periods. These schemes separate the encryption process from the actual operating scenarios of power grid business, the dynamic flow path of data, and the real-time status of user permissions. Once data is encrypted, the key used is relatively fixed, and even if the data is transmitted to different business nodes or faces changes in user permissions, the original encryption protection mechanism lacks the ability to adaptively adjust accordingly.

[0003] The main drawback of current methods lies in the disconnect between key management and business logic. Key generation often relies on a single, predictable factor, failing to adequately consider the specific context of data within the complex power grid business chain. Access control is typically independent of the encryption and decryption process; when a user's role changes, the range of data they can access may be restricted, but the keys protecting this data remain unchanged, leaving historical ciphertext vulnerable to unauthorized access. A cryptographic protection mechanism is needed that closely aligns with the dynamic changes in the power grid data lifecycle and access control, enabling security protection to evolve in real-time and accurately with business scenarios, data flow, and access status. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention aims to solve at least one of the technical problems existing in the prior art;

[0005] Therefore, this invention proposes a data leakage prevention encryption method based on power grid data, including:

[0006] Based on the sensitivity level information of the power grid business data, the power grid data is divided into multiple encryption levels, and a corresponding encryption algorithm type is matched for each level of power grid data based on the encryption level.

[0007] The system acquires real-time business scenario information during the operation of power grid services and generates a dynamic key seed. It then binds the dynamic key seed with the data flow node information during the power grid data flow process to generate an initial dynamic key.

[0008] Obtain user role information and user permission change information from the power grid business system. When the user permission change information triggers a preset key update condition, automatically update the initial dynamic key based on the latest user role information and the data flow node information to generate an updated dynamic key.

[0009] The power grid data at the corresponding encryption level is encrypted using the encryption algorithm type and the corresponding dynamic key to generate encrypted power grid data ciphertext.

[0010] Based on the preset role and permission management rules, the permissions of users requesting access to the encrypted power grid data are verified;

[0011] When the permission verification is successful, the authorized decryption level is determined according to the user role information, and the ciphertext of the power grid data is decrypted based on the dynamic key and encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level to obtain the power grid data content that can be accessed by the user.

[0012] Preferably, the step of dividing the power grid data into multiple encryption levels based on the sensitivity level information of the power grid business data includes:

[0013] The sensitivity level information is determined based on the service type and data attributes of the power grid data;

[0014] The data acquisition includes multiple business types of power grid business data, including dispatch and control data, user electricity consumption information data, and equipment status monitoring data.

[0015] The system acquires multiple data attributes of power grid business data, including the data source, data real-time requirements, and data impact scope.

[0016] Construct a sensitivity assessment matrix, input the business type and the data attribute into the sensitivity assessment matrix, and calculate the initial sensitivity score for each power grid business data;

[0017] Based on a preset sensitivity score threshold range, the initial sensitivity score is mapped to a plurality of preset discrete sensitivity levels, wherein each sensitivity level corresponds to an encryption level.

[0018] Preferably, the step of matching the corresponding encryption algorithm type to the power grid data for each encryption level based on the encryption level includes:

[0019] A high-strength asymmetric encryption algorithm is used for core-level data, while a lightweight symmetric encryption algorithm is used for ordinary-level data.

[0020] Establish an encryption algorithm strategy library, which stores the mapping relationship between algorithm strength identifiers and encryption levels;

[0021] Assign a first algorithm strength identifier to the core-level data and a second algorithm strength identifier to the ordinary-level data, wherein the first algorithm strength identifier corresponds to a high-strength asymmetric encryption algorithm and the second algorithm strength identifier corresponds to a lightweight symmetric encryption algorithm.

[0022] Based on the encryption level, search the encryption algorithm policy library to obtain the algorithm strength identifier corresponding to the encryption level;

[0023] Based on the algorithm strength identifier, a specific encryption algorithm type is selected from a preset set of available encryption algorithms.

