Communication methods and devices

By selecting and activating appropriate security algorithms between access network devices and terminal devices, the problem of inflexible user plane data security protection is solved, and flexible security protection based on the needs of the communication system is achieved.

CN123123904APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611071851.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-07-17
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, security algorithms for protecting user plane data are not flexible enough and cannot adapt to the needs of different communication systems.

Method used

The access network device and the terminal device select a first security algorithm and activate the security protection of RRC messages based on the algorithm. The confidentiality and integrity protection status of user plane data is indicated through a first configuration message, and the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm is used to perform user plane security protection.

Benefits of technology

It improves the flexibility of user plane data security protection, enabling the selection of appropriate security algorithms according to the needs of different communication systems, thereby enhancing the security of user plane data.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A communication method and apparatus, belonging to the field of communications, are disclosed. The method includes: activating security protection for RRC messages between an access network device and a terminal device based on a first security algorithm; sending a first configuration message for security protection based on the first security algorithm to the terminal device, the first configuration message being an RRC message, the first configuration message including a user plane security state, the user plane security state indicating whether to protect the confidentiality of user plane data of the terminal device, and whether to protect the integrity of user plane data of the terminal device; and activating user plane security based on the user plane security state using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. Thus, the security algorithm for protecting user plane data is not limited to the security algorithm for protecting RRC messages, thereby improving the flexibility of the security algorithm for protecting user plane data.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of communications, and more specifically, to a communication method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0002] In mobile communication systems, to ensure the security of information transmission, the network side and terminal devices typically negotiate security algorithms to enable security protection. For example, in the access-stratum (AS) security mode command (SMC) procedure, the access network device selects a security algorithm supported by the terminal device. In this way, the access network device and the terminal device can use this security algorithm to enable security protection for radio resource control (RRC) messages.

[0003] Currently, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard stipulates that the security algorithm selected by access network equipment and terminal equipment in the AS SMC procedure will be used to protect the security of RRC messages and user plane data. In other words, access network equipment and terminal equipment will reuse the security algorithm selected in the AS SMC procedure for protecting RRC messages to protect the user plane data transmitted between them.

[0004] However, the above regulations make security algorithms for protecting user plane data less flexible. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a communication method and apparatus that can improve the flexibility of security algorithms for protecting user plane data.

[0006] Firstly, a communication method is provided. The entity executing the method provided in the first aspect can be an access network device. Unless otherwise specified, the access network device in this application can be a communication device (e.g., an access network equipment), a component in a communication device (e.g., a processor, chip, or chip system), or a logic module or software capable of implementing some or all of the functions of the communication device.

[0007] For example, the method includes: selecting a first security algorithm for a terminal device; activating security protection for RRC messages between an access network device and the terminal device based on the first security algorithm; sending a first configuration message for security protection based on the first security algorithm to the terminal device, the first configuration message being an RRC message, the first configuration message including a user plane security status, the user plane security status indicating whether to perform confidentiality protection on the user plane data of the terminal device, and indicating whether to perform integrity protection on the user plane data of the terminal device; and activating user plane security based on the user plane security status using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0008] Based on the above scheme, the access network device can activate user plane security using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. This makes the security algorithm for protecting user plane data not limited to the security algorithm for protecting RRC messages, thereby improving the flexibility of the aforementioned security algorithm for user plane.

[0009] In some implementations, the core algorithm of the first security algorithm includes at least one of the following: 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, SNOW 5G algorithm, 256-bit ZUC algorithm, 128-bit AES algorithm, SNOW 3G algorithm, or 128-bit ZUC algorithm.

[0010] In some implementations, the first security algorithm is a first independent integrity protection algorithm; wherein, the method further includes: selecting a first independent encryption algorithm for the terminal device; wherein, based on the first security algorithm, activating security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device includes: activating security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm; wherein, the second security algorithm is a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0011] Based on the above scheme, the access network device can use the security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm to provide security protection for user plane data. It is understood that some relevant standards stipulate that the first independent integrity protection algorithm is not an empty algorithm; therefore, the second security algorithm is also a non-empty algorithm, thus enabling substantial security protection for user plane data.

[0012] In some implementations, based on the user plane security state, a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm is used to activate user plane security, including: when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is to be protected for confidentiality, and the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm is used to activate user plane security.

[0013] As an example, the access network device can determine whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm. Thus, if the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality, and the access network device determines that the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the access network device can activate user plane security by using the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0014] In some implementations, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is to be protected by confidentiality, and the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the user plane security is activated by using the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm. This includes: when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is to be protected by confidentiality, determining whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm; and when the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, activating the user plane security by using the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0015] In some implementations, the first security algorithm is a first combined mode algorithm; wherein, the second security algorithm includes a second independent encryption algorithm and / or a second independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first combined mode algorithm.

[0016] In some implementations, before activating user plane security using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm, the method further includes: determining the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state and the core algorithm.

[0017] As an example, the operation of determining the second security algorithm described above can be performed before the access network device sends the first configuration message, or after the access network device sends the first configuration message, or simultaneously with the access network device sending the first configuration message; no limitation is made here.

[0018] In some implementations, the second security algorithm is determined based on the user plane security state and the core algorithm, including: determining the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state, security configuration and the core algorithm, wherein the security configuration is used to indicate the correspondence between the user plane security state and the type of the second security algorithm, and the type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

[0019] In some implementations, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for both confidentiality and integrity; or, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for confidentiality; or, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both integrity and confidentiality, the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for integrity.

[0020] In some implementations, the first configuration message may further include at least one of the following: security capability information, used to indicate whether the access network device supports a combined mode algorithm; an identifier of the second security algorithm; or, type information of the second security algorithm, used to indicate whether the type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

[0021] In some implementations, the method further includes: obtaining the user plane security policy corresponding to the terminal device, the user plane security policy being used to indicate whether the user plane data of the terminal device needs to be protected for confidentiality and / or integrity; and determining the user plane security status based on the user plane security policy.

[0022] Secondly, a communication method is provided. The method provided in the second aspect can be executed by a terminal device. Unless otherwise specified, the terminal device in this application can be a communication device (e.g., a terminal equipment), a component in a communication device (e.g., a processor, a chip, or a chip system), or a logic module or software that can implement some or all of the functions of the communication device.

[0023] For example, the method includes: receiving a security activation message from an access network device, the security activation message indicating a first security algorithm; activating security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and a terminal device based on the first security algorithm; receiving a first configuration message from the access network device that performs security protection based on the first security algorithm, the first configuration message being an RRC message, the first configuration message including a user plane security state, the user plane security state indicating whether to perform confidentiality protection for user plane data of the terminal device, and indicating whether to perform integrity protection for user plane data of the terminal device; and activating user plane security based on the user plane security state using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0024] In some implementations, the core algorithm of the first security algorithm includes at least one of the following: a 256-bit AES algorithm, a SNOW 5G algorithm, a 256-bit ZUC algorithm, a 128-bit AES algorithm, a SNOW 3G algorithm, or a 128-bit ZUC algorithm.

[0025] In some implementations, the first security algorithm is a first independent integrity protection algorithm, and the security activation message is also used to indicate a first independent encryption algorithm; wherein, based on the first security algorithm, activating security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device includes: activating security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm; wherein, the second security algorithm is a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0026] In some implementations, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality and integrity, and the access network device supports a combined mode algorithm, the type of the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for confidentiality and integrity; or, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality and integrity, and the access network device does not support a combined mode algorithm, the type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for confidentiality and / or integrity.

[0027] In some implementations, the first configuration message also includes security capability information, which indicates whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0028] In some implementations, the method further includes: determining the network standard of the access network device; if the network standard of the access network device is the network standard corresponding to the 6th generation (6G) communication system, or the network standard corresponding to the communication system after the 6G communication system, determining that the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm; or, if the network standard of the access network device is the network standard corresponding to the communication system before the 6G communication system, determining that the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm.

[0029] In some implementations, the first security algorithm is a first combined mode algorithm; wherein, the second security algorithm includes a second independent encryption algorithm and / or a second independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first combined mode algorithm.

[0030] In some implementations, before activating user plane security using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm, the method further includes: determining the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state and the core algorithm.

[0031] In some implementations, the second security algorithm is determined based on the user plane security state and the core algorithm, including: determining the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state, security configuration and the core algorithm, wherein the security configuration is used to indicate the correspondence between the user plane security state and the type of the second security algorithm, and the type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

[0032] In some implementations, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for both confidentiality and integrity; or, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for confidentiality; or, when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both integrity and confidentiality, the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for integrity.

[0033] In some implementations, the first configuration message may also include at least one of the following: an identifier of the second security algorithm; or, type information of the second security algorithm, indicating that the type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

[0034] Thirdly, a communication device is provided, including processing circuitry (or a processor) and an input / output interface (also referred to as an interface circuit), the input / output interface being used for inputting and / or outputting signals, and the processing circuitry being used to execute either the first aspect or the second aspect, or any possible implementation of either the first aspect or the second aspect.

[0035] In some implementations, the processing circuitry is used to communicate with other devices via an interface circuit and to execute either the first aspect or the second aspect, or any possible implementation of either the first aspect or the second aspect.

[0036] Fourthly, a communication device is provided. This communication device may include units, modules, or means for performing the functions of the communication device.

[0037] In some implementations, the communication device may include modules, units, or means for performing the methods / operations / steps / actions described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect. These modules, units, or means may be hardware circuits, software, or a combination of hardware circuits and software.

[0038] In some implementations, the communication device may include modules, units, or means for performing the methods / operations / steps / actions described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect, which may be hardware circuits, software, or a combination of hardware circuits and software.

[0039] Fifthly, a computer-readable storage medium is provided that stores a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause any aspect of the first or second aspect, or any possible implementation thereof, to be performed (or implemented).

[0040] In a sixth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause any aspect of the first or second aspect, or any possible implementation of any aspect of the first or second aspect, to be executed (or implemented).

[0041] A seventh aspect provides a communication device, including a processor for executing (or implementing) any aspect of the first or second aspect, or any possible implementation of any aspect of the first or second aspect, by executing a computer program (or computer-executable instructions) stored in a memory, and / or by logic circuitry.

[0042] In some implementations, the device also includes memory. In some implementations, the processor and memory are integrated together. In other implementations, the memory is located outside the device. The processor may include one or more processors.

[0043] In some implementations, the memory may be used to store part or all of the necessary computer programs or instructions for implementing any of the first or second aspects described above, or for any possible implementation of the first or second aspect.

[0044] In some implementations, the communication device further includes a communication interface for communicating with other devices, such as sending or receiving data and / or signals. Exemplarily, the communication interface may be a transceiver, circuit, bus, module, input / output interface, or other types of communication interface.

[0045] Eighthly, a chip is provided, including a processor for calling a computer program or computer instructions in memory to cause the processor to execute or implement any aspect of the first or second aspect, or any possible implementation of any aspect of the first or second aspect.

[0046] In some implementations, the processor is coupled to the memory via an interface.

[0047] A ninth aspect provides a communication system comprising at least one of the following: a terminal device or an access network device. The access network device is configured to perform the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof; the terminal device is configured to perform the second aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0048] The description of the beneficial effects of any of the third to ninth aspects can be referred to the description of the corresponding beneficial effects of the first or second aspect. Attached Figure Description

[0049] Figure 1 It is a schematic block diagram of a communication system.

[0050] Figure 2 This is a schematic flowchart of a communication method provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0051] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a combinatorial pattern algorithm.

[0052] Figure 4 This is a schematic flowchart of an AS SMC process.

[0053] Figure 5 This is a schematic flowchart of a UP security activation process.

[0054] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a communication method provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0055] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0056] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0057] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0058] Figure 10 This is a schematic block diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0059] Figure 11 This is a schematic block diagram of another communication device provided in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0060] In this application, unless otherwise specified or in case of logical conflict, the terminology and / or descriptions of different embodiments are consistent and can be referenced by each other. Technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments based on their inherent logical relationships.

[0061] I. In this application, "at least one" means one or more, and "more than one" means two or more. "And / or" describes the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can mean: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, or B exists alone, where A and B can be singular or plural. In the textual description of this application, the character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, and c can mean: a, or, b, or, c, or, a and b, or, a and c, or, b and c, or, a, b, and c. Here, a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0062] II. In this application, the terms "first," "second," and various numerical designations (e.g., #1, #2, etc.) indicate distinctions made for ease of description and are not intended to limit the scope of the embodiments of this application. For example, first information and second information can distinguish different messages, rather than being used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such described objects can be interchanged where appropriate to describe solutions other than those in the embodiments of this application.

[0063] Third, in this application, descriptions such as "when," "under the circumstances," and "if" all refer to the device taking corresponding actions or being in a corresponding position under certain objective circumstances. They are not time-limited, nor do they require the device to perform a judgment action when implementing it, nor do they imply any other limitations.

[0064] IV. In this application, "instruction" or "for instruction" can include both direct (or explicit) and indirect (or implicit) instruction. When describing instruction information for instructing A, it can include whether the instruction information directly or indirectly instructs A, but does not necessarily mean that the instruction information carries A. For example, in the case of indirect (or implicit) instruction, the receiving end of the instruction information can obtain A based on the parameters indicated by the instruction information, combined with other rules or parameters, or through deduction.

[0065] V. The indication methods involved in the embodiments of this application should be understood to cover various methods that enable the party to be indicated to obtain the information to be indicated. The information to be indicated can be sent as a whole or divided into multiple sub-information and sent separately. Moreover, the sending period and / or sending time of these sub-information can be the same or different. This application does not limit the sending method, for example.

[0066] VI. In this application, "protocol" can refer to standard protocols in the field of communications, such as 5G protocols, new radio (NR) protocols, and related protocols applied to future communication systems; this application does not limit this term. "Predefined" can include predefined terms, such as protocol definitions. "Preconfiguration" can be implemented by pre-storing corresponding codes, tables, or other means that can be used to indicate relevant information in the device; this application does not limit the implementation method.

[0067] VII. In this application, terms such as “message,” “information,” “signal,” or “information element (IE)” can be used interchangeably. There are no restrictions on the name of the message or information, as long as it can achieve the corresponding function.

[0068] 8. "Sending information to XX (device)" can be understood as the destination of the information being that device. This can include sending information directly or indirectly to that device. "Receiving information from XX (device), or receiving information from XX (device)" can be understood as the source of the information being that device. This can include receiving information directly or indirectly from that device. Information may undergo necessary processing between the source and destination, such as format changes, but the destination can understand the valid information from the source. Similar expressions in this application can be understood in a similar way, and will not be repeated here. Furthermore, "sending" can also be understood as the "output" of the chip interface, and "receiving" can also be understood as the "input" of the chip interface. In other words, "sending" or "receiving" can occur between devices, for example, between network devices and terminal devices via an air interface. "Sending" or "receiving" can also occur within a device, for example, between components, modules, chips, software modules, or hardware modules within the device via a bus, wiring, or interface.

[0069] 9. In this application, the terms "exemplarily," "for example," etc., are used to indicate examples, illustrations, or descriptions to present concepts in a specific manner. Any embodiment or design described as an "example" in this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or designs. In the embodiments of this application, "of," "corresponding (relevant)," "corresponding," and "associated" may sometimes be used interchangeably, and it should be noted that their intended meanings are consistent unless their distinctions are emphasized.

[0070] 10. This application will present various aspects, embodiments, or features relating to systems that may include multiple devices, components, modules, etc. Each system may include devices, components, modules, etc., other than those illustrated, and / or may not include all and all of the devices, components, modules, etc. discussed in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0071] XI. The business scenarios described in the embodiments of this application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application. As those skilled in the art will know, with the emergence of new business scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0072] 12. In the various embodiments of this application, the sequence number of each process does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application. The terms "comprising," "including," "having," and their variations all mean "including but not limited to," unless otherwise specifically emphasized.

[0073] The technical solutions of this application embodiment can be applied to various communication systems, including but not limited to: Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems, NR systems, and 5G (5G) systems. th Generation 5G mobile communication systems, narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT) systems, enhanced machine-type communication (eMTC) systems, enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) systems, ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) systems, satellite communication systems, LTE-machine-to-machine (LTE-M) systems, or systems such as 6G (5G) ... low-latency communications (URLLC) systems, satellite communication systems, LTE-machine-to-machine (LTE-M) systems, or 6G (6G) mobile communication systems. th Systems that evolve after 5G, such as 5G (6G) mobile communication systems, etc.

