Secure computation system, device, method and program

The secure computing system addresses the challenge of performing group by operations on encrypted tables with flags by using encryption techniques to manage and ignore dummy records, ensuring accurate results in secure computation.

JP7582477B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-13NIPPON TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023532977
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-07-08
Publication Date
2024-11-13
Estimated Expiration
2041-07-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing secure computation methods fail to perform group by operations on tables with added flags, as they assume all records have meaningful values, leading to incorrect results due to ignored values affecting the final outcome.

Method used

A secure computing system and method that processes encrypted data using multiple secure computing devices, employing encryption techniques like secret sharing and homomorphic encryption to handle tables with flags, allowing for stable sorting and group by count operations without decoding.

Benefits of technology

Enables group by count operations on encrypted tables with flags, ensuring accurate results by managing and ignoring dummy records through encryption-based processing.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A secure computing device 1n of the secure computing system according to one embodiment of the present invention comprises a first calculation unit 11n, a second calculation unit 12n, a third calculation unit 13n, a fourth calculation unit 14n, a fifth calculation unit 15n, a sixth calculation unit 16n, a seventh calculation unit 17n, and an output unit 18n. Through computation performed in coordination by these units, it is possible to perform a "group by count" computation on a table to which a flag is added.
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a technique for performing database operations while keeping data confidential. [Background technology]

[0002] In order to handle data safely, a technology called secure computation that analyzes encrypted data is being researched. Among these, encrypted database processing is being considered to efficiently extract data that meets certain conditions and calculate aggregate values ​​while keeping the data encrypted.

[0003] The group by operation, a type of DB processing, is a grouping process that takes a table as input, groups it by the values ​​of a specified column, and optionally calculates statistics for each group and outputs them in tabular format.

[0004] A method for performing a group by operation while keeping it encrypted has been proposed in Non-Patent Document 1. The input and output considered here is a normal table in which each element is encrypted.

[0005] On the other hand, when database processing is performed while the data is encrypted, the input and output may differ from normal tables in that a flag may be added to indicate whether a certain record is the original output or not.

[0006] k → Let be the vector of keys, and v → Let be the vector of values, and f → Let be a vector of flags and [·] be encrypted data. FIG. 7(a) shows an example of a normal unencrypted table, FIG. 7(b) shows an example of an encrypted table in Non-Patent Document 1, and FIG. 7(c) shows an example of a table with added flags.

[0007] In Fig. 7, "?" indicates that some value is entered. If the flag is 0, the value of that record is ignored, so the value of this "?" is arbitrary. [Prior art documents] [Non-patent literature]

[0008] [Non-Patent Document 1] Ryo Kikuchi, Hiroki Hamada, Dai Igarashi, Hajime Takahashi, Katsumi Takahashi, "Let's try cross-sectional movement analysis using secret computing," In SCIS,2020. Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0009] The algorithm proposed in Non-Patent Document 1 does not work when a table with the flags added as shown in Fig. 7(c) is input. This is because, in addition to the input format being different, it was previously assumed that all records had meaningful values, so it was not possible to skip unused records for processing, and the value of "?", which should be ignored, would affect the final result, making it impossible to obtain the intended result.

[0010] An object of the present invention is to provide a secure computation system, device, method, and program for performing a group by count operation on a table to which a flag has been added. [Means for solving the problem]