[0024] Preferably, the step of acquiring real-time business scenario information during power grid operation and generating a dynamic key seed includes:

[0025] Monitor the power grid's operational status and capture real-time business scenario information related to data security. The real-time business scenario information includes current power grid operating status information, data access timestamps, and the identifier of the business system that initiated the data transfer.

[0026] A preset hash function is used to perform a one-way transformation on the real-time business scenario information to generate a fixed-length intermediate hash value.

[0027] The intermediate hash value is conflated with a random number generated by a random number generator to generate a dynamic key seed.

[0028] Preferably, the step of binding the dynamic key seed with the data transfer node information in the power grid data transfer process to generate an initial dynamic key includes:

[0029] Track the complete flow path of power grid data from its source to its final storage or consumption end, and record information on all data flow nodes along the complete flow path;

[0030] Extract the unique identifier and node type code contained in the information of each data flow node;

[0031] Using the dynamic key seed as input and the node unique identifier and node type code as additional parameters, the key derivation function derives the initial dynamic key bound to each data flow node.

[0032] Preferably, the step of automatically updating the initial dynamic key based on the latest user role information and the data flow node information when the user permission change information triggers a preset key update condition includes:

[0033] Listen for event notifications issued by the user permission management system, and when the user permission change information is captured, parse the event notification content;

[0034] Determine whether the event notification content contains a predefined key-triggered event, wherein the key-triggered event includes user role promotion, user role downgrade, and user access permission revocation;

[0035] If the key triggering event is included, then determine the user role information and associated power grid data range affected by the key triggering event;

[0036] Obtain the current data flow node information and historical dynamic keys corresponding to the associated power grid data range;

[0037] Based on the updated user role information, the current data flow node information, and the preset key update strategy, the key derivation process is re-executed to generate an updated dynamic key to replace the historical dynamic key.

[0038] Preferably, the step of verifying the permissions of users requesting access to the encrypted power grid data, based on preset role-based access control rules, includes:

[0039] Receive a power grid data encrypted access request sent by a user, wherein the power grid data encrypted access request contains user identity credential information and a power grid data encrypted identifier to be accessed;

[0040] The user's role information and role permission list are retrieved by querying the role permission database based on the user's identity credentials.

[0041] The encryption level information of the power grid data ciphertext is obtained by querying the power grid data ciphertext attribute table based on the power grid data ciphertext identifier.

[0042] Input the user role information, the role permission list, and the encryption level information into the access control decision engine;

[0043] The access control decision engine performs logical judgments based on preset role and permission management rules, and outputs the permission verification result of whether the user is authorized to access the encryption level to which the power grid data ciphertext belongs.

[0044] Preferably, the step of decrypting the ciphertext of the power grid data based on the dynamic key and encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level includes:

[0045] Based on the decryption level authorized to the user, obtain the currently valid dynamic key corresponding to the decryption level from the key management service;

[0046] Obtain the encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level from the encryption algorithm policy library, and determine the reverse decryption algorithm of the encryption algorithm type;

[0047] The reverse decryption algorithm and the currently valid dynamic key are used to decrypt the ciphertext of the power grid data;

[0048] The decryption operation outputs plaintext data, and the level of detail of the plaintext data matches the decryption level authorized to the user.

[0049] Preferably, the method further includes:

[0050] During power grid data transmission, the integrity verification value of the encrypted power grid data is monitored in real time.

[0051] When the encrypted power grid data arrives at a data transfer node, the integrity check value is verified using a dynamic key bound to the data transfer node.

[0052] If the integrity verification value fails, a data tampering alarm message is generated and the transmission of the encrypted power grid data to subsequent data transfer nodes is interrupted.

[0053] The data tampering alarm information and related data flow node information are recorded in the security audit log;

[0054] The step of verifying the integrity check value using a dynamic key bound to the data transfer node includes:

[0055] At the power grid data sending end, while encrypting the original power grid data to generate power grid data ciphertext, a first integrity verification value is calculated using a message authentication code algorithm and a sending end dynamic key, and the first integrity verification value is appended to the power grid data ciphertext and transmitted together.