[0074] Figure 1 It is a schematic block diagram of a communication system. For example... Figure 1 As shown, this communication system uses the 5G system (5GS) as an example. As an example, this communication system consists of three parts: the terminal part, the data network (DN) part, the radio access network ((R)AN) part, and the core network (CN) part.

[0075] The nodes of each part are briefly introduced below.

[0076] 1. Terminal section: The terminal portion may include one or more terminals. The terminal device may be a device deployed on the terminal side. In the embodiments of this application, the terminal device may be, for example, a... Figure 1The user equipment (UE) in the context can also be a device that enables the UE to perform this function, such as a chip or chip system, which can be installed in the UE. A chip system can consist of chips or include chips and other discrete components.

[0077] Terminal equipment can be a device that provides voice and / or data connectivity to users. Terminal equipment can be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; it can also be deployed on water (such as on ships); and it can also be deployed in the air (e.g., on NTN equipment such as airplanes, balloons, satellites, or high-altitude platforms). Terminal equipment can also be referred to as user equipment (UE) or user device. In this application embodiment, terminal devices include, but are not limited to: cellular phones, mobile phones, tablets, laptop computers, notebook computers, handheld computers, mobile internet devices (MIDs), computers with wireless transceiver capabilities, cordless phones, session initiation protocol (SIP) phones, smartphones, wireless local loop (WLL) stations, personal digital assistants (PDAs), handsets or handheld devices with wireless communication capabilities, vehicle-mounted devices (e.g., cars, bicycles, electric vehicles, airplanes, ships, trains, high-speed trains, etc.), wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches, smart bracelets, pedometers, smart glasses, etc.), satellite terminals, terminal devices in the Internet of Things or the Internet of Vehicles, as well as any form of terminal, relay user equipment, or terminal in a future evolved public land mobile network (PLMN), etc.

[0078] 2. Data Network Section: The data network portion may include a Data Network (DN). A DN can be a network used to provide data transmission. For example, a DN may include networks used by carrier services (such as the Internet Protocol (IP) Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)), the Internet, or third-party service networks. A DN can also be called a Packet Data Network (PDN), and is typically a network located outside the carrier's network, such as a third-party network.

[0079] 3. (R)AN section: The AN portion is a subnetwork of the operator's network, serving as the implementation system between service nodes and terminal devices within the operator's network. For example, for a terminal device to access the operator's network, it first goes through the access network, and then connects to the service nodes of the operator's network via the access network.

[0080] The access network portion may include one or more access network elements. In the embodiments of this application, an access network element may be a means for implementing the functions of an access network device, or a means that enables the access network device to implement those functions, such as a chip or chip system, which may be installed in the access network device. The chip system may consist of chips, or may include chips and other discrete components.

[0081] Access network equipment can be any device with wireless transceiver capabilities. For example, access network equipment can be a base station used to connect terminal devices to a radio access network (RAN). Access network equipment is sometimes also referred to as access network element, access network device, access network node, RAN node, RAN, access network (AN) node, or AN. It is understood that the names of devices with access network equipment functions may differ in systems employing different wireless access technologies. For ease of description, devices that provide wireless communication access capabilities to terminal devices can be collectively referred to as base stations or RANs.

[0082] For example, RAN includes, but is not limited to, various forms of macro base stations, micro base stations or indoor stations, pico base stations, small stations, balloon stations, relay stations, access points, etc.

[0083] 4. CN section: The CN (Network Component) can adopt a service-based architecture (SBA) or other architectures. For example, the CN may include, but is not limited to, the following network functions (NFs): unified data management (UDM), policy control function (PCF), authentication server function (AUSF), security anchor function (SEAF), network exposure function (NEF), access and mobility management function (AMF), session management function (SMF), and user plane function (UPF). A brief introduction to some NFs is given below.

[0084] 1) AMF network element: For example, AMF network elements can be used in mobile networks for terminal attachment, tracking area update procedures, providing non-access stratum (NAS) messages, completing registration management, connection management, reachability management, allocating tracking area lists (TA lists), access authorization, authentication, and mobility management. Furthermore, AMF network elements can also be used for transparent routing of session management (SM) messages to session management network elements.

[0085] In future communication systems (such as 6G communication systems), AMF may be broken down into multiple functions, such as routing, mobility management, or security anchors.

[0086] 2) SMF network element: For example, an SMF network element can be used to implement at least one of the following: session management, UE IP address allocation and management, selection, control or management of user plane functions (e.g., UPF network elements), configuration of flow control on the UPF to route traffic to the correct destination, policy control, QoS-related control, or downlink data notification, etc.

[0087] 3) UPF network element: For example, a UPF network element can be used to implement at least one of the following: packet routing of user plane data, forwarding of user plane data, processing of user plane paths for Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sessions, or processing of QoS for user plane data. User data can access the DN through this network element. In the embodiments of this application, the UPF network element can be used to implement user plane functions.

[0088] 4) PCF network element: For example, PCF network elements can be used to implement at least one of the following: a unified policy framework to guide network behavior, or to provide policy information to network nodes (e.g., SMF network elements, RAN, etc.) or terminal devices.

[0089] 5) UDM network element: used for unified data management, user data management, processing user identification, access authentication, registration, or mobility management, etc.

[0090] As an example, a UDM network element may include a subscription identifier de-concealing function (SIDF) and / or an authentication repository and processing function (ARPF). The SIDF can be used to parse a user's hidden identity. The ARPF can be used to store a long-term key and generate an authentication vector based on that long-term key.

[0091] The term "network element" can also be referred to as an entity, device, apparatus, network function, or module, etc., and is not specifically limited in this application. Furthermore, in this application, for ease of understanding and explanation, the description of "network element" is omitted in some descriptions. For example, the SMF network element is abbreviated as SMF. In this case, "SMF" can be understood as an SMF network element or an SMF entity. The following omits descriptions of the same or similar cases.

[0092] The embodiments of this application can be applied to the above. Figure 1 The communication system shown can also be applied to other communication systems, and no limitation is made here.

[0093] To facilitate understanding of the embodiments of this application, some basic concepts involved in this application will be briefly explained.

[0094] 1. PDU Session Establishment: Figure 2This is a schematic flowchart of a communication method 200 provided in an embodiment of this application. Method 200 illustrates part of the process of establishing a PDU session. Parts not described in method 200 can be found in the relevant content of 3GPP technical specification (TS) version 23.502, 19.5.0. The following is in conjunction with... Figure 2 This section introduces the various operations of method 200.

[0095] In S201, the UE sends a PDU session establishment request to the AMF. This PDU session establishment request can be used to request the establishment of a PDU session. As an example, the PDU session establishment request can be carried within a NAS message. For instance, the NAS message may include an N1 session management (SM) container, which can contain the PDU session establishment request.

[0096] For example, a PDU session establishment request may include at least one of the following: PDU session ID, request type, or other information.

[0097] S202, AMF selects SMF. For example, AMF can select an appropriate SMF based on information in the PDU session establishment request. For specific selection methods, please refer to the relevant content in 3GPP technical specification (TS) 23.501, which will not be elaborated further.

[0098] S203, AMF sends an Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext (Nsmf_PDU session_createSM context) request to the selected SMF.

[0099] As an example, the AMF can obtain the UE's identifier during the registration process and store it in the UE's context. The AMF can determine that the PDU session establishment request originates from the UE through the underlying signaling connection used to receive the PDU session establishment request in S201, thereby determining the UE's context and subsequently obtaining the UE's identifier from that context. For example, the UE's identifier could be the UE's subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI).

[0100] For example, the Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext request may include the PDU session ID, request type, UE identifier, or other information.

[0101] S204, SMF queries UDM for UE's subscription data.

[0102] As an example, the SMF can send the UE's identifier to the UDM. The UDM can then retrieve the UE's subscription data locally from the UDM based on this identifier and send the UE's subscription data to the SMF.

[0103] S205, the SMF sends an Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext response to the AMF. For example, the SMF can create an SM context associated with the PDU session ID and carry the SM context ID in the Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext response.

[0104] In other examples, the Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext request in S203 can be replaced with the Nsmf_PDUSession_UpdateSMContext (Nsmf_PDU session_updateSM context) request. Accordingly, the Nsmf_PDUSession_CreateSMContext response in S205 can be replaced with the Nsmf_PDUSession_UpdateSMContext response.

[0105] S206, PDU Session Authentication / Authorization Procedure. S206 is an optional operation. For example, SMF can determine whether to execute S206 based on the request type.

[0106] S207, SMF selects PCF, etc. S207 is an optional operation. For example, if the PDU session requires the use of dynamic policy and charging control (PCC) rules, the SMF can execute S207. Alternatively, the SMF can use policies configured locally within the SMF.

[0107] S208, SMF should be UPF.

[0108] S209, SMF initiates SM policy association modification to PCF. S209 is an optional operation.

[0109] S210a, SMF sends an N4 session establishment / modification request to UPF.

[0110] For example, if the request type indicates "Initial Request," the SMF initiates an N4 session establishment procedure with the selected UPF. Accordingly, the SMF sends an N4 session establishment request to the UPF. As another example, if the request type indicates a different value, the SMF initiates an N4 session modification procedure with the selected UPF. Accordingly, the SMF sends an N4 session modification request to the UPF.

[0111] S210b, the UPF sends an N4 session establishment / modification response to the SMF. For example, if the SMF sends an N4 session establishment request to the UPF, the UPF sends an N4 session establishment response to the SMF to indicate that the N4 session has been established. As another example, if the SMF sends an N4 session modification request to the UPF, the UPF sends an N4 session modification response to the SMF to indicate that the N4 session has been modified.

[0112] S211, SMF and AMF exchange Namf_Communication_N1N2MessageTransfer (Namf_Communication_N1N2 Message Transfer) messages.

[0113] For example, the above message includes information such as the PDU session ID.

[0114] S212, AMF sends an N2 PDU session request to RAN.

[0115] S213, the RAN and UE initiate an AN-specific resource. As an example, the RAN can include information indicating the AN-specific resource in the PDU session establishment acceptance message. This PDU session establishment acceptance message can be used to indicate that the PDU session establishment request has been accepted by the network.

[0116] S214, the RAN sends an N2 PDU session response to the AMF. As an example, this response includes information such as the PDU session ID.

[0117] Following S214, method 200 also includes subsequent procedures for PDU session establishment, which will not be detailed here.

[0118] The above description uses the 5G PDU session establishment process as an example. In future communication systems (such as 6G communication systems), the PDU session establishment process may change, and this application does not limit it. Furthermore, the name of the term "PDU session" may also change in future communication systems, and this application does not limit it.

[0119] 2. User plane security policy In mobile communication systems, to ensure the security of service data transmission, access network equipment can provide security protection for downlink data from terminal devices, such as encryption and / or integrity protection, and then transmit the secure downlink data to the terminal device through the air interface between the access network equipment and the terminal device. Correspondingly, terminal devices can provide security protection for uplink data and transmit the secure uplink data to the access network equipment through the air interface.

[0120] The user plane security policy can indicate whether user plane confidentiality protection and / or user plane integrity protection are activated for the data radio bearer (DRB) belonging to the PDU session. The user plane security policy can also be called user plane security enforcement information or other names.

[0121] The UE and RAN can protect user plane data transmitted during a session according to user plane security policies. User plane security policies may include: integrity protection policies, and / or confidentiality protection policies. The user plane security policy for a session can be determined during the session establishment process.

[0122] As an example, the integrity protection policy in the user plane security policy can have three possible values: 1) Required: For user plane data on a session, integrity protection is required.

[0123] 2) Preferred: Integrity protection can be used or not for user plane data on a session. In other words, integrity protection is optional (should) for user plane data on a session.

[0124] 3) Not needed: No integrity protection is provided for user plane data on the session.

[0125] As an example, the confidentiality protection policy in the user plane security policy can have three possible values: 1) Required: For user plane data on a session, confidentiality protection is required.

[0126] 2) Preferred: Confidentiality protection can be used or not for user plane data on a session. In other words, confidentiality protection is optional (should) for user plane data on a session.

[0127] 3) Not needed: No confidentiality protection is provided for user plane data on the session.

[0128] The aforementioned user-facing data can also be understood as traffic.

[0129] As an example, user plane security policies can be determined and distributed to the RAN during the PDU session establishment process. For instance, the SMF can determine the user plane security policy for the PDU session based on the following information during the PDU session establishment process: 1) The user plane security policy of the subscription, which can be part of the session management subscription data received by the SMF from the UDM.

[0130] 2) User plane security policy configured locally in the SMF. When the UDM does not provide a user plane security policy, the user plane security policy for the PDU session can be determined based on the local configuration of the SMF.

[0131] In some possible implementations, the SMF can send the user plane security policy associated with the PDU session to the RAN via the AMF in S211 and S212.

[0132] After receiving the user plane security policy, the RAN can perform a user plane security activation procedure with the UE. For example, the RAN can send an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE to activate user plane security.

[0133] This message can indicate that user plane integrity protection and / or confidentiality protection is activated for the DRB corresponding to the session.

[0134] As an example, the message may contain an instruction to activate user plane integrity protection and / or confidentiality protection for the DRB corresponding to the session in accordance with the user plane security policy.

[0135] 3. Security Algorithm Negotiation As an example, security algorithm negotiation can refer to the process by which the UE and the network side (e.g., AMF or RAN) negotiate security algorithms. For instance, the security algorithm negotiation process may include: the UE reporting its security capabilities to the network side, which indicates the security algorithms supported by the UE; and the network side selecting a security algorithm based on the UE's security capabilities and the network side's own capabilities.

[0136] In some possible implementations, the network side is configured with an algorithm priority list. Based on the security capabilities reported by the UE, the network side can select the highest priority security algorithm from the algorithm priority list that is supported by the UE. It is understandable that the security algorithms in the algorithm priority list are also security algorithms supported by the network side itself.

[0137] For example, security algorithms used to protect signaling and data between the UE and the network side include Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, SNOW3G algorithm, ZUC algorithm, etc.

[0138] As an example, in security algorithms used solely for confidentiality protection (or standalone encryption algorithms), the 128-bit SNOW3G algorithm can also be called 128-NEA1; the 128-bit AES algorithm can also be called 128-NEA2; and the 128-bit ZUC algorithm can also be called 128-NEA3. An empty algorithm can also be denoted as NEA0.

[0139] As an example, in security algorithms used solely for integrity protection (or independent integrity protection algorithms), the 128-bit SNOW3G algorithm can also be called 128-NIA1; the 128-bit AES algorithm can also be called 128-NIA2; and the 128-bit ZUC algorithm can also be called 128-NIA3. An empty algorithm can also be denoted as NIA0.

[0140] In some examples, the communication system can upgrade the symmetric security algorithm from 128-bit to 256-bit and can introduce authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithms. As an example, a 256-bit symmetric security algorithm used solely for confidentiality protection can be called 256-NEAx. A 256-bit symmetric security algorithm used solely for integrity protection can be called 256-NIAx. A 256-bit AEAD algorithm used for integrity and / or confidentiality protection can be called 256-NCAx. Exemplarily, x = 4, 5, or 6 above indicates that the specific algorithm is the SNOW 5G algorithm, the AES-256 algorithm, or the ZUC-256 algorithm, respectively.

[0141] The AEAD algorithm can also be called an authenticated encryption algorithm or a combined mode algorithm. The AEAD algorithm is a secure algorithm that can achieve both confidentiality and integrity protection. The AEAD algorithm has a certain degree of flexibility in its use; for example, it can be used for both confidentiality and integrity protection simultaneously, or only for confidentiality protection, or only for integrity protection.

[0142] 4. AEAD Algorithm In the context of the AEAD algorithm, integrity protection can also be understood as "authentication".

[0143] For example, the AEAD algorithm can achieve both confidentiality and integrity protection of data with a single key (such as the AEAD key) as the input key.

[0144] For ease of understanding, combined with Figure 3 (a) and (b) briefly introduce how to use the AEAD algorithm.

[0145] See Figure 3 In (a) at the sending end, the input to the AEAD algorithm may include a key (K), an initial vector (IV), an input block stream (IBS), associated data (AAD), a mode (MODE), the length of the IBS, and the length of the AAD.

