Illegal base station detection device, method for detecting illegal base station, and illegal base station detection program
The unauthorized base station detection device uses power strength analysis and radio wave mapping to identify and prevent unauthorized base stations, enhancing vehicle communication security and safety.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2023084826
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-23
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-05-23
AI Technical Summary
Conventional technologies fail to detect unauthorized base stations disguised as legitimate ones, which can intercept vehicle communications, and existing base station simulators are large and expensive, making them impractical for vehicle installation.
An unauthorized base station detection device that uses received power information to differentiate between normal and unauthorized base stations by comparing power strength with reference information, utilizing methods such as constant power analysis, radio wave maps, and multiple communication module comparisons.
Effectively identifies unauthorized base stations, reducing the risk of communication interception and accidents by accurately distinguishing between legitimate and fraudulent stations.
Smart Images

Figure 2024168283000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present invention relates to an unauthorized base station detection device that detects unauthorized base stations attached primarily to moving objects such as vehicles, a method implemented by the device, and a program executable by the device. [Background technology]
[0002] In recent years, technologies for driving assistance and autonomous driving control using large-capacity cellular communications, vehicle-to-vehicle communications, and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications (V2X) have been attracting attention in automobiles and other vehicles. As a result, vehicles are being equipped with communication functions and are becoming more connected.
[0003] In cellular communications, vehicles communicate via base stations. However, if an unauthorized base station that behaves like a genuine base station is installed, there is a risk of the unauthorized base station eavesdropping on communications and leaking information, so there is a need to identify unauthorized base stations.
[0004] For example, the invention disclosed in Patent Document 1 is configured to identify a base station as unauthorized when an identity request message for a long-term identifier is received from the same base station simultaneously or within a very short time from at least two different devices among a plurality of wireless devices. However, from actual network statistics, it is very unlikely that two or more wireless devices in close proximity to each other receive an identity request message simultaneously or within a very short threshold time. This is because an identity request message is sent by a legitimate base station only to request a long-term identifier from a UE under some exceptional circumstances, such as when initially registering to a network, when a long-term identifier is lost in a core network, or when authentication between a UE and a base station fails. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0005] [Patent Document 1] Special Publication No. 2022-548847 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0006] Here, the present inventors have found the following problem as a result of detailed investigation. The conventional technology described in Patent Document 1 can detect when multiple wireless communication modules attempt to connect to unauthorized base stations at the same time. However, it cannot detect devices that pose as base stations of a specific mobile communication operator. In addition, conventionally, base station simulators were large and expensive devices, so it was difficult to install them inside vehicles. However, in recent years, the use of software defined radio (SDR) has made it easy to create low-cost, small devices, so it has become possible to install unauthorized base station simulators (hereinafter referred to as "unauthorized base stations") inside vehicles. If an unauthorized base station is installed in an autonomous vehicle, the vehicle-mounted communication device connected to the unauthorized base station may be intruded into or its communications may be intercepted.
[0007] The present invention provides an unauthorized base station detection device that distinguishes between a normal base station and an unauthorized base station attached to a mobile object. [Means for solving the problem]
[0008] An unauthorized base station detection device according to one aspect of the present disclosure is an unauthorized base station detection device (11, 12, 13, 14) that detects whether a base station (40, 50) to which a communication module (30) mounted on a mobile object is connected is an unauthorized base station, a reception power information acquisition unit (101, 301, 401) for acquiring reception power information indicating a reception power strength of a radio wave received by the communication module from the base station; a determination unit (102, 202, 302, 402) for determining whether or not the base station is an unauthorized base station by comparing the received power information with reference information; and an output unit (103) that outputs an unauthorized base station detection notification when it is determined that the base station is an unauthorized base station.
[0009] In addition, the claims and the numbers in parentheses attached to the constituent elements of the invention described in this section indicate the correspondence between the present invention and the embodiments described below, and are not intended to limit the present invention. Effect of the Invention
[0010] According to the above configuration, the unauthorized base station detection device of the present invention makes it possible to detect unauthorized base stations that have been illegally installed in moving objects such as vehicles, and can reduce the risks of, for example, a decrease in the driving performance of the moving object, the leakage of customer information, or the induction of accidents. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0011] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining the arrangement of communication modules, normal base stations, and unauthorized base stations that are the basis of each embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining the arrangement of an unauthorized base station detection device that is the premise of each embodiment. [Diagram 3] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining an example of the configuration of an electronic control system that is the premise of each embodiment. [Figure 4] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of an unauthorized base station detection device according to a first embodiment. [Diagram 5] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining a flow of a detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device of the first embodiment. [Figure 6] FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram for explaining a method for determining whether a base station is unauthorized or not according to the first embodiment; [Figure 7] FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating the configuration of an unauthorized base station detection device according to a second embodiment. [Figure 8] FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining the flow of a detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device of the second embodiment. [Figure 9] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram for explaining a method for determining whether a base station is unauthorized or not according to the second embodiment; [Figure 10] FIG. 11 is a block diagram illustrating the configuration of an unauthorized base station detection device according to a third embodiment. [Figure 11] FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining the flow of a detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device of the third embodiment. [Figure 12] FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram for explaining a method for determining whether a base station is unauthorized or not according to the third embodiment; [Figure 13] FIG. 13 is a block diagram illustrating the configuration of an unauthorized base station detection device according to a modification of the third embodiment. [Figure 14] FIG. 13 is an explanatory diagram for explaining a method for determining whether a base station is unauthorized or not according to a modification of the third embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0012] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.
[0013] The present invention means the invention described in the claims or in the Summary of the Invention section, and is not limited to the following embodiments. Furthermore, at least the words in quotation marks mean the words described in the claims or in the Summary of the Invention section, and are not limited to the following embodiments.
