Test measurement system and control method of interlock system
The enhanced interlock system with self-check and fault detection capabilities addresses the limitations of conventional systems by ensuring reliable fault detection and maintenance, maintaining safety standards in test and measurement equipment.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024064581
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2024-04-08
- Filing Date
- 2024-04-12
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-19
AI Technical Summary
Conventional safety interlock systems for test and measurement equipment lack failure detection and troubleshooting capabilities, making it difficult to identify and rectify single relay contact failures, which compromises safety and maintenance efficiency.
An enhanced interlock system with self-check functionality and modular design that includes single fault detection, allowing for continuous operation monitoring and integrity testing of both internal and external connections, ensuring compliance with safety standards like EN ISO13849-1:2015, Category 3.
The system provides reliable fault detection and troubleshooting, ensuring safe operation by identifying and reporting interlock failures, thus maintaining safety standards and reducing downtime.
Smart Images

Figure 2024161339000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] This disclosure relates to test and measurement instruments and systems, and more particularly to safety interlocks for test and measurement instruments or systems. [Background technology]
[0002] It is beneficial for test and measurement equipment and systems (referred to as systems in this application) such as source measure units (SMUs) and power supplies to include a safety interlock system. The interlock system prevents exposure of the user or the user's machinery to hazardous voltages if it detects a faulty system or wiring between the test and measurement equipment and the user's device under test (DUT). The system will only energize or connect hazardous hardware (i.e., hardware that operates at high or "hazardous" voltages) if the external wiring path is unbroken. This eliminates the possibility of energizing hazardous hardware during events such as opening an external door or enclosure.
[0003] Figure 1 shows a conventional safety interlock scheme, consisting of a power supply 10 (typically 5V and enabled by the signal 5VINT_EN) and a mainframe relay 12. An interlock power supply 20 powers two relays with independent contacts 14 and 16 to close a hardware path and enable downstream hardware on the "interlocked" module.
[0004] The downstream hardware may consist of high voltage or high current sources that can be considered hazardous to the end user. Typically, the user provides external wiring 17 to the coil of this interlock relay, possibly through external devices such as door switches, hall sensors, etc. The system then provides power to the hazardous hardware only if the external wiring path is not disconnected. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0005] [Patent Document 1] Special Publication No. 2023-552101 [Non-patent literature]
[0006] [Non-Patent Document 1] "Keithley Source Measure Units", Tektronix / Keithley, [Online], [Retrieved April 11, 2024], Internet<https: / / www.tek.com / ja / products / keithley / source-measure-units> Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0007] The interlock relay in this case is a safety control component for the test equipment manufacturer, and implementations must use a redundant set of contacts to ensure a "double" fault protection design: if one relay contact fails and remains closed, the other set of independent contacts continues to operate, maintaining the interlock function and maintaining the safety of the equipment. This type of interlock has two significant drawbacks:
[0008] First, this interlock has no fault detection. This interlock relay has double-fault protection, but one contact can fail without any knowledge or indication of any change in operation. Its interlock status signal, INT_STATUS, continues to indicate that the relay is fine. Thus, this interlock does not detect or indicate that a single fault has occurred in the hardware that may inevitably fail one day. In the event of a single fault, safety-conscious users want to know if the double-fault system has become a single-fault system. A malfunctioning system needs to be repaired, but the system needs to indicate its fault first.
[0009] Second, the interlock design makes problem solving difficult. If a user discovers that the interlock function is faulty, the simplistic nature of the wiring and hardware implementation in Figure 1 does not help them identify where the problem occurred. In a moderately complex system, solving the problem would require the hardware to be completely disconnected and taken offline while someone identifies and repairs the problem. [Means for solving the problem]
[0010] In contrast to the more simplified interlock system shown in Figure 1, the present embodiment solves the two deficiencies mentioned above and also brings test and measurement equipment closer to the machine level of safety standards. The EN ISO13849-1:2015, Category 3 standard provides an example of a machine level safety standard that some users desire.