[0146] See Figure 3 In (a) of the diagram, at the sending end, the output of the AEAD algorithm can include an output blockstream (OBS) and a MAC value. The MAC value is used to verify the integrity of the OBS and AAD. For ease of description, the MAC value will be simply referred to as MAC below.

[0147] As an example, the OBS can be ciphertext obtained after the IBS has been protected for confidentiality. This OBS can also be called ciphertext (C) or have other names. For instance, the length of the OBS can be the same as the length of the IBS.

[0148] As an example, MAC can be information obtained after using the AEAD algorithm to perform integrity protection on OBS and AAD.

[0149] In some examples, the AEAD algorithm can have the following three modes depending on the values ​​of IBS and AAD.

[0150] Combined-mode: The sender performs both confidentiality and integrity protection on the content to be protected. The content protected for confidentiality and integrity can be the same or different. For example, if AAD is set to NULL in the input, all content to be protected is in IBS. Alternatively, AAD can be non-NULL; in this case, AAD represents content protected only for integrity, while IBS represents content protected for both confidentiality and integrity. Combined-mode can also be called "both confidentiality and integrity protection mode" or other names.

[0151] Integrity-only mode: The sender performs integrity protection only on the content to be protected. For example, if IBS is empty in the input, all the content to be protected is in AAD. In this way, the sender only performs integrity protection on the content to be protected, without confidentiality protection, and the OBS section in the output is empty. Integrity-only mode can also have other names.

[0152] Encryption / ciphering-only mode: The sender only provides confidentiality protection for the content to be protected. For example, if AAD is set to NULL and MAC_BYTEs is set to 0, IBS is protected only by confidentiality and not by integrity. For example, when MAC_BYTEs is 0, the AEAD algorithm can be considered to be performing the above-mentioned confidentiality / ciphering-only mode. Confidentiality / ciphering-only mode may also be called confidentiality-only mode or have other names.

[0153] See Figure 3 In (b) of the diagram, at the receiving end, the inputs to the AEAD algorithm may include the key K, IV, OBS, AAD, MODE, OBS length, and AAD length. The outputs of the AEAD algorithm may include IBS and MAC.

[0154] For example, the receiver can determine whether the MAC output by the AEAD algorithm matches the MAC sent by the transmitter. If they match, the receiver can determine that the AAD and OBS have not been tampered with. Furthermore, the receiver can use the output IBS for subsequent operations.

[0155] 5. Secure activation process After selecting a security algorithm on the network side, the network side can activate the security of both the UE and the network side through a security activation process.

[0156] For example, after the RAN selects a security algorithm, the selected security algorithm can be sent to the UE through the access stratum (AS) SMC procedure, and security protection for RRC messages between the UE and the RAN can be activated.

[0157] For ease of understanding, combined with Figure 4 A detailed introduction to the AS SMC process.

[0158] Figure 4 This is a schematic flowchart of an AS SMC process, which includes the following steps: S410, RAN configuration allows a list of algorithm priority options.

[0159] In some possible implementations, the RAN receives the UE's security capabilities (e.g., the RAN receives the UE's security capabilities from the AMF) and selects a security algorithm based on the UE's security capabilities and an algorithm priority list. For example, the RAN can select the security algorithm with the highest priority from the algorithm priority list, and one that the UE's security capabilities indicate as supported.

[0160] As an example, the selected security algorithms may include security algorithms for integrity protection and / or security algorithms for confidentiality protection. The security algorithm for integrity protection may also be referred to as a standalone integrity protection algorithm. The security algorithm for confidentiality protection may also be referred to as a standalone encryption algorithm.

[0161] S420, RAN activates RRC integrity security protection.

[0162] Activating RRC integrity protection in the RAN can be understood as the RAN needing to use an independent integrity protection algorithm to perform secure processing (e.g., integrity protection or integrity verification) on RRC messages. As an example, this independent integrity protection algorithm is not an empty algorithm.

[0163] Before sending the AS SMC message, the RAN activates RRC integrity security protection.

[0164] In some possible implementations, RAN can deduce key K based on the chosen independent integrity protection algorithm. RRCint Furthermore, RAN can be based on a selected independent integrity protection algorithm and key K. RRCint Integrity protection is provided for AS SMC messages.

[0165] As an example, AS SMC messages are protected only for integrity, not for confidentiality.

[0166] S430, the RAN sends an AS SMC message to the UE.

[0167] The AS SMC message can indicate the selected independent encryption algorithm and the selected independent integrity protection algorithm. The selected independent encryption algorithm and the selected independent integrity protection algorithm are part of the security context.

[0168] The security algorithms for RRC messages and user plane data can be unified, meaning that the selected independent encryption algorithm and independent integrity protection algorithm are applicable to both RRC message security protection and user plane data security protection.

[0169] After sending the AS SMC message, the RAN can execute S440.

[0170] S440, RAN activates confidentiality protection (e.g., encryption) for downlink RRC messages.

[0171] Activating confidentiality protection for downlink RRC messages in the RAN can be understood as requiring the RAN to encrypt the RRC messages using an independent encryption algorithm. As an example, this independent encryption algorithm can be an empty algorithm or not. If the independent encryption algorithm is empty, the RAN needs to run an empty independent encryption algorithm to encrypt the RRC messages. This situation is still considered to have activated confidentiality protection for downlink RRC messages.

[0172] After the UE receives the AS SMC message, the UE can execute S450.

[0173] S450, UE verifies AS SMC message.

[0174] For example, the UE can deduce key K based on the independent integrity protection algorithm indicated by the AS SMC message. RRCint The UE performs integrity verification on the AS SMC message based on the key and the independent integrity protection algorithm indicated by the AS SMC message. If the integrity verification is successful, the UE activates integrity and confidentiality protection for the uplink RRC message, and activates decryption for the downlink RRC message.

[0175] Activating downlink RRC message decryption for the UE can be understood as the UE needing to use an independent encryption algorithm to decrypt the RRC message. As an example, this independent encryption algorithm can be an empty algorithm or a non-empty algorithm. If the independent encryption algorithm is empty, the UE needs to run an empty independent encryption algorithm to decrypt the RRC message. This situation is still considered as activating downlink RRC message decryption.

[0176] If the AS SMC message verification is successful, the UE can use key K. RRCint The independent integrity protection algorithm and key K indicated by the AS SMC message. RRCint The integrity protection of the AS security mode completion message is performed, and S460 is executed.

[0177] S460, the UE sends an AS security mode completion message with integrity protection to the RAN.

[0178] After issuing the AS security mode completion message, the UE can execute S470.

[0179] S470, the UE activates confidentiality protection for uplink RRC messages.

[0180] Activating confidentiality protection for uplink RRC messages by the UE can be understood as requiring the UE to encrypt the RRC messages using an independent encryption algorithm. As an example, this independent encryption algorithm can be an empty algorithm or a non-empty algorithm. If the independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the UE needs to run an empty independent encryption algorithm to encrypt the RRC messages. This situation is still considered to have activated confidentiality protection for uplink RRC messages.

[0181] S480, RAN activates confidentiality protection for uplink RRC messages.

[0182] Activating confidentiality protection for uplink RRC messages in the RAN can be understood as requiring the RAN to decrypt the RRC messages using an independent encryption algorithm. As an example, this independent encryption algorithm can be an empty algorithm or a non-empty algorithm. If the independent encryption algorithm is empty, the RAN needs to run an empty independent encryption algorithm to decrypt the RRC messages. This situation is still considered as activating the decryption of uplink RRC messages.

[0183] Upon receiving the AS security mode completion message, the RAN uses the integrity protection key K. RRCint The RAN performs integrity verification on messages completed in AS security mode. If the verification is successful, the RAN can execute S480, that is, activate deconfidentiality protection for uplink RRC messages.

[0184] If the RAN determines that UP security protection is to be implemented, the RAN can execute the UP security activation procedure.

[0185] Figure 5 This is a schematic flowchart of a UP security activation process, including the following steps: S510, RRC security is activated. For example, it has already been implemented between the RAN and the UE. Figure 4 The process is illustrated. As an example, RRC security is activated, which can be understood as: RRC confidentiality protection and / or RRC integrity protection are activated.

[0186] As one possible interpretation, RRC security can also be called AS security. That is, AS security can be understood as RRC security. In this case, AS security may not include user plane security. User plane security can be understood as the protection of the confidentiality and / or integrity of user plane data.

[0187] As another possible interpretation, AS security can include RRC security and user plane security.

[0188] In some possible implementations, Figure 5The illustrated process can be performed during DRB addition. For example, referring to "2. UP Security Policy" above, the SMF can send an UP security policy to the RAN during PDU session establishment. The RAN can then execute S520 based on this UP security policy.

[0189] S520, the RAN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE. For example, this message may include a confidentiality protection indication and / or integrity protection indication for the corresponding DRB.

[0190] For example, assuming the UP security policy indicates that confidentiality and integrity protection are required, the message may carry an integrity protection instruction to indicate that UP integrity protection is enabled. Alternatively, the message may omit the confidentiality protection instruction, thus implicitly indicating that UP confidentiality protection is enabled.

[0191] Enabling UP integrity protection can be understood as the UE and RAN enabling integrity protection for UP data. For example, the transmitting end in the UE and RAN can perform integrity protection on UP data, and correspondingly, the receiving end in the UE and RAN can perform integrity verification on UP data. If the integrity verification of UP data fails, or if the UP data lacks integrity protection, the receiving end can discard the UP data.

[0192] Enabling UP confidentiality protection can be understood as the UE and RAN enabling confidentiality protection for UP data. For example, the transmitting end in the UE and RAN can encrypt the UP data, and correspondingly, the receiving end in the UE and RAN can decrypt the UP data.

[0193] As an example, this message carries a confidentiality protection instruction, which can indicate that UP confidentiality protection is not enabled. This message does not carry an integrity protection instruction, which can indicate that UP integrity protection is not enabled. Examples of other cases indicating UP security policy are explained above and will not be repeated here.

[0194] S530, RAN activates UP confidentiality protection and / or UP integrity protection.

[0195] For example, if the RRC connection reconfiguration message indicates that DRB is activated for UP integrity protection, and if the RAN does not have K UPint RAN generates K UPint In addition, the RAN activates the UP integrity protection of the aforementioned DRB.

[0196] Similarly, if the RRC connection reconfiguration message indicates that DRB is activating UP confidentiality protection, and if RAN does not have K UPenc RAN generates K UPenc In addition, the RAN activates the UP confidentiality protection for the aforementioned DRB.

[0197] S540, UE verifies RRC connection reconfiguration message.

[0198] As an example, the UE verifies the integrity of the RRC connection reconfiguration message. If the verification is successful, and the RRC connection reconfiguration message indicates DRB activation UP integrity protection, and if the UE does not have K... UPint UE generates K UPint In addition, activate the UP integrity protection of the aforementioned DRB.

[0199] Similarly, if the verification is successful, and the RRC connection reconfiguration message indicates that DRB UP confidentiality protection is activated, and if the UE does not have K UPenc UE generates K UPenc In addition, the UE activates the aforementioned DRB's UP confidentiality protection.

[0200] As an example, if the UE successfully verifies the integrity of the RRC connection reconfiguration message, the UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the RAN, that is, it executes S550.

[0201] S550, the UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the RAN.

[0202] 6. RRC connection reconfiguration message The following section details the RRC connection reconfiguration message sent by the RAN to the UE in S530.

[0203] As an example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message may include radio bearer configuration (RadioBearerConfig). The UE can establish a DRB based on RadioBearerConfig.

[0204] For example, RadioBearerConfig may include DRB-related configurations, etc.

[0205] The DRB-related configuration can be used to configure one or more DRBs. For example, the DRB-related configuration can carry DRB-related configuration information, such as one or more Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) configurations, or one or more DRB identifiers. The DRB identifier can correspond to a PDCP configuration. For example, the UE and RAN can establish a PDCP entity for a DRB corresponding to a specific DRB identifier, and this PDCP entity can be established based on the PDCP configuration corresponding to that DRB identifier.

[0206] DRB-related configurations can be called DRB to add modify list (drb-ToAddModList) or have other names.

[0207] As an example, PDCP configuration may include a user plane security state. This user plane security state may include integrity protection indications and / or confidentiality protection indications.

[0208] For example, an integrity protection indicator can be used to instruct the PDCP entity corresponding to the aforementioned DRB to enable integrity protection.

[0209] Integrity protection indicators can also be called integrity protection (integrityProtection) or have other names.

[0210] For example, a confidentiality protection indicator can be used to instruct the PDCP entity corresponding to the DRB-related configuration not to enable confidentiality protection. For instance, if the PDCP configuration does not carry a confidentiality protection indicator, it means confidentiality protection is enabled; if the PDCP configuration carries a confidentiality protection indicator, it means confidentiality protection is disabled.

[0211] The confidentiality protection instruction can also be called cipher disabled (cipherDisabled) or have other names.

[0212] As an example, the PDCP configuration can be called PDCP configuration (pdcp-config) or have other names.

[0213] During the PDU session establishment process, after the UE receives the RRC connection reconfiguration message, it can establish the corresponding DRB. For example, if the DRB identifier is included in drb-ToAddModList, the UE will create a PDCP entity for the DRB corresponding to that DRB identifier and configure the PDCP entity according to the received PDCP configuration.

[0214] As mentioned earlier, the RAN can configure whether integrity protection and confidentiality protection of the PDCP entity are enabled in the PDCP configuration through two options: integrity protection indication and confidentiality protection indication.

[0215] Based on the above Figure 4 and Figure 5 As shown in the diagram, in the AS SMC process, the RAN selects a security algorithm based on the UE's security capabilities and the algorithm priority list configured by the RAN.

[0216] When a UE requests to establish a PDU session, the RAN will reuse the security algorithm selected in the AS SMC procedure for protecting RRC messages and perform security protection on the PDU session through user plane security activation.

[0217] For example, the 3GPP standard specifies that in 5G wireless communication networks: the RAN should select the highest priority independent integrity protection algorithm from its configured list that is present in the UE's security capabilities. The selected algorithm should be indicated to the UE in the AS SMC. The selected encryption algorithm is used for encryption of user plane and RRC traffic (when activated). The selected independent integrity protection algorithm is used for integrity protection of user plane and RRC traffic (when activated).

[0218] Based on the above regulations, the security algorithm used to protect user plane data (denoted as the UP security algorithm) is the same as the security algorithm used to protect RRC messages (denoted as the RRC security algorithm). This regulation makes the UP security algorithm inflexible. For example, if the RAN selects an empty independent encryption algorithm (e.g., NEA0) in the AS SMC procedure, then if the RAN determines that confidentiality protection for UP data is required, the UE and RAN cannot provide substantial confidentiality protection for the UP data, thus failing to meet the user's security requirements for UP data.

[0219] In view of this, embodiments of this application provide a communication method. In this communication method, the UP security algorithm can be the security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the RRC security algorithm, thereby improving the flexibility of the UP security algorithm.

[0220] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a communication method 600 provided in an embodiment of this application. The method 600 can be applied to... Figure 1 The communication system shown can also be applied to other communication systems. The following section will combine... Figure 6 Describe the method 600.

[0221] S610, the access network device selects the first security algorithm for the terminal device.

[0222] The first security algorithm can be a security algorithm used to activate RRC security, or in other words, a security algorithm used to protect RRC messages between the terminal device and the access network device. The meaning of RRC security is explained above, such as... Figure 4 Related descriptions.

[0223] As an example, the first security algorithm may be a first independent integrity protection algorithm, a first independent encryption algorithm, or a first combined mode algorithm.

[0224] The first independent integrity protection algorithm may be an independent integrity protection algorithm used to activate RRC integrity protection, or it may be an independent integrity protection algorithm used to protect RRC messages between the terminal device and the access network device.

[0225] The independent integrity protection algorithm can be a security algorithm used alone for integrity protection. For example, the independent integrity protection algorithm can be 256-NIA4, 256-NIA5, 256-NIA6, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, or 128-NIA3.

[0226] The aforementioned independent integrity protection algorithm may also be called an integrity-only protection algorithm or have other names, which are not limited here.

[0227] The first independent encryption algorithm may be an independent encryption algorithm used to activate RRC confidentiality protection, or it may be an independent encryption algorithm used to protect RRC messages between the terminal device and the access network device.

[0228] The independent encryption algorithm can be a security algorithm used alone for confidentiality protection. For example, the independent encryption algorithm can be 256-NEA4, 256-NEA5, 256-NEA6, NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, or 128-NEA3.

