Method and device for distributing multicast encryption keys
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2023526208
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2021-08-19
- Filing Date
- 2021-10-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-01
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-10-29
AI Technical Summary
Current 5G Multicast Broadcast Service (5MBS) security solutions face challenges in efficiently updating cryptographic keys to prevent unauthorized access and ensure secure communication, leading to potential compromise of multicast/broadcast traffic.
A method for a primary station to distribute updated cryptographic keys to secondary stations by determining the need for key updates and transmitting them via encrypted messages, using a combination of unicast and multicast methods to reduce signaling overhead and ensure system security.
The proposed method efficiently updates cryptographic keys, reducing the number of messages required and enhancing system security by ensuring only authorized devices can access multicast/broadcast content, thereby preventing unauthorized access and data modification.
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Abstract
Description
[Technical Field]
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of wireless communications, and more particularly to security measures for communications between a primary station, such as a base station, and at least one secondary station, such as a terminal, or a mobile station forming a network. Other entities, such as security entities, may exist in such a network. [Background technology]
[0002] In wireless networks, devices connect to the network to exchange data. Security is especially important for wireless devices that do not require physical interaction to access the network. Encryption also allows control over access to resources such as multimedia flows. Wireless networks must therefore implement measures to exclude unauthorized devices from the network. 3GPP® is the organization responsible for standardizing global solutions for mobile telecommunications systems. Telecommunications systems developed within 3GPP® partnerships are no exception. In particular, with 5G, security measures are being discussed to enhance network security.
[0003] 5G multicast broadcast service (5MBS) enables subscribers to gain access to data streams, particularly multimedia data streams. A common application is the streaming of video and additional information during live events, such as live events in stadiums (sports, concerts), including playback video or additional information or enhanced performance. A key aspect is ensuring that all subscribers, but only subscribers, can access the service. Therefore, the stream is encrypted using a group encryption key shared among all users' terminals.
[0004] However, different problems have been found with the currently proposed solution. These can be summarized as follows: - Background 1: 5MBS communication architecture for 5G, r17 - Background 2: Current security key issues and solutions for 5MBS - Background 3: MBMS Security Architecture for 5G, r16.
[0005] Background 1: 5MBS communication architecture for 5G, r17 TR23.757v1.0.1 (hereinafter referred to as [1]) describes a study on architectural improvements for 5G multicast broadcast services (5MBS) for 5G (Release 17). Section 4 of [1] contains the architectural assumptions and principles, and the following text is adapted from Section 4.
[0006] First, 5MBS applies the following general architectural requirements and principles. - The solution shall be based on 5G system architecture principles, as in the case of TS23.501 (hereinafter referred to as [2]), including flexibility and modularity for newly introduced functions. - The system shall provide efficient transport for various multicast and broadcast services. - The solution should minimize the impact on existing external services. -In this study, the architecture reference model defined in TS23.501[2] clause 4.2 is used as a baseline architecture for supporting multicast and broadcast services. In particular, Figure 1 shows a high-level MBS architecture with 5G UE, NG-RAN, and 5GC.
[0007] Furthermore, there are several specific requirements for Internet Protocol Television (IPTV). - The solution for IPTV should minimize the impact on the IPTV network and the set-top box (STB). - The solution for IPTV STBs shall reuse IGMP / MLD messages via the user plane to join / leave IPTV channel groups. - The solution for IPTV shall provide an efficient mechanism for UEs to join / leave IP channel groups, including reducing latency and signaling.
[0008] The sequence for establishing and distributing an MBS session is assumed to be as follows: 1. Optional distribution of 5GMBS service information from the application / service layer to 5GC. Note that a framework is available for distributing 5GMBS service information to the 5G CN (core network). However, this step may be replaced by prior agreement without explicit signaling. 2. The UE participates in receiving the MBS flow; that is, the UE requests to join the MBS session (in the case of a multicast session). 3. Establishing the MBS flow transport. Note that this step may occur before step 2 for individual UEs joining an already started MBS session. 4. Distribution of MBS data to the UE. 5. The UE stops receiving MBS flows (in the case of a multicast session). 6. Release of the MBS flow transport (indicating session termination).
[0009] MBS traffic needs to be delivered from a single data source (Application Service Provider) to multiple UEs. Depending on many factors, multiple delivery methods can be used to deliver MBS traffic in 5GS. For clarity, the delivery methods are not called unicast / multicast / broadcast, but are called as described below.
[0010] From the perspective of the 5G CN, two delivery methods are possible. - 5GC individual MBS traffic delivery method: The 5G CN receives a single copy of the MBS data packets and delivers separate copies of those MBS data packets to individual UEs via the PDU session for each UE. - 5GC shared MBS traffic delivery method: The 5G CN receives a single copy of the MBS data packets and delivers a single copy of those MBS packets to the RAN node, and the RAN node then delivers them to one or more UEs.
[0011] When the 5GC individual MBS traffic delivery method is supported, the same received single copy of the MBS data packets by the CN can be delivered via both the 5GC individual MBS traffic delivery method for some UEs and the 5GC shared MBS traffic delivery method for other UEs.
[0012] From the perspective of the RAN, two delivery methods are available for the transmission of MBS packet flows over the radio (in the case of shared delivery). - Point-to-Point (PTP) delivery method: The RAN node delivers separate copies of the MBS data packets to individual UEs over the radio. - Point-to-Multipoint (PTM) delivery method: The RAN node delivers a single copy of the MBS data packets to a set of UEs over the radio.
[0013] Note that here, the RAN node may use a combination of PTP / PTM to deliver MBS packets to the UE. As shown in Figure 2, depending on the selected solution, for a 5G MBS session, a shared PTP or PTM delivery method and an individual delivery method may be used simultaneously.
[0014] In Appendix A.1 of [1], 5MBS reference architecture alternatives are described. In particular, it is considered in terms of the transport layer aspect and the service layer aspect. This is shown below as A.1.1 and A.1.2.
[0015] A.1.1. Transport Layer Aspect of the Reference Architecture: Figure 3 shows the 5G system architecture for integrated multicast transport using unicast. This solution relies on extending the existing 5GS network functions, NG-RAN which currently supports only unicast transport, and the UE to support multicast transport.
[0016] The following new functions are added to the current AF, 5GC NF (network function), NG-RAN, and UE. - Application Function (AF): - Support negotiation with the NEF for MBS service functions and service exposure. - Network Exposure Function (NEF): - 5GMBS service exposure. - Negotiation of 5G MBS services with the AF, including QoS and 5GMBS service areas. - Policy Control Function (PCF): - Support policies for multicast services, including QoS parameters such as 5QI, MBR, and GBR. <000- Receive MBS service information directly from AF (operator-owned) or indirectly via NEF. - Session Management Function (SMF): - Control of MBS transport based on MBS policies received from PCF. - Configuration of User Plane Functions (UPF) for MBS flows and for point-to-point or point-to-multipoint transfers. - RAN configuration for MBS flow and QoS information. - SM configuration in UE for MBS flow. - SMF can be used for both unicast and MBS. - User Plane Function (UPF): - Support for packet filtering of MBS flows, and delivery of MBS flows to the RAN via point-to-point or point-to-multipoint N3. - Receive 5G MBS flow configuration from SMF. - Detection of Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) packets and notification to the SMF (if UE joining is performed via IGMP). - UPF can receive both unicast and MBS flows. - The I-UPF may be used for the delivery of MBS flows from the UPF attached to N6 to the NG-RAN, and the N9 interface may be used for MBS traffic delivery. - NG-RAN: - Receiving and over-the-air distribution of MBS flows via N3. - Switching between multicast and unicast delivery of MBS flows. - UE configuration for receiving MBS flows at the AS layer. - UE: - Support for extending UE policy configuration to MBS. - Support for SM extensions for MBS flow. - Signaling for joining the MBS flow (via SM signaling or user-plane IGMP enrollment). - MBS support in the AS layer.
[0017] A.1.2 Service layer configuration for the standard architecture: Orthogonal to the explanation of the multicast flow user plane model in the transport layer, a service layer can be supported on top. The service layer is completely separate from the multicast transport. This allows applications that do not require a service layer to establish multicast transport directly via Nnef (control plane) and N6 (user plane data).
[0018] Figure 4 shows an example of service layer support for multicast / broadcast using xMB / MB2 as the entry point. A new network feature called Multicast Service Function (MSF) is introduced. MSF provides only service layer functionality and requires a 5G system for the underlying multicast transport necessary for multicast services (via Npcf or Nnef). MSF has the following features: - Entry points for both control plane service layer signaling and user plane data, e.g., xMB / MB2. Interaction can occur directly with external AF or via NEF. - MSF control plane (MSF-C): - Multicast service configuration. - MBS service level management. - xMB-C / MB2-C termination. - (If necessary) Codec configuration. - MSF User Plane (MSF-U): - xMB-U / MB2-U termination. - Data encoding at the service layer. - Multicast service layer data packet distribution via N6.
[0019] If an application does not require specific service layer functionality, the application can: - Use Nnef directly for multicast session configuration / negotiation. - N6 for multicast data distribution It can be used.
[0020] This is shown in Figure 5, which illustrates an exemplary MBS system with direct application server / function interaction.
[0021] Appendix A.2 of [1] describes a 5GMBS system architecture based on dedicated MBS functionality.
[0022] To support MBS in 5GS user service delivery, there are two variant operating modes: one for transport-only mode and the other for full-service mode (TS23.246 Clause 7.5). - In transport-only mode, MBS application data is transparent to the network functions shown in Figure 6. - In full-service mode, MBSF / MBSU is aware of the content stream and can convert the content stream to a 3GPP® compliant stream.
[0023] Figure 6 shows a single exemplary architecture for MBS in 5GS. In Figure 6, the SMF and UPF, which are responsible for supporting MB sessions, are referred to as "MB-SMF" and "MB-UPF," respectively. There is nothing preventing MB-SMF and MB-UPF from simultaneously supporting both PDU and MB sessions, for example, PDU and MB sessions to the same DNN. However, MB-SMF and MB-UPF can also be deployed and configured to handle MB sessions exclusively. It is thought that operating a limited number of MB-SMF and MB-UPF dedicated to the MBS would reduce signaling and, in some cases, be simpler and more cost-effective. This architecture makes that possible, if preferred.
