Signature management system
Patent Information
- Application Number
- EP2023771812
- Authority / Receiving Office
- EP · EP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-09-14
- Filing Date
- 2023-09-12
- Publication Date
- 2025-07-23
AI Technical Summary
Modern military watercraft face a diverse threat environment with various detection methods, requiring a holistic approach to manage signatures to avoid detection, which existing systems fail to address effectively.
A signature management system integrated into the electronic data processing system of watercraft, utilizing sensors, active elements, and algorithms to optimize and control signatures by changing the states of active elements, such as propulsion, cooling systems, and radar cross-sections, in real-time to minimize detection probability.
Enables rapid, targeted, and efficient adaptation of signatures to changing threat situations, enhancing operational effectiveness and survivability by reducing the probability of detection across multiple sensory domains.
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Figure 1.1
Abstract
Description
[0001] Signature management system
[0002] The invention relates to a watercraft and a method with an integrated signature management system.
[0003] The optimization of individual components with regard to signatures is well known. The simplest and most well-known case is that of a submarine that wishes to remain undetected, traveling at extremely low speed to generate as little noise as possible. The engine power, and thus the speed, is thus selected depending on the noise emissions that can be tolerated. This obviously plays a role primarily for military vessels, which usually wish to remain undetected. In principle, this would also make sense for civilian vessels, but not to avoid detection, but rather to reduce disturbance. For example, this could be used to avoid emissions on a whale migration route that could have a disruptive influence on marine mammals, or at least to reduce them as much as possible. Due to its greater importance, the following will focus specifically on the application to military vessels.
[0004] However, the current threat landscape for military vessels, both surface vessels and submarines, has become more diverse. While traditionally visual detection and later radar and sonar dominated, today a wide variety of sensors are used to detect other vessels. This, in turn, means that a larger number of potential emissions must be regulated to avoid detection. It is therefore desirable to increasingly consider the threat landscape holistically.
[0005] From DE 10 2016 202 781 A1 a device for the integrated display of information on a watercraft is known.
[0006] A method for route calculation is known from DE 10 2016 202 784 A1.
[0007] DE 10 2020 200 471 A1 discloses a military watercraft with sensors. DE 10 2008 051 308 A1 discloses a submarine with a gas delivery system.
[0008] US 6 456 269 B1 discloses a fluxgate magnetic field sensor that integrates ferromagnetic test material into its magnetic circuit.
[0009] From DE 10 2016 202 781 A1 a device for the integrated display of information on a watercraft is known.
[0010] The object of the invention is to provide a holistic signature management system.
[0011] This object is achieved by the watercraft having the features specified in claim 1 and by the method having the features specified in claim 17. Advantageous further developments emerge from the subclaims, the following description, and the drawings.
[0012] The watercraft according to the invention has an electronic data processing system. Typically, the electronic data processing system consists of a plurality of individual components that are interconnected via at least one network. Often, the electronic data processing system can consist of two separate and only partially connected subsystems, a so-called red network and a so-called black network. The red network is a purely internal ship network, to which all safety-critical ship components are connected. This protects, in particular, all data in the red network, the loss of which could be detrimental to external security. The black network, on the other hand, is typically designed for external communication and is therefore, in principle, more open and thus more vulnerable.Data exchange between the red network and the black network is usually only possible to a very limited extent in order to prevent an external attack on the red network. The inventive system for electronic data processing thus comprises all interconnected data processing devices of the watercraft. The watercraft has sensors. The most important sensors of watercraft are in particular sonar sensors, radar, antennas (e.g., for radio reconnaissance), cameras in the visible and / or infrared range, anemometers, and many more. The sensors therefore clearly serve to reconnaissance of the environment; they serve to detect and assess hazards. The sensors are therefore not used to capture their own images, but to detect the external world. Therefore, the sensors could also be referred to as environmental sensors.These are therefore not system-internal sensors, such as a thermocouple in a cold room, which switches on a cooling device when a certain temperature is exceeded and deactivates this cooling device again when it falls below a second temperature. The electronic data processing system is connected to the sensors to receive the data recorded by the sensors. The sensors record data and then send it in processable form to the electronic data processing system. For example and in particular, each sensor is assigned a specific data processing device within the data processing system and these are connected to one another. For example, the sonar sensors are connected to a sonar data processing device. The watercraft has active elements. Active elements are to be understood broadly within the meaning of the invention.An active element is anything that has an effect in the physical world, i.e. outside of pure data processing. An active element is, for example, the motor used to generate propulsion. Another active element could be a weapon system, for example. However, an active element can also be an air compressor, a cooling chamber, an active element of the electrical distribution network, or a door locking device. Likewise, active transmitting antennas are also considered active elements within the meaning of the invention, as they are designed to emit electromagnetic radiation, for example. The electronic data processing system is designed to control the active elements and is connected to the active elements for control purposes. For example, the drive motor can be controlled via a control station as part of the electronic data processing system, thus moving the watercraft.The active elements have at least first states and second states. For example, a hangar door can be open or closed. For example, a wall cooling device that sprays the outer skin with water for cooling can be switched on or off. The signature of the watercraft is different in the first states and the second states. For example, if the hangar door is open, flight operations are possible, but the open hangar door negatively influences the radar cross-section and the signature is significantly worse. If the hangar door is closed, the signature is minimized, the radar cross-section is minimal, but flight operations are also not possible. If the outer skin is sprayed with water by a wall cooling device, the thermal signature is reduced.On the other hand, energy is required and water is constantly being pumped onto the vessel, so this should be done when the thermal signature is actually relevant. There are good reasons why the active elements are not necessarily in the optimal state for the signature.
[0013] According to the invention, the electronic data processing system comprises a signature management system. The signature management system is thus an integral component of the electronic data processing system and is designed to receive the acquired data or an evaluation of the acquired data, evaluate this data using algorithms, and output data for signature optimization. The acquired data can comprise both direct sensor data and data from systems evaluating the sensor data. For example, it can be sonar data or data from contacts identified using this sonar data. The algorithms can consider data from databases and also include mathematical models. In particular, the mathematical models include modeling of the vessel's own signature as a function of the vessel's operating parameters.The output of data for signature optimization and thus for changing the control of the active elements to change the vessel's signature by changing the states of the active elements can include both the direct active connection between the signature management system and the indirect active connection between the signature management system and the active element. The indirect active connection can include a manual step for controlling the active elements; the result of the signature management system is displayed to a person, for example, as a suggestion, which the person can then implement. With a direct active connection, the signature management system can implement the calculated measures directly and automatically and intervene directly in the system control.The signature management system is designed to modify the control of the active elements to change the vessel's signature by changing the states of the active elements via the electronic data processing system. The signature management system is thus an integral component and connects a multitude of systems. This allows for a much faster, more efficient, and more targeted adaptation of the vessel's signature. For example, if a submarine's sonar system detects sound contact and the electronic data processing system identifies this as an enemy frigate, the signature management system can react immediately and, for example, shut down the cooling room. This will maintain the temperature even after shutdown, but unnecessary noise can be avoided.Or, in another example, if a frigate's radar detects an approaching aircraft, the signature management system can, for example, close hangar doors to reduce the radar cross-section. Active elements are thus controlled in a time- and situation-dependent manner to achieve targeted changes in the signature, thereby deliberately undercutting a detection probability. It's not about regulating a pump permanently or only based on a general specification, for example, to always achieve noise reduction while submerged at low speed, but rather about a targeted response to a threat situation detected by the sensors.