[0011] Further, such an interlock system has the advantage of performing a self-check or self-test of the interlock system and reporting back to the user as to the integrity of the interlock system, such an interlock system, according to embodiments of the present application, provides a test system that allows the user to have confidence in the safety of their end application and the connections between the test system and the DUT. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0012] [Figure 1] Figure 1 shows a conventional hardware safety interlock implementation. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 shows a diagram of one embodiment of an improved interlock system having modules. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the relationship between signals from each unit shown in FIG. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 shows another embodiment of an improved interlock system. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 shows an embodiment of an interlock relay and test circuit. [Figure 6] Figure 6 shows an embodiment of the module side hardware of the interlock relay. [Figure 7] FIG. 7 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of a K-fault testing sequence. [Figure 8] FIG. 8 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of a user path test sequence. [Figure 9] FIG. 9 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of a power supply and load test sequence. [Figure 10] FIG. 10 shows a flow chart of an embodiment of a global integrity test sequence. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0013] FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of an embodiment of an interlock system according to some embodiments of the disclosed technology. The exemplary interlock system of FIG. 2 may include a modular source measure unit (SMU) device or power supply or the like for use in a system that uses high voltage and / or high current power supplies, referred to herein as "danger" signals. The test and measurement equipment herein includes the mainframe backplane 30, the mainframe digital processing unit 52 in the digital mainframe 50, and a test and measurement equipment module 60, such as the SMU module shown, which may reside in one of several mainframe backplane slots. This module is optional, but is useful to illustrate the system's ability to monitor all aspects of the system. The system may include any number of test and measurement equipment modules coupled to the mainframe backplane 30 and / or the digital mainframe 50.
[0014] In addition to the interlock relay hardware, the mainframe is configured with additional hardware to support internal testing of the relay and power functions. Additionally, the interlock power signal is distributed to six locations within the mainframe module interface to support modules with interlock functions. The main digital processor collects the signals from the hardware to process the results of the integrity tests. All signals and nodes throughout the interlock subsystem are buffered and monitored by this digital system structure to establish the internal health of the entire interlock system at any time. The example module shown employs an interlock system for a specific output. Modules can have a variety of structures, but the interlocks may have a consistent hardware implementation to support this overall scheme. This module architecture also includes a digital subsystem structure that collects the status of the internal interlocks and reports it to the main digital system for use in the overall interlock testing.
[0015] In the example of Figure 2, the interlock system functionality is distributed between the mainframe backplane 30, the test and measurement equipment modules 60, and the mainframe digital processing unit 52 that is part of the digital mainframe 50. An embodiment of the disclosed technology adds functionality to both the mainframe backplane and each test and measurement equipment module that plugs into the mainframe backplane. In this way, the modules become part of the integrity test and can test everything from the user's wiring to the test and measurement equipment modules.
[0016] One aspect of the interlock system shown in FIG. 2 is that it includes a hardware interlock to detect when a single fault occurs in a safety critical component. In these embodiments, the hardware interlock includes a relay, without being limited to a particular safety critical component. An example of this functionality is shown by a "single fault detection" block 34 on the mainframe backplane 30. The "single fault detection" block 34 receives input from relay K0 36 of the backplane interlock 37 in addition to an "INTERLOCK_DRIVE" signal, and outputs an "INT_FAULT_BP" signal to the mainframe digital processing unit 52. Other components on the mainframe backplane 30 send and receive various signals that allow monitoring and testing of the various elements of the interlock system.
[0017] As shown in FIG. 2, the mainframe backplane 30 has an interlock power supply 32 that provides power (typically 5V) to the external wiring 17 coupled to contact 19 via the INTERLOCK_OUT signal. The user system returns an "INTERLOCK_RETURN" signal via contact 54 that is connected to a relay KO 36 on the backplane interlock 37. The backplane interlock 37 has double fault protection. The components below the mainframe backplane 30 enable testing of the interlocks at TST INT (test interlock) 40 with INTERLOCK_TEST signal 42 and INTERLOCK_STATUS signal 44. These signals are received by the mainframe digital processing unit 52. TST INT 40 receives signals from the test and measurement equipment module interlocks on line 46 and from the backplane interlock 37 to generate the INTERLOCK_TEST signal.
