Threshold Signature Scheme
The method allows smaller groups to generate valid threshold signatures by using dummy participants to simulate a larger participant threshold, ensuring security and enabling smaller groups to utilize threshold signature schemes effectively.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024525006
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2021-10-26
- Filing Date
- 2022-09-26
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-13
AI Technical Summary
Existing threshold signature schemes require a threshold number of participants equal to or greater than the shared secret key threshold, limiting their applicability to larger groups, and there is a need for a method that allows smaller groups to utilize these schemes effectively.
A computer-implemented method that involves a set of target participants and dummy participants, where target participants generate valid signatures using a set of shared secret key components, including temporary private keys, blind keys, and intermediate keys, while dummy participants do not contribute to signature generation, allowing smaller groups to replicate the scheme by simulating a threshold of t+1 participants using 2t+1 participants, including dummy participants who provide key shares but do not generate signatures.
Enables smaller groups to generate valid threshold signatures without compromising security, as the dummy participants' shares are managed to ensure that only target participants contribute to signature generation, maintaining the security of the shared secret key.
Smart Images

Figure 2024541936000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] The present disclosure relates to a method for generating a share of a threshold digital signature. [Background technology]
[0002] Public key cryptography is a type of cryptosystem that uses a key pair: a private key known only to its owner, and a public key that is generated based on the corresponding private key and can be distributed without compromising the security of the private key.
[0003] Public key cryptography allows a sender to encrypt a message using the recipient's public key (i.e., the public key that corresponds to a private key known only to the recipient). The encrypted message can only be decrypted using the recipient's private key.
[0004] Similarly, a sender can use his or her own private key to sign a message, e.g., to prove that the message was sent by the sender and / or to show that the sender agrees to the message. A signer (i.e., the party generating the signature) uses their private key to create a digital signature based on a message. Creating a digital signature based on a message means providing the message and the private key to a function that generates a signature based on both the message and the private key. The signature is added to (e.g., tagged with) or otherwise associated with the message. Anyone who has the signer's corresponding public key can use the same message and the digital signature on the message to verify whether the signature was validly created, i.e., whether the signature was actually created using the signer's private key. As well as ensuring the authenticity of the message, digital signatures also ensure the integrity and non-repudiation of the message. That is, digital signatures can be used to prove that the message has not been altered since it was signed with the signature, and that the creator of the signature cannot deny creating the signature in the future.
[0005] A digital signature scheme typically includes three procedures, or algorithms: a key generation algorithm is used to generate a random private key and a corresponding public key; a signature algorithm is used to generate a signature based on a message and the private key; and a verification algorithm is used to verify whether a signature was generated using the corresponding private key and according to the signature algorithm, given a public key and a message.
[0006] In general, a shared secret may be used to share a data item that is distributed among a group of participants. Each participant has a different share of the secret. Usually, the secret can only be reconstructed when a certain number of participants (called a "threshold") make their respective shares available to be combined together, for example to compute the secret. A common use of a shared secret is as a shared private key of a private-public key pair. That is, the private key may be distributed among a group of participants such that no single participant has access to the private key. Thus, no single participant can generate a valid signature of a message. Instead, some or all of the participants must generate the private key together in order to generate a signature.
[0007] Instead of participants sharing their private key shares to generate a signature, they may instead use a threshold signature scheme. A threshold signature scheme allows a threshold number of participants in a group to create a digital signature based on a message using their individual shares of a shared secret key, without the private key being made available to any one participant. Here, a digital signature is a signature that is generated based on the message to be signed. In such a scheme, a signature can only be created if a threshold number of participants agree to generate the signature on the message. Attempts to generate a signature using a smaller number of participants will not generate a valid signature. Thus, a valid signature by a group (i.e., one generated using the message and the shared secret key) must have had a threshold number of people agree to generate the signature. This also means that any adversary would need to obtain a threshold number of shares of the private key in order to forge a signature using the private key.
[0008] A threshold signature scheme is said to be threshold-optimal if the threshold for generating a valid signature is the same as the threshold of the shared secret key. Summary of the Invention
[0009] A threshold signature scheme requires a threshold number of participants to contribute, i.e., participate, to generate a valid signature. For example, a threshold number of signature shares must be contributed by a group of participants. While only a threshold number of signature shares are required to generate a valid signature, some signature schemes require more than a threshold number of participants to be able to compute their signature shares. That is, signature shares may be generated based on values that can only be computed with more than a threshold number of participants. As an example, the threshold for a threshold signature may be t+1, while at least 2t+1 participants are required to generate a signature share, or at least one or more values on which the signature share is based are required. In this case, it is not possible for a given group of participants to utilize a threshold signature scheme. It is therefore desirable to provide a technique that would allow smaller groups to utilize such a signature scheme.
[0010] According to one aspect disclosed herein, a computer-implemented method for generating shares of a threshold signature is provided, where a group of participants includes a set of target participants and a set of dummy participants, the number of target participants being less than the number of participants required to generate a valid signature, each target participant and each dummy participant has i) a respective share of a first private key, ii) a respective share of a temporary private key, iii) a respective share of a first blind key, iv) a respective share of a second blind key, and v) each target participant has a temporary public key corresponding to the temporary private key. The method is then performed by a first one of the target participants and includes the steps of generating a first component of the threshold signature based on the temporary public key, generating respective shares of a first intermediate key based on respective shares of the temporary private key and respective shares of the first blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the first intermediate key from each of the other target participants and each of the dummy participants, generating the first intermediate key based on the respective shares of the first intermediate key, generating respective shares of an inverse temporary private key based on the reciprocal of the first intermediate key and the respective shares of the first blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the first private key, the respective shares of the first blind key, generating respective shares of a second intermediate key based on respective shares of a key and respective shares of the second blind key and obtaining respective shares of the second intermediate key from each of the other target participants and each of the dummy participants; generating the second intermediate key based on the respective shares of the second intermediate key; generating respective shares of a pre-signature value based on a first component of the threshold signature, the inverse of the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, and the respective shares of the second blind key; and generating respective shares of the threshold signature based on the respective shares of the inverse temporary private key, the respective shares of the pre-signature value, and a message.