[0024] The extensions to existing entities and the new functional components are as follows: - UE, NG-RAN, AMF, SMF, UPF, NEF, and PCF support MBS. - UE supports 5G MBS services. - NG-RAN supports point-to-multipoint (PTM) and point-to-point (PTP) distribution of MBS media. NG-RAN independently controls the switching between PTM and PTP for optimal service quality and resource efficiency. - AMF selects MB-SMF and is extended to be part of the signaling distribution tree. - MB-SMF is an extended SMF that controls MB sessions, signaling using AF (via NEF / MBSF), QoS control using PCF, and provisioning MB session information upon request from AMF. PDU sessions maintained by the UE for individual delivery of MBS services can be associated with MB sessions managed by MB-SMF. - MB-UPF is a UPF that has been extended using MBS user plane functionality. - MBSF (Multicast / Broadcast Service Function) is a function that can be part of NEF or deployed independently. MBSF can support TMGI allocation or other MBS signaling for service level management. MBSF also provides an interface to application functions or content providers, and it has an interface to MBSU. MBSF can perform authorization of UEs to join MB sessions. - MBSU (Multicast / Broadcast Service User Plane) is a new entity responsible for handling the payload portion for service level functionality and management. - NEF is an existing NF that provides an interface to AF. -PCF is extended to handle QoS for MB sessions, for example, to allow QoS profiles for shared distribution.
[0025] The extensions to existing interfaces and the new interfaces are as follows: - The N2 interface controls MB sessions, including the management of the shared N3 tunnel between MB-UPF and NG-RAN. - The N3 interface supports a shared N3 tunnel between MB-UPF and NG-RAN. - The N4 interface manages the shared N3 tunnel between MB-UPF and NG-RAN, including the establishment of the shared N3 tunnel. - The N7 and N30 interfaces allow for policy control of MB sessions. - The N11 interface is extended with MBS control signaling, including management of the shared N3 tunnel between MB-UPF and NG-RAN. - The N29 interface is extended using MBS control signaling. - The N33 interface is extended using MBS control signaling. - Ny: A new interface between MBSF and MBSU for managing MBSU functionality. -N×MB-U: A new interface between the new MBSU and AF for MBS user plane traffic.
[0026] Following these architectures, several possible solutions are described in [1]. For example, solution #2 in [1] assumes a 5G MBS system architecture based on dedicated MBS functionality. Figure 6.2.2.2a-1 illustrates session initiation with 5GC individual MBS traffic delivery (i.e., with a PUD session to the UE). Figure 6.2.2.2-1 illustrates session initiation for an MBS session. It is important to ensure that the AF delivers the media stream to the MB-UPF, and that the MB-UPF sends it further down the network.
[0027] Background 2: Key Security Issues and Solutions for 5MBS Based on the overall architecture for 5MBS described above [1], research is currently being conducted on how to secure 5MBS systems. This is reflected in TR33.850 v0.2.0 (Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services) [2]. There are currently three main issues that need to be resolved: - Key Issue #1: 5GS shall support authentication and authorization for multicast communication services. In particular, this key issue relates to the standard architecture of [1] summarized above and to Key Issue #3 of [1], which includes two aspects: (i) defining and studying how UEs support the required level of authorization for accessing multicast communication services, and (ii) how UEs can join / leave multicast communication services (including being authorized or disabled to access them). - Key Issue #2: 5GS shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and anti-replay protection for MBS traffic. - Key Issue #3: The distribution of keys for protecting MBS traffic between the key generator and the UE shall be protected in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and anti-replay.
[0028] [2] provides three solutions for KI#2 and KI#3. These solutions are solutions #1, #2, and #3. - Solution #1 focuses on protecting MBS traffic at the transport layer. In this case, the group key is used at the PDCP level and generated in the RAN. This group key is used to protect MBS traffic. - Solution #2 focuses on protecting MBS traffic at the service layer. The group key is generated in (MB)-SMF. This key is securely sent to each UE using the MUK, a key derived from Kausf. The group key is used to protect MBS traffic. Solution #3 focuses on protecting MBS traffic using a multicast transport key (MTK) generated in the core network and distributed to the UE in a secure (unicast) manner. This MTK is used to protect the MBS traffic.
[0029] Background 3: MBMS Security Architecture for 5G, r16 For the description of the invention in 5MBS, it is important to understand how security is achieved in 4G in the case of MBMS. The security architecture for MBMS is described in TS33.246[3]. Next, the most important aspects are summarized.
[0030] *Appendix B describes the security threats considered. B.1 deals with threats to wireless interfaces. B.1.1 specifically describes "Unauthorized access to MBMS user service data," which includes threats that an intruder could eavesdrop on MBMS user service data, such as users who subscribe to and unsubscribe from MBMS user services continuing to receive services without being charged, and subscribers deriving decryption keys and distributing them to unauthorized parties. B.1.2 describes "Threats to integrity," including the modification and reproduction of messages in a manner that deceives users of content from actual sources.
[0031] *Appendix C outlines security requirements. In particular, C.4 outlines MBMS key management requirements, including: "The UE and MBMS key generator shall support operators performing re-entry as often as they deem necessary to ensure that 1) users who subscribe to MBMS user services but subsequently unsubscribe cannot access MBMS user services further without being properly billed, 2) users who are subscribed to MBMS user services cannot access data from previous transmissions in MBMS user services unless they are properly billed, and 3) the impact of subscribed users distributing decryption keys to unsubscribed users is controllable."
[0032] *Figure 7 (corresponding to Figure 4.1 in [3]) describes the overall MBMS security architecture. The Itectec webpage available at https: / / itectec.com / spec / 4-2-key-management-overview / (referred to hereafter as [4]) contains a description of key management and security in MBMS based on [3]. According to Section 4.2 of [4] and [3], "BM-SC controls the use of MBMS service keys (MSKs) to secure different RTP sessions and FLUTE channels. MSKs are used to secure the distribution of MBMS transport keys (MTKs), which are used to secure RTP sessions and FLUTE channels as specified in Clauses 6.5 and 6.6. Distribution of MSKs is secured with user-specific MBMS user keys (MUKs) received from the GBA, see Clause 6.1. MSKs and MTKs are managed at the MBMS user service level." This means that UEs with access to the service receive MSKs secured with MUKs. MTKs are distributed to multiple UEs secured with MSKs. This is shown below (arrows indicate protection): [Table 1]
[0033] *Section 6.3.2.2 describes the MSK request procedure required by the UE to obtain a new MSK. This procedure is part of other procedures, for example, when the UE misses a key update (out of coverage) or a solicited pull procedure by the BM-SC. This last procedure is described in 6.3.2.2.4 and is shown in Figure 6.2b in [3] and in Figure 8 below. It shows that the BM-SC sends a MIKEY message to the UE, the UE verifies it, and if correct, the UE sends an HTTP POST request to obtain an MSK update.
[0034] *MIKEY stands for Multimedia Internet Keying, and it is defined in RFC 3830 (https: / / tools.ietf.org / html / rfc3830). MIKEY was defined by Ericsson Research in 2004 and describes a key management scheme that can be used for real-time applications (for both peer-to-peer and group communications).
[0035] *Section 6.3.2.3 of [3] describes how the MSK is delivered to the UE, in particular (i) MSK push (Section 6.3.2.3.1) in which the MB-SC delivers the key in a MIKEY message via UDP. The UE responds in kind with a MIKEY message via UDP.
[0036] Section 6.3.3 of [3] describes the procedure for MTKs, including their unique IDs which depend on the MSK ID. This means that the same MTK cannot be used with two different MSKs. MTK updates are protected using the MSK, and this message may be included in a multicast / broadcast stream.
[0037] *Appendix I provides an example of how traffic is protected. In particular, the same MSK can be used to protect two user services.
[0038] *Section 6.3.4 describes how to handle “multiple BM-SC deployments,” which is applicable only when the same MBMS user service is sent through multiple BM-SCs. When this happens, the keys in the multiple BM-SCs, both MSK (Section 6.3.4.4) and MTK (Section 6.3.4.5), are used with the same traffic, so their keys are the same. Solutions #1, #2, and #3 in [2] use a single group key to protect multicast / broadcast traffic. The problem is that if the group key is compromised (e.g., a UE is malicious, or only the UE is removed from the MBS), those solutions do not describe how to update the group key so that the distributed content is not obtained or modified at a later point in time. In particular, if the group key cannot be updated, an attacker could, a) For example, access to content can still be maintained by passively monitoring communications. b) For example, traffic can be injected in the context of a MitM attack.
[0039] Similarly, [3] describes a security architecture for MBMS in which individual device keys (MUKs) are used to distribute multicast service keys (MSKs) used to protect multicast transport keys (MTKs) for specific MBMS services (r16). In this case, the group key is equivalent to the MTK. If a UE is compromised, the UE needs to update the MSK and MTK. [3] describes how to update the MSK, but updating it requires a lot of signaling, as each UE needs to contact the BM-SC to get a new MSK, as shown in Figure 8 which describes a BM-SC responsive pull. [Overview of the Initiative] [Problems that the invention aims to solve]
[0040] One objective of the present invention is to alleviate the above-mentioned problems.
[0041] Another object of the present invention is to ensure that cryptographic keys are updated efficiently.
[0042] Another object of the present invention is to reduce the amount of signaling required to reconfigure the system when a terminal is damaged or disabled.
[0043] Another object of the present invention is to provide primary and secondary stations that can update shared cryptographic keys more efficiently while improving the security of the system. [Means for solving the problem]
[0044] Therefore, in a first embodiment of the present invention, a method for a primary station that distributes cryptographic keys to a plurality of secondary stations, the method is: a. A step of determining whether a group key needs to be updated, wherein the group key is used for multicast protected communications from a primary station to a plurality of secondary stations. b. When it is determined that an update is needed, the step of sending the updated encryption key to at least a subset of secondary stations via an encrypted message. We propose a method that has the following characteristics.
[0045] Therefore, if the group key needs to be updated, the system automatically provides the updated encryption key to ensure that the system is not compromised. Note that the encryption key may correspond to the encryption key used to encrypt data information. In some variations, the encryption key may be used for integrity protection, for example, to authenticate the origin or freshness of a message.
[0046] In a variant of the first aspect of the present invention, the updated encryption key is an updated group key, and the encrypted message is encrypted with a user-specific encryption key and sent by unicast. Unicast means that the message is addressed to a single target. This corresponds to a point-to-point message. This can be done, for example, by using a dedicated channel and / or by identifying the recipient of the message.
[0047] In yet another variant of the first aspect of the present invention, the step of determining whether a group key needs to be updated includes determining whether at least one of the following conditions is met: at least one of the secondary access rights has been disabled; at least one of the secondary access rights has been lost; the validity period of the group key has expired; or at least one of the secondary access rights has left a predetermined location.