[0014] The configurations and methods described in the dependent claims are optional configurations and methods in the invention described in the independent claims. The configurations and methods of the embodiments corresponding to the configurations and methods described in the dependent claims, and the configurations and methods described only in the embodiments without being described in the claims, are optional configurations and methods in the present invention. The configurations and methods described in the embodiments when the description of the claims is broader than the description of the embodiments are also optional configurations and methods in the present invention in the sense that they are examples of the configurations and methods of the present invention. In either case, by being described in the independent claims, they become essential configurations and methods of the present invention.
[0015] The effects described in the embodiments are effects obtained when the configurations of the embodiments are provided as examples of the present invention, and are not necessarily effects that the present invention possesses.
[0016] When there are multiple embodiments (including modified examples), the configurations disclosed in each embodiment are not limited to each embodiment, but can be combined across the embodiments. For example, a configuration disclosed in one embodiment may be combined with another embodiment. Also, configurations disclosed in each of the multiple embodiments may be collected and combined.
[0017] The problem described in the section on problems that the invention is intended to solve is not a publicly known problem, but was discovered independently by the inventor, and this, together with the configuration and method of the present invention, is a fact that affirms the inventive step of the invention.
[0018] 1. Configuration underlying each embodiment (1) Location of unauthorized base station detection equipment and related equipment The arrangement and connection status of the communication module 30 to which the unauthorized base station detection device of each embodiment is connected, the unauthorized base station 40, and the normal base station 50 will be described with reference to FIG.
[0019] The communication module 30 is a module that realizes a communication function used in the electronic control system S mounted on the vehicle. As described later in FIG. 2, the communication module 30 is connected in various ways to the unauthorized base station detection devices (11, 12, 13, 14) of the respective embodiments (hereinafter, abbreviated as unauthorized base station detection device 11, etc.).
[0020] The normal base station 50 is installed by a legitimate communication carrier and is a device that provides cellular communication services. The communication module 30 is connected to the normal base station 50 and performs necessary communication.
[0021] In contrast, the unauthorized base station 40 is a device that is installed in a vehicle by a suspicious person or the like and behaves like a normal base station 50. Specifically, the unauthorized base station 40 is a device intended to intrude into equipment in the vehicle and intercept communications. The unauthorized base station 40 is also called, for example, an IMSI catcher, a stingray, a fraudulent base station, or the like. The unauthorized base station 40 is realized, for example, by an SDR device and a personal computer (PC).
[0022] When such an unauthorized base station 40 is installed, the communication module 30 performs a handover from a normal base station 50 to the unauthorized base station 40, and mistakenly recognizes the unauthorized base station 40 as the normal base station 50 and performs communication.
[0023] The arrangement of the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like in each embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. In FIG. 2(a), an unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are provided in a communication device, and the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are connected to a communication module 30 in the communication device. In FIG. 2(b), an unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are provided outside the communication device, and the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are connected to a communication module 30 provided inside the communication device. In both FIG. 2(a) and FIG. 2(b), the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are "mounted" on a vehicle, which is a "mobile body." In contrast, in FIG. 2(c), an unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are provided in a server device or the like arranged outside the vehicle. Where: "Mobile object" refers to an object that can move and can move at any speed. It also includes cases where the mobile object is stationary. For example, it includes, but is not limited to, automobiles, motorcycles, bicycles, pedestrians, ships, aircraft, and objects mounted on these. "Mounted" includes not only the case where the device is directly fixed to the moving body, but also the case where the device is not fixed to the moving body but moves with the moving body, such as the case where the device is carried by a person riding on the moving body, or the case where the device is mounted on cargo placed on the moving body.
[0024] 2(a) and 2(b), the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the communication module 30 are connected via an in-vehicle communication network such as a Controller Area Network (CAN) or a Local Interconnect Network (LIN). Alternatively, the connection may be made using any communication method, whether wired or wireless, such as Ethernet (registered trademark), Wi-Fi (registered trademark), or Bluetooth (registered trademark).
[0025] In the case of FIG. 2(c), the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the communication module 30 are connected via a communication network such as IEEE802.11 (Wi-Fi (registered trademark)), IEEE802.16 (WiMAX (registered trademark)), W-CDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access), HSPA (High Speed Packet Access), LTE (Long Term Evolution), LTE-A (Long Term Evolution Advanced), or a wireless communication method such as 4G or 5G. Alternatively, DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) can be used. When the vehicle is parked in a parking lot or in a repair shop, a wired communication method can be used instead of a wireless communication method. For example, a LAN (Local Area Network), the Internet, or a fixed telephone line can be used.
[0026] (2) Configuration of electronic control system S Fig. 3 is a diagram showing an example of the configuration of an electronic control system S mounted on a vehicle. The electronic control system S is composed of a plurality of ECUs 20 and an in-vehicle network connecting these. Fig. 3 shows eight ECUs (ECU20a to ECU20h) as an example, but the electronic control system S is naturally composed of any number of ECUs. In the following explanation, when describing a single or a plurality of electronic control devices as a whole, they will be described as ECU20 or each ECU20, and when describing each individual electronic control device specifically, they will be described as ECU20a, ECU20b, ECU20c, .... The ECU 20 may be a physically independent electronic control unit, or a virtualized electronic control unit realized using virtualization technology.
[0027] In the case of FIG. 3, the ECUs 20 are connected to each other via the in-vehicle network described above in the explanation of FIG. 2(a) and FIG. 2(b) or via other wired or wireless communication methods. In addition, a connection refers to a state in which data can be exchanged, and includes not only cases in which different hardware is connected via a wired or wireless communication network, but also cases in which virtual machines realized on the same hardware are virtually connected to each other.
[0028] The electronic control system S shown in FIG. 3 includes an integrated ECU 20a, an external communication ECU 20b, zone ECUs (20c, 20d), and individual ECUs (20e to 20h).
[0029] The integrated ECU 20a is an ECU that has a function of controlling the entire electronic control system S and also has a gateway function of mediating communication between the ECUs 20. The integrated ECU 20a is also called a gateway ECU (G-ECU) or a mobility computer (MC). The integrated ECU 20a may also be a relay device or a gateway device.