[0011] A secure computation system according to one aspect of the present invention includes a plurality of secure computation devices, where m is the number of records and is an integer equal to or greater than 1, and k → is the vector of keys k → =(k1,…,k m ), and f → is a vector of flags f → =(f1,…,f m ), where α is an arbitrary value or an arbitrary vector, [α] is the ciphertext of α, and a predetermined operation can be performed using α as the ciphertext. → The ciphertext of [f → ] and vector k→ The ciphertext [k → ] to obtain the vector f → Negation of and vector k → Using the combined vector as a key, vector f → and vector k → Vector f' obtained by sorting each of → and vector k' → The ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ], and a plurality of first computation units for generating ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ], for i = 1, ..., m-1, f' i = 1 and k' i ≠k' i+1 or f' i =1 and f' i+1 When =0, e' i =0, otherwise e' i = 1, and f' m When =1, e' m =0, otherwise e' m e' such that =1 m The ciphertext [e' m ], e i Vector e' with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext [e' → a plurality of second calculation units that generate a ciphertext [m'] of m' by subtracting the number of records whose flag is 0 from m, and a plurality of third calculation units that generate a ciphertext [e' → ], for i = 1, ..., m, the vector e → Element e of i = 0, the value is i, and the vector e → Element e of i = 1, then x has value m' i The ciphertext of [x i ], x i Vector x with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [x → ], and a plurality of fourth computation units for generating ciphertext [e' → ], ciphertext [x →] and the ciphertext [k' → ] to obtain the vector e' → With key, vector x → , vector k' → and vector e' → The vector x' is a sorted version of → , vector k'' → and vector e'' → The ciphertext [x' → ],ciphertext[k'' → ] and the ciphertext [e'' → ], and a plurality of fifth calculation units for obtaining the ciphertext [x' → ] to find the vector x' → Let the ciphertext [x'1] of element x'1 in be the ciphertext [c1], and for i = 2, ..., m, let vector x' → Element x' of i to element x' i-1 The value obtained by subtracting i The ciphertext of [c i ], c i Vector c with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [c → ], and a plurality of sixth calculation units for generating the ciphertext [e'' → ] to obtain the vector e'' → A vector e''' consisting of the values ​​of each element of → The ciphertext [e''' → and a plurality of seventh calculation units that calculate Effect of the Invention

[0012] You can perform group by count operations on tables to which the flag has been added. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0013] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of the functional configuration of a secure computation system. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of the secure computing device. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 is a diagram showing an example of an algorithm. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 is a diagram showing an example of an algorithm. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining an example of an input and an example of an output. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of a processing procedure of a secure computation method. [Figure 7] FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining the background art. [Figure 8] FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating an example of a functional configuration of a computer. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0014] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail. In the drawings, components having the same functions are designated by the same reference numerals, and duplicated explanations will be omitted.

[0015] In addition, the symbol " → " should be written directly above the character immediately following it, but due to limitations in text notation, it is written immediately after the character in question.

[0016] Write the encrypted data as [x] and the vector x → =(x1,…,x n ) and write [x → ]=([x1],…,[x n ]).

[0017] Encryption is assumed to be performed using a method that allows the following operations to be performed on the encrypted data, such as secret sharing (e.g., Reference 1) or homomorphic encryption (e.g., Reference 2). When the · in ciphertext[·] is a bit value, the ciphertext[·] may be written as ciphertext[[·]]. The notation <π> may also be used for substitution. · is an arbitrary value or vector. Different encryptions may be used for the values ​​to be stored. In other words, these encryptions may or may not all be the same.

[0018] That is, for any value or vector of α, [α] is the ciphertext of α, and for any permutation of β, <β> is the ciphertext of β.

[0019] <Reference 1>Dai Ikarashi, Ryo Kikuchi, Koki Hamada, and Koji Chida. Actively private and correct MPC scheme in t < n / 2 from passively secure schemes with small overhead. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2014, p. 304, 2014. <Reference 2>Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Fully homomorphic encryption without bootstrapping. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), Vol. 18, p. 111, 2011. Assume that secret sharing and homomorphic encryption are supported for addition, subtraction, and constant multiplication. In other words, assume that the relationship c[a]±[b] ±d=[ca±b±d] holds.

[0020] Multiplication can be calculated using the method described in Reference 1 in the case of secret sharing, or homomorphic arithmetic in the case of homomorphic encryption. Multiplication is written as [c]←Mult([a],[b]), where c=ab.

[0021] A stable sort is one where the input [x → ]=([x1],…,[x n ]) for i ∈ {1,…,n-1}, x i '≦x i+1 'such that [x' → ]=([x1'],…,[x n ']), where x i '=x i+1 ', the original x →The order of the above shall take precedence.

[0022] More specifically, stable sorting consists of two algorithms: GENPERM and SORT.

