SECURE REMOTE CONTROL OF A WEAPON SYSTEM

Description

Subject of the invention

[0001] The present invention falls within the technological field of secure telecommunications which make it possible to control the functions of one or more weapon systems, such as for example unmanned tank turrets, whose electronic architecture includes a data bus, for example a CAN, Ethernet or other bus. Technological background and state of the art

[0002] Today, the controls of a conventional, therefore manned, tank turret are generally introduced by two operators, the commander and the gunner. However, the market increasingly demands the offer of unmanned turrets, as the endangerment of operators during missions is becoming less and less acceptable from a social point of view.

[0003] The present invention is positioned within the framework of the addition of a wireless communications system for the transmission of videos and turret commands and measurements.

[0004] When moving from wired connections to radio connections, many constraints are added to take into account the security of the connections, such as bandwidth usage, latency time, frequencies available for communication, etc., to obtain the desired quality of service. Quality of service (QoS, Quality of service ) refers to any technology capable of managing data transmission, while reducing packet loss, latency and jitter ( jitter ) on the network. This concept aims to control and manage network resources, by prioritizing certain types of network data.

[0005] Furthermore, the context involves the remote operation of weapon systems in complex and noisy environments, requiring ad hoc bandwidth and frequency use depending on the reality on the ground, in such a way as to guarantee the quality of service, i.e. taking into account in particular the latency time, and in the most secure way possible, via an appropriate connection mechanism between a control station and one or more weapon systems.

[0006] Currently, the aforementioned need is used in particular in the field of drones mainly for recreational purposes, but the technique implemented is generally limited to model-type piloting without the use of a complex electronic system such as that involving a multiplexed bus, called a field bus (as opposed to a bus for office computer communication) such as the CAN or MiICAN bus, an Ethernet-based system or other. As a reminder, a field bus establishes the connection between the sensors, the actuators and the control computer (or PLC, programmable logic controller). Several devices can be connected to a fieldbus and send their messages via the same line (linear topology).

[0007] There are also solutions in the field of autonomous vehicles which, depending on the control systems and / or algorithms used, are capable of generating one or more specific control instructions autonomously (robot type).

[0008] In the field of armored vehicle turrets, many demonstration turrets can be found, but they are generally remotely operated by cable and not by radio.

[0009] Little information on this subject is publicly available, and the unmanned turrets currently available on the market are therefore still largely operated by wired connection. In particular, there is no confirmation of the orders.

[0010] For example, EP 0 419 897 A2 discloses a remote control system for a combat vehicle comprising a remote control apparatus for providing signals to the vehicle to control a plurality of vehicle functions conventionally controlled by personnel on board the vehicle; a vehicle-mounted apparatus selectively operable to receive the signals from the remote control apparatus and to operate the plurality of vehicle functions in accordance with the signals; and an apparatus for selectively disabling the vehicle-mounted apparatus to allow non-remote control of the vehicle functions.

[0011] In US 2012 / 281829 A1, a digital remote firing system for selectively firing a plurality of remote mission payloads is disclosed. The digital remote firing system includes a first set of firing circuits communicatively coupled and operable to fire a corresponding first set of remote mission payloads and a second set of firing circuits communicatively coupled and operable to fire a corresponding second set of remote mission payloads.The remote digital firing system includes a firing control panel communicatively connected to the firing circuits of the first and second sets, a first digital code socket configured to be integrated in communicative combination with each firing circuit of the first set and the firing control panel, a second digital code socket configured to be integrated in communicative combination with each firing circuit of the second set and the firing control panel, and a payload selection switch for selecting a remote mission payload.

[0012] Document EP 1 1947 413 B2 discloses a method for remote control of a combat vehicle weapon system with a weapon system computer, which acts on aiming devices of the weapon system, in which a weapon system display unit for displaying screen contents and a weapon system input unit are connected, which are arranged inside the combat vehicle for controlling the weapon system in a non-remotely controlled mode, whereby a data link is established between a remote control computer, to which a remote control display unit and a remote control input unit are connected, and the weapon system computer, characterized in that, in a remote control mode for remotely controlling the weapon system computer by the remote control computer,the screen contents displayed in the non-remotely controlled mode on the weapon system display unit are represented at least partially on the remote control display unit and in that input actions, which are executed by the remote control input unit, act as input actions of the weapon system input unit and in such a way that the weapon system can be switched by the remote control computer into a safe state, in which movement of the weapon system is prevented.,

[0013] WO 01 / 65197 A1 discloses a modular system essentially comprising a mobile command post, ground bases and remote-controlled weapons. The ground bases are distributed over an area to be protected and are responsible for detecting, locating and monitoring intrusions into said area. The remote-controlled weapons are positioned within firing range of this area and operate either automatically based on data collected by the ground bases or by human intervention from the command post.