[0030] The external communication ECU 20b is an ECU having a communication module 30 that communicates with an external device provided outside the vehicle, for example, in each embodiment, with a normal base station 50 or an unauthorized base station 40. The communication method used by the external communication ECU 20b is the wireless communication method or the wired communication method described in the explanation of FIG. 2(c). In order to realize a plurality of communication methods, a plurality of external communication ECUs 20b may be provided. Also, instead of providing the external communication ECU 20b, the integrated ECU 20a may include the function of the external communication ECU 20b.
[0031] The zone ECUs (20c, 20d) are ECUs with a gateway function appropriately arranged according to the location and function of the individual ECU. For example, the zone ECU 20c is an ECU having a gateway function to mediate communication between the individual ECUs 20e and 20f arranged at the front of the vehicle and other ECUs 20, and the zone ECU 20d is an ECU having a gateway function to mediate communication between the individual ECUs 20g and 20h arranged at the rear of the vehicle and other ECUs 20. The zone ECUs (20c, 20d) are sometimes called domain computers (DC). The individual ECUs 20e and 20f are connected to the zone ECU 20c via a network 1 (NW1), and the individual ECUs 20g and 20h are connected to the zone ECU 20d via a network 2 (NW2).
[0032] The individual ECUs (20e to 20h) can be configured with ECUs having any desired functions. For example, they can be drive system electronic control devices that control the engine, steering, brakes, etc., vehicle body electronic control devices that control meters, power windows, etc., information system electronic control devices such as navigation devices, or safety control system electronic control devices that perform control to prevent collisions with obstacles or pedestrians. Also, the ECUs may not be parallel to each other, but may be classified as master and slave.
[0033] The unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like in each embodiment may be provided in any ECU 20. For example, the case where the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are provided in the external communication ECU 20b corresponds to the case of Fig. 2(a). The case where the unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like are provided in an ECU 20 other than the external communication ECU 20b, i.e., the integrated ECU 20a, the zone ECUs (20c, 20d), or the individual ECUs (20e to 20h), corresponds to the case of Fig. 2(b). The unauthorized base station detection device 11 and the like of each embodiment will be described below in order.
[0034] 2. Embodiment 1 (1) Configuration of unauthorized base station detection device 11 An example of the configuration of the unauthorized base station detection device 11 of this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 4. The unauthorized base station detection device 11 includes a received power information acquisition unit 101, a determination unit 102, and an output unit 103. The unauthorized base station detection device 11 communicates with a normal base station 50 and an unauthorized base station 40 via a communication module 30 of an in-vehicle communication device mounted on a moving object such as a vehicle. The normal base station 50 is connected to an automatic driving management center 60. The unauthorized base station 40 is connected to, for example, an unauthorized management center.
[0035] The reception power information acquisition unit 101 acquires "reception power information" indicating the reception power intensity of radio waves received from a base station to which the communication module 30 is connected (i.e., either the normal base station 50 or the unauthorized base station 40, or both in the case of two or more lines). The reception power information acquisition unit 101 may acquire the reception power information from the communication module 30 or the like, or may acquire the reception power information by measuring the reception power by itself. Here, the "reception power information" includes not only cases where the reception power strength is directly indicated, but also cases where the reception power strength is indirectly indicated, such as the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR). The received power intensity is calculated, for example, using the following formula. Received power strength (dBm) = Transmitted power strength (dBm) + Absolute gain of transmitting antenna (dBi) + Absolute gain of receiving antenna (dBi) - Free space fundamental transmission loss (dB) - Cable loss (dB)
[0036] The determination unit 102 determines whether the base station to which the communication module 30 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40 or not by "comparing" the reception power information acquired by the reception power information acquisition unit 101 with the reference information. Here, "comparing" includes not only a direct comparison of two pieces of information, for example, finding the difference between the two pieces of information and evaluating the difference, but also a case where one piece of information is used as the standard to evaluate the relationship of other information to the information at that position, or a case where the relationship between two pieces of information is evaluated.
[0037] The reference information may be information that serves as a criterion for determining whether the reception power information satisfies a predetermined condition. In this embodiment, the unauthorized base station 40 is installed in a vehicle, and in consideration of the fact that the distance between the unauthorized base station 40 and the communication module 30 does not change, if the reception power strength is "constant", it is determined that the base station to which the communication module 30 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40. The reference information in this case is, for example, a "threshold value", or an "upper limit value" and a "lower limit value". That is, for example, if the reception power strength is within ±10% of the threshold value or if the maximum value of the amplitude of the reception power strength does not exceed the upper limit value or the lower limit value, the reception power strength is evaluated as being constant, since the fluctuation of the reception power strength is within a certain range. A specific determination method will be described later with reference to FIG. 6. Where: "Constant" does not necessarily mean that the value is strictly constant, and it is also evaluated as being constant when it changes within a certain range. Specifically, for example, it is evaluated as being constant when it is within a range of a predetermined percentage from a threshold, when it is within a range indicated by an upper limit value and a lower limit value, or when the variance value is equal to or less than a predetermined value. The "threshold value," "upper limit value," and "lower limit value" include cases where the constant values are always constant, as well as cases where the constant values change depending on conditions.
[0038] Other examples of the reference information include those in the second and third embodiments.
[0039] The output unit 103 outputs an unauthorized base station detection notification when it is determined that the base station to which the communication module 30 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40. In the case of Fig. 4, the output unit 103 outputs the unauthorized base station detection notification to the communication module 30, and the communication module 30 that receives the unauthorized base station detection notification switches the connection to a normal base station 50 and notifies the autonomous driving management center 60 via the normal base station 50 that an unauthorized base station 40 has been detected. If the vehicle is an autonomous vehicle, the autonomous driving management center 60 can be notified that an unauthorized base station 40 has been detected, thereby allowing the following processing to be performed. i) The autonomous vehicle manages current users by receiving dispatch requests from a user terminal application that requires prior registration. If a user detects an unauthorized base station 40 while in the vehicle, the autonomous vehicle management center 60 is notified, and potential suspects can be identified. ii) When a driver gets off an autonomous vehicle, the autonomous driving management center 60 can obtain user information by making an electronic payment. If an electronic payment is made after detecting an unauthorized base station, it is possible to identify potential suspects. iii) Information from cameras inside and outside the autonomous vehicle and cameras installed in infrastructure facilities is managed by the autonomous driving management center 60. After detecting an unauthorized base station 40, suspects can be identified from camera information inside and outside the vehicle.
