An information terminal based on Internet information security
By introducing hardware circuits such as network PHY chips and photoelectric sensing modules into information terminals, the problem of software protection failure is solved, hardware-level network isolation and real-time protection are achieved, and the security and reliability of information terminals are improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202522742229.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Utility models(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-12-24
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-17
- Estimated Expiration
- 2035-12-24
AI Technical Summary
Existing software protection solutions for information terminals fail after the operating system is compromised, failing to provide reliable network security protection, and hardware-assisted solutions lack intelligence and real-time capability.
Design an information terminal based on Internet information security, using a network PHY chip and network interface circuit, combined with a network activity photoelectric sensing module, an analog traffic analysis and judgment module, and a network physical link execution module, to realize the judgment of abnormal traffic and the forced interruption of network physical links through pure hardware circuits.
It achieves hardware-level security protection independent of the main processor and operating system, ensuring reliable network isolation even when software fails, and preventing real-time blocking of attack traffic.
Smart Images

Figure CN224987451U_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This utility model relates to the field of network information security technology, specifically an information terminal based on Internet information security. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development of internet technology, information terminals are facing increasingly severe cyberattack threats, such as distributed denial-of-service attacks, cyber storms, and abnormal network traffic caused by malware. These attacks can exhaust terminal resources, leading to service interruptions, data leaks, and even turning terminals into springboards for attacks.
[0003] Currently, protective measures against these threats primarily rely on software solutions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and various antivirus software deployed within the operating system. These software solutions achieve security by parsing, filtering, and making policy decisions on network packets at the operating system kernel or application layer. However, this software-dependent approach has inherent vulnerabilities: when the operating system itself or the main processor is compromised by malware, the integrity and reliability of these security software programs cannot be guaranteed, and their protective functions may be bypassed, disabled, or tampered with, thereby exposing information terminals to risks.
[0004] To improve the reliability of protection, some hardware-assisted security solutions have emerged in existing technologies. For example, using network switches based on MAC address filtering, or setting physical switches on network interfaces. However, the former still requires software to configure policies and cannot deal with attacks such as MAC address spoofing; the latter usually requires manual intervention and cannot achieve real-time, automatic blocking of attack traffic, lacking intelligence.
[0005] Therefore, there is an urgent need in this field for a hardware-level network security protection terminal that can operate independently of the terminal's main processor and operating system, and possess autonomous decision-making and execution capabilities. This terminal should be able to directly extract activity characteristics from the network physical layer, perform abnormal traffic analysis and judgment through built-in pure hardware circuitry, and ultimately execute a forced interruption of the network physical link, thereby providing a low-level, reliable security defense for the information system when software protection systems fail. Utility Model Content
[0006] The purpose of this utility model is to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art and provide an information terminal based on Internet information security, including a network PHY chip and a network interface circuit that provides an interface for the network PHY chip. The network PHY chip is configured with a transmission status indication signal terminal and connected to a transmission status indicator light. It also includes... The network activity photoelectric sensing module has its photosensitive part coupled to the optical path of the transmission status indicator light of the network PHY chip, and is used to receive optical signals and convert the optical signals into electrical signals; The analog flow analysis and decision module has its signal input terminal connected to the electrical signal output terminal of the network activity photoelectric sensing module. It is used to perform analog integration and threshold decision on the received electrical signal to generate a switch control signal. The network physical link execution module has its control input terminal connected to the switch control signal output terminal of the analog traffic analysis and decision module. The network physical link execution module includes a controlled switch device, which is connected in series in the power path of the network interface circuit and is used to cut off or restore the power supply of the network interface circuit in response to the switch control signal.
[0007] Preferably, the network activity photoelectric sensing module includes a photoresistor, a first resistor, and a first voltage comparator; the photoresistor and the first resistor are connected in series between the power supply voltage and ground, and their connection point is connected to the non-inverting input terminal of the first voltage comparator; the inverting input terminal of the first voltage comparator is connected to a first reference voltage source, and the output terminal of the first voltage comparator serves as the electrical signal output terminal of the network activity photoelectric sensing module.
[0008] Preferably, the first reference voltage source is provided by a first voltage divider circuit composed of a first potentiometer.
