A method and system for secure stealth access to battlefield network nodes

By combining passive sensing and covert handshake with a closed-loop solution of hardware trusted authentication, the contradiction between rapid network access and low-exposure security in tactical networking is resolved. This solution enables low-exposure discovery, trusted authentication, and controlled network access, thereby improving the system's survivability and resilience in highly confrontational environments.

CN123122797APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17RONGZHITONG TECH BEIJING
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611017832.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-07-09
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing tactical networking technologies present a contradiction between "rapid network access" and "low-exposure security." Traditional active discovery methods are easily intercepted, leading to network risks such as eavesdropping, replay attacks, impersonation, and injection of false neighbors.

Method used

A closed-loop solution employing passive sensing, covert handshake, hardware trusted authentication, and key protection is adopted. Threat levels are assessed through silent monitoring, monitoring windows and transmission power are configured, and Dragon Beacon frame parsing, PUF response authentication, and AEAD protection are performed to achieve low-exposure discovery and trusted authentication.

Benefits of technology

It achieves low-exposure discovery, trusted authentication, and controlled network access under threat classification conditions, eliminates the weak protection window of "connect first, then harden", improves anti-cloning and anti-impersonation capabilities, and ensures the consistency of session protection after handshake.

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Abstract

This invention relates to the field of tactical communication network security technology, and discloses a method and system for secure stealth access of battlefield network nodes. The method includes: after the node is powered on, performing silent monitoring and assessing the current threat level, configuring the monitoring window duration, backoff upper limit, and transmit power threshold; identifying dragon beacon frames within the monitoring window; initiating a whisper response with the minimum necessary power and entering an SDP covert handshake; completing bidirectional authentication based on PUF response and / or hardware fingerprint; performing temporary public key exchange, deriving a session key through KDF, and switching to the AEAD protection context; issuing member tokens, roles, and communication policies, and entering a controlled operating state. This invention integrates passive sensing, covert handshake, hardware trusted authentication, and key protection into a unified closed loop, using an SDP state machine to achieve low-exposure access driven by threat classification, eliminating the weak protection window of "connect first, then harden," and balancing LPI / LPD, authentication, and connectivity.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of battlefield communication network security technology, and in particular to a method and system for secure stealth access of battlefield network nodes. Background Technology

[0002] Existing tactical networking technologies present a structural contradiction between "rapid network access" and "low-exposure security." Traditional active discovery methods, which rely on periodic broadcast beacons for neighbor discovery, are easily intercepted and located by electronic reconnaissance systems. The "connect first, harden later" approach creates a weak protection window, within which the network faces risks such as eavesdropping, replay attacks, impersonation, and fake neighbor injection. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a solution that integrates passive sensing, covert handshakes, hardware-based trusted authentication, and key protection into a closed loop, balancing low probability of intercept (LPI) and low probability of detection (LPD), as well as authentication and connectivity, under threat classification constraints. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The purpose of this invention is to provide a secure and stealthy access method and system for battlefield network nodes, which solves the contradiction between "rapid network access" and "low-exposure security" in existing tactical networking, and realizes an integrated closed loop of low-exposure discovery, trusted authentication and controlled network access under threat classification conditions.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for secure stealth access to a battlefield network node is provided, comprising the following steps: S1, after the node is powered on, it performs silent listening and assesses the current threat level T, and configures the listening window duration, backoff upper limit and transmit power threshold accordingly; S2, within the duration of the listening window, perform relevant detection and field parsing on the candidate signals to identify the dragon beacon frame; S3. After successful identification, based on the threat level T and link budget, initiate a whisper response with the minimum necessary power under the transmit power threshold constraint and enter the SDP (Silent Discovery Protocol) covert handshake. S4. Challenge-response authentication is completed in the SDP covert handshake channel. The authentication material includes a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) response and / or a hardware fingerprint, and replay protection is achieved by combining timing random quantities. S5, based on the successfully authenticated security context, performs a temporary public key exchange, derives a session key through KDF (Key Derivation Function), and then switches to the AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) protection context; S6. Based on the AEAD protection context, member tokens, roles, and communication policies are issued, and the node enters a controlled operating state. The communication policy includes power, frequency hopping, and key update parameters.