[0018] The module slots 38 allow the mainframe backplane 30 to provide various functions such as SMUs, power supplies of various functions, and power supplies of various types. Various modules are inserted into one of the slots shown. If a module is present, an INTERLOCK_STATUS signal regarding the interlock of the module appears on line 46 that interfaces with the mainframe backplane 30. A module may include many different types of components to provide the necessary functionality to facilitate the insertion of the module. Although the description herein is directed to a module 60, any functionality possessed by the module 60 may be applied to any module coupled to the mainframe backplane 30. The module 60 has relays 62, 64, 72, and 74, which are connected to a single fault detection circuit 66. If any of these relays 62, 64, 72, and 74 become inoperative or fail, the single fault detection circuit 66 on the module 60 provides a signal to the fault detection control 70 and ultimately to the mainframe digital processing unit 52 as an INT_FAULT_MOD (interlock fault module) signal.
[0019] Each of the single fault detection circuits of the mainframe backplane 30 or the module 60 can detect if an associated relay has failed without interrupting its normal operational behavior and maintaining its fail-safe characteristics. The mainframe digital processing unit 52 receives the fault signal from the single fault detection block and utilizes logic to determine if a safety critical component failure has occurred. The module 60 also has a module function circuit 68 that provides a corresponding module output 76. Multiple modules such as the module 60 may include high voltage coils and the like. Similarly, the module function circuit 68 generates the module output 76 if the interlock functions properly. If the interlock does not function properly, the module output 76 is not generated.
[0020] Another aspect of the interlock system shown in FIG. 2 includes a hardware method that allows the user to test the complete system interlock integrity, generating an output 56. FIG. 2 illustrates this functionality with the TST INT 40 on the mainframe backplane 30. This functionality includes a specific hardware structure that simulates the interlock system without the modules having dangerous voltages present, allowing the user to identify if there is a problem with the system setup including the user's own external wiring and the equipment's internal hardware. In this description, this simulation is called the "integrity test" and is a simulation that is performed using the equipment's hardware. If the integrity test passes, the user knows when to take the equipment out of test mode and into run mode where the system constitutes a safety proven system. The mainframe digital processing unit 52 receives the results of the interlock "test" and determines whether the system has passed or failed. Furthermore, the mainframe digital processing unit 52 reports any faults that may occur. The mainframe digital processing unit 52 provides an interface to the user to inform the user of these findings.
[0021] Combining these two aspects, test and measurement devices and systems according to embodiments of the disclosed technology can achieve compliance with the EN ISO13849-1:2015, Category 3 standard.
[0022] A further aspect of the exemplary interlock system of FIG. 2 is that all of the relays included are safety rated UL 508, including relay KO of interlock 37 on mainframe backplane 30, relay K1 of test and measurement equipment module interlocks 62 and 64, and relay K2 of other test and measurement equipment module interlocks 72 and 74.
[0023] The module side interlock has two series and redundant contacts which eliminates hot switching and improves longevity. The module 60 has single fault detection on the relay contacts, similar to the mainframe backplane 30. The mainframe side interlock integrity test process checks both the internal hardware and the user connections before enabling the module 60, as described below with respect to Figures 7-10. The user side has an easy to operate and fault protected interlock interface. In the event of a hardware failure, it is not possible to identify the specific fault / component, only that a single fault has occurred.
[0024] As such, embodiments of the disclosed technology provide several advantages over conventional interlock systems. These advantages include the ability to check the interlock hardware to ensure it is still operational and not in a faulted state. The system also has the ability to check the interlock hardware inside the modular structure to ensure it is operational and not in a faulted state. The system has additional hardware to support checking the external (user's) wiring of the interlock path. In this way, the user can test and troubleshoot the external connections to resolve wiring issues and provide assurance that there are no problems with the user's setup.
[0025] By running several software test sequences, as detailed below, all this newly added hardware can work together to check the “health” of the internal interlock system. The interlock path from the user to the module can be fully simulated and checked on the hardware without any physical involvement, providing a complete “integrity test” and reporting the results to the user. If the tests pass, the user can be confident that the interlock system has not experienced a single failure and will work perfectly when put into operation. Furthermore, this test can be incorporated into the user’s test automation, so that the system can be checked over the life of the product and interlock hardware failures can be identified immediately when they occur. The mainframe can be specified to comply with the safety standard EN ISO13849-1:2015, Category 3, setting new expectations for safety / interlock design for users of test and measurement equipment.
[0026] 3-7 show circuit diagrams of some of the exemplary implementations of the interlock system in the mainframe according to some embodiments of the disclosed technology. This description does not describe the functions of all the circuits, but describes the main signals and functions. The implementation of the various circuits is left to the designer.