[0014] Thus, according to the invention, not only the signature optimization of a single system is possible, but also a holistic signature management through the integrative approach.
[0015] The signature management system on watercraft serves to ensure operational effectiveness and survivability. A watercraft's signatures are an essential design feature. The ability to conduct covert operations is directly related to the signature. This is especially true for underwater units, for example. The "undetectable" nature of an underwater unit is its raison d'être. If the underwater unit were easily detectable, it would be dispensable as a naval warfare asset. The operational advantage of an underwater unit over other naval warfare assets, for example, lies in its long detection and engagement range. In contrast, the low detectability of one's own underwater unit by enemy surface and underwater units, land-based units, and air-based units is a major obstacle. The operational environment is changing rapidly, and the threats from sea, air, and land-based units have increased.
[0016] Signatures can vary depending on the operating and power-on state and the aging of the active elements. The functional chain, consisting of the own signature, the propagation of the own signature, and the sensitivity of enemy sensors, is ultimately the relevant factor. Therefore, knowledge of propagation conditions in the environment and threat data are of utmost importance. Last but not least, the balance between one's own sensitivity and one's own sensor performance is relevant. This is a crucial factor for gaining and maintaining a tactical advantage and self-protection. An assessment of both the enemy sensor performance and its sensitivity is an important basis for planning and conducting operations.
[0017] All modules of the signature management system are used to capture, process, calculate, store, and distribute data. For individual signatures, parameters are determined regarding change, vulnerability, and sensitivity. The real-time calculations of current signature values, vulnerability, and sensitivity of extensive parameters are based on information about the environment, operating and power-on status, and the signature itself, with the goal of monitoring the signature and adapting it to the tactical situation.
[0018] A watercraft's signature includes the change in the physical environmental parameters resulting from its presence. Such changes can be detected by enemy surface and underwater units and thus used for reconnaissance and weapons deployment. The signature management system encompasses a balanced consideration of all relevant signatures, the control, and reduction of signatures throughout their entire life cycle, taking into account the operation, task, capability, sea area, and environmental conditions.
[0019] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system has a module for the non-acoustic signature. The non-acoustic signature includes, in particular, the radar cross-section or heat emission. Due to the increasing number of detection methods being used, this area in particular is of increasing importance but also of growing complexity. A key component here is the internal knowledge that must be present in the module for the non-acoustic signature. For example, if the watercraft has a hangar, it must be known what the radar cross-section is with the hangar door open and how large the radar cross-section is with the hangar door closed. In short, the module for the non-acoustic signature must know which measures can be taken to reduce the non-acoustic signature and what effect these have.For this purpose, the module for the non-acoustic signature preferably has a database in which measures for reducing the non-acoustic signature and their effect are recorded.
[0020] In a further embodiment of the invention, the module for the non-acoustic signature is designed to reduce the thermal signature. The module for the non-acoustic signature can therefore preferably not only suggest measures, but also preferably implement them automatically. This significantly shortens the system's reaction time, allowing a faster response to a rapidly changing threat situation. This can be particularly advantageous in an asymmetric threat situation. For example, and preferably, the module for the non-acoustic signature is designed to adapt the direction of travel of the watercraft and / or to spray the outer skin of the watercraft for cooling purposes. The direction of travel determines the surface facing away from the sun. By changing the direction of travel, excessive heating and thus easier IR detection can be avoided.This is particularly preferred when the vessel is traveling at very low speed, as otherwise the position would change too drastically or a specified target would not be reached. Another option is active cooling with water, which can also be used, for example, with a fire extinguishing device. The sprayed water cools the vessel, particularly to the ambient temperature, allowing the infrared signature to be reduced quickly and briefly.
[0021] In a further embodiment of the invention, the module for the non-acoustic signature is designed to reduce the radar cross-section by closing openings, particularly through gates. The outer hull of a ship, such as a frigate, is typically optimized with regard to radar cross-section. However, there are larger openings for helicopters or smaller boats, for example, that can be opened. When the gates are open, these often produce a very clear radar image. Therefore, the radar cross-section can be quickly reduced again by closing the gates, for example, when an approaching missile is detected. This can improve the effectiveness of a countermeasure.
[0022] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system comprises a module for the acoustic signature. Due to the good and rapid sound transmission and the constant sound generation by the propeller of a watercraft, the acoustic signature is one of the most important signatures, which is why it is usually considered separately. On the other hand, the acoustic signature in particular has been comparatively well recorded due to its importance in the past and is still considered today, albeit in isolation, as is known, for example, from DE 10 2022 203 332 in connection with a controllable-pitch propeller. What is new is its integration into the overall system, so that, for example, the familiar adjustment of the propeller's pitch angle can be carried out depending on detected and identified enemy contacts.
[0023] In a further embodiment of the invention, the module for the acoustic signature is designed to reduce the acoustic signature by adjusting or switching off active elements. For example, and in particular, the active elements are selected from the group comprising the drive, compressor, air conditioning, and heating technology. For example, air conditioning and heating technology, in particular, can simply be switched off for a short time, e.g., the cooling of cold rooms. In this case, an increase in temperature is accepted for a short-term reduction in the acoustic signature. The drive can, for example, be slowed down, as is known. Alternatively, the pitch angle of a controllable-pitch propeller can be adjusted, for example, in order to operate more quietly but possibly with higher fuel consumption.
[0024] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system comprises a module for mission planning. This makes it possible to adapt the route and signature to each other. For example, the route can be planned around known location points in such a way that, depending on the planning, a more extensive course is chosen in this area if active elements are required that would enable detection. Alternatively, such active elements can be deactivated in such areas in a long-term plan to take a shorter course. The highly integrated nature of the signature management system thus enables mutual optimization.
[0025] In a further embodiment of the invention, the mission planning module is designed to calculate the probability of detection along a planned route and to take into account the available energy reserves. In a submarine, energy reserves include, in particular, the energy stored in the batteries, as well as the energy that can be generated, for example, via a fuel cell. For larger missions, the diesel supply for surface travel can also be considered as an energy reserve. Therefore, the energy reserve can also depend on the mode of travel (surface-mounted or underwater). Therefore, mission planning can also consider submerged travel, snorkeling travel, and surface travel for optimal use of energy reserves.
[0026] In a further embodiment of the invention, the mission planning module is designed to take the weather forecast into account when planning the route. The weather is not only relevant for the journey itself, it also has a direct influence on the signature and the probability of detection. While, for example, strong, turbulent wind leads to rapid mixing of exhaust gases and can thus help reduce the thermal signature, a very cold environment can increase the probability of detection. In completely calm seas, the stern of a ship is significantly easier to see and lasts longer than in stormy seas. Rain and clouds can further complicate detection in the visible range, while clear weather favors optical recognition. It can therefore be useful when planning a route to specifically select areas with weather events that positively influence the signature.