[0014] The problem to be solved is to give an existing and operational turret the possibility of being operated indifferently either by on-board personnel or, in particular or dangerous situations, by remote manipulation.

[0015] The main challenge is to reduce the exposure of soldiers in theaters of operation by allowing them to remotely control armored vehicle turrets smoothly, securely and reliably. Aims of the invention

[0016] The present invention aims to be able to transform the weapon systems of an existing fleet, and currently operated in a conventional, manned and non-remotely operated mode of use, into a remote-operated mode of use, such as for example the transformation of a turret with on-board personnel (commander and gunner) into an uninhabited turret remotely operated from a remote control station.

[0017] In particular, the invention aims to implement via wireless communication, for example radio communication, the security and fluidity of communications between two or more entities not physically connected.

[0018] In particular, the invention aims to propose secure and efficient management from the point of view of the concept of quality of service of communications in a hybrid system consisting of two field data buses connected by a radio link, the bus and radio communications having very different constraints.

[0019] Another object of the invention is to allow personnel at the remote control station to have access to the devices, controls, sensors and commands of a weapon system such as a turret exactly as if they were inside the turret. However, as soon as the turret is no longer to be controlled and operated remotely, the additional transceiver client must be able to be disconnected from the interface and the turret return to its initial state to be operated by the on-board personnel (commander and gunner typically). Main characteristic elements of the invention

[0020] A first aspect of the present invention relates to a system for ensuring the security of two-way communications using a radiofrequency type wireless network, between N weapon systems capable of being remotely operated, N≥1, and a control station, comprising: a remote control station intended to accommodate at least one operator, with a first field data bus to which a first controller is connected with at least as a client a first transceiver system; N conventional weapon systems each with a second field data bus, and at least one client, said system comprising an additional client provided with a second transceiver system, capable of being connected to each of the N weapon systems, permanently or removably, for use in teleoperation mode; the first controller with its first transceiver then being capable of receiving data from and / or sending commands to the client via the radio network and the additional client with its second transceiver being capable of sending data from and / or receiving commands intended for the client via the radio network; the first transceiver and the second transceiver being implemented in software, defining operation in software radio or SDR and are configured to exchange messages so as to guarantee the requested quality of service and in particular a predetermined latency time;characterized in that said system is configured to, in the event of said predetermined latency time being exceeded, enter degraded SDR mode and allow the two field data buses and their respective clients to be operated smoothly despite disturbances in the radio link; in the following manner: a transmitter that sends a message to a receiver receives from the receiver a first acknowledgment which allows the message to be erased at the transmitter; in the event of non-receipt of the first acknowledgment, the message is resent a certain number of times within a given time period fixed by the predetermined latency time; after this given time period, the transmitter enters degraded mode and / or continues to try to pass the message and sends a second acknowledgment to the working bus of which it is a client so that the other clients of this working bus can operate without disturbance and in a transparent manner. ;

[0021] According to preferred embodiments, the system for ensuring the security of two-way communications further comprises at least one of the following features or a suitable combination of several of them: the N weapon systems are armored vehicle turrets and the clients are sensors or actuators; the additional client is a second controller or computer provided with the second transceiver system for removably connecting to at least one of the N weapon systems in a conventional configuration; the first fieldbus, respectively the second fieldbus, is an industrial fieldbus such as CAN, MilCAN or Ethernet; the fieldbuses can be replaced by communication systems operating according to other architectures, such as a star architecture for example; the accessibility to the operator of the respective devices, controllers, sensors and actuator controls of the weapon system is transparent and identical to a conventional configuration where the weapon system is manned; the system is configured to accept commands sent with very low latency;the system is capable of managing multiple communications with weapon systems; the system includes means of searching for unoccupied frequencies to avoid jamming and enemy radio links.

[0022] A second aspect of the present invention relates to the use of a weapon system such as an armored vehicle turret, successively according to one of the following two modes and vice versa: an unmanned teleoperation mode using the system for securing two-way radio communications between the control station and the remotely operated weapon system, as described above; an ordinary or conventional operating mode, in manned form, where the second controller or computer equipped with a second transmitter-receiver system has been disconnected from the weapon system. Brief description of the figures

[0023] There figure 1schematically represents a secure wireless communications system between a control station and one or more remotely operated turrets according to the present invention. The figure 2 schematically represents the separation of the channels respectively dedicated to the video stream and to the transit of commands and data in the system according to the invention. The figure 3 schematically represents the means of controlling communications using a work bus and radio transmission, according to the invention. The figure 4 represents the information processing structure using a MilCAN bus. Detailed description of the invention

[0024] According to the system of the present invention shown in the FIG. 1, a weapon system 1, such as an armored vehicle turret, or more generally N weapon systems, uninhabited, is (are) remotely operated from a (same) control station 2 in a simultaneous and dynamic manner (i.e. weapon systems can be added and removed in real time). The communications between the control station 2 and the weapon system(s) 1 are wireless communications, preferably radiofrequency communications 3.

