Method for authenticating a lone worker terminal to a remote server

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for certifying a terminal (1) for a lone worker with a remote server (2), comprising the following steps: - generation (31) of a unique token, including a first digital key, - transmission (32) of the unique token, - generation (33) of a terminal private key and a terminal public key, - transmission (35) of a message including the terminal identifier, the terminal public key, and an authentication code, the authentication code being calculated using the first digital key and input data formed by at least part of the message, - verification (36) of the validity of the authentication code using the first digital key, - generation (37) of a digital certificate including the terminal identifier, the terminal public key, and a signature created using a second digital key. Figure 1

Description

Title of the invention: Method for authenticating a lone worker terminal to a remote server Technical field of the invention

[0001] The invention relates to a method for authenticating a terminal with a remote server.

[0002] It relates to the technical field of terminals intended for isolated workers. Previous technique

[0003] Many professional activities involve a worker performing tasks without the proximity of a colleague who could identify a potential emergency situation and / or provide assistance. This is the case, for example, when intervening in premises unoccupied by staff or when intervening outside of staff hours on site.

[0004] In this text, the term "isolated worker" is used to designate a person who is required to carry out professional activities without the presence of at least one person in close proximity to him.

[0005] To ensure the safety of a lone worker, it is necessary to have monitoring and alert systems adapted to the specific characteristics of the location and the lone worker's activities. The use of a system comprising a terminal worn by the lone worker and connected to a remote server is a commonly adopted approach to meet this need. The terminal is generally equipped with sensors (accelerometer, inertial measurement unit) enabling the detection of a dangerous situation, such as a fall, as well as verification means, such as a voice communication system. The terminal may, in particular, be a mobile phone.

[0006] When configuring a terminal for use as an alert, tracking, and / or monitoring device for a lone worker, the terminal and a remote server must be configured to allow their connection. Furthermore, this connection must be authenticated and confidential. Specifically, no other device should be able to impersonate the terminal with the remote server, nor impersonate the remote server with the terminal, and the information exchanged between the terminal and the remote server must not be observable or blocked. The information exchanged by the terminal and the remote server is potentially private or could compromise site and / or personnel security, for example, when the lone worker is a security guard whose terminal transmits their location to the remote server.To meet this need, a common method is to use a username and password. which will be recognized by the remote server. However, passwords are prone to being forgotten or shared, which compromises the security of connections between the terminal and the remote server. Furthermore, each connection between the terminal and the remote server requires the use of a password, creating a short but repetitive step that a lone worker must perform every day. Presentation of the invention

[0007] The present invention remedies the aforementioned drawbacks by proposing a method for certifying a terminal for a lone worker with a remote server.

[0008] To this end, and according to a first aspect, the process of certifying a terminal for a lone worker with a remote server comprises the following steps:

[0009] - generation, by the remote server, of a unique token containing a first key digital,

[0010] - transmission, by the remote server to the terminal, of the unique token,

[0011] - generation, by the terminal, of a pair of digital keys comprising a key private key of the terminal and a public key of the terminal,

[0012] - transmission, by the terminal to the remote server, of a message comprising the terminal identifier, the terminal's public key, and an authentication code, the authentication code being calculated using the first numeric key and input data formed by at least part of the message,

[0013] - verification, by the remote server, of the validity of the authentication code in using the first digital key,

[0014] - if the authentication code is valid, the remote server generates a digital certificate containing the terminal identifier, the terminal's public key and a signature created using a second digital key.

[0015] Such steps allow the lone worker terminal to be certified with the remote server. Certification means that the terminal's identity is known to the remote server and that this identity cannot be spoofed by another entity. Indeed, the digital certificate links the terminal's identifier to the terminal's public key in a manner guaranteed by the remote server. The remote server thus performs a role equivalent to that of a certification authority. Thanks to this terminal certification with the remote server, future communications between the terminal and the remote server can be secured to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of, on the one hand, the alerts raised by the terminal in the event of abnormal situations involving the lone worker, and on the other hand, any video or voice communications used to verify the alert.This verification of the alert confirms the need for intervention by a rescue team.

[0016] In addition, such steps allow the terminal to be certified to the remote server without requiring the lone worker or anyone else to use a password. This facilitates the implementation of lone worker monitoring to ensure their safety.

[0017] A unique token is understood to mean, for example, a digital piece of data or a digital message. A unique token is commonly called a "token" in English.