[0056] At the power grid data receiving end, after receiving the power grid data ciphertext and the attached first integrity check value, the receiving end uses the corresponding dynamic key and the same message authentication code algorithm to calculate the received power grid data ciphertext and generate a second integrity check value.

[0057] Compare whether the first integrity check value and the second integrity check value are consistent;

[0058] If they match, the integrity check value is deemed to have passed verification, and the encrypted power grid data has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0059] Preferably, the present invention also includes a power grid data leakage prevention and encryption system, the system including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the power grid data leakage prevention and encryption method described above.

[0060] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0061] The dynamic key seed is bound to specific node information in the power grid data flow process to generate the initial dynamic key. This technology embeds the path characteristics of data flow into the key generation source. The key is no longer a static string independent of the business process, but a cryptographic mapping of the data flow state. In this way, even the same original data will have different keys used for encryption due to different path nodes in the power grid, increasing the difficulty for attackers to steal keys through a single channel and then decrypt data in batches. The encryption strength is deeply integrated with the dynamic business environment of the data.

[0062] This technology monitors user permission changes in real time and automatically updates dynamic keys based on the latest user roles and data flow node information when preset conditions are triggered. It establishes a direct linkage mechanism between permission changes and key lifecycle management. Key updates are automatically triggered and executed by the system without manual intervention. This ensures that changes in access control policies are immediately reflected in the updated data decryption capabilities. When a user's permissions are revoked or adjusted, even if they hold the old key, they cannot decrypt the updated ciphertext. This achieves immediate effect and positive security for permission revocation, effectively preventing lateral unauthorized access to data due to delayed permission management. Attached Figure Description

[0063] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of the power grid data anti-leakage encryption method described in this invention.

[0064] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating the division of encryption levels for power grid data;

[0065] Figure 3 Flowchart for generating dynamic key seeds;

[0066] Figure 4 Line graph showing the change in key update frequency for different encryption levels of the power grid;

[0067] Figure 5 A bar chart showing the relationship between the encryption level of power grid data and the algorithm strength. Detailed Implementation

[0068] The technical solution of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the embodiments. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0069] See Figure 1Based on the sensitivity level information of power grid business data, the power grid data is divided into multiple different encryption levels, each corresponding to a selected encryption algorithm type. Real-time business scenario information during power grid operation is acquired, and a dynamic key seed is generated accordingly. This dynamic key seed is then bound to the data flow node information traversed during the power grid data flow process, thereby generating an initial dynamic key. User role information and user permission change information in the power grid business system are acquired. When a detected user permission change triggers a preset key update condition, the generated initial dynamic key is automatically updated based on the latest user role information and related data flow node information, generating an updated dynamic key. Using the encryption algorithm type matched to each encryption level, combined with the dynamic key corresponding to that level and the current context, the power grid data at the corresponding encryption level is encrypted, ultimately generating encrypted power grid data ciphertext. When a user requests access to the encrypted power grid data is received, the user's permissions are verified according to preset role and permission management rules. After the permission verification is successful, the authorized decryption level is determined based on the user's user role information. Then, the ciphertext of the power grid data is decrypted using the dynamic key and encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level, thereby obtaining the power grid data content that the user is allowed to access.

[0070] In one embodiment of the present invention, see [reference] Figure 2 The encryption level classification of power grid data is based on sensitivity level information, which is jointly determined by the business type and data attributes of the power grid data. In specific implementations, dispatch control data, user electricity consumption information data, and equipment status monitoring data are common types of power grid business data. In specific implementations, the data source, data real-time requirements, and data impact scope constitute the data attribute dimensions required for evaluation. The constructed sensitivity evaluation matrix is ​​a multi-factor weighted calculation model. The rows of the matrix represent different business types, the columns represent different data attributes, and each intersection has a predefined quantified scoring weight. By inputting the business type and data attributes of a specific power grid business data segment into the sensitivity evaluation matrix, the initial sensitivity score of the power grid business data is calculated using the predefined weights and calculation rules within the matrix. The calculation of the initial sensitivity score follows the formula below:

[0071]