[0011] The present disclosure allows a set of target participants to compute valid signatures regardless of the number of target participants, including cases where the number of target participants is less than the number of participants required by the signature scheme. The present disclosure makes use of “dummy participants.” These are participants who provide certain data items (e.g., keys) so that the target participants can compute other data items that are required by the scheme but cannot be generated by the set of target participants alone. In other words, the present disclosure allows the target participants to replicate the scheme when the size of the set of target participants is smaller than the group size required by the scheme. The method is such that the target participants can generate valid signature shares but the dummy participants cannot. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0012] To aid in the understanding of embodiments of the present disclosure and to show how such may be carried into effect, reference will now be made, by way of example only, to the accompanying drawings in which: [Figure 1] FIG. 1 illustrates generally one exemplary system for generating threshold signatures. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 illustrates one exemplary method for generating a threshold signature. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0013] 1. Cryptographic concepts Although the following examples are described with respect to elliptic curve cryptography, the invention is not limited to any one particular cryptographic scheme and may be applied generally to any cryptographic scheme, such as RSA or other public key cryptographic schemes.
[0014] 1.1 Elliptic Curve Groups The elliptic curve E satisfies the following equation.
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[0015] This group operation can be used to define another operation on elements, called point multiplication, shown below. p ), and a scalar k∈Z * n For , the point k·G is defined to be the point G added to itself k times.
[0016] In elliptic curve cryptography, the private key is a scalar k∈Z n \{0}, where Z n\{0} is the notation for the set {1, ..., n-1}, and the corresponding public key is a point k · G on an elliptic curve. For example, in some blockchain protocols, the elliptic curve is chosen to be the secp256k1 elliptic curve, and a, b, and p are fully specified by this curve. The order n of the group is calculated given these values, and is prime in the case of this curve. The secp256k1 standard also specifies a point G that is used as the generator of the group.
[0017] 1.2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm To create a signature on a message msg, using private key a, the following steps are taken: 1. Calculate the message digest e=hash(msg), which can be any hash function. For example, in some embodiments, hash(msg)=SHA256(SHA256(msg)), where SHA256(■) is the SHA-256 hash function. Note that instead, the message can be hashed once or more than once using the same or different hash functions. 2. Choose a random integer k ∈ {1, ..., n-1}, where n is the degree of the elliptic curve, e.g., the secp256k1 curve. In the following, k is called the ephemeral private key. 3. Calculate the ephemeral public key that corresponds to this ephemeral private key: k·G=(Rx,Ry). 4.r=R x Calculate r mod n. If r=0, go back to step 2. 5. Calculate the multiplicative inverse of the temporary key k -1 mod n. 6.s=k -1 Calculate (e+ar) mod n. If s=0, go back to step 2. 7. The signature on the message msg is (r, s).
[0018] The ephemeral key must be kept secret, otherwise the private key can be calculated given the message and the signature. In addition, a different ephemeral key must be used each time a signature is generated. Otherwise, it is possible to derive the private key a given two different signatures and their corresponding messages.
[0019] Given a message msg, a public key P = a G, and the corresponding signature (r, s), the signature can be verified by completing the following steps: 1. Compute the message digest e = hash(msg), for example e = SHA256(SHA256(msg)). 2. Calculate the multiplicative inverse: s modulo n -1 It is. 3.j 1 =es -1 mod n and j 2 =rs -1 Calculate the square root of n. 4. Point Q=j 1 G+j 2 Calculate P. 5. If Q=O, i.e., the point at infinity, then the signature is invalid. 6.If Q ≠ O, then
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[0020] In a threshold signature scheme, this private key a is divided into key shares that are distributed among the participants in the threshold scheme group.
[0021] 1.3 Jointly verifiable random secret sharing Suppose N participants wish to create a shared secret that can only be reproduced by at least (t+1) participants in the scheme. To create a shared secret, the following steps are taken: 1. Participants agree on a unique label for each participant. Each participant i generates a random number for (t+1).
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[0022] The shared secret is of the form (i,a i ), where i is a participant label in the scheme. This method of creating a secret share for a is described herein as a i=JVRSS(i). Note that "JVRSS" typically stands for "joint verification random secret sharing" and includes steps 4 and 5 as well. However, throughout this document JVRSS is interpreted to mean performing at least steps 1-3, with steps 4 and 5 being optional steps.
[0023] Now that the participants have generated a shared polynomial, they can each verify that the other participants have shared the correct information with all participants, and that all participants have the same shared polynomial. This is done as follows: 4. Each participant i determines the obfuscated coefficient for k = 1, …, t.
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[0024] If all participants find that this formula holds for each polynomial, then the group can be collectively confident that they have all created the same shared polynomial.
[0025] 1.4 Reconstructing the Shared Secret Suppose a participant wishes to reconstruct a shared secret a, which is the zeroth degree of a shared polynomial, with (t+1) points on this polynomial of the form
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[0026] 1.5 Public Key Computation The N zeroth-order private polynomial coefficient public keys, for i = 1, …, N, shared in step 4 of the JVRSS, are j0 Given G, each participant computes a shared public key P using:
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[0027] 1.6 Adding a Shared Secret Compute the addition of two shared secrets shared among a group of N participants, where each secret polynomial has degree t, and where no entity knows the individual secrets, the following steps are taken: 1. Generate a first shared secret a, where participant i’s share is a for i=1,…,N, with a threshold of (t+1) i =JVRSS(i). 2. Generate a second shared secret b, where participant i’s share is the threshold value for (t+1) and b i = JVRSS(i). 3. Each participant i calculates his / her additive share.
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[0028] This method for appending the shared secret is denoted by ADDSS(i), for participant i, and results in each participant i knowing v=(a+b).
[0029] 1.7 Multiplication of Shared Secrets Compute the production of two shared secrets, both shared among a group of N participants, where each secret polynomial has degree t, by performing the following steps: 1. Generate a first shared secret a, where participant i’s share is a for i=1,…,N. i = JVRSS(i). The shared secret polynomial has degree t, meaning that it needs to be recreated by the (t+1) participants. 2. Generate a second shared secret b, where participant i’s share is b i = JVRSS(i), where the shared secret polynomial again has degree t. 3. Each participant earns his / her multiplicative share μ by using i Calculate.
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[0030] This method for computing the product of two shared secrets is denoted herein by μ=ab=PROSS(i), for participant i.
[0031] 1.8 Inverse of a Shared Secret To compute the inverse of the shared secret a, the following steps are taken: 1. Every participant computes the product of their shared secrets PROSS(i). The result is μ = ab mod n. 2. Each participant computes the modular inverse of μ, which results in
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[0032] This method for computing the inverse of a shared secret is as follows: for participant i, a i -1 =INVSS(i).