[0018] A message authentication code means, for example, a message authentication code based on hashing, also called "HMAC" in English, calculated from the message according to a cryptographic hash function, for example "HMAC-SHA-256", using a digital key.

[0019] Verification of the validity of the authentication code means, for example, the use of a cryptographic process comprising a new step of generating an authentication code for the message and a step of comparing the authentication code whose validity is verified with the newly generated authentication code.

[0020] An authentication code is considered valid when the authentication code whose validity is verified and the newly generated authentication code are identical.

[0021] A "digital key pair comprising a private key and a public key" is understood to mean an asymmetric encryption key pair. Only the private key can decrypt information encrypted by the public key, and only the public key can decrypt information encrypted by the private key. In particular, the digital key pair could be, for example, a key pair generated according to the "DSA" digital signature algorithm.

[0022] In particular embodiments the invention may further comprise one or more of the following features, taken individually or in all technically possible combinations.

[0023] According to one embodiment, the unique token also includes a certification identifier. The message transmitted by the terminal to the remote server also includes the certification identifier, and the certification process includes an additional step of verification by the remote server of the correspondence between the certification identifier in the unique token and the certification identifier in the message.

[0024] The term "certification identifier" refers to a unique identifier for each execution of a certification process. The use of the certification identifier allows the remote server, in particular when several certification processes are performed simultaneously for several terminals by the same remote server, to know which initial digital key to use to verify the validity of the code. authentication. In this way, the remote server saves time when performing several certification processes simultaneously.

[0025] "Verification of the correspondence between the certification identifier in the unique token and the certification identifier in the message" means, for example, a comparison between the two certification identifiers.

[0026] According to one implementation method, the certification process includes the following additional steps:

[0027] - transmission, by the remote server to the terminal, of the digital certificate,

[0028] - storage of the digital certificate by the terminal.

[0029] The transmission to the terminal and subsequent storage of the digital certificate by the terminal allows the remote server to save storage space, also known as memory space. Indeed, when several terminals for lone workers are certified with the same remote server, each digital certificate can be stored by the corresponding terminal rather than by the remote server.

[0030] According to a second aspect, the invention relates to a method for authenticating a terminal for a lone worker comprising the following steps:

[0031] - terminal certification with the remote server according to the certification process of the first aspect of the invention,

[0032] - transmission, by the terminal to the remote server, of an authentication request including the terminal identifier,

[0033] - verification, by the remote server, of the validity of the digital certificate comprising the terminal identifier transmitted in the authentication request,

[0034] - if the certificate is valid, transmission, by the remote server to the terminal, of a message, called forward message, containing a random number,

[0035] - after receiving the forward message, a signature of the random number is generated, via the terminal using the terminal's private key,

[0036] - transmission, from the terminal to the remote server, of a message, called a message return, containing the signature of the random number,

[0037] - verification of the validity of the random number signature, by the remote server, using the terminal's public key,

[0038] - if the signature is valid, notification, by the remote server to the terminal, of the success authentication.

[0039] Such steps allow a lone worker terminal to be authenticated with a remote server. "Authenticated" means that, prior to any exchange of information between the terminal and the remote server, the security and authenticity of the exchanges are ensured. Furthermore, such steps allow the terminal to be authenticated with the remote server without requiring the lone worker or any other person to use a password. This facilitates the implementation Instead of monitoring the lone worker to ensure their safety, the terminal certification step with the remote server can advantageously be performed only once per terminal. Subsequent steps can then be carried out prior to establishing each secure communication between the terminal and the remote server. For example, at the beginning of each intervention by the lone worker using the terminal.

[0040] Verification of the validity of the signature of the random number means a cryptographic process, for example "DS A", using input data consisting of the random number, the public key of the terminal and the signature intended to verify that the signature was generated from the random number using the private key of the terminal.

[0041] A "valid signature" is understood to mean a signature for which the result of the validity check is positive.

[0042] The term “random number” means a number generated randomly, commonly called “rand” in English.

[0043] Verification of the validity of the digital certificate by the remote server ensures the authenticity of the terminal even if the digital certificate has not been stored securely between the certification and authentication processes. Indeed, the terminal's identity could be spoofed if the link between its identifier and its public key, established during the certification process, were modified by another entity, which is possible if the certificate is stored in insecurely. However, such a modification renders the digital certificate invalid.