[0040] In addition, the communication module 30 that has received the unauthorized base station detection notification may immediately stop the operation of the communication module 30 in order to prevent interception or intrusion of communication. Also, the communication module 30 that has received the unauthorized base station detection notification may stop communication with the unauthorized base station 40 and start communication by handing over to a normal base station 50. Furthermore, the output unit 103 may output the unauthorized base station detection notification to a device other than the communication module 30. For example, by directly outputting the unauthorized base station detection notification to a control device of a camera installed in a vehicle, it is possible to capture an image of a user who is suspected to have installed an unauthorized base station 40 with the camera without going through the autonomous driving management center 60. Furthermore, when the autonomous driving management center 60 receives a notification that an unauthorized base station has been detected, if there is no user on board the autonomous driving vehicle, the autonomous driving vehicle may be returned to a garage or the like, and the unauthorized base station 40 may be removed. If there is a user on board, the autonomous driving vehicle may be delivered to the destination without being returned to the garage, and then the vehicle may be returned to the garage.
[0041] In addition to the above configuration, the unauthorized base station detection device 11 may further include a movement information acquisition unit 104 that acquires "movement information" indicating the movement or stoppage of a moving object. The movement information acquisition unit 104 acquires, for example, position information from a GPS receiver, speed information from a vehicle speed sensor, or acceleration information from a gyro sensor, and outputs the information to the determination unit 102. Note that the movement information acquisition unit 104 itself may be at least one of the GPS receiver, the vehicle speed sensor, and the gyro sensor. Here, the "movement information" is sufficient if it directly or indirectly indicates that a moving object is moving, and examples of this include speed, acceleration, and position.
[0042] The determination unit 102 receives the movement information from the movement information acquisition unit 104. Then, when the determination unit 102 determines that the received movement information indicates that the mobile object is moving and that the received power intensity is “constant” as described above, the determination unit 102 determines that the base station is an unauthorized base station 40. This makes it possible to improve the accuracy of determining whether or not a base station 40 is unauthorized.
[0043] Furthermore, when the received movement information indicates that the mobile object is stopped, the determination unit 102 does not determine whether or not the base station is an unauthorized base station 40. When the mobile object is stopped, the received power strength may be evaluated as constant even if the mobile object is connected to a normal base station 50, so it is desirable for the determination unit 102 not to perform a determination. This makes it possible to prevent erroneous detection when there is little fluctuation in the received power intensity.
[0044] (2) How to detect unauthorized base stations The flow of the unauthorized base station detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device 11 will be described with reference to Fig. 5. Note that the operations shown in Fig. 5 not only show the unauthorized base station detection method executed in the unauthorized base station detection device 11, but also show the processing procedure of the unauthorized base station detection program executable in the unauthorized base station detection device 11. The processing shown here is not limited to the order shown in Fig. 5. In other words, the order may be changed as long as there are no constraints, such as a relationship in which a certain step utilizes the result of the previous step. The same applies to Figs. 8 and 11 described below.
[0045] In the unauthorized base station detection device 11, the received power information acquisition unit 101 acquires received power information indicating the received power intensity of radio waves received by the communication module 30 from a base station (S11).
[0046] The movement information acquisition unit 104 acquires movement information indicating whether the moving object is moving or stopped (S12). Then, the determination unit 102 determines whether the moving object is moving or stopped based on the movement information (S13). If it is determined that the moving object is stopped, the process returns to the first step. If it is determined that the moving object is moving, the process proceeds to S14.
[0047] The determination unit 102 compares the reception power information acquired in S11 with the reference information to determine whether the base station connected to the communication module 30 is an unauthorized base station 40 (S14). If it is determined that the base station is an unauthorized base station 40, the process proceeds to S15. If it is determined that the base station is a normal base station 50, the process returns to the first step.
[0048] The output unit 103 outputs the unauthorized base station detection notification to the communication module 30 (S15). The unauthorized base station detection notification may be output to a device or block other than the communication module 30.
[0049] When the communication module 30 receives radio waves from a newly connected base station, this flow is repeated to determine whether the newly connected base station is an unauthorized base station 40 or not.
[0050] An example of the step (S14) of determining whether or not the base station 40 is unauthorized will be described with reference to Fig. 6. Fig. 6 shows the relationship between the received power strength (dBm) of radio waves received by the communication module 30 from the base station and the position and time. In this example, an upper limit value and a lower limit value are used as reference information to determine that the received power strength is constant.
[0051] As shown in Fig. 6, when connected to a normal base station 50, the received power strength from the normal base station 50 fluctuates as the vehicle moves. This is because the distance to the base station changes as the vehicle moves, and because there may be obstacles such as buildings between the vehicle and the base station. For example, the received power strength at point A is significantly different from the received power strength at point B XX seconds later. In contrast, when connected to an unauthorized base station 40, the received power strength from the unauthorized base station 40 hardly changes even if the vehicle moves. This is because the distance between the unauthorized base station 40 and the communication module 30 does not change regardless of the movement of the vehicle. For example, the received power strength at point A and the received power strength at point B are almost the same.
[0052] Therefore, in order to determine whether a connection is made to a normal base station 50 or an unauthorized base station 40, appropriate upper and lower limit values are set, thereby making it possible to determine which base station a connection is made to. That is, when the received power strength exceeds the upper or lower limit value, it can be determined that a connection is made to a normal base station 50, and when the received power strength is within the range between the upper and lower limit values, it can be determined that a connection is made to an unauthorized base station 40.