[0025] For the purposes of the invention, a software radio system (SDR) will preferably be used. software-defined radio ) . It is known to be a configurable radiocommunication system using digital signal processing techniques on programmable digital circuits. Its flexibility allows it to adapt to different radiocommunication protocols, and to meet the growing needs for performance and interoperability between systems.

[0026] From Command Post 2, the operator can select which turret 1 he wants to operate, with the radio system taking care of setting the radio parameters (frequency, bandwidth, etc.) based on the defined QoS. Preferably, he receives a real-time video signal from cameras embedded in the various selected turrets. He also controls all the functions of the turret he chooses to operate.

[0027] The radio system normally allows video and pilot data to be transported in full duplex, i.e. in both directions of communication on the radio and the electronic system, via a field bus such as a CAN bus (for Controller Area Network ) , Ethernet or another architecture known to those skilled in the art.

[0028] Advantageously, the video and data are transmitted on N different channels, N>1 (see FIG. 2). The number of channels can be configured by software. Free frequency search algorithms will be used to avoid interference ( jammings ) and other opposing radio links in order to have optimal operation. The control station comprises at least one acquisition interface 4 (screen) and one control interface 5 (keyboard, controller, button, joystick, etc.), on which the operator can operate the selection 6 of a video stream 10 coming from one of the turrets 1. Via the control interface 5, the operator can also control a controller 9 which sends a command 8 to a turret 1, based on the data received from the sensor(s) 7.

[0029] The data transmission channel, which is essential for operation, must have as few errors and latency as possible and must be full duplex. Preferably, transmission will be carried out using means already present and internal to the weapon system, for example the CAN bus, MilCAN or other (see FIG. 3 ).

[0030] All commands from the transmitter and the reception or confirmation messages from the receivers are transmitted and received via the electronic field bus, e.g. CAN, Ethernet or other bus. Receivers can be actuators or other elements that can be controlled electrically, by human action or by automation.

[0031] There FIG. 3shows a schematic view of the control with the data bus and the radio, according to the invention. The electronic circuit of the control station 2 comprises a first bus 13 (as described above, for example a CAN bus) to which are connected, in a manner known to those skilled in the art, the controller 9 and a first transceiver (RF modem) 11. The electronic circuit of the remotely operated turret 1 comprises a second bus 14 (as described above, for example a CAN bus) to which are connected, in a manner known to those skilled in the art, "clients", such as for example a sensor 7 or an actuator 8 as well as an additional client on the weapon system bus which is a second transceiver (RF modem) 12, making it possible to remotely connect the control station 2 to the weapon system 1 in remotely operated mode. In fact, the CAN bus is duplicated but it can be seen virtually in the system as a single bus.On such a bus, if a transmitter (client 1) sends for example a frame with a command (or data) to a receiver (client 2), upon receipt of the command by the receiver, the latter will send in return to the transmitter a frame with a message of validation and good reception of the command (called acknowledgment, this notion being well known to those skilled in the art of communication systems).

[0032] All information passes through the CAN bus, whether it is control information (bidirectional) or video stream type information (unidirectional).

[0033] A difficulty in controlling communications arises when, for example, there is excessive loss and / or latency of the radio signal between transmitters and receivers. Thus, on the control station side for example, if the controller (client 1) sends a control signal to the electronic system which is not in fact received, it therefore does not receive the acknowledgment (or acknowledgement) from the receiver (client 2).

[0034] According to the invention, the addition of the "RF modem" client on the CAN bus of the weapon system must not modify (almost) in any way the behavior of the CAN bus. The RF modem therefore behaves like a conventional client on this bus and will therefore collect the messages to be sent to the control station. The reasoning also applies in the other direction (from the control station to the weapon system). This allows a classic and normal operation of the physical CAN bus of the weapon system. The RF modem will then send this data to the control station in the most efficient way possible (minimal use of resources so as to guarantee QoS) and request an acknowledgment from the RF modem of the control station. Upon receipt of this acknowledgment by the RF modem of the weapon system, the message is deleted from the memory of this RF modem. If this acknowledgment is not received, the RF modem of the weapon system will resend the message to the control station a certain number of times.After this time, determined in such a way as to guarantee the latency times for the correct teleoperation of the weapon system, the RF modem of the weapon system enters a degraded mode from a radio point of view and / or tries to transmit the data again. In the event of failure, the RF modem signals to the CAN bus of the weapon system that the message has not been transmitted (for example by issuing a “second” acknowledgment). The other clients of the CAN bus then receive this information and continue their operations based on this information.