[0027] In a further embodiment of the invention, the mission planning module is designed to schedule the activation of active elements. For example, this allows cooling of cold storage rooms during times when the signature is less critical. At times when a high risk is expected, these active elements, such as a cold storage room, can then be deactivated. Thus, unavoidable emissions that enable detection are shifted to times when this is less critical.
[0028] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system comprises a module for enemy assessment. Enemy assessment means that presumed capability values are assigned to a contact. For example, if a ship is classified as a submarine hunting unit, it can be assumed that this ship will have better sonar than, for example, a task force supply ship. Therefore, in this case, the distance would have to be greater or the signature significantly reduced to avoid detection. Particularly in the area of non-acoustic signatures, the assessment of enemy ships becomes increasingly complex. Therefore, the enemy assessment module preferably comprises a database. The database of enemy units contains presumed detection ranges according to detection types. This can enable at least a relative estimate.
[0029] In a further embodiment of the invention, the electronic data processing system additionally comprises one or more systems selected from the group consisting of a sensor system, weapon guidance system, navigation system, and communication system. In a further embodiment of the invention, the electronic data processing system comprises a visualization device. In particular, the visualization device serves to display the route, for example and preferably in the form of an interactive map. The visualization device is particularly preferably arranged on the bridge.
[0030] In a further embodiment of the invention, the mission planning module is integrated into a sensor command and control system (SCCS). Such systems are already commonly found on board military vessels, thus facilitating integration into the overall ship systems.
[0031] The signature management system can, for example, be equipped with some or all of the following modules:
[0032] Mission planning module
[0033] Module for the non-acoustic signature
[0034] Acoustic signature module
[0035] Threat analysis module
[0036] Module for visualization, monitoring and control
[0037] Module for future applications
[0038] Examples of implementations of the mission planning module are presented below.
[0039] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system comprises a module for mission planning. This makes it possible to perform a travel range calculation (forecast) for all planned waypoints in offline mode for planning on land, as well as a travel range calculation for all waypoints and at each ship position in online mode for use at sea, including monitoring of the active elements, taking environmental conditions into account. The travel range calculations and the monitoring results of the operating and activation states of the active elements are transferred to the module for visualization, monitoring, and control for further processing. In a further embodiment of the invention, the module for mission planning is designed to perform one or more of the following tasks:
[0040] Driving range calculation (forecast) on start / destination point and on all planned waypoints in offline mode for planning on land,
[0041] Calculation of the cruising range on the start / destination point, on all waypoints and on each ship position in online mode, for use at sea, and the
[0042] Monitoring the operating and switching states of the active elements taking into account the environmental conditions,
[0043] Transfer of the travel range calculations and monitoring results to the module for visualization, monitoring and control.
[0044] The energy reserves of an underwater unit include, for example, the energy stored in the batteries, the fuel stored in the bunkers, and the reactants, oxygen and hydrogen, stored in the designated storage units for the air-independent propulsion. The energy reserves depend on the operating conditions of the active elements. The mission planning module calculates optimal travel areas along a planned or currently traveled route, taking into account the available energy reserves and environmental conditions.
[0045] High seawater temperatures, for example, lead to increased energy consumption (hotel load) because the active elements on board must be sufficiently cooled with water. Additional cooling compressors then ensure sufficient cooling of the active elements, but simultaneously increase the acoustic target level signature. Therefore, it can be useful when planning routes to specifically select areas that positively influence the signature.
[0046] For this purpose, the mission planning module has a database with sea area data such as temperatures, propulsion power data and activation lists for each operating mode.
[0047] Exemplary embodiments of the module for the non-acoustic signature are presented below. In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system has a module for the non-acoustic signature.
[0048] The non-acoustic signature module may, for example and in particular, include the measurement and calculation of the following non-acoustic signatures:
[0049] Infrared signature visual signature radar backscatter cross section electromagnetic signature
[0050] These signatures can be detected by enemy surface and underwater units, by air-based units such as maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters, and by land-based units. In particular, sea mines exploit the electromagnetic signature for guarding and / or detonation.
[0051] In a further embodiment of the invention, the module for the non-acoustic signature is designed to calculate and compare the target / actual value of the non-acoustic signature with previously set threshold parameters for the maximum permissible detection probability. Furthermore, the target / actual comparison of the non-acoustic signature, in particular with suggested measures if the signatures are exceeded, can be transferred, for example, to the module for visualization, monitoring, and control. The module for visualization, monitoring, and control then takes measures if previously set threshold parameters are exceeded, depending on the selected operating mode (automatic or semi-automatic).
[0052] The module for the non-acoustic signature, for example, has, in particular, a historical database.
[0053] The infrared signature and the visual signature are the difference in radiant intensity between the vessel and the background. They are highly dependent on external influences and can be reduced, for example, by active cooling or heating. The infrared signature and the visual signature are divided into the direct signature (hotspot), the indirect signature, and the visual signature.
[0054] A watercraft, for example, creates a direct signature (hotspot) through its retractable devices because they are equipped with electronic components. These electronic components emit heat and can be detected by enemy surface and underwater units, as well as airborne units. The direct signature can be reduced, for example, by deactivating electronic components or simply by retracting the retractable devices.
[0055] The indirect signature is generated by a watercraft, for example, when the turret or deployable devices break through the water surface. This creates so-called white water and Kelvin waves or thermal wakes, which depend on the deployable device configuration and the speed of the watercraft and can also be detected by enemy surface and underwater units, as well as airborne units. The indirect signature can be reduced, for example, by reducing the deployable device configuration or by reducing speed, or simply by retracting the deployable devices.
[0056] The visual signature is generated by a watercraft when turbulent waves, eddies, or very wavy water surfaces form, for example, caused by an underwater unit traveling very close to the water surface. It is also possible for the silhouette of an underwater unit to appear above the water surface. The visual signature can be detected by enemy surface and underwater units, as well as airborne units. The visual signature can be reduced, for example, by reducing speed near the water surface or simply by changing the diving depth.
[0057] The radar backscatter cross section of an object is determined by:
[0058] Reflectance geometric cross-section
[0059] Aspect angle Therefore, the concept of signature reduction is based on a small geometric cross-section and reduced reflectivity through the use of radar-absorbing material (RAM). Both the size and the ability to apply RAM often conflict with the requirements of the sensor capabilities. It is a strategic balance between the ability to detect targets at long range, which usually implies large antennas and consequently increases the risk of detection due to the large antennas. Air-based anti-submarine units use the X-band (8.2-12.4 GHz) to detect deployable devices of underwater units. In order to reduce reflectivity against incoming missiles in the K u-Band (12.4-18 GHz) is also reduced, the RAM coating is combined. Further measures include the selection of optimized designs for the deployment devices of underwater units during the design phase. The outer hull, for example that of a surface unit, is usually optimized with regard to the radar backscatter cross section. However, there are larger openings for on-board helicopters or boats, for example, that can be opened. When the doors are open, these often produce a very clear radar image. Therefore, the radar backscatter cross section can be reduced by closing the doors, for example if the surface unit is attacked by a missile. The effectiveness of a countermeasure can thus be improved.