[0229] The aforementioned standalone encryption algorithm may also be called an encryption-only algorithm, a standalone confidentiality protection algorithm, a confidentiality protection-only algorithm, or other names, which are not limited here.

[0230] The first combined mode algorithm can be a combined mode algorithm for activating RRC security, or it can be a combined mode algorithm for protecting RRC messages between the terminal device and the access network device.

[0231] The combined mode algorithm can be a security algorithm used for integrity protection and / or confidentiality protection. For example, the combined mode algorithm can be 256-NCA4, 256-NCA5, or 256-NCA6.

[0232] For example, the combined pattern algorithm may also be called the AEAD algorithm, the authentication encryption algorithm, or have other names.

[0233] In some possible implementations, during the pre-registration process of a terminal device registering with the network or establishing a connection, the access network device can acquire the security capabilities of the terminal device. These security capabilities can indicate the security algorithms supported by the terminal device.

[0234] As an example, the access network device can select a first security algorithm based on this security capability and a list of algorithm priorities configured locally within the access network device. For instance, the access network device can select the security algorithm with the highest priority and supported by the terminal device from the algorithm priority list as the aforementioned first security algorithm.

[0235] In some possible implementations, method 600 further includes: the access network device activating security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first security algorithm. As an example, the access network device can use the identifier of the first security algorithm (or the identifier of the core algorithm corresponding to the first security algorithm) as input parameters for key derivation to obtain key #1. Further, the access network device can activate RRC security between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first security algorithm and the aforementioned key #1.

[0236] For example, the activation operation described above may specifically include S620.

[0237] S620, the access network device sends a security activation message to the terminal device.

[0238] For example, the security activation message can be used to activate RRC security on the terminal device side. For instance, the terminal device can execute S630 as described below based on the security activation message.

[0239] As an example, the security activation message can be used to indicate a first security algorithm. For instance, the security activation message may include an identifier of the first security algorithm, or an identifier of the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0240] The core algorithm can be an algorithm used to generate a keystream. For example, the first security algorithm can use this core algorithm to generate a keystream and protect the data based on the generated keystream.

[0241] The core algorithm can also be called keystream generators, core functions, underlying algorithms, or basic algorithms.

[0242] For example, the core algorithm of the first security algorithm is: a 256-bit AES algorithm, a SNOW 5G algorithm, a 256-bit ZUC algorithm, a 128-bit AES algorithm, a SNOW 3G algorithm, or a 128-bit ZUC algorithm.

[0243] S630, the terminal device activates security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first security algorithm.

[0244] In some possible implementations, the terminal device can activate integrity and / or confidentiality protection for RRC messages transmitted between the access network device and the terminal device based on a first security algorithm and related keys. See [link to relevant documentation] for details. Figure 4 Related descriptions.

[0245] For example, the terminal device can generate key #2 based on the first security algorithm indicated by the security activation message. As an example, the terminal device can use the identifier of the first security algorithm or the identifier of the core algorithm corresponding to the first security algorithm as input parameters for key derivation to obtain key #2.

[0246] Understandably, in normal communication scenarios, the key #2 on the terminal device side and the key #1 on the access network device side are the same.

[0247] Furthermore, the terminal device can use the first security algorithm and key #2 to protect the integrity and / or confidentiality of RRC messages transmitted between the terminal device and the access network device.

[0248] In some examples, where the security activation message includes the identifier of the first security algorithm, the terminal device can obtain the identifier of the first security algorithm from the security activation message, or determine the identifier of the core algorithm corresponding to the first security algorithm based on the identifier of the first security algorithm.

[0249] In some possible implementations, where the first security algorithm is a first independent integrity protection algorithm, the method 600 further includes: the access network device selecting a first independent encryption algorithm for the terminal device. In this case, the security activation message also includes an identifier of the first independent encryption algorithm. For example, the security activation message may include an identifier of the first security algorithm (i.e., the first independent integrity protection algorithm) and an identifier of the first independent encryption algorithm. The access network device and the terminal device can activate RRC security between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm.

[0250] In the above possible implementations, the first independent encryption algorithm may be an empty algorithm. It is understandable that even if the first independent encryption algorithm is empty, the access network device and the terminal device will still run it to protect the confidentiality of the RRC message. However, this confidentiality protection has no substantial protective effect. For example, the encrypted RRC message is identical to the plaintext RRC message.

[0251] In some possible implementations, where the first security algorithm is a first independent encryption algorithm, the method 600 further includes: the access network device selecting a first independent integrity protection algorithm for the terminal device. In this case, the security activation message also includes an identifier of the first independent integrity protection algorithm. For example, the security activation message may include an identifier of the first security algorithm (i.e., the first independent integrity protection algorithm) and an identifier of the first independent encryption algorithm. The access network device and the terminal device can activate RRC security between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm.

[0252] In some other possible implementations, the first security algorithm may be a first combined mode algorithm. In this case, the access network device and the terminal device may activate RRC security between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first combined mode algorithm.

[0253] As an example, the security activation message may also include security indication information. This security indication information is used to indicate whether confidentiality protection for RRC messages is activated, and / or, to indicate whether integrity protection for RRC messages is activated.

[0254] In this way, the access network device and the terminal device can activate the integrity protection and / or confidentiality protection of the RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first combined mode algorithm and security indication information.

[0255] In other examples, where the security activation message includes an identifier of the core algorithm of the first security algorithm, the terminal device can determine the first security algorithm based on the identifier of the core algorithm.

[0256] As an example, if the terminal device determines that the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, the terminal device can determine that the first security algorithm is the combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm; conversely, if the terminal device determines that the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm, the terminal device can determine that the first security algorithm is the independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm.

[0257] Regarding how a terminal device determines whether an access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, the following are some possible examples: In the first example, the terminal device can determine the network standard of the access network device.

[0258] For example, a network standard may be referred to as a radio access technology (RAT) type or have other names.

[0259] For example, if the network standard of the access network device is the network standard corresponding to the 6G communication system, or the network standard corresponding to the communication system after the 6G communication system, the terminal device can determine that the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0260] As an example, the network standard corresponding to the 6G communication system can be called AA.

[0261] As an example, the network standard corresponding to communication systems after 6G communication systems could be the network standard corresponding to 7G communication systems, etc.

[0262] In the above example, as one implementation logic of the terminal device, when the access network device is a network standard corresponding to a 6G communication system, or a network standard corresponding to a communication system with a network generation later than 6G, the terminal device can determine that the first security algorithm is the combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm. In other words, the terminal device can directly determine the first security algorithm based on the network standard of the access network device, without first determining whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm based on the network standard, and then determining the first security algorithm based on whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0263] However, this application does not limit this. As another implementation logic of the terminal device, the terminal device can first determine whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm based on the network standard of the access network device, and then determine the first security algorithm based on whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0264] For example, if the network standard of the access network device is the network standard corresponding to a communication system prior to 6G (e.g., the network standard corresponding to 4G or 5G communication systems), the terminal device can determine that the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm. Similar to the previous point, the specific implementation logic of the terminal device is not limited here.

[0265] As an example, during initial access, a terminal device can read characteristic parameters from messages such as the master information block (MIB) or system information block (SIB) to determine the network standard of the access network device.

[0266] In the second example, the security activation message may further include security capability information. This security capability information indicates whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm. The terminal device can determine the first security algorithm based on the received security capability information.

[0267] Below, we will continue to introduce other examples of how the terminal device determines the first security algorithm.

[0268] As another example, the security activation message also includes security indication information. The meaning of the security indication information is explained above. The terminal device can determine the first security algorithm based on this security indication information.

[0269] For example, when the security indication information indicates that integrity protection and confidentiality protection of RRC messages are activated, the terminal device can determine that the first security algorithm is the combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm.

[0270] For example, if the security indication information indicates that confidentiality protection for RRC messages is activated but integrity protection is not activated, the terminal device can determine that the first security algorithm is the independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm.

[0271] For example, if the security indication information indicates that integrity protection for RRC messages is activated but confidentiality protection is not activated, the terminal device can determine that the first security algorithm is the independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm.

[0272] Following S630 above, the access network device and the terminal device can transmit RRC messages based on the activated security protection. The execution order of the security protection and security activation messages for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device can be found above, for example... Figure 4 Related content.

[0273] In some possible implementations, method 600 also includes S640 after S630.

[0274] S640, the access network device sends a first configuration message to the terminal device for security protection based on the first security algorithm. The first configuration message may carry the user plane security state #1.

[0275] As an example, if the security activation message in S620 includes an identifier of a first security algorithm, and the first security algorithm is a first independent integrity protection algorithm, the security activation message may also include an identifier of a first independent encryption algorithm. The aforementioned first configuration message can be protected by both the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm. For example, the access network device sends a first configuration message to the terminal device that is securely protected based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm.

[0276] Understandably, this first independent encryption algorithm may or may not be an empty algorithm.

[0277] The first configuration message may be a message used to activate user plane security.

[0278] For example, the first configuration message may include a user plane security state #1. This user plane security state #1 indicates whether to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device, and / or whether to protect the integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device.

[0279] In some possible implementations, prior to S640, the access network device can obtain the user plane security policy corresponding to the terminal device. This user plane security policy indicates whether confidentiality and / or integrity protection is required for the user plane data of the terminal device. The specific content of the user plane security policy is detailed above, such as in "2. User Plane Security Policy," and will not be repeated here.

[0280] As an example, the access network device can determine the user plane security state #1 based on the user plane security policy.

[0281] For example, the user plane security policy may include a confidentiality protection policy and / or an integrity protection policy. The value of the confidentiality protection policy can be "required," "preferred," or "not needed." The value of the integrity protection policy can be "required," "preferred," or "not needed."

[0282] In some examples, when the confidentiality protection policy in the user plane security policy indicates "needed", the user plane security state #1 determined by the access network device indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be kept confidential.

[0283] In other examples, when the confidentiality protection policy in the user plane security policy indicates "recommended", the user plane security state #1 determined by the access network device indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be kept confidential, or indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should not be kept confidential.

[0284] In some other examples, when the confidentiality protection policy in the user plane security policy indicates "not required", the user plane security state #1 determined by the access network device indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is not confidential.

[0285] In some examples, when the integrity protection policy in the user plane security policy indicates "needed", the user plane security state #1 determined by the access network device indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for integrity.

[0286] In other examples, when the integrity protection policy in the user plane security policy indicates "recommended", the user plane security state #1 determined by the access network device indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for integrity, or indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should not be protected for integrity.

[0287] In some other examples, when the integrity protection policy in the user plane security policy indicates "not required", the user plane security state #1 determined by the access network device indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is not protected for integrity.

[0288] As an optional example, the first configuration message may also include at least one of the following: security capability information, the identifier of the second security algorithm, or the type information of the second security algorithm.

[0289] The security capability information is used to indicate whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0290] The second security algorithm can be a security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. The core algorithm of the second security algorithm is the same as that of the first security algorithm. For example, if the first security algorithm is 128-NIA2, the second security algorithm can be 128-NEA2. Both of these security algorithms use a 128-bit AES algorithm as their core algorithm. As another example, if the first security algorithm is 256-NIA5, the second security algorithm can be 256-NCA5. Both of these security algorithms use a 256-bit AES algorithm as their core algorithm.

[0291] The type information of the second security algorithm can be used to indicate the type of the second security algorithm.

[0292] The details regarding the access network device's determination of the second security algorithm, or the identifier of the second security algorithm, or the type of the second security algorithm are provided later, such as in S650, and will not be elaborated here.

[0293] The second security algorithm can be either an independent algorithm or a combined algorithm.

[0294] In some examples, the type of security algorithm can include at least two types, one of which is called a standalone algorithm and the other is called a combinatorial pattern algorithm.

[0295] As an example, a standalone algorithm can be a standalone encryption algorithm or a standalone integrity protection algorithm.

[0296] In some examples, the independent algorithm type can be further divided into two types: independent encryption algorithms and independent integrity protection algorithms.

[0297] In other examples, the type of security algorithm can include at least three types: one called a standalone encryption algorithm, another called a standalone integrity protection algorithm, and a third called a combined mode algorithm. As an example, the standalone encryption algorithm type can be represented as NEA. The standalone integrity protection algorithm type can be represented as NIA. The combined mode algorithm type can be represented as NCA.

[0298] However, this application does not limit this, and the type of security algorithm may also include other types.

[0299] As an example, the first configuration message could be an RRC connection reconfiguration message or have another name.

[0300] S650, the access network device activates user plane security based on the user plane security state #1 and uses the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0301] In some possible implementations, prior to S650, the access network device can determine the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1 and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. This process can also be understood as the access network device mapping the first security algorithm to the second security algorithm.

[0302] As an example, if the first configuration message carries the identifier of the second security algorithm and / or the type information of the second security algorithm, the access network device determines that the operation of the second security algorithm can be performed before S640.

[0303] For example, the access network device can determine the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1, the security configuration, and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0304] The security configuration is used to indicate the correspondence between the user plane security state #1 and the type of the second security algorithm.

[0305] As one possible interpretation, the security configuration could be a unified mapping rule or mapping table. For example, the security configuration could indicate the correspondence between the aforementioned user plane security state #1 and the type of the second security algorithm. Furthermore, the security configuration might also indicate the correspondence between other possible user plane security states and other security algorithm types.

[0306] As an example, this security configuration can indicate the following correspondences respectively: when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data is protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the corresponding security algorithm type is a combined mode algorithm; when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data is protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the corresponding security algorithm type is an independent algorithm (e.g., specifically an independent integrity protection algorithm); when the user plane security state indicates that the user plane data is protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the corresponding security algorithm type is an independent algorithm (e.g., specifically an independent encryption algorithm).

[0307] As another possible interpretation, the security configuration could also be a specific configuration among at least one security-related configuration. For example, among at least one security-related configuration, the security-related configuration used to indicate the correspondence between the user plane security state #1 and the type of the second security algorithm is the aforementioned "security configuration".

[0308] As an example, there can be multiple security-related configurations, including at least one mentioned above. Other security-related configurations besides this one can be used to indicate the correspondence between specific user plane security states and other security algorithm types. The specific correspondence logic is similar to the previous understanding and will not be elaborated here.

[0309] For example, based on the above security configuration, the specific process by which the access network device determines the second security algorithm may include: the access network device queries the above security configuration (or at least one security-related configuration) based on the user plane security state #1 to determine the type of the second security algorithm (e.g., whether it is a combined mode algorithm or an independent algorithm). The access network device determines the second security algorithm based on its type and in conjunction with the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. For example, if the core algorithm of the first security algorithm is a 256-bit AES algorithm, and the type of the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, then the access network device ultimately determines the second security algorithm to be 256-NCA5.

[0310] As an example, the security configuration (or multiple security-related configurations) mentioned above may be predefined, pre-configured, or obtained by the access network device through other means.

[0311] For example, the terminal device and the access network device negotiate and determine the security configuration during the connection establishment process. Alternatively, other network elements (e.g., core network elements) may issue the security configuration to the access network device and the terminal device, or the access network device may determine the security configuration and then instruct the terminal device via air interface signaling.

[0312] It should be noted that this application does not limit the order in which the operation of determining the second security algorithm is performed and in the execution of S640. For example, the operation of the access network device determining the second security algorithm can be performed before S640, after S640, or simultaneously with S640.

[0313] As a first example (e.g., corresponding to method 700 below), the first security algorithm described above is a first independent integrity protection algorithm. In this case, the second security algorithm is a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combination mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0314] In some possible implementations, S650 includes: when the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality and the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the access network device uses the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm to activate user plane security.

[0315] For example, when the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality, the access network device determines whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm; if it is determined that the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the access network device uses the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm to activate user plane security.

[0316] For example, the access network device determines whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm; if the first independent encryption algorithm is determined to be an empty algorithm, the access network device determines whether the user plane security state #1 indicates confidentiality protection for the user plane data of the terminal device; if the user plane security state #1 indicates confidentiality protection for the user plane data of the terminal device, the access network device uses the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm to activate user plane security.

[0317] In some possible implementations, the access network device can determine the security key based on a second security algorithm. Furthermore, the access network device can activate user plane security based on the second security algorithm and the security key.

[0318] For example, the security key mentioned above can be one key or multiple keys, and there is no limitation here.