[0048] In yet another variant of the first aspect of the present invention, the updated cryptographic key is a first set key shared by a first set of secondary authorities.
[0049] According to this variant, secondary stations are grouped into sets. Each set contains several secondary stations, all of which share the same set encryption key. This set encryption key, or first set key, allows for the encryption / protection of several multicast messages addressed to the secondary stations of the first set. Thus, when updating the group key, the primary station can direct each multicast message to each set. This reduces the number of messages sent, as messages are sent via multicast to each secondary station and no longer via unicast. By multicast, this corresponds to a single message addressed to a group of secondary stations, for example, using a common encryption set key. This can be done, for example, by using a broadcast channel. In one example of this variant, the first set key is updated when, in step a, it is determined that the access rights of at least one of the secondary stations belonging to the first set are currently invalid. This effectively means that one of the secondary stations in the first set has been compromised or disabled. Thus, the first set needs to update its set key to ensure that an attacker cannot access data sent to the first set.
[0050] When this first set key is updated, the updated group key may be sent via multicast to each set of secondary stations. This corresponds to the step of sending the updated group key to each set of secondary stations in a message protected with the respective set key associated with each set of secondary stations.
[0051] Note that in some cases, for example, when a secondary station is joining for the first time, or when there are few stations in the set, this message may be sent by unicast instead. Furthermore, in certain specific cases, it is possible to send the message twice, once by unicast and once by multicast.
[0052] It should be noted that the first set key may be used to encrypt messages sent to the secondary set, and / or to protect the integrity of messages sent to the secondary set, and / or to protect the freshness of messages sent to the secondary set.
[0053] According to a second aspect of the present invention, a method for a primary station that distributes cryptographic keys to a plurality of secondary stations, the method is: a. A step of determining whether a group key needs to be updated, wherein the group key is used for protected multicast communication from a primary station to a plurality of secondary stations. b. When it is determined that an update is needed, the step of sending the updated group key to each set of secondary stations in each multicast message, wherein the multicast message is protected by the respective set key associated with each corresponding set. A method is proposed that has the following characteristics.
[0054] As previously described, according to this second aspect of the invention, secondary stations are grouped into sets. Each set contains several secondary stations, all of which share the same set encryption key. This set encryption key, or first set key, enables encryption / protection of several multicast messages addressed to the secondary stations of the first set. Thus, when updating the group key, the primary station can direct each multicast message to each set. This dramatically reduces the number of messages sent, as messages are sent by multicast to each secondary station and no longer by unicast. By multicast, this corresponds to a single message addressed to a group of secondary stations, for example, using a common encryption set key. This can be done, for example, by using a broadcast channel. In one example of this variant, the first set key is updated when, in step a, it is determined that the access rights of at least one of the secondary stations belonging to the first set are currently invalid. This effectively means that one of the secondary stations of the first set has been compromised or disabled. Therefore, the first set needs to update its set key to ensure that an attacker cannot access the data sent to the first set.
[0055] In this second aspect of the present invention, the step of determining whether the group key needs to be updated is based on the following conditions, namely: - At least one of the secondary station's access rights has been disabled. - At least one of the secondary station access rights has been lost. - The group key's validity period has expired. - At least one of the secondary stations has moved away from its designated location. This includes determining whether at least one of the following conditions is met.
[0056] If the need for an update is linked to an access rights issue with one of the stations, the set key may also need to be updated. For example, the method may, in step a, if the determination that the group key is linked to the access rights of a first secondary station belonging to a first set of secondary stations is invalid, send a new first set key by unicast to each secondary station in the first set via a protected unicast message.
[0057] When this update of the first key is performed for the first set, the secondary station of the first key may receive the updated encryption group key. Thus, the method further includes, in such an example, step c., sending the updated group key to the first set of secondary stations in a multicast message, the multicast message of which will be encrypted with the new first set key. This is the same as with the other sets, but these did not require an update of the set key. Thus, for all secondary stations of the other sets, the number of messages required for the update is reduced.
[0058] In a different example, the group key may be updated by the same unicast message used for the new first set key. Therefore, the protected unicast message would also include the updated group key. This avoids sending a new multicast message to the first set, thereby further reducing the amount of messages emitted during group key updates.
[0059] A third aspect of the present invention relates to a method for a primary station that distributes cryptographic keys to a plurality of secondary stations, the method being: a. A step of determining whether a group key needs to be updated, wherein the group key is used for protected multicast communication from a primary station to a plurality of secondary stations. b. When it is determined that an update is required, the first set key is sent by unicast to at least one subset of the first secondary stations through a protected unicast message, c. A step of sending a first set of updated group keys of a secondary station in a multicast message, wherein the multicast message is protected by the first set of keys, or alternatively, the updated group keys are included in the protected unicast message of step b. d. A step of sending updated group keys to each further set of secondary stations in each multicast message, wherein the multicast message is protected by the respective set key associated with each corresponding set. A method is proposed that has the following characteristics.
[0060] It should be noted that the primary station can be a base station, for example, an eNode B (eNB) in LTE or a gNode B (gNB) in 5G. However, the primary station may correspond to a higher-level entity in the network, such as a core network element or a network trust center. In such cases, the steps for transmission to the secondary station may include indirect transmission of the message through different interfaces (fiber optic, Ethernet, air interface) and through different entities, such as base stations or relays. In such cases, it may not be directly from the primary station. A message delivering an encryption key may be initiated by a given 5G network function in the core network, which may then give it to another entity in the core network responsible for transmitting 5MBS traffic.
[0061] In a variant of a second or third aspect of the present invention, the set of secondary stations is formed based on location, and step d. further comprises a primary station transmitting an updated group key in at least one further multicast message, the further multicast message being encrypted with the respective set key used in the neighboring set. In one example, the neighboring set is a set of multiple secondary stations camping in a cell served by another primary station. It could be, for example, a set of secondary stations served in adjacent cells. These may be served by the same primary station or different primary stations. Since the secondary stations have moved away from their original cells, this allows for some mobility of the secondary stations without the risk of missing the group key update. To further improve this reliability and reduce the risk of secondary stations missing the updated key, multicast messages may be retransmitted periodically.
[0062] In these different embodiments, however, the sets may be formed in a more random manner, for example, based on the identifier of the secondary station or based on the connection time.
[0063] In yet another variant of these aspects of the present invention, the multicast message includes an authentication footprint message, which is calculated as a hash of the updated group key, along with the updated group key.
[0064] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a method for a secondary station to receive an encryption key in a network, the method is: a. A step of receiving a first set of keys by unicast through a protected unicast message from a primary station, wherein the first key is associated with a first set of keys from a secondary station. b. A step of receiving and decrypting a group key updated in a multicast message to a first set of secondary stations, wherein the decryption step uses the first set key. A method is proposed that has the following characteristics.
[0065] In a fourth variant of the present invention, the multicast message includes an authentication footprint message along with a protected updated group key, and the method further comprises the secondary station authenticating the multicast message by checking whether the hash of the decrypted group key matches the received authentication footprint. Thus, if an attacker attempts to impersonate a primary station and send a fake message, all secondary stations will be able to report a malfunction. Therefore, it can be proposed that if the check fails, an anomaly be reported to the primary station.
[0066] According to a fifth aspect of the present invention, a primary station operating in a cellular network and communicating with a plurality of secondary stations, wherein the primary station is A controller adapted to determine whether a group key needs to be updated, wherein the group key is used for protected multicast communication from a primary station to multiple secondary stations, A transmitter coupled to a controller, adapted to send an updated group key to each set of secondary stations in each multicast message when it is determined that an update is needed, wherein the multicast message is protected by the respective set key associated with each corresponding set, and A primary station equipped with the following features is proposed.
[0067] It should be noted that the primary station can be a base station, for example, an eNodeB in LTE or a gNodeB in 5G. However, the primary station may correspond to a higher-level entity in the network, such as a core network element or a network trust center. In such cases, the steps for transmission to the secondary station may include indirect transmission of the message through different interfaces (fiber optic, Ethernet, air interface) and through different entities, such as base stations or relays. In such cases, it may not be directly from the primary station. A message delivering an encryption key may be initiated by a given 5G network function in the core network, which may then give it to another entity in the core network responsible for transmitting 5MBS traffic.
[0068] Therefore, since many multicast messages can be used instead of conventional unicast messages, the primary station can update the group key to all secondary stations in a more efficient way.
[0069] A sixth aspect of the present invention is proposed, a secondary station operating in a cellular network and communicating with a primary station, comprising: a receiver adapted to receive a first set key by unicast from the primary station through a protected unicast message, wherein the first key is associated with a first set of the secondary station; and a controller adapted to decode an updated group key in a multicast message to the first set of the secondary station, wherein the decodement uses the first set key.
[0070] It should be noted that decoding multicast messages may also be replaced or supplemented by authenticity and / or freshness checks of multicast messages.
[0071] According to a seventh aspect of the present invention, a program code means as dedicated hardware for a computer program is proposed, which includes instructions for performing the methods of the first, second, third, or fourth aspect of the present invention, which are stored and / or distributed in a suitable medium, such as an optical storage medium or a solid medium, supplied together with or as part of other hardware, but which can also be distributed in other forms, such as via the Internet or other wired or wireless telecommunication systems.
[0072] It should be noted that the above-mentioned devices may be implemented based on individual hardware circuits having individual hardware components, integrated chips, or chip modules, or on signal processing devices or chips controlled by software routines or programs stored in memory, which are written to computer-readable media or downloaded from a network such as the Internet.
[0073] It should be understood that the claimed method and the claimed apparatus (primary or secondary station) may have preferred embodiments similar to and / or equivalent to the embodiments defined in the dependent claims.
[0074] It should be understood that preferred embodiments of the present invention may also be any combination of the above embodiments having dependent claims or independent claims.