[0023] GENPERM is x → GENPERM is a function that outputs the encrypted version of the permutation π that rearranges x. → ]) is written.

[0024] SORT π x → and rearranged x' → is a function that calculates the encrypted value. For example, SORT calculates [x → ']←SORT(<π>,[x → ]) is written.

[0025] For simplicity of description, when sorting multiple vectors with the same permutation, SORT can be written as, for example, ([x' → ],[y' → ])←SORT(<π>,([x → ],[y → ])).

[0026] The obvious way to configure SORT is to use a sorting network. In addition, if secret sharing is used, SORT can be performed efficiently by the method described in Reference 3.

[0027] <Reference 3>Koji Chida, Koki Hamada, Dai Ikarashi, Ryo Kikuchi, Naoto Kiribuchi, and Benny Pinkas. An secure three-party sorting protocol with an honest majority. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2019, p. 695, 2019. The equality test EQ is a function that takes [x] and [y] as input and outputs the ciphertext [e] of e such that if x=y, it is 1, and if x≠y, it is 0. For example, EQ can be written as [e]←EQ([x],[y]). Here, e is 1 if x=y, and 0 if x≠y.

[0028] When testing for equality between multiple elements, EQ can be written as [e]←EQ(([a],[b]),([c],[d])), where e is 1 if a=c and b=d, and 0 otherwise.

[0029] Generally, if data is encrypted in bit representation, equality can be determined by performing a circuit calculation to see if each bit of [xy] is 0. The circuit calculation can be performed using addition, subtraction, and multiplication.

[0030] If the data is encrypted in integer representation, it is possible to perform equality check by converting the data into bit representation using bit decomposition (see, for example, Reference 4) and performing a similar circuit calculation.

[0031] <Reference 4>Ryo Kikuchi, Dai Ikarashi, Takahiro Matsuda, Koki Hamada, and Koji Chida. Efficient bitdecomposition and modulus-conversion protocols with an honest majority. In ACISP 2018, pp.64-82, 2018. If it is also encrypted on mod p, then [(xy) p-1 ] can also be calculated using multiplication to check for equality.

[0032] IFTHEN is a function that takes flag [f] (where f∈{0,1}) and [x], [y] as input, and outputs [x] if f=1, and [y] if f=0. IFTHEN is written, for example, as [e]←IFTHEN([f]:[x],[y]). Here, e is x if f=1, and y if f=0.

[0033] IFTHEN can be implemented, for example, as Mult([f],[x])+Mult([1-f],[y]).

[0034] MODCONV is a function that takes an encrypted bit value [[a]] as input and generates the same encrypted value [a] but with a different ciphertext form. In other words, MODCONV is a function that takes an encrypted bit value [[a]] as input and generates an encrypted value [a] that is the integer representation of a. MODCONV can be written, for example, as [a] ← MODCONV([[a]]).

[0035] BITDECOMP is a function that takes an encrypted integer value [a] as input and generates the same value [[a]], which is the bit representation of a, but with a different ciphertext shape. In other words, BITDECOMP is a function that takes an encrypted integer value [a] as input and generates a ciphertext [[a]], which is the bit representation of a. BITDECOMP is, for example, [[k → ]]←BITDECOMP([k → ]), where k → =(k1,k2,…,k L ), then k=Σ i=1 L 2 i-1 k i It is.

[0036] The number of records in the table that is the subject of processing in the secure computing system, device, method, and program is m. This table is stored in a key vector k → The ciphertext [k → ], a vector of flags f → The ciphertext of [f → ]. The ciphertext [f → Let the elements of ] be ciphertext of bits. If there are no bits, convert them to bits using the bit decomposition protocol.

[0037] FIG. 5(a) shows an example of a table to be processed by the secure computation system, device, method, and program. Since the group by count operation does not use a value, in the table shown in FIG. 5(a), → The ciphertext [k → ] and flag f → The ciphertext of [f → ] is the only one listed.