[0072] Wherein: S initial This represents the initial sensitivity score, where m represents the total number of business types, n represents the total number of data attributes, and W... ij Indicates business type T i With data attribute P j The corresponding weight coefficients in the sensitivity assessment matrix, function δ(T) i ,Pj The power grid business data in this segment has a business type T. i and data attribute P j The value is 1 if the sensitivity score is within the range of 1, and 0 otherwise. The preset sensitivity score threshold range maps a continuous range of sensitivity scores to discrete sensitivity levels. For example, when the calculated initial sensitivity score is in the range [80, 100], it is mapped to the "core level", and when it is in the range [30, 79], it is mapped to the "normal level". Each determined sensitivity level directly corresponds to an encryption level.

[0073] In some embodiments, a "high-strength" algorithm strength identifier is assigned to "core-level" data, and a "standard-strength" algorithm strength identifier is assigned to "ordinary-level" data. It can be understood that the "high-strength" algorithm strength identifier corresponds to a set of high-strength asymmetric encryption algorithms, which includes asymmetric encryption algorithms that meet specific security standards. It can also be understood that the "standard-strength" algorithm strength identifier corresponds to a set of lightweight symmetric encryption algorithms, which includes computationally efficient symmetric encryption algorithms. When a segment of power grid data is designated as "core-level," the corresponding "high-strength" algorithm strength identifier is obtained by searching the encryption algorithm strategy library based on the "core-level." Optionally, based on the "high-strength" algorithm strength identifier, the RSA-OAEP algorithm is selected from the set of high-strength asymmetric encryption algorithms as the encryption algorithm type for that segment of power grid data. When a segment of power grid data is designated as "ordinary-level," the corresponding "standard-strength" algorithm strength identifier is obtained by searching the encryption algorithm strategy library based on the "ordinary-level."

[0074] In one embodiment of the present invention, see [reference] Figure 3The dynamic key seed generation process begins with monitoring the operational status of the power grid. This monitoring process captures real-time business scenario information related to data security. This real-time business scenario information includes the current power grid operating condition information, data access timestamps, and the identifier of the business system initiating the data transfer. In specific implementation, the current power grid operating condition information can be specified as the real-time power grid frequency value, such as "50.01Hz", the data access timestamp can be specified as "2025-08-01 10:30:25.123", and the identifier of the business system initiating the data transfer can be specified as "Energy Management System_EMS_01". In practical implementation, a preset hash function is used to perform one-way transformation processing on the captured real-time business scenario information. The hash function can be the SHA-256 algorithm. First, the above information strings are concatenated into an input string "Frequency: 50.01Hz_Timestamp: 2025-08-01 10:30:25.123_System: EMS_01" according to a predetermined format. Then, this input string is input into the SHA-256 hash function to generate a fixed-length 256-bit intermediate hash value. In practical implementation, the generated intermediate hash value is confused with a random number generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator. The confusion operation can use a bitwise XOR operation to generate the final dynamic key seed. The generation of the dynamic key seed can be expressed by the following formula:

[0075] K seed =H(C f ∥C t ∥C s )⊕R

[0076] Where: K seed This represents the generated dynamic key seed, where H(⋅) represents the selected hash function, and C... f Indicates the current power grid operating status information, C t Represents the data access timestamp, C s The symbol ∥ represents the business system that initiated the data flow, R represents a random number generated by a random number generator, and ⊕ represents a bitwise XOR operation.

[0077] In one embodiment of the present invention, the automatic update process of dynamic keys based on user permission changes begins by listening to event notifications issued by the user permission management system. When the system captures user permission change information, it automatically parses the specific content of the event notification. The event notifications issued by the user permission management system can adopt a structured message format. In specific implementation, it is determined whether the parsed event notification content contains a predefined key triggering event. The predefined key triggering events include "user role promotion", "user role demotion", and "user access permission revocation". For example, parsing the event notification yields "Event type: user role promotion, user ID: USER_1001, original role: ordinary dispatcher, new role: dispatch team leader, affected data range identifier list: [AREA_EAST_01]", this event content contains the key triggering event "user role promotion".