[0009] Preferably, the analog flow analysis decision module includes a second resistor, a capacitor, and a threshold decision unit; One end of the second resistor serves as the signal input terminal of the decision module, and the other end is connected to one end of the capacitor. The connection point outputs a voltage signal and is connected to the signal input terminal of the threshold decision device. The other end of the capacitor is grounded, and the signal output terminal of the threshold decision device serves as the switch control signal output terminal of the decision module.
[0010] Preferably, the threshold decision unit includes a second voltage comparator, and the inverting input of the second voltage comparator is connected to a second reference voltage source.
[0011] Preferably, the second reference voltage source is provided by a second voltage divider circuit composed of a second potentiometer.
[0012] Preferably, the network physical link execution module includes a switching transistor, a current-limiting resistor, and a relay; The control electrode of the switching transistor is connected to the switch control signal output terminal of the analog flow analysis and decision module through the current limiting resistor, and the second current electrode of the switching transistor is grounded. The coil of the relay is connected in series between the first current electrode of the switching transistor and the driving power supply, and the normally closed contact of the relay serves as the controlled switching device.
[0013] Preferably, the switching transistor is an NPN bipolar transistor.
[0014] Preferably, it also includes a normally open manual reset button connected in parallel with the capacitor.
[0015] The beneficial effects of this utility model are: 1. Establishing an independent hardware protection mechanism: The security protection system is constructed through pure hardware circuits, which does not rely on software at all, and fundamentally overcomes the failure problem of traditional software solutions after the system is compromised.
[0016] 2. Achieve reliable physical isolation: The physical layer signals are directly processed using photoelectric conversion and analog circuits, and the network power supply is physically cut off through relay control, ensuring the determinism and unbypassability of the protection action.
[0017] 3. Provides continuous and effective security protection: Even in the event of a complete operating system failure, it can still maintain its protective functions, providing an always effective hardware-level security defense for information terminals. Attached Figure Description
[0018] Figure 1 This is a diagram of an information terminal system architecture based on Internet information security. Figure 2 This is a circuit structure diagram of the network activity photoelectric sensing module in this utility model; Figure 3 This is a circuit diagram of one embodiment of the analog flow analysis and decision module in this utility model; Figure 4 This is a circuit diagram of another embodiment of the analog flow analysis and decision module in this utility model; Figure 5 This is a structural diagram of the relay drive circuit of the network physical link execution module in this utility model; Figure 6 This is a structural diagram of the network power supply control circuit of the network physical link execution module in this utility model.
[0019] Figure Labels R1 is the first resistor; R2 is the second resistor; R3 is the current-limiting resistor; C1 is the capacitor; RP1 is the first potentiometer; RP2 is the second potentiometer; Q1 is the switching transistor; LDR is the photoresistor; U1A is the first voltage comparator; U2A is the threshold decision unit; U3A is the second voltage comparator; S1 is the normally open manual reset button; K1 is the relay. Detailed Implementation
[0020] The technical solution of this utility model is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the scope of protection of this utility model is not limited to the following description.
[0021] The features and performance of this utility model will be further described in detail below with reference to embodiments. Example 1 This embodiment provides a basic implementation method. like Figure 1 As shown, an information terminal based on Internet information security includes a main processor, memory, storage device, network PHY chip, network interface circuit, and transmission status indicator light. The memory and storage devices are connected to the main processor. The data bus of the network PHY chip is connected to the main processor. The network PHY chip is equipped with a transmission status indicator signal terminal, and a transmission status indicator light is connected to the transmission status indicator signal terminal of the network PHY chip. The network interface circuit is connected to the electrical signal terminal of the network PHY chip. It also includes a network activity photoelectric sensing module, whose photosensitive part is spatially optically coupled to the transmission status indicator of the network PHY chip; The analog traffic analysis and decision module has its signal input terminal connected to the electrical signal output terminal of the network activity photoelectric sensing module; The network physical link execution module has its control input connected to the switch control signal output of the analog traffic analysis and decision module. The network physical link execution module includes a controlled switch device connected in series in the power path of the network interface circuit. The network interface circuit typically includes a network transformer for electrical isolation and signal matching. The controlled switch device is directly connected in series with the primary side of the network transformer (i.e., the side connected to the network PHY chip) in the DC power supply circuit via its two electrodes.
