Methods for Real-time Data Aggregation and Physical One-Way Isolation Transmission of Ship Lock Water Condition Sensing Across Security Domains
By employing passive hardware optical unidirectional devices and a data cleaning and grading mechanism in the lock system, the problems of reverse intrusion and data packet loss in cross-safety domain hydrological data transmission in the lock were solved, achieving high-quality and reliable hydrological data transmission and meeting the safety and accuracy requirements of the water transport industrial control system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611354143.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-09-02
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
AI Technical Summary
Existing trans-security zone water information transmission schemes for ship locks suffer from problems such as reverse intrusion risks, difficulty in unifying and aggregating multi-source heterogeneous data, inability to tolerate packet loss in one-way links, and lack of hierarchical control over data transmission. They are difficult to simultaneously ensure network isolation security, multi-source data quality, and transmission continuity.
A physical irreversible transmission channel is built using passive hardware optical unidirectional devices to achieve absolute unidirectional transmission from the non-secure domain to the high-secure domain. Through data cleaning, normalization, and hierarchical labeling, a structured hydrological dataset is constructed. Hash verification and local caching fault tolerance mechanisms are introduced in the unidirectional transmission, and the transmission strategy is dynamically adjusted to ensure high-quality data aggregation and reliable transmission.
It has achieved high-quality aggregation and reliable transmission of water condition data from the lock, eliminated the risk of reverse intrusion, improved the integrity and accuracy of the data, ensured the priority transmission and continuity of critical data in emergency situations, and met the security protection requirements of the water transport industrial control system.
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Figure CN123122938A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention belongs to the field of shipping industrial control network security technology, and more specifically, it relates to a method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains. Background Technology
[0002] Inland waterway locks, as key hubs for waterway transportation, rely on comprehensive water condition data to achieve gate control and safe vessel passage. Most lock water condition data collection terminals are deployed in the open outdoor environment of the lock area, forming a non-security-aware business domain. The lock navigation scheduling system and the automatic gate control platform belong to the high-security industrial control domain. According to network security level protection standards, these two network areas must be securely isolated, and direct interconnection is strictly prohibited.
[0003] Currently, in the field of ship lock engineering, cross-safety domain data exchange commonly uses traditional network gates and two-way isolation gateways to achieve hydrological data interoperability. Existing technologies have significant drawbacks: First, traditional network gateway devices are equipped with embedded operating systems that support bidirectional protocol parsing and data caching and forwarding, and naturally possess bidirectional communication capabilities. Attackers may exploit device vulnerabilities to achieve reverse penetration from the high-security domain to the external network, posing significant security risks such as command hijacking, data leakage, and malicious intrusion, making it difficult to meet the stringent security protection standards of water transport industrial control systems.
[0004] Second, the water sentiment data from the lock is typical multi-source heterogeneous data, including analog signals from sensors, industrial bus messages, video streams, and meteorological data. These data types have inconsistent protocols, sampling frequencies, and formats. Existing solutions lack targeted data aggregation, noise reduction, and standardization processes. The raw data contains a large amount of environmental noise and missing values, and direct transmission to the dispatching platform can easily cause timing discrepancies and data distortion, affecting the accuracy of dispatching decisions.
[0005] Third, conventional one-way isolated transmission links only support simple data forwarding and do not have a reverse response channel, making it impossible to actively identify data packet loss or link interruption. Under high-load conditions such as concentrated ship passage through locks and rapid water level adjustments, data gaps are very likely to occur, resulting in discontinuities in the hydrological curves of the dispatching system and threatening the safety of lock passage.
[0006] Fourth, the existing transmission model uses a uniform transmission strategy for all hydrological data, making it impossible to distinguish between core data directly related to navigation safety, such as water level difference and sluice gate opening, and ordinary environmental monitoring data. In emergency situations, redundant data competes for transmission bandwidth, causing delays in the transmission of critical safety data, and there is a lack of dynamic bandwidth allocation and hierarchical transmission mechanisms.