[0005] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the evaluation parameters of the threat level T include at least one of the following: electromagnetic environment signal density, known threat signal feature matching degree, geographic area threat intelligence, and the node's interception history; when the threat level T increases, the listening window duration is shortened, the backoff upper limit is increased, and the transmission power threshold is reduced.

[0006] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the dragon beacon frame includes a synchronization pattern, protocol version, network domain identifier fragment, security capabilities, dragon identifier, location cues, time / frequency hopping context, and integrity field, and adopts a low duty cycle and / or periodic jitter transmission strategy.

[0007] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in step S3, if the threat level T and the link budget do not meet the whisper link establishment conditions, then backoff, frequency switching or waiting policy window is executed according to the backoff upper bound and then the process returns to step S1; the SDP includes five states: deep silence, minimum probe, active listening, selective response and full participation, and the state transition is jointly determined by the threat level T and the local policy.

[0008] According to one embodiment of the present invention, when the threat level T jumps to a value exceeding a critical threshold, the SDP state reverse rollback is triggered, and the state rollback from full participation through selective response, active listening, and minimum detection back to deep silence.

[0009] According to an embodiment of the present invention, in step S4, if authentication fails, the process reverts to step S3, and if necessary, back to step S2; the specific process of the two-way authentication is as follows: the authentication initiator generates a random challenge value and sends it, the authentication responder outputs a PUF response based on the local PUF instance, constructs an authentication response by combining the random challenge value and the timestamp, and after verifying the validity and freshness of the PUF response, the authentication initiator reverses the symmetrical process to complete the two-way authentication.

[0010] According to one embodiment of the present invention, in step S5, if key negotiation fails, the process reverts to step S3; the temporary public key exchange adopts the ECDH mechanism, the KDF adopts HKDF-SHA256, and the derived input includes the shared secret, the hashes of the public keys of both parties, and the context information exchanged in the authentication phase of step S4.

[0011] According to one embodiment of the present invention, the AEAD protection context adopts the AES-256-GCM mode, and the associated data includes message sequence number, message type and sender identifier. The sequence number is strictly monotonically increasing, and a key update process is triggered when it overflows.

[0012] According to one embodiment of the present invention, in step S6, the communication strategy is configured in conjunction with the threat level T: when the threat level increases, the power is reduced, the frequency hopping pattern is expanded, and the key update cycle is shortened; when the threat level decreases, the strategy is adjusted in the opposite direction to optimize connectivity.

[0013] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a secure stealth access system for battlefield network nodes to implement the above method, the system comprising: The threat perception module is used to perform electromagnetic environment silent monitoring, threat level T assessment, and configuration of monitoring window duration / backoff upper limit / transmit power threshold; The beacon parsing module is used to perform candidate signal correlation detection, dragon beacon frame field parsing, and network domain matching judgment. The SDP handshake module is used to manage the SDP state machine, execute whisper response power control, backoff / frequency switching / waiting strategy decisions, and covert handshake process scheduling. The two-way authentication module is used to generate and manage challenge values, perform PUF response collection and verification, extract and compare hardware fingerprints, manage temporal random variables, and detect replay attacks. The key management module is used to perform temporary key pair generation, ECDH public key exchange, KDF session key derivation, AEAD protection context establishment and update, key lifespan monitoring and automatic rotation triggering; The network access control module is used to generate and issue member tokens, configure role permissions, issue power / frequency hopping / key update policies, maintain controlled operating state, and connect with topology maintenance. The SDP handshake module includes a state transition submodule that maintains five states: deep silence, minimal probing, active listening, selective response, and full participation. The state transition is driven by changes in threat level T and authentication / link events, and supports forward advancement and reverse rollback.