[0027] FIG. 3 shows a block diagram of signals from various parts shown in FIG. 2 that are used to allow the user to wire to the interlock through the user's external system, some elements not shown in FIG. 2. The interlock power supply 32 in FIG. 3 corresponds to the interlock power supply 32 in FIG. 2. FIG. 3 includes design elements (not shown in FIG. 2) such as diode 90 and resistor 18 that provide overvoltage and overcurrent protection as well as monitor the 5VINT (5V interlock) signal itself for faults. These design elements allow for internal fault detection of this power supply. Other elements not shown here are added to further detect open circuit conditions. A status block 92 provides a 5VINT_PG (power good) signal that can indicate if the power signal itself has a fault. The status block 92 monitors all signals from the interlock power supply and the user return signal as well as other signals to determine their state, such as run mode, test mode, or if there is a fault, and provides that status to the interlock. The hardware implementation of this status block 92 may include a variety of circuit elements, but its importance lies in monitoring power and user status to ensure safe operation.
[0028] This 5VS power supply 94 shown in FIG. 4 is used for the internal interlock power supply. This power supply 94 does not provide any power external to the mainframe backplane 30. Referring back to FIG. 2, FIG. 2 shows the power supply as the power supply for the backplane interlock 37. The system monitors the power supply 94 for overvoltage, undervoltage or overcurrent conditions via a PG signal from a status block 96 (not shown in FIG. 2), thereby allowing internal fault detection of this separate power supply 94. Similar to the status block 92 in FIG. 3, hardware in the status block 96 monitors the health of the power supply 94 used to power the internal interlock.
[0029] This block diagram in FIG. 5 includes the safety relay KO 36 of the backplane interlock 37 of FIG. 2, a test enable signal, and a signal for checking the status of almost all nodes involved in the interlock system in a test enable in a check circuit 98. The status check circuit 98 may include the TST INT circuit 40 of FIG. 2. The nodes have user status 54 and modules via module slots 38 that are sent to the mainframe digital processing unit 52. The number of module slots 38 may vary from 1 to N. The embodiment of FIG. 2 shows six slots, and although the description may refer to distributing power to six locations, one location per slot, this is merely an example. The operation is described in the flow chart below. Below is a description of each signal. [Table 1]
[0030] Figure 6 shows an example of how an improved interlock system may exist in one example module structure. Figure 6 shows some hardware components to facilitate understanding of the following description, but this description is not intended to suggest how the module interlock works in this particular example. The module side hardware ensures that both contacts of the safety control relay are open when they should be open. The module side hardware is only intended to report the state of the relay when the interlock is open.
[0031] Under normal circumstances, when the interlock is open and both interlock relays 100 and 110 are functioning normally, bias resistors 101 and 111 pull the detection node of comparator 104 or 114, depending on the rail, in the opposite direction to the rail being monitored. Resistor 101 pulls the detection node negative for comparator 104 monitoring the positive rail, and resistor 111 pulls the detection node positive for comparator 114 monitoring the negative rail. In this situation, both comparators 104 and 114 output a low signal. This particular embodiment has positive and negative high and low voltage rails, and the other circuits 102 and 112 are powered by the power supply. Figure 6 shows just an example of how a system can implement interlocks in modules to provide complete monitoring of the safety of the system.
[0032] However, if any of the four contacts are not fully open when the interlock should be open, that contact will pull the corresponding comparator towards its rail, causing either comparator 104 or comparator 114 to output a high signal instead. For example, if the contacts of relay 100 fail to open, the positive high voltage rail will pull the detection node positive through resistor 105, causing the output of comparator 104 to go high. A similar sequence occurs with the negative rail of resistor 115.
[0033] Having looked at the specific hardware implementations of the various circuit components, we now turn to a discussion of the testing and monitoring of the various interlocks that are enabled by the overall architecture of these interlocks. It should be noted that the details of the implementation of the interlocks are left to the designer as long as the system allows the processor to monitor and test the interlocks, a process that is not found in the current state of the art. It should also be noted that the overall integrity test described below with respect to FIG. 10 may perform only one or selected of multiple tests within the scope of the embodiments and claims.