[0060] The electromagnetic signature has, for example and in particular, the following manifestations:
[0061] 1 ) Magnetic signature a) Static magnetism (SM) i) Permanent magnetism ii) Induced magnetism iii) Eddy current magnetism iv) DC stray fields v) Corrosion-related b) Alternating magnetism (AM) i) AC stray field ii) Corrosion-related 2) Electrical signature a) Static Electric (SE) i) Corrosion-related ii) DC stray field b) Alternating Electric (AE) i) Corrosion-related ii) AC stray field
[0062] Individual points will be discussed below as examples.
[0063] Magnetic signature
[0064] Static magnetism (SM)
[0065] Permanent magnetism
[0066] Iron exposed to a strong magnetic field for a short time or a weak magnetic field for a long period becomes a permanent magnet. This is caused by the constant influence of the Earth's magnetic field during long periods of time spent in one location, especially during the manufacturing phase in the shipyard. Constant vibrations and current feeds, for example, from electric welding equipment, also have an aggravating effect.
[0067] Induced magnetism
[0068] In the ship, the Earth's magnetic field, as an external magnetic field, aligns elementary magnets depending on the direction and strength of the magnetic field at the vessel's location. The induced magnetism therefore depends on the vessel's location, attitude, and course.
[0069] Eddy current magnetism
[0070] The vessel's own motion constantly alters the effective field line density of the Earth's magnetic field in the metal plates and sheets of the hull and superstructure, as well as in the frame structures. This permanently induces eddy currents, which in turn generate a magnetic field. Eddy current magnetism is dependent on the vessel's own motion, particularly due to rolling and pitching at high speeds and in rough seas. DC stray field magnetism
[0071] All corrosion currents, electrical systems, and devices generate an electromagnetic field. These fields depend on the operating mode.
[0072] Corrosion-induced magnetism
[0073] Corrosion currents caused by different metals (ship's hull, sacrificial anodes) in seawater have a very strong influence. The effects of these currents are diverse and generate static magnetic fields through compensating currents.
[0074] Alternating magnetism (AM)
[0075] AC stray field magnetism
[0076] All electrical metals and conductors, power supply systems, and motors generate their own electric / magnetic fields, also known as stray fields. The direction of these fields depends on the design and the current flow. These stray fields can reach considerable magnitudes and cannot be neglected.
[0077] Corrosion-induced magnetism
[0078] Corrosion currents caused by different metals (ship's hull, sacrificial anodes) in seawater have a very strong influence. The effects of these currents are diverse and generate alternating magnetic fields through compensating currents.
[0079] Electrical signature (UEP Underwater Electrical Potential)
[0080] Static electric (SE)
[0081] Corrosion-related and DC stray field
[0082] All electrical metals and conductors, power supply systems, and motors generate their own electric / magnetic fields, also known as stray fields. The direction of these fields depends on the design and the current direction. These stray fields can reach considerable magnitudes and cannot be neglected. Corrosion currents, which arise from the presence of different metals (ship's hull, sacrificial anodes) in seawater, have a very strong influence. The effects of these currents are diverse and generate static magnetic fields through compensating currents. Alternating electric (AE)
[0083] Corrosion-related and AC stray field
[0084] The very low-frequency electromagnetic waves that arise from a slowly changing interaction between electric potential and the magnetic field, for example, from a rotating propeller, generate these very low-frequency electromagnetic emissions (TEA), also known as extremely low-frequency electromagnetic emissions (ELFE). This signature has a long range underwater.
[0085] After completion and regularly during the use phase, the vessel undergoes a magnetic treatment to eliminate permanent magnetism. The goal of the treatment is to eliminate the residual magnetic field entirely. The residual magnetic field should be uniform, symmetrical, and as stable as possible along the entire vessel. The effectiveness of the magnetic treatment is to minimize the static magnetic signature. It is not stable over time and should be repeated regularly during the use phase. The sea area in which the vessel operates must also be taken into account due to the induced component of the static magnetic signature. The static magnetic signature of a vessel changes due to magnetostriction during operation.
[0086] The electromagnetic signature is determined and adjusted using built-in magnetic sensors. Information about the ship's configuration and settings, as well as environmental information, is provided via interfaces to various ship systems and a database.
[0087] A vessel equipped with a magnetic self-protection system (MES) is designed to reduce the static magnetic signature while taking into account changes in the static magnetic signature. This requires a calibration of the measurement range. These systems only work on vessels with a non-magnetic design.
[0088] The task of the signature management system can include the collection and storage of magnetic sensor data, the estimation of the magnetic signature in real time as a function of the operating state of the active elements. For example, a cold storage room can be shut down, thus shifting unavoidable emissions that allow detection to times when detection is less critical, the real-time adjustment of the actual magnetic signature, and the prediction of the magnetic signature depending on the operating state using historically recorded data.
[0089] Further tasks may include monitoring the magnetic self-protection system (MES). These include, for example, alerting in the event of deviations in the magnetic signature and, in particular, providing signature information for the assessment and prediction of mine passages and the assessment and prediction of the detection sensitivity of airborne units such as maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters.
[0090] Exemplary embodiments of the acoustic signature module are presented below.
[0091] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system comprises a module for the acoustic signature.
[0092] The acoustic signature module includes, for example and in particular, the measurement and calculation of the following acoustic signatures:
[0093] Acoustic target level signature
[0094] Acoustic target signature
[0095] Hydrodynamic / Seismic signature
[0096] These signatures can be detected by enemy surface and underwater units, by air-supported units such as maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters, by land-based units with hydrophone chains, and by effectors such as sea mines, incoming lightweight and heavyweight torpedoes, and sonar buoys. In a further embodiment of the invention, the acoustic signature module is designed to calculate and compare the acoustic signature with preset threshold parameters for the active elements. Furthermore, the acoustic signature module is designed to transmit the acoustic signature comparison, including suggested measures if the signature threshold is exceeded, to the visualization, monitoring, and control module.The module for visualization, monitoring and control takes action when previously set threshold parameters are exceeded, depending on the selected operating mode "Automatic" or "Semi-automatic".
[0097] The acoustic signature module particularly and preferably features historical databases.
[0098] The acoustic target level signature (Water Borne Noise_WBN) is divided into the following signatures:
[0099] Flow Noise (FN)
[0100] Propeller noise (PN)
[0101] Structure-borne noise (SBN)
[0102] Airborne Noise (ABN)
[0103] Fluid-borne noise (FBN)
[0104] Flow noises (swath effects / wake / wake eddies) are hydrodynamic noises generated by turbulent boundary layers between the ship's hull and the water. They depend on the ship's speed. Possible causes include fluctuating water flow velocity along the ship's hull or pressure hull, excitation of mechanical components, noise at inlets and outlets, and flow-induced cavitation. Hydrodynamic noise accounts for only a small proportion of the ship's overall noise. It is often masked by engine and propeller noise. However, it plays a significant role in ship-based sonar systems. The effectiveness of sonar systems is significantly influenced, especially at high speeds. The detection of swath effects plays a major role in anti-submarine warfare.These hydrodynamic wake vortex signatures are used to classify known and unknown wake vortices from hydrodynamic signal measurements. Sources for this signature include ship and boat geometry as well as active elements from the group of ship's technical systems.
[0105] Measures to reduce flow noise (wake turbulence) include, for example, changing the boat geometry, reducing speed, increasing diving depth, small rudder angles or small course and depth maneuvers.