[0319] As an example, an empty algorithm can be understood as a secure algorithm that does not substantially encrypt or decrypt data. For instance, an empty algorithm could be NEA0.

[0320] In some possible implementations, the terminal device or access network device uses an empty algorithm to encrypt or decrypt the data to be processed (e.g., plaintext) and still obtains the data to be processed itself.

[0321] In some other possible implementations, prior to S650, the method 600 includes: when the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected by confidentiality and the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the access network device determines that the second security algorithm is an independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0322] For example, when the user plane security status #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality, the access network device determines whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm; if the first independent encryption algorithm is determined to be an empty algorithm, the access network device determines that the second security algorithm is an independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0323] For example, the access network device determines whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm; if it is determined that the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the access network device determines whether the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality; if the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality, the access network device determines that the second security algorithm is an independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0324] Understandably, some relevant communication standards typically stipulate that the integrity protection algorithm used to protect RRC messages cannot be an empty algorithm. Therefore, the second security algorithm determined based on the non-empty first independent integrity protection algorithm is also non-empty, thus solving the problem of user plane data lacking substantial confidentiality protection due to the selection of an empty encryption algorithm.

[0325] However, this application does not exclude the possibility that the first independent integrity protection algorithm is also an empty algorithm. As an optional mechanism, if the first independent integrity protection algorithm is also an empty algorithm, the access network device may reselect a non-empty independent encryption algorithm and indicate the independent encryption algorithm to the terminal device through the aforementioned first configuration message or other means.

[0326] In some examples, if the access network device supports a combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm determined by the access network device may be a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combined mode algorithm.

[0327] As a first possible implementation, the access network device can determine the type of the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1 and the security configuration.

[0328] For example, when the user plane security state #1 indicates that confidentiality and integrity protection should be performed on the user plane data of the terminal device, the access network device determines that the type of the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm. In this case, the second security algorithm can be a second combined mode algorithm. Furthermore, the access network device can perform confidentiality and integrity protection on the user plane data of the terminal device based on the combined mode of the second combined mode algorithm.

[0329] For example, when the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the access network device determines the type of the second security algorithm as an independent algorithm (e.g., an independent encryption algorithm). In this case, the second security algorithm can be a second independent encryption algorithm. Furthermore, the access network device can protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device based on this second independent encryption algorithm.

[0330] For example, if the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the access network device may not perform the operation of determining the second security algorithm as described above, but instead reuse the first independent integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the user plane data.

[0331] The example above can be understood as an example of a security configuration. For instance, a security configuration could be used to indicate the correspondence between the aforementioned user plane security state #1 and the type of the second security algorithm.

[0332] As a second possible implementation, the second security algorithm determined by the access network device can be a second combined mode algorithm.

[0333] For example, when User Plane Security State #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the access network device uses the combined mode of the second combined mode algorithm to protect the user plane data for both confidentiality and integrity. When User Plane Security State #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the access network device uses the confidentiality-only / encryption-only protection mode of the second combined mode algorithm to protect the user plane data for confidentiality. When User Plane Security State #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the access network device uses the integrity-only protection mode of the second combined mode algorithm to protect the user plane data for integrity.

[0334] For example, the security-related policies of the access network device can instruct the use of a combined mode algorithm to activate user plane security. Thus, the access network device can execute the second possible implementation described above based on the aforementioned security-related policies.

[0335] The security-related policies can be predefined, preconfigured, or obtained by the access network device through other means; no restrictions are imposed here.

[0336] In the second possible implementation described above and the third possible implementation described below, the access network device may determine the second security algorithm before or after S640, and no limitation is made here.

[0337] As a third possible implementation, the second security algorithm determined by the access network device can be a second independent encryption algorithm.

[0338] For example, when User Plane Security State #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the access network device uses the second independent encryption algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data and uses the first independent integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the user plane data. When User Plane Security State #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the access network device uses the second independent encryption algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data. When User Plane Security State #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the access network device may not perform the above-mentioned operation of determining the second security algorithm, but instead reuse the first independent integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the user plane data.

[0339] For example, the security-related policies of the access network device can instruct the use of an independent algorithm to activate user plane security. Thus, the access network device can execute the third possible implementation described above based on the aforementioned security-related policies. The method for obtaining the security-related policies is described above and will not be repeated here.

[0340] In other examples, if the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm determined by the access network device may be a second independent encryption algorithm.

[0341] For example, when the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality and integrity, the access network device uses the second independent encryption algorithm to protect the user plane data for confidentiality and the first independent integrity protection algorithm to protect the user plane data for integrity; when the user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality, but the user plane data of the terminal device should not be protected for integrity, the access network device uses the second independent encryption algorithm to protect the user plane data for confidentiality.

[0342] As a second example (for example, corresponding to method 800 below), when the first security algorithm is a first combination mode algorithm, the second security algorithm includes a second independent encryption algorithm and / or a second independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first combination mode algorithm.

[0343] In some possible implementations, the access network device can determine the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1, the security configuration, and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. For example, the above possible implementations can be divided into the following three cases.

[0344] In the first scenario, when user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for both confidentiality and integrity, the second security algorithm is of the type of independent encryption algorithm and independent integrity protection algorithm. In this case, the access network device determines that the second security algorithm includes both the second independent encryption algorithm and the second independent integrity protection algorithm. Further, the access network device uses the second independent encryption algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data and uses the second independent integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the user plane data.

[0345] As an alternative, the access network device can also directly reuse the first combination mode algorithm and use the combination mode of the first combination mode algorithm to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the user plane data.

[0346] In the second scenario, when user plane security state #1 indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device should be protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the second security algorithm is an independent encryption algorithm. In this case, the access network device determines the second security algorithm as a second independent encryption algorithm. Furthermore, the access network device uses this second independent encryption algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.

[0347] As an alternative, the access network device can also directly reuse the first combined mode algorithm and use the confidentiality-only / encryption protection mode of the first combined mode algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data.

[0348] In the third scenario, where user plane security state #1 indicates that integrity protection is provided for the user plane data of the terminal device, but confidentiality protection is not provided, the second security algorithm is an independent integrity protection algorithm. In this case, the access network device determines the second security algorithm as a second independent integrity protection algorithm. Furthermore, the access network device uses this second independent integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the user plane data.

[0349] As an alternative, the access network device can also directly reuse the first combined mode algorithm and use the integrity protection mode of the first combined mode algorithm to perform integrity protection on the user plane data.

[0350] The three scenarios described above can be understood as another example of security configuration. For instance, security configuration can be used to indicate the correspondence between the aforementioned user plane security state #1 and the type of the aforementioned second security algorithm.

[0351] In some possible implementations, after S640, method 600 also includes: S660.

[0352] S660, the terminal device activates user plane security based on the user plane security state #1 and uses the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0353] In some possible implementations, prior to S660, the terminal device can determine the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1 and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. This process can also be understood as the terminal device mapping the first security algorithm to the second security algorithm.

[0354] For example, the terminal device can determine the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1, the security configuration, and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. The meaning and acquisition method of the security configuration are described above, such as in the relevant description of S650, and will not be repeated here.

[0355] As a first example (e.g., corresponding to method 700 below), the first security algorithm described above is a first independent integrity protection algorithm. In this case, the second security algorithm is a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combination mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0356] It is understood that the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device and the access network device is consistent, thereby ensuring that both communicating parties can encrypt and decrypt user plane data respectively, and / or perform integrity protection and integrity verification.

[0357] In some possible implementations, the terminal device can determine the security key based on a second security algorithm. Furthermore, the terminal device can activate user plane security based on the second security algorithm and the security key.

[0358] Under normal communication conditions, the security key determined by the terminal device and the access network device is consistent.

[0359] As a first example (e.g., corresponding to method 700 below), the first security algorithm described above is a first independent integrity protection algorithm. In this case, the second security algorithm is a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combination mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0360] In some examples, where the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device can be either a second independent encryption algorithm or a second combined mode algorithm. For details on how the terminal device determines whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, please refer to the relevant examples in S630 above, such as through security capability information in the first configuration message and / or the network standard of the access network device; these will not be elaborated upon here.

[0361] As a first possible implementation, the terminal device can determine the type of the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1 and the security configuration.

[0362] For example, when user plane security state #1 indicates that confidentiality and integrity protection should be performed on the user plane data of the terminal device, and the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, the type of the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device is a combined mode algorithm. In this case, the second security algorithm can be a second combined mode algorithm. Furthermore, the terminal device can perform confidentiality and integrity protection on the user plane data of the terminal device based on the combined mode of the second combined mode algorithm.

[0363] Other examples can be found in the description of the first possible implementation in S650, and will not be repeated here.

[0364] As a second possible implementation, the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device can be a second combined mode algorithm. See the relevant description of the second possible implementation in S650 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0365] For example, the terminal device can obtain a security-related policy. This security-related policy instructs the use of a combined-mode algorithm to activate user plane security when the access network device supports the combined-mode algorithm.

[0366] For details on how the terminal device determines whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, please refer to the previous text, such as the relevant description of S630, which will not be repeated here.

[0367] It is understood that this security-related policy is the same as the security-related policy on the access network device side. Thus, the access network device and the terminal device can activate user plane security using the second combination mode algorithm based on this security-related policy.

[0368] The security-related policies can be predefined, preconfigured, or obtained by the terminal device through other means; no restrictions are imposed here.

[0369] As a third possible implementation, the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device can be a second independent encryption algorithm. See the relevant description of the third possible implementation in S650 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0370] As an example, the terminal device may not perform the operation of determining whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, but instead determine to execute the third possible implementation method mentioned above based on security-related policies.

[0371] As another example, the terminal device could also perform the operation of determining whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm. However, the terminal device would still execute the third possible implementation described above.

[0372] In other examples, where the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device may be a second independent encryption algorithm. See S650 for the relevant description regarding the access network device not supporting the combined mode algorithm; further details will not be repeated here.

[0373] As an example, the terminal device may not perform the operation of determining whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, but instead determine to execute the above example based on security-related policies.

[0374] For example, this security-related policy instructs the terminal device to activate user plane security using an independent algorithm.

[0375] As another example, the terminal device can also perform the operation of determining whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0376] For example, if the terminal device determines that the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device may be a second independent encryption algorithm. Conversely, if the terminal device determines that the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm determined by the terminal device may be a second combined mode algorithm.

[0377] For example, the terminal device executes the above example based on a security-related policy. This security-related policy may instruct: if the access network device supports the combined-mode algorithm, to activate user plane security using the combined-mode algorithm; if the access network device does not support the combined-mode algorithm, to activate user plane security using an independent algorithm.

[0378] For further descriptions of security-related strategies, please refer to the previous text; they will not be repeated here.

[0379] As a second example (for example, corresponding to method 800 below), when the first security algorithm is a first combination mode algorithm, the second security algorithm includes a second independent encryption algorithm and / or a second independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first combination mode algorithm.

[0380] In some possible implementations, the terminal device can determine the second security algorithm based on the user plane security state #1, the security configuration, and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm. For example, the above possible implementations can be divided into three cases. These three cases correspond one-to-one with the three cases described in S650, and will not be repeated here.

[0381] In some other possible implementations, the terminal device may reuse the first combined mode algorithm and, based on the user plane security state #1, use different modes of the first combined mode algorithm to perform confidentiality and / or integrity protection on the user plane data. For details, please refer to the three alternatives in S650, which will not be repeated here.

[0382] It is understandable that the specific mode of the second security algorithm or the first combined mode algorithm used by the terminal device is the same as that of the access network device.

[0383] The following describes how the terminal device determines the second security algorithm based on other methods.

[0384] In some examples, the first configuration message described above may carry an identifier of the second security algorithm. In this way, the terminal device can obtain the identifier of the second security algorithm from the first configuration message and, based on that identifier, activate user plane security using the second security algorithm.

[0385] In other examples, the first configuration message described above may carry type information for the second security algorithm. In this way, the terminal device can determine the second security algorithm based on this type information and the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0386] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. Method 700 can be used as an example of method 600. In method 700, the security algorithm (denoted as RRC security algorithm) selected by the access network device for security protection of RRC messages may include an independent encryption algorithm and an independent integrity protection algorithm. The following describes the various operations of method 700, taking a UE as the terminal device and a RAN as the access network device.

[0387] S701, core network element #1 sends UE security capabilities to RAN.

[0388] Prior to S701, the UE and the network had to go through pre-processing procedures such as registration, master authentication, and non-access stratum security mode command (NAS SMC) procedures.

[0389] After the above process, core network element #1 in the network can obtain the UE's security capabilities. These UE security capabilities indicate the security algorithms supported by the UE. This UE security capability can serve as an example of the security capabilities of the terminal device described earlier.

[0390] For example, during the registration process, the UE can send a registration request to core network element #1, which requests to register the UE with the network. This registration request can carry the UE's security capabilities.

[0391] It should be noted that this application does not limit the specific name of core network element #1. In future communication networks (such as 6G communication networks), core network element #1 may also be called AMF, core proxy function (CPF), signaling routing function (SRF), or have other names.

[0392] S702, the RAN selects the RRC security algorithm based on the UE's security capabilities and the algorithm priority list configured by the RAN.

[0393] For example, the RAN can select the highest priority security algorithm that is supported by the UE from the algorithm priority list as the aforementioned RRC security algorithm.

[0394] As an example, the RRC security algorithm may include an independent encryption algorithm (denoted as Independent Encryption Algorithm #1) and an independent integrity protection algorithm (denoted as Independent Integrity Protection Algorithm #1).

[0395] The aforementioned independent encryption algorithm #1 can be used as an example of a first independent encryption algorithm. The aforementioned independent integrity protection algorithm #1 can also be used as an example of a first security algorithm or a first independent integrity protection algorithm.

[0396] For example, if an empty algorithm in the RAN's configured algorithm priority list is set to the highest priority, the standalone encryption algorithm #1 selected by the RAN is an empty algorithm (e.g., NEA0).

[0397] For example, according to the protocol, the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 selected by the RAN will not be an empty algorithm. However, this application is not limited to this. For example, in some other examples of embodiments of this application, the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 selected by the RAN may also be an empty algorithm.

[0398] In some possible implementations, the RAN can enable integrity protection for downlink RRC messages based on this independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0399] As an example, RAN can deduce key K based on independent integrity protection algorithm #1. RRCint For example, RAN can use the identifier of this independent integrity protection algorithm #1 as the input parameter value for key derivation to derive the key K. RRCint Unless otherwise specified, the interpretation of "derive key based on a certain algorithm" in other places in this application may include, but is not limited to, the examples above.

[0400] Furthermore, RAN can be based on Independent Integrity Protection Algorithm #1 and key K. RRCint Integrity protection is performed on AS SMC messages, and S703 is executed.

[0401] S703, the RAN sends an AS SMC message with integrity protection to the UE.

[0402] This AS SMC message can be used as an example of the security activation message mentioned earlier.

[0403] After the RAN sends the AS SMC message, the RAN can activate encryption for the downlink RRC message.

[0404] As an example, the AS SMC message can indicate the aforementioned independent encryption algorithm #1 and the aforementioned independent integrity protection algorithm #1. For instance, the AS SMC message may include the identifier of the aforementioned independent encryption algorithm #1 and the identifier of the aforementioned independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0405] As an example, the UE can deduce the key K based on the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 indicated by AS SMC. RRCintFurthermore, the UE can be based on independent integrity protection algorithm #1 and key K. RRCint Perform integrity verification on AS SMC messages.

[0406] If the integrity verification is successful, the UE activates the integrity protection and encryption of uplink RRC messages, and activates the decryption of downlink RRC messages.

[0407] Furthermore, if integrity verification is successful, the UE can use key K. RRCint The independent integrity protection algorithm #1 indicated by the AS SMC message is used to perform integrity protection on the AS security mode completion message and execute S704.

[0408] S704, the UE sends an AS security mode completion message with integrity protection to the RAN.

[0409] After sending the AS security mode completion message, the UE can activate encryption of uplink RRC messages.

[0410] After the RAN receives the AS security mode completion message, the RAN uses the integrity protection key K. RRCint The RAN performs integrity verification on messages completed in AS security mode. If verification is successful, the RAN can activate the decryption of uplink RRC messages.