[0034] FIG. 7 illustrates the first test, referred to herein as the K fault test. This K fault test checks the safety interlock relay 37 on the mainframe backplane 30 and then repeats for all installed modules that have interlocks. The figure does not show a specific module test sequence, but is very similar to the Interlock Relay Fault Test of FIG. 7. The test begins at 120 with the various signals described above being set up for testing the first interlock. In one embodiment, this test setup includes setting these signals to the following values: 5VS INT_EN=0; INT_EN =0; INT_TEST =0; INT_RUN =0; and K_FAULT_TEST =0. After setup, at 122 the system performs the first interlock test by checking the 5VS power signal and the K_FAULT (K fault) signal. If the power is not good or a fault is returned, the test fails at 124. If the test passes, the system sets up the second interlock test at 126. In this embodiment, the setup for the second interlock test is 5VINT_EN=0, INT_EN =0; INT_TEST =0; INT_RUN =0; and K_FAULT_TEST =1. After the test at 128, if the interlock is not ready or the second interlock fails, the test fails at 130. This failure typically indicates a downstream hardware failure or a faulty (malfunctioning) relay. If the second interlock passes the test, the overall test passes at 132.
[0035] FIG. 8 shows a second test sequence, which may be a user path test that tests the input signal returned by the user through contact 54 in FIG. 2. This user path test verifies the wiring and ability of the user to operate the mainframe interlock relay. At 140, the system sets up a first user test with power off. In one embodiment, the settings for the first user test may be 5VINT_EN=0; INT_EN =0; INT_TEST =0; INT_RUN =0; and K_FAULT_TEST =0. At 142, the system checks the interlock return for a signal. If the system detects a signal, the test fails at 144 because the system was not expecting a signal. This failure could mean that the user power was plugged in or that the user power has some kind of fault. If the test passes, the system turns on the power at 146 and sets up a second user test. The second user test itself may perform the same operations as the first user test. The setup for the second user test is the same except that 5VINT_EN = 1. At 148 the system attempts to detect a signal on the interlock return. If there is no signal, the user wiring may be shorted and the test fails at 150. The system then checks the power signal for the power supply at 152 using the same setup as the second user test, but this time without the need for the third test setup. If the 5VINT_PG signal or other power good signal is not equal to 1 at 154, the test fails at 156. This may indicate a fault condition in the interlock power supply (such as the user wiring being shorted to ground or chassis). If this test passes, the overall test passes at 158.
[0036] FIG. 9 illustrates a test sequence for a power supply and load test associated with module slot 38 of FIG. 2. This test loads the internal interlock relay to demonstrate the power supply's ability to provide the required current, regardless of how many slots of interlock loads there are. Since the embodiment of FIG. 2 shows six slots, the interlock load for the test is set to mimic this number of modules. During this test, the module interlocks are disconnected so they will not be actuated. At 160, the system sets up a test of the user operated interlock. One embodiment includes the following settings: 5VINT_EN=1; INT_EN =1; INT_TEST =0; INT_RUN =0; and K_FAULT_TEST =0. After running the test, the system checks the power good (PG) signal at 162 to see if a fault was detected and if the interlock is ready. If any of these are not true, the test fails at 164, which may indicate that the user has failed to actuate the interlock relay or that an internal fault has occurred. At 166 the system sets up the same test, but now the power is turned on. The settings remain the same except that INT_TEST is set to 1. This test is run for as short a time as possible. The same checks as the previous test are checked at 168. If any of the conditions fail the test is failed at 170, indicating an internal fault that has prevented the internal interlock power supply from driving the full load of the interlock. Optionally the user may then be disconnected at 172. A new, different test is run with all settings set to 0. At 174 the same conditions are checked as the previous two tests, except that FAULT is 0 for a pass and INT_READY must also be 0. If any of these conditions fail the test is failed at 176, otherwise the test is passed at 178.
[0037] The final test sequence consists of the integrity test described above. In this final sequence, the results of the previous tests are collected and a pass / fail result is generated that is returned to the user. If a test fails, the system provides the user with information about which part of the system has failed. A module interlock test determines the state of the interlocks at 180, which may take the form of the test sequence of FIG. 7 and is applied to the module 60 instead of the mainframe backplane 30. A user path test at 184 may take the form of the test of FIG. 8. A test of the internal interlocks may take the form of the test of FIG. 7 at 186 and is applied to the mainframe backplane 30, and a test of the internal power and load test at 188 may take the form of the test sequence of FIG. 9. If all the previous tests have passed, the overall integrity test passes at 190. If any fail, the overall test fails at 182.
