Endpoint and protocol for trusted digital manufacturing

The DMTE system addresses DM cybersecurity issues by using a secure and untrusted controller setup with digital signatures and encryption to ensure secure and reliable digital manufacturing processes, enhancing trust and compliance in DM systems.

JP2024163250AInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-21ブレイト アレックス +4
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2024152189
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2020-05-05
Filing Date
2024-09-04
Publication Date
2024-11-21
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Digital manufacturing (DM) systems face significant cybersecurity challenges due to untrusted machines and uncontrolled data replication, leading to vulnerabilities in traceability, intellectual property protection, and quality control, with existing methods failing to establish secure and reliable digital feedback loops.

Method used

Implementing a digital manufacturing trusted endpoint (DMTE) with a secure controller connected to a wide area network and an untrusted controller for local communication, ensuring data integrity and authenticity through digital signatures and encryption, while maintaining electrical isolation between the two controllers.

Benefits of technology

The DMTE system enhances trust in DM processes by ensuring secure data handling, maintaining data integrity, and enabling reliable on-demand manufacturing with traceability and compliance verification, reducing risks of unauthorized data modification and ensuring quality control.

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Abstract

To provide an endpoint and protocol for trusted digital manufacturing.SOLUTION: An endpoint for trusted fabrication is provided, the endpoint including at least one secure controller configured for connection to a wide area network, and at least one untrusted controller configured for local communication, where the endpoint is configured for connection to a fabricator and further configured to receive digitally-signed data specifying at least one item for manufacture, verify the digitally-signed data, and direct the fabricator to manufacture the at least one item after verifying the digitally signed data.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] (CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS) This application claims the benefit of and priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 63 / 020,191, filed May 5, 2020, the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference as if set forth herein in its entirety.

[0002] The embodiments described herein relate to methods and systems for trusted on-demand manufacturing, and more particularly, but not exclusively, to methods and systems for verifying digitally signed data at a processing machine prior to manufacturing an item. [Background technology]

[0003] The supply chain for modern processing methods such as additive manufacturing (AM) and computer numerical control (CNC) machining includes both physical raw materials and digital data elements. The digital data elements include configurations and low-level manufacturing instructions for individual machinery, which in whole or in large part control the dimensional, mechanical, and sometimes material properties of the items being produced. Digital manufacturing (DM) encompasses these highly data-driven manufacturing and processing processes. A familiar example of DM is 3D printing, where a computer (digital) model of an item is directly processed or "printed" on a 3D printer. To produce a particular item, a manufacturer needs data elements for that item and compatible DM machines; similarly, any changes to the data elements will result in changes to the item being produced, and such changes may be unclear to the user.

[0004] From a security perspective, DM is large scale and has a larger attack surface than traditional manufacturing. New attack surface vectors in DM include disclosure or modification of data files (e.g., CAD models, AM artifacts, G-code, machine parameters, etc.). Any modification to data elements can also make it difficult to enforce process controls to ensure, for example, that the material, mechanical, and functional properties of a given part are substantially the same and invariant to when, where, or by whom it is manufactured.

[0005] Traceability (or a full-blown digital twin) is important for some parts (e.g., in aircraft manufacturing), which means that for a given instance of a part, a manufacturer needs to be able to determine when and where it was processed, who made it, what design files were used, what inspection criteria were applied, etc. Capturing and retrieving this type of information is a well-established process for conventionally manufactured parts, but the time and space decoupling of the design, processing, and actuation of digitally and additively manufactured parts can make traceability more difficult.

[0006] Currently, DM machines themselves are difficult to solve from a cybersecurity perspective: they contain sophisticated computer systems that are typically designed for stand-alone or industrial / commercial network deployments, but are not designed (or necessarily intended) to meet the rigorous cybersecurity certifications typically required for network deployments in defense, medical, aerospace, and other safety-critical environments, and / or are more generally untrusted. The computer systems themselves, if connected to an internal network, can be a threat vector.

[0007] As a result, in many classified environments, DM machines are "air-gapped" from classified networks and DM artifacts (data) are transported via read-only media (e.g., CD ROMs). More generally, even in less stringent cybersecurity regulatory contexts, uncontrolled duplication of DM artifacts is a vector for industrial espionage, sabotage, disclosure of trade secrets, etc., and can lead to circumvention of quality control processes, policy / regulatory controls, etc. Specifically, vulnerabilities introduced by uncontrolled duplication of DM data and isolated DM machines include privacy, authenticity, control, readiness, agility, and convenience. If not physically secured or destroyed, malicious actors could gain access to the data on the media. For example, a security breach on a user's computer could allow an attacker to modify DM / AM artifacts, leading to, for example, in-use part defects. Well-intentioned users could "tweak" or modify DM artifacts, thereby compromising process control. Currently, there is no secure way to digitally close the feedback loop (e.g., between conversion and the entire production process) for traceability, intellectual property (IP) protection, quality analysis, etc. The process itself is cumbersome and inconvenient for the user compared to, for example, a user clicking "print" in a web portal and printing the part on any certified machine in the world, similar to what a user may do with a network-connected printer.

[0008] From a commercial perspective, DM would enable a new marketplace where users would be able to purchase license rights to process items on their own machinery rather than buying pre-made items. However, instead of delivering physical items, the seller would distribute data (similar to licensed software). The feasibility of commercializing such a marketplace would depend on the enforcement of contractual provisions such as quantity limits or redistribution of DM data in the digital ecosystem, which would require strong trust relationships and certain other certainties in the process of data distribution, processing, and data removal (release of licensed content upon expiration of the license rights). However, as discussed above, DM / AM machines themselves are generally untrusted, thus requiring the mechanism to extend trust from the DM data source to the DM machine, which would require minimal trust in the DM machine and its users. Thus, there is a need for a method and system for improving DM machines and collating instructions to process items. Summary of the Invention [Means for solving the problem]

[0009] This Summary is provided to introduce some of the concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description section. This Summary is not intended to identify or exclude key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.

[0010] According to one aspect, an embodiment relates to an endpoint for trusted processing. In some embodiments, the endpoint comprises at least one secure controller configured for connection to a wide area network and at least one untrusted controller configured for local communication, the endpoint configured for connection to a processing machine and further configured to receive digitally signed data defining at least one item for production, verify the digitally signed data, and instruct the processing machine to produce the at least one item after verifying the digitally signed data.

[0011] In some embodiments, the secure controller is configured to be unmodifiable by the user.

[0012] In some embodiments, the endpoint is further configured to generate a receipt upon completion of the production of the at least one item.

[0013] In some embodiments, the machine is a 3D printer.

[0014] In some embodiments, the untrusted controller is configured to be modifiable by the user.

[0015] In some embodiments, the endpoints are network connected.

[0016] In some embodiments, the digitally signed data is also encrypted. In some embodiments, the digitally signed data is encrypted using a key associated with the endpoint.

[0017] In some embodiments, the at least one secure controller and the at least one untrusted controller are electrically isolated from each other.