[0106] The wake vortex detection strategy is based on a flow model for detecting "von Kärmän wake vortices." This includes the creation of a wake vortex classification database for hydrodynamic wake vortex signatures for classifying unknown wake vortices from signal measurements.
[0107] Propeller noise (PN) is cavitation and sound radiation from the propeller. The rotational frequencies of the drive motor and blade rotational frequencies occur in the lower frequency range. Propeller blades resonate due to broadband excitation of the flow. With synchronous excitation, a self-sustaining oscillation with a very high level (singing) occurs due to the flow-blade interaction. The continuous spectrum is generated directly in the water and depends on the speed and water depth. The propeller is also influenced by hydrodynamic interaction, i.e., by the fluctuating wake fields of the vessel. The varying pressure fields influence the behavior of the stern. Propeller cavitation is caused by vacuum bubbles that burst or collapse due to a sharp pressure drop at the interface between the liquid and the surface as soon as they are exposed to normal pressures again.Such a process generates an acoustic and seismic "shock wave" that can damage neighboring structures. The source of this signature is the propeller of the active element from the group of ship's technical systems.
[0108] Measures to reduce propeller noise (cavitation and natural frequencies) include modified propeller geometry, speed reduction, cavitation control, increased diving depth, small rudder angles or small course and depth maneuvers, and rudder blade pitch angles. Surface units can, for example, reduce radiated noise by activating a so-called "prairie masker system" and mask their propeller blade configuration, thereby reducing their signature.
[0109] For this purpose, the acoustic signature module, for example, preferably has a database, including historical information from previous constructions, in which measures to reduce the acoustic signature and their effects are recorded.
[0110] Structure-borne noise (SBN) is engine noise. It is generated by propulsion and auxiliary machinery and is transmitted as vibrations through the ship's hull into the water. The machinery primarily generates vibrations at single frequencies or harmonic fundamental frequencies. These frequencies are very stable over time and are used as a classification tool. Causes of engine noise include rotating imbalances in components, shaft friction, shock excitations in components, cavitation in pumps, pipes, and valves, as well as transients in the steering system and mechanical defects. Other causes include noise generated by the crew, for example, during the change of watch, as well as general activities such as movements in the boat.
[0111] Sources for this signature include, for example, active elements from the group of command and weapon deployment systems, ship technical systems and ship or boat geometry.
[0112] Measures to reduce structure-borne noise include sound insulation modules, double elastic mountings, single elastic mountings, floating decks, flexible loops for cabling in elastically mounted systems, and active sound cancellation. For this purpose, the acoustic signature module preferably has a database, including historical information from previous constructions, in which measures to reduce the acoustic signature and their effects are recorded.
[0113] The strategy for detecting structure-borne sound is based, for example, on the following databases:
[0114] Database for noise sources (machines)
[0115] Database for acoustic impedance of elastic bearings
[0116] Shipbuilding structure database
[0117] Database of secondary transmission routes
[0118] Numerical models of vibration analysis for modal analysis of shipbuilding structures, acoustic noise radiation, finite element analysis of energy and statistical energy analysis support the reduction of the signature.
[0119] Airborne noise (ABN) is sound waves that are absorbed by the air, transmitted, and reflected by obstacles. Sources of this signature include, for example, active elements from the group of ship's technical systems.
[0120] Measures to reduce airborne noise include silencers, floating decks and active sound cancellation.
[0121] For this purpose, the acoustic signature module preferably has a database, including historical information from previous constructions, in which measures to reduce the acoustic signature and their effects are recorded.
[0122] Fluid-borne noise (FBN) contributes significantly to airborne and structure-borne noise in fluid flow systems. Fluid-borne noise can lead to fatigue of system components. This signature can be reduced through passive and active measures.
[0123] Hydraulic systems are divided into passive and active measures to reduce the signature. Passive measures include, for example:
[0124] Reduction of pump flow rate
[0125] Reduction of engine speed
[0126] Tuning the circuit to avoid resonance conditions Use of a silencer or pulsation damper Use of compensators and accumulators
[0127] Passive systems such as silencers, pulsation dampers, accumulators, and compensators have proven effective. However, they require tuning to specific systems. However, these measures are unsuitable for highly dynamic systems, as they impair dynamic response.
[0128] Active measures include, for example:
[0129] Control units
[0130] Sources for this signature include, for example, active elements from the group of ship-related systems.
[0131] The acoustic target signature is a backscattering phenomenon that depends on the geometry of the object. The acoustic target signature, also called target echo strength, has a significant influence on whether a watercraft can be detected with an active sonar system. Primary threats to underwater units include surface units equipped with sonar systems in the high, medium, and / or low frequency range. Sea mines can also be equipped with a small active sonar system. It is not absolutely necessary for the transmitter to be located at the same location as the receiver (monostatic or multistatic principle). The disadvantage of active sensors is the energy consumption and the inherent risk of betrayal if the system is constantly active.
[0132] Approaching light and heavy torpedoes with their active torpedo sonar represent a further threat to both surface and underwater units. The use of new bi- / multistatic sonar detection techniques is changing the threat landscape for underwater units. The bi- / multistatic detection technique decouples the transmitter (TX) and receiver (RX). The covertly operating unit is the real beneficiary of this technique, as it poses the greatest threat (the silent shooter). Algorithms in the bistatic receiver enable it to detect not only the direct blast but also the bistatic sound reflected from the surrounding area and arriving with a time delay. These two signals are correlated with the original transmitted active signal, and echoes are detected. The bi- / multistatic detection technique increases the detection range. This changes the operational environment for the submarine.Anti-submarine units operate either cooperatively or non-cooperatively. In the cooperative mode, the surface anti-submarine unit and the underwater anti-submarine unit act as a coordinated anti-submarine unit. In the non-cooperative mode, the underwater unit operates independently and uses bistatic sound incidence for bistatic detection (ping steel). This method is available to both friendly and hostile underwater units.
[0133] Possible measures to reduce the acoustic target signature include, for example, a modified boat geometry with an anti-reflection coating (stealth concept) for an underwater unit. The stealth concept significantly reduces the probability of detection. A anti-reflection coating or a sound-cancelling coating would also be possible without changing the boat geometry. The principle of active sound cancellation is based on monitoring the incoming sound at the target. Using a dedicated sound source on the target body, an identical signal is generated that is 180° out of phase. Both sound signals overlap (destructive interference) and, in the best case, cancel each other out. The sound is thus destroyed at the target; theoretically, no reflection occurs.The method requires fast, cost-intensive measurement, control, and transducer technology on the target body and is therefore not relevant for reducing reflections from large and complex sonar targets. The hydrodynamic / seismic signature, also called the pressure signature, is generated by a moving vessel. The vessel creates a dynamic flow system, with a current generating a negative pressure. The displacement leads to the acceleration of the water particles (current) and a reduction in pressure. The resulting negative pressure is proportional to the size and speed of the vessel.
[0134] A changing propeller load creates a fluctuating wake field at the stern of the vessel. Varying pressure fields are generated that affect the stern (hydrodynamic interaction).
[0135] The dynamic pressure profile generated by a watercraft, for example, a surface unit, is superimposed by wave motion. In great water depths, the wave motion is very similar to that of a watercraft (swell). This signature depends on the ship or boat geometry, draft, diving depth, roll, pitch, speed, sea state, and maneuvers of the ship or boat.