[0038] By performing a group by count operation using the secure computation system, device, method, and program, the table shown in FIG. 5(b) can be obtained from the table shown in FIG. 5(a). → ] is the vector of keys k → A vector k'' with the elements of → This is the ciphertext of [c → ] is a vector c → is the ciphertext of [[e'' → ]] is the vector k'' → A vector of flags e'' corresponding to → is the ciphertext.

[0039] In Figure 5(a), the ciphertext [k'' → ] has two keys [1], and the ciphertext [k'' → ] has one key [2], and the ciphertext [k'' → ] has four keys.

[0040] Therefore, in Fig. 5(b), the ciphertext [k'' → ] corresponding to [1] in → ] has an element [2], and the ciphertext [k'' → ]'s corresponding ciphertext [c → ] has an element [1], and the ciphertext [k'' → ]'s corresponding ciphertext [c → ] has an element of [2].

[0041] An example of the configuration of a secure computation system and method will be described with reference to Fig. 1. This secure computation system and method performs a so-called group by count operation by secure computation.

[0042] The secure computation system is composed of N (≧2) secure computation devices 11, ..., 1 N In this embodiment, the secure computing devices 11, ..., 1 N Each of the secure computing devices 11, ..., 1 is connected to a communication network 2. The communication network 2 is a circuit-switched or packet-switched communication network configured so that the connected devices can communicate with each other, such as the Internet, a LAN (Local Area Network), or a WAN (Wide Area Network). Note that the devices do not necessarily need to be able to communicate online via the communication network 2. For example, the secure computing devices 11, ..., 1 N The information to be input to the secure computing device 11, ..., 1 is stored in a portable recording medium such as a magnetic tape or a USB memory, and the information is read from the portable recording medium to the secure computing device 11, ..., 1 N It may also be configured so that the data can be input offline.

[0043] Referring to FIG. 2, a secure computing device 1 included in the secure computing system n A configuration example of the secure computing device 1 of the secure computing system (n=1, ..., N) will be described. n For example, as shown in FIG. n , second calculation section 12 n , Third calculation part 13 n , Fourth calculation part 14 n , Fifth calculation part 15 n , Sixth calculation part 16 n , Seventh Calculation Department 17 n , output section 18 nn It is equipped with:

[0044] Secret computing device 1 n Each component of (1≦n≦N) is another secure computing device 1 n' The secure computation of the embodiment is realized by performing the processes of each step described below and illustrated in FIG. 6 in cooperation with each component (n′=1, . . . , N, where n≠n′).

[0045] The process of each step is performed by secure computation. n performs each step without recovering the ciphertext, in other words, without knowing the contents of the ciphertext.

[0046] Secret computing device 1 n The secure computing device 1 is a special device configured by loading a special program into a publicly known or dedicated computer having a central processing unit (CPU), a main memory (RAM), etc. n For example, the secure computing device 1 executes each process under the control of the central processing unit. n The data input to the secure computing device 1 and the data obtained in each process are stored in, for example, a main memory device, and the data stored in the main memory device is read out to the central processing unit as necessary and used for other processes. n At least a part of each of the components may be configured by hardware such as an integrated circuit.

[0047] <First calculation section 111,…,11 N > A plurality of first calculation units 111, ..., 11 N In the vector f → The ciphertext of [f → ] and vector k → The ciphertext [k → ] will be entered.

[0048] A plurality of first calculation units 111, ..., 11 N is the vector f → The ciphertext of [f → ] and vector k → The ciphertext [k → ] to obtain the vector f → Negation of and vector k → Using the combined vector as a key, vector f → and vector k → Vector f' obtained by sorting each of →and vector k' → The ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ] is generated (step S1).

[0049] The plurality of first calculation units 111, . . . , 11 N The processing described above is realized, for example, by the processing from "1:" to "4:" in FIG.

[0050] That is, a plurality of first calculation units 111, . . . , 11 N teeth, 1:[[k †→ ]]←BITDECOMP([k → ]) 2:[[f *→ ]]←1-[[f → ]] 3:<π>←GENPERM([[f *→ ]],[[k †→ ]]) 4: ([[k' → ]],[k' → ],[[f' → ]])←SORT(<π>,([[k †→ ]],[k → ],[[f → ]])) For example, the following process is performed.