[0014] The present invention provides a secure and stealthy access method and system for battlefield network nodes. Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: (1) Integrate "passive sensing - covert handshake - hardware trusted authentication - key protection" into a single closed loop, eliminate the weak protection window of "connect first and then strengthen", and achieve security upon access; (2) The SDP protocol dynamically constrains the chain establishment power, listening window and fallback strategy to achieve a strategic balance between low exposure (LPI / LPD) and connectivity, and adapts to threat classification scenarios; (3) Incorporate PUF response and hardware fingerprint into challenge response authentication to enhance anti-cloning and anti-impersonation capabilities by utilizing the physical non-cloning property; (4) A continuous security chain of "temporary public key exchange → KDF derivation → AEAD protection" is adopted to ensure the consistency and forward security of session protection after the handshake; (5) Construct a threat-driven polymorphic SDP state machine to support proactive rollback when threats escalate, thereby improving the survivability and resilience of the system in a highly adversarial environment. Attached Figure Description

[0015] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and form part of this invention, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention and are used to explain the invention, but do not constitute an undue limitation of the invention. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a secure stealth access method for battlefield network nodes according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the dragon-patterned beacon frame structure according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is an SDP state transition diagram according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a timing diagram of authentication and key negotiation according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a secure stealth access system for battlefield network nodes according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0016] To facilitate a clear description of the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the terms "first" and "second" are used to distinguish identical or similar items with essentially the same function and effect. For example, the first threshold and the second threshold are merely used to distinguish different thresholds and do not limit their order. Those skilled in the art will understand that the terms "first" and "second" do not limit the quantity or execution order, and that the terms "first" and "second" are not necessarily different.

[0017] It should be noted that in this invention, the terms "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations, or descriptions. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary" or "for example" in this invention should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of terms such as "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a concrete manner.

[0018] In this invention, "at least one" refers to one or more, and "more than one" refers to two or more. "And / or" describes the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A alone, A and B simultaneously, or B alone, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of singular or plural items. For example, "at least one of a, b, or c" can represent: a, b, c, a combination of a and b, a combination of a and c, a combination of b and c, or a, b, and c, where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0019] This application relates to secure access technology for battlefield ad hoc network nodes, focusing on covert discovery, two-way authentication, and session key establishment processes in highly mobile, heavily jammed, and highly contested scenarios. The application background can be a link-layer secure access sub-process within the DragonNet / BARN (Battlefield Adaptive Resilient Network) architecture.

[0020] like Figure 1 As shown, a flowchart of a method for secure stealth access to a battlefield network node is presented. This method includes the following steps: S101, Silent Monitoring and Threat Assessment.

[0021] After power-on, the node enters an initial silent state, with the RF front-end in receive mode, not actively transmitting any signals. It monitors the environment without actively exposing itself, assesses the threat level T, and accordingly sets the listening window, backoff upper limit, and transmit power threshold.

[0022] During the monitoring process, electromagnetic environment parameters are collected, including: spectrum energy distribution, signal frequency, matching results of known enemy threat signal features, historical interception / jamming records of this node, and the threat intelligence level corresponding to the current geographic coordinates. Threat assessment covers four core parameters: First, electromagnetic environment signal density, which obtains the energy per unit bandwidth and the number of signal carriers through spectrum scanning and energy detection, reflecting the current spectrum congestion level and potential interference intensity; Second, known threat signal feature matching degree, which uses feature library matching algorithms to compare the relevant values ​​of specific radar or jammer signal templates to identify signs of enemy electronic warfare equipment activity; Third, geographic area threat intelligence, which combines BeiDou positioning and pre-set threat level map queries to obtain the prior threat situation of the area where the node is located; Fourth, the node's interception history, which retrieves the recent number of interceptions and jamming durations from the local event log to assess the cumulative degree of exposure risk.

[0023] Threat level T uses a five-level quantification mechanism, for example, T∈{1,2,3,4,5}, where T=1 represents an extremely low threat environment, and T=5 represents an extremely high threat environment. The threat level determines the following operational parameters: Listening window duration W_listen: shortens when the threat level rises to reduce exposure risk; The upper bound of retreat, B_max, increases as the threat level rises, reducing the probability of response. Transmit power threshold P_max: Decreases when the threat level increases, compressing the interception distance.

[0024] The threat level directly drives the linkage configuration of subsequent operating parameters: when the threat level increases, nodes shorten the listening window duration to reduce the single exposure time, increase the backoff upper bound to reduce the response probability, and reduce the transmit power threshold to compress the interception distance; conversely, when the threat level decreases, the above parameters are adjusted in the opposite way to optimize network connectivity.

[0025] S102, Dragon Pattern Beacon, passive sensing.