[0033] 1.9 Generating and Verifying a Shared Secret Compute a shared secret key among N ≥ 2t+1 participants, of which t+1 are needed to create a signature, and the participants run JVRSS using the t+1 threshold and the public key calculation described above. As a result, every participant i=1,…,N has a secret key share a i and the corresponding shared public key P = (a · G).
[0034] 1.10 Ephemeral Key Share Generation Generate ephemeral key shares and corresponding key shares as required for signing. A group of size N performs the following steps with a shared secret key a of threshold (t+1). 1. Generate the inverse share k of the common secret i -1 = INVSS(i). Here, (t + 1) shares need to be recreated. 2. Each participant uses the obfuscation factors shared in the verification of k i to calculate the following.
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[0035] 1.11 Adding Secrets with Different Thresholds When adding secrets of degrees t and t', the addition of the two secrets requires max(t, t') + 1 shares for calculation. The reason behind this is that the share addition step of the shared secret creates shares of a new polynomial. This new additive polynomial is equivalent to the result of the addition of the individual polynomials of the two shared secrets. The addition of two polynomials is to add the corresponding coefficients at each degree of x. Therefore, the degree of the additive polynomial must be the same as the highest degree of the two polynomials. This can be generalized to the addition of more than two polynomials. Here, the degree of the resulting polynomial is the same as the degree of the highest individual polynomial.
[0036] Once the addition of two secrets with different thresholds is calculated, the security of the higher threshold secret is reduced. This is because now, if the result (a + b) with respective thresholds t, t' is known and assuming t < t', then a can be calculated using t shares, and then (a + b) - a = b can be calculated, and thus the value b is calculated using only t shares. This lower threshold is hereinafter referred to as the "implicated threshold" of b.
[0037] 1.12 Secret multiplication with different thresholds In the case of multiplying two secrets with thresholds of t and t', the multiplication calculation requires t + t' + 1 shares. In this case, the multiplication of the shares of the two polynomials results in shares on a new polynomial. This new polynomial is the result of multiplying the two individual polynomials, and thus the degree of the result is the addition of the degrees of the two individual polynomials.
[0038] Multiplication can also be generalized to any number of shared secrets, and the resulting threshold is the sum of the individual thresholds plus 1. That is,
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[0039] Similar to addition, the multiplication of two secrets with different thresholds results in a relative threshold of a secret with a higher threshold. As before, if ab is known, where a has a threshold of t, b has a threshold of t', and t < t', then both a and b can be calculated using t shares. First, a can be calculated, and then b can be found using only the t-share secret with (ab)a -1 used.
[0040] 1.13 Combining Addition and Multiplication of Shared Secrets into One Step To calculate any combination of addition and multiplication in one step, it is possible to generalize the above. Assume a group of N participants wants to calculate the result ab + c. Here, a, b, c are, respectively, shared secrets with thresholds (t a + 1), (t b + 1), (t c + 1). max(t a + t b , t c)There exists a condition that <N>. That is, the number of participants in the scheme must be greater than the maximum value between the degree of the secret c and the degree of the result of the addition of the secrets a and b. 1. Each participant i calculates their secret shares a a +1), (t b +1), (t c +1) having i =JVRSS(i), b i =JVRSS(i), c i =JVRSS(i) respectively. 2. Each participant i calculates the share λ i =a i b i +c i . 3. Each participant i shares the result λ i with other participants. 4. Each participant i interpolates over max(t 1 ,…,λ i ,…)=ab + c to find the result λ = int(λ a +t b ,t c )+1 shares.
[0041] This is done in the calculation of the shared signature according to some of the following embodiments. That is, there is an interpolation over s i =k i -1 (e + a i r). This is essentially the case with a i b i =k i -1 a i r and c i =k i -1 e i . In this case, t a +t b =2t and t c =t, and the interpolation is over max(t a +t b ,t c )+1 = 2t + 1 shares.
[0042] 2. Signature Generation FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary system 100 for generating signature shares. As illustrated, the system 100 includes a plurality (i.e., a group) of participants (e.g., users, machines, etc.) 102, 104. The group of participants is comprised of two separate sets of participants: a set of target participants 102b and a set of dummy participants 104. The target participants are participants who generate respective signature shares or at least can generate respective signature shares. In contrast, the dummy participants are unable to generate respective signature shares, hence the term “dummy”. The terms “target participant” and “dummy participant” can be interchanged with, for example, “first participant” and “second participant”. That is, these terms are merely labels for the two sets of participants. The participants may also be referred to as parties or entities. Each of the participants 102, 104 operates a respective computing device.
[0043] Each of the respective computing devices of each participant 102, 104 includes a respective processing device including one or more processors, e.g., one or more central processing units (CPUs), accelerator processors (GPUs), application specific processors, and / or field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Each computing device may also include memory, i.e., computer readable storage in the form of a non-transitory computer readable medium. The memory may include one or more memory units employing one or more memory media, e.g., magnetic media such as a hard disk, electronic media such as a solid state drive (SSD), flash memory, or EEPROM, and / or optical media such as an optical disk drive. Each computing device may include at least one user terminal, e.g., a desktop or laptop computer, a tablet, a smartphone, or a wearable device such as a smart watch. Alternatively or additionally, each computing device may include one or more other networked resources, such as cloud computing resources (cloud computing resources include resources of one or more physical server devices implemented at one or more sites) accessed via the user terminal. It will be understood that any act described as being performed by a party of system 100 may be performed by a respective computing device operated by that party.
[0044] Each of the participants 102, 104 is configured to transmit data to one, some, or all of the other participants 102, 104 over the Internet using a LAN or WAN connection, or over alternative wired or wireless communication means. Unless the context requires otherwise, references to a participant 102 transmitting data may be understood as transmitting data to the other participants 102 individually, e.g., over a secure communication channel between the two participants, or broadcasting to the entire group, e.g., via email or other means. Again, unless the context requires otherwise, each participant 102, 104 may transmit data in raw or encrypted form. For example, data may be encrypted using the recipient participant's public key before being transmitted to the recipient participant.
[0045] 1, the set of target participants includes three participants 102a, 102b, 102c, and the set of dummy participants includes two participants 104a, 104b (shown surrounded by dashed circles). This is for illustrative purposes only, and it will be understood that in general each set may include any number of participants. Note that unless the context requires otherwise, "first," "second," etc. are used merely as distinguishing labels and do not necessarily imply order, hierarchy, etc.