[0044] Verification of the validity of the digital certificate by the remote server, for example, means a verification carried out using a cryptographic process using input data comprising the digital certificate, the signature of the digital certificate and a digital key intended to verify that the signature was generated from the certificate using the digital key or a private key corresponding to the digital key when the digital key is a public key generated according to an algorithm such as, for example, the "DS A".

[0045] According to one implementation method, the authentication request includes the digital certificate.

[0046] The transmission of the digital certificate from the terminal to the remote server in the authentication request implies that, during the implementation of the certification process of the first aspect of the invention, the digital certificate was transmitted to the terminal and stored by the terminal. Such steps allow the remote server to save storage space, also known as memory space.

[0047] According to one embodiment, the unique token is transmitted in the form of a QR code.

[0048] A "QR code," also called a "Quick Response Code," is a two-dimensional barcode, in the form of an image, displayed on a screen or printed on paper and readable by an electronic device. The act of reading a QR code using an electronic device is commonly called scanning.

[0049] In the case where the terminal is, for example, a mobile phone, the lone worker or a coordinator of the implementation of the lone worker's safety will be able to easily contribute to the terminal certification process with the remote server by scanning, using the terminal, the QR code containing the unique token issued by the remote server.

[0050] According to one embodiment, the unique token is transmitted to the terminal by SMS or email. If the terminal is directly accessible by the remote server prior to the certification process, for example, when the terminal is a mobile phone and its number is known to the remote server or the email address of the mobile phone owner is known, then the unique token can be transmitted to the terminal by SMS or email, thus facilitating the certification process.

[0051] According to one embodiment, the process according to the first or second aspect includes an additional step of revocation of the digital certificate by the remote server.

[0052] "Revocation" means that the certificate is no longer considered valid and the terminal identifier it contains is no longer considered to correspond to that of a certified terminal. This makes it possible to cancel the certification of a terminal that, for example, has been lost or is no longer used by a lone worker, and to prevent that terminal from still being able to connect to the remote server.

[0053] According to one embodiment, the method according to the first or second aspect includes an additional step of associating, by the remote server, a lone worker profile with the terminal identifier.

[0054] The term "lone worker profile" refers to a set of information relevant to the safety of the lone worker and which varies depending on the individual worker. This includes, for example, the type of monitoring to be carried out (fall detection, timer for the duration of occupancy of a hazardous area, etc.) or the type of emergency procedure (calling a colleague, calling the fire department, etc.). This allows for the implementation of safety measures tailored to the specific needs of a lone worker.

[0055] According to one embodiment, the method according to the first or second aspect includes an additional step of configuring, by the remote server, the lone worker profile so as to add the following characteristics: - a monitoring profile, - a procedure to clear up any doubt, - a backup procedure.

[0056] The term "monitoring profile" refers to the monitoring or monitoring of the isolated worker to be carried out, for example, fall detection or detection of entry into a dangerous area.

[0057] A verification procedure is defined as a procedure that allows an alert to be confirmed before triggering a rescue procedure. The alert can be confirmed, for example, if the lone worker does not press a button on the terminal within a certain time or following a video communication with an operator via the terminal.

[0058] A rescue procedure is defined as a procedure that allows for assistance to be provided to a lone worker. For example, a call to a security service indicating the location of the lone worker in distress or a call to a colleague of the lone worker in distress.

[0059] This step makes it possible to put in place a security adapted to the specificities of a lone worker and / or his place of intervention and / or the nature of the distress situation detected.

[0060] According to a third aspect, the invention relates to a terminal comprising the following elements:

[0061] - a communication module,

[0062] - a processing unit,

[0063] - an electronic memory comprising a computer program including instructions which, when the program is executed by the processing unit, lead the latter to implement the steps of the process, carried out by the terminal, according to the first aspect or the second aspect of the invention.

[0064] Such arrangements allow said terminal to ensure, in combination with a remote server, the security of a lone worker without the communications carried out within the framework of this security being compromised by a third party and without requiring the use of a password.

[0065] The term terminal means an electronic device designed specifically to ensure the safety of a lone worker or originally designed for another application, for example, a mobile phone.

[0066] According to a fourth aspect, the invention relates to a server comprising the following elements:

[0067] - a communication module,

[0068] - a processing unit,

[0069] - an electronic memory comprising a computer program including instructions which, when the program is executed by the processing unit, lead the latter to implement the steps of the process, carried out by the remote server, according to the first or second aspect of the invention.