[0035] To overcome the aforementioned difficulty, which could be seen as a defect in the system, it will therefore be provided, according to the invention, while the radio acknowledgment is pending, to send a second acknowledgment, this one provisional, on the CAN bus while waiting to receive the final acknowledgment. This can be done for example by keeping, at the modem level, an inventory which includes the list of messages sent (as already suggested above), the messages being deleted gradually as soon as the final acknowledgments are received. This technique will allow the CAN buses to operate correctly while taking into account their constraints, in particular by respecting the authorized latency times of the buses and with modems whose operation will be transparent for the bus system.

[0036] This method can be advantageously applied when there is an overload of sending messages, and / or when there is an arbitration problem when simultaneously sending acknowledgment messages.

[0037] There FIG. 4 gives the schematic of the information processing (frame) using a MilCAN bus. List of reference symbols

[0038] 1armored vehicle turret or generally weapon system 2remote control station 3wireless link (radio) 4acquisition interface 5command interface 6video streaming selection 7sensor 8command 9command control 10video streaming 11command station modem 12removable turret controller modem 13command station CAN bus 14turret CAN bus 20additional removable controller for remote-operated turret 21CAN frame - RTR (Remote Transmission Request) bit: 0 if data, 1 if request 22CAN frame - ACK (acknowledgement) bits

Claims

1. A system for securing two-way communications using a radio frequency wireless network between N weapons systems (1) apt to be remotely operated, with N≥1, and a control station (2), comprising: - a remote-control station (2) for accommodating at least one operator, with a first field data bus (13) to which a first controller (9) is connected with at least a first transceiver system (11) as a client; - N conventional weapons systems (1) each with a second field data bus (14), and at least one client (7, 8), said system comprising an additional client (20) provided with a second transceiver system (12), apt to be connected to each of the N weapons systems (1), permanently or removably, for operation in remote operation mode; the first controller (9) with the first transceiver (11) thereof then being then apt to receive data from and / or send commands to the client (7, 8) via the radio network and the additional client (20) with the second transceiver (12) being apt to send data from and / or receive commands intended for the client (7, 8) via the radio network; - the first transceiver (11) and the second transceiver (12) being implemented as software programs, defining an operation in software radio or SDR mode and are configured for exchanging messages so as to provide the requested quality of service and in particular a predetermined latency time; characterized in that said e system is configured for entering degraded SDR mode if the predetermined latency time is exceeded and to allow both field data buses (13, 14) and the respective clients thereof to be operated smoothly despite radio link interference in the following manner : - a transmitter which sends a message to a receiver receives a first acknowledgment from the receiver, which allows the message sent to the transmitter to be erased; - if the first acknowledgment is not received, the message is returned a certain number of times within a time limit set by the predetermined latency time; - after said time limit, the sender enters degraded mode and / or continues to try to pass the message and sends a second acknowledgment to the working bus of which same is a client so that the other clients of the working bus can operate without disruption and in a transparent manner.

2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the N weapons systems are armored vehicle turrets (1) and the clients are sensors (7) and actuators (8).

3. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the additional client is a second controller or computer (20) equipped with the second transceiver system (12) for removably connecting to at least one of the N weapons systems in a conventional configuration.

4. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the first field bus (13), respectively the second field bus (14), is an industrial field bus such as CAN, MilCAN or Ethernet.

5. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the field buses (13, 14) can be replaced by communication systems operating according to other architectures, such as e.g. a star [network] architecture.

6. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the accessibility for the operator to the respective devices, controllers, sensors and actuator commands of the weapons system (1) is transparent and identical to a conventional configuration where the weapons system (1) is manned.

7. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the system is configured for accepting commands sent with very low latency.

8. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that same is apt to manage multiple communications with the weapons systems.

9. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that same comprises means for searching for unmanned frequencies so as to avoid jamming and enemy radio links.

10. An operation of a weapons system (1) such as an armored vehicle turret, successively in one of the following two modes and vice versa: - an unmanned remote operation mode using the security system for two-way radio communications between the control station and the remotely operated weapons system, according to any of the preceding claims; - an ordinary or conventional mode of operation, in manned form, where the second controller or computer (20) equipped with a second transceiver system (12) has been disconnected from the weapons system (1).