[0046] The system 100 also comprises a coordinator 101. The coordinator may be one of the target participants, for example the first target participant 102a. Alternatively, the coordinator 101 may be a separate entity. The coordinator operates a respective computer device as described above with reference to the participants 102, 104. The coordinator 101 is the party that initiates the signature using a threshold number of signature shares generated by each target participant 102 (described below). That is, the coordinator 101 generates a signature on (or for) the message to be signed. Again, note that generating a signature on a message is interpreted to mean that the signature depends on the message to be signed, or, in other words, that the signature is a function of the message to be signed. The coordinator 101 may also be the party that transmits the signature and optionally the message to a third party 103, or otherwise outputs the signature. For example, the third party 103 may be a certificate authority or other form of certificate authority, or another user. In other examples, the signature may be recorded, for example, in a database or other document. In some examples, the signature may be recorded and made available to the public, for example, on a website or other publicly accessible medium, such as a blockchain.
[0047] The coordinator 101 may send the message to be signed to the target participants 102. The message may be sent to all of the participants 102 or to a subset of the participants, e.g., a threshold number of the target participants. The coordinator 101 sends the message to one participant, who can then forward the message to one, some, or all of the other target participants 102. The message may be sent over the Internet using a LAN or WAN connection, or over alternative wired or wireless communication means. The message may be sent to each participant 102 individually, e.g., over a secure communication channel between the coordinator 101 and each participant 102, or may be broadcast as a whole to the set of target participants, e.g., via email or other means. The message may be sent in raw form or in an obfuscated form. For example, the message may be encrypted or hashed one or more times.
[0048] One or more of the target participants 102 can obtain the message via alternative means, i.e., not from the coordinator 101. For example, the message may be generated by one of the target participants 102 or may be otherwise available, for example, publicly. One or more of the target participants 102 can receive the message from a third party 103. A target participant 102 that obtains the message can send the message (in raw or encrypted form) to one or more other target participants 102. For example, a first target participant 102 can send the message to the other target participants.
[0049] Each participant 102, 104, both target and dummy, has (e.g., stores in memory) a respective share of a shared secret key. The shared secret key is a number, such as a 256-bit integer. Similarly, any keys mentioned below are also numbers. The shared secret key may have a threshold of t+1.
[0050] Techniques for generating shares of a secret key are well known to those skilled in the art. As an illustrative example, participants may participate in a joint verifiable secret sharing scheme (JVRSS) to generate their respective shares of a shared secret key. For example, a first target participant 102a may use the JVRSS technique described above to generate a first secret key share a of a secret key a. 1 That is, the first target participant 102a has an index of 1, and for participant 1, 1 = JVRSS(1), where the private key is denoted by a. Each participant 102, 104 may generate a first private key share a i For example, the second target participant 102b may generate a 2 =JVRSS(2) may be used to generate the second private key share, and so on.
[0051] Using a joint secret sharing scheme, we obtain the first secret key share a 1 To generate
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[0052] Each target participant 102 may compute a corresponding public key a·G based on a set of obfuscation coefficients, where the coefficients are each participant's 102 private key share a i is used to generate the temporary private key share k i When generating ijThe first participant 102a can share the obfuscated coefficient a with each of the other participants 102, 104. The coefficients are obfuscated by a common generation point G on the selected elliptic curve. These obfuscated coefficients can be transmitted directly between the participants 102, 104 or can be broadcast to the group. For example, the first participant 102a can share the obfuscated coefficient a 10 G, a 11 G, a 12 ·G, etc. The public key corresponding to the private key can be calculated as follows:
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[0053] Private key share a i It will be appreciated that it is not necessary for a corresponding public key to be generated in order to generate the dummy participant 104, and thus this is an optional feature that the participant 102 may implement if they choose. Note also that the public key may be generated by the target participant 102, not the dummy participant 104, although they may generate one if desired.
[0054] Private key share a i can be generated using alternative methods, i.e., without using the JVRSS method described above. Methods for generating shares of a private key are known per se in the art. Similarly, methods for distributing shares of a private key (or other such data) are known per se in the art. That said, a private key share a i can be generated in a number of ways. For example, a dealer (e.g., a trusted one of the target participants 102 or an independent party) may be used to generate a secret key share a using, for example, Shamir's secret sharing scheme. i A user may generate and distribute one, some, or all of the private key shares a iOne such scheme that can be used to generate and distribute
[0055] Regardless of the particular method used to generate the private key shares, each of the target participants 102 and each of the dummy participants 104 will generate a respective private key share a of the same private key a. i have (e.g., store)
[0056] Each of the group of participants (i.e., each target participant 102 and each dummy participant 104) also receives a respective share k of the shared ephemeral key k. i For example, the first target participant has a first ephemeral key share k 1 and the second target participant has a second ephemeral key share k 2 The ephemeral keys may have a threshold of t+1. The shares of the shared ephemeral key may be generated using JVRSS, Shamir's secret sharing scheme, or alternative techniques. The target participant 102 generates a public key that corresponds to the shared ephemeral key. The dummy participant 104 is not required to generate this ephemeral public key.
[0057] Along with their respective private key shares and respective ephemeral key shares, each of the target participants also has (e.g., stores in memory) a first component of a threshold signature (the “first signature component”), which is sometimes known as the r value. For completeness, the second signature component is sometimes known as the s value, and is described in more detail below. The first signature component is based on a public key corresponding to the shared ephemeral key, and more specifically, on the x component of the public key corresponding to the shared ephemeral key. For example, the first signature component may be calculated as r=x mod n.
[0058] Instead of, or in addition to, storing their respective shares of the shared ephemeral key, some or all of the group of participants may store their respective reverse shares k i -1 Note that in some instances, this may be stored as k i -1 = INVSS(i).
[0059] Each of the group of participants (i.e., each target participant 102 and each dummy participant 104) also receives a respective share α of the first blind key α. i , and each share β of the second blind key β i The blind key shares may also have (e.g., stored in memory) a first key share or a data item. A blind key share may be used to obfuscate or otherwise "blind" or "hide" another key share or data item. That is, a blind key share may be applied to a first key share to hide the first key share, so that the resulting key share may be shared without revealing the first key share. In a simple example, the first key share may be 100 and the blind key shares may be 74, allowing the number 174 to be shared. Now, without knowing that the blind key shares are 74, the recipient would not be able to know the first key share with certainty. It will be appreciated that in practice the key shares may be a much larger number. The blind key shares may be generated using JVRSS or alternative techniques. Each blind key may have a threshold of t+1.