[0038] As noted above, it should be noted that some embodiments do not include all of the exact same tests in the exact sequence given. The overall approach of testing the interlocks of every part of a system in a manner that allows testing without applying hazardous power levels is unprecedented. Additionally, the use of a processor to monitor every individual interlock test and provide an indication of pass / fail and, if a failure occurs, information about the failure is also unprecedented.
[0039] Aspects of the disclosed technology can operate on specially created hardware, firmware, digital signal processors, or specially programmed general-purpose computers, including processors that operate according to programmed instructions. The term "controller" or "processor" in this application contemplates microprocessors, microcomputers, ASICs, and dedicated hardware controllers, among others. Aspects of the disclosed technology can be implemented in computer-available data and computer-executable instructions, such as one or more program modules, executed by one or more computers (including a monitoring module) or other devices. Generally, program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, and the like, which, when executed by a processor in a computer or other device, perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data formats. The computer-executable instructions may be stored in computer-readable storage media, such as hard disks, optical disks, removable storage media, solid-state memory, RAM, and the like. As will be appreciated by those skilled in the art, the functionality of the program modules may be combined or distributed as desired in various embodiments. Furthermore, such functionality may be embodied in whole or in part in firmware or hardware equivalents, such as integrated circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc. Certain data structures may be used to more effectively implement one or more aspects of the disclosed techniques, and such data structures are considered to be within the scope of the computer-executable instructions and computer-usable data described herein.
[0040] The disclosed aspects may, in some cases, be implemented in hardware, firmware, software, or any combination thereof. The disclosed aspects may also be implemented as instructions carried by or stored on one or more computer-readable media that may be read and executed by one or more processors. Such instructions may be referred to as computer program products. A computer-readable medium as described herein means any medium that can be accessed by a computing device. By way of example, and not limitation, computer-readable media may include computer storage media and communication media.
[0041] Computer storage media means any medium that can be used to store computer-readable information. By way of example and not limitation, computer storage media may include random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), digital video disc (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, and any other volatile or non-volatile removable or non-removable media implemented in any technology. Computer storage media excludes signals themselves and transitory forms of signal transmission.
[0042] A communication medium refers to any medium capable of communicating computer readable information. By way of example, and not limitation, communication media may include coaxial cables, fiber optic cables, air, or any other medium suitable for communicating electrical, optical, radio frequency (RF), infrared, acoustic, or other types of signals. Working Example
[0043] In the following, examples useful for understanding the technology disclosed in the present application are presented. The embodiment of the technology may include one or more of the examples described below and any combination thereof.
[0044] Example 1 is a test and measurement system comprising: one or more high voltage sources having a high voltage that is dangerous to a user; a backplane of a test and measurement device capable of using one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks, a power signal, and one or more slots configured to receive one or more modules; and one or more processors, the one or more processors being configured to execute a program that causes the one or more processors to perform the following processes: monitoring one or more signals from the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks; determining an operational state and a fault state of each of the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks without any involvement of the one or more high voltage sources; and verifying wiring of an interlock path between the test and measurement device and a user system.
[0045] Example 2 is the test and measurement system of Example 1, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to monitor signals from the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks includes a program that causes the one or more processors to perform the following processes: executing a module interlock test on a module interlock of any module inserted in the one or more slots and receiving a signal resulting from the module interlock test; executing a user path test and receiving a signal resulting from the user path test; executing an internal interlock test and receiving a signal resulting from the internal interlock test; executing an internal power supply and path test and receiving a signal resulting from the internal power supply and path test; and indicating that the test and measurement system has passed the test if the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power supply and path test all indicate pass.
[0046] Example 3 is a test and measurement system of Example 2, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that performs processing to indicate that the test and measurement system has failed when any of the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power supply and path test indicates a failure.
[0047] Example 4 is the test and measurement system of example 3, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that provides information regarding failed tests.
[0048] Example 5 is a test and measurement system of any of Examples 1 to 4, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks causes the one or more processors to perform a first test on a first interlock, a process of performing a second interlock test when the first interlock passes the first interlock test, and a process of enabling the test and measurement system when the second interlock passes the second interlock test.
[0049] Example 6 is the test and measurement system of any of Examples 1 to 5, further comprising an interface to a user system.