[0075] These and other aspects of the present invention will become apparent from the embodiments described below, and will be clarified by referring to the embodiments described below. [Brief explanation of the drawing]
[0076] [Figure 1] This is a diagram illustrating the high-level MBS architecture, which has already been explained. [Figure 2] This is a diagram showing the distribution method for MBS, which has already been explained. [Figure 3]This is a diagram showing the 5G system architecture for integrated multicast transport using unicast, as previously explained. [Figure 4] This is a diagram illustrating an example of multicast / broadcast service layer support, as previously explained. [Figure 5] This is a diagram illustrating an exemplary MBS system that involves direct interaction with the application server, as previously explained. [Figure 6] This is a block diagram representing a single exemplary architecture for MBS in 5GS, as already explained. [Figure 7] This is a diagram illustrating the overall MBMS security architecture, as already explained. [Figure 8] This is a diagram illustrating the conventional method for updating keys in UE, as already explained. [Figure 9] This is a diagram illustrating the procedure according to the first embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 10] This is a diagram illustrating the procedure according to a second embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 11] This is a diagram representing a modified key hierarchy according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 12] This figure shows a specific exemplary embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 13] This is a diagram illustrating a procedure according to another embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 14] This is a block diagram representing a network in which an embodiment of the present invention is implemented. [Figure 15] This diagram represents different key hierarchies for the embodiments proposed in the present invention. [Figure 16] This is a diagram proposing changes to the 3GPP (registered trademark) standard. [Modes for carrying out the invention]
[0077] As seen above, the present invention can be implemented in cellular networks such as 4G or 5G networks.
[0078] In these telecommunications systems shown in Figure 14, the secondary station 100 acts as a terminal or end device (also called a user device, or UE, in 5G). The secondary station can access different types of services, including voice and data services, through base stations 110 (also called gNBs in 5G) deployed in the field. Each base station 110 serves and communicates with secondary stations 100 present in the area, also called cells 111. The base stations are connected to a core network (CN) 120, which is managed by a network operator and controls the telecommunications system and coordinates the delivery of services.
[0079] As can be seen in relation to Figure 14, such a cellular network comprises multiple terminals or secondary stations 100, which are mobile devices (or UEs) that can move from one network cell 111 to another. Each cell 111 is served by a base station 110 (or gNodeB) that forms an interface between the secondary station 100 and the core network 120.
[0080] Therefore, the secondary station 100 communicates with the base station 110 over various radio channels on the uplink (from the secondary station to the base station) and the downlink (from the base station to the secondary station). Other radio channels exist, for example, between secondary stations (e.g., sidelink channels) and between base stations (e.g., X2 interface), but are not shown for the sake of brevity in Figure 14. Embodiments of the present invention may also apply to these interfaces, but in the following parts of this specification, embodiments of the present invention focus on the links between secondary stations and base stations.
[0081] It should be noted that various embodiments are implemented between secondary and primary stations. In some embodiments, the primary station may correspond to several entities of the core network 120. A base station may also operate as a primary station (partially or completely) in the sense of embodiments of the present invention.
[0082] According to the definition of embodiments of the present invention, a procedure is proposed for updating the group key used to protect multicast / broadcast traffic in solutions #2 and #3 of [2]. The basic idea is to generate a new group key and distribute it to the UEs so that multicast / broadcast content is protected with the new group key. This basic idea thus ensures that an attacker cannot access the content or inject traffic, but it has the drawback of involving high overhead for distributing the new content key to all "N-1" undamaged UEs.
[0083] The basic idea described above is improved in various embodiments and examples (extended ideas) below by defining "M" UE groups, each associated with a key group. The groups may be based, for example, on the location of the UE. If the UE is compromised, - The content key is updated using the group key from M-1 undamaged groups. - The group key and content key are updated using N / M-1 messages directed to the UE in the group corresponding to the damaged UE.
[0084] In this way, the signaling overhead is reduced from N-1 to N / M+M-2. For example, if N=10000 and M=25, the overhead is reduced from 9999 messages to 63 messages. This extended idea applies to solutions such as #1, #2 and #3 in [2] and can also be used to reduce signaling overhead in [3].
[0085] It should be noted that one difference between this embodiment of the present invention and the solution in [3] is that this embodiment allows the same K_group (used to protect multicast / broadcast content, similar to MTK in [3]) to be distributed using different K_set keys (used to distribute key groups, similar to MSK in [3]). [Table 2]
[0086] Basic embodiments of the present invention are detailed in the context of Solution #2 of [2], but similar techniques are applicable to similar solutions of [2] (e.g., Solution #3). This embodiment is also applicable to [3].
[0087] Basic Embodiment Figure 9 illustrates the basic procedure proposed in the present invention, where the alphabetical steps (af) are additions applied to solution #2 of [2]. a) Inspect whether UE is permitted to join the MBS Group. b) Check if UE access permissions have changed, for example, if they have been disabled. c) Send a request to update the group key. d) Update the group key. e) Send a unicast message protected with MUK to each non-disabled UE that updates K_group_enc and K_group_int. Each UE verifies the authenticity of the message and uses the UE's MUK to decrypt the new group key. Freshness also needs to be verified (see Embodiment 3 below). f) The updated group key is used to protect the content data and send it to the UE.
[0088] In Figure 9, AE represents authenticated encryption, meaning that the message is i) authenticated by a message authentication code (MAC) calculated using a key, e.g., a unique key (K_int) for authentication and integrity protection, and ii) encrypted using a key, e.g., a unique key (K_enc) for encryption. An example of AE is AES in GCM mode.
[0089] This basic solution allows updating k_group and preventing disabled UEs from accessing or modifying broadcast data. This basic solution requires N-1 message exchanges if N UEs are subscribed to a given MBS.
[0090] Embodiment 1: Definition of UE set and set key Figure 10 illustrates an improved embodiment from the basic embodiment of the present invention, where step (ai) in alphabetical order is an addition applied to the solution of Solution #2 of [2]. a) Inspect whether UE is permitted to join the MBS Group. b) Generate a key K_group to protect the content, and generate M keys K_sets to protect the distribution of K_group. Each set refers to M~N / L sets of UEs. c) Determine which set the UE will be placed in. d) Check if the UE has been deactivated or has left the group. e) Send a request to update 1) the group key used to protect multicast / broadcast content, and 2) the set key used to protect the distribution of the group key among the set of devices affected by the UE disabling. f) The group keys (K_group_enc and K_group_int) are updated. The set keys (K_set_enc and K_set_int) associated with the set of UEs are updated. g) The set keys of M-1 UEs in the damaged set are updated by M-1 point-to-point interactions. h) The new group key used to protect the content is updated by sending L messages to an unaffected set. i) The updated group key is used to protect the content data and send it to the UE.
[0091] This embodiment allows updating k_group and preventing disabled UEs from accessing or modifying broadcast data. This basic solution requires the exchange of M-1 point-to-point messages and the delivery of L multicast messages. For example, if N=1000, M=40, and L=25, the basic embodiment requires 999 messages, while this method requires 64.
[0092] When this embodiment is applied to the solution proposed in [3], different sets of UEs accessing the same multicast broadcast service are given different set keys (MSKs). Unicast communication between the UE and MB-BC requires updating the group key, instead these different set keys are used to protect the same group key (MTK) at a given time. This modification alters the key hierarchy in MIKEY used in [3], as shown in Figure 11. MSKs are defined for sets of users, and there are L sets of users. Each of them can be updated individually, and each of them has a different counter {i1, i2, ..., iL}. If a set key (MSK) is updated, this implies a change in the group key (MTK). The MTKs have different counters to identify them. Even if a set key (MSK) is not updated, the group key (MTK) may be updated proactively, for example, if it has been used for a very long period of time.
[0093] Figure 12 shows a more specific example where there are three sets of devices, each having a set key identified using MSK_1, MSK_2, and MSK_3. Within each set of devices, there is a device, and within set 1, there is device a with a device key indicated as MUK_a; within set 2, there is device b with a device key indicated as MUK_b; and within set 3, there is device c with a device key indicated as MUK_c. - The primary group key in use to protect content data is indicated as MTK_0. - In this situation, a change occurs in set a of devices, for example, a device leaves that set of devices. This triggers an update in MSK_1_i1~MSK_1_(i1+1), i.e., the set key changes and its index is incremented. Since the group key MTK_0 may be corrupted, MSK_1_(i1+1), MSK_2_i2, and MSK_3_i3 are used to safely distribute the new MTK_1 to devices in different sets. - In this situation, MTK_1 is used for a long period of time. This triggers an update to MTK_2, which is safely distributed using MSK_1_(i1+1), MSK_2_i2, and MSK_3_i3. - In this situation, a change occurs in set b of devices, for example, a device leaves that set of devices. This triggers an update in MSK_2_i2~MSK_2_(i2+1), i.e., the set key changes and its index is incremented. Since the group key MTK_2 may be corrupted, MSK_1_(i1+1), MSK_2_(i2+1), and MSK_3_i3 are used to safely distribute the new MTK_3 to devices in different sets.
[0094] This embodiment may also be compatible with solution #1 of [2]. Instead of having to deliver N RRC reconfiguration requests, it is possible to send only M-1 RRC reconfiguration requests to update the new set key. The new group key must be delivered along with the multicast / broadcast traffic, and in particular, the new group key is protected using L set keys of L sets of the UE. Note that this requires that the RAN be able to include this key information in the multicast / broadcast traffic. If this last requirement is not feasible, an alternative would be to deliver the new group key by RRC reconfiguration requests, but note that these messages would be unicast messages, requiring changes in the RAN to enable the delivery of RRC reconfiguration messages over the broadcast channel.
[0095] This solution may be used in the context of solution #3 of [2]. In this solution, a multicast transport key (MTK) is defined which is generated in the core network (MB-CP). This MTK is distributed securely (by unicast) to each UE and is used to protect MBS data from MB-UP to the UE. When this embodiment is used, multiple set keys are generated in the core network (MB-CP). These set keys are then transported securely to the UE by secure unicast messages. The set keys are then used to update a group key which protects the content key from MB-UP to the UE.
[0096] A key aspect of this embodiment is how the set of UEs is defined. An option is to define them location-dependent. Location may refer to an area covered, for example, by a base station, or by the base station's antenna beam, or based on the tracking area. This is important because all UEs in that area can receive content using the same radio resources. A concrete example might be in a stadium where multicast / broadcast content (e.g., digital signage, or information about a game) is to be delivered by a base station. To give the best possible performance, the base station uses multiple radio beams to address different sets of users in the stadium. Other methods of defining the set are possible, for example, depending on the characteristics of the UEs and the multicast and broadcast services they subscribe to.