[0026] Perform sliding correlation detection on the candidate signals collected within the monitoring window, match the dragon beacon synchronization pattern, and parse them according to the field order after successful synchronization.

[0027] like Figure 2 As shown, the dragon beacon frame uses the TLV extended format, and the fields are arranged in the following order: The sequence begins with a 4-byte synchronization pattern, serving as a fixed preamble for signal detection and timing synchronization at the receiver. This is followed by a 1-byte protocol version field, identifying the current DDP protocol version number for compatibility assessment by the receiver. Next, a 4-byte network domain identifier fragment carries partial network identification information; the complete network identifier requires further confirmation during subsequent handshake phases. Following this is a 2-byte security capability field, using a bitmap to identify the authentication algorithms, key lengths, and AEAD modes supported by the sender. Next, an 8-byte dragon pattern identifier serves as a network-specific identifier, used by the receiver to quickly filter out non-target network beacons. This is followed by a variable-length position hint field, providing coarse-grained position information to assist the receiver in link budget estimation. Then, a 4-byte time / frequency hopping context field carries the current frequency hopping pattern index and absolute timeslot number, ensuring time-frequency synchronization between the sender and receiver. Finally, a 4-byte integrity field, employing CRC-32 or a lightweight MAC mechanism, ensures the integrity of the beacon frame transmission.

[0028] Furthermore, the transmitter of the dragon-patterned beacon employs a low duty cycle (e.g., 1%) and / or periodic jitter (±20% random offset) transmission strategy. By reducing the probability and temporal regularity of signal occurrence, this effectively weakens the detection and tracking capabilities of enemy electronic reconnaissance systems, thereby meeting the requirements of low interception probability and low detection probability. After parsing, the receiver performs network domain matching judgment, only responding to beacons belonging to the same operational network, avoiding invalid exposure to signals from different networks.

[0029] S103, whispered chain establishment and SDP covert handshake.

[0030] Assess the current threat level T and link budget. If both threat level T and link budget allow, initiate a whisper response and enter SDP covert handshake at the minimum necessary power. If the conditions are not met, execute backoff, frequency switching, or wait for the window. For example, if T ≤ T_th (threat threshold) and received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) ≥ SNR_min (SNR threshold), then initiate a whisper response at the minimum necessary power P_tx. The minimum necessary power is calculated as follows: P_min(dBm) = P_noise(dBm) + SNR_th(dB) + L_path(dB) + M_fade(dB); P_tx = max(P_min, P_floor); where P_noise is the receiver noise power, L_path is the estimated path loss, M_fade is the fading margin, and P_floor is the device's physical minimum transmit power.

[0031] After entering the SDP covert handshake, both parties exchange capability negotiation parameters and confirm the authentication algorithm, key set, and initial state of the state machine. If the conditions are not met, exponential backoff, frequency hopping pattern switching, or waiting for the next policy window will return to S101.

[0032] SDP includes five states: deep silence, minimal probing, active eavesdropping, selective response, and full involvement. State transitions are jointly determined by threat level T and local policies. For example... Figure 3 As shown, the five states are as follows: Deep silence: Radio frequency reception is intermittently activated, without transmitting any signals; this mode is activated when the threat level is highest. Minimal detection: A periodically very short listening window that only collects data without responding; Active listening: Standard listening window, performs beacon resolution; Selective response: Responding to a matched beacon with the lowest power, performing a limited handshake; Full participation: Normal network access and operation, performing full-function communication.

[0033] S104, two-way authentication.

[0034] The challenge-response authentication is completed in the SDP covert handshake channel. The authentication materials include the PUF response and / or hardware fingerprint, and replay protection is implemented by combining timing random variables. If authentication fails, the process reverts to step S103, and if necessary, back to step S102.

[0035] The specific process of two-way authentication is as follows: Figure 4 As shown: (1) Authentication initiator A generates a 128-bit random challenge value N_a and sends a challenge request; (2) Authentication responder B selects the PUF challenge value C_puf, collects the PUF response R_puf = PUF(C_puf), and reads the device hardware fingerprint H_fp; (3) B constructs the authentication response: {R_puf, H_fp, N_a, T_s, MAC}, where T_s is the timestamp and MAC covers the aforementioned fields; (4) A verification: Check the freshness of N_a (matching of time-series random variables); verify the consistency between the PUF response R_puf and the expected value (based on a pre-built PUF model or database); compare the legality of the hardware fingerprint H_fp; verify the integrity of MAC; (5) Reverse the symmetrical process to complete the two-way authentication.