[0053] 6, the horizontal axis represents time and position, but it may represent time only. In this case, it is preferable to set a condition that the vehicle is moving.
[0054] Alternatively, instead of using the upper and lower limits or thresholds, the variance or autocorrelation of the data strings at different points may be calculated to determine whether the received power intensity is constant. In this case, the reference information is a predetermined variance value or a predetermined autocorrelation value.
[0055] (3) Summary As described above, according to this embodiment, the unauthorized base station detection device 11 determines whether the connected base station is an unauthorized base station or not by comparing the received power information with the reference information, and can reduce the risks of, for example, a deterioration in the running performance of a mobile body, leakage of customer information, or the induction of an accident. In addition, when the received power strength is constant, it is determined that the base station is an unauthorized base station, because the characteristics of the received power strength that is expected when an unauthorized base station is installed in a vehicle are utilized. In other words, since this characteristic is utilized, it is possible to accurately determine whether the base station is an unauthorized base station. When the mobile information is also used to determine whether the base station is an unauthorized base station, it is possible to more accurately determine whether the base station is an unauthorized base station. In addition, because the upper and lower limits or thresholds are used as the reference information, the size of the reference information itself can be reduced, and the calculation of comparing the received power information with the reference information can be simplified. In particular, when the unauthorized base station detection device 11 is installed in a vehicle, it can be realized with an ECU with low calculation capacity, and restrictions due to hardware performance can be reduced.
[0056] 3. Embodiment 2 (1) Configuration of unauthorized base station detection device 12 In the first embodiment, the determination unit 102 determines whether or not a base station is an unauthorized base station based on whether or not the received power strength is constant. However, an unauthorized base station may vary the transmission power in order to camouflage itself. In this embodiment, therefore, an unauthorized base station detection device 12 capable of determining whether or not a base station is unauthorized even in such a case will be described.
[0057] An example of the configuration of the unauthorized base station detection device 12 of this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 7. The unauthorized base station detection device 12 further includes a location information acquisition unit 205 and a radio wave map storage unit 206 in addition to the configuration of the unauthorized base station detection device 11 of embodiment 1. Also, the function of the determination unit 202 differs from that of the determination unit 102 of embodiment 1. Hereinafter, blocks that share functions with the blocks of embodiment 1 are given the same numbers as the blocks of embodiment 1, and the description of embodiment 1 will be quoted.
[0058] The location information acquisition unit 205 acquires "location information" indicating the current location of a moving object. The location information acquisition unit 205 acquires the location information from, for example, a GPS receiver. Note that the location information acquisition unit 205 itself may be a GPS receiver. Here, "location information" refers to any information indicating a position on stationary coordinates that directly or indirectly indicates the position of a moving body, such as information calculated to determine stationary coordinates from signals transmitted by artificial satellites, or information calculated to determine the current location from base station information for cellular communications or Wi-Fi terminals, etc.
[0059] The radio wave map storage unit 206 is a recording medium that stores a radio wave map. The radio wave map indicates the relationship between a position on a stationary coordinate system and the predicted received power intensity at that position, and the form of the information can be any, such as a table or a graph. In order to always store the latest radio wave map, it is desirable for the radio wave map storage unit 206 to store the map downloaded periodically (for example, once a day) from a radio wave map providing server 70 (corresponding to an "external device") installed on the cloud. The radio wave map storage unit 206 itself may be provided outside the vehicle.
[0060] The determination unit 202 compares the reception power information acquired by the reception power information acquisition unit 101 and the location information acquired by the location information acquisition unit 205 with the radio wave map stored in the radio wave map storage unit 206 to determine whether the base station is an unauthorized base station 40. For example, the determination unit 202 makes the acquired location information correspond to a position on the stationary coordinates of the radio wave map, compares the reception power intensity indicated by the acquired reception power information with the predicted reception power intensity of the radio wave map, and calculates the degree of similarity to make the determination. More specifically, this will be described later with reference to FIG. 8. In this embodiment, a radio wave map is used as the reference information.
[0061] (2) How to detect unauthorized base stations The flow of the unauthorized base station detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device 12 will be described with reference to Fig. 8. Note that steps in which the same processes as in the first embodiment are performed are given the same step numbers as in Fig. 5, and the description of the first embodiment will be cited.
[0062] The location information acquisition unit 205 acquires location information indicating the current location of a moving object (S21). The judgment unit 202 judges whether the base station is an unauthorized base station 40 or not by comparing the reception power information acquired in S11 and the location information acquired in S21 with the radio wave map stored in the radio wave map storage unit 206 (S24).
[0063] An example of the step (S24) of determining whether or not the base station 40 is unauthorized will be described with reference to Fig. 9. As in Fig. 6, Fig. 9 shows the relationship between the received power strength (dBm) of radio waves received by the communication module 30 from the base station and the position and time. In this example, it is determined whether or not the connected base station is an unauthorized base station 40 based on the degree of agreement with the radio wave map.
[0064] In FIG. 9, the location on the radio wave map and the predicted received power intensity are plotted. 9, when connected to a normal base station 50, the pattern of the predicted received power strength shown by the radio wave map and the pattern of the received power strength match in terms of the received power strength itself and its change tendency at the same location. For example, the received power strength from point A to point B does not deviate significantly from the predicted received power strength in the same section. In contrast, when connected to an unauthorized base station 40, the pattern of the predicted received power strength shown in the radio wave map and the pattern of the received power strength are different in the received power strength itself and its change tendency at the same location. For example, the received power strength from point A to point B is significantly different from the predicted received power strength in the same section.
[0065] Therefore, in order to determine whether the terminal is connected to a normal base station 50 or an unauthorized base station 40, the determination unit 202 compares the pattern of the received power strength with the pattern of the predicted received power strength indicated by the radio wave map, and determines the degree of agreement. For example, the determination unit 202 obtains a correlation value between the two patterns, and determines whether the terminal is connected to an unauthorized base station 40 based on whether the correlation value is equal to or greater than a predetermined correlation value.