[0097] Embodiment 2: Promoting Mobility In solution #1 of [2], mobility can be further standardized. When a UE moves to a nearby cell, it is important to use the same group key in the distribution of multicast / broadcast content to avoid traffic interruptions. From this perspective, the same group key is used to broadcast content in surrounding cells. Since the set key is used to update the group key, it is recommended to give the UE a set key associated with a set of devices around the UE's location. The danger of not following this recommendation is that when the UE moves to a surrounding cell, the group key may be updated using the set key of that cell, and the UE may miss its message. Alternatively, the base station may broadcast the group key update using the set key of the surrounding area. In this way, when the UE comes from the surrounding area, it will be able to decrypt the new group key. The advantage of this last method is that the risk of leakage is reduced because less key material is given to the UE. Another obvious benefit is that the set key should be updated when the UE leaves a set of UEs. If the UE has a single set key, the amount of updating is less.
[0098] This is illustrated in Figure 13, where a UE (e.g., a UE within a thick circle) can have multiple set keys. In this case, the UE within the thick circle could have K_0 and K_0i, i={0, ..., 5}. Alternatively, the UE could have only K_0, and the surrounding cells would be broadcasting group key updates using the surrounding set keys.
[0099] An additional benefit of this is to note regarding RAN architectures that use DU / CU partitioning. In such an architecture, each distributed unit (DU) can be an independent cell, and a central unit (CU) runs the RRC layer for all DUs. A possible approach is to have a different group key for each DU to protect MBS traffic. If a UE leaves a DU, only the UE in the DU needs to be updated. From this perspective, this solution may appear to have similar performance to having multiple set keys. The difference lies with the CU, as the CU distributing MBS traffic to all DUs must protect the MBS traffic using as many group keys as it processes the DUs. Using the solution proposed in this invention, each DU would have its own set key, which is used to verify and decrypt the distribution of the group key protecting the MBS data. The CU only needs to encrypt the MBS data once using the group key shared by all DUs under its control. When distributing this data, the CU must include the protected group key, which is then protected using each of the set keys assigned to each of the DUs under its control, after the protected MBS traffic.
[0100] Embodiment 3: Maintaining Synchronization A UE, which is part of a group, may miss key group updates. When this happens, the UE may be unable to decrypt the delivered content. To avoid this situation, the currently used key group is distributed periodically in a proactive manner, especially immediately after a key update is performed.
[0101] Another important aspect concerns how freshness is guaranteed. This is ensured by using time, e.g., UTC time, in the construction of the initialization vector (IV) used in the AE. If counters are used in the IV construction, the IV should be set to an initial value when a new group key is distributed, and it should always be incremented. The UE should not accept messages with an IV older than its current IV. Since the transport key is shared among all devices, an attacker could also attempt to inject fake traffic. For this purpose, the attacker would have to use an IV with a higher value. The UE should not accept messages whose IV is much higher than their current IV, e.g., equivalent to sending data for several seconds or minutes. If the IV is constructed by using a UTC-based counter, the UE should not accept messages containing an IV that differs from the current time by more than a small time window.
[0102] Embodiment 4: Ensuring source authentication during group key updates The problem encountered in the systems described so far is that the group key is updated using several set keys (as described in Embodiment 1). Since the MTK is updated using the MSK, this problem also appears in [3]. After the set keys (and the MSK in [3]), an attacker may attempt to "fake" the update of the group key. This can lead to a situation where a set of devices obtains the wrong group key. The direct consequence is that they become unable to decrypt the content they receive, and the message authentication code fails. Furthermore, if the attacker manages to inject fake content protected with the previously injected fake group key, the UEs in that set of devices will accept the fake content.
[0103] I propose two methods to address this problem.
[0104] Method 1: To solve this problem in these systems and in [3], the network can construct an authentication footprint for group key updates. This footprint is constructed by 1) randomly obtaining a new group key K (this key is, for example, 256 bits long), and 2) hashing K (for example, SHA2 or SHA3), i.e., R=HASH(K). When the network broadcasts a key update by distributing the new group key protected with M set keys (step h in Figure 10), the network also appends R to its message.
[0105] Upon receiving this group key update message, the UE does the following: a) The UE searches for a portion of the message containing its group key update, which is protected (encrypted / integrity) using its set key. The UE checks the message authentication code, the UE checks the freshness of the update message, and if both conditions are successful, the UE decrypts the new group key. b) The UE checks whether the hash of the received value R is equal to the decrypted group key.
[0106] In the attack described above, the nodes in a set of nodes will successfully check for all two conditions a) and b) above. However, since the information is sent via a broadcast channel, all devices will receive this message, and devices in other sets of devices will fail to verify condition b). Therefore, those devices in other sets of devices will show inconsistency and can trigger an alarm directed to the core network containing the received message. The network can verify which sets are affected / under attack by checking which of the group key updates are incorrect.
[0107] Method 2: In the context of current research on addressing fake base stations, several solutions using digital signatures are discussed. One of them is the Digital Signing Network Function (DSnF). DSnF is a function that can be used to sign SIs, but it can also be used to sign other information, for example, group key updates. In this case, message h in Figure 10 would also be signed by DSnF. For this purpose, the network entity generating this message must first send a request to DSnF to obtain the signature of the message. This signature is then appended to the group key update. If this is done in this way, 1) The MAC verification using the set key is correct. 2) (As in the case of Embodiment 3) Freshness inspection using a counter is correct. 3) The digital signature was successfully verified. Only in this case will the UE accept the decrypted key update.
[0108] Note that if group key generation and distribution occur within the RAN (as in solution #1 of [2]), base stations can add signatures. This may require sending a request to DSnF first. Alternatively, they can use their own public / private key pairs if they possess them.
[0109] Furthermore, in view of previous embodiments and variations of the present invention, we propose adapting the process described in TR33.850 as follows.
[0110] 2. Detailed Proposal KI#2 of TR33.850 requires 5GS to support confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and anti-replay protection for MBS traffic. KI#3 of TR23.757 also requires studying "How can a UE subscribe to / unsubscribe from multicast communication services (including being permitted to or disabled to access them)?"
[0111] When both major issues are placed in context, one may encounter dangers and threats such as the following: • The content key used to protect 5MBS traffic is used for extended periods of time. A device that has left the group should be prevented from receiving new content. • The device should be enrolled and prevented from having access to older content. • A device within the group is malicious and should be prevented from injecting fake content.
[0112] The above dangers and threats require the following: 1. Adapt existing major issues, or create something new that requires 5GS to accommodate updating the keys used to protect multicast content. 2. An efficient solution for distributing and updating keys so that the keys used to protect content can be distributed and updated in an efficient manner.
[0113] I asked SA3 to consider including two additional changes in TR33.850. The first change sets the requirements regarding the need for key updates. The second change describes an efficient and resilient method for key distribution and updating. For illustrative purposes, this is in the context of the existing solution #2.
[0114] ****Start of Change 1**** Main Issue #3: Securing Key Distribution 5.3.1 Main issue details MBS introduces the concept of point-to-multipoint service to the 3GPP® system. MBS traffic is delivered from an application service provider to multiple UEs via 5GS. To securely transmit data to a given set of users, MBS traffic needs to be protected to mitigate potential attacks. As a fundamental security principle, keys are required to protect MBS traffic. Compared to UE keys, the keys for protecting MBS traffic are one-to-many keys. When a UE joins an MBS session, only authorized users can receive the keys delivered from the key generator for protecting MBS traffic. UEs can also leave or have their MBS sessions compromised.
[0115] 5.3.2 Security Threats If the keys used to protect MBS traffic are not kept confidential, an attacker could use the 3GPP® network to gain "free access" to MBS services.
[0116] If the keys used to protect MBS traffic are not protected for integrity or anti-replay, authorized users may not be able to properly collect MBS traffic.
[0117] If you are unable to update the key to protect MBS traffic, • If a device leaves a group, that device may still be able to access the content. • When a device joins a group, that device may be able to access previous content. If a device in the group is malicious, it may be able to inject fake content.
[0118] 5.3.3 Potential Security Requirements The distribution of keys for protecting MBS traffic between the key generator and the UE shall be protected by confidentiality, integrity, and anti-replay protection.
[0119] 5GS will be capable of updating keys to protect MBS traffic. ****End of Change 1****
[0120] ****Start of Change 2**** Solution #2: Protect MBS traffic at the service layer 6.2.1 Solution Overview This solution addresses key issues 2 and 3 to support secure MBS traffic delivery from a context provider to multiple UEs via 5GS. In baseline architecture 2 of TR23.757[2], the MBSU (Multicast / Broadcast Service User Plane) is defined as a new entity for handling the payload portion responsible for service level functionality and management. Similarly, the MSF User Plane (MSF-U) in baseline architecture 1 is also defined in the service layer. This solution protects MBS traffic between the MBSU / MSF-U and UEs in the operator domain. It is independent of protection at the application layer from the content provider.
[0121] Keys for protecting MBS traffic are generated in the SMF. These keys are then distributed to the UEs and MBSU / MSF-Us. UEs belonging to a multicast group collect the same keys in the MBSU / MSF-U. Keys can be updated in an efficient manner.
[0122] 6.2.2 Solution Details Replacement of Figure 6.2.2-1: The procedure for protecting MBS traffic at the service layer, as shown in Figure 16. The procedure is described as follows: 1. UE registers 5GS and establishes a PDU session. 2. Content providers use higher layers (e.g., application layers) to announce the availability of multicast. 3. The UE sends a PDU session change request. This request shall include information about the multicast group, including the identifier of the multicast group that the UE wishes to join. Multicast_group_ID can be a multicast address or other identifier. 4. AMF calls Nsmf_PDUSession_UpdateSMContext, which contains information about the multicast group. Editor's Note: If SA2 agrees to support multicast session join / leave behavior for UEs via UP, such as IGMP join / leave, steps 3 & 4 will need to be modified. 5. If an MBS context is not available in (MB)-SMF, (MB)-SMF interacts with UDM to check if a multicast context for the multicast group exists in the system. 6. If a multicast context does not yet exist, the (MB)-SMF will use the Namf_N1N2MessageTransfer service to request the AMF to propagate the message to the RAN node in order to create one in the RAN. The IP address of the MBSU / MBS-U may be included if needed for the UE to locate the MBSU / MBS-U. 7. An N2 session change request is sent to the RAN. 8. The RAN sends an RRC reconfiguration request message to the UE. 9. If the UE is permitted to access the MBS service, the UE derives the multicast user key (MUK) from Kasuf, and Multicast_group_ID is used as an input parameter. Editor's note: MUK is derived from FFS. Editor's note: The key update procedure after re-authentication is FFS. 10. SMF requests MUK and sends Multicast_group_ID to AUSF. 11. AUSF derives the multicast user key (MUK) based on Kasuf and Multicast_group_ID. 12. AUSF responds to SMF using MUK. 13. SMF distributes MUK to MBSU / MSF-U. 14. The MBSU / MSF-U receives and stores the MUK. It then responds with an ACK to the SMF. 15. Continue with the multicast service startup procedure. 16. MBSU / MSF-U checks whether an MBS security context is available for this multicast group. The MBS security context used for MBS traffic protection includes key_ID, K_group_enc, K_group_int, encryption algorithm, and integrity algorithm. key_ID is used to indicate which key pair is used. K_group_enc and K_group_int are used for encryption and integrity protection of MBS traffic, respectively. If not, MBSU / MSF-U generates K_group and derives K_group_enc and K_group_int. The encryption algorithm and integrity algorithm are selected. 17.UE calculates a token based on the MUK and requests a traffic key from MBSU / MSF-U. Editor's note: The token structure is FFS. 18. MBSU / MSF-U uses MUK to validate the token, and if successful, distributes the MBS security context to the UE. Editor's Note: Message names and flows may be updated to align with conclusions from SA2 and the RAN WG. Editor's note: The roaming mode is FFS (Full-Frequency Service).