[0036] The PUF employs a physically non-clonable structure such as an SRAM PUF or a Ring Oscillator PUF, ensuring that each device has unique and uncopyable response characteristics. R1 and R2 are one-time random numbers; the ephemeral public key is used for session key material negotiation. Optional security modules represent internal calls such as PUF, secure elements, or cryptographic coprocessors.

[0037] S105, Key negotiation and protection switching.

[0038] After successful authentication, a temporary public key exchange is performed based on the successful authentication security context. A session key is derived using KDF, and then the system switches to the AEAD protection context. If key negotiation fails, the process reverts to step S103. The temporary public key exchange uses the ECDH mechanism. (1) A generates a temporary key pair (d_A, Q_A), and B generates a temporary key pair (d_B, Q_B); (2) Exchange public keys Q_A and Q_B; (3) A calculates the shared secret S = d_A · Q_B, and B calculates S = d_B · Q_A; (4) Derive the session key via HKDF-SHA256: PRK = HMAC-SHA256(salt, S), OKM = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L), where info contains the hash value of Q_A||Q_B and the authentication context exchanged in the S4 stage, and L is the required key length.

[0039] Switch to the AES-256-GCM AEAD protection context. The associated data includes the message sequence number, message type, and sender identifier. The sequence number is strictly monotonically increasing, and a key update process is triggered upon overflow.

[0040] S106, controlled network access.

[0041] Based on the AEAD protection context, member tokens, roles, and communication policies are issued, and the node enters a controlled operating state. The communication policy includes power, frequency hopping, and key update parameters. Once the node enters the controlled operating state, it can be connected to subsequent topology maintenance and service forwarding according to the system design.

[0042] After a node completes controlled network access, the communication policy issued by the network access control module is not statically fixed, but dynamically configured based on the threat level T. Specifically, the communication policy covers three core parameters: power, frequency hopping pattern, and key update cycle. Each parameter adjusts in opposite or the same direction as the threat level rises or falls, in order to achieve a strategic balance between security and connectivity.

[0043] When the threat level T increases, the node adopts enhanced concealment strategies: reducing transmission power to compress the electromagnetic exposure range and shorten the enemy's interception distance; expanding the frequency hopping pattern to increase the number of available frequency points or increase the frequency hopping rate to reduce the probability of being tracked and interfered with; and shortening the key update cycle to accelerate session key rotation and limit the effective utilization window of potentially leaked keys.

[0044] Conversely, when the threat level T decreases, nodes adopt connectivity optimization strategies: moderately increase transmission power to extend reliable communication distance; shrink frequency hopping patterns to reduce frequency switching overhead and improve channel utilization; and extend key update cycles to reduce key management load and ensure service transmission efficiency.

[0045] This linkage configuration mechanism is driven by real-time monitoring by the threat awareness module and coordinated by the state transition submodule of the SDP handshake module, ensuring that nodes can quickly adapt and adjust when the threat situation changes, maintaining network resilience and operational availability.

[0046] like Figure 3 As shown, when the threat level T jumps to a value exceeding the critical threshold, an SDP state rollback is triggered. The node was initially in a fully engaged state; however, the threat perception module detects a match in the enemy's interference signal characteristics, causing T to jump from 2 to 4. The SDP state machine engine triggers the state rollback: Full Engagement → Selective Response → Active Listening. After continuous monitoring, T further increases to 5, and the rollback continues: Active Listening → Minimal Probe → Deep Silence. The node stops service forwarding, shortens the listening window, increases the upper bound of the backoff, and reduces the transmit power to the minimum. After continuous monitoring, T returns to 2, and the state machine gradually transitions forward: Minimal Probe → Active Listening → Selective Response → Full Engagement, restoring full functionality.