[0066] (3) Other features When the determination unit 202 determines that the connection is made to a normal base station 50, the reception power information acquired by the reception power information acquisition unit 101 and the location information acquired by the location information acquisition unit 205 may be transmitted to the radio wave map server 70. This allows the radio wave map server 70 to accumulate the latest information without collecting reception power information and location information using a special probe car. Alternatively, when the determination unit 202 determines that the mobile station 50 is connected to a normal base station 50, the reception power information and the location information may be stored in the radio wave map storage unit 206. This allows the radio wave map in the radio wave map storage unit 206 to reflect the latest information.
[0067] (4) Summary As described above, according to this embodiment, the unauthorized base station detection device 12 can determine whether or not a base station is unauthorized, by using a radio wave map as reference information, even if the unauthorized base station fluctuates its transmission power in order to disguise itself. In addition, by using a radio wave map, a predicted received power strength is used that reflects conditions specific to the position in the stationary coordinate system, such as the relationship between the terrain or buildings and the position and directivity of the base station, thereby enabling more accurate judgments to be made.
[0068] 4. Embodiment 3 (1) Configuration of unauthorized base station detection device 13 In the first embodiment, the determination unit 102 determines whether or not a base station is an unauthorized base station based on whether or not the received power strength is constant. However, an unauthorized base station may vary the transmission power in order to camouflage itself. In this embodiment, similarly to the second embodiment, a rogue base station detection device 13 capable of determining whether or not a base station is rogue even in such a case will be described.
[0069] An example of the configuration of the unauthorized base station detection device 13 of this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 10. The unauthorized base station detection device 13 differs from the first embodiment in that the communication module 30 is composed of a first communication module 31 and a second communication module 32, which are multiple communication modules. Also, the functions of the reception power information acquisition unit 301, the judgment unit 302, and the output unit 303 differ from the reception power information acquisition unit 101, the judgment unit 102, and the output unit 103 of the first embodiment. Hereinafter, blocks that have the same functions as the blocks of the first embodiment are given the same numbers as the blocks of the first embodiment, and the description of the first embodiment will be quoted.
[0070] The communication module 30 includes at least a first communication module 31 and a second communication module 32. In this embodiment, it is assumed that the first communication module 31 is connected to a normal base station 50 and receives radio waves, and the second communication module 32 is connected to an unauthorized base station 40 and receives radio waves. The communication module 30 may include three or more communication modules. In this case, two of the communication modules are the first communication module 31 and the second communication module 32.
[0071] It is assumed that the first communication module 31 and the second communication module 32 will connect to the same carrier and the same base station unless they connect to an unauthorized base station 40. In this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 10, the first communication module 31 is assumed to be connected to a normal base station 50. A connection to a normal base station 50 corresponds to, for example, a case where it is possible to infer that the first communication module 31 is connected to a normal base station 50 based on past communication conditions and communication history, or a case where communication has been started after an authentication process. In the latter case, for example, an unauthorized base station 40 is authenticated via IMSI, whereas if there is an authentication history with a normal network to which the normal base station 50 belongs, authentication is performed using TMSI instead of IMSI. If there has been a connection with the network in the past, authentication is performed using TMSI, so in this case, it is known that the connection is with a normal base station 50. In addition, the case according to the modified example described later corresponds to this case.
[0072] The reception power information acquisition unit 301 acquires first reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the first communication module 31 from a base station (corresponding to the "first base station"), and second reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the second communication module 32 from a base station (corresponding to the "second base station").
[0073] The determination unit 302 determines whether the base station to which the communication module 30 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40 by comparing the reception power information with the reference information. In this embodiment, the first reception power information is used as the reference information. As described above, it can be inferred that the first communication module 31 is connected to a normal base station 50, and therefore it can be used as a comparison target with the reception power information of other communication modules. That is, the determination unit 302 determines whether the base station to which the second communication module 32 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40 by comparing the second reception power information with the first reception power information, which is the reference information.
[0074] When the output unit 303 determines that the base station to which the second communication module 32 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40, it outputs an unauthorized base station detection notification to the normal base station 50 via the first communication module 31. In this way, when a vehicle has multiple communication modules, the unauthorized base station detection notification can be output via a communication module that is not connected to the unauthorized base station 40, thereby ensuring that the unauthorized base station detection notification is sent to the autonomous driving management center 60.
[0075] (2) How to detect unauthorized base stations The flow of the unauthorized base station detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device 13 will be described with reference to Fig. 11. Note that the steps in which the same processes as in the first embodiment are performed are given the same step numbers as in Fig. 5, and the description of the first embodiment will be cited.
[0076] The reception power information acquisition unit 301 acquires first reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the first communication module 31 from a base station, and second reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the second communication module 32 from a base station (S31).
[0077] The determination unit 302 compares the second reception power information with the first reception power information, which is reference information, to determine whether the base station to which the second communication module 32 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40 or not (S34).
[0078] When the output unit 303 determines that the base station to which the second communication module 32 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40, it outputs an unauthorized base station detection notification to the normal base station 50 via the first communication module 31 (S35).
[0079] An example of the step (S34) of determining whether or not the base station 40 is unauthorized will be described with reference to Fig. 12. Like Fig. 6, Fig. 12 shows the relationship between the reception power strength (dBm) of radio waves received by the communication module 30 from the base station and the position and time. In this example, it is determined whether or not the base station connected to the second communication module 32 is an unauthorized base station 40 based on the degree of agreement between the first reception power information and the second reception power information, which are reference information.
[0080] In FIG. 12, the received power intensity is plotted against time based on the first received power information, which is the reference information. When the second communication module 32 is connected to a normal base station 50, the pattern is basically the same as that of the first reception power information (not shown). In contrast, when the second communication module 32 is connected to an unauthorized base station 40, the pattern of the received power strength based on the first received power information significantly deviates from the pattern of the received power strength based on the second received power information. For example, in both cases where the unauthorized base station 40 transmits radio waves at a constant transmission power (received power information (A)) and where the unauthorized base station 40 changes the transmission power (received power information (B)), the pattern of the received power strength based on the first received power information significantly deviates.