[0018] In some embodiments, the endpoint and the processor are collocated.

[0019] In another aspect, embodiments relate to a method for trusted on-demand manufacturing. In some embodiments, the method includes receiving digitally signed data describing at least one item for manufacturing at an endpoint connected to a processing machine, verifying the digitally signed data at the endpoint, and manufacturing the at least one item using the digitally signed data after verifying the digitally signed data, where the endpoint comprises at least one secure controller and at least one untrusted controller.

[0020] In some embodiments, the digitally signed data is encrypted using a public key associated with the endpoint.

[0021] In some embodiments, the method further comprises checking the manufactured items for compliance with at least one parameter defined in the digitally signed data.

[0022] In some embodiments, the secure controller is configured to be unmodifiable by the user.

[0023] In some embodiments, the untrusted controller is configured to be modifiable by the user.

[0024] In some embodiments, the endpoints are network connected.

[0025] In some embodiments, the digitally signed data is also encrypted. In some embodiments, the digitally signed data is encrypted using a key associated with the endpoint.

[0026] In some embodiments, the at least one secure controller and the at least one untrusted controller are electrically isolated from each other.

[0027] In some embodiments, the endpoint and the processor are collocated. The present invention provides, for example, the following: (Item 1) An endpoint for trusted processing, the endpoint comprising: at least one secure controller configured for connection to a wide area network; At least one untrusted controller configured for local communication; Equipped with the endpoint is configured for connection to a processing machine; receiving digitally signed data specifying at least one item for manufacture; verifying the digitally signed data; instructing said converting machine to manufacture said at least one item after verifying said digitally signed data; The endpoint is further configured to: (Item 2) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, wherein the secure controller is configured to be unmodifiable by a user. (Item 3) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, further configured to generate a receipt upon completion of the production of the at least one item. (Item 4) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, wherein the processing machine is a 3D printer. (Item 5) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, wherein the untrusted controller is configured to be modifiable by a user. (Item 6) Item 1, wherein the endpoint is network-connected. (Item 7) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, wherein the digitally signed data is also encrypted. (Item 8) 8. The endpoint of claim 7, wherein the digitally signed data is encrypted using a key associated with the endpoint. (Item 9) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, wherein the at least one secure controller and the at least one untrusted controller are electrically isolated from each other. (Item 10) 2. The endpoint of claim 1, wherein the endpoint and the processing machine are collocated. (Item 11) 1. A method for trusted on-demand manufacturing, the method comprising: receiving, at an endpoint connected to the converting machine, digitally signed data describing at least one item for production; verifying the digitally signed data at the endpoint; verifying the digitally signed data and then manufacturing the at least one item using the digitally signed data; Including, The method, wherein the endpoints comprise at least one secure controller and at least one untrusted controller. (Item 12) Item 12. The method of item 11, wherein the digitally signed data is encrypted using a public key associated with the endpoint. (Item 13) 12. The method of claim 11, further comprising checking the manufactured item for compliance with at least one parameter defined in the digitally signed data. (Item 14) Item 12. The method of item 11, wherein the secure controller is configured to be unmodifiable by a user. (Item 15) Item 12. The method of item 11, wherein the untrusted controller is configured to be modifiable by a user. (Item 16) Item 12. The method of item 11, wherein the endpoints are network connected. (Item 17) Item 12. The method of item 11, wherein the digitally signed data is also encrypted. (Item 18) Item 18. The method of item 17, wherein the digitally signed data is encrypted using a key associated with the endpoint. (Item 19) Item 12. The method of item 11, wherein the at least one secure controller and the at least one untrusted controller are electrically isolated from each other. (Item 20) 12. The method of claim 11, wherein the endpoint and the processor are collocated. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0028] Non-limiting and non-exhaustive embodiments of the present disclosure are described with reference to the following figures, in which like reference numerals refer to like parts throughout the various views unless otherwise specified.

[0029] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 depicts a block diagram of a digital manufacturing trusted endpoint, according to one embodiment.

[0030] [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 depicts a flowchart of a method for trusted on-demand manufacturing, according to one embodiment.

[0031] [Diagram 3]FIG. 3 depicts a digital manufacturing trusted endpoint with air gap traversal according to one embodiment.

[0032] [Figure 4] FIG. 4 depicts a flowchart of a method for digital manufacturing transactions, according to one embodiment.

[0033] [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 depicts a block diagram of a networked process at a trusted endpoint in digital manufacturing, according to one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0034] Various embodiments are described more fully below with reference to the accompanying drawings, which form a part of this specification, showing specific exemplary embodiments. However, the concepts of the present disclosure may be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as being limited to the embodiments described herein, but rather, these embodiments are provided as part of a thorough and complete disclosure to fully convey the scope of the concepts, techniques, and implementations of the present disclosure to those skilled in the art. The embodiments may be practiced as a method, a system, or a device. Thus, the embodiments may take the form of a hardware implementation, a completely software implementation, or an implementation combining software and hardware aspects. Therefore, the following detailed description should not be taken in a limiting sense.

[0035] References in the specification to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment" mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment is included in at least one example implementation or technique according to this disclosure. Appearances of the phrase "in one embodiment" in various places in the specification do not necessarily all refer to the same embodiment.

[0036] Moreover, the terminology used within the specification has been selected primarily for readability and instructional purposes, and may not have been selected to precisely describe or delineate the disclosed subject matter. Thus, the present disclosure is intended to be illustrative and non-limiting with respect to the scope of the concepts discussed herein.

[0037] Embodiments herein are directed to devices, hardware, systems, methods, protocols, and other inventions related to secure and / or transactional digital manufacturing, handling of digital manufacturing data elements, and extending robust trust, policy, control, and traceability to manufacturing and operations performed on untrusted or untrusted equipment and requiring minimal trust from users operating the equipment. In security terms, embodiments implement measures to ensure data privacy (INFOSEC) and authenticity and integrity of data files. Some embodiments are directed to methods and devices for trusted on-demand manufacturing.

[0038] 1 depicts a block diagram of a digital manufacturing trusted endpoint 100, according to one embodiment. In some embodiments, the endpoint 100 may be a trusted endpoint. In some embodiments, the endpoint 100 may be a DM endpoint.

[0039] In some embodiments, a method extends trust from the DM data source (DMDS) 110 to the DM equipment. In some embodiments, the equipment may constitute the endpoint 100, referred to herein as the digital manufacturing trusted endpoint (DMTE) 105. In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 enables DM processing transactions, including secure, bidirectional, transactional communication between the DMDS 110 and the DMTE 105. The DMTE 105 facilitates two methods for DM processing transactions: a networked method (i.e., network connectivity exists between the DMDS 110 and the DMTE 105) and an air-gapped method (i.e., not networked). In some embodiments, the method of conveying data from the DMDS 110 to the DMTE 105 and vice versa is the only essential difference between these methods (shown in more detail in FIGS. 3 and 5).