[0123] 6.2.2.1 MBS security content for efficient group key distribution and updating This section explains the logic of step 18 in Figure 6.2.2.1.
[0124] A multicast group with N members is divided into M sets S_i, i={1, M}. Each set has approximately L~N / M UEs. Each UE has three keys: a device-specific key MUK, a transport key K_transport_i shared with the other L-1 devices in the same set, and a group key shared with all N devices and used to protect multicast content. The MUK is used to securely deliver the transport key in point-to-point connections. The transport key is used to securely deliver the group key in multicast mode. The key hierarchy is as follows, with arrows indicating protection. MUK->K_transport_i->K_group
[0125] E{K1, K2} signifies authenticated encryption of key K2 using key K1 and is used to indicate secure key delivery.
[0126] The distribution and updating of group keys are performed by two messages. Message 18a: The UE receives a key transport for the set to which it belongs, protected using the UE's MUK. The UE first verifies the message authentication code, and if it is correct, the UE decrypts its transport key. Freshness can be achieved in several ways. For example, an incrementing initialization vector can be used, which depends on the initial access token exchanged in step 17. Message 18b: The new group key is distributed by protecting it with a transport key in a point-to-point or multicast message. The hash of the group key is included.
[0127] The UE first looks for a portion of the message addressed to its set. For example, if the UE belongs to set z, the UE needs to look for E{K_transport_z, K_group}. Next, the UE verifies the message authentication code, and if it is correct, the UE decrypts the new group key. Freshness can be achieved by using the same freshness counter used for distributing content data. Finally, the UE also checks whether the hash of the decrypted key is equal to the hash H of the group key, which was appended to the end of this message.
[0128] These two messages can be combined to address different situations. 1. Initial key distribution to the UE: The UE is given its transport key and group key in the same message combining 18a and 18b. 2. Key update triggered by very long use of a key group: Message 18b is used to distribute the new group key to all UEs. 3. Key update triggered by a new device joining the group: Message 18a is used to deliver the corresponding transport key to the new UE. Message 18b is then used to distribute the new group key to all UEs. 4. Key updates triggered by a UE leaving / being disabled: If a UE leaves or is disabled, its transport key and group key associated with its set are corrupted. To address this situation, message 18a is sent to L-1 of its set to update the transport key. Message 18b is then used to distribute the new group key to all UEs.
[0129] This method is efficient and flexible, as follows: • Updating a group key due to a device leaving requires only L-1+M messages, instead of the N messages required when only point-to-point messages are involved. For example, if N=1600, M=40, and L=40, the key update requires only 39 point-to-point messages for the transport key update and 40 messages for the group key update. Since M transport keys are used, an attacker attempting to compromise the UE can only attempt to update the group key of a maximum of L-1 devices. This limits the impact of such an attack, especially compared to a situation where a single key is used to transport the group key, which would affect N-1 devices. Furthermore, the hash of the group key is included in message 18b so that devices in other sets can check for consistency, detect the attack, and notify the MBS. In this sense, this solution is M-elastic.
[0130] The following concerns the editor's notes for Solution 2 of TR33.850-040 regarding UE recertification. The process during UE recertification is as follows: Step 0: The UE initiates the re-authentication process and proceeds to Step 1. Step 1: During the re-authentication process: Step 1.1: The UE attempts to process the incoming protected MBS traffic by using its known group key. If successful, the UE proceeds to Step 2. Step 1.2: If the UE is unable to process the incoming protected MBS traffic, the UE attempts to access a new group key, which is distributed at regular intervals during message 18b, by using its previous transport key. If successful, the UE gains access to the new group key and proceeds to Step 2. Step 1.3: The UE waits for the delivery of the new transport key and group key. These two keys are delivered by messages 18a and 18b. These keys are delivered only if the re-authentication and re-authorization process is successful and are protected with MUK. Once the UE receives them, the UE proceeds to step 3, or otherwise proceeds to step 2. Step 2: The UE is not authenticated or authorized to access MBS traffic. Step 3: The UE has the current group key and transport key and can access protected MBS traffic and any group key updates.
[0131] Note that Step 1.2 requires that updates to new group keys protected by the set (transport) key are not protected by the old group key. Note that if you want to optimize the key update process during UE re-authentication, it is advantageous not to do so.
[0132] It should be noted that the above process is optimized to improve the user experience, as a UE can attempt to access MBS traffic even before it is re-authenticated by attempting to use group keys and transport keys that the UE already possesses. This is done in steps 1.1 and 1.2. If these keys work, the UE can access the traffic directly. If these keys do not work, there are two possible reasons. The first reason is that the keys have been updated by a normal key update, or another UE has left the multicast group. The second reason is that the UE itself is no longer permitted and is prohibited from accessing MBS traffic.
[0133] Note that if a transport key is not used, step 1.2 above should be skipped, and only step 1.3 contains message 18a.
[0134] The key hierarchy described in the above embodiment uses M different transport keys (K_transport_i) used to update the group key. This technique thus reduces the number of unicast messages / point-to-point interactions required to update the transport key from N to N / M. The group key can then be updated by sending a new group key protected with the M different transport keys. This technique significantly reduces signaling overhead when security enforces that UEs frequently leave or join MBS groups, requiring group key updates in those cases. The reason for this is that if there is only a single transport key (as in the case of LTE), the transport key needs to be updated, which requires N unicast interactions. Once the transport key is updated, the group key protected with the new transport key can be distributed, for example. In contrast, having M transport keys means that N / M-1 unicast messages are required to update a compromised key, and M protected group keys need to be distributed through the multicast channel, thus requiring a total of N / M-1+M keys to be sent. This is approximately equal to 2*SQRT(N) when M is approximately SQRT(N). Problems can arise in configurations where MBS group members are fairly static (no one leaves or joins) and the policy enforces very frequent replacement of the group key. In such configurations, the technique proposed above in the context of Sol#2 of TR33.850 may have higher overhead because multiple transport keys are used to protect the new group key. To address this problem, it is possible to apply a slightly more complex key hierarchy, which can be seen as a combination of the key hierarchy in MBMS (LTE solution) and the key hierarchy proposed above. This new key hierarchy contains M+1 transport keys. The M transport "set" keys (K_transport_i) are as described above, that is, each of those transport keys is used by a disparate set of L=N / M UEs. • A single transport "common" key (K_transport_common) that is common to all UEs.
[0135] In this setting, • If the MBS group UE members remain static and the group key needs to be changed frequently, the transport "common" key is used to securely distribute the new group key. This is secure because the UE members do not change, and therefore all M+1 transport keys remain valid. This is efficient because a single key is used to securely send the updated group key. • MBS group UE members are dynamic, in which case L-1 unicast messages are used to update the "damaged" transport "set" key when a UE leaves or joins. It should be noted that these L-1 messages are protected using a UE-specific MUK key. The new group key and new transport "common" key are then updated by sending those two keys, protected with M transport "set" keys, through a multicast channel. Alternatively, the new transport "common" key is updated by protecting it with M transport "set" keys through a multicast channel, and the new transport "common" key is then used to update the new group key, also through a multicast channel.
[0136] Figure 15 illustrates the relevant key hierarchies. The first key hierarchy is the one used in LTE and in solution 12 of R33.850. Here, each UE has a MUK used to securely receive the MSK over the unicast channel. The MSK is common to all UEs and can be used to distribute the MTK, i.e., the group key, to all UEs over the multicast channel. The second key hierarchy (key hierarchy A) concerns the default solution described above when no transport key is used. This key hierarchy directly updates the MTK using a unique key specific to each UE. The third key hierarchy (key hierarchy B) has multiple M MTKs associated with disparate sets of up to L UEs. Each UE uses its device-specific MUK to securely receive its MSK. All M MSKs are then used to distribute the MTK. The fourth key hierarchy (key hierarchy C) is the key hierarchy described above, which has M MSKs (transport "set" keys), each coupled to a disparate set of up to L UEs, and one MSK (transport "common" key) common to all UEs. The key hierarchy in Figure 15 is applicable, for example, to Sol #12 of TR33.850, or to other service layer solutions in its 3GPP® research.
[0137] Entities protecting MBS traffic, such as an NF or several NFs interacting with each other, are responsible for determining the key hierarchy and the policy that determines how often the keys should be updated. • For example, regular key updates for group keys, including frequency or maximum usage. • For example, normal key updates for transport "common" keys, including frequency or maximum usage. • Updating the transport "set" key when a UE leaves or joins. • Updating the transport "common" key and / or group key when a UE leaves or joins. It will likely be managed under these circumstances.
[0138] In TR33.850, authentication and authorization fall under the scope of primary issue #1. Securing MBS traffic falls under the scope of primary issue #3. In the above solution, the process for re-authentication depends solely on the implementation of solution 2, but (re)authentication is handled as part of a different solution. For example, in TR33.850-040, solution 6 performs authentication and authorization for multicast communication services. Solution 6 does so based on K_AKMA. In particular, the key K_MBS is derived from K_AKMA and used for authentication and authorization. In other solutions, e.g., solution 2, the device key MUK is used for group key distribution. In this case, MUK is derived from K_ausf. The next issue to be addressed is how to put together solutions in TR33.850 that address different critical issues (e.g., KI#1 and KI#3) but ultimately need to work together.