[0051] In the example in Figure 3, the ciphertext [f' → ] as the ciphertext [[f' → In the example of Figure 3, the ciphertext [k' → ] as the ciphertext [[k' → ]] and ciphertext [k' → ] is generated.

[0052] In addition, GENPERM([[f *→ ]],[[k †→ ]]) is the ciphertext [[f *→ ]] and ciphertext [[k †→ Using ]], we get the vector f *→ and vector k †→This means the process of generating a ciphertext <π> of a permutation π by stably sorting the vector obtained by combining each of the elements.

[0053] <Second calculation section 121,…,12 N > A plurality of second calculation units 121, ..., 12 N contains the ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ] will be entered.

[0054] A plurality of second calculation units 121, ..., 12 N is the ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ], for i = 1, ..., m-1, f' i = 1 and k' i ≠k' i+1 or f' i =1 and f' i+1 When =0, e' i =0, otherwise e' i = 1, and f' m When =1, e' m =0, otherwise e' m e' such that =1 m The ciphertext [e' m ], e i Vector e' with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext [e' → ] is generated (step S2).

[0055] The plurality of second calculation units 121, . . . , 12 N The processing described above is realized, for example, by the processing from "5:" to "10:" in FIG.

[0056] That is, a plurality of second calculation units 121, . . . , 12 N teeth, 5:each 1≦i≦m-1 do 6: [[e i ]]←IFTHEN([[f' i EQ([[k' i ]],[[k' i+1 ]]),[[1]]) 7: [[e' i ]]←IFTHEN([[f' i ]]XOR[[f' i+1 ]]:[[0]],[[e i ]]) 8: [e' i ]←MODCONV([[e' i ]]) 9: [[e' m ]]=1-[[f m ]] 10:[e' m ]←MODCONV([[e' m ]]) For example, the following process is performed.

[0057] <Third calculation section 131,…,13 N > A plurality of third calculation units 131, ..., 13 N At least m is input to

[0058] A plurality of third calculation units 131, ..., 13 N uses at least m, subtracts the number of records whose flag is 0 from m to obtain m', and generates a ciphertext [m'] of m' (step S3).

[0059] The plurality of third calculation units 131, . . . , 13 N The processing described above is realized, for example, by the processing from "11:" to "12:" in FIG.

[0060] That is, a plurality of third calculation units 131, . . . , 13 N teeth, 11:[f * ]←MODCONV(1-[[f' → ]]) 12: [m'] = m - Σ i=1 m [f * i ] For example, the following process is performed.

[0061] In this example, a plurality of third calculation units 131, . . . , 13 Nto the ciphertext [[f' → ]] is further input to a plurality of third calculation units 131, ..., 13 N is this ciphertext [[f' → ]] is then used to generate the ciphertext [m'].

[0062] In addition, the plurality of third calculation units 131, . . . , 13 N is the ciphertext [[f' → ]] is replaced with the ciphertext [f' → ] may be used to generate the ciphertext [m'] in the same manner as above.

[0063] <Fourth calculation section 141,…,14 N > A plurality of fourth calculation units 141, ..., 14 N contains the ciphertext [e' → ] will be entered.

[0064] A plurality of fourth calculation units 141, ..., 14 N is the ciphertext [e' → ], for i = 1, ..., m, the vector e → Element e of i = 0, the value is i, and the vector e → Element e of i = 1, then x has value m' i The ciphertext of [x i ], x i Vector x with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [x → ] is generated (step S4).

[0065] The plurality of fourth calculation units 141, . . . , 14 N The process is realized, for example, by the process from "13:" to "14:" in FIG.

[0066] That is, a plurality of fourth calculation units 141, . . . , 14 N teeth, 13:each 1≦i≦m do 14: [x i ]←IFTHEN([e' i]:[m'],[i]) For example, the following process is performed.

[0067] <Fifth calculation section 151,…,15 N > A plurality of fifth calculation units 151, ..., 15 N contains the ciphertext [e' → ], ciphertext [x → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ] will be entered.