[0040] In some embodiments, the term "DMDS 110" may refer to a system or service configured to store, manage, aggregate, sell, or otherwise provide DM data. In some embodiments, a DMTE 105 may be associated with a single DMDS 110, for example, within an organization. In some embodiments, a DMTE 105 may be associated with multiple DMDSs 110.

[0041] In some embodiments, the DMDS 110 (or its components and / or ancillary services) may include a user interface (not shown), such as a web portal and touch screen, that allows a user to, among other things, request processing of items at a DM machine 120 via the DMTE 105. In some embodiments, the DMDS 110 includes a digital manufacturing transaction manager (DMTM) that is involved in DM processing transactions and, in some embodiments, contains or communicates with a controller 125, which is a component that communicates with the networked DMTE 105. In some embodiments, the DMDS 110 may also interface with or communicate with external (non-local) DM data sources, for example, to obtain third-party data elements for processing. In some embodiments, the controller 125 may be external to the DMTE 105 and separate from the DMDS 110. In some embodiments, the controller 125 is a component of the DMDS 110.

[0042] Some embodiments use strong cryptography as the primary mechanism for establishing and verifying trust between the DMDS 110 and the DMTE 105. For purposes of disclosure herein, public key cryptography and public key infrastructure (PKI) terminology will be used to describe logical cryptographic operations. As will be understood by those skilled in the art, the embodiments do not depend on any particular cryptosystem or its implementation, so any cryptosystem that provides equivalent or stronger assurances may be used. In some embodiments, the ultimate source of trust (the origin of the trust chain) in a PKI is a set of root certificate authorities. In some embodiments, it may be assumed, without loss of generality, that at least within a given administrative domain, the DMDS 110 and the DMTE 105 are configured to trust certificates and other material signed or issued by each other's root certificate authorities (or equivalent).

[0043] Both methods (network-connected and air-gapped) include the following non-normative logical sequence of events, some of which may be optional, some of which may or may not depend on the order of execution according to some embodiments.

[0044] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may comprise a trusted computer platform 130 that is at least one of electrically isolated and galvanically isolated with an isolation barrier 135 from the connected DM machine 120. As will be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art, in some embodiments, the electrical or galvanic isolation barrier may be implemented using, for example, opto-isolators, inductive coupling, coupling transformers, or other methods or components. In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may comprise a "trusted side" 130 and an "untrusted side" 140. In some embodiments, the trusted side 130 is isolated from the untrusted side 140 with an isolation barrier. In some embodiments, at least one controller 127 on the trusted side 130 is electrically isolated from at least one controller 150 on the untrusted side 140 with an isolation barrier. In some embodiments, the secure controller 127 on the trusted side 130 is configured to be unmodifiable by a user. In some embodiments, the unsecured controller 150 on the untrusted side 140 is configured to be modifiable by a user.

[0045] Computing elements on the trusted side 130 communicate 145 with the DM machine 120 via communications between a secure controller 127, such as a microprocessor or field programmable gate array (FPGA), and an untrusted controller 150. In some embodiments, this arrangement provides isolation of the data and control paths, for example, preventing the DM machine 120 from "breaking through" to the untrusted side 140.

[0046] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may be a standalone self-contained embedded system or device. The DMTE 105 may comprise at least two components: a trusted side 130 and an untrusted side 140. In some embodiments, the trusted side 130 may comprise at least one interface 183 for mounting DM packages, a user interface 189, and trusted computer resources, such as a secure controller 127, a cryptographic key storage device 173, and a persistent local storage device 152.

[0047] In some embodiments, an untrusted side 140 with an interface configured to be connected to at least one external DM machine 120 may communicate 145 with a trusted side 130 through an isolation barrier and an untrusted controller 150, such as a microcontroller or FPGA, configured to communicate with a secure controller 127, such as an FPGA or microcontroller, at the trusted side 130. In some embodiments, the secure controller 127 may be configured for connection to a wide area network (WAN) or a local area network (LAN). In some embodiments, the untrusted controller 150 may be configured for local communication.

[0048] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may support being connected to at most one DM machine 120. In some embodiments, there is a one-to-one association between the DMTE 105 and the DM machine 120. In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may be configured to connect to and operate any DM machine 120 that supports one or more of the DMTE's external untrusted side interfaces linked to the untrusted side 140. In some embodiments, this connection may require any modifications to the physical hardware of the DMTE 105 or to the firmware 138 or software of the trusted side 130 of the DMTE 105. In some embodiments, this connection may not require any modifications to the hardware, software, and / or configuration of the DM machine 120.

[0049] In some embodiments, the trusted computing platform 130 is at least one of electrically and galvanically isolated with an isolation barrier 135 from the untrusted computing platform 140. In some embodiments, the connections on the untrusted computing platform 140 may be earth referenced, so that the trusted computing platform 130 may remain floating with respect to ground. In some embodiments, the isolation withstand voltage of the isolation barrier 135 may be at least 5 kV.

[0050] In some embodiments, communication between the trusted and untrusted computing platforms 130 and 140 may use a low-level serial or parallel interface, such as Low Voltage Differential Signaling (LVDS), that is only capable of exchanging application-level data. This interface may be an Isolated Data Channel (IDC) 160 and may be configured to support duplex and / or half-duplex operation.

[0051] In some embodiments, the IDC prevents untrusted computing platforms 140 from accessing memory, storage, and control functions on trusted computing platform 130. In some embodiments, the IDC is not used to bridge or convey network traffic to or from untrusted computing platforms 140.

[0052] In some embodiments, other electrical or galvanically isolated logic level signals may be passed between the controllers 127 and 150 of the trusted side 130 and untrusted side 140, but never couple signals from external DM machines or interfaces of the external untrusted side 140 across the isolation barrier 135.

[0053] Some embodiments may use radio frequency / electromagnetic interference (RF / EMI) shielding surrounding the untrusted side 140 to provide isolation against radiated interference to the outside of the trusted side 130 and DMTE 105. In some embodiments, such isolation is at least 80 dBm. Some embodiments may use additional RF / EMI shielding, for example, around the trusted side 130, power supplies, etc. Some embodiments do not assume the presence of a ground connection.

[0054] In some embodiments, the DMTE may employ at least one form of tamper resistance 170 that, at a minimum, protects all key material and volatile memory. In some embodiments, the isolation barrier 135 may be configured to include or surround both the trusted side 130 and the untrusted side 140 of the DMTE 105 (except for the external interfaces).

[0055] In some embodiments, the protocols, interfaces, formats, and semantics for DMDS-DMTE communication, DMTE PKI and key management, DM packages, and DM processing receipts are fully defined and standardized.

[0056] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include a battery-backed real-time clock (RTC) or equivalent (not shown). Some embodiments may use network-based clock synchronization, such as GPS, or other clock synchronization methods.

[0057] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may be physically disposed within the DM machine, for example as a plug-in card or optional module. In some embodiments, some essential differences between such embodiments and a "standalone" DMTE are factors in the type and format of the DMTE itself and the external interfaces of the untrusted side of the DMTE; the DM machine is still treated as untrusted, and the interfaces of the trusted side 130 of the DMTE, including the user interface, are external to the DM machine 120, as described below.