[0139] To address this problem, it is necessary to describe the keys used for authentication / authorization and the keys used for distributing key updates within the relevant key hierarchy. In one embodiment addressing this problem, this is done as follows:
[0140] [Table 3]
[0141] K_AKMA is derived from K_AUSF, as described in 3GPP® TS33.535 16.0.0 Release 16. K_AKMA is then used to derive the master K_MBS key for the UE and a given MBS service. Two keys are derived from this K_MBS key. The first key, K_MBS_Authentication_Authorization, is used for the authentication and authorization procedure in solution 6 of TR33.850, for example. This means that in solution 6, the additional key derivation step from K_MBS has been eliminated. The second key, K_MUK, is used in the distribution of the group key used to protect multicast traffic. This K_MUK appears in solution 2, for example, which means that solution 2 should be modified to derive K_MUK from K_MBS and K_AKMA instead of deriving K_MUK directly from K_AUSF. Note that when deriving some of the above keys, for example K_MUK, you can use counter c as input to a key derivation function to obtain multiple K_MUKs within the current authentication and authorization session.
[0142] The following are alternatives to the above key hierarchy:
[0143] [Table 4]
[0144] The difference here is that K_MUK (used in Solution 2) is derived from K_MBS (used in Solution 6). In particular, K_MUK can be derived from K_MBS, the information exchanged during the authentication and authorization process, and counter c. The counter allows for the deriving of multiple K_MUKs if the key needs to be changed within the current authentication and authorization session.
[0145] Note that the above key hierarchy does not explain whether K_MUK should be changed when the UE re-authenticates. Triggering an update of K_MUK in case of re-authentication is optional; this can be done by counter c as described above.
[0146] In the case of UE re-authentication, it should be noted that, as in Solution 2, even if the key hierarchy K_AUSF → MUK is preserved, the MUK may also need to be changed. The main reason is that re-authentication can trigger an update of K_AUSF itself. TS33.501-A.2 describes the process for generating K_AUSF, which depends, for example, on the serving network name. If this occurs, preserving the same MUK can cause synchronization problems, as proposed in proposal S3-210919 presented to 3GPP(registered trademark) SA3 #102-e-Bis. For example, suppose a UE joins an MBS service by authenticating and generating a first MUK key. The UE is then idle for a long period of time. Later, the UE rejoins and triggers its re-authentication. However, suppose either the UE or the core network may have deleted the old MUK, for example, because the UE was idle for a long time. If only one of the parties deleted the old MUK, that party generates a new MUK. However, if K_AUSF changes for the re-authentication process, for example, if the UE joins through a different serving network, the new MUK will not match the old MUK. In general, and independently of Solution 2, the device key used to distribute the transport key or group key should be updated after (re)authentication.
[0147] Following K_MUK, if the UE is using a solution that utilizes a set key (or transport key), the corresponding set key may also need to be updated. The same may apply to group keys used to secure MBS traffic. However, doing so can result in high signaling overhead. Generally, a better approach is to keep (i) the keys used for authentication / authorization and distribution of set keys / group keys and (ii) the set keys and MBS group keys separate. In particular, set keys and MBS group keys may only need to be updated if the UE's re-authentication process fails.
[0148] The solution presented here can be considered an in-band key update mechanism. However, some solutions separate the control plane and the user plane. The control plane is used for distributing key group updates, while the user plane is responsible for distributing multicast traffic. This separation appears, for example, in solution 8 of TR33.850-040. In this solution, the (MB)-SMF solution is responsible for generating the group key (MTK) and the corresponding key identifier (KID). This key and identifier are later shared with the MBSF-U within the core network. This key and identifier are later shared with the UEs via the control channel. The content provider distributes the multicast data to the MBSF-U, which is responsible for distributing the multicast data via the user plane to all UEs connected to the service. This is done by protecting the multicast data using the group key.
[0149] In the case of a key update, all N UEs subscribed to the service need to receive the key update. As explained throughout this document, not only do all UEs need to be notified, but all UEs must also confirm that they have properly received the key update, which can involve significant communication resources.
[0150] The ideas in this embodiment can be applied to improve this solution, which also involves the separation of the user plane and the control MBS plane. When a group key is scheduled, the following occurs: Step 1: (MB-)SMF generates a new group key. Step 2, if the UE leaves the MBS, is disabled, etc., the (MB-)SMF also generates a new set key corresponding to the set of devices to which the UE belonged. The (MB-)SMF distributes the new set key, which is used to securely transport the new group key, to the (M-1) devices in the set through the control plane. This message is equivalent to message 18a in solution 2 of TR33.850. Step 3, (MB-)SMF shares with MBSF-U the new group key and a key update message in which the new key group is protected using L set keys. This is equivalent to message 18b in Solution 2 in TR33.850. Step 4, when the MBSF-U receives this key update, it first distributes the key update, i.e., the new group key protected with L set keys (equivalent to message 18b in solution 2 of TR33.850), by sending this information in bandwidth together with the normal multicast content. This information is therefore protected with the current group key. This may be done multiple times to ensure that the UE receives this key update. Step 5, MBSF-U can switch to using the new group key.
[0151] In the extension of the above procedure, when the UE receives a key update message in step 4, the UE may also notify the (MB-)SMF of the receipt of such a key update. In this extension, the (MB-)SMF waits until most of the UEs confirm receipt of the key update or until the timer times out, and then notifies the MBSF-U of this event which triggers a group key switch (step 5 above).
[0152] If the previous extension applies, step 3 may consist only of key update messages, and the delivery of the new group key may be delayed until the moment the (MB-)SMF notifies the MBSF-U that most UEs have received the key update.
[0153] If the previous extension applies, “the majority of UEs” means a given percentage of the N UEs subscribed to the MBS service, e.g., 99% of the UEs. For the remaining UEs, the (MB-)SMF may choose a direct connection through the control channel. Similarly, “the timer times out” means that the MBSF-U has been distributing key update messages for a sufficiently long period of time, and that any UEs that have not acknowledged receiving the message should be contacted directly through the control channel.
[0154] It should be noted that this split applies to the distribution of set keys (or transport keys) delivered through the control channel and the distribution of group keys delivered in bandwidth through the user plane. This can be done for any parameters (N, M, L) in this solution, and in particular, it can be done when there is a single set / transport key.
[0155] In SA3#102-e-Bis, proposal S3-210857 provides a framework for secure key distribution. This framework defines inputs and outputs to two key derivation functions that generate two broadcast keys for encryption and integrity protection, namely KMTentt and KMTint. The input to each KDF includes 1) a rekeying token, 2) a multicast group token, 3) an algorithm identifier, and 4) a temporary mobile group identifier (TMGI). The network provides 2) and 4) to the UE in a secure manner, in particular by a secure RRC message. The UE and RAN can then generate the same KMTentt and KMTint. If rekeying is required, the network can provide the UE with a rekeying token so that both the UE and RAN can generate new multicast keys KMTentt and KMTint. Note that in this solution, element 2) the multicast group token serves as the master multicast key. This parameter should therefore be generated in a secure manner and of sufficient length. This proposal S3-210857 may also benefit from the methods described herein for reducing the volume of signaling messages. In particular, if a new multicast key needs to be generated by the UE, this proposal S3-210857 requires the sending of N secure messages containing a new rekeying token to every UE. The rekeying token does not require confidentiality protection, but it does require integrity protection. Instead of sending N integrity-protected messages, the N UEs can be divided into M=N / L sets of devices. Each set of devices has a different set or transport key. These transport keys are used for the delivery of the above elements when needed for a set of devices that remain immutable. This delivery is done in multicast mode. If the set of devices changes (a new UE joins / leaves), a new transport key and any of the above elements may be delivered by an RRC-protected message.
[0156] In this solution, it should be noted that when a UE leaves a group, the leaving UE knows the multicast group token that acts as the master key. The way to apply the method described in this specification to this solution is to use a different rekeying token for each base station. When different rekeying tokens are used (i.e., the rekeying material is by the base station), only the rekeying token of the base station from which the UE leaves needs to be updated. Otherwise, if the same rekeying token is used at all base stations, a UE leaving an MBS group when located at a particular base station would force 5GS to update all UEs at all base stations. This is inefficient and involves more signaling overhead.
[0157] In this particular solution (and S3-210857, and other solutions where MBS encryption and integrity keys are updated through a control channel), the new K_MT_enc and K_MT_int keys should be used when a rekeying token is sent to the UE through multiple RRC messages. There may be time intervals during which the old K_MT_enc and K_MT_int keys, as well as the new K_MT_enc and K_MT_int keys, need to be active. When the base station begins using the new MBS encryption and integrity keys, the base station (or the entity protecting and transmitting MBS traffic) may indicate this key switch to the UE by including identifiers for the MBS encryption and integrity keys in the multicast data (user plane). Alternatively, the base station may use and invert a single bit in the multicast data channel to indicate the switch from the old key to the new key.
[0158] It should be noted that this proposal S3-210857 has two design flaws, since it states that RRC messages are encrypted in message 8 in Figure 6.X.2.2-1 and message 7 in Figure 6.X.2.3-1. The proposal does not mention integrity protection. In the case of message 8, encryption is required for the distribution of element 2). However, integrity protection is also essential, as otherwise it would be possible to modify the message and refuse service to the UE. In the case of message 7, the requirements are also integrity protection and freshness. If element 1) is a counter, the counter may be public, but the receiving party must be able to verify its integrity and freshness.
[0159] In this proposal S3-210857, if 1) is a counter, the UE only needs to update its counter, so it should be noted that a disabled UE may still be able to access MBS traffic even if the counter changes. Therefore, the rekeying token must be sufficiently long (e.g., 128 bits or more) and must be randomly generated. Shorter rekeying tokens (e.g., 32 bits or 64 bits) are insufficient, as an attacker could pre-calculate the key in advance and pick the correct key when the rekeying tokens are distributed. An attacker could also potentially log the traffic and decrypt it at a later point.
[0160] In SA3#102-e-Bis, proposal S3-211144 provides another solution for MBS key generation. Instead of distributing new keys on demand, this solution is similar to S3-210857, as the MBS encryption and integrity keys are derived from a master key from several parameters including counters and random values. As with S3-210857, this solution may also benefit the method described in this application for reducing the volume of signaling messages. For example, a set of keys may correspond to a UE receiving MBS services through a particular base station. Devices in the same set share a set key or transport key. When the MBS encryption key and integrity key (KMRB-int and KMRB-enc in Figure 6.X.2.1-1 of S3-211144) need to be updated at all UEs in the base station, the base station distributes the parameters required to update KMRB-int and KMRB-enc, such as RANDMBS and CountMBS, via the multicast channel MRB (PTM). These parameters are protected using the corresponding transport key.