[0070] Such arrangements allow said server to ensure, in combination with a terminal, the safety of a lone worker without the communications carried out within the framework of this safety being compromised by a third party and without requiring the use of a password. Presentation of the figures

[0071] The invention will be better understood upon reading the following description, given by way of non-limiting example, and made with reference to the figures:

[0072] [Fig. 1] a schematic representation of an example of a method for certifying a terminal for lone workers according to one aspect of the invention,

[0073] [Fig.2] a schematic representation of an example of a method for authenticating a terminal for a lone worker according to one aspect of the invention,

[0074] [Fig.3] a schematic representation of an example of a method for authenticating a terminal for a lone worker according to one aspect of the invention,

[0075] [Fig.4] a schematic representation of an example of a terminal for a lone worker according to one aspect of the invention,

[0076] [Fig.5] a schematic representation of an example of a remote server according to one aspect of the invention.

[0077] In these figures, identical reference numerals from one figure to another designate identical or analogous elements. For clarity, the elements shown are not necessarily to the same scale, unless otherwise stated.

[0078] Detailed description of particular embodiments of the invention

[0079] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of an example of a method for certifying a lone worker terminal to a remote server. A terminal 1 and a server 2 are shown. Terminal 1 includes an application or computer program and an operating system. Server 2, referred to as the remote server in this text, also includes an application and a sanctuary. A "sanctuary" is understood to be a secure memory or storage space, meaning that the integrity and confidentiality of the information contained in this sanctuary are guaranteed. The server performs a generation step 31 of a unique token. The unique token includes a first digital key, "Key 1," also called the authentication key. In one embodiment, the unique token may also The first digital key and the certification identifier are generated to be unique. Indeed, with each execution of the certification process, a new first digital key and a new certification identifier are generated, ensuring they are different from all previously generated first digital keys and certification identifiers. The digital token is then transmitted from the remote server to the terminal.

[0080] According to one implementation, the unique token is transmitted by the remote server to the terminal using a QR code. Specifically, an administrator connected directly to the application on server 1 can print or display the QR code on a screen and then scan it with the terminal.

[0081] According to one implementation method, the unique token is transmitted, from the server to the terminal, by email or by SMS.

[0082] According to one embodiment, the unique token is a sequence of numbers and letters indicated orally to a lone worker or operator, or printed on paper and manually entered by the lone worker or operator on the terminal using a touch keyboard with which the terminal would be equipped.

[0083] Terminal 1 performs a step 33 of generating a pair of digital keys comprising a terminal private key "Terminally Private Key 2" and a terminal public key "Terminally Public Key 3". Only the terminal's private key can decrypt a message encrypted with the terminal's public key, and only the terminal's public key can decrypt a message encrypted with the terminal's private key. This is an asymmetric encryption key pair. In one implementation, the step of generating a pair of digital keys has already been performed by the terminal prior to the certification process. The terminal then performs a step 34 of creating an authentication code. In the example considered and described in [Fig. 1], the authentication code "Key 1 [hash 1]" is created by calculating a hash of the terminal's public key and / or a terminal identifier using the first digital key.In another implementation method, the hash is calculated from a part of the terminal's public key and / or a part of the terminal's identifier. This hash is derived from a digital hash function using a digital key, for example, "HMAC-SHA256".

[0084] In the present application, the nomenclature "Key x [hash x]" indicates the hash x generated by a cryptographic process using the key x.

[0085] Terminal 1 then transmits a message containing its public key, its identifier, and the authentication code to the remote server 2. According to one implementation, the terminal creates the authentication code by calculating a hash from all or part of the certification identifier and then also transmits The certification identifier is sent to the remote server. Remote server 2 then verifies that the authentication code is valid. In one implementation, this verification step 36 includes a step of calculating a new authentication code from the message using the first digital key, and a step of verifying the correspondence between the newly generated authentication code and the authentication code whose validity is being checked. This verification step 36 ensures that the public key and identifier are indeed those of the terminal that received the first digital key. An entity that did not possess the first digital key would not have been able to generate an authentication code with that key, nor would it have been able to substitute another public key and identifier for those sent by the terminal while maintaining the correspondence between the message and the authentication code.

[0086] If during this verification 36, the authentication code does not correspond to the message, the certification process is interrupted or abandoned.

[0087] According to one embodiment, when certifications of several terminals are performed simultaneously, the remote server 1 uses the certification identifier to identify the first appropriate digital key to verify the validity of the authentication code.