[0058] In some embodiments, the DMTE may comprise at least one trusted side external interface. In some embodiments, all external interfaces connected to the trusted side 130 may be clearly marked as such and may be located sufficiently far away from the untrusted side external interfaces 180.

[0059] In some embodiments, DMTE 105 may include at least one 10 / 100 / 1,000 Base-T Ethernet interface 181 connected to trusted side 130 and exposed via a standard RJ-45 jack. In some embodiments, Ethernet interface 181 may support auto-duplex, auto-MDI / MDX, and auto-negotiation.

[0060] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include a removable media 183, such as a built-in trusted DVD / CD ROM drive, or other optical or magnetic storage removable media drive. In some embodiments, this drive may be field replaceable without special training, and replacement of the drive does not activate or trigger the anti-tamper mechanism.

[0061] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include a trusted, externally accessible reader (a "flash card reader") for one or more types of non-USB, flash memory removable media 183 (e.g., SD card, CompactFlash, etc.). In some embodiments that include a flash card reader, the embodiment may take measures to ensure that such media cannot be written to (e.g., by permanently deasserting write validity).

[0062] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include a trusted, externally accessible USB host port (not shown) that is restricted in hardware for use with keyboard and mouse HID devices, with all other device profiles / types permanently disabled (in hardware). In some embodiments, the use of an external keyboard and / or mouse is not required for normal operation in some embodiments.

[0063] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may have a display that is typically 6 inches or more in width and height, with a resolution greater than or equal to 1,024×768. In some embodiments, the display is implemented by exposing a trusted VGA, DVI, HDMI, DisplayPort, or other display output interface 189. In some embodiments, the display is implemented as a buried display. In some embodiments, the buried display is IP65 rated (environmentally rated) or higher. In some embodiments, the buried display is field replaceable without special training, and replacement of the buried display does not activate or trigger the anti-tamper mechanism.

[0064] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include a user input mechanism comprising a touch screen and / or soft keys located on the perimeter of the embedded display (if applicable) in the user interface 189. In some embodiments, if soft keys are implemented, a minimum of four soft keys are located adjacent each edge (left, right, top, and bottom) of the display. In some embodiments, the embedded touch screen must comply with other requirements for embedded displays.

[0065] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include other buttons, switches, lights, annunciators, general purpose input / outputs (GPIOs), etc., coupled to the trusted party as needed.

[0066] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include a reader (not shown) for a physical authentication token such as a smart card; in these embodiments, the DMTE includes a trusted side built-in reader or includes provision for an external reader connected directly to the DMTE 105 via a dedicated trusted side connector / interface (not shown).

[0067] For security purposes, the DMTE 105 does not expose serial, JTAG, programming, or other means of direct control or modification of the DMTE's hardware, firmware, and / or software from outside the tamper detection boundary (i.e., accessing such interfaces would trigger tamper detection). In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may be configured to expose a separate, dedicated external, trusted side interface (not shown) to perform equivalent or similar functions if, and only if, use of such interfaces requires strong authentication, where the DMTE's Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 173 may be the authority source.

[0068] The trusted party 130 may include a security system such as a TPM 173 or equivalent. In some embodiments, the TPM is responsible for "key ring" functions such as securely storing key material, generating key material, and may optionally securely store other information such as certain system configuration information. In some embodiments, privileged operations on the DMTE 105, such as sensitive configurations, firmware upgrades, etc., require authentication from the TPM 173 or equivalent. In some embodiments, the TPM 173 may be integrated within the trusted party processor 127. In some embodiments, the TPM 173 may include one or more components that are distinct from the trusted party processor 127.

[0069] In some embodiments, DMTEs 105 are each assigned its DMTE ID, which is a globally unique identifier. The DMTE ID can be used by external systems to look up the individual DMTE's corresponding public key, certificate, or equivalent. DMTEs 105 each have the ability to verify digital signatures, certificates, etc., presented to it using only locally available information (i.e., without browsing external resources). In some embodiments, DMTE firmware is configured to be digitally signed. DMTEs 105 may be designed so that they will not run or install firmware that is not signed, firmware with an invalid signature, or firmware that is not signed by a trusted entity.

[0070] The trusted side of the DMTE 105 may include a highly reliable flash / solid state memory (or equivalent) 152 to be used as persistent storage. In some embodiments, the capacity of this persistent storage is at least 32 GB. In some embodiments, the contents of this storage are encrypted at device installation. In some embodiments, the key material associated with the encryption is contained within or managed by the TPM 173.

[0071] In some embodiments, the entire untrusted and trusted sides 140, 130 of the DMTE 105, including firmware, programmable hardware, hardware, software, source code, etc., may be audited, vetted, and certified to one or more industry and / or government standards for hardware and software security.

[0072] In some embodiments, some DMTE 105 embodiments may assume that any connected DM equipment 120 is untrusted and potentially hostile. The DMTE 105 hardware and software are designed such that an attacker or adversary cannot gain control of, access or modify data from the untrusted side 140, or otherwise compromise the trusted side of the DMTE 105, except to the extent that behavior of the untrusted side 140, such as an electrical malfunction, may cause loss or denial of service to the DMTE 105 itself. As will be understood by those skilled in the art, in the context of cybersecurity, the nouns "attacker" and "adversary" are interpreted broadly to include a human being, organization, machine, or other automated device.

[0073] In some embodiments, the trusted party 130 has the ability to reboot, reset, and reflash / reload the firmware (or reprogrammable logic) of the untrusted party 140.

[0074] In some embodiments, the untrusted party 140 does not contain any non-volatile memory or persistent storage that is writable by the untrusted party 140 and / or cannot be forcibly and reliably erased or overwritten by the trusted party 130.

[0075] In some embodiments, the only assertions of trust on the untrusted side 140 of the DMTE 105 and attached DM machine 120 are that DM instructions, configurations, and commands sent by the trusted side 130 to the untrusted side 140 will be faithfully communicated to the DM machine 120, that the DM machine 120 will faithfully apply and correctly execute the instructions, configurations, and commands and provide truthful information / feedback in response to information queries (e.g., job progress, firmware versions, materials loaded, etc.), and that the untrusted side 140 will faithfully communicate the information / feedback to the trusted side 130. Any DM machine 120 that cannot satisfy this assertion may be unusable for any application that requires or expects any form of trustworthy processing.

[0076] Certain aspects of policy enforcement and control, such as validation of processed parts, may assume that authorized users (also referred to herein as "operators") interacting with the DMTE 105 are trustworthy and acting in good faith. That is, any aspect of policy or enforcement or control whose accuracy or integrity depends on user input must implicitly assume that the user is trustworthy and acting in good faith. In some embodiments, automated quality control or inspection may be leveraged to reduce reliance on operator trustworthiness.

[0077] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 never uploads or copies DM data from the DM data source 110 to persistent storage on the DM machine 120 unless it is required for the DM machine 120 to function and the policy / control metadata in the DM package (securely provided by the DMDS 110) explicitly allows such uploading or copying.