[0022] In this embodiment and subsequent embodiments, the operating power supply of the network activity photoelectric sensing module, the analog traffic analysis and decision module, and the network physical link execution module is uniformly identified as VCC (typically +5V DC power supply). The power supply required by the network interface circuit and its network transformer (such as +3.3V or +2.5V) is the execution power supply, which will be clearly stated in the text to distinguish it.
[0023] The work process is as follows: After the information terminal is powered on, the main processor exchanges data with the memory and storage devices via electrical signals. When network communication is required, the main processor transmits electrical signals to the network PHY chip via the data bus.
[0024] While the network PHY chip processes and transmits data, its internal transmission status indicator circuit generates a corresponding drive current, causing the transmission status indicator light directly connected to it to change its brightness. This light change is synchronized with the physical layer activity of data transmission.
[0025] The network activity photoelectric sensing module receives the light radiation from the status indicator light through its photosensitive element, and converts the received light energy into an analog voltage signal that continuously varies with the light intensity based on the photoelectric effect. The signal conditioning circuit inside the module shapes this voltage signal into a digital square wave signal that is synchronized with the flashing of the indicator light, and outputs it to the analog flow analysis and decision module.
[0026] The analog traffic analysis and decision module receives digital level signals from the network activity photoelectric sensor module and performs analog integration and threshold decision functions.
[0027] When network transmission activity is in a short, intermittent normal mode, the average strength of the module input signal is low, and its switch control signal output remains in an invalid state (such as low level).
[0028] When network activity shifts to a sustained, high-frequency attack pattern, the average strength of the module's input signal increases significantly. Once this strength exceeds the module's internally set security threshold, the module immediately outputs a valid control signal (e.g., a transition to a high level) at its switch control signal output. This level transition signal is transmitted to the network physical link execution module. This signal drives the controlled switch device inside the module to switch from a closed state to an open state. Since this controlled switch device is directly connected in series in the power supply circuit of the network interface circuit, its disconnection directly cuts off the power supply to the network PHY chip and the network interface circuit, thereby achieving a forced interruption of the network physical link.
[0029] When the abnormal network traffic disappears, and the average strength of the input signal of the analog traffic analysis and decision module drops below the recovery threshold, its output switch control signal will return to an invalid state, causing the controlled switch device in the network physical link execution module to reset to closed, and the network connection will be restored.
[0030] The information terminal provided in this embodiment offers a solution that differs from traditional software-based protection methods. This solution establishes a purely hardware-based signal sensing and processing link, shifting the focus of network behavior monitoring from software-level data analysis to physical-layer optical signal capture. This path shift allows the security mechanism to operate independently of the main processor and operating system, maintaining the effectiveness of protection even when the core software layer fails. By identifying network traffic characteristics through analog circuits and ultimately executing physical control of the power supply circuit, a closed loop from behavior monitoring to physical isolation is achieved. This technical approach provides an inherently reliable way to enhance the self-protection capabilities of information terminals under extreme security threats.
[0031] Example 2 Based on Example 1, this example further explains the specific implementation of the network activity photoelectric sensing module.
[0032] like Figure 2 As shown, the network activity photoelectric sensing module includes a photoresistor LDR, a first resistor R1, and a first voltage comparator U1A.
[0033] The circuit connection is as follows: The photoresistor LDR can be a GL5528 general-purpose photoresistor, one end of which is connected to the power supply voltage VCC, and the other end is connected to one end of the first resistor R1. This connection point is denoted as node A; the other end of the first resistor R1 is grounded (GND). Thus, the photoresistor LDR and the first resistor R1 are connected in series to form a voltage divider circuit that is sensitive to ambient light, and the voltage at node A changes with the light intensity.
[0034] Node A is connected to the non-inverting input of the first voltage comparator U1A, which can be a general-purpose LM393 voltage comparator. The positive power supply terminal of the first voltage comparator U1A is connected to power supply VCC, and its negative power supply terminal is grounded (GND). The inverting input terminal of the first voltage comparator U1A is connected to a first reference voltage source. The output terminal of the first voltage comparator U1A serves as the electrical signal output terminal of the network activity photoelectric sensing module, outputting a regular square wave signal.
[0035] The first reference voltage source is provided by a first voltage divider circuit consisting of a first potentiometer RP1 with a resistance of 1. Specifically, the two fixed terminals of the first potentiometer RP1 are connected to the power supply VCC and ground (GND) respectively, and its adjustable sliding terminal outputs the first reference voltage source and is connected to the inverting input terminal of the first voltage comparator U1A.