[0081] Therefore, in order to determine whether the second communication module 32 is connected to a normal base station 50 or an unauthorized base station 40, the determination unit 302 compares the pattern of the received power strength based on the first received power information with the pattern of the received power strength based on the second received power information, and determines the degree of agreement between them. For example, the determination unit 302 obtains a correlation value between the two patterns, and determines whether the second communication module 32 is connected to an unauthorized base station 40 based on whether the correlation value is equal to or greater than a predetermined correlation value.
[0082] (3) Summary As described above, according to this embodiment, the unauthorized base station detection device 13 can determine whether or not a base station is unauthorized, even if the unauthorized base station varies its transmission power in order to disguise itself, by using the first reception power information as reference information. In addition, by using the first received power information as reference information, the received power strength reflects conditions specific to the vehicle's position, such as the relationship between the terrain or buildings and the position or directivity of the base station, thereby enabling more accurate judgment.
[0083] 4. Modification of the third embodiment (1) Configuration of unauthorized base station detection device 14 This modification is a case where the communication module 30 includes three or more communication modules. In this case, it is not necessary to specify in advance the communication modules that can be assumed to be connected to a normal base station 50, as described in the third embodiment. That is, by calculating the correlation value based on the reception power information of each communication module, it is possible to determine that the communication module specified by the reception power information with a low correlation value is connected to the unauthorized base station 40.
[0084] An example of the configuration of the unauthorized base station detection device 14 of this modified example will be described with reference to Fig. 13. The unauthorized base station detection device 14 differs from the third embodiment in that the communication module 30 is composed of a first communication module 31, a second communication module 32, and a third communication module 33. The functions of the reception power information acquisition unit 401, the judgment unit 402, and the output unit 403 differ from the reception power information acquisition unit 301, the judgment unit 302, and the output unit 303 of the third embodiment. Hereinafter, blocks having functions in common with those of the third embodiment are given the same numbers as those of the blocks of the third embodiment, and the description of the third embodiment will be quoted.
[0085] The communication module 30 includes at least a first communication module 31, a second communication module 32, and a third communication module 33. In this embodiment, it is assumed that the first communication module 31 and the second communication module 32 are connected to a normal base station 50 and receive radio waves, and the third communication module 33 is connected to an unauthorized base station 40 and receives radio waves. The communication module 30 may include four or more communication modules. It is assumed that each of the multiple communication modules 30 connects to the same carrier and the same base station.
[0086] The reception power information acquisition unit 401 acquires first reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the first communication module 31 from a base station, second reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the second communication module 32 from a base station, and third reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the third communication module 33 from a base station.
[0087] The judgment unit 402 judges whether the base station to which the communication module 30 is connected is an unauthorized base station 40 by comparing all combinations of two pieces of reception power information among the reception power information acquired by the reception power information acquisition unit 401.
[0088] The output unit 403 outputs an unauthorized base station detection notification to a normal base station 50 via a communication module different from the communication module connected to the base station determined to be an unauthorized base station 40 . In this way, when a vehicle has multiple communication modules, the unauthorized base station detection notification can be output via a communication module that is not connected to the unauthorized base station 40, thereby ensuring that the unauthorized base station detection notification is sent to the autonomous driving management center 60.
[0089] (2) How to detect unauthorized base stations The flow of the unauthorized base station detection method in the unauthorized base station detection device 14 of this modified example is basically the same as that of the third embodiment, so FIG. 11 will be cited. An example of the step (S34) of determining whether or not the base station 40 is unauthorized will be described with reference to Fig. 14. Similar to Fig. 6, Fig. 14 shows the relationship between the received power strength (dBm) of radio waves received by the communication module 30 from the base station and the position and time.
[0090] In FIG. 14(a), time and received power intensity are plotted based on the first received power information, the second received power information, and the third received power information. Then, for all combinations of these two pieces of received power information, the correlation value of the patterns of the received power strength is calculated. For example, as shown in Fig. 14(b), the correlation value between the received power pattern based on the first received power information and the received power pattern based on the second received power information is 0.72, which is a relatively high value, so it can be inferred that both are connected to a normal base station 50. In contrast, the correlation value between the reception power pattern based on the first reception power information and the reception power pattern based on the third reception power information, and the correlation value between the reception power pattern based on the second reception power information and the reception power pattern based on the third reception power information, show low values of 0.44 and 0.22, respectively. This suggests that the third communication module identified by the third reception power information commonly included in these combinations is connected to an unauthorized base station 40.
[0091] In this case, the reference information is the first reception power information and / or the second reception power information. By comparing these reference information with the third reception power information, it is determined that the base station connected to the third communication module 33 is an unauthorized base station 40.
[0092] (3) Summary As described above, according to this embodiment, the unauthorized base station detection device 14 can determine whether or not a base station is unauthorized, even if the unauthorized base station varies its transmission power in order to disguise itself, by using any one of a plurality of pieces of received power information as reference information. Furthermore, since a plurality of pieces of received power information are used as reference information, a more accurate determination can be made.
[0093] 5. Summary The features of the unauthorized base station detection device and the like in each embodiment of the present invention have been described above.
[0094] The terms used in each embodiment are merely examples and may be replaced with synonymous terms or terms having the same functions.
[0095] The block diagrams used to explain the embodiments classify and organize the configuration of the device by function. The blocks showing the respective functions are realized by any combination of hardware or software. In addition, since the block diagrams show the functions, they can also be understood as disclosures of a method invention and a program invention that realizes the method.
[0096] The order of the functional blocks that can be understood as the processes, flows, and methods described in each embodiment may be changed as long as there are no constraints such as a relationship in which one step utilizes the results of another step prior to it.
[0097] The terms first, second, through Nth (N is an integer) used in each embodiment and in the claims are used to distinguish two or more configurations or methods of the same type, and do not limit the order or superiority or inferiority.