[0078] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 stores the encrypted DM package (or parts thereof) on the trusted persistent local storage 152. In some embodiments, any data stored on the trusted persistent local storage 152 may be permanently deleted upon closure of the transaction.

[0079] In some embodiments, unencrypted DM package content (other than specific metadata) is never written to persistent storage 152. In some embodiments, such content may be stored in volatile memory under conditions that ensure it is permanently erased or overwritten upon completion of a transaction.

[0080] In some embodiments, the DMTE may generate a receipt for the completed transaction. In some embodiments, the receipt may include information related to the processed parts (quantities, quality control data, etc.), the operator (user), and / or other information as required to satisfy policy, control, and / or contractual warranties. In some embodiments, the receipt may include encrypted content.

[0081] In some embodiments, the DMTEs 105 are each configured to store digitally signed receipts in persistent storage 152 for a minimum period of time, typically at least 180 days. During this time, authorized users can read and view issued receipts and, if desired, upload them to the DMDS 110 or other authorized destinations.

[0082] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may not contain an integrated wireless transceiver (e.g., 802.11 or Bluetooth), unless the transceiver is unavoidably embedded within other components (e.g., a system-on-chip integrated circuit), with all radio frequency (RF) inputs and outputs permanently tied to signal ground, and completely contained within the tamper detection boundary 170.

[0083] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 includes an untrusted side external interface 180 for connecting the DM machine 120. In some embodiments, the external interface 180 that is connected to the untrusted side 140 may be clearly marked as such and may be located sufficiently away from the untrusted side external interfaces (e.g., 189).

[0084] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may have an untrusted, 2-wire or 4-wire RS232 serial interface 182, which may be exposed via a 9-pin D-style connector (not shown). In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may have an untrusted, 4-wire RS485 serial interface 182. In some embodiments, if implemented, the RS485 interface 182 may operate in 2-wire (half-duplex) and 4-wire (full-duplex) modes.

[0085] The DMTE 105 may have an untrusted 10 / 100 Base-T Ethernet interface 129 exposed via an RJ-45 jack. In some embodiments, this interface 129 is configured to support auto-negotiation of speed, MDI / MDX, and duplex. In some embodiments, this interface 129 may not be connected, bridged, or otherwise associated with the trusted Ethernet 181 or other trusted network interfaces. Some embodiments optionally support 1,000 Base-T Ethernet.

[0086] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may have an untrusted side USB 2.0 (or later) host interface 131 exposed via a Type-A or Type-C female jack (not shown).

[0087] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include an untrusted side USB 2.0 (or later) device interface 131 exposed via a Type B or Type C female jack (not shown). In some embodiments, the USB host interface implementation may also enable or be reconfigured for device mode operation, in which case the same interface may be used for both host and device modes.

[0088] In some embodiments, the DMTE 105 may include at least four untrusted, single-ended general purpose input / output (GPIO) 137 logic level connections; if included, this interface is typically exposed via a five-terminal Phoenix style terminal block (or equivalent), with the fifth pin connected to a separate logic level ground (0V).

[0089] FIG. 2 depicts a flowchart of a method for trusted on-demand manufacturing 200, according to one embodiment.

[0090] In some embodiments, a user requests the processing of a specific item on a particular DM machine controlled by the DMTE (step 210). In some embodiments, the request may specify certain parameters of the item to be produced, such as material, quantity, etc. If the request is permitted according to the parameters set in the DMTE, a new DM transaction is initiated. In some embodiments, the request may not be permitted according to parameters set in the DMTE, such as the method of producing a weapon. In such a case, if the DMTE recognizes the request as an impermissible request, the DM transaction request will be terminated.

[0091] In some embodiments, after the request is granted, the DMDS assembles a DM package for the specific item to be processed on the DM machine (step 220). In some embodiments, the DM package may include processing instructions such as G-code, as well as control / policy assertions such as machine configuration, maximum quantities, etc.

[0092] In some embodiments, the DMDS digitally signs the DM package with its signature certificate (or equivalent), step 230. In some embodiments, this signature is an assertion that the DM package originates from the specific DMDS.

[0093] In some embodiments, the DMDS encrypts the DM package (step 240). In some embodiments, this encryption may be used to ensure data privacy over the contents of the DM package. In some embodiments, the DMDS may encrypt at least one of the DM packages, or signed content therein, using the DMTE's public key (or equivalent). In some embodiments, the DMDS may not encrypt the DM package.

[0094] In some embodiments, the DM package is conveyed to the DMTE, and optionally the DM package is decrypted and verified (step 250). In some embodiments, the DMTE may verify the digital signature of the DM package and the digital signature of any signed content. In some embodiments, if at least one of the decryption or signature verification fails (step 265), a receipt indicating the request failure is generated and conveyed back to the DMDS (step 270).

[0095] In some embodiments, responsive to successful decryption and signature verification (step 255), the DMTE may initiate processing of the tangible item (step 260). In some embodiments, the DMTE may collaborate with an operator (user) to initiate processing.

[0096] In some embodiments, each processed instance of a concrete item is matched, and the DMTE records whether or not the match was passed (step 280).

[0097] When the quantity specified in the DM package is exhausted (in the case of a specific item being matched and accepted), or upon an operator request to terminate processing of the DM package, or upon other completion of the DM package, the DMTE generates a receipt for processing of the DM package, which is conveyed back to the DMDS (step 290).

[0098] Upon receiving a valid receipt for the DM package, the DMDS completes and closes the transaction (step 295).

[0099] 3 depicts a DMTE 305 having an air gap traverse 310, according to one embodiment 300. In some embodiments, the DMTE 305 and a processing machine, such as a DM machine 320, may be collocated.

[0100] In some embodiments, the signed and encrypted DM package may be downloaded by the user 325 at the interface 330, written to a removable medium 335 such as a CD / DVD ROM, and transported across the air gap 310 to the DMTE 305. In some embodiments, the DM package may be physically transported. In some embodiments, the DMTE 305 may process the requested items at the DM machine 320 and then generate a receipt 345 that is physically transported across the air gap 310. In some embodiments, the DM machine may be a 3D printer. In some embodiments, the receipt 345 may be a QR code.

[0101] In some embodiments, each DM package assembled by DMDS 350 may comprise a globally unique transaction identifier. In some embodiments, this identifier may be in the form of a Type 4 UUID (RFC4112). In some embodiments, this identifier may comprise a UTC timestamp with one second precision.

[0102] In some embodiments, the receipt 345 may be digitally signed by the DMTE 305. In some embodiments, a value in the receipt 345 may be encrypted by the DMTE 305, for example, under the public key of the DMDS, in which case a second digital signature may also be included on the receipt 345. In some embodiments, at least one receipt 345 may be partially or fully encrypted. In some embodiments, the receipt 345 may include the transaction identifier UUID of the corresponding unencrypted DM package.

[0103] In some embodiments, the receipt 345 may be persisted in persistent storage 360 ​​on the DMTE 305 .