[0161] Next, note that S3-211144 assumes a key hierarchy where KMBS is the master key distributed to the RAN. From this key, gNB-specific keys are generated as follows: KMBS-RAN=KDF{KMBS, TMGI, RANDMBS, CountMBS, PCI, ARFCN-DL}
[0162] The use of PCI and ARFCN-DL binds keys to specific RAN cells. However, this also has a major drawback: if a UE leaves or is disabled from an MBS group, the keys at all base stations distributing MBS traffic need to be updated. This leads to significant signaling overhead because the same master key is used for all base stations distributing a given MBS service. This can be mitigated in several ways, both in this case and in other systems. Each base station randomly generates a different gNB-specific key KMBS-RAN. The key hierarchy includes intermediate levels related to the tracking area, such as between RAN and KMBS. This intermediate key, KMBS-TA, is specific to the tracking area and aims to reduce the impact of key updates. Instead of receiving the KMBS, the UE receives only the gNB-specific key KMBS-RAN or intermediate key, for example, the KMBS-TA in messages 5 and 11 in Figure 6.a.2.1-1 of S3-211144.
[0163] Note that if the UE does not have access to the master MBS key, the mobility (handover) procedure should be modified so that the UE is notified of the target MBS RAN key or target MBS TA key.
[0164] (i)K MBS-RAN KDF{K MBS TMGI, RAND MBS , Count MBS It is calculated as PCI, ARFCN-DL, (ii)K MBS-RAN If UE leaves the group, it relies solely on RANDMBS for security reasons. (iii) gNB's K with a withdrawn / invalidated UE MBS-RAN Note that K_MBS is not needed as only the following needs to be updated. The same applies to multicast group tokens in proposal S3-210857.
[0165] moreover, 1. This solution is basically RAND, as explained by (1), (2), and (3), and as in the case of equation (0) for deriving K_MRB-int and K_MRB-enc from there. MBS This is equivalent to a solution that securely distributes (keys for RAN) directly to the UE. RRC(RAND MBS TMGI, CountMBS 、PCI, ARFCN-DL)(0) In this method, the UE receives and checks all other parameters individually, i.e., TMGI, Count<000001In (1), (4), and (5), the PCI may be removed because the message is distributed within the RRC message coming from that particular base station.
[0167] In SA3#102-e-Bis, proposal S3-210918 provides another solution for MBS key generation, somewhat similar to solution 8 of TR33.850. In this new solution, MBSF-C generates a new group key (MTK2) which is distributed to MBSF-U and (MB)-SMF. (MB)-SMF is responsible for distributing this new key to the UE via unicast signaling messages. Once this is done, (MB)-SMF notifies MBSF-U. Following this notification, MBSF-U begins using this key MTK2 to protect MBS data. This solution may benefit the described embodiment in order to reduce signaling overhead. In particular, MBSF-C or (MB)-SMF may distribute the UEs into sets, each set linked to its own transport key. The new group key MTK2 can thus be distributed to UEs protected using this transport key via a multicast stream, and still protected using the old MTK2 key. When a UE receives an update, it notifies (MB)-SMF, which will track all UEs that are aware of the new key. For UEs that do not respond, (MB)-SMF may use the unicast key update modification proposed in S3-210918. Once (MB)-SMF assures that the majority of UEs registered in the MBS traffic have received the new MTK2 key, (MB)-SMF sends an MTK activation notification to MBSF-U.
[0168] Note that Proposal S3-210918 assumes a unidirectional link from (MB)-SMF to UE and key update notifications in step 6. This may not be sufficient, as UEs may miss signaling messages, which could cause interruptions during MBS data reception. Note that the current proposal may require a policy in (MB)-SMF describing how to handle situations where a certain percentage of UEs do not acknowledge receipt of the key update notification message. In particular, this policy may include the relative or absolute number of UEs that may not have acknowledged receipt of the message before the MTK activation notification was sent to the MBSF-U. This policy may also include a timer that triggers the sending of this notification when the timer expires. This policy may also define how UEs that do not acknowledge the key update notification should be managed, for example, how many times the message should be sent.
[0169] In SA3#102-e-Bis, proposal S3-211070 provides an alternative solution for the generation and distribution of MBS keys and MBS traffic. This solution relies on three keys: MUK (device-specific key), MSK, and MTK. The MUK is used to distribute the MSK in unicast messages over a secure connection. The MTK is protected by the MSK. The MTK can be delivered in unicast or multicast messages. The MTK, or keys derived therefrom, is used to protect MBS data. This proposal S3-211070 is similar to the idea disclosed in this application. The main difference is that S3-211070 appears to include a single MSK. S3-211070 can benefit from the idea in this application when UEs in an MBS service are divided into M sets, each using a different MSK. For this purpose, the distribution of multicast traffic keys is required to include MTKs encrypted with different MSKs. This solution uses a key hierarchy for the derivation of MUK from KAF using AKMA, as previously described in this application (KAUSF->KAKMA->KMBS(KAF)->MUK).
[0170] These devices may be implemented by means of computer program code and / or as dedicated hardware for the associated devices. Computer programs may be stored and / or distributed in suitable media, such as optical or solid-state media, delivered together with or as part of other hardware, but may also be distributed in other forms, such as via the Internet or other wired or wireless telecommunication systems.
[0171] References [1]TR23.757v1.0.0 [2]TR33.850v0.2.0 [3]TS33.246-g00 3 (MBMS security) [4]https: / / itectec.com / spec / 4-2-key-management-overview /
Claims
1. 1. A method for a primary station to distribute an encryption key to a plurality of secondary stations, the method comprising: a. determining whether a group key needs to be updated, said group key being used for multicast secured communications from said primary station to said secondary stations; b. when it is determined that an update is required, transmitting an updated encryption key via an encrypted message to at least a subset of said secondary stations; The method comprising:
2. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the updated encryption key is an updated group key, and the encrypted message is encrypted with a user-specific encryption key and sent unicast.
3. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of determining whether the group key needs to be updated includes determining whether at least one of the following is satisfied: at least one of the access rights of the secondary stations has been revoked; at least one of the access rights of the secondary stations has disappeared; a validity period of the group key has expired; or at least one of the secondary stations has moved away from a predetermined location.
4. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the updated encryption key is a first set key shared with a first set of secondary stations.
5. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein in step a., the first set key is updated when it is determined that the access rights of at least one of the secondary stations belonging to the first set are not currently valid.
6. 6. The method of claim 5, further comprising the step of transmitting the updated group key to each set of secondary stations in a message protected with a respective set key associated with each set of secondary stations.
7. 1. A method for a primary station to distribute an encryption key to a plurality of secondary stations, the method comprising: a. determining whether a group key needs to be updated, said group key being used for secured multicast communication from said primary station to said secondary stations; b. when it is determined that an update is required, sending the updated group key to each set of secondary stations in a respective multicast message, said multicast message being protected by a respective set key associated with each corresponding set; The method comprising:
8. The step of determining whether the group key needs to be updated comprises: at least one of the access rights of the secondary station has been revoked; the loss of at least one of the access rights of the secondary station; the validity period of the group key has expired; At least one of the secondary stations has left the predetermined location. is satisfied.
9. 9. The method of claim 7 or 8, further comprising, if in step a. the decision that the group key is linked to the access rights of a first secondary station belonging to the first set of secondary stations is not valid, sending a new first set key by unicast to each secondary station of the first set through a protected unicast message.
10. 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising the step of: c) transmitting the updated group key to the first set of secondary stations in the multicast message, the multicast message being encrypted by the new first set key.
11. 10. The method of claim 9, wherein the protected unicast message also includes the updated group key.
12. 1. A method for a primary station to distribute an encryption key to a plurality of secondary stations, the method comprising: a. determining whether a group key needs to be updated, said group key being used for secured multicast communication from said primary station to said secondary stations; b. when determining that an update is required, transmitting a first set of keys by unicast to at least a first subset of said secondary stations through a protected unicast message; c. sending the updated group key to the first set of secondary stations in a multicast message, the multicast message being protected by the first set of keys, or alternatively including the updated group key in the protected unicast message of step b.; d. sending the updated group key to each further set of secondary stations in a respective multicast message, the multicast message being protected by a respective set key associated with each corresponding set; The method comprising:
13. 11. The method according to claim 7, wherein the set of secondary stations is formed based on location, and step d. further comprises the primary station sending the updated group key in at least one further multicast message, the further multicast message being encrypted by a respective set key used in a proximity set.
14. 14. The method of claim 13, wherein the neighbor set is a set of multiple secondary stations camping in a cell served by another primary station.
15. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 14, wherein the multicast message is retransmitted periodically.
16. 16. The method of claim 7, wherein the multicast message includes the updated group key together with an authentication footprint message computed as a hash of the updated group key.
17. 1. A method for a secondary station receiving an encryption key in a network, the method comprising: a. receiving a first set key by unicast through a protected unicast message from a primary station, the first key being associated with a first set of secondary stations; b. receiving and decrypting an updated group key in a multicast message to the first set of secondary stations, said decrypting using the first set of keys; The method comprising:
18. 20. The method of claim 17, wherein the multicast message includes an authentication footprint message along with the protected updated group key, the method further comprising the secondary station authenticating the multicast message by checking whether a hash of the decrypted group key matches the received authentication footprint.
19. 20. The method of claim 18, further comprising reporting an anomaly to the primary station if the check fails.
20. A primary station operating in a cellular network and in communication with a plurality of secondary stations, the primary station comprising: a controller adapted to determine whether a group key needs to be updated, the group key being used for protected multicast communication from the primary station to the plurality of secondary stations; and a transmitter coupled to the controller adapted to transmit an updated group key to each set of secondary stations in a respective multicast message when it is determined that an update is required, the multicast message being protected by a respective set key associated with each corresponding set; A primary station comprising:
21. A secondary station operating in a cellular network and in communication with a primary station, the secondary station comprising: a receiver adapted to receive a first set of keys by unicast from a primary station through a protected unicast message, the first keys being associated with a first set of secondary stations; a controller adapted to decrypt a group key updated in a multicast message to the first set of secondary stations, the decrypting using the first set key; A secondary station equipped with
22. Program code means as computer programs and / or dedicated hardware, stored and / or distributed on a suitable medium, such as an optical storage medium or a solid-state medium, supplied together with or as part of other hardware, but which may also be distributed in other forms, such as via the Internet or other wired or wireless telecommunications systems.