[0088] According to one implementation method, if the certification identifier received by the remote server corresponds to a certification identifier sent for longer than a predefined duration, the certification process is interrupted.

[0089] If the match between the message and the authentication code is established, the remote server 2 generates a digital certificate. Established match means that the authentication code is indeed the one in the message (that there has therefore been no substitution of information in the message) and that it was correctly generated using the first digital key. The digital certificate contains the terminal identifier, the terminal's public key, and a signature created using a second digital key.

[0090] According to one implementation method, the second digital key "Key 4 priv. Serv." is a private key of the remote server 2.

[0091] In the example considered and described in [Fig. 1], the digital certificate is transmitted to the terminal and then stored by the terminal in anticipation of the future implementation of an authentication process according to another aspect of the invention. This frees up memory space on the remote server, which can then be used to store information other than the digital certificates of the certified terminals.

[0092] According to one implementation, the digital certificate is not transmitted to the terminal and is stored by the remote server. This makes it possible to limit the amount of information to be sent by the terminal during the authentication process.

[0093] Figure 2 is a schematic representation of an example of a method for authenticating a lone worker terminal 1 to a remote server 2. The step of implementing the method for certifying a lone worker terminal is not shown in this figure. Terminal 1 sends its digital certificate to the remote server 2. Then, the remote server performs a verification 42 of the validity of the digital certificate. During this verification, the remote server checks the signature of the digital certificate using the second digital key. In the example considered and illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the signature of the digital certificate is created using a private key of the remote server "Private Key 4 Serv." In this case, the signature is verified using a public key of the remote server "Public Key 4 Serv."The public and private keys of the remote server form an asymmetric encryption key pair generated using an algorithm such as, for example, the "DSA" digital signature algorithm or the "ECDSA" elliptic curve digital signature algorithm. The use of an asymmetric encryption key pair by the remote server instead of a symmetric encryption key allows the remote server to avoid accessing the sanctuary to retrieve the second digital key. Indeed, a public key does not require secure storage space, and accessing secure storage space (sanctuary) is slower and more computationally expensive due to the identity verifications required during this access. The signature of the digital certificate "Key 4 priv. Serv. [hash 2]" is verified. In the example considered and illustrated in [Fig.[2] The remote server calculates a hash from all or part of the terminal's public key and terminal identifier using the same method as that used during certificate generation, and then verifies the validity of the certificate signature using an algorithm such as "DSA," using the newly generated hash and the remote server's public key "Public Key 4 Server." In one implementation, terminal 1 transmits an authentication request containing the terminal identifier but not the digital certificate. In this case, the validity of the digital certificate containing the terminal identifier is verified.

[0094] Next, the remote server 2 transmits an outbound message containing a random number. After receiving it, the terminal calculates a signature 44 of the random number using its private key. Then, the terminal transmits a return message containing the signature of the random number to the remote server. After receiving the return message, the remote server 2 verifies 47 the signature of the random number using the terminal's public key. If the signature is valid, the remote server notifies the terminal that its authentication was successful. The terminal 1 and the remote server 2 will then be able to exchange information in the context of monitoring the lone worker in a secure and confidential manner, for example through the use of previously exchanged digital keys and / or using a secure communication protocol such as https.

[0095] According to one implementation method, the authentication process is interrupted in the following cases:

[0096] - the digital certificate is not valid,

[0097] - the terminal identifier is not valid,

[0098] - the signature of the random number received in the return message does not correspond to the random number sent in the forwarding message,

[0099] - the signature of the random number was not calculated using the private key of the terminal,

[0100] - the time between sending the outbound message and receiving the return message exceeds a predetermined duration.

[0101] According to one embodiment, the authentication process is interrupted after several attempts to send a random number in an outgoing message. For example, in the event of a disruption to communication on the network used by the terminal and the remote server, the signature of the random number in the return message has been corrupted and no longer corresponds to the random number in the outgoing message. The remote server increments a counter, and the terminal resends the return message. If the counter reaches a predefined maximum number of attempts, the authentication process is interrupted.