[0047] like Figure 5 The diagram shows a secure stealth access system for battlefield network nodes. This system is used to implement the above method and includes: Threat perception module 501 is used to perform electromagnetic environment silent monitoring, threat level T assessment, and configuration of monitoring window duration / backoff upper limit / transmit power threshold; Specifically, it includes an electromagnetic environment monitoring unit 501a, a threat assessment engine 501b, and a parameter configuration unit 501c. The electromagnetic environment monitoring unit 501a is responsible for controlling the radio frequency front-end to perform spectrum scanning in a specified frequency band and collecting raw IQ data or power spectral density data; the threat assessment engine 501b integrates electromagnetic environment signal density, known threat signal feature matching degree, geographical area threat intelligence, and the node's interception history, and outputs a quantified threat level T; the parameter configuration unit 501c generates specific values ​​for the listening window duration, backoff upper limit, and transmit power threshold based on the threat level T, and sends them to the beacon parsing module 502 and the SDP handshake module 503.

[0048] The beacon parsing module 502 is used to perform candidate signal correlation detection, dragon pattern beacon frame field parsing, and network domain matching judgment. Specifically, it includes a correlation detection unit 502a, a frame parser 502b, and a network domain matching unit 502c. The correlation detection unit 502a performs sliding correlation operations on the baseband signal to detect the dragon pattern beacon synchronization pattern; the frame parser 502b parses the beacon content field by field in TLV format to extract key information such as protocol version, security capabilities, and time / frequency hopping context; the network domain matching unit 502c compares the dragon pattern identifier with the locally preset network identifier, filters out inter-network beacons, and if a match is successful, sends a whisper link establishment trigger signal to the SDP handshake module 503.

[0049] SDP handshake module 503 is used to manage the SDP state machine, execute whisper response power control, backoff / frequency switching / waiting strategy decisions and covert handshake process scheduling. Specifically, it includes a state machine engine 503a, a power control unit 503b, a policy scheduler 503c, and a state transition submodule 503d. The state machine engine 503a maintains a global state machine with five states: deep silence, minimum detection, active listening, selective response, and full participation. The power control unit 503b calculates the minimum necessary power based on the link budget equation and determines the actual whisper transmission power in conjunction with the transmit power threshold. The policy scheduler 503c executes backoff, frequency switching, or waiting strategies when conditions are not met, controlling the retry timing and frequency selection. The state transition submodule 503d maintains a five-state automaton, receives threat level change events, authentication success / failure events, and link quality events, driving the state machine to transition between forward advancement and reverse fallback. When a threat jumps, it triggers a rapid fallback to a deep silence state.

[0050] The two-way authentication module 504 is used to generate and manage challenge values, perform PUF response collection and verification, extract and compare hardware fingerprints, manage time-series random variables, and detect replay attacks. Specifically, it includes a challenge generation unit 504a, a PUF interface 504b, a fingerprint reading unit 504c, a response verification unit 504d, and a replay detector 504e. The challenge generation unit 504a generates a 128-bit random challenge value and injects it into the authentication protocol; the PUF interface 504b connects to the local PUF instance, inputs the challenge value C_puf, and collects the physically unclonable response R_puf; the fingerprint reading unit 504c reads the device hardware fingerprint H_fp from the secure storage area; the response verification unit 504d compares the PUF response with the preset expected value on the network side to verify the legality of the hardware fingerprint and check MAC integrity; the replay detector 504e maintains a time-series random quantity cache, detects repeatedly used challenge values ​​or timestamps, and prevents replay attacks.

[0051] The key management module 505 is used to perform temporary key pair generation, ECDH public key exchange, KDF session key derivation, AEAD protection context establishment and update, key lifetime monitoring and automatic rotation triggering. Specifically, it includes a key pair generation unit 505a, an ECDH unit 505b, a KDF engine 505c, an AEAD engine 505d, and a key monitoring unit 505e. The key pair generation unit 505a generates a temporary public-private key pair (d, Q) based on elliptic curve parameters; the ECDH unit 505b performs scalar multiplication to calculate the shared secret S; the KDF engine 505c implements HKDF-SHA256, deriving the session key from the shared secret, the hashes of both parties' public keys, and the authentication context; the AEAD engine 505d implements AES-256-GCM encryption and decryption, managing the monotonically increasing sequence number and overflow handling; and the key monitoring unit 505e tracks key usage time or traffic thresholds, triggering automatic key updates.