[0060] From this, each target participant 102 will receive a share s of the second signature component s. i We will now explain how each can be generated.
[0061] The participants (target 102 and dummy 104) each acquire a share μ of a first intermediate key μ. iEach participant 102, 104 starts by generating a respective share k of the intermediate key. i , and each share of the first blind key, α i Based on (i.e., as a function of) each share μ of the first intermediate key μ i For example, the shares of the temporary key and the shares of the first blind key may be combined by multiplication, in which case the first intermediate key may also be referred to as a multiplicative key. Each target participant 102 then generates its respective share μ i to each of the other target participants 102. The dummy participants 104 also transmit their respective shares μ i to the target participant 102. The target participant 102 does not (or at least does not need to) send its respective share to the dummy participant 104. Similarly, the dummy participant 104 sends its respective share μ i shall not be shared with each other.
[0062] The target participants 102 then receive their respective shares μ i For example, the first target participant 102a generates a first intermediate key share μ 1 and share μ i , and then constructing a first intermediate key based on those shares. Constructing the first intermediate key μ includes i For a temporary key and a first blind key with threshold t+1, the first intermediate key μ has a threshold higher than 2t+1, meaning that at least 2t+1 participants are required to generate the first intermediate key.
[0063] Upon computing the first intermediate key μ, each target participant 102 receives the inverse element μ -1 , and each share of the first blind key, α iBased on the i -1 ("an inverse ephemeral key share") In the example, because the dummy participant 104 does not compute the first intermediate key, the dummy participant 104 cannot compute the inverse ephemeral key share.
[0064] Each participant (both the target participant 102 and the dummy participant 104) receives a share λ of each of the second intermediate keys λ. i Generate a share λ of the second intermediate key λ. i are the respective shares of the first blind key, α i , the second blind key and its respective share β i , and each share of the shared secret key a i For example, each share of the first blind key and each share of the shared secret key may be combined by multiplication and then appended to each share of the second blind key. i may be combined in other ways to generate respective shares of the second intermediate key. Similar to the shares of the first intermediate key, the target participants 102 each receive a respective key share λ i The dummy participants 104 also share their respective key shares λ i The target participants 102 do not transmit their respective key shares to the dummy participants 104, and the dummy participants 104 do not transmit their respective key shares λ i Do not share.
[0065] The target participants 102 then receive their respective shares λ of the second intermediate key. i For example, the first target participant 102a generates a share of the second intermediate key λ based on 1 and share λ from other participants 102, 104 iand then construct a second intermediate key λ based on those shares. Constructing the second intermediate key λ may include interpolating across each share of the second intermediate key. If the first blind key and the shared secret key have a threshold t+1, then the second intermediate key has a threshold higher than 2t+1, meaning that at least 2t+1 participants are required to generate the second intermediate key.
[0066] In some embodiments, the target participant 102 then determines a pre-signature share σ based on a portion of the previously calculated share. i In other embodiments, one or more of the shares calculated above are updated before generating the pre-signature shares. The former is described first.
[0067] In some embodiments, each target participant 102 generates a first component of the signature (the “r value”), the inverse μ -1 , the second intermediate key λ, and the second blind key share β i Based on the pre-signature share σ i Therefore, each target participant’s respective pre-signature share σ i Each share of the second blind key may be subtracted from the second intermediate key, and the result may be multiplied by the r value and the inverse of the first intermediate key.
[0068] In other embodiments, each share of the second blind key may be updated before generating each pre-signature share. The pre-signature shares may then be generated in the same manner as just described, except using the updated shares of the second blind key rather than the existing key shares. Those skilled in the art will be familiar with how to update the key shares themselves. Updating a key share does not affect the key itself; i.e., the value of the key remains the same. One exemplary technique for updating key shares is described below.
[0069] Note that the pre-signature share may be pre-computed because the pre-signature share does not require knowledge of the message. In other words, the pre-signature share may be generated prior to obtaining the message. Thus, multiple different pre-signature shares may be pre-computed, each for use in generating a different respective share of the second signature component for signing different messages.
[0070] Once the respective pre-signature shares have been calculated, each target participant 102 then receives a reverse ephemeral key share k i -1 , pre-signature share σ i Alternatively, the target participant 102 may update the ephemeral key shares and generate respective shares of the second component of the signature based on the updated inverse ephemeral key shares, the pre-signature shares σ i , and the message to be signed, eg, a hash of the message, may generate respective shares of the second signature component.
[0071] The target participant 102 then sends a share s of the second signature component i to the coordinator 101 for generating a signature. That is, the coordinator 101 may generate a signature based on the share of the second signature component, e.g., share s iA threshold signature is then formed from the first and second signature components (r,s). As mentioned above, in some examples, the coordinator 101 may be one of the target participants, e.g., the first target participant 102a.
[0072] The coordinator 101 may then broadcast or transmit the signature to one or more other entities. Additionally or alternatively, the coordinator may store the signature and / or record the signature as part of a digital record, such as in an email or other document. For example, the message may be part or all of a blockchain transaction. The signature may be included in the blockchain transaction (if the message is only part of the blockchain transaction) or may be included in a different blockchain transaction.
[0073] Returning now to the updating of key shares, one exemplary method that may be used to update key shares is described in International Patent Application PCT / EP2021 / 062941. As mentioned above, pre-signature shares may be calculated by each targeted participant 102 based on the updated share of the second blind key. To update their respective shares of the second blind key, each targeted participant 102 performs the following process: First, the targeted participant 102 generates a share of the third blind key, for example using an alternative technique such as JVRSS or SSSS. Each targeted participant 102 then uses its respective share of the third blind key to mask its respective share of the second blind key, for example by adding (or subtracting) together the respective shares of the second and third blind keys. The masked shares of the second blind key are shared among (i.e., sent to) the other targeted participants 102. A masked version of the second blind key is then generated based on the masked share of the blind key. Upon generating the masked blind key, each target participant 102 then obtains an updated share of the second blind key based on the masked blind key and its respective share of the third blind key, for example by subtracting one from the other.
[0074] The same process may be used to update the temporary secret key shares: a fourth blind key may be used in place of the third blind key.