[0050] Example 7 is a test and measurement system of Example 6, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that causes the one or more processors to perform a process of monitoring one or more signals from the user system.
[0051] Example 8 is the test and measurement system of Example 7, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from the user system includes a program that causes the one or more processors to perform the following operations: performing a first interlock return test on an interlock return contact without powering on; if the interlock return signal passes the first interlock return test, supplying power to the path; performing a second interlock return test on the interlock return; if the interlock return passes the second interlock return test, checking a power supply status; and enabling the test and measurement system based on the power supply status.
[0052] Example 9 is a test and measurement system of Example 5, wherein the program that causes one or more processors to perform a process for enabling the test and measurement system based on a power supply status causes the one or more processors to perform a process for failing the test and measurement system if the power supply status is in a fault state.
[0053] Example 10 is the test and measurement system of any of examples 1 to 9, further comprising one or more modules each having an interlock.
[0054] Example 11 is the test and measurement system of Example 10, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that causes the one or more processors to perform a process of monitoring one or more signals from the one or more modules.
[0055] Example 12 is a test and measurement system of Example 11, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from the one or more modules causes the one or more processors to perform a first test on a first module interlock on a module among the one or more modules, a second test on a second module interlock on the module if the first module interlock passes the first test, and a process of enabling the test and measurement system if the second module interlock passes the second test.
[0056] Example 13 is a test and measurement system of any of Examples 1 to 12, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to process monitoring one or more signals from the one or more backplane interlocks causes the one or more processors to process monitoring one or more signals from an internal interlock relay.
[0057] Example 14 is a test and measurement system of Example 13, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from an internal interlock relay causes the one or more processors to perform the following processes: performing a user-operated internal interlock relay test after connecting a user circuit; applying maximum power to the internal interlock relay if the internal interlock passes the internal interlock relay test; performing a maximum power test on the internal interlock relay; disconnecting the user circuit; sending a reset signal to the internal interlock relay; and indicating that the internal interlock relay has passed if the internal interlock relay is reset.
[0058] Example 15 is the test and measurement system of Example 14, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that causes the one or more processors to perform processing to indicate that the internal interlock relay has failed when any of the user-operated internal interlock relay test, the maximum power test, or a reset fails.
[0059] Example 16 is a method for controlling an interlock system, comprising the steps of: performing a module interlock test on a module interlock of any module inserted into one or more slots; receiving a signal resulting from the module interlock test; performing a user path test; receiving a signal resulting from the user path test; performing an internal interlock test; receiving a signal resulting from the internal interlock test; performing an internal power supply and path test; receiving a signal resulting from the internal power supply and path test; and indicating that the interlock system is pass when the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power supply and path test all indicate pass.
[0060] Example 17 is a method for controlling the interlock system of Example 16, further comprising the step of energizing the interlock system if the interlock system passes the test.
[0061] Example 18 is a method for controlling the interlock system of either Example 16 or 17, further comprising a process for indicating that the interlock system has failed when any of the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power supply and path test indicates a failure.
[0062] Example 19 is a method for controlling the interlock system of example 18, further comprising a process for providing information about which test has failed.
[0063] In addition, the present description refers to specific features. It should be understood that the disclosure herein includes all possible combinations of those specific features. When a specific feature is disclosed in connection with a particular aspect or embodiment, that feature can also be used in connection with other aspects and embodiments, to the extent possible.
[0064] Furthermore, when the application refers to a method having two or more defined steps or processes, those defined steps or processes may be performed in any order or simultaneously, unless the context precludes such a possibility.
[0065] All features disclosed in the specification, claims, abstract and drawings, and all steps in any disclosed method or process, may be combined in any combination, except where at least some of such features or steps are mutually exclusive combinations. Each feature disclosed in the specification, abstract, claims and drawings may be replaced by an alternative feature serving the same, equivalent or similar purpose, unless expressly stated otherwise.