[0052] The network access control module 506 is used to generate and issue member tokens, configure role permissions, issue power / frequency hopping / key update policies, maintain controlled operating state, and connect with topology maintenance. Specifically, it includes a token management unit 506a, a role configuration unit 506b, a policy orchestrator 506c, and a runtime manager 506d. The token management unit 506a generates member tokens containing node identifiers, validity periods, and permission bitmaps; the role configuration unit 506b assigns routing node, edge node, or relay node roles based on network topology requirements; the policy orchestrator 506c integrates threat level T and network performance requirements to orchestrate power level tables, frequency hopping pattern update instructions, and key lifetime parameters; and the runtime manager 506d maintains the controlled operational status of nodes and connects to subsequent topology maintenance protocols and service forwarding engines.

[0053] Figure 5 The modules shown exchange data via an internal secure bus. Critical materials (PUF response, temporary private key, session key) are stored in a hardware secure isolation zone, which is prohibited from direct software access. The hardware secure isolation zone can be implemented using a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or a Secure Element (SE) to ensure that cryptographic operations and sensitive data are not attacked by upper-layer software.

[0054] Example 1: Low-threat scenario.

[0055] After node A powers on and joins the network normally, the threat perception module assesses T=2 (low threat). The beacon parsing module captures the dragon-patterned beacon emitted by node B within the listening window, and the network domain match is successful. The SDP handshake module calculates that the link budget meets the requirements and responds with a whisper power of -30dBm. The two-way authentication module completes the PUF challenge response, the key management module derives a 256-bit session key, and the network access control module issues member tokens and communication policies. The entire process takes less than 500ms, and node A enters a fully engaged state.

[0056] Example 2: Threat Jump Active Retreat.

[0057] Node A is operating in a fully engaged state. The threat perception module detects a match in the characteristics of an enemy interference signal, and state T changes from 2 to 4. The SDP state machine engine triggers a state rollback: Full Engagement → Selective Response → Active Listening. Node A stops service forwarding, shortens the listening window, increases the backoff upper bound, and reduces the transmit power to -50dBm. After continuous monitoring, T returns to 2, and the state machine gradually transitions forward to return to the fully engaged state.

[0058] Example 3: Authentication failure rollback and retry.

[0059] When node A performs S4 two-way authentication, the PUF response verification fails (possibly due to signal interference causing abnormal PUF acquisition). The two-way authentication module notifies the SDP handshake module, triggering a fallback to S3 to re-execute the whispered connection establishment. If authentication fails three times consecutively, it falls back to S2 to re-sensitize the dragon beacon, switching to a backup frequency if necessary.

[0060] This invention integrates "passive sensing—covert handshake—hardware trusted authentication—key protection" into a single closed loop, reducing the weak protection window of "connection first, hardening later". By constraining chain establishment power, listening window, and fallback strategies with SDP, a configurable balance between low-exposure access and connectivity is achieved. Incorporating PUF responses and / or hardware fingerprints into challenge responses improves anti-cloning and anti-impersonation capabilities. Employing a continuous security chain of "temporary public key exchange + KDF + AEAD" enhances session protection consistency after the handshake.

[0061] Although the invention has been described herein in conjunction with various embodiments, those skilled in the art will understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments by reviewing the accompanying drawings, disclosure, and other materials. In this specification, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude multiple components. A single processor or other unit can implement several functions listed in the specification. While certain measures are described in different embodiments, this does not mean that these measures cannot be combined to produce good results.

[0062] Although the invention has been described in conjunction with specific features and embodiments, it is obvious that various modifications and combinations can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, this specification and drawings are merely illustrative of the invention and are considered to cover any and all modifications, variations, combinations, or equivalents within the scope of the invention. Clearly, those skilled in the art can make various alterations and modifications to the invention without departing from its spirit and scope. Thus, if such modifications and modifications fall within the scope of the invention and its equivalents, the invention is also intended to include such modifications and modifications.