[0102] Implementing the certification process example shown in [Fig. 1] and then the authentication process example shown in [Fig. 2] allows a lone worker terminal to be authenticated to a remote server. The lone worker terminal and the remote server can then exchange information necessary for the lone worker's safety and tailored to the specific requirements of the lone worker's intervention(s) / mission(s) in a secure and confidential manner. Furthermore, achieving this secure connection between the lone worker terminal and the remote server does not require a password to be used by the lone worker or any other operator. The use of passwords often presents a security vulnerability, as a password can be stolen or compromised.Advantageously, the certification process can be carried out once for a terminal, and that terminal can then authenticate itself with the remote server multiple times, for example, at the beginning of each intervention by the lone worker using the terminal.

[0103] Figure 3 schematically represents an example of a method for authenticating a terminal for a lone worker according to one aspect of the invention. A step of Certification step 30 is represented. This step includes a substep of generating a unique token by a remote server. This unique token contains a first digital key. The unique token is then transmitted to a lone worker terminal. The terminal generates a pair of digital keys, including a private key and a public key. The terminal creates an authentication code, consisting of a hash calculated from all or part of the terminal's public key using the first digital key. The terminal transmits its public key and the authentication code. Next, the remote server verifies the validity of the authentication code. If the authentication code is valid, the remote server generates a digital certificate containing the terminal's public key and a signature created using a second digital key. In one implementation, the remote server transmits the digital certificate to the terminal.

[0104] Once the terminal is certified with the remote server and prior to establishing a secure connection between said terminal and the remote server, the terminal transmits 41 an authentication request containing the digital certificate to the remote server. The remote server verifies 42 the validity of the digital certificate. If the validity of the digital certificate is established, the remote server transmits 43 a message, called the outbound message, containing a random number to the terminal. Then, the terminal calculates 44 a signature of the random number using its private key and transmits 45 a message, called the return message, containing the signature of the random number to the remote server. The remote server verifies 47 the signature of the random number using the terminal's public key. If the signature is valid, the remote server notifies 48 the terminal of the successful authentication.The remote server and the terminal will then be able to communicate securely.

[0105] According to one implementation, the remote server revokes the digital certificate. "Revokes" means canceling the validity of a digital certificate. The terminal whose identifier and public key are contained in the digital certificate can no longer be authenticated with the remote server. This step of revoking the digital certificate is performed when the corresponding terminal is lost or is no longer used by the lone worker for monitoring and safety.

[0106] According to one implementation, the remote server associates a lone worker profile with the terminal identifier (contained in the digital certificate). The lone worker profile allows monitoring and any triggered rescue operations to be adapted to the specific characteristics of the lone worker. The lone worker profile contains, for example, information on the type of monitoring to be carried out (fall detection, timer for presence in a hazardous area), and any indicators of the monitoring start conditions (start and end times of mission, entry into an intervention zone) personal information enabling faster medical care (blood type, allergies).

[0107] According to one implementation method, the remote server configures the lone worker profile to add the following characteristics:

[0108] - a monitoring profile comprising a set of information enabling to adapt the monitoring carried out by the terminal of the lone worker. For example, conditions for the start and end of monitoring (the lone worker leaves the intervention area), a type of monitoring (fall detection using an inertial measurement unit, detection of noise exceeding a certain threshold, detection of certain voice commands such as a call for help from the lone worker);

[0109] - a doubt-removal procedure comprising information enabling Configure any alert confirmation procedures. Depending on the type of alert, it is possible to add a confirmation before triggering a rescue procedure. This confirmation can take the form, for example, of pressing a button on the terminal before a certain predefined delay or of confirmation by an operator during a video or voice call via the terminal;

[0110] - a backup procedure allowing the way an alert is handled to be adapted to the needs of the lone worker, the location of the intervention and the type of alert. For example, the person or persons to be notified in case of emergency (security personnel at the intervention site, public emergency services, work colleagues).

[0111] Configuring the lone worker profile to add such characteristics allows monitoring and / or tracking and / or alerting to be carried out in a way adapted to the specificities of each lone worker and to each of the missions carried out.

[0112] According to one implemented method, the same worker profile configuration is applied to several different lone worker terminals, for example when several lone workers intervene on the same site to carry out missions presenting the same risks.

[0113] Figure 4 schematically represents an example of a lone worker terminal according to one aspect of the invention. The terminal 1 comprises a communication module 13, a processor 12 also called a "processing unit," and an electronic memory 11. The electronic memory 11 contains instructions which, when executed by the processor 12, cause said processor to implement the steps of the process, carried out by the terminal, according to any one of the previously described implementation methods of certifying a lone worker terminal to a remote server.