[0104] In some embodiments, unless explicitly allowed by the DM package's policy / control metadata, the DMTE 305 will not accept a DM package that has a transaction identifier UUID that matches any DM package for which the DMTE 305 has issued a receipt; one skilled in the art will recognize this as a form of defense against replay attacks.

[0105] In most embodiments, the stored receipt 345 may be viewable on a display 370 associated with the DMTE 305. In some embodiments, the display 370 may be collocated on the DMTE 305. In some embodiments, the stored receipt 345 may be viewable as at least one of a QR code, a PDF417 2D barcode, or other machine-readable graphic format. In some embodiments, the operator may be able to print a hardcopy receipt in the same format.

[0106] In some embodiments, for air-gapped transactions, the DMT The E305 presents a receipt 345 on its display 370 and requests user confirmation (i.e., confirmation that the receipt was captured) prior to approval of the subsequent air-gapped transaction. In a networked transaction, the digital content of the receipt is transmitted over the network to the DMDS 350. In some embodiments, the digital content may be transmitted in alphanumeric or binary format.

[0107] In some embodiments, the DMDS 350 may expose an API that receives the receipt in the form of an image (e.g., a digital photo of a 2D barcode). In some embodiments, the DMDS 350 may expose an API that receives the receipt in the form of a binary or string, e.g., the decoded contents of the receipt.

[0108] In some embodiments, the cross-platform mobile application comprises: It may be made available to the user so that, using a mobile device with a digital camera, the user can photograph or scan the receipt and upload it to the DMDS 350 or other authorized system.

[0109] In some embodiments, the receipt 345, or other non-machine-machine interaction, used for the air-gapped transaction 300 may take forms other than that of a 2D barcode, image, or equivalent. For example, the receipt 345 may be presented as a string of characters that a user rewrites and transmits to the DMDS 350. In some embodiments, the data in the receipt 345 may be securely transmitted from the DMTE 305 to the DMDS 350 in a one-way manner and without direct connectivity between the DMTE 305 and the DMDS 350 (i.e., across the air gap 310).

[0110] In some embodiments, the DMTE 305 may further comprise a printer 385, or printing device, connected to the trusted side; in some embodiments, the printer 385 is integrated within the DMTE 305, and in some embodiments, the printer 385 is external to the DMTE 305 and connected to an interface provided by the trusted side. In embodiments having a printer 385, the printer 385 may be used to print a (physical paper) receipt 345 for transmission across the air gap 310. In some embodiments, the printer 385 is also used to print hard copies of other information, such as test results.

[0111] In some embodiments, when a user sends a receipt to the DMDS 350 for an air-gapped 310 transaction, this transmission confirms that the removable media 335 and any copies of its contents have been securely destroyed or erased. In some embodiments, DM packages stored on the removable media 335 may be strongly encrypted.

[0112] In some embodiments, upon issuance of the receipt 345, the DMTE 305 may permanently erase the DM package and any content (except for content that may be contained within a receipt for the DM package) from all local storage 360 ​​on the DMTE 305 (except removable media, which is read-only).

[0113] In some embodiments, DMTE 305 has the ability to receive and queue multiple parallel DM transaction requests and DM packages. In some embodiments, if queuing is supported, an operator may be able to select a DM package to process and / or switch or modify among multiple queued packages via interface 330, or a user interface associated with DMTE 305. This feature allows several parts, e.g., components of an assembly, to be processed sequentially, or time sharing of DM machine 320.

[0114] In some embodiments, air-gapped DMTEs 305 (i.e., DMTEs that never communicate with a DMDS 350 over a network) can be configured such that they can accept DM requests and packages from multiple DMDSs 350.

[0115] In some embodiments, the DMTE 305 is configured to allow an authorized operator (user) to request the processing of an ad-hoc, unauthorized and / or unsigned DM package stored and distributed on the removable media 335 (e.g., for prototyping, testing, or under extenuating circumstances). In some embodiments, during such processing, the DMTE 305 prominently displays a message on the display 370 at all times indicating that an ad-hoc processing is in progress. While no "transaction" exists for such processing, the DMTE 305 may generate and record a receipt 345 for such processing. In some embodiments, "ad-hoc" processing is disabled by default and is not enabled in a production or development environment.

[0116] In some embodiments, the DMTE 305 hardware may ensure that the medium 335 is accessed in a read-only manner, i.e., the DMTE hardware may ensure that data cannot be written to the medium 335.

[0117] In some embodiments, the removable media 335 is a non-volatile memory module such as a flash or SD card. In these embodiments, the hardware read-only guarantee can be implemented by physically disconnecting a "write-enable" pin / connection on the external connector of the respective trusted side. In some embodiments, the write-enable pin is clipped off or removed entirely from the connector. In some embodiments, this allows convenient use and reuse of unmodified non-volatile memory modules to convey DM packages to the DMTE 305 while ensuring that the media is not written to on the DMTE 305 side of the air gap 310.

[0118] In some embodiments, the medium 335 may comprise a container configured to store files and documents, such as at least one of a machine-readable metadata file, a machine-readable DM machine configuration file, a DM processing file, a machine-readable and machine-executable inspection or test specification file, a human-readable document or file, a machine-readable DM machine interface definition file, or a digital signature. In some embodiments, the container of the medium 335 may be digitally signed. In some embodiments, the signature may be stored separately or placed within the container. In some embodiments, the metadata file describes the contents of the container and the corresponding DM recipe. In some embodiments, the metadata file may further specify specific actions to be taken prior to, during, and / or following DM processing. In some embodiments, the metadata file contains machine-readable declarations and parameterizations of policies, controls, or other rules to be enforced or applied to the associated DM transaction.

[0119] In some embodiments, the metadata file defines the exact DM machine 320, or an equivalence class of DM machines with which the recipe is compatible. In some embodiments, defining the exact DM machine 320 may include the model, manufacturer, firmware revision, etc. of the DM machine 320. In some embodiments, the DM machine 320 may be configured to interface with any existing file. In some embodiments, the DM machine 320 may define how endpoints should communicate with the specified DM machine 320, including but not limited to data encoding, timing, electrical / signaling methods, physical layer protocols, application layer protocols, and error handling semantics.

[0120] In some embodiments, the combination of the metadata, the DM machine configuration, the DM processing file, and, if applicable, the DM interface file may completely define and constrain the processing of a specific item on a specific DM machine 320 from a specific material (e.g., a specific metal alloy powder).

[0121] In some embodiments, the container on the removable medium 335 is an archive file, such as a ZIP or TAR, In some embodiments, the container supports data compression.

[0122] In some embodiments, a DM recipe may further contain digital signatures on one or more of its contents, in some embodiments, these digital signatures assert the authorized source or provenance of the respective content.

[0123] In some embodiments, one or more of the contents may be encrypted. In some embodiments, the metadata further comprises a specification for the specific content of a DM receipt that will be generated for a DM transaction for a given recipe.

[0124] In some embodiments, there will be many DM recipes for a given item, with each recipe being specific to processing on a particular DM machine 320, produced from specific materials.