[0036] The work process is as follows: When the transmit status indicator light of the network PHY chip is off, the ambient light is weak, and the photoresistor LDR exhibits a high impedance state (its resistance is typically greater than 1MΩ). In this state, the voltage divider circuit formed by LDR and the first resistor R1 makes the voltage at node A close to the power supply voltage VCC (e.g., +5V). At this time, if the first reference voltage source set by the first potentiometer RP1 is a certain intermediate value (e.g., 2.5V), the voltage at the non-inverting input of the first voltage comparator U1A is higher than the voltage at its inverting input, causing the voltage comparator U1A to output a high level.
[0037] When the transmit status indicator light is on, the light it emits shines on the photosensitive surface of the photoresistor LDR, causing the resistance of the LDR to drop sharply to a low level (e.g., on the order of 10kΩ). This change causes the voltage at node A to be significantly pulled down (e.g., below 1V). At this time, the voltage at node A is lower than the first reference voltage at the inverting input of the voltage comparator U1A, and the output state of the first voltage comparator U1A then flips to a low level.
[0038] As the transmission status indicator flashes continuously due to network data transmission activity, the above process repeats cyclically. The resistance of the photoresistor LDR changes rapidly between high and low resistance, causing corresponding voltage fluctuations at node A. Ultimately, this generates a regular square wave signal at the output of the first voltage comparator U1A, synchronized with the flashing of the transmission status indicator. By adjusting the first potentiometer RP1, the value of the first reference voltage can be changed, thereby setting the light intensity threshold required to trigger the output level flip, achieving adaptive adjustment to different ambient light backgrounds and LED brightness.
[0039] The photoelectric sensing module provided in this embodiment demonstrates a physical signal sensing path that differs from software data acquisition. This scheme directly converts network activity status from visible light signals to standard digital level signals by combining photosensitive elements with analog comparator circuits. This direct conversion mechanism makes the signal acquisition stage completely independent of the main system's software environment, ensuring the originality and authenticity of the monitored signals at the physical level. The adjustable reference voltage design provides adaptability to differences in LED brightness under different hardware environments. This implementation provides a highly reliable and easy-to-implement hardware solution for building a primary signal sensing layer that is independent of operating system reliability.
[0040] Example 3 Based on Example 1, this example further explains the specific implementation of the analog traffic analysis and decision module.
[0041] like Figure 3 As shown, the analog flow analysis decision module includes a second resistor R2, a capacitor C1, a threshold decision unit U2A, and a manual reset button S1.
[0042] The circuit connection is as follows: One end of the second resistor R2 serves as the signal input terminal of the analog flow analysis decision module, and the other end is connected to one end of capacitor C1. This connection point is denoted as node B. The other end of capacitor C1 is grounded (GND). Node B serves as the integral voltage output point and is connected to the non-inverting input terminal of the threshold decision unit U2A. The threshold decision unit U2A uses a 74HC14 type fixed threshold Schmitt trigger; the power supply terminal (VCC) of the threshold decision unit U2A is connected to the power supply VCC, and the ground terminal (GND) shares the same ground with the system ground; the output terminal of the threshold decision unit U2A serves as the switch control signal output terminal of the analog flow analysis decision module and is connected to the subsequent network physical link execution module; the normally open manual reset button S1 is a normally open push-button switch, with one end connected to node B and the other end grounded (GND), connected in parallel with capacitor C1.
[0043] The working process is as follows: The pulse signal representing network data traffic from the previous stage repeatedly charges and discharges capacitor C1 through the second resistor R2, thereby integrating at node B to obtain a DC voltage proportional to the average pulse voltage value. When the network traffic increases, the integrated voltage of node B increases accordingly. Once this voltage exceeds the upper trigger threshold of the threshold decision unit U2A (fixed threshold Schmitt trigger), the output state of U2A immediately flips, generating an effective switching control signal. When the abnormal network traffic disappears, the integrated voltage of node B slowly discharges through the second resistor (R2). When the voltage drops to the lower trigger threshold of U2A, its output state will automatically return to the invalid state. The manual reset button (S1) can be used to force the rapid discharge of the charge of capacitor (C1) in the triggered state, so that the voltage of node B drops rapidly below the threshold, thereby immediately restoring the network connection without waiting for natural discharge.