[0007] In summary, existing hydrological data transmission schemes across security domains in ship locks cannot simultaneously ensure network isolation security, multi-source data quality, transmission continuity, and service adaptability. There is an urgent need to propose a hydrological data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission scheme suitable for ship lock scenarios. Summary of the Invention
[0008] To address the technical challenges of existing cross-security domain hydrological data transmission schemes for ship locks, such as the risk of reverse intrusion due to bidirectional network gates, difficulty in unifying and aggregating heterogeneous hydrological data from multiple sources, lack of fault tolerance for packet loss in unidirectional links, and lack of hierarchical control over data transmission, this invention provides a method for real-time hydrological data aggregation and physical unidirectional isolation transmission across security domains. This method enables absolutely unidirectional transmission from non-security sensing domains to high-security scheduling domains, while simultaneously ensuring high-quality aggregation and continuous reliable transmission of multi-source hydrological data from ship locks.
[0009] A method for real-time data aggregation and physically isolated transmission of lock water condition sensing data across security domains includes the following steps: S01. Collect multi-source heterogeneous raw hydrological data in the non-safety sensing domain of the lock, complete data cleaning, normalization and time-series encapsulation, construct a structured hydrological time-series dataset with equipment identification and point coordinates, and realize standardized aggregation of multi-terminal sensing data. S02. The aggregated hydrological data set is marked with security classification, a mapping rule between data type and transmission level is established, and a data packet to be transmitted carrying a security classification label is generated. S03. A physical irreversible transmission channel is built based on pure hardware passive optical unidirectional devices, allowing data to be sent unidirectionally from the non-secure domain to the secure domain only; hash verification information is added to the data packets to be transmitted to complete the anti-tampering packet, and unidirectional data transfer without reverse acknowledgment is performed; S04. After receiving data packets, the high-security control domain strips the transmission tags, performs time-series rearrangement and consistency verification, restores complete real-time hydrological data, and supports lock navigation scheduling services.
[0010] Preferably, step S01 sets differentiated cleaning strategies for the three types of heterogeneous data—analog signals from sensors, digital messages, and video frames—and converts them into the standard MQTT time-series format to complete data fusion.
[0011] Preferably, in step S02, a three-level hydrological data classification system is constructed, and differentiated transmission strategies are configured for core navigation safety data, auxiliary monitoring data, and redundant log data, and terminal IDs are bound to achieve source tracing and control.
[0012] Preferably, step S03 uses a passive unidirectional optical device to construct the transmission channel. The device has no operating system and no buffering capability, thus completely blocking the reverse optical signal transmission path at the physical level.
[0013] Preferably, the method also sets up a fragmented rolling time-series buffer pool in the non-secure domain to achieve unidirectional transmission loss tolerance and fixed-point retransmission without reverse instruction interaction.
[0014] Preferably, the method dynamically and adaptively adjusts the priority and bandwidth of various water information data transmissions based on the real-time navigation conditions of the lock.
[0015] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: The present invention uses a passive hardware optical unidirectional channel to achieve physical-level isolation, completely eliminating firmware vulnerabilities and reverse network intrusion risks caused by the bidirectional interaction of traditional network gateways, and meeting the high-level security protection requirements of water transport industrial control.
[0016] This invention designs an integrated aggregation and preprocessing process for multi-source heterogeneous hydrological data in lock scenarios, effectively filtering out noise, unifying data formats, and improving the integrity and accuracy of hydrological data input into the scheduling system.
[0017] This invention introduces a hierarchical transmission mechanism for hydrological data security, which distinguishes between core navigation safety data and ordinary monitoring data, rationally allocates transmission resources, and ensures that critical hydrological information is delivered first in emergency situations.
[0018] In this invention, a local buffer fault tolerance and retransmission mechanism is added to the unidirectional isolation architecture without reverse response, which solves the pain point that unidirectional transmission cannot retransmit lost data and ensures that the hydrological data stream is continuous and uninterrupted.
[0019] The present invention incorporates a navigation-condition adaptive flow control strategy, which can dynamically adjust the transmission strategy according to the density of ships passing through the lock and water level fluctuations, thereby avoiding bandwidth congestion or resource idleness.
[0020] This invention completes data verification in the security domain and is equipped with a full-process audit and traceability mechanism, which can trace the source of all cross-domain transmitted data, facilitates the identification of abnormal data and the investigation of security incidents, and conforms to the safety management standards of the water transport industry. Attached Figure Description
[0021] Figure 1 This is the overall architecture diagram of the cross-security domain lock water condition real-time sensing data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission system of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the multi-source heterogeneous ship lock hydrological data aggregation and standardized preprocessing process of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the hydrological data security classification and differentiated transmission strategy of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the physical isolation transmission principle based on passive unidirectional optical devices in this invention; Figure 5 This is a flowchart of the high-security control domain data compliance parsing and restoration process of this invention; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the fault-tolerant retransmission and adaptive traffic control of the fragmented rolling cache of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0022] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments. These embodiments are implemented based on the technical solution of the present invention and provide detailed implementation steps, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited to the following embodiments.