[0075] In general, embodiments of the invention may be used to generate a signature on any message (i.e., for a message). As a specific example use case, the message may be part or all of a blockchain transaction. That is, the signature may be used to sign one or more inputs and / or one or more outputs of the blockchain transaction. For example, the generated signature may be used to, at least in part, unlock an output of the blockchain transaction. As a specific example, an output of a previous transaction may be a pay-to-public-key-hash (P2PHK) output that is locked to a hash of a public key. To be unlocked, an input of a later transaction referencing the P2PHK output must include the (unhashed) public key and a signature generated based on the private key corresponding to the public key.
[0076] A "locking script" and an "unlocking script", represented by a script, can take the following forms:
number
[0077] With reference to the above embodiment,<Public Key> can be equated with P=a·G, and <signature>contains a threshold signature s, where the previous transaction is the message to be signed. Note that, as stated above, an ECDSA signature is of the form (r,s).
[0078] Note that the described signature generation methods are not limited to any particular use case and may be used generally to generate a signature based on any message. Signing all or part of a blockchain transaction is just one illustrative example. The described methods may be used, for example, to sign and / or authorize legal documents (e.g., wills, deeds, or other contracts), communications between one or more parties, digital certificates (e.g., those issued by a certificate authority), medical prescriptions, bank transfers or financial instruments, mortgage or loan applications, etc.
[0079] As a specific example, a group of participants (e.g., five participants in total) may form a board of directors for a corporation. A voting issue for the corporation may require a majority of the board (i.e., at least three participants) to agree on a particular vote. The board may use the described signature generation method to prove that at least three board members agreed to vote in favor of a particular outcome. In this example, the threshold of the signature generation scheme is three. That is, at least three of the board members must provide their respective signature shares in order for the coordinator to successfully generate a signature. If a signature is successfully generated, then at least the threshold number of board members (i.e., three) must have agreed to vote in favor of that outcome. Successful generation of a signature thus serves as a record of the vote and proves that a majority of the board voted in a particular way.
[0080] Another use case of the invention is in the field of digital certificates, e.g., digital certificates issued according to the X.509 standard. A digital certificate contains a signature that signs over some data. While the data can generally be any data, one particular example of data included in a digital certificate is a public key. The public key in a digital certificate is often called a "certified public key." The issuer of the digital certificate (a "certified authority") can perform one or more checks (e.g., know-your-customer checks) on the owner of the public key, and if the checks are successful, the certification authority issues a digital certificate that includes the public key certificate. Users can use the public key certificate to prove that they are who they say they are, for example, by signing messages with the private key that corresponds to the public key certificate.
[0081] One specific use for a certificate authority is in signing the certificates used in HTTPS for secure browsing on the Internet. Another common use is in the issuance of identity cards by national governments for use in signing documents electronically. The certificate authority uses its private key to sign a public key (or any other data to be certified).
[0082] FIG. 2 shows a flow chart illustrating one exemplary method 200 for generating a signature according to a described embodiment. The method 200 begins in step S201, where each participant 102, 104 may establish the required key shares, e.g., a secret key share, a temporary key share, and a blind key share. In step S202, the target participant 102 generates a first intermediate key based on a first intermediate key share generated by the target participant 102 and the dummy participant 104. In step S203, the target participant 102 generates a second intermediate key based on a second intermediate key share generated by the target participant 102 and the dummy participant 104. In step S204, each target participant 102 generates a message-independent pre-signature share. In step S205, each target participant 102 generates a signature share (or, rather, a share of the second component of the signature) based on the pre-signature share. In step S206, the coordinator 101 generates a signature based on a threshold number of signature shares.
[0083] 3. How to simulate t+1 schemes out of N<2t+1 The described embodiments may be used to simulate t+1 of N<2t+1 schemes. For example, a signature scheme may require at least 2t+1 participants, while a target group may consist of only t+1 participants.
[0084] To replicate the scheme with a group size smaller than 2t+1, the scheme needs to start with 2t+1 participants, where up to t of the other participants are "dummy" participants, such as service providers or trusted third parties (TTPs) offering this as a service. We assume that all secret shares and associated private data generated by each dummy participant are not compromised and are deleted immediately after the setup phase. This can be achieved by the dummy participants being independent of the scheme (i.e., target) participants. It is possible that a TTP provides all dummy services.
[0085] To create a shared secret of threshold (t+1) in a group of N<2t+1 participants, where the signing threshold is also (t+1), the following steps are performed: First, assume that "all participants" refers to the N "scheme" participants plus N' "dummy" participants, with the total number of participants being N+N'=2t+1.
[0086] All participants begin by establishing their private key shares and corresponding public keys. 1. All participants compute a shared secret key using JVRSS, where each participant i has a secret key share a i It has. 2. Scheme participants compute the corresponding public keys P. Dummy participants do not need to compute public keys. 3. All participants compute a shared ephemeral key as described in the introduction, where participants have a share k with a threshold of (t+1). i It has. 4. The scheme participant calculates the corresponding r value for this ephemeral key. 5. All participants run JVRSS for the blinded secret α. As a result, participants receive a share α i =JVRSS(i). 6. All participants receive a multiplicative share μ i = α i k i Calculate. 7. Each participant broadcasts this to scheme participants only, i.e. dummy participants do not receive any shares. 8. Scheme participants use all their shares to calculate the multiplicative value μ=interpolate(μ 1 ,…,μ 2t+1 ), and then calculate their inverse key shares (k i -1 =μ -1 α i ) to calculate 9. All participants receive a share of β i = JVRSS(i), where the shared secret has a threshold (t+1). 10. All participants then receive the intermediate share λ i = α i a i +β i This value has a threshold of (2t+1). These shares are calculated by i -1 Instead of α i Since the dummy participant does not need to have knowledge of (kα) in order to be able to compute the inverse ephemeral key share. 11. All participants receive the intermediate share λ i to the N scheme participants. Again, the dummy participants do not receive any shares themselves. 12. Each scheme participant will calculate the interpolation λ=interpolate(λ across (2t+1) shares. 1 ,…,λ 2t+1 ) = αa + β to calculate the intermediate value. 13. Each scheme participant i calculates β by essentially “removing” the dummy participant using the method in Section 3.2.1. i , k i -1 , and α i This results in an updated share β i ',k i ' -1 , and α i ' brings about α i Note that β does not need to be updated since it is no longer used. The private key shares are also updated since they will not be used again in this signature, but may be used in future signatures. i To update the share of, take the following steps: a. Use JVRSS to create a blind shared secret k, so that participant i has a share k i It has. b. Each participant i has β i +k i Then, we compute and broadcast this. c. Each participant receives a share β' = interpolate(β 1 ,…). d. Each participant will receive his / her updated share β i '=β-k i Calculate. This is the other shared secret share k i -1 and a i is repeated to update 14. All participants delete their old shares. This assumption is safe because the scheme is secure against at most t dishonest participants, so if all honest participants delete their shares, there are at most t shares remaining. This is not sufficient to uniquely determine any shared secret. 15. Each scheme participant i will hold their pre-signed share σ i =rμ -1 (λ-β i ')=r(kα) -1 ((αa+β)-β i ') to calculate 16. Each scheme participant i has the following i ' -1 ,σ i ), and the private key share (α i ',P) is stored. To sign a message msg, at least (t+1) participants perform the following steps: 17. The coordinator sends a request to at least (t+1) participants to create signature shares on the message msg. 18. Each scheme participant i computes a message digest e = hash(msg). Recall that in Bitcoin, this hash function is the double SHA-256 hash function. 19. Each scheme participant i has their signature share s i =k i ' -1 e+σ i Calculate. 20. All signing participants receive their signature shares (r,s i ) to the coordinator. 21. The coordinator calculates s = interpolate(s 1 ,…,s t+1 )=k -1 Compute (e+ar) as required, and the final signature is (r,s).