Claims

1. A method for secure stealth access to a battlefield network node, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1, after the node is powered on, it performs silent listening and assesses the current threat level T, and configures the listening window duration, backoff upper limit and transmit power threshold accordingly; S2, within the duration of the listening window, perform relevant detection and field parsing on the candidate signals to identify the dragon beacon frame; S3. After successful identification, based on the threat level T and the link budget, initiate a whisper response and enter the SDP covert handshake with the minimum necessary power under the transmit power threshold constraint. S4. Challenge-response authentication is completed in the SDP covert handshake channel. The authentication materials include PUF response and / or hardware fingerprint, and replay protection is achieved by combining timing random quantities. S5, based on the successfully authenticated security context, performs a temporary public key exchange, derives a session key through KDF, and then switches to the AEAD protection context; S6. Based on the AEAD protection context, member tokens, roles, and communication policies are issued, and the node enters a controlled operating state. The communication policy includes power, frequency hopping, and key update parameters.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The assessment parameters for the threat level T include at least one of the following: electromagnetic environment signal density, known threat signal feature matching degree, geographic area threat intelligence, and the node's interception history. When the threat level T increases, the listening window duration is shortened, the backoff upper limit is increased, and the transmission power threshold is reduced.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The dragon beacon frame includes a synchronization pattern, protocol version, network domain identifier fragment, security capabilities, dragon pattern identifier, location cues, time / frequency hopping context, and integrity field, and employs a low duty cycle and / or periodic jitter transmission strategy.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S3, if the threat level T and the link budget do not meet the whisper link establishment conditions, then backoff, frequency switching, or waiting policy window is executed according to the backoff upper bound before returning to step S1; the SDP includes five states: deep silence, minimum probe, active listening, selective response, and full participation. The state transition is jointly determined by the threat level T and the local policy.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, When the threat level T jumps to a value exceeding the critical threshold, the SDP state reverses back, retreating from the fully engaged state through selective response, active listening, and minimum detection to the deep silent state.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S4, if authentication fails, the process reverts to step S3, and if necessary, back to step S2. The specific process of the two-way authentication is as follows: the authentication initiator generates a random challenge value and sends it; the authentication responder outputs a PUF response based on the local PUF instance; the authentication response is constructed by combining the random challenge value with the timestamp; after verifying the validity and freshness of the PUF response, the authentication initiator reverses the symmetrical process to complete the two-way authentication.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S5, if key negotiation fails, the process reverts to step S3. The temporary public key exchange uses the ECDH mechanism, the KDF uses HKDF-SHA256, and the derived input includes the shared secret, the hashes of both parties' public keys, and the context information exchanged during the authentication phase in step S4.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The AEAD protection context adopts the AES-256-GCM mode, and the associated data includes message sequence number, message type and sender identifier. The sequence number is strictly monotonically increasing, and a key update process is triggered when it overflows.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S6, the communication strategy is configured in conjunction with the threat level T: when the threat level increases, the power is reduced, the frequency hopping pattern is expanded, and the key update cycle is shortened; when the threat level decreases, the strategy is adjusted in the opposite way to optimize connectivity.

10. A secure stealth access system for battlefield network nodes, used to implement the method described in any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that, The system includes: The threat perception module is used to perform electromagnetic environment silent monitoring, threat level T assessment, and configuration of monitoring window duration / backoff upper limit / transmit power threshold; The beacon parsing module is used to perform candidate signal correlation detection, dragon beacon frame field parsing, and network domain matching judgment. The SDP handshake module is used to manage the SDP state machine, execute whisper response power control, backoff / frequency switching / waiting strategy decisions, and covert handshake process scheduling. The two-way authentication module is used to generate and manage challenge values, perform PUF response collection and verification, extract and compare hardware fingerprints, manage temporal random variables, and detect replay attacks. The key management module is used to perform temporary key pair generation, ECDH public key exchange, KDF session key derivation, AEAD protection context establishment and update, key lifespan monitoring and automatic rotation triggering; The network access control module is used to generate and issue member tokens, configure role permissions, issue power / frequency hopping / key update policies, maintain controlled operating state, and connect with topology maintenance. The SDP handshake module includes a state transition submodule, which maintains five states: deep silence, minimal probing, active listening, selective response, and full participation. The state transition is driven by changes in threat level T and authentication / link events, and supports forward advancement and reverse rollback.