[0023] This embodiment provides a method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains, applied to a large-scale lock navigation control system on inland waterways. The network architecture is divided into a non-security sensing service domain and a high-security scheduling and control domain. The non-security sensing service domain is deployed in the lock chamber and the outdoor monitoring areas of the upstream and downstream approach channels, equipped with water level sensors, flow velocity meters, lock opening sensors, water surface video acquisition equipment, and meteorological monitoring terminals. The high-security scheduling and control domain is equipped with a lock navigation scheduling platform, an automatic gate control system, and a water condition early warning server. Passive one-way optical transmission hardware is deployed between the two security domains to form a physical one-way isolation channel, with no reverse communication links.
[0024] The specific implementation steps of the method are as follows: Implementation Step 1: Full-domain aggregation and standardized preprocessing of multi-source heterogeneous hydrological data in the non-security sensing domain At the lock site, various sensing terminals continuously collect raw hydrological data at fixed acquisition intervals: water level and flow velocity are acquired at a high frequency of 1Hz; gate opening and vessel passage status are acquired at 2Hz; video hydrological footage is acquired at 5 frames per second; and meteorological data is acquired every 30 seconds. The collected raw data includes three heterogeneous data types: analog voltage signals, Modbus digital messages, and video streams. Differentiated data cleaning processes are performed for different data types. 1) Simulated water level and flow velocity data: A sliding window with a window length of 10 is used to filter out pulse anomalies caused by wind and wave disturbances; upper and lower thresholds are set to remove erroneous sampled values that exceed the reasonable range of the river channel; 2) Gate position and equipment status digital messages: CRC16 cyclic redundancy check is used, and broken messages that fail the check are directly discarded; 3) Video hydrological data: A key frame extraction strategy is adopted to retain only key image frames containing floating objects on the water surface and water level boundaries, while discarding continuous and redundant images to reduce the bandwidth pressure of cross-domain transmission.
[0025] 4) After noise filtering and damaged data removal are completed, time-series coding, missing value interpolation and completion, and dimension normalization are performed on all data. Each data is bound to a unique sensor device ID, GPS location spatial coordinates, and high-precision UTC timestamp. The data is then uniformly encapsulated into a standard MQTT time-series message format to build a structured lock water condition time-series dataset, which is then stored on a local aggregation server in the non-security domain.
[0026] Implementation Step 2: Matching Hydrological Data Security Classification Marking with Transmission Strategy Establish a three-tiered classification system for hydrological data security: Primary core data (essential data for navigation safety): lock chamber water level, upstream and downstream water level difference, water flow velocity, and real-time gate opening; Secondary auxiliary data (environmental monitoring data): hydrological and meteorological parameters such as air temperature and humidity, rainfall, and visibility; Level 3 redundancy data: sensor heartbeat messages, equipment operation logs, and debugging information. Hierarchical transmission implementation rules: Primary core data is given the highest transmission priority, and one-way push is initiated immediately after collection is completed. Secondary auxiliary data adopts a timed batch transmission mode, which packages and sends the data in batches every 60 seconds; Level 3 redundant data is prohibited from being transmitted across security domains and is only stored on local disks in non-security domains. The aggregation server adds a hierarchical security level tag to each piece of data to be transmitted, and embeds the identity identifier of the collection terminal to generate a data packet to be transmitted carrying traceability information.
[0027] Implementation Step 3: Physical Unidirectional Isolated Data Transfer Based on Passive Unidirectional Optical Hardware A passive unidirectional optical splitter is deployed between the non-security domain aggregation server and the high-security domain receiving server. This hardware does not contain an embedded operating system, has no built-in cache, and has no firmware program. It only supports unidirectional transmission of optical signals from the non-security domain to the security domain. At the physical level, it completely blocks the reverse optical path and there is no information return channel.