[0087] To achieve a threshold-optimal scheme for group sizes smaller than the required 2t+1, the scheme requires 2t+1-N dummy participants, who are then treated as participants who leave the scheme after their shares for the required computations have been used. In particular, the dummies do not need to have knowledge of the results kα or λ. These values can be added to the computations at a later stage, as explained in the previous section. The reason behind updating the shares is to prevent an attacker from obtaining shares from dummy participants, and then requesting only less than the threshold number of scheme participants to obtain enough information to create any of the shared secrets. By updating the shares, this removes the dummy participants from the scheme.
[0088] Note that a similar effect could be achieved by requesting that the dummy participants delete their shares after step 12. However, by updating the shares, the scheme participants can be confident that the shares held by the dummy participants have been invalidated, providing further assurance to the scheme participants.
[0089] If, after removal of the dummy participant, further calculations are required using the 2t+1 threshold, the participant can again update its shares to bring the dummy participant into the scheme, perform the required calculations, and remove the dummy again. These do not have to be the same dummy participant.
[0090] 4. Further observations It will be appreciated that the above embodiments have been described by way of example only. More generally, a method, an apparatus, or a program may be provided according to any one or more of the following statements:
[0091] Statement 1. A computer-implemented method for generating shares of a threshold signature, wherein a group of participants includes a set of target participants and a set of dummy participants, the number of target participants being less than the number of participants required to generate a valid signature, each target participant and each dummy participant having i) a respective share of a first private key, ii) a respective share of a temporary private key, iii) a respective share of a first blind key, iv) a respective share of a second blind key, and each target participant having v) a temporary public key corresponding to the temporary private key, the method being performed by a first one of the target participants; generating a first component of the threshold signature based on the temporary public key; generating respective shares of a first intermediate key based on the respective shares of the temporary private key and the respective shares of the first blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the first intermediate key from each other target participant and each dummy participant; generating the first intermediate key based on respective shares of the first intermediate key; generating respective shares of an inverse temporary private key based on the inverse of the first intermediate key and the respective shares of the first blind key; generating respective shares of a second intermediate key based on the respective shares of the first private key, the respective shares of the first blind key, and the respective shares of the second blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the second intermediate key from each other target participant and each dummy participant; generating said second intermediate keys based on respective shares of said second intermediate keys; generating respective shares of a pre-signature value based on a first component of the threshold signature, an inverse of the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, and respective shares of the second blind key; generating a second component of each of the threshold signatures based on the respective share of the reverse temporary private key, the respective share of the pre-signature value, and a message.
[0092] Statement 2. The method of statement 1, the method including making a second component of each of the threshold signatures available to a coordinator for generating the threshold signature.
[0093] Statement 3. The method comprises: obtaining a second component of each of the threshold signatures from one or more other target participants; A method as described in statement 1, comprising: generating a second component of the threshold signature to generate the threshold signature.
[0094] Statement 4. The temporary private key, the first blind key, the second blind key, and the second component of the threshold signature have a first threshold, and The method of any of statements 1 to 3, wherein the first intermediate key and the second intermediate key have a higher, second threshold.
[0095] Statement 5. A method as described in any of statements 1 to 4, wherein the method includes a step of updating each share of the second blind key, and each share of the pre-signature value is based on the updated respective share of the second blind key.
[0096] Statement 6. The step of updating each share of the second blind key comprises: generating respective shares of a third blind key; generating respective shares of a masked second blind key based on the respective shares of the second blind key and the respective shares of the third blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the masked second blind key from each other target participant; generating a second masked blind key based on each share of the second masked blind key; A method as described in any of statements 1 to 5, comprising a step of generating updated respective shares of the second blind key based on the masked second blind key and the respective shares of the third blind key.
[0097] Statement 7. A method as described in any of statements 1 to 6, wherein the method includes a step of updating each share of the reverse temporary private key, and wherein a second component of each of the threshold signatures is based on the updated respective share of the reverse temporary private key.
[0098] Statement 8. The step of updating each share of the reverse temporary key comprises: generating respective shares of a fourth blind key; generating a respective share of a masked reverse ephemeral key based on the respective share of the reverse ephemeral key and the respective share of the fourth blind key, and obtaining a respective share of the masked reverse ephemeral key from each other target participant; generating the masked reverse temporary key based on each share of the masked reverse temporary key; and generating updated respective shares of the reverse temporary key based on the masked reverse temporary key and the respective shares of the fourth blind key.
[0099] Statement 9. The method of any of statements 1 to 8, the method including sending a respective share of the first intermediate key to each other target participant.
[0100] Statement 10. The method of any of statements 1 to 9, the method including sending a respective share of the second intermediate key to each other target participant.
[0101] Statement 11. The method of any of statements 1 to 10, wherein each share of the first intermediate key is based on a multiplication of a respective share of the ephemeral private key by a respective share of the first blind key.
[0102] Statement 12. The method of any of statements 1 to 11, wherein each share of the second intermediate key is based on at least a multiplication of a respective share of the first blind key by a respective share of the first private key.