[0044] The core value of this solution lies in its superior stability. By employing a fixed threshold Schmitt trigger, the circuit utilizes its inherent hysteresis characteristics to effectively filter out signal jitter near the critical point, thereby generating a definite decision output and demonstrating strong anti-interference capabilities.
[0045] In another implementation, such as Figure 4As shown, the threshold decision unit U2A can be implemented using a second voltage comparator U3A. The second voltage comparator U3A can be an LM393 general-purpose voltage comparator, with its inverting input connected to a second reference voltage source. This second reference voltage source is provided by a second voltage divider circuit composed of a second potentiometer, which is provided by the power supply VCC divided by the second potentiometer RP2. Specifically, the two fixed terminals of the second potentiometer RP2 are connected to the power supply VCC and ground (GND) respectively. Its adjustable terminal serves as the output terminal of the second reference voltage source, outputting the second reference voltage and connecting to the inverting input terminal of the second voltage comparator U3A. The non-inverting input terminal of the second voltage comparator U3A is connected to node B. The power supply terminal of the second voltage comparator U3A is connected to the power supply VCC, and its ground terminal (GND) shares the same ground as the system ground. Its output terminal serves as the switch control signal output terminal of the analog flow analysis decision module, connected to the subsequent network physical link execution module. One end of the normally open manual reset button S1 is connected to node B, and the other end is grounded (GND), connected in parallel with capacitor C1.
[0046] In this embodiment, the decision module operates as follows: its signal integration process is the same as the first scheme, that is, after the input pulse is integrated through R2 and C1, a DC voltage proportional to the network flow is generated at node B. Simultaneously, a voltage divider circuit composed of the second potentiometer RP2 provides a user-configurable second reference voltage, which is applied to the inverting input of the second voltage comparator U3A. U3A continuously compares the potential of its non-inverting input (the integrated voltage of node B) with the potential of its inverting input (the set reference voltage). When the network flow increases to the point that the voltage of node B exceeds the set reference voltage, the output of U3A immediately flips, generating a switch control signal to drive the subsequent actuator to disconnect the link. When the abnormal network flow disappears and the integrated voltage of node B drops below the second reference voltage, the output of U3A automatically flips to an invalid state, and the link is restored. The manual reset button (S1) can be used to forcibly and quickly clear the integrated charge on node B in the triggered state, allowing the circuit to immediately reset and restore the network connection.
[0047] The core advantage of this solution lies in its high flexibility. By using an external potentiometer to create an adjustable reference voltage source, users can easily set and adjust the decision threshold according to specific application scenarios and flow sensitivity, making it highly adaptable.
[0048] Example 4 Based on Example 1, this example further explains the specific implementation of the network physical link execution module.
[0049] The network physical link execution module includes a switching transistor Q1, a current-limiting resistor R3, and a relay K1.
[0050] The circuit connection is as follows: like Figure 5 As shown, the switching transistor Q1 is an NPN bipolar transistor, such as the 2N3904 type. Its base is connected to the switching control signal output terminal of the analog flow analysis decision module through the current-limiting resistor R3 to receive the decision signal. The emitter of the switching transistor Q1 is directly grounded (GND). One end of the coil of the relay K1 is connected to the power supply VCC, and the other end is connected to the collector of the switching transistor Q1. Figure 6 As shown, the normally closed contact of the relay K1 serves as the controlled switching device, and its two terminals are respectively connected in series to the DC power supply circuit (such as +3.3V or +2.5V power supply path) on the primary side of the network transformer in the network interface circuit.
[0051] Under normal network conditions, the analog flow analysis and decision module outputs an invalid control signal (such as a low level). This low-level signal is applied to the base of the switching transistor Q1 through the current-limiting resistor R3, causing Q1 to be in the off state. Because Q1 is off, the circuit from power supply VCC to ground is broken, no current flows through the coil of relay K1, its normally closed contact remains closed, the power supply circuit of the network interface circuit is unobstructed, and the device network connection is normal.
[0052] When abnormal network attack traffic is detected, the analog traffic analysis and decision module outputs a valid control signal (such as a transition to a high level). This high-level signal drives the switching transistor Q1 to enter a saturated conduction state through R3. The conduction of Q1 creates a current path from the power supply VCC through the coil of relay K1 to ground. After the coil is energized, it generates a magnetic field, attracting its internal armature and causing the normally closed contact to open. The opening of this normally closed contact directly cuts off the power supply to the network interface circuit, thereby achieving a forced interruption of the network physical link and realizing the protection purpose of hardware-level isolation.