[0098] The unauthorized base station detection device in each embodiment is assumed to be used in an electronic control device that constitutes an on-board system installed in a vehicle, but the unauthorized base station detection device of the present invention can be applied to any electronic control device unless specifically limited in the claims.
[0099] Examples of the form of the device of the present invention are as follows. Examples of the component form include a semiconductor element, an electronic circuit, a module, and a microcomputer. Examples of semi-finished products include electronic control units (ECUs (Electric Control Units)) and system boards. Finished product forms include mobile phones, smartphones, tablets, personal computers (PCs), workstations, and servers. Other examples include devices with communication functions, such as video cameras, still cameras, and car navigation systems.
[0100] Furthermore, necessary functions such as an antenna and a communication interface may be added to each device.
[0101] In addition, the present invention can be realized not only by dedicated hardware having the configuration and functions described in each embodiment, but also as a combination of a program for realizing the present invention recorded on a recording medium such as a memory or a hard disk, and general-purpose hardware having a dedicated or general-purpose CPU and memory capable of executing the program.
[0102] A program stored in a non-transient physical recording medium (for example, an external storage device (hard disk, USB memory, CD / BD, etc.) or an internal storage device (RAM, ROM, etc.)) of dedicated or general-purpose hardware can be provided to the dedicated or general-purpose hardware via a recording medium, or via a communication line from a server without using a recording medium. This makes it possible to always provide the latest functions through program upgrades. [Industrial Applicability]
[0103] Although the present disclosure has been described primarily as an unauthorized base station detection device for on-board electronic control devices installed in automobiles, it can be applied to all moving objects, such as motorcycles, ships, trains, and aircraft. [Explanation of symbols]
[0104] 11, 12, 13, 14 Unauthorized base station detection device, 20 ECU, 30 Communication module, 40 Unauthorized base station, 50 Normal base station, 60 Automatic driving management center, 70 Radio wave map providing server, 101, 301, 401 Reception power information acquisition unit, 102, 202, 302, 402 Determination unit, 103, 303, 403 Output unit, 104 Movement information acquisition unit, 205 Location information acquisition unit, 206 Radio wave map storage unit
Claims
1. An unauthorized base station detection device (11, 12, 13, 14) for detecting whether a base station (40, 50) to which a communication module (30) mounted on a mobile object is connected is an unauthorized base station, a reception power information acquisition unit (101, 301, 401) for acquiring reception power information indicating a reception power intensity of radio waves received by the communication module from the base station; a determination unit (102, 202, 302, 402) for determining whether or not the base station is an unauthorized base station by comparing the received power information with reference information; and an output unit (103, 303, 403) that outputs an unauthorized base station detection notification when the base station is determined to be an unauthorized base station. Unauthorized base station detection device (11, 12, 13, 14).
2. Further, a movement information acquisition unit (104) is provided for acquiring movement information indicating movement or stoppage of the moving object, The determination unit (102) determines that the base station is an unauthorized base station when the movement information indicates the movement of the mobile object and the received power strength is constant. An unauthorized base station detection device (11) according to claim 1.
3. The reference information is a threshold value, or an upper limit value and a lower limit value. The unauthorized base station detection device according to claim 2 .
4. The determination unit does not perform a determination when the movement information indicates a stop of the moving object. The unauthorized base station detection device according to claim 2 .
5. Further, a location information acquisition unit (205) is provided for acquiring location information indicating a current location of the moving object, the reference information is a radio wave map showing a relationship between a position on a stationary coordinate system and a predicted received power intensity at the position; The determination unit (202) determines whether the base station is an unauthorized base station by comparing the reception power information and the location information with the radio wave map. The unauthorized base station detection device (12) according to claim 1.
6. The radio wave map is acquired from an external device (70) provided outside the moving body. The unauthorized base station detection device according to claim 5.
7. The communication module includes a plurality of modules including at least a first communication module (31) and a second communication module (32); The reception power information acquisition unit (301, 401) acquires first reception power information, which is the reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the first communication module from a first base station, and second reception power information, which is the reception power information indicating the reception power strength of radio waves received by the second communication module from a second base station that is the base station; the reference information is first reception power information, The determination unit (302, 402) determines whether or not the base station is an unauthorized base station by comparing the second reception power information with reference information. An unauthorized base station detection device (13, 14) according to claim 1.
8. Further, a movement information acquisition unit (104) is provided for acquiring movement information indicating movement or stoppage of the moving object, The determination unit performs a determination when the movement information indicates the movement of the moving object. The unauthorized base station detection device according to claim 7.
9. The determination unit does not perform a determination when the movement information indicates a stop of the moving object. The unauthorized base station detection device according to claim 8.
10. The output unit outputs the unauthorized base station detection notification via the first communication module. The unauthorized base station detection device according to claim 7.
11. The unauthorized base station detection device is mounted on the mobile body. The unauthorized base station detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 10.
12. The unauthorized base station detection device is provided outside the mobile body. The unauthorized base station detection device according to any one of claims 1 to 10.
13. A method for detecting an unauthorized base station, which is executed by an unauthorized base station detection device (11, 12, 13, 14) for detecting whether a base station (40, 50) to which a communication module (30) mounted on a mobile object is connected is an unauthorized base station, comprising: The communication module acquires reception power information indicating the reception power strength of the radio wave received from the base station (S11); By comparing the received power information with reference information, it is determined whether the base station is an unauthorized base station (S14); If it is determined that the base station is an unauthorized base station, an unauthorized base station detection notification is output (S15). A method for detecting unauthorized base stations.
14. An unauthorized base station detection program executable by an unauthorized base station detection device (11, 12, 13, 14) for detecting whether a base station (40, 50) to which a communication module (30) mounted on a mobile object is connected is an unauthorized base station, The communication module acquires reception power information indicating the reception power strength of the radio wave received from the base station (S11); By comparing the received power information with reference information, it is determined whether the base station is an unauthorized base station (S14); If it is determined that the base station is an unauthorized base station, an unauthorized base station detection notification is output (S15). Unauthorized base station detection program.
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