[0103] Statement 13. A method according to statement 2 or a statement dependent on statement 2, the method comprising the step of receiving the message from the coordinator.
[0104] Statement 14. The method of statement 13, the method including generating respective shares of the pre-signature value before receiving the message from the coordinator.
[0105] Statement 15. The method of any of statements 1-14, wherein any one or more of the respective shares of the first private key, the respective shares of the temporary private key, the respective shares of the first blind key, and the respective shares of the second blind key are generated using a Joint Verification Random Secret Sharing (JVRSS) scheme.
[0106] Statement 16. The method of any of statements 1 to 15, wherein the message includes at least a portion of a blockchain transaction.
[0107] Statement 17. The method comprises: adding the threshold signature to the blockchain transaction; and submitting the blockchain transaction to a blockchain network.
[0108] Statement 18. A computer device, comprising: a memory comprising one or more memory units; a processing device comprising one or more processing devices; The memory stores code configured to be executed on the processing device, the code being configured to, when executed on the processing device, perform a method as recited in any one of statements 1 to 17.
[0109] Statement 19. A computer program stored in a computer readable storage device, the computer program being configured to perform the method of any one of statements 1 to 17 when executed on a computing device.
[0110] In accordance with another aspect disclosed herein, a method may be provided that includes an action of each target participant.
[0111] In accordance with another aspect disclosed herein, a system may be provided that includes a computing device of each target participant.
[0112] In accordance with another aspect disclosed herein, a method may be provided that includes actions of each target participant and each dummy participant.
[0113] In accordance with another aspect disclosed herein, a system may be provided that includes a computer device for each participant, a target participant and each dummy participant.
[0114] Other variations or uses of the disclosed techniques may become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art once given the disclosure herein, and the scope of the present disclosure is not limited by the described embodiments, but only by the appended claims.< / signature>
Claims
1. 1. A computer-implemented method for generating a share of threshold signature, comprising: The group of participants includes a set of target participants and a set of dummy participants; the number of target participants is less than the number of participants required to generate a valid signature; each target participant and each dummy participant has i) a respective share of a first secret key, ii) a respective share of a temporary private key, iii) a respective share of a first blind key, iv) a respective share of a second blind key, and each target participant has v) a temporary public key corresponding to said temporary private key; The method is performed by a first one of the target participants; generating a first component of the threshold signature based on the temporary public key; generating respective shares of a first intermediate key based on the respective shares of the temporary private key and the respective shares of the first blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the first intermediate key from each other target participant and each dummy participant; generating the first intermediate key based on respective shares of the first intermediate key; generating respective shares of an inverse temporary private key based on the inverse of the first intermediate key and the respective shares of the first blind key; generating respective shares of a second intermediate key based on the respective shares of the first private key, the respective shares of the first blind key, and the respective shares of the second blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the second intermediate key from each other target participant and each dummy participant; generating the second intermediate keys based on respective shares of the second intermediate keys; generating respective shares of a pre-signature value based on a first component of the threshold signature, an inverse of the first intermediate key, the second intermediate key, and respective shares of the second blind key; generating a second component of each of the threshold signatures based on the respective share of the reverse temporary private key, the respective share of the pre-signature value, and a message; A method comprising:
2. The method comprises: making a second component of each of the threshold signatures available to a coordinator for generating the threshold signature; The method of claim 1 , comprising:
3. The method comprises: obtaining a second component of each of the threshold signatures from one or more other target participants; generating a second component of the threshold signature to generate the threshold signature; The method of claim 1 , comprising:
4. the temporary private key, the first blind key, the second blind key, and the second component of the threshold signature have a first threshold; and the first intermediate key and the second intermediate key have a higher second threshold value; The method of claim 1.
5. The method comprises: updating each share of the second blind key; the respective shares of the pre-signature value being based on an updated respective share of the second blind key. The method of claim 1.
6. The step of updating each share of the second blind key comprises: generating respective shares of a third blind key; generating respective shares of a masked second blind key based on the respective shares of the second blind key and the respective shares of the third blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the masked second blind key from each other target participant; generating a second masked blind key based on each share of the second masked blind key; generating updated respective shares of the second blind key based on the masked second blind key and respective shares of the third blind key; The method of claim 5 , comprising:
7. The method comprises: updating each share of the reverse temporary private key; a second component of each of the threshold signatures based on the updated respective share of the reverse temporary private key. The method of claim 1.
8. The step of updating each share of the reverse temporary private key comprises: generating respective shares of a fourth blind key; generating respective shares of a masked reverse temporary private key based on the respective shares of the reverse temporary private key and the respective shares of the fourth blind key, and obtaining respective shares of the masked reverse temporary private key from each other target participant; generating the masked reverse ephemeral private key based on each share of the masked reverse ephemeral private key; generating updated respective shares of the reverse temporary private key based on the masked reverse temporary private key and the respective shares of the fourth blind key; The method of claim 7, comprising:
9. The method comprises: transmitting a respective share of the first intermediate key to each of the other target participants; The method of claim 1 , comprising:
10. The method comprises: transmitting a respective share of the second intermediate key to each of the other target participants; The method of claim 1 , comprising:
11. each share of the first intermediate key is based on a multiplication of a respective share of the ephemeral private key by a respective share of the first blind key. The method of claim 1.
12. each share of the second intermediate key is based on at least a multiplication of a respective share of the first blind key by a respective share of the first private key. The method of claim 1.
13. The method comprises: receiving the message from the coordinator; The method of claim 2 , comprising:
14. The method comprises: generating respective shares of the pre-signature value prior to receiving the message from the coordinator; The method of claim 13, comprising:
15. any one or more of the respective shares of the first private key, the respective shares of the temporary private key, the respective shares of the first blind key, and the respective shares of the second blind key are generated using a Joint Verification Random Secret Sharing (JVRSS) scheme. The method of claim 1.
16. The message includes at least a portion of a blockchain transaction. The method of claim 1.
17. The method comprises: adding the threshold signature to the blockchain transaction; submitting the blockchain transaction to a blockchain network; 17. The method of claim 16, comprising:
18. 1. A computing device comprising: a memory comprising one or more memory units; a processing device comprising one or more processing devices; the memory storing code configured to be executed on the processor; The code, when executed on the processing device, is configured to perform the method of claim 1. Computer equipment.
19. A computer program stored in a computer readable storage device, comprising: When executed on a computing device, the computing device is configured to perform the method of claim 1. Computer program.
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