[0136] Examples of implementations of the threat analysis module are presented below.
[0137] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system comprises a threat analysis module. This makes it possible to transfer the target data, classification data, and threat analysis data from the command and weapon deployment system to the threat analysis module. The prerequisite for data transfer is that the contact and / or contacts have been classified as hostile. The threat analysis module independently and autonomously performs a threat analysis, which it compares with the transmitted data and the contents of its own databases. This results in the calculation of the distance (danger zone) at which the vessel can be detected, using its own databases, which store data on the sensitivity of enemy sensors, effectors, and detection and weapon deployment ranges. Threat analysis means that capability values are assigned to a contact.For example, if a contact has been classified as an enemy anti-submarine unit, it can be assumed that this unit has better sonar performance than, say, a task force support ship. Therefore, in this case, the enemy would have to be evaded or the signature significantly reduced to avoid detection. Especially in the area of non-acoustic signatures, the assessment of enemy surface and underwater units, as well as airborne units, is becoming increasingly complex. Sea mines, sonar buoys, and incoming light and heavy torpedoes pose particular threats.
[0138] In a further embodiment of the invention, the threat analysis module comprises the following databases:
[0139] Database with information on the sensitivity of enemy sensors
[0140] Database with information on enemy detection ranges
[0141] Database with information on enemy weapon ranges
[0142] Database with information on enemy effectors (sea mines, light and heavy torpedoes, sonar buoys)
[0143] In a further embodiment of the invention, the threat analysis module is designed for one or more, preferably all, of the following tasks: a) Acceptance of the propagation conditions from the active element b) Acceptance of the target data, classification data and threat analysis data from the active element c) Automatic threat analysis and comparison with the contents of own databases and comparison of the transmitted data from the active element d) Automatic calculation of the distance (danger zone) at which the own ship / boat can be detected. e) The threat analysis is output to the module for visualization, monitoring and control. Exemplary embodiments of the module for visualization, monitoring and control are presented below.
[0144] In a further embodiment of the invention, the signature management system has a module for visualization, monitoring, and control. This allows the visualization of the analysis and calculation results from the other modules and the evaluation of the analysis and calculation results for improved decision-making, as well as the monitoring and control of the active elements. The module for visualization, monitoring, and control is an interaction component for the interaction between the crew and the signature management system.
[0145] The analysis and calculation results from the other modules are preferably presented in a switchable 2D / 3D model, supported by graphical and numerical data as well as an underlying electronic nautical chart in order to present hazard potentials in the near and far field.
[0146] A key feature of the module for visualization, monitoring, and control is the automatic forecasting of the duration of the measures that can be taken to reduce the signature and evade enemy detection. During operations, particularly in threat situations, the user decides how the signature management system should respond to control the active elements, or can respond independently. The user has the option of selecting between "automatic" or "semi-automatic" (veto right) operating mode in the signature management system. This is necessary, for example, in combat situations or in special security situations.
[0147] In "Automatic" mode, the signature management system independently executes the necessary measures to control the active elements, for example, to save energy reserves and / or reduce self-signatures. Accordingly, warning and alarm messages are generated in the module for visualization, monitoring, and control, along with the measures taken by the signature management system. If the "Automatic" function is selected, switching to the "Semi-Automatic" function (veto right) is possible at any time. This results in the abort of initiated measures and the automatically restoring of changed operating and switching states in the active elements.
[0148] The "semi-automatic" function may be necessary when certain circumstances, such as in specific threat situations, prevent the signature management system from automatically changing the operating and activation states of the active elements, for example, to conserve energy reserves and / or reduce self-signatures. Accordingly, warning and alarm messages are generated in the module for visualization, monitoring, and control, along with the measures that could have been taken.
[0149] The assignment of the function “Automatic” and / or “Semi-Automatic” (veto right) is possible for automatic or semi-automatic partial control of selected active elements.
[0150] In a further embodiment of the invention, the module for visualization, monitoring and control is designed for one, several or all of the following tasks: a) Transfer of the environmental propagation data from the active element to the threat analysis module b) Transfer of the target, classification and threat analysis data from the active element to the threat analysis module c) Transfer of the environmental propagation data from the threat analysis module to the visualization, monitoring and control module d) Transfer of the target, classification and threat analysis data from the threat analysis module to the visualization, monitoring and control module e) Calculation of the threat analysis in the threat analysis module and transfer to the visualization, monitoring and control module f) Calculation of the driving range,Operating and power-up status in the mission planning module and transfer to the visualisation, monitoring and control module g) Calculation and target / actual comparison of the non-acoustic signature with the previously set threshold parameters in the non-acoustic signature module and transfer of the target / actual comparison of the non-acoustic signature and transfer of suggested measures if the signatures are exceeded to the visualisation, monitoring and control module h) Calculation and target / actual comparison of the acoustic signature with the previously set threshold parameters in the acoustic signature module and transfer of the target / actual comparison of the acoustic signature and suggested measures if the signatures are exceeded to the visualisation, monitoring and control module i) Calculation of future applications in the future applications module and transfer to the visualisation module,Monitoring and control j) Visualization of the analysis and calculation results in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, from the other modules k) Automatic and / or manual evaluation of the analysis and calculation results for decision-making, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control l) Generation of warning and alarm messages in the event of a threat or immediate threat, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control m) Generation of warning and alarm messages when energy reserves are no longer sufficient, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control n) Generation of warning and alarm messages when previously defined threshold parameters of the non-acoustic signature are exceeded, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control o) Generation of warning and alarm messages when previously defined threshold parameters of the non-acoustic signature are exceeded,in the module for visualization, monitoring and control p) Automatic control of the active elements in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, with the "Automatic" function, if the signature management system is to carry out the necessary measures independently q) Semi-automatic control of the active elements in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, with the "Semi-automatic" function (veto right), if the signature management system is not to carry out the necessary measures independently r) Switching from the "Automatic" to "Semi-automatic" function (veto right) in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, if the situation requires it, which leads to the abort of initiated measures and changed operating and switching states in the active elements are automatically saved in the module for visualization, monitoring and control,be restored s) Automatic and / or semi-automatic control of selected subsystems of the active elements in the module for visualisation, monitoring and control, with the function "Automatic" and / or "Semi-automatic" t) Presentation of the analysis and calculation results from the other modules in a switchable 2D / 3D model, underlaid with graphic and numerical data as well as an underlying electronic nautical chart to present hazard potentials in the near and far field, in the module for visualisation, monitoring and control.,
[0151] Additionally, a module can be provided for future applications. When designing an entire system for a surface and underwater unit, it is essential to conduct a precise requirements analysis in order to offer targeted solutions. In this context, it is important to continuously question the validity of assumed requirements. This module makes it possible to implement specific customer requirements and changing threat situations.