[0411] Through S703 and S704 described above, RRC security between the UE and RAN is activated. That is, the UE enables encryption and integrity protection for uplink RRC messages, and decryption and integrity verification for downlink RRC messages. Correspondingly, the RAN enables encryption and integrity protection for downlink RRC messages, and decryption and integrity verification for uplink RRC messages.

[0412] After RRC security is activated, the UE may execute S705 due to service requirements.

[0413] S705, the UE sends a PDU session establishment request to the network.

[0414] For example, this PDU session establishment request is used to request the establishment of a PDU session for transmitting user plane data.

[0415] For example, a PDU session establishment request may include service information, such as indicating the service to which the user plane data to be transmitted by the UE belongs.

[0416] As an example, business information may include at least one of the following: data network name (DNN), single network slice selection assistance information (S-NSSAI), or application (APP) identifier.

[0417] As an example, the UE can send a PDU session establishment request to core network element #1 via the RAN. Core network element #1 can execute S706.

[0418] S706, Core network element #1 sends a PDU session establishment request to core network element #2.

[0419] As an example, the PDU session establishment request received by core network element #1 from the UE can be carried in the NAS message. Core network element #1 can extract the PDU session establishment request from the NAS message and send the PDU session establishment request to core network element #2.

[0420] It should be noted that this application does not limit the specific name of core network element #2. In future communication networks (such as 6G communication networks), core network element #2 may also be called SMF, session management element, session management function, or have other names.

[0421] S707, core network element #2 responds to the PDU session establishment request and determines the user plane security policy corresponding to the PDU session.

[0422] In some possible implementations, core network element #2 can comprehensively determine the user plane security policy of the PDU session based on the service information carried in the PDU session establishment request and the user plane security policy subscribed by core network element #2 from the UDM.

[0423] S708, core network element #2 sends user plane security policy to RAN.

[0424] For example, core network element #2 sends an N2 PDU session request message to the RAN through core network element #1, which carries the user plane security policy.

[0425] S709, RAN determines the UP security algorithm based on the user plane security policy and / or independent encryption algorithm #1.

[0426] The UP security algorithm can be a security algorithm used to protect UP data. For example, the UP security algorithm may include independent encryption algorithms and independent integrity protection algorithms. Another example is that the UP security algorithm may include a combined mode algorithm.

[0427] In some possible implementations, where the RAN determines to protect the integrity of the UE's UP data without protecting the confidentiality of the UE's UP data, the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN may include independent encryption algorithm #1 and independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0428] In some other possible implementations, where the RAN determines that the UE's UP data should be kept confidential but not protected for integrity, the RAN determines that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm mapped to the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 (denoted as independent encryption algorithm #2), based on independent encryption algorithm #1. This independent encryption algorithm #2 can be used to protect the confidentiality of the UE's UP data.

[0429] The aforementioned independent encryption algorithm #2 can serve as an example of the second security algorithm or the second independent encryption algorithm mentioned above.

[0430] In this context, the security algorithm #b mapped to security algorithm #a can be understood as the security algorithm #b corresponding to the core algorithm of security algorithm #a. That is, the core algorithms of security algorithm #a and security algorithm #b can be the same. However, the types of security algorithm #a and security algorithm #b can be different.

[0431] The aforementioned independent integrity protection algorithm #1 can be considered as an example of security algorithm #a. The aforementioned independent encryption algorithm #2 can be considered as an example of security algorithm #b.

[0432] In the above possible implementations, as an example, if the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is 256-NIA5, the independent encryption algorithm #2 can be 256-NEA5. It is evident that the core algorithm of both 256-NIA5 and 256-NEA5 is the 256-bit AES algorithm.

[0433] As an example, the RAN determines that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped by the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 based on the independent encryption algorithm #1. Specifically, when the independent encryption algorithm #1 is an empty algorithm, the RAN determines that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped by the independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0434] For example, RAN can determine whether independent encryption algorithm #1 is an empty algorithm. If independent encryption algorithm #1 is an empty algorithm, RAN can determine that the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2. If independent encryption algorithm #1 is not an empty algorithm, RAN can determine that the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #1, or independent encryption algorithm #2, without limitation.

[0435] Understandably, if the RAN reuses independent encryption algorithm #1 as a security algorithm for protecting the confidentiality of UP data when it is an empty algorithm, then although UP encryption is enabled between the UE and the RAN, there is no substantial confidentiality protection for the UP data. Therefore, when the RAN determines that independent encryption algorithm #1 is an empty algorithm, it can determine that the security algorithm used to protect the confidentiality of UP data is the independent encryption algorithm mapped to independent integrity protection algorithm #1. Since the protocol stipulates that independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is not an empty algorithm, the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped to independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is also not an empty algorithm. Thus, by using independent encryption algorithm #2, the UE and the RAN can achieve substantial confidentiality protection for the UP data.

[0436] In some possible implementation scenarios, the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 may also be an empty algorithm. In this case, the RAN can determine whether the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is an empty algorithm. If the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is not an empty algorithm, the RAN can determine that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped by the independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0437] In some other possible implementations, where the RAN determines to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the UE's UP data, the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN may include an independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped to an independent integrity protection algorithm #1 or a combined mode algorithm #2.

[0438] Among them, the combined mode algorithm #2 can be understood as the same combined mode algorithm as the core algorithm of the independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0439] For example, if the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is 256-NIA5, the combined mode algorithm #2 can be 256-NCA5. It is evident that the core algorithms of both 256-NIA5 and 256-NCA5 are 256-bit AES algorithms.

[0440] As an example, the RAN can determine whether the UP security algorithm includes standalone encryption algorithm #2 or combined mode algorithm #2 based on its own security capabilities (e.g., whether it supports combined mode algorithms) and / or local security-related policies.

[0441] In some examples, where the RAN supports combined mode algorithms, the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN includes combined mode algorithm #2. This combined mode algorithm #2 can serve as an example of the second security algorithm or the second combined mode algorithm in method 600 described above.

[0442] For example, the RAN supports combined mode algorithms, which can also be understood as the RAN's PDCP layer supporting encryption before integrity protection, or the RAN supporting encryption before integrity protection.

[0443] Among them, the above-mentioned combined mode algorithm #2 can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of UP data.

[0444] In other examples, where the RAN does not support the combined mode algorithm, the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN includes independent encryption algorithm #2. Furthermore, the UP security algorithm also includes independent integrity protection algorithm #1.

[0445] For example, the RAN does not support the combined mode algorithm, which can also be understood as the RAN's PDCP layer not supporting encryption before integrity protection, or the RAN not supporting encryption before integrity protection.

[0446] Specifically, the aforementioned independent encryption algorithm #2 can be used to protect the confidentiality of UP data. The aforementioned independent integrity protection algorithm #1 can be used to protect the integrity of UP data.

[0447] S710, the RAN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE.

[0448] This RRC connection reconfiguration message can serve as an example of the first configuration message.

[0449] In some possible implementations, after S710, the RAN enables UP confidentiality protection and / or UP integrity protection based on the UP security algorithm.

[0450] In some examples, where the RAN determines that integrity protection is required for the UE's UP data, but confidentiality protection is not required, the RAN-determined UP security algorithm includes Independent Integrity Protection Algorithm #1. Thus, the RAN enables UP integrity protection based on Independent Integrity Protection Algorithm #1.

[0451] For example, if the RAN does not store the integrity protection key used to enable UP integrity protection, the RAN can deduce the integrity protection key based on the independent integrity protection algorithm #1. The RAN can then enable UP integrity protection based on the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 and the integrity protection key.

[0452] If the RAN stores an integrity protection key for enabling UP integrity protection, the RAN can obtain the integrity protection key and enable UP integrity protection based on the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 and the integrity protection key.

[0453] In other examples, where the RAN determines that confidentiality protection is required for the UE's UP data, but integrity protection is not, the RAN determines that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped to the independent integrity protection algorithm #1. Thus, the RAN can enable UP confidentiality protection based on the independent encryption algorithm #2.

[0454] For example, if the RAN does not store the confidentiality protection key used to enable UP confidentiality protection, the RAN derives the confidentiality protection key based on independent encryption algorithm #2. The RAN can then enable UP confidentiality protection based on independent encryption algorithm #2 and the confidentiality protection key.

[0455] If the RAN stores a confidentiality protection key for enabling UP confidentiality protection, the RAN can obtain the confidentiality protection key and enable UP confidentiality protection based on the independent encryption algorithm #2 and the confidentiality protection key.

[0456] In some other examples, where the RAN determines that the UE's UP data needs to be protected for both integrity and confidentiality, the RAN determines that the UP security algorithm includes either the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped to the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 or the combined mode algorithm #2.

[0457] When the UP security algorithm includes the combined mode algorithm #2, the RAN can enable UP confidentiality protection and UP integrity protection based on the combined mode algorithm #2.

[0458] For example, if the RAN does not store the security key used to enable UP confidentiality protection and UP integrity protection, the RAN derives the security key based on Combination Mode Algorithm #2. The RAN can then enable UP confidentiality protection and UP integrity protection based on Combination Mode Algorithm #2 and the security key.

[0459] If the RAN stores a security key for enabling UP confidentiality protection and UP integrity protection, the RAN can obtain the security key and enable UP confidentiality protection and UP integrity protection based on the combined mode algorithm #2 and the security key.

[0460] The security key can be a single key or multiple keys; no limitation is made here.

[0461] When the UP security algorithm includes an independent encryption algorithm #2, it also includes an independent integrity protection algorithm #1. Thus, the RAN enables UP confidentiality protection based on the independent encryption algorithm #2. The RAN enables UP integrity protection based on the independent integrity protection algorithm #1. The specific key acquisition process is similar to that described above and will not be repeated here.

[0462] Below are some examples of RRC connection reconfiguration messages.

[0463] As an example, this RRC connection reconfiguration message can instruct the UE whether to enable UP integrity protection and / or UP confidentiality protection. The UE can determine whether to enable UP integrity protection and / or UP confidentiality protection based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message.

[0464] For example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message includes a user plane security status. This user plane security status can be used to indicate whether confidentiality and / or integrity protection is applied to the UE's UP data.

[0465] Optionally, the RRC connection reconfiguration message may also include at least one of the following: security capability information, algorithm mapping information, or an identifier of the UP security algorithm.

[0466] Among them, security capability information can be used to indicate whether the RAN supports combined mode algorithms.

[0467] For example, security capability information can occupy 1 bit. For instance, if this bit is 0, it indicates that the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm. Conversely, if this bit is 1, it indicates that the RAN does not support the combined mode algorithm. Alternatively, if this bit is 1, it indicates that the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm. Conversely, if this bit is 0, it indicates that the RAN does not support the combined mode algorithm. This security capability information can also occupy more bits; this is not limited here.

[0468] For example, the security capability information can be used to indicate the network standards supported by the RAN. For instance, the security capability information can be used to indicate that the RAN supports the network standards corresponding to 6G communication systems. In this case, the security capability information can implicitly indicate that the RAN supports combined mode algorithms. As another example, the security capability information can be used to indicate that the RAN does not support the network standards corresponding to 6G communication systems, or to indicate that the RAN supports the network standards corresponding to 5G or 4G communication systems. In this case, the security capability information can implicitly indicate that the RAN does not support combined mode algorithms.

[0469] The algorithm mapping information can be used to indicate the mapping of the independent integrity protection algorithm #1. This algorithm mapping information can serve as an example of the type information of the second security algorithm mentioned earlier.

[0470] For example, algorithm mapping information can be used to indicate that a standalone integrity protection algorithm #1 is mapped to a standalone encryption algorithm #2 or a combined mode algorithm #2. As another example, algorithm mapping information can be used to indicate that the UP security algorithm includes either a standalone encryption algorithm #2 or a combined mode algorithm #2. Yet another example, algorithm mapping information can be used to indicate the use of a security algorithm different from the security algorithm selected or indicated during the AS SMC process.

[0471] For example, the algorithm mapping information can occupy 1 bit. For instance, if this bit is 0, it indicates an independent encryption algorithm. Conversely, if this bit is 1, it indicates a combined mode algorithm. Thus, when this bit is 0, the algorithm mapping information can be used to indicate that the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is mapped to the independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the independent integrity protection algorithm #1, i.e., independent encryption algorithm #2; when this bit is 1, the algorithm mapping information can be used to indicate that the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is mapped to the combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the independent integrity protection algorithm #1, i.e., combined mode algorithm #2.

[0472] Alternatively, a value of 1 indicates a combined encryption algorithm. Conversely, a value of 0 indicates an independent encryption algorithm. See the above text for a detailed description, which will not be repeated here.

[0473] It should be noted that there is no limit to the number of bits occupied by the algorithm mapping information here. The algorithm mapping information can occupy only 1 bit or more bits.

[0474] The identifier for the UP security algorithm may include the identifier of the independent encryption algorithm #2 or the identifier of the combined mode algorithm #2.

[0475] S711, the UE is configured based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message.

[0476] For example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message includes a user plane security status. This user plane security status can be used to indicate whether confidentiality and / or integrity protection is applied to the UE's UP data.

[0477] In some examples, when the user plane security status indicates that the UE's UP data is protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the UE determines, based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message, that the UP security algorithm includes Independent Integrity Protection Algorithm #1. Furthermore, the UE enables UP integrity protection based on Independent Integrity Protection Algorithm #1. The specific key acquisition and usage process is similar to the RAN's behavior and will not be elaborated further.

[0478] In other examples, when the user plane security status indicates that the UE's UP data is protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the UE determines, based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message, that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped to the independent integrity protection algorithm #1. Furthermore, the UE enables UP confidentiality protection based on the independent encryption algorithm #2. The specific key acquisition and usage process is similar to the RAN's behavior and will not be described further.

[0479] In some possible implementations, in response to the aforementioned user plane security state, the UE maps the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 to the independent encryption algorithm #2 and enables UP confidentiality protection based on the independent encryption algorithm #2.

[0480] In some possible implementations, the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes algorithm mapping information, which indicates that the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is mapped to the independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the independent integrity protection algorithm #1. In this case, the UE can map the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 to the independent encryption algorithm #2 based on the algorithm mapping information. The UE can then enable UP confidentiality protection based on the independent encryption algorithm #2 according to the user plane security status.

[0481] In some other possible implementations, the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes an identifier for Independent Encryption Algorithm #2. In this case, the UE can enable UP confidentiality protection based on Independent Encryption Algorithm #2, using this identifier and the user plane security status.

[0482] In some further examples, where the user plane security status indicates that the UE’s UP data is protected for both integrity and confidentiality, the UE may determine that the UP security algorithm includes either the independent encryption algorithm #2 mapped to the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 or the combined mode algorithm #2.

[0483] When the UP security algorithm includes the combined mode algorithm #2, this combined mode algorithm #2 can be used to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the UE's UP data. Thus, the UE can enable UP confidentiality and UP integrity protection based on the combined mode algorithm #2. The specific key acquisition and usage procedures are similar to those of the RAN and will not be elaborated further.

[0484] When the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2, it also includes independent integrity protection algorithm #1. Independent encryption algorithm #2 is used to protect the confidentiality of the UE's UP data; independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is used to protect the integrity of the UE's UP data. Thus, the UE enables UP confidentiality protection based on independent encryption algorithm #2. The UE enables UP integrity protection based on independent integrity protection algorithm #1. The specific key acquisition and usage procedures are similar to the RAN's behavior and will not be elaborated further.

[0485] In some possible implementations, where the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes security capability information, the UE can determine whether the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2 or combined mode algorithm #2 based on the security capability information.

[0486] For example, if the security capability information indicates that the RAN supports combined mode algorithms, the UE can determine that the UP security algorithm includes combined mode algorithm #2. As another example, if the security capability information does not indicate that the RAN supports combined mode algorithms, the UE can determine that the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2.

[0487] As one possible implementation scenario, the 4G RAN or 5G RAN may or may not support the combined mode algorithm. The 6G RAN may support the combined mode algorithm. The UE can access the 6G core network through the 4G RAN, 5G RAN, or 6G RAN. In this case, the RAN can carry security capability information in the RRC connection reconfiguration message, allowing the UE to know whether the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm. If the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm, the UE can then use the combined mode algorithm to enable UP integrity protection and UP confidentiality protection.

[0488] In some other possible implementations, where the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes algorithm mapping information, the UE can determine whether the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2 or combined mode algorithm #2 based on the algorithm mapping information.