[0053] When the abnormal flow disappears and the output of the decision module returns to a low level, the switching transistor Q1 is turned off again, the coil of relay K1 is de-energized, and its normally closed contact is automatically reset and closed under the action of the spring, restoring the power supply to the network interface circuit, and the network connection is re-established.
[0054] This embodiment provides a simple and reliable electrically controlled physical isolation scheme. By controlling relay K1 with a low-power transistor switching circuit, the on / off control of the higher-voltage operating power supply circuit of the network device is realized with a low-voltage, low-current logic signal, completing a safety closed loop from logic decision to physical execution.
[0055] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of this utility model. It should be understood that this utility model is not limited to the forms disclosed herein and should not be construed as excluding other embodiments. It can be used in various other combinations, modifications, and environments, and can be altered within the scope of the concept described herein through the above teachings or related technologies or knowledge. Modifications and variations made by those skilled in the art that do not depart from the spirit and scope of this utility model should be protected within the scope of the appended claims.
Claims
1. An information terminal based on Internet information security, comprising a network PHY chip and a network interface circuit providing an interface for the network PHY chip, the network PHY chip being configured with a transmission state indication signal terminal and connected with a transmission state indication lamp, characterized in that, Also includes The photoelectric sensing module for network activity has its photosensitive part coupled to the optical path of the transmission status indicator light of the network PHY chip; The analog traffic analysis and decision module has its signal input terminal connected to the electrical signal output terminal of the network activity photoelectric sensing module; The network physical link execution module has its control input terminal connected to the switch control signal output terminal of the analog traffic analysis and decision module. The network physical link execution module includes a controlled switch device, which is connected in series in the power path of the network interface circuit.
2. The information terminal based on the Internet information security according to claim 1, characterized by comprising: The network activity photoelectric sensing module includes a photoresistor, a first resistor, and a first voltage comparator; the photoresistor (LDR) and the first resistor (R1) are connected in series between the power supply voltage and ground, and their connection point is connected to the non-inverting input terminal of the first voltage comparator (U1A); the inverting input terminal of the first voltage comparator (U1A) is connected to a first reference voltage source, and the output terminal of the first voltage comparator (U1A) serves as the electrical signal output terminal of the network activity photoelectric sensing module.
3. The information terminal based on the Internet information security according to claim 2, characterized by comprising: The first reference voltage source is provided by a first voltage divider circuit consisting of a first potentiometer (RP1).
4. The information terminal based on Internet information security according to claim 1, wherein The analog flow analysis decision module includes a second resistor (R2), a capacitor (C1), and a threshold decision unit (U2A). One end of the second resistor (R2) serves as the signal input terminal of the decision module, and the other end is connected to one end of the capacitor (C1). The connection point outputs a voltage signal and is connected to the signal input terminal of the threshold decision device (U2A). The other end of the capacitor (C1) is grounded, and the signal output terminal of the threshold decision unit (U2A) serves as the switch control signal output terminal of the decision module.
5. An information terminal based on Internet information security according to claim 4, characterized in that, The threshold decision unit (U2A) includes a second voltage comparator (U3A), the inverting input of which is connected to a second reference voltage source.
6. An information terminal based on Internet information security according to claim 5, characterized in that, The second reference voltage source is provided by a second voltage divider circuit consisting of a second potentiometer (RP2).
7. An information terminal based on Internet information security according to claim 1, characterized in that, The network physical link execution module includes a switching transistor (Q1), a current-limiting resistor (R3), and a relay (K1). The control electrode of the switching transistor (Q1) is connected to the switching control signal output terminal of the analog flow analysis and decision module through the current limiting resistor (R3), and the second current electrode of the switching transistor (Q1) is grounded. The coil of the relay (K1) is connected in series between the first current electrode of the switching transistor (Q1) and the driving power supply, and the normally closed contact of the relay (K1) serves as the controlled switching device.
8. An information terminal based on Internet information security according to claim 7, characterized in that, The switching transistor (Q1) is an NPN bipolar transistor.
9. An information terminal based on Internet information security according to claim 4, characterized in that, It also includes a normally open manual reset button (S1) connected in parallel with the capacitor (C1).