[0114] Such provisions allow the lone worker terminal 1 to exchange information relating to the safety of the lone worker confidentially and secured with a remote server without requiring the use of a password by the lone worker or an operator.

[0115] Figure 5 schematically represents an example of a remote server according to one aspect of the invention. The remote server 2 includes a communication module 23. This communication module 23 is configured to connect to a telecommunications network, enabling the remote server 2 and a lone worker terminal 1 to communicate electronically over a distance. The remote server also includes a processor 22, also called a "processing unit," and an electronic memory 21. The processor 22 is connected to the communication module 23 and the electronic memory. The electronic memory 21 contains instructions which, when executed by the processor 22, cause said processor to implement the steps, performed by the remote server, according to any one of the previously described implementation modes of the method for certifying a lone worker terminal to the remote server.

[0116] Such arrangements allow the remote server 2 to exchange information relating to the safety of a lone worker confidentially and securely with a terminal, with which the lone worker is equipped, without requiring the use of a password by the lone worker or by an operator.

Claims

Demands

1. A method for certifying a terminal (1) for a lone worker with a remote server (2), comprising the following steps: - generation (31), by the remote server (2), of a unique token comprising a first digital key, - transmission (32), by the remote server (2) to the terminal (1), of the unique token, - generation (33), by the terminal (1), of a pair of digital keys comprising a terminal private key and a terminal public key, - transmission (35), by the terminal (1) to the remote server (2), of a message comprising the terminal identifier, the terminal public key and an authentication code, the authentication code being calculated using the first digital key and input data formed by at least part of the message, - verification (36), by the remote server (2), of the validity of the authentication code using the first digital key, - if the authentication code is valid,generation (37) by the remote server (2) of a digital certificate containing the terminal identifier, the terminal's public key and a signature created using a second digital key.

2. A certification method according to claim 1, wherein the unique token also includes a certification identifier, wherein the message, transmitted by the terminal (1) to the remote server (2), includes the certification identifier and comprising an additional step of verification by the remote server (2) of the correspondence between the certification identifier in the unique token and the certification identifier in the message.

3. A certification method according to claim 1 or 2, comprising the following additional steps: - transmission (38), by the remote server (2) to the terminal (1), of the digital certificate, - storage of the digital certificate by the terminal (1).

4. A method for authenticating a terminal (1) for a lone worker to a remote server (2), said method comprising the following steps: - certification (30) of the terminal (1) with the remote server (2) according to the certification method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, - transmission (41) by the terminal (1) to the remote server (2) of an authentication request containing the terminal identifier, - verification (42) by the remote server (2) of the validity of the digital certificate containing the terminal identifier transmitted in the authentication request, - if the digital certificate is valid, transmission (43) by the remote server (2) to the terminal (1) of a message, called the outbound message, containing a random number, - after receipt of the outbound message, generation (44) of a signature of the random number by the terminal (1) using the terminal's private key, - transmission (45) from the terminal (1) to the remote server (2) of a message, called the return message, containing the signature of the random number, - verification (47) of the validity of the signature of the random number,by the remote server (2), using the terminal's public key, - if the signature is valid, notification (48), by the remote server (2) to the terminal (1), of the successful authentication.

5. Authentication method according to claim 4, wherein the certification step (30) of the terminal (1) with the remote server (2) is according to the certification method of claim 3 and wherein the authentication request includes the digital certificate.

6. A method according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the unique token is transmitted in the form of a QR code.

7. A method according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the unique token is transmitted by SMS or email.

8. A method according to any one of the preceding claims comprising an additional step of revocation of the digital certificate by the remote server (2).

9. A method according to any one of the preceding claims comprising an additional step of associating, by the remote server (2), a lone worker profile with the terminal identifier.

10. A method according to claim 9 comprising an additional step of configuring, by the remote server (2), the lone worker profile to add the following characteristics: - a monitoring profile, - a procedure for verifying doubt, - a rescue procedure.

11. Terminal (1) comprising the following elements: - a communication module (13), - a processing unit (12), - an electronic memory (11) comprising a computer program including instructions which, when the program is executed by the processing unit (12), cause the latter to implement the steps of the process, carried out by the terminal, according to any one of the preceding claims.

12. Server (2) comprising the following elements: - a communication module (23), - a processing unit (22), - an electronic memory (21) comprising a computer program including instructions which, when the program is executed by the processing unit (22), cause the latter to implement the steps of the process, carried out by the remote server, according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

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