[0125] In some embodiments, the DM recipe is a recipe that is approved for use in a pharmaceutical preparation, including passing inspections, tests, etc. It is developed, validated, and proven so that items processed according to the process will have predictable and well-characterized mechanical, dimensional, material, aesthetic, and / or other properties with a high degree of confidence. In some embodiments, these properties can be invariant to the location and time the item is processed. In some embodiments, these properties are invariant among multiple (types of) DM machines for a given material.

[0126] In some embodiments, two or more of the files comprising the recipe may be combined into a single file and / or one logical file may be split into multiple separate files.

[0127] Some embodiments may comprise DM package methods, mechanisms, protocols, and system components. In some embodiments, the DM package may comprise a container, a DM recipe, at least one machine-readable metadata file, DM transaction metadata, including a DM transaction identifier (ID), and one or more digital signatures. In some embodiments, the DM recipe, metadata file, and DM transaction metadata may be contained within the container and digitally signed. In some embodiments, the signature may be stored separately or placed within the container. In some embodiments, the metadata file fully describes the contents of the container.

[0128] In some embodiments, the metadata file and the DM transaction metadata, or a combination thereof, identify an endpoint or endpoints that are intended to perform the corresponding DM transaction. In some embodiments, the DM transaction metadata contains machine-readable declarations and parameterizations of policies, controls, or other rules that will be enforced or applied to the transaction. In some embodiments, the declarations and parameterizations may be in addition to those that may be specified in a DM recipe.

[0129] In some embodiments, the container is an archive file, such as ZIP or TAR. In some embodiments, the container supports data compression. In some embodiments, the DM package may further contain digital signatures on one or more of its contents. In some embodiments, these digital signatures assert the authorized source or origin of the respective content. In some embodiments, the signed data in the DM package may also be encrypted.

[0130] In some embodiments, the DM package is communicated to the processing environment via a removable digital media 335, such as a CD / DVD ROM or a removable storage device. In some embodiments, the DM package is communicated to the processing environment via a computer network. In embodiments in which the DM package is to be communicated to the DMTE 305, the DM package comprises the set of metadata, DM recipes, and files necessary to fulfill a DM transaction request for a particular item on a particular DM machine 320, served by a particular DMTE 305. In some embodiments, no other external information is required by the DMTE 305 to fulfill the transaction request.

[0131] In some embodiments, the DM recipe contains all the data files, metadata, machine configurations, user instructions, actionable inspection or approval requirements, material specifications, and / or other information required to process a given item, made from a particular material, on a particular DM machine 320. In some embodiments, the DM recipe may be transmitted 395 from the DMTE 305 to the DM machine 320 using at least one of a serial drive, USB, a P2P network, or other equivalents recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art.

[0132] In some embodiments, the policies, controls, and / or rules that are enforced include limitations on the number of parts that may be processed from a package, the date and time after which a package may be voided (or may not be processed), distribution information for processed parts, or requirements for users to perform inspections;

[0133] In most embodiments, DM package files at device installation and in transit (over communications lines) may typically be encrypted under the DMTE or recipient's public key (or equivalent). The decrypted file may be digitally signed by a separate DMDS 350 (data source or authority source) and its contents may be digitally signed (individually or separately) by that separate authority source.

[0134] In some embodiments where the untrusted side of the DMTE comprises a programmable logic device such as an FPGA or microcontroller, the recipe may further comprise one or more firmware / bitstream files to be used to program the untrusted side; this allows the system to add support for new DM machines in a data-driven manner without modifying the DMTE itself; it also enhances the recipe such that items processed from the recipe are each processed using the same interface logic / firmware.

[0135] 4 depicts a flowchart of a method for digital manufacturing transactions 400, according to one embodiment. In some embodiments, the DM manufacturing transactions are implemented by a DM Transaction Manager (DMTM). In some embodiments, the DMTM is a component of a DMDS or a surrounding system.

[0136] In some embodiments, a user request initiates a DM processing transaction ("transaction") (step 410). In some embodiments, a user submits the request through a user interface or API. In some embodiments, the transaction request may include the identity of the requesting user, an identifier of the specific item to be processed, an identifier of the specific DM machine, and, if applicable, a specific DM recipe defined by the user. In some embodiments, the request may further include the specific ingredients or materials from which the item should be processed. In some embodiments, the DM recipe is selected automatically by the DMTM, the DMDS, or another component.

[0137] In some embodiments, in response to receipt of the DM transaction request, the DMTM verifies the request (step 420). In some embodiments, this verification may comprise at least one of verifying that the requesting user is authorized to access and process the given item, verifying that the requesting user is authorized to request processing on the selected DM machine, verifying that the selected DM recipe, if specified, is compatible with the selected DM machine, verifying that a DM recipe compatible with the selected DM machine exists if no DM recipe is selected, verifying that the facility in which the selected DM machine is located is capable of performing the required quality control or inspection, verifying that the selected item is authorized to be processed at the location of the selected DM machine (e.g., to comply with International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) requirements or other contractual obligations), or verifying that the requested item to be produced complies with at least one parameter specified in the digitally signed data.

[0138] In some embodiments, if the match fails (step 425), the DM transaction request is denied (step 430). In some embodiments, the DMTM takes action to inform the requesting user that the request has been denied. For example, in some embodiments, the user may receive an alert in the interface that the DM transaction has been denied. In some embodiments, the DMTM may beep or include a warning light to indicate to the user that the request has been denied.

[0139] In some embodiments, the DMTM may create a log entry for the rejected transaction request, step 440. In some embodiments, such an entry may not be associated with a transaction identifier if the transaction was never opened / initiated at all.

[0140] In some embodiments, if the match passes (step 435), the DMTM opens a new DM transaction for the request (step 450).

[0141] In some embodiments, each DM transaction is assigned a unique transaction identifier (step 460). In some embodiments, the identifier may be in the form of a Type 4 UUID [RFC4122]. In some embodiments, after step 460, all state changes or updates related to this transaction are persistently stored.

[0142] In some embodiments, the DMTM assembles a DM package for the transaction (step 470). In some embodiments, the DMTM decomposes and obtains any non-local data elements that are required for processing. DM processing may fail at this point if external resources are unavailable or the request is denied. In this event, the DMTM closes the transaction with a failure status.

[0143] If all elements are successfully disassembled, the DM package may be communicated to the DMTE of the DM machine, or equivalent location where the items will be processed (step 480). In some embodiments, a receipt may be communicated to the DMTM (step 481).

[0144] In some embodiments, the DMTM verifies the receipt issued by the DMTE or equivalent, step 482. Some embodiments have well-defined semantics and procedures for handling invalid receipts.

[0145] In some embodiments, after verifying the receipt, the DMTM may delete any copies of the external data element over which it may have ownership rights (step 490). In some embodiments, the DMTM forwards the receipt to the third party owner or other authorized agent of the external data element, and if third party licensing rights are involved in the transaction, individual licensing rights are transferred upon communication with the licensor.