[0078] In some embodiments, if the event notification content includes a key triggering event, the user role information affected by the key triggering event and the associated power grid data range are determined. In some embodiments, for the example event described above, the determined affected user role information is the updated "Dispatch Supervisor," and the associated power grid data range is the East China regional power grid data identified as "AREA_EAST_01." The current data flow node information corresponding to the "AREA_EAST_01" data range is obtained. For example, the nodes involved in the data flow in this region include "Acquisition Server A," "Regional Database B," and "Analysis Platform C," and the historical dynamic keys currently used by these nodes are obtained. It is understood that the key update strategy stipulates that under the "user role promotion" event, the key needs to be recalculated based on the new role level. It is understood that re-executing the key derivation process refers to calling the key derivation function to generate a new key based on the updated user role information, the current data flow node information, and the parameters in the key update strategy. Optionally, for the node "Acquisition Server A," its key update process follows the following formula:

[0079]

[0080] in: This represents the updated dynamic key generated by node "Collection Server A". The function KDF(⋅) represents the key derivation function, K seed Indicates the original or updated dynamic key seed, ID A The unique identifier for node "Collection Server A", Type A The node type code representing node "Collection Server A", Role new This represents the updated user role information "Dispatch Supervisor," and θ represents the policy parameters defined in the key update strategy. Optionally, an updated dynamic key is generated. Then, the system automatically uses Replace the historical dynamic key previously used by node "Collection Server A" The same update and replacement operations are performed on nodes “Regional Database B” and “Analysis Platform C” to complete the key update for the entire associated data range.

[0081] In one embodiment of the present invention, the user access permission verification process begins with receiving a request from a user to access encrypted power grid data. This request must include user identity credentials and the identifier of the encrypted power grid data to be accessed. Specifically, the user identity credentials can be the serial number of a digital certificate, “CN=UserA,SN=123456789”, and the identifier of the encrypted power grid data to be accessed can be a globally unique identifier, “CipherID_20240801001”. The user identity credentials “CN=UserA,SN=123456789” are used to query the role and permission database. This database stores the mapping relationship between user identifiers, user role information, and role and permission lists. The retrieved user role information is “Regional Analyst”, and the role and permission list is [“Level 1 Data Reading”, “Level 2 Data Reading”]. The power grid data encrypted identifier "CipherID_20240801001" is used to query the power grid data encrypted attribute table. The power grid data encrypted attribute table records the correspondence between the encrypted identifier and the encryption level of the original data before encryption. The encryption level information of the power grid data encrypted is "Level 2". The obtained user role information "Regional Analyst", role permission list ["Level 1 Data Read", "Level 2 Data Read"] and encryption level information "Level 2" are input into the access control decision engine.

[0082] In some embodiments, the access control decision engine performs logical judgments based on preset role-based access control rules, which define the access permissions for different user roles to different encryption levels. The preset rule can be expressed as: access is only permitted if a user's role-based access list contains a "read" permission for the target encryption level. The access control decision engine takes the user role information "Regional Analyst" and the target encryption level "Level 2" as input, searches the rule base, and performs matching calculations based on the user's role-based access list. It can be understood that the user "Regional Analyst's" role-based access list contains a "Level 2 Data Read" entry. It can also be understood that the target encryption level "Level 2" matches the level identifier in the access permission entry "Level 2 Data Read" and the operation type is consistent. The access control decision engine performs logical judgments and outputs a permission verification result of "Pass". If another user, "Trainee Dispatcher," has a role-based access list that only contains ["Level 1 Data Read"], when they request access to the same "Level 2" ciphertext, the access control decision engine outputs a permission verification result of "Deny".