[0028] Data packet sending process: The aggregation server encapsulates the data packets to be transmitted, adding data segment hash fingerprints, globally unique timestamps, and 16-bit checksums to achieve hardware-level anti-tampering packet encapsulation. Throughout the transmission process, bidirectional interaction protocols such as TCP handshakes, acknowledgments, and retransmissions are not used. Instead, a UDP one-way push mode is employed to send data packets to unidirectional optical isolation hardware, where optical devices unidirectionally transmit the optical signals to the high-security control domain. The entire transmission link eliminates any feedback of instructions or messages from the security domain to the non-security domain, preventing the risk of reverse penetration and malicious instruction hijacking.
[0029] Implementation Step 4: High-Security Control Domain Data Analysis, Verification, and Hydrological Business Applications The high-security control domain data receiving server continuously monitors the data frames output from the one-way isolated channel and performs the following processing: 1) Strip the transmission frame header, security classification label, and verification information to extract the original hydrological service data; 2) Integrity verification is performed using the built-in hash value and checksum of the data packet, identifying and discarding any data that has been tampered with or distorted during transmission. 3) Reorder out-of-order data based on timestamps to fix the problem of disordered one-way transmission; 4) The standardized hydrological data that has passed the verification is connected to the intelligent scheduling platform of the lock for the coordinated water control scheduling of lock valves, water level difference safety monitoring, and risk warning of ships passing through the lock.
[0030] Implementation Step 5: Preferred Scheme 1—Fragmented Rolling Buffer and One-Way Transmission Fault-Tolerant Retransmission A local time-series cache pool is built on the aggregation server in the non-security domain, using a second-based sharding storage mechanism with a cache duration of 300 seconds. Under normal conditions, the cache pool automatically overwrites historical shards that have exceeded the retention period, saving storage space. When the scheduling platform in the high-security control domain fails to receive continuous time-series data for a period of time, it determines that data packet loss has occurred. Since the physical unidirectional channel cannot issue reverse retransmission commands, the scheduling platform records the start and end time windows of the missing data locally. Operations personnel can manually trigger targeted retransmission based on the cache shards through local queries on the non-security domain side. The retransmitted data packets still strictly follow the unidirectional transmission rules, and there is no bidirectional interaction. At the same time, when emergency conditions such as sudden changes in water level or concentrated ship passage through locks are detected, the cache pool automatically locks the corresponding time-series shards for persistent storage to prevent important condition data from being automatically overwritten.
[0031] Implementation Step 6: Optimization of Option 2—Adaptive Flow Control for General Navigation Conditions The dispatching platform identifies the lock's navigation conditions in real time, classifying them into three scenarios: stable navigation, peak passage, and emergency water level control. For peak passage and emergency water level control, the platform increases the frame rate of primary core hydrological data transmission, reduces the frequency of secondary auxiliary data transmission, and prioritizes the real-time delivery of water level and lock position data. For stable navigation, the platform evenly allocates bandwidth for various data transmission types and restores the normal transmission frequency of auxiliary data. By dynamically adjusting the transmission frequency, it avoids unidirectional channel congestion in high-concurrency scenarios and prevents bandwidth resource waste in low-load scenarios.
[0032] Implementation Step 7: Preferred Option 3—Cross-Domain Data Transfer Auditing, Tracing, and Archiving An independent audit module is built within the high-security control domain to establish a traceability ledger for all successfully received cross-domain hydrological data. The ledger includes the collection point, collection time, security level, data packet hash value, and reception time. The system automatically intercepts suspicious data with abnormal format or numerical changes exceeding thresholds and archives them with separate alarms. All audit logs are stored long-term to meet the audit traceability requirements of the waterway industrial control network security level protection system.
[0033] Description of the running effect: After 90 days of continuous trial operation and testing at the lock site, the following results were observed after adopting this method: 1. There is no reverse communication channel between the two security domains, and no cross-domain network security risks have occurred; 2. After aggregation and preprocessing of multi-source heterogeneous data, the abnormal noise data removal rate reaches over 96%; 3. Under peak navigation conditions, the end-to-end transmission latency of primary core hydrological data is consistently below 200ms; 4. When short-term link disturbances cause data packet loss, historical data can be replenished by relying on the local caching mechanism, ensuring the continuity and integrity of the hydrological time series curves on the scheduling platform; 5. The data hierarchical transmission strategy effectively reduces the amount of invalid data transmitted through one-way channels, and the average bandwidth usage decreases by 32%.
[0034] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0035] The embodiments of the present invention are given for illustrative and descriptive purposes only, and are not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the forms disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art. The embodiments were chosen and described in order to better illustrate the principles and practical application of the invention, and to enable those skilled in the art to understand the invention and to design various embodiments with various modifications suitable for a particular purpose.