[0066] For convenience of illustration, specific embodiments of the invention have been illustrated and described, but it will be understood that various modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the invention should not be limited, except as by the appended claims. [Explanation of symbols]
[0067] 18 resistor 19 Contacts 30 Mainframe Backplane 32 Interlock power supply 34 Single Fault Detection Block 36 Relay KO 37 Backplane Interlock 38 module slots 40 Interlock Test (TST INT) 42 INTERLOCK_TEST (Interlock test) signal 44 INTERLOCK_STATUS (Interlock Status) Signal 46 Line 50 Digital Mainframe 52 Mainframe Digital Processing Unit 54 Contact 60 Modules 62 Relay 64 Relay 66 Single fault detection circuit 68 Module Functional Circuit 70 Fault detection control 72 Relay 74 Relay 90 Diode 92 Status Block 94 Power supply 96 Status Block 100 Interlock Relay 101 Bias resistor 102 Circuit 104 Comparator 105 resistor 110 Interlock Relay 111 Bias resistor 112 Circuit 114 Comparator 115 Resistor SSR Solid State Relay (Switch)
Claims
1. 1. A test and measurement system comprising: one or more high voltage sources having voltages that are dangerous to a user; one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks; A power signal; one or more slots configured to receive one or more modules; a backplane of a test and measurement device capable of using the One or more processors Equipped with the one or more processors monitoring one or more signals from the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks; determining the operational and fault conditions of each of said one or more backplane dual fault protection interlocks without any involvement of said one or more high voltage power supplies and verifying wiring of interlock paths between said test and measurement equipment and a user system; a test and measurement system configured to execute a program that causes the one or more processors to perform the steps of:
2. a program for causing the one or more processors to monitor signals from the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks, performing a module interlock test on a module interlock of any module inserted into the one or more slots and receiving a signal resulting from the module interlock test; performing a user path test and receiving a signal resulting from the user path test; performing an internal interlock test and receiving a signal resulting from the internal interlock test; performing internal power and path tests and receiving signals resulting from the internal power and path tests; indicating that the test and measurement system has passed the test if the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power and path test all indicate a pass; 2. The test and measurement system of claim 1, further comprising a program for causing said one or more processors to:
3. 3. The test and measurement system of claim 2, wherein the one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that performs processing to indicate that the test and measurement system has failed when any of the signals from the module interlock test, the user path test, the internal interlock test, and the internal power supply and path test indicate a failure.
4. a program for causing the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from the one or more backplane double fault protection interlocks, performing a first test on a first interlock; performing a second interlock test when the first interlock passes the first interlock test; enabling the test and measurement system when the second interlock passes the second interlock test; 2. The test and measurement system of claim 1, further comprising:
5. an interface to a user system; The one or more processors are further configured to execute a program that causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from the user system, the program comprising: performing a first interlock return test on the interlock return contacts without applying power; providing power to the path if the interlock return signal passes the first interlock return test; performing a second interlock return test on the interlock return; if the interlock return passes the second interlock return test, checking the power status; enabling the test and measurement system based on the power supply status; 2. The test and measurement system of claim 1, further comprising a program for causing said one or more processors to:
6. 5. The test and measurement system of claim 4, wherein the program that causes one or more processors to perform a process for enabling the test and measurement system based on the power supply status causes the one or more processors to perform a process for failing the test and measurement system if the power supply status is in a fault state.
7. 2. The test and measurement system of claim 1, wherein the program that causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from the one or more backplane interlocks causes the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from an internal interlock relay.
8. A program for causing the one or more processors to monitor one or more signals from an internal interlock relay, A process of performing a user-operated internal interlock relay test after connecting a user circuit; applying full power to the internal interlock relay if the internal interlock passes the internal interlock relay test; performing a maximum power test on the internal interlock relay; Disconnecting the user circuit; sending a reset signal to the internal interlock relay; indicating that the internal interlock relay has passed if the internal interlock relay is reset; 8. The test and measurement system of claim 7, further comprising one or more processors configured to perform the steps of:
9. 1. A method for controlling an interlock system, comprising: performing a module interlock test on the module interlocks of any modules inserted into one or more slots; receiving a signal resulting from said module interlock test; A process for performing a user path test; receiving a signal resulting from said user path test; A process for performing an internal interlock test; receiving a signal resulting from said internal interlock test; performing an internal power supply and path test; receiving signals resulting from the internal power supply and path test; indicating that the interlock system is pass when the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power and path test all indicate pass; A method for controlling an interlock system comprising:
10. 10. The method of claim 9, further comprising the step of indicating that the interlock system has failed if any of the signal from the module interlock test, the signal from the user path test, the signal from the internal interlock test, and the signal from the internal power and path test indicate a failure.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
At least partly electrically operated monitoring device for a motor vehicle
JP2023552101A