[0068] A plurality of fifth calculation units 151, ..., 15 N is the ciphertext [e' → ], ciphertext [x → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ] to obtain the vector e' → With key, vector x → , vector k' → and vector e' → The vector x' is a sorted version of → , vector k'' → and vector e'' → The ciphertext [x' → ],ciphertext[k'' → ] and the ciphertext [e'' → ] is generated (step S5).

[0069] The plurality of fifth calculation units 151, . . . , 15 N The process is realized, for example, by the process from "15:" to "16:" in FIG.

[0070] That is, a plurality of fifth calculation units 151, . . . , 15 N teeth, 15:<π'>←GENPERM([[e' → ]]) 16: ([x' → ],[[e'' → ]],[k'' → ])←SORT(<π'>,([x → ],[[e' → ]],[k' → ])) For example, the following process is performed.

[0071] In the example in Figure 3, the ciphertext [e' → ] as the ciphertext [[e' → In the example in Figure 3, the ciphertext [e'' → ] as the ciphertext [[e'' → ]] is generated.

[0072] <Sixth calculation section 161,…,16 N > A plurality of sixth calculation units 161, ..., 16 N contains the ciphertext [x' → ] will be entered.

[0073] A plurality of sixth calculation units 161, ..., 16 N is the ciphertext [x' → ] to find the vector x' → Let the ciphertext [x'1] of element x'1 in be the ciphertext [c1], and for i = 2, ..., m, let vector x' → Element x' of i to element x' i-1 The value obtained by subtracting i The ciphertext of [c i ], c i Vector c with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [c → ] is generated (step S6).

[0074] The plurality of sixth calculation units 161, . . . , 16 N The processing described above is realized, for example, by the processing from "17:" to "19:" in FIG.

[0075] That is, a plurality of sixth calculation units 161, . . . , 16 N teeth, 17: [c1] = [x'1] 18:each 2≦i≦m do 19: [c i ]=[x' i ]-[x' i-1 ] For example, the following process is performed.

[0076] <Seventh calculation section 171,…,17 N > A plurality of seventh calculation units 171, ..., 17 N contains the ciphertext [e'' → ] will be entered.

[0077] A plurality of seventh calculation units 171, ..., 17 N is the ciphertext [e'' → ] to obtain the vector e'' → A vector e''' consisting of the values ​​of each element of → The ciphertext [e''' → ] is calculated (step S2).

[0078] The plurality of seventh calculation units 171, . . . , 17 N The process described above is realized, for example, by the process of "20:" in FIG.

[0079] That is, a plurality of seventh calculation units 171, . . . , 17 N teeth, 20:[[e''' → ]] =1-[[e'' → ]] For example, the following process is performed.

[0080] In the example in Figure 3, the ciphertext [e'' → ] as the ciphertext [[e'' → In the example in Figure 3, the ciphertext [e''' → ] as the ciphertext [[e''' → ]] is generated.

[0081] <Output section 181, ..., 18 N > A plurality of output units 181, ..., 18 N contains the ciphertext [k'' → ], ciphertext [c → ] and the ciphertext [e''' → ] will be entered.

[0082] A plurality of output units 181, ..., 18 N is the ciphertext [k'' →], ciphertext [c → ] and the ciphertext [e''' → ] is output (step S8).

[0083] In addition, the plurality of output units 181, . . . , 18 N is the ciphertext [k'' → ], ciphertext [c → ] and the ciphertext [e''' → ] to obtain the ciphertext [k'' → ] and the ciphertext [c → ] to vector e''' → Element e of i It is also possible to output ''' with the elements corresponding to the elements indicating the dummy records deleted.

[0084] Ciphertext [k'' → ], ciphertext [c → ] and the ciphertext [e''' → 5B, multiple output units 181, . . . , 18 N is the ciphertext [e''' → ], the ciphertext [k'' → ] and the ciphertext [c → ] may be output. Note that the ciphertext [[e''' in Figure 5(b) → ]] is the ciphertext [e''' → In this case, the plurality of output units 181, ..., 18 N is the ciphertext [k'' → ] and the ciphertext [c → ] may be