[0152] The signature management system is linked, for example, to the command and weapon deployment system, the ship's technical system, and the ship and boat geometry. The signature management system is critical for survivability and mission success. One key result, for example, is the calculation of a forecast for the duration of the measures that can be taken to reduce the ship's signature and evade enemy detection. To this end, the signature management system processes the processes previously calculated in the various modules and visualizes the analysis and calculation results in modules for visualization, monitoring, and control for further analysis and evaluation for improved decision-making.Warning and alarm messages appear when energy reserves are no longer sufficient, when previously defined thresholds for the non-acoustic and acoustic signature are exceeded, and in the event of threats and immediate threats. During operation, the user decides how the signature management system should react to control the active elements, using the previously set operating mode: "Automatic" or "Semi-Automatic" (veto right). The "Semi-Automatic" function may be necessary if certain circumstances, such as in special threat situations, prevent the signature management system from automatically changing the operating and switch-on states of the active elements, for example to conserve energy reserves and / or reduce self-signatures. Accordingly, warning and alarm messages appear in the module for visualization, monitoring, and control.In "Automatic" mode, the signature management system independently carries out the necessary measures to control the active elements, for example to save energy reserves and / or reduce self-signatures. Accordingly, warning and alarm messages appear in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, indicating which measures are being and have been taken by the signature management system. If the "Automatic" function has been selected, it is possible to switch to the "Semi-Automatic" function at any time. This results in initiated measures being aborted and changed operating and switch-on states in the active elements being automatically restored, for example in special situations. The "Automatic" and / or "Semi-Automatic" function (veto right) can be assigned individually for automatic or semi-automatic control of the active elements during operational use.All modules of the signature management system are used to capture, process, calculate, store, and distribute data. For individual signatures, parameters are determined regarding change, vulnerability, and sensitivity. The real-time calculations of current signature values, vulnerability, and sensitivity of extensive parameters are based on information about the environment, operating and power-on status, and the signature itself. The goal is to monitor the signature and adapt it to the tactical situation. The signature management system specifically encompasses balanced consideration of all relevant signatures, the control, and reduction of signatures throughout their entire lifecycle, taking into account the operation, task, capability, sea area, and environmental conditions.
[0153] For example, the signature management system is designed to utilize its own databases. These databases are designed to store current signal measurements and provide comparison options between current and historical signal measurements, for example:
[0154] Database of noise sources (machines)
[0155] Database of acoustic impedance of elastic bearings
[0156] Shipbuilding structure database
[0157] Database of secondary transmission routes
[0158] Furthermore, for example, the signature management system is designed for the use of its own models and analysis applications, for example:
[0159] Flow model
[0160] Numerical model of vibration analysis for modal analysis of shipbuilding structures
[0161] Analysis application for acoustic noise radiation
[0162] Analysis application for finite element analysis of energy
[0163] Analysis application for statistical energy analysis
[0164] Furthermore, for example, the signature management system is designed to use its own databases for storing current target parameters and for comparing current and historically stored target data, for example:
[0165] Database with information on the sensitivity of enemy sensors, database with information on enemy detection ranges, database with information on enemy weapon deployment ranges, database with information on enemy effectors (sea mines, light and heavy torpedoes, sonar buoys). In a further aspect, the invention relates to a method for operating a watercraft with a signature management system. The method comprises the following steps: a) specifying a maximum permissible detection probability, b) determining the states of the active elements, c) estimating the own signature, d) comparing the own signature according to step c) with the detection probability specified in step a), e) upon detecting an exceedance in step d), adjusting the states of the active elements to adapt the signature so that the maximum permissible detection probability is exceeded.
[0166] The key is therefore the targeted adaptation of the states to reduce the detection probability. The method thus serves to adapt its own signature to an external situation (e.g., the distance and capability of other vehicles) in order to likely avoid detection.
[0167] Signature management can perform these steps continuously. These steps can also be performed when the situation changes, for example, when contact is made with another vessel or aircraft. Alternatively, or preferably additionally, steps b) to e) can also be performed predictively. This way, for example, route planning can determine which active elements will be used, when, and to what extent.
[0168] In a further embodiment of the invention, a switch-on schedule for the active elements is created predictively during mission planning. This has the advantage that, for example, in the case of a cold storage room, times can be planned during which it can be switched off, particularly outside of meal preparation times. Alternatively or additionally, the route can be planned so that a greater distance is maintained from potential adversaries, for example if the cold storage room needs to be cooled again. Thus, there is preferably an interaction between switch-on schedule and route planning. In a further embodiment of the invention, in step e), the thermal signature is adjusted by changing the direction of travel. This can be done in two ways.Firstly, it can prevent one side from constantly facing the sun, which would otherwise overheat it, especially by having the bow or stern facing the sun to minimize absorption of solar radiation. Secondly, a side heated by the sun can be turned away from the threat in the event of a threat.
[0169] In a further embodiment of the invention, in step e) the radar cross-section is adjusted by closing openings, in particular by gates.
[0170] In a further aspect, the invention relates to a method for operating a watercraft with a signature management system. The method comprises the following steps: a) specifying a maximum permissible detection probability, b) determining the states of the active elements, c) estimating the own signature, d) comparing the own signature according to step c) with the detection probability specified in step a), e) upon detection of an exceedance in step d), adjusting the active elements to fall below the threshold, wherein steps a) to e) may in particular comprise individual, several, or all of the following steps.
[0171] In particular, estimating one's own signature in step c) and comparing one's own signature after step c) with the detection probability specified in step a) in step d):
[0172] I. Transfer of target, classification and threat analysis data from the active element to the threat analysis module,
[0173] II. Transfer of environmental propagation data from the threat analysis module to the visualization, monitoring, and control module. III. Transfer of target, classification, and threat analysis data from the threat analysis module to the visualization, monitoring, and control module.
[0174] IV. Calculation of the threat analysis in the threat analysis module and transfer to the visualization, monitoring and control module,
[0175] V. Calculation of the driving range, operating and power-on status in the mission planning module and transfer to the visualization, monitoring and control module,
[0176] VI. Calculation and target-actual comparison of the non-acoustic signature with the previously set threshold parameters in the non-acoustic signature module and transfer of the target-actual comparison of the non-acoustic signature and the transfer of proposed measures in case of exceedance of the signatures to the visualization, monitoring and control module,
[0177] VII. Calculation and target-actual comparison of the acoustic signature with the previously set threshold parameters in the acoustic signature module and the transfer of the target-actual comparison of the acoustic signature and proposed measures in case of exceedance of the signatures to the visualization, monitoring and control module,
[0178] VIII. Calculation of future applications in the module for future applications and transfer to the module for visualization, monitoring and control,
[0179] In addition, the method may comprise one or more of the following steps:
[0180] IX. Visualization of analysis and calculation results in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, from the other modules,
[0181] X. Automatic and / or manual evaluation of analysis and calculation results for decision making, in module for visualization, monitoring and control,
[0182] XI. Generation of warning and alarm messages in case of threat or immediate threat, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control. XII. Generation of warning and alarm messages when energy reserves are no longer sufficient, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control.