[0083] When authorization is granted, the ciphertext of the power grid data is decrypted based on the dynamic key and encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level. According to the user-authorized decryption level "Level 2", the currently valid dynamic key corresponding to "Level 2" is obtained from the key management service, which returns the key handle "KeyHandle_L2_Active_20240801". The encryption algorithm type corresponding to "Level 2" is obtained from the encryption algorithm policy library. The encryption algorithm policy library instructs the "Level 2" data to be encrypted using the "AES-256-GCM" algorithm, and determines that the reverse decryption algorithm of "AES-256-GCM" is its own decryption mode. Using the determined reverse decryption algorithm and the obtained currently valid dynamic key, the ciphertext of the power grid data "CipherID_20240801001" is decrypted. The decryption process can be represented as follows:

[0084] P=D Alg (C,K L2_active )

[0085] Where: P represents the plaintext data output by the decryption operation, and the function D Alg (⋅) represents the decryption function of the "AES-256-GCM" algorithm, C represents the input ciphertext of the power grid data, and K L2_activeThis indicates the currently valid dynamic key corresponding to "Level 2" obtained from the key management service. Optionally, the decryption operation outputs plaintext data matching the user's authorized decryption level, "Level 2," such as power grid data containing regional statistical summaries and anonymized device identifiers, but excluding more detailed real-time operating parameters for individual devices, which may belong to a higher "Level 3." See Table 1 for the relationship between user roles and accessible data levels.

[0086] Table 1: Correspondence between User Roles and Authorization / Decryption Levels

[0087] User role information Role Permission List Authorized decryption level Accessible data content summary System Administrator [Levels 1-4: Full Access] Levels 1, 2, 3, 4 Complete data at all levels Dispatch Team Leader [Level 1 data read / write, Level 2 data retrieval] Level 1, 2 Core commands, regional operation details Regional Analyst [Read data from level 1, read data from level 2] Level 1, 2 Regional statistical summary, information on desensitization equipment Trainee Dispatcher [Level 1 Data Reading] Level 1 Publicly available power grid overview information

[0088] See Figure 4 This is a line graph showing the frequency of key updates at different encryption levels in the power grid. It illustrates the fluctuations in the update frequency of "Level 1" and "Level 2" keys. Level 1 is generally updated more frequently than Level 2, peaking at 3 times on August 15, 2024. Level 2 is updated only on certain days, with a peak of 2 times. The more frequent updates of Level 1 keys align with the dynamic key update logic for its corresponding "ordinary level data" (high access frequency). The peak update on August 15, 2024, likely corresponds to scenarios triggering key updates during the same period, such as changes in user permissions or adjustments to data flow nodes. Combined with concurrent power grid business activities, the effectiveness of the "permission change triggers key update" rule can be verified, allowing for optimization of the dynamic key triggering logic.

[0089] In one embodiment of the present invention, integrity verification during power grid data transmission is achieved by real-time monitoring of the integrity verification value of the encrypted power grid data during transmission. The integrity verification value is a cryptographic digest used to verify whether the data has not been tampered with during transmission. In a specific implementation, when an encrypted piece of encrypted power grid data is transmitted along the transfer path and arrives at a preset data transfer node, the system automatically uses a dynamic key bound to that specific data transfer node to verify the integrity verification value accompanying the transmitted encrypted data. In a specific implementation, if the integrity verification fails, it indicates that the encrypted power grid data may have been tampered with or corrupted during transmission. The system immediately generates a data tampering alarm message containing elements such as time, node identifier, and ciphertext identifier, and forcibly interrupts the transmission link of the encrypted power grid data to subsequent data transfer nodes. In a specific implementation, after generating the data tampering alarm message and interrupting transmission, the system records the complete data tampering alarm message and the relevant data transfer node information that triggered the verification failure in an immutable security audit log for subsequent audit analysis.

[0090] The integrity check value verification process using a dynamic key bound to the data flow node includes the complete process of generating and appending a check value at the sending end and verifying the check value at the receiving end. At the power grid data sending end, while encrypting the raw power grid data to generate ciphertext, a first integrity check value is generated using a specified message authentication code algorithm and the corresponding dynamic key at the sending end. The first integrity check value (MAC) is... send The calculation follows the formula below:

[0091] MAC send =KDF HMAC (K send C)

[0092] Among them: MAC send This represents the first integrity check value generated at the sending end, function KDF. HMAC (⋅) represents the key-derived message authentication code calculation function using the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm, K send This represents the dynamic key of the sending end bound to the data transfer node, and C represents the encrypted power grid data to be transmitted. In specific implementation, after generating the first integrity check value MAC_send, the first integrity check value MAC_send is encapsulated together with the encrypted power grid data C as an additional field into a data transmission unit for transmission.