[0146] In some embodiments, the DMTM closes the transaction, step 495. In some embodiments, closing the transaction, step 495, may include the DMTM issuing notices, if applicable, to other systems, agents, users, etc.

[0147] In some embodiments, the DMTM periodically polls for open transactions and, if necessary, request status from a networked DMTE (or equivalent). In some embodiments, the DMTM polls on-demand for open transactions and, if necessary, request status from a networked DMTE (or equivalent). For open transactions that have associated grant / lease rights, the DMTM has a mechanism to inform the requesting user, supervisor, or other designated persons that the respective grant / lease content has not been transferred, and / or takes other action as specified within policy, or in some embodiments, provided by the implementation.

[0148] In some embodiments, an authorized user may terminate an open transaction that is awaiting a receipt if the processing facility is destroyed or due to equipment failure. This type of transaction termination results in an unambiguous record in the transaction log, including the identity of the user that requested the transaction termination. If the transaction is associated with a license / lease right, the DMTM may transmit a differentiated form of receipt to the lessor / licensor, i.e., making it unambiguous that the transaction did not complete successfully, and the DMTM may provide the lessor / licensor with any gap information it may have regarding the DM transaction, such as DM processing counts, as reported by the DMTE during periodic status checks.

[0149] In some embodiments, transaction log entries for open, close, record receipt, abort, lease acquisition, and lease transfer are digitally signed by the DMTM, and in some embodiments the DMTM may sign any transaction log entry as needed.

[0150] In some embodiments, the DMTM supports the ability to transactionally and automatically manage the processing of composite items (items that are assemblies of several other items). In some embodiments, the DMTM supports the ability to traverse multiple DMTEs to satisfy a DM processing request (e.g., when multiple instances of an item are required).

[0151] In some embodiments, the DMTM supports the ability for authorized users to view pending (open) transactions for a particular DMTE (or equivalent) or group, and for authorized users to set the priority of pending jobs queued on a per-machine basis.

[0152] 5 depicts a block diagram 500 of networked processing at a digital manufacturing trusted endpoint 505, according to one embodiment. In some embodiments, the signed and encrypted DM package is transmitted from the DMDS 510 to the DMTE 505 via a network 515. A receipt is similarly sent back to the DMDS 510 after processing at the DM machine 520 is completed.

[0153] In some embodiments, a user may interact with the DMDS 510, directly or indirectly, at the interface 530. In some embodiments, the user may be remote from the DMDS 510 and / or the DMTE 505. In some embodiments, the DMTE 505 and the DM machine 520 are co-located.

[0154] In some embodiments, the user who requested a given networked DM processing transaction, and other authorized users, have the ability, via interaction with the DMDS 510 or another authorized system, to verify that the corresponding DM package has been distributed to the corresponding DMTE 505, to check whether a receipt has been received, to view the receipt, and to see other related transaction information.

[0155] In some embodiments, an authorized user, via the DMDS 510 or another authorized system, has the ability to abort a networked DM processing transaction prior to distribution of an individual DM package to an individual DMTE 505. In this case, no receipt is generated and the transaction is closed.

[0156] In some embodiments, an authorized user may abort a DM processing transaction for which processing has not yet begun, via the DMDS 510 or another authorized system. In this case, the DMTE 505 issues and transmits a receipt indicating that processing has not begun, and the transaction is closed normally.

[0157] In some embodiments, in response to a networked DM processing request and associated DM package receipt, the DMTE 505 may alert the operator via its display and / or other annunciators that a new "job" has arrived.

[0158] In some embodiments, further interaction between the operator and the DMTE 505 may be required, for example, to confirm the reading of input materials or other preparatory steps.

[0159] In some embodiments, the operator has the ability to reject a networked DM processing request, in which case the DMTE 505 issues and transmits a receipt indicating that processing was not initiated and the transaction is closed normally.

[0160] In some embodiments, upon receipt of a valid DM package, the DMTE 505 will notify an individual DMDS 510 that it received the package and that the package is valid.

[0161] In some embodiments, the DMDS 510 can securely query a network-connected DMTE 505 regarding the status of any DM processing request (identified by a transaction identifier UUID), including fetching the corresponding receipt (if issued).

[0162] In some embodiments, the network connection 515 between the DMDS 510 and the DMTE 505 is via a secure encrypted protocol (such as transport layer security). In some embodiments, the establishment of the connection will include mutual authentication, for example, via client and server certificates. Some embodiments implement additional security mechanisms at other protocol layers.

[0163] In some embodiments, upon completion of a networked transaction, when the DMDS 510 informs the DMTE 505 that a receipt has been successfully distributed, the DMTE 505 attempts to transmit the corresponding receipt to the requesting DMDS 510 instance. In some embodiments, if the DMTE 505 is unable to distribute the receipt, it may retry the distribution a randomly selected number of times, typically separated by at least 30 minutes, and redistribution of the receipt will terminate after a certain time interval, typically not exceeding 72 hours.

[0164] The methods, systems, and devices discussed above are examples. Various configurations may omit, substitute, or add various procedures or components, as appropriate. For example, in alternative configurations, the method may be performed in a different order than described, and various steps may be added, omitted, or combined. Also, features described for one configuration may be combined in various other configurations. Different aspects and elements of the configurations may be combined in a similar manner. Also, technology evolves, and thus many of the elements are examples and do not limit the scope of the disclosure or claims.

[0165] For example, the embodiments of the present disclosure are described above with reference to block diagrams and / or operational illustrations of methods, systems, and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present disclosure. The functions / acts mentioned in the blocks may occur out of the order shown in any flowchart. For example, two blocks shown in succession may in fact be executed substantially in parallel, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on the functionality / acts involved. Additionally or alternatively, not all of the blocks shown in any flowchart need to be executed and / or performed. For example, if a given flowchart has five blocks containing functions / acts, it may be the case that only three of the five blocks are executed and / or performed. In this example, any of the three of the five blocks may be executed and / or performed.

[0166] A statement that a value exceeds (or exceeds) a first threshold is equivalent to a statement that the value is slightly greater than the first threshold, meets or exceeds a second threshold, e.g., the second threshold is a value that is higher than the first threshold within the resolution of the relevant system. A statement that a value is less than (or within) a first threshold is equivalent to a statement that the value is slightly less than the first threshold, is less than or equal to the second threshold, e.g., the second threshold is a value that is lower than the first threshold within the resolution of the relevant system.

[0167] Specific details are given in the description to provide a thorough understanding of the example configurations (including implementations). However, the configurations may be practiced without these specific details. For example, well-known circuits, processes, algorithms, structures, and techniques have been shown without unnecessary detail to avoid obscuring the configurations. This description provides only example configurations and does not limit the scope, applicability, or configurations of the claims. Rather, the foregoing description of the configurations will provide one of ordinary skill in the art with an enabling description for implementing the described techniques. Various changes may be made in the function and arrangement of elements without departing from the spirit or scope of the present disclosure.

Claims

[Claim 1] The invention described in this specification.

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