[0489] For example, if the algorithm mapping information indicates that the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is mapped to the combined mode algorithm #2, the UE can determine that the UP security algorithm includes the combined mode algorithm #2. As another example, if the algorithm mapping information indicates that the independent integrity protection algorithm #1 is mapped to the independent encryption algorithm #2, the UE can determine that the UP security algorithm includes the independent encryption algorithm #2.

[0490] In some other possible implementations, the UE can determine whether the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2 or combined mode algorithm #2 based on the RAN network standard.

[0491] For example, if the RAN supports 6G communication technology, the UE can determine that the UP security algorithm includes combined mode algorithm #2. As another example, if the RAN does not support 6G communication technology, or if the RAN only supports 5G and / or 4G communication technologies, the UE can determine that the UP security algorithm includes independent encryption algorithm #2.

[0492] As an example, the network type can be indicated by the security capability information in the RRC connection reconfiguration message; or, the UE can determine the network type of the RAN when accessing the RAN.

[0493] For example, during the initial access process, the UE can read the master information block (MIB) and then obtain messages such as the system information block (SIB) based on the MIB, thereby determining the network standard of the RAN that the UE accesses.

[0494] As an example, for a 5G RAN (e.g., gNB), the aforementioned SIB1 may include an NR band indicator (e.g., freqBandIndicatorNR) and / or NR cell bandwidth (e.g., carrierBandwidth) to identify that the cell accessed by the UE is a cell of a 5G communication network. In this way, the UE can determine that the RAN accessed by the UE is a 5G RAN based on the above information.

[0495] As an optional example, the SIB1 mentioned above may also include random access configuration for NR (e.g., physical random access channel (PRACH) format, mapping relationship between synchronization signal block (SSB) and PRACH, etc.). The SIB1 sent by the 4G RAN may not contain the above information, so that the UE can determine that the RAN accessed by the UE is the 4G RAN based on the above information.

[0496] As an example, for a 4G RAN (e.g., an eNB), the RAN can identify the cell to which the UE is accessing as a 4G communication network cell through Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA) parameters in SIB1 and subsequent SIBs (e.g., SIB2 to SIB8). Thus, the UE can determine that the RAN it is accessing is a 4G RAN based on the above information.

[0497] For example, SIB5 transmitted by the 4G RAN can be used to indicate frequency reselection between different systems, and SIB3 or SIB4 can be used to configure intra-frequency or inter-frequency reselection. In this way, the UE can determine that the RAN it is accessing is the 4G RAN based on the above information.

[0498] As an example, for a 6G RAN (e.g., referred to as aNB), the RAN can identify the cell accessed by the UE as a 6G communication network cell through parameters in the MIB, SIB, or other information. In this way, the UE can determine that the RAN it accesses is a 6G RAN based on the above information.

[0499] S712, the UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the RAN.

[0500] In some possible implementations, after the UE completes the configuration based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message, the UE can send the RRC connection reconfiguration completion message to the RAN. Furthermore, the UE and RAN can use the aforementioned determined UP security algorithm to provide appropriate security protection for subsequent UP data of the session.

[0501] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. Method 800 can be considered as another example of method 600. In method 800, the access network device can select a combined mode algorithm as the RRC security algorithm. The following describes the various operations of method 800, taking a UE as the terminal device and a RAN as the access network device.

[0502] S801, core network element #1 sends the UE's security capabilities to the RAN.

[0503] The specific implementation of S801 is similar to that of S701 mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0504] S802, the RAN selects the RRC security algorithm based on the UE's security capabilities and the algorithm priority list configured by the RAN.

[0505] As an example, the RRC security algorithm may include a combinatorial mode algorithm (denoted as Combinatorial Mode Algorithm #1).

[0506] Among them, the above-mentioned combination mode algorithm #1 can be used as a specific example of the first security algorithm (or the first combination mode algorithm) in the above-mentioned method 600.

[0507] In some possible implementations, the RAN can enable integrity protection for downlink RRC messages based on this combined mode algorithm #1.

[0508] As an example, the RAN can deduce the key based on the combination mode algorithm #1. Furthermore, the RAN can perform integrity protection on AS SMC messages and execute S803 based on the combination mode algorithm #1 and the key.

[0509] S803, the RAN sends an AS SMC message with integrity protection to the UE.

[0510] As an example, the AS SMC message may include the identifier of the aforementioned combined mode algorithm #1.

[0511] As an example, the AS SMC message may also include security indication information, which indicates whether confidentiality protection for the RRC message is enabled.

[0512] For example, if the security indication information indicates that confidentiality protection for RRC messages is enabled, the RAN can activate confidentiality protection for downlink RRC messages after the RAN sends the AS SMC message.

[0513] As an example, the UE can deduce the key based on the combined mode algorithm #1 indicated by the AS SMC. Furthermore, the UE can perform integrity verification on the AS SMC message based on the combined mode algorithm #1 and the key.

[0514] If integrity verification is successful, the UE can activate integrity protection for uplink RRC messages. If the security indication information indicates that confidentiality protection for RRC messages is enabled, the UE can activate encryption for uplink RRC messages and decryption for downlink RRC messages.

[0515] S804, the UE sends an AS security mode completion message with integrity protection to the RAN.

[0516] When the security indication information indicates that confidentiality protection for RRC messages is enabled, the UE can activate encryption of uplink RRC messages after the UE sends an AS security mode completion message.

[0517] After the RAN receives the AS safe mode completion message, it performs integrity verification on the message. If the verification is successful, the RAN can activate the decryption of uplink RRC messages.

[0518] After RRC security is activated, the UE may execute S805 to S808 due to service requirements.

[0519] S805, the UE sends a PDU session establishment request to the network.

[0520] S806, core network element #1 sends a PDU session establishment request to core network element #2.

[0521] S807, core network element #2 responds to the PDU session establishment request and determines the user plane security policy corresponding to the PDU session.

[0522] S808, core network element #2 sends user plane security policy to RAN.

[0523] For details of S805 to S808 above, please refer to S705 to S708, which will not be repeated here.

[0524] S809, the RAN determines the UP security algorithm based on the user plane security policy and / or combined mode algorithm #1.

[0525] The UP security algorithm described above can be used as an example of the second security algorithm mentioned earlier.

[0526] In some possible implementations, the RAN can determine whether to protect the confidentiality and / or integrity of the UE's UP data based on the user plane security policy.

[0527] As an example, the RAN can determine the UP safety algorithm based on the results determined above. Exemplarily, the process of determining the UP safety algorithm can be divided into the following cases: In the first scenario, if the RAN determines that the UE's UP data requires both confidentiality and integrity protection, the RAN decides to reuse the combined mode algorithm #1 as the UP security algorithm. In other words, the UP security algorithm is the aforementioned combined mode algorithm #1. Furthermore, the RAN can use the combined mode of the combined mode algorithm #1 to simultaneously protect the UP data from both confidentiality and integrity.

[0528] As an alternative to the first scenario, the UP security algorithm determined by RAN may also include independent encryption algorithm #2 and independent integrity protection algorithm #2.

[0529] Specifically, the independent encryption algorithm #2 can be an independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the combined mode algorithm #1. This independent encryption algorithm #2 can be used to provide separate confidentiality protection for the UP data.

[0530] Specifically, the independent integrity protection algorithm #2 can be the independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the combined mode algorithm #1. This independent integrity protection algorithm #2 can be used to perform individual integrity protection on the UP data.

[0531] In the second scenario, where the RAN determines to protect the confidentiality of the UE's UP data but not its integrity, the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN can be an independent encryption algorithm #2.

[0532] As an alternative to the second scenario, the RAN can directly reuse the combined mode algorithm #1 for the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN. Furthermore, the RAN can use the confidentiality-only / encryption-only protection mode of the combined mode algorithm #1 to provide separate confidentiality protection for the UP data.

[0533] In the third scenario, where the RAN determines to protect the integrity of the UE's UP data without protecting its confidentiality, the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN can be the independent integrity protection algorithm #2.

[0534] As an alternative to the third scenario, the RAN can directly reuse the combined mode algorithm #1 for the UP security algorithm determined by the RAN. Furthermore, the RAN can use the integrity-only protection mode of the combined mode algorithm #1 to perform separate integrity protection on the UP data.

[0535] S810, the RAN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE.

[0536] This RRC connection reconfiguration message can serve as an example of the first configuration message.

[0537] In some possible implementations, after S810, the RAN enables UP confidentiality protection and / or UP integrity protection based on the UP security algorithm. See the relevant description in S710 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0538] For example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message includes the user plane security state. The meaning of the user plane security state is explained above, such as in the relevant description in S710.

[0539] Optionally, the RRC connection reconfiguration message may also include at least one of the following: algorithm mapping information, or an identifier of the UP security algorithm.

[0540] As an example, this algorithm mapping information can be used to instruct the UE to map the combined mode algorithm #1 to independent algorithms (e.g., independent encryption algorithms and / or independent integrity protection algorithms), or to instruct the UE to reuse the combined mode algorithm #1 and adopt different operating modes of the combined mode algorithm. Other descriptions are similar to those above and will not be repeated here.

[0541] S811, the UE is configured based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message.

[0542] For example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message includes the user plane security state. The UE can parse the user plane security state in the RRC connection reconfiguration message and, in conjunction with the combined mode algorithm #1 obtained in the AS SMC procedure, determine the UP security algorithm. It is understood that the specific logic of the UE side in determining the UP security algorithm corresponds to the logic of the RAN side in S809 above, and will not be elaborated here.

[0543] In some possible implementations, the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes algorithm mapping information. The UE can combine this algorithm mapping information with the aforementioned user plane security status to determine whether to map the combined mode algorithm #1 to an independent algorithm or directly reuse a specific mode of the combined mode algorithm #1, thereby performing the corresponding operation.

[0544] In some other possible implementations, the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes an identifier for the UP security algorithm. The UE can determine the UP security algorithm based on this identifier.

[0545] In step S812, the UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the RAN. See step S712 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0546] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of another communication method provided in an embodiment of this application. Method 900 can be considered as another example of method 600. In method 900, the security activation message from the access network device to the terminal device may include an identifier of the core algorithm. Below, taking a UE as the terminal device and a RAN as the access network device as an example, the various operations of method 900 are described.

[0547] S901, core network element #1 sends the UE's security capabilities to the RAN.

[0548] The specific implementation of S901 is similar to that of S701 mentioned above, and will not be repeated here.

[0549] S902, the RAN determines the RRC security algorithm based on the UE's security capabilities.

[0550] In some possible implementations, the RAN can determine the RRC security algorithm based on local configuration (e.g., the aforementioned algorithm priority list or other forms of configuration rules) and the UE's security capabilities.

[0551] In some other possible implementations, the RAN can first determine the core algorithm (denoted as core algorithm #1) based on the local configuration and the UE's security capabilities, and then determine the RRC security algorithm based on the core algorithm.

[0552] As an example, the RRC security algorithm can be a combined mode algorithm or two independent algorithms (e.g., an independent integrity protection algorithm and an independent encryption algorithm). Alternatively, the RRC security algorithm may include a combined mode algorithm, an independent integrity protection algorithm, and an independent encryption algorithm.

[0553] It is understandable that the core algorithm of the aforementioned RRC security algorithm is core algorithm #1.

[0554] In some possible implementations, the RAN can deduce the key based on the determined RRC security algorithm. Furthermore, the RAN can perform integrity protection on AS SMC messages based on the RRC security algorithm and the key, and execute S903.

[0555] S903, the RAN sends an AS SMC message with integrity protection to the UE.

[0556] As an example, the AS SMC message includes the identifier and security indication information of the aforementioned core algorithm #1. This security indication information can be used to indicate whether confidentiality protection and / or integrity protection for RRC messages are activated.

[0557] Optionally, the AS SMC message may also include security capability information. This security capability information is used to indicate whether the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0558] When the security indication information indicates that confidentiality protection for RRC messages is activated, encryption of downlink RRC messages can be activated after the RAN has sent the AS SMC message.

[0559] In some possible implementations, after receiving the AS SMC message, the UE can determine the RRC security algorithm based on the identifier of the core algorithm #1.

[0560] Based on the relevant descriptions in Method 600 above, the specific methods by which the UE determines the RRC security algorithm may include the following examples: As an example, the UE can determine the RRC security algorithm based on whether the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm.

[0561] For example, if the UE determines that the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm, the UE can determine that the RRC security algorithm is the combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1; conversely, if the UE determines that the RAN does not support the combined mode algorithm, the UE can determine that the RRC security algorithm is the independent integrity protection algorithm and / or independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1.

[0562] The UE can determine whether the RAN supports the combined mode algorithm by using the security capability information carried in the AS SMC message, or by using the RAN's network standard (e.g., whether it is the network standard corresponding to the 6G communication system, or the network standard corresponding to the communication system after the 6G communication system). See the relevant description above for details.

[0563] As another example, the UE can determine the RRC security algorithm based on the security indication information mentioned above.

[0564] For example, if the security indication information indicates that integrity protection and confidentiality protection for RRC messages are activated, the UE determines that the RRC security algorithm is the combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1; if the security indication information indicates that only confidentiality protection is activated and integrity protection is not activated, the UE determines that the RRC security algorithm is the independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1.

[0565] After determining the RRC security algorithm, the UE derives the key based on the RRC security algorithm. Furthermore, the UE can perform integrity verification on AS SMC messages based on the RRC security algorithm and the key.

[0566] If integrity verification is successful, the UE can activate integrity protection for uplink RRC messages. If the security indication information indicates that confidentiality protection for RRC messages is enabled, the UE can activate encryption for uplink RRC messages and decryption for downlink RRC messages.

[0567] In S904, the UE sends an AS security mode completion message with integrity protection to the RAN. The specific description of S904 is similar to that of S804 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0568] From S905 to S908, the UE initiates the PDU session establishment process, and the core network sends the user plane security policy to the RAN.

[0569] The specific interaction process and implementation method of S905 to S908 mentioned above can be found in the relevant description of S705 to S708 in Method 700 above, and will not be repeated here.

[0570] S909, RAN determines the UP security algorithm based on the user plane security policy and core algorithm #1.

[0571] The UP security algorithm can be used as an example of the second security algorithm mentioned above.

[0572] In some possible implementations, the RAN can determine whether to protect the confidentiality and / or integrity of the UE's UP data based on the user plane security policy.

[0573] As an example, the RAN can determine the UP safety algorithm based on the results determined above. Exemplarily, the process of determining the UP safety algorithm can be divided into the following cases: In the first scenario, if the RAN determines that the UE's UP data requires both confidentiality and integrity protection, the RAN will use the combined mode algorithm corresponding to core algorithm #1 as the UP security algorithm. Furthermore, the RAN can use a combined mode of this combined mode algorithm to simultaneously protect the UP data from both confidentiality and integrity.

[0574] As an alternative to the first scenario, the RAN may also determine that the UP security algorithm includes a separate encryption algorithm and a separate integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1. Furthermore, the RAN can use the separate encryption algorithm to protect the confidentiality of the UP data. The RAN can use the separate integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the UP data.

[0575] As an example, if the RAN supports combined mode algorithms, it can use combined mode algorithms as UP-secure algorithms. If the RAN does not support combined mode algorithms, it can use separate encryption algorithms and separate integrity protection algorithms as UP-secure algorithms.

[0576] In the second scenario, if the RAN determines that the UP data of the UE is to be kept confidential but not to be protected for integrity, the RAN will use the independent encryption algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1 as the UP security algorithm.

[0577] As an alternative to the second scenario, the RAN can also determine the UP security algorithm as a combined mode algorithm corresponding to core algorithm #1. Furthermore, the RAN can use the confidentiality-only / encryption-only protection mode of this combined mode algorithm to provide separate confidentiality protection for the UP data.

[0578] In the third case, if the RAN determines to protect the integrity of the UE's UP data but not to protect the confidentiality of the UP data, the RAN will use the independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm #1 as the UP security algorithm.

[0579] As an alternative to the third scenario, the RAN can also determine the UP security algorithm as a combined mode algorithm corresponding to core algorithm #1. Furthermore, the RAN can use the integrity-only protection mode of this combined mode algorithm to perform separate integrity protection on the UP data.

[0580] S910, the RAN sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE.

[0581] This RRC connection reconfiguration message can serve as an example of the first configuration message.