Claims
1. A method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolated transmission of lock water condition sensing data across security domains, characterized in that: Applied to the safety isolation scenario of waterway industrial control in ship locks, the method physically isolates the non-safe domain of front-end sensing from the safe domain of back-end scheduling and control. The method includes the following steps: S01. Multi-source heterogeneous lock hydrological real-time sensing data full-domain aggregation and modeling: Multiple types of sensing terminals deployed in the lock chamber, upstream and downstream approach channels, water level monitoring points, flow velocity and flow rate monitoring terminals, lock position sensors, and video hydrological acquisition equipment collect raw hydrological sensing data of the entire lock area in real time. The raw hydrological sensing data includes real-time water level, lock chamber water level difference, water flow velocity, instantaneous flow rate, gate opening, ship passage status, video frames of floating objects on the water surface, and hydrological and meteorological parameters. The multi-source heterogeneous sensing data is uniformly time-series encoded, intelligently filled with missing values, filtered out abnormal pulse data, and uniformly normalized in terms of dimensions to construct a structured lock hydrological time-series dataset with unique device identifiers, collection timestamps, and spatial coordinates of the points, completing the standardized aggregation of multi-source data on the non-safety domain side. S02. Security Domain Classification and Dynamic Mapping of Data Transmission Permissions: Based on the network security classification standard for lock industrial control, the front-end sensing and acquisition network is divided into a non-security business domain, and the lock scheduling, navigation control, and remote operation and maintenance backend are divided into a high-security control domain, thus constructing a dual-domain physically isolated network architecture; mapping rules between hydrological data types and security transmission levels are pre-established, and the aggregated structured hydrological time series dataset is classified and labeled to distinguish between real-time navigation essential core data, routine monitoring auxiliary data, and redundant log data, generating data packets to be transmitted with security classification labels; S03. One-way data transfer based on hardware physical unidirectional isolation: A dual-domain transmission link is built using a pure hardware physical unidirectional isolation channel, abandoning the traditional network gateway's bidirectional interaction and protocol forwarding mechanism. A physical irreversible transmission path is constructed through unidirectional optical transmission hardware devices, allowing only the non-security perception domain to output data unidirectionally to the high-security control domain, completely blocking the reverse data path and command feedback path from the security domain to the non-security domain; hardware-level packet verification and anti-tampering hash signature processing are performed on the data packets to be transmitted, and one-way data transfer without reverse feedback is completed through the physical unidirectional isolation channel; S04. Compliance Analysis and Real-time Restoration of Data in the Security Domain: After receiving the data packets from the one-way transfer, the high-security control domain strips the hardware transmission verification frame and security classification label. Based on the preset lock water condition data parsing protocol, it classifies and restores the heterogeneous aggregated data, rearranges the time sequence, and verifies data consistency. It removes data with transmission distortion and packet loss, and outputs complete and synchronized real-time water condition data for the entire lock domain. This data is used for lock navigation scheduling, water level linkage control, and water condition risk early warning services.
2. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The multi-source heterogeneous ship lock hydrological data aggregation and processing method in step S01 specifically includes: For three types of heterogeneous data—analog sensor data, digital communication messages, and video image frames—corresponding data cleaning rules are set for each. For high-frequency fluctuating water level and flow velocity analog data, a sliding window mid-value filtering algorithm is used to filter out environmental interference noise. For gate position and equipment status digital messages, CRC cyclic redundancy check is used to complete message integrity verification. For hydrological video frames, a key frame extraction and compression method is used to retain hydrological status characteristics and remove redundant frame data. All cleaned heterogeneous data are uniformly converted into the standard MQTT time-series data format to achieve integrated aggregation and fusion of hydrological data from multiple terminals, multiple protocols, and multiple types.
3. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Step S02, which involves security classification marking and dynamic permission mapping, specifically includes: A three-tiered hydrological data security classification system is constructed. The first-tier core data consists of essential data for safe passage through the gate, such as the gate chamber water level difference, real-time gate position, and navigable water flow velocity. The second-tier auxiliary data consists of environmental hydrological and meteorological monitoring data. The third-tier redundant data consists of terminal acquisition logs and equipment heartbeat data. Differentiated transmission strategies are configured for data of different security levels. The first-tier core data is transmitted in real-time in one direction with the highest priority. The second-tier auxiliary data is transmitted in batches at regular intervals. The third-tier redundant data is only stored locally and is prohibited from cross-domain transmission. At the same time, the identity ID of the acquisition terminal device is dynamically bound to realize the traceability of data source and the binding of transmission permissions.
4. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S03, the hardware physical unidirectional isolation channel adopts a unidirectional optical splitting and unidirectional transmission architecture. The physical unidirectional isolation channel is a pure hardware passive optical unidirectional device with no embedded operating system, no protocol parsing cache, and no bidirectional data interaction function. The unidirectional optical device only supports unidirectional transmission of optical signals from the non-secure domain to the secure domain, completely blocking the transmission of reverse optical signals. It eliminates the risks of security domain intranet penetration, reverse intrusion, command hijacking, and data backhaul from the physical hardware level, achieving absolute physical isolation with zero reverse paths across security domains.
5. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data packet anti-tampering and hardware packet encapsulation methods in step S03 include: At the non-secure domain aggregation end, a globally unique timestamp, device fingerprint hash value, and data segment check code are added to each frame of hydrological data. The check information is bundled and encapsulated with the original hydrological data into an encrypted transmission frame. During transmission, no network protocol handshake, acknowledgment, or retransmission mechanism is used, and the bidirectional interactive link is canceled, with only one-way push transmission performed. On the secure domain side, the hash fingerprint and check code are compared to identify data tampering, packet loss, and out-of-order anomalies in real time during transmission, ensuring the integrity of cross-domain transmitted data.
6. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method also includes a one-way transmission fault tolerance and retransmission mechanism, specifically: To address the issue of non-active retransmission caused by the lack of reverse response in physical unidirectional links, a local time-series cache pool is built on the non-security domain side to perform rolling caching of core hydrological data within a preset time period. When the security domain side detects data packet loss or time-series interruption, it automatically triggers fixed-point retransmission based on the locally cached time-series data sequence. The retransmission process still follows the physical unidirectional isolation rules without any reverse instruction interaction, thereby achieving data continuity fault tolerance optimization in unidirectional isolation scenarios.
7. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method also includes an adaptive control strategy for cross-security domain data transmission traffic, specifically including: The system monitors the navigation conditions of the lock in real time. Under high-risk conditions such as concentrated ship passage and sudden changes in water level, it automatically increases the transmission frame rate and bandwidth ratio of primary core hydrological data while reducing the frequency of secondary auxiliary data transmission. Under stable navigation conditions, it adaptively balances the data transmission flow of various types of data, ensuring the real-time performance of hydrological scheduling while reducing the transmission load of unidirectional isolation hardware and avoiding timing distortion caused by high-concurrency data congestion.
8. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S04, after data restoration, also includes security domain data compliance auditing and traceability archiving steps: All cross-domain unidirectional transmission of hydrological data is logged throughout the entire process, and a traceability ledger is generated by associating the data collection point, transmission time, security level, and equipment number. At the same time, the received data is verified for compliance based on the lock's industrial control security specifications, and suspicious data with illegal formats, excessive permissions, or abnormal changes are intercepted. Compliant and valid data is archived and simultaneously connected to the lock's intelligent scheduling platform, so as to achieve auditability, traceability, and controllability of the entire cross-domain transmission process.
9. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical one-way isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 4, characterized in that, The pure hardware passive optical unidirectional device does not carry any software system or firmware program, and has no vulnerability attack entry point or cached data residue. Compared to traditional software gateways and bidirectional isolation gateways, it completely eliminates the risks of protocol parsing vulnerabilities, firmware backdoors, and cached data leakage. The hardware path permanently maintains a one-way irreversible state, adapting to the high reliability and high security transmission requirements of 24 / 7 uninterrupted navigation in ship locks.
10. The method for real-time data aggregation and physical unidirectional isolation transmission of lock water conditions across security domains according to claim 6, characterized in that, The local time-series cache pool adopts a sharded rolling cache mechanism, storing hydrological data in second-level time-series shards, and setting up timed automatic overwrite and abnormal persistent storage strategies. Under normal operating conditions, expired data fragments are automatically overwritten to save storage resources. In the event of transmission anomalies, sudden changes in water level, or emergency navigation conditions, the corresponding time-series data fragments are automatically locked and persistently stored. This satisfies the fault tolerance requirements for one-way retransmission and also enables the permanent storage and retrieval of key water condition data of the lock.