[0093] See Figure 5 This is a bar chart showing the correspondence between encryption levels and algorithm strength for power grid data. It conforms to the security rule of "matching high-sensitivity levels with high-strength encryption algorithms." Core confidential data (such as dispatch control data) uses the strongest algorithms, while ordinary data (such as publicly available overview information) uses lightweight algorithms, balancing security and performance. It visually verifies the rationality of the "encryption level - algorithm strength" mapping rule, ensuring that the encryption strength of highly sensitive data meets the standards. If the strength of ordinary-level algorithms is too high, it can be adjusted to a lighter algorithm based on this chart, reducing the resource consumption of system encryption / decryption. It provides a visual basis for power grid data security compliance review, demonstrating that the encryption measures for different sensitivity levels of data are appropriate for their risk levels.

[0094] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical methods of the present invention and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications or equivalent substitutions can be made to the technical methods of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical methods of the present invention.

Claims

1. A data leakage prevention encryption method based on power grid data, characterized in that, include: Based on the sensitivity level information of the power grid business data, the power grid data is divided into multiple encryption levels, and a corresponding encryption algorithm type is matched for each level of power grid data based on the encryption level. The system acquires real-time business scenario information during the operation of power grid services and generates a dynamic key seed. It then binds the dynamic key seed with the data flow node information during the power grid data flow process to generate an initial dynamic key. Obtain user role information and user permission change information from the power grid business system. When the user permission change information triggers a preset key update condition, automatically update the initial dynamic key based on the latest user role information and the data flow node information to generate an updated dynamic key. The power grid data at the corresponding encryption level is encrypted using the encryption algorithm type and the corresponding dynamic key to generate encrypted power grid data ciphertext. Based on the preset role and permission management rules, the permissions of users requesting access to the encrypted power grid data are verified; When the permission verification is successful, the authorized decryption level is determined according to the user role information, and the power grid data ciphertext is decrypted based on the dynamic key and encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level to obtain the power grid data content that can be accessed by the user. The step of automatically updating the initial dynamic key based on the latest user role information and the data flow node information when the user permission change information triggers a preset key update condition includes: Listen for event notifications issued by the user permission management system, and when the user permission change information is captured, parse the event notification content; Determine whether the event notification content contains a predefined key-triggered event, wherein the key-triggered event includes user role promotion, user role downgrade, and user access permission revocation; If the key triggering event is included, then determine the user role information and associated power grid data range affected by the key triggering event; Obtain the current data flow node information and historical dynamic keys corresponding to the associated power grid data range; Based on the updated user role information, the current data flow node information, and the preset key update strategy, the key derivation process is re-executed to generate an updated dynamic key to replace the historical dynamic key.

2. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of dividing power grid data into multiple encryption levels based on the sensitivity level information of power grid business data includes: The sensitivity level information is determined based on the service type and data attributes of the power grid data; The acquisition of multiple business types of power grid business data includes dispatch and control data, user electricity consumption information data, and equipment status monitoring data. The system acquires multiple data attributes of power grid business data, including the data source, data real-time requirements, and data impact scope. Construct a sensitivity assessment matrix, input the business type and the data attribute into the sensitivity assessment matrix, and calculate the initial sensitivity score for each power grid business data; Based on a preset sensitivity score threshold range, the initial sensitivity score is mapped to a plurality of preset discrete sensitivity levels, wherein each sensitivity level corresponds to an encryption level.

3. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of matching the corresponding encryption algorithm type to the power grid data at each encryption level based on the encryption level includes: A high-strength asymmetric encryption algorithm is used for core-level data, while a lightweight symmetric encryption algorithm is used for ordinary-level data. Establish an encryption algorithm strategy library, which stores the mapping relationship between algorithm strength identifiers and encryption levels; Assign a first algorithm strength identifier to the core-level data and a second algorithm strength identifier to the ordinary-level data, wherein the first algorithm strength identifier corresponds to a high-strength asymmetric encryption algorithm and the second algorithm strength identifier corresponds to a lightweight symmetric encryption algorithm. Based on the encryption level, search the encryption algorithm policy library to obtain the algorithm strength identifier corresponding to the encryption level; Based on the algorithm strength identifier, a specific encryption algorithm type is selected from a preset set of available encryption algorithms.

4. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of acquiring real-time business scenario information during power grid operation and generating a dynamic key seed includes: Monitor the power grid's operational status and capture real-time business scenario information related to data security. The real-time business scenario information includes current power grid operating status information, data access timestamps, and the identifier of the business system that initiated the data transfer. A preset hash function is used to perform a one-way transformation on the real-time business scenario information to generate a fixed-length intermediate hash value. The intermediate hash value is conflated with a random number generated by a random number generator to generate a dynamic key seed.

5. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of binding the dynamic key seed with the data transfer node information in the power grid data transfer process to generate an initial dynamic key includes: Track the complete flow path of power grid data from its source to its final storage or consumption end, and record information on all data flow nodes along the complete flow path; Extract the unique identifier and node type code contained in the information of each data flow node; Using the dynamic key seed as input and the node unique identifier and node type code as additional parameters, the key derivation function derives the initial dynamic key bound to each data flow node.

6. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of verifying the permissions of users requesting access to the encrypted power grid data, based on preset role-based access control rules, includes: Receive a power grid data encrypted access request sent by a user, wherein the power grid data encrypted access request contains user identity credential information and a power grid data encrypted identifier to be accessed; The user's role information and role permission list are retrieved by querying the role permission database based on the user's identity credentials. The encryption level information of the power grid data ciphertext is obtained by querying the power grid data ciphertext attribute table based on the power grid data ciphertext identifier. Input the user role information, the role permission list, and the encryption level information into the access control decision engine; The access control decision engine performs logical judgments based on preset role and permission management rules, and outputs the permission verification result of whether the user is authorized to access the encryption level to which the power grid data ciphertext belongs.

7. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of decrypting the ciphertext of the power grid data based on the dynamic key and encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level includes: Based on the decryption level authorized to the user, obtain the currently valid dynamic key corresponding to the decryption level from the key management service; Obtain the encryption algorithm type corresponding to the decryption level from the encryption algorithm policy library, and determine the reverse decryption algorithm of the encryption algorithm type; The reverse decryption algorithm and the currently valid dynamic key are used to decrypt the ciphertext of the power grid data; The decryption operation outputs plaintext data, and the level of detail of the plaintext data matches the decryption level authorized to the user.

8. The method for preventing data leakage based on power grids according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: During power grid data transmission, the integrity verification value of the encrypted power grid data is monitored in real time. When the encrypted power grid data arrives at a data transfer node, the integrity check value is verified using a dynamic key bound to the data transfer node. If the integrity verification value fails, a data tampering alarm message is generated and the transmission of the encrypted power grid data to subsequent data transfer nodes is interrupted. The data tampering alarm information and related data flow node information are recorded in the security audit log; The step of verifying the integrity check value using a dynamic key bound to the data transfer node includes: At the power grid data sending end, while encrypting the original power grid data to generate power grid data ciphertext, a first integrity verification value is calculated using a message authentication code algorithm and a sending end dynamic key, and the first integrity verification value is appended to the power grid data ciphertext and transmitted together. At the power grid data receiving end, after receiving the power grid data ciphertext and the attached first integrity check value, the receiving end uses the corresponding dynamic key and the same message authentication code algorithm to calculate the received power grid data ciphertext and generate a second integrity check value. Compare whether the first integrity check value and the second integrity check value are consistent; If they match, the integrity check value is deemed to have passed verification, and the encrypted power grid data has not been tampered with during transmission.

9. A data leakage prevention and encryption system based on power grids, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the power grid data anti-leakage encryption method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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