[0183] XIII. Generation of warning and alarm messages when previously defined threshold parameters of the non-acoustic signature are exceeded, in the module for visualization, monitoring and control,
[0184] XIV. Generation of warning and alarm messages when previously defined threshold parameters of the non-acoustic signature are exceeded, in module for visualization, monitoring and control,
[0185] When determining the excess in step d), the adjustment of the active elements to reduce the excess in step e) may, for example, comprise one or more of the following steps:
[0186] XV. Automatic control of the active elements in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, with the “Automatic” function if the signature management system is to carry out the necessary measures independently,
[0187] XVI. Semi-automatic control of the active elements in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, with the “semi-automatic” function (veto right), if the signature management system should not carry out necessary measures independently,
[0188] XVII. Switching from the “Automatic” to “Semi-Automatic” function (veto right) in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, if the situation requires it, which leads to the cancellation of initiated measures and the automatic restoration of changed operating and switching states in the active elements in the module for visualization, monitoring and control,
[0189] XVIII. Automatic and / or semi-automatic control of selected subsystems of the active elements in the module for visualization, monitoring and control, with the function “automatic” and / or “semi-automatic”,
[0190] XIX. Presentation of the analysis and calculation results from the various modules in a switchable 2D / 3D model, supported by graphical and numerical data as well as an underlying electronic nautical chart to present hazard potentials in the near and far field, in a module for visualization, monitoring, and control.
[0191] The watercraft according to the invention is explained in more detail below using an embodiment shown in the drawings.
[0192] Fig. 1 Watercraft
[0193] Fig. 2 Electronic data processing system
[0194] Fig. 3 Submarine
[0195] Fig. 1 shows an exemplary watercraft 10, in the example shown a surface vessel. The watercraft 10 has an electronic data processing system 20. This system can extend over the entire watercraft 10, with large parts usually being arranged in the area of the bridge. The watercraft 10 has sensors. As an example, a sonar 32 and a radar 34 are shown here. The data recorded by the sensors is transmitted to a sensor system 50 within the electronic data processing system 20 and evaluated there. The sensors themselves can also be arranged, for example, within the black network, i.e. within the electronic data processing system 20. The sensor system 50 usually generates classified information from the pure recorded measured values and is therefore usually arranged in the red network of the electronic data processing system 20.The watercraft 20 also has active elements; shown here as examples are the engine 42 with a propeller 44 for propulsion, a hangar door 46, and an effector 48. A control system 60 within the electronic data processing system 20 serves to control the active elements. It is important to note that a signature management system 70 is centrally located within the electronic data processing system 20. This means that, on the one hand, it has access to the information acquired by the sensors and evaluated by the sensor system 50. On the other hand, it is able to specifically modify the signature of the watercraft 10 via the control system 60, depending on the prevailing threat situation. Fig. 2 shows the electronic data processing system 20 with several modules. These modules can preferably be located within the signature management system 70.In particular, a mission planning module 100, a non-acoustic signature module 102, an acoustic signature module 104, an enemy assessment module 106, and a visualization module 108 are provided. The mission planning module 100 includes, for example, map materials, models for fuel consumption calculation, and the like. Furthermore, the mission planning module 100 can have a weather forecast module or be connected to a weather forecast module. The non-acoustic signature module 102 serves, in particular, to evaluate the non-acoustic signature and to optimize the non-acoustic signature based on the situation. The same applies analogously to the acoustic signature module 104.Furthermore, there is an enemy assessment module 106, which evaluates the contacts detected by the sensor system 50 in particular with regard to their ability to detect the watercraft 10, particularly taking into account position and preferably also predicted movement. The visualization module 108 serves to make this information available, for example, on the bridge.
[0196] Fig. 3 shows another watercraft 10. Unlike the example shown in Fig. 1, this is a submarine. Otherwise, the above statements apply analogously.
[0197] Reference symbol
[0198] 10 watercraft
[0199] 20 Electronic data processing system
[0200] 32 Sonar 34 Radar 42 Engine 44 Propeller 46 Hangar Door 48 Effector 50 Sensor System 60 Control System 70 Signature Management System
[0201] 100 Mission Planning Module
[0202] 102 Module for the non-acoustic signature
[0203] 104 Acoustic Signature Module 106 Enemy Assessment Module
[0204] 108 Visualization module
Claims
Patent claims 1. A watercraft (10) with an electronic data processing system (20), wherein the watercraft (10) has sensors (32, 34), wherein the electronic data processing system (20) is connected to the sensors (32, 34) for receiving the data detected by the sensors (32, 34), wherein the watercraft (10) has active elements (42, 44, 46, 48), wherein the electronic data processing system (20) is designed to control the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48) and is connected to the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48) for control, wherein the active elements have at least first states and second states, wherein the signature of the watercraft (10) is different in the first states and the second states, characterized in that the electronic data processing system (20) has a signature management system, wherein the signature management system is designed to change the control of the active elements (42, 44, 46,48) is designed to change the signature of the watercraft (10) by changing the states of the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48) by the electronic data processing system (20).
2. Watercraft (10) according to claim 1, characterized in that the signature management system has a module for the non-acoustic signature (102).
3. Watercraft (10) according to claim 2, characterized in that the module for the non-acoustic signature (102) is designed to reduce the thermal signature for adjusting the direction of travel of the watercraft (10) and / or for spraying the outer skin of the watercraft (10) for cooling.
4. Watercraft (10) according to one of claims 2 to 3, characterized in that the module for the non-acoustic signature (102) is designed to reduce the radar cross-section for closing openings, in particular by gates.
5. Watercraft (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the signature management system has a module for the acoustic signature (104).
6. Watercraft (10) according to claim 5, characterized in that the acoustic signature reduction module (104) is configured to adjust or deactivate active elements (42, 44, 46, 48).
7. Watercraft (10) according to claim 6, characterized in that the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48) are selected from the group comprising drive, compressor, condenser, air conditioning and heating technology.
8. Watercraft (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the signature management system has a module for mission planning (100).
9. Watercraft (10) according to claim 8, characterized in that the mission planning module (100) is designed to calculate the probability of detection along a planned route and to take into account the available energy reserves.
10. Watercraft (10) according to one of claims 8 to 9, characterized in that the mission planning module (100) is designed to take the weather forecast into account when planning the route.
11. Watercraft (10) according to one of claims 8 to 10, characterized in that the mission planning module (100) is designed to plan the activation of the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48).
12. Watercraft (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the signature management system has an enemy assessment module (106). Watercraft (10) according to claim 12, characterized in that the enemy assessment module (106) has a database, wherein the database has suspected detection ranges for enemy units according to detection types. Watercraft (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the electronic data processing system (20) additionally has one or more systems selected from the group consisting of a sensor system (50), a weapon guidance system, a navigation system, and a communication system. Watercraft (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the electronic data processing system (20) has a visualization device. Watercraft (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the mission planning module (100) is integrated into a sensor control system.A method for operating a watercraft (10) with a signature management system, the method comprising the following steps: a) specifying a maximum permissible detection probability, b) determining the states of the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48), c) estimating the own signature, d) comparing the own signature according to step c) with the detection probability specified in step a), e) upon detection of an exceedance in step d), adapting the states of the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48) to adapt the signature so that the maximum permissible detection probability is undershot. Method according to claim 17, characterized in that steps b) to e) are carried out predictively. Method according to claim 18, characterized in that predictive in the Mission planning involves planning the activation of the active elements (42, 44, 46, 48). Method according to one of claims 17 to 18, characterized in that in step e) the thermal signature is adapted by changing the Direction of travel. Method according to one of claims 17 to 20, characterized in that in step e) the radar cross-section is adjusted by closing openings, in particular by gates.