[0582] In some possible implementations, after S910, the RAN enables UP confidentiality protection and / or UP integrity protection based on the UP security algorithm. See the relevant description in S710 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0583] For example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message includes the user plane security state. The meaning of the user plane security state is explained above, such as in the relevant description in S710.

[0584] Optionally, the RRC connection reconfiguration message may also include at least one of the following: algorithm mapping information, or an identifier of the UP security algorithm.

[0585] As an example, this algorithm mapping information can be used to instruct the UE to map core algorithm #1 to a standalone algorithm (e.g., a standalone encryption algorithm and / or a standalone integrity protection algorithm) or a combined mode algorithm. Other descriptions are similar to those above and will not be repeated here.

[0586] S911, the UE is configured based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message.

[0587] For example, the RRC connection reconfiguration message includes the user plane security state. The UE can parse the user plane security state in the RRC connection reconfiguration message and, in conjunction with the core algorithm #1 obtained in the AS SMC procedure, determine the UP security algorithm. It is understood that the specific logic of the UE side in determining the UP security algorithm corresponds to the logic of the RAN side in S909 mentioned above, and will not be elaborated here.

[0588] In some possible implementations, the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes algorithm mapping information. Based on this algorithm mapping information, the UE can determine whether to map core algorithm #1 as an independent algorithm or as a combined mode algorithm, and thus perform the corresponding operation.

[0589] In some other possible implementations, the RRC connection reconfiguration message also includes an identifier for the UP security algorithm. The UE can determine the UP security algorithm based on this identifier.

[0590] S912, the UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration complete message to the RAN.

[0591] After the UE completes the configuration based on the RRC connection reconfiguration message, it sends a reconfiguration completion message to the RAN. Furthermore, the UE and RAN can use the UP security algorithm determined above to provide appropriate security protection for subsequent UP data transmitted in this session.

[0592] The following combination Figure 10 and Figure 11 The communication device provided in this application is described in detail. It is understood that the description of the device embodiments corresponds to the description of the method embodiments. Therefore, for details not described in detail, please refer to the method embodiments above; for brevity, some details are omitted.

[0593] This application embodiment can divide the access network device and terminal device into functional modules according to the above method example. For example, each function can be divided into its own functional modules, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The integrated module can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional module. It should be noted that the module division in this application embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods. The following description uses the division of functional modules according to each function as an example.

[0594] Figure 10 This is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 10 provided in an embodiment of this application. The device 10 includes a transceiver unit 11 and a processing unit 12. The transceiver unit 11 can implement corresponding communication functions, and the processing unit 12 is used for data processing. In other words, the transceiver unit 11 is used to perform operations related to receiving and sending, and the processing unit 12 is used to perform other operations besides receiving and sending. The transceiver unit 11 can also be referred to as a communication interface or a communication unit.

[0595] Optionally, the device 10 may further include a storage unit 13, which may be used to store instructions and / or data. The processing unit 12 may read the instructions and / or data in the storage unit so that the device can perform the operation of the device in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0596] For example, the processing unit 12 involved in the communication device 10 can be implemented by a processor or processor-related circuit components, and can be a processor or processing module; the transceiver unit 11 can be implemented by a transceiver or transceiver-related circuit components or a communication interface.

[0597] In one design, the device 10 may correspond to the access network device in the above method embodiments, or to a component of the access network device (such as a chip).

[0598] The device 10 can implement the steps or processes corresponding to those performed by the access network device in the above method embodiments. The transceiver unit 11 can be used to perform transceiver-related operations of the access network device in the above method embodiments, and the processing unit 12 can be used to perform processing-related operations of the access network device in the above method embodiments.

[0599] In one possible implementation, processing unit 12 is configured to select a first security algorithm for the terminal device; processing unit 12 is further configured to activate security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first security algorithm; transceiver unit 11 is configured to send a first configuration message for security protection based on the first security algorithm to the terminal device, the first configuration message being an RRC message, the first configuration message including a user plane security status, the user plane security status indicating whether to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device, and indicating whether to protect the integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device; processing unit 12 is further configured to activate user plane security based on the user plane security status, using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0600] Wherein, when the device 10 is used to perform Figures 6 to 9 When using the method described above, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of the access network device transmitting and receiving information in the method; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps of the access network device in the method.

[0601] It is understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0602] In another design, the device 10 may correspond to the terminal device in the above method embodiments, or a component of the terminal device (such as a chip).

[0603] The device 10 can implement the steps or processes corresponding to those executed by the terminal device in the above method embodiments. The transceiver unit 11 can be used to perform transceiver-related operations of the terminal device in the above method embodiments, and the processing unit 12 can be used to perform processing-related operations of the terminal device in the above method embodiments.

[0604] In one possible implementation, transceiver unit 11 is configured to receive a security activation message from an access network device, the security activation message indicating a first security algorithm; processing unit 12 is configured to activate security protection for RRC messages between the access network device and the terminal device based on the first security algorithm; transceiver unit 11 is further configured to receive a first configuration message from the access network device that provides security protection based on the first security algorithm, the first configuration message being an RRC message, the first configuration message including a user plane security status, the user plane security status indicating whether to provide confidentiality protection for user plane data of the terminal device, and indicating whether to provide integrity protection for user plane data of the terminal device; transceiver unit 11 is further configured to activate user plane security based on the user plane security status, using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm.

[0605] Wherein, when the device 10 is used to perform Figures 6 to 9 When using the method described in the text, the transceiver unit 11 can be used to execute the steps of the terminal device transmitting and receiving information in the method; the processing unit 12 can be used to execute the processing steps of the terminal device in the method.

[0606] It is understood that the specific processes by which each unit performs the corresponding steps described above have been detailed in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity. It should also be understood that the device 10 here is embodied in the form of a functional unit. The term "unit" here can refer to an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), electronic circuitry, a processor (e.g., a shared processor, a proprietary processor, or a group processor, etc.) and memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, combined logic circuitry, and / or other suitable components supporting the described functions. In an alternative example, those skilled in the art will understand that device 10 may specifically be an access network device in the above embodiments, used to execute the various processes and / or steps corresponding to the access network device in the above method embodiments; or, device 10 may specifically be a terminal device in the above embodiments, used to execute the various processes and / or steps corresponding to the terminal device in the above method embodiments. To avoid repetition, these will not be repeated here.

[0607] The apparatus 10 of each of the above-described schemes has the function of implementing the corresponding steps performed by the entities (such as access network devices or terminal devices) in the above-described methods. This function can be implemented by hardware or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more units corresponding to the above-described functions; for example, the transceiver unit can be replaced by a transceiver (for example, the transmitting unit in the transceiver unit can be replaced by a transmitter, and the receiving unit in the transceiver unit can be replaced by a receiver), and other units, such as processing units, can be replaced by processors, which respectively execute the transceiver operations and related processing operations in each method embodiment.

[0608] In addition, the transceiver unit 11 can also be a transceiver circuit (for example, it may include a receiving circuit and a transmitting circuit), and the processing unit can be a processing circuit.

[0609] Figure 11 This is a schematic diagram of another communication device 20 provided in an embodiment of this application. The device 20 includes a processor 21, which is used to execute computer programs or instructions stored in a memory 22, or to read data / signaling stored in the memory 22, to perform the methods in the above-described method embodiments. Optionally, there may be one or more processors 21.

[0610] Optionally, such as Figure 11As shown, the device 20 also includes a memory 22 for storing computer programs or instructions and / or data. The memory 22 may be integrated with the processor 21 or may be disposed separately. Optionally, there may be one or more memories 22.

[0611] Optionally, such as Figure 11 As shown, the device 20 also includes a transceiver 23 for receiving and / or transmitting signals. For example, the processor 21 controls the transceiver 23 to receive and / or transmit signals.

[0612] As one option, the device 20 is used to implement the operations performed by the access network device or the terminal device in the various method embodiments described above.

[0613] It is understood that the processor mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be a central processing unit (CPU), or one or more of other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), microprocessor units (MPUs), microcontroller units (MCUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), artificial intelligence processors (AI processors), or neural processing units (NPUs); or, the processor mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be an ASIC or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, etc. A general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.

[0614] It is also understood that the memory mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory and / or non-volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can be cache or random access memory (RAM). For example, RAM can be used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, RAM includes the following forms: static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDRSDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous linked dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0615] For example, when the processor is a general-purpose processor, DSP, ASIC, FPGA or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, or discrete hardware component, the memory (storage module) can be integrated into the processor.

[0616] It should be noted that the memory described in this article is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0617] This application also provides a chip system (or processing system) including logic circuits and input / output interfaces.

[0618] The logic circuit can be a processing circuit in the chip system. The logic circuit can be coupled to a memory cell, calling instructions from the memory cell, enabling the chip system to implement the methods and functions of the embodiments of this application. The input / output interface can be an input / output circuit in the chip system, outputting processed information or inputting data or signaling information to be processed into the chip system for processing.

[0619] As one approach, the chip system is used to implement the operations performed by the access network device or the terminal device in the various method embodiments described above.

[0620] For example, the logic circuit is used to implement the processing-related operations performed by the access network device or the terminal device in the above method embodiments; the input / output interface is used to implement the sending and / or receiving-related operations performed by the access network device or the terminal device in the above method embodiments.

[0621] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for implementing the methods executed by the device in the above-described method embodiments.

[0622] For example, when the computer program is executed by a computer, it enables the computer to implement the methods executed by the access network device or terminal device in the various embodiments of the above methods.

[0623] This application also provides a computer program product comprising instructions that, when executed by a computer, implement the methods performed by an access network device or a terminal device in the above-described method embodiments.

[0624] This application also provides a communication system, including at least one of the following: an access network device, a terminal device, or other nodes involved in this application.

[0625] The explanations and beneficial effects of the relevant contents in any of the devices provided above can be found in the corresponding method embodiments provided above, and will not be repeated here.

[0626] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0627] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0628] In the several embodiments provided in this application, the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of the units described above is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0629] The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0630] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit.

[0631] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods of the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

Claims

1. A communication method, characterized in that, The method is applied to an access network device, and the method includes: Select the first security algorithm for the terminal device; Based on the first security algorithm, security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device is activated. Send a first configuration message for security protection based on the first security algorithm to the terminal device. The first configuration message is a radio resource control message. The first configuration message includes a user plane security status. The user plane security status is used to indicate whether to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device and whether to protect the integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device. Based on the user plane security status, a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm is used to activate user plane security.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The core algorithms of the first security algorithm are: 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, Snowflake SNOW 5G algorithm, 256-bit Zu Chongzhi ZUC algorithm, 128-bit AES algorithm, SNOW3G algorithm, or 128-bit ZUC algorithm.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The first security algorithm is a first independent integrity protection algorithm; The method further includes: Select a first independent encryption algorithm for the terminal device; Specifically, based on the first security algorithm, activating security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device includes: Based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm, security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device is activated. The second security algorithm is either the second independent encryption algorithm or the second combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Based on the user plane security state, a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm is used to activate user plane security, including: When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected by confidentiality, and the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm is used to activate user plane security.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, When the user plane security status indicates confidentiality protection for user plane data of the terminal device, and the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm is used to activate user plane security, including: When the user plane security status indication protects the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device, determine whether the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm; If the first independent encryption algorithm is an empty algorithm, the second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm is used to activate user plane security.

6. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The first security algorithm is a first combined mode algorithm; The second security algorithm includes a second independent encryption algorithm and / or a second independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first combined mode algorithm.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, Before activating user plane security using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm, the method further includes: Based on the user plane security status and the core algorithm, the second security algorithm is determined.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, Based on the user plane security state and the core algorithm, the second security algorithm is determined, including: Based on the user plane security state, security configuration, and core algorithm, the second security algorithm is determined. The security configuration is used to indicate the correspondence between the user plane security state and the type of the second security algorithm. The type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that, When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is subject to confidentiality and integrity protection, the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device; or... When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the second security algorithm is a standalone algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device; or, When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the second security algorithm is of the independent algorithm type, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that, The first configuration message also includes at least one of the following: Security capability information is used to indicate whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm; The identifier of the second security algorithm; or, The type information of the second security algorithm is used to indicate whether the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that, The method further includes: Obtain the user plane security policy corresponding to the terminal device, wherein the user plane security policy is used to indicate whether the user plane data of the terminal device needs to be protected for confidentiality and / or integrity. The user plane security status is determined based on the user plane security policy.

12. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 11, characterized in that, Based on the first security algorithm, activate security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device, including: A security activation message is sent to the terminal device, the security activation message including the identifier of the first security algorithm or the identifier of the core algorithm.

13. A communication method, characterized in that, The method is applied to a terminal device, and the method includes: Receive a security activation message from an access network device, the security activation message being used to indicate a first security algorithm; Based on the first security algorithm, security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device is activated. The system receives a first configuration message from the access network device, which is a radio resource control message. The first configuration message includes a user plane security status, which indicates whether to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device and whether to protect the integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device. Based on the user plane security status, a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm is used to activate user plane security.

14. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that, The core algorithms of the first security algorithm are: 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, Snowflake SNOW 5G algorithm, 256-bit Zu Chongzhi ZUC algorithm, 128-bit AES algorithm, SNOW 3G algorithm, or 128-bit ZUC algorithm.

15. The method according to claim 13 or 14, characterized in that, The first security algorithm is a first independent integrity protection algorithm, and the security activation message is also used to indicate the first independent encryption algorithm; Specifically, based on the first security algorithm, activating security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device includes: Based on the first independent integrity protection algorithm and the first independent encryption algorithm, security protection for radio resource control messages between the access network device and the terminal device is activated. The second security algorithm is either the second independent encryption algorithm or the second combined mode algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first independent integrity protection algorithm.

16. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that, When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected for confidentiality and integrity, and the access network device supports a combined mode algorithm, the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device; or... When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected for confidentiality and integrity, and the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm, the type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the user plane data of the terminal device for confidentiality and / or integrity.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that, The first configuration message also includes security capability information, which is used to indicate whether the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm.

18. The method according to claim 16 or 17, characterized in that, The method further includes: Determine the network standard of the access network device; If the network standard of the access network device is the network standard corresponding to the 6G communication system, or the network standard corresponding to a communication system whose network generation is later than 6G, then it is determined that the access network device supports the combined mode algorithm; or, If the network standard of the access network device is the network standard corresponding to the communication system prior to 6G communication system, it is determined that the access network device does not support the combined mode algorithm.

19. The method according to claim 13 or 14, characterized in that, The first security algorithm is a first combined mode algorithm; The second security algorithm includes a second independent encryption algorithm and / or a second independent integrity protection algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first combined mode algorithm.

20. The method according to any one of claims 13 to 19, characterized in that, Before activating user plane security using a second security algorithm corresponding to the core algorithm of the first security algorithm, the method further includes: Based on the user plane security status and the core algorithm, the second security algorithm is determined.

21. The method according to claim 20, characterized in that, Based on the user plane security state and the core algorithm, the second security algorithm is determined, including: Based on the user plane security state, security configuration, and core algorithm, the second security algorithm is determined. The security configuration is used to indicate the correspondence between the user plane security state and the type of the second security algorithm. The type of the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

22. The method according to any one of claims 13 to 15, 19 to 21, characterized in that, When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is subject to confidentiality and integrity protection, the second security algorithm is a combined mode algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device; or... When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected for confidentiality but not for integrity, the second security algorithm is a standalone algorithm, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the confidentiality of the user plane data of the terminal device; or, When the user plane security status indicates that the user plane data of the terminal device is protected for integrity but not for confidentiality, the second security algorithm is of the independent algorithm type, wherein the second security algorithm is used to protect the integrity of the user plane data of the terminal device.

23. The method according to any one of claims 13 to 22, characterized in that, The first configuration message also includes at least one of the following: The identifier of the second security algorithm; or, The type information of the second security algorithm is used to indicate whether the second security algorithm is an independent algorithm or a combined mode algorithm.

24. A communication device, characterized in that, It is configured to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 23.

25. A communication device, characterized in that, include: At least one processor, which causes the communication device to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 23 by executing a computer program or instructions stored in at least one memory.

26. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program or instructions that, when executed, cause the method of any one of claims 1 to 23 to be performed.

27. A computer program product, characterized in that, Includes a computer program or instructions, which, when executed, implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 23.

28. A communication system, characterized in that, The device includes an access network device and a terminal device, wherein the access network device is used to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 12, and the terminal device is used to perform the method of any one of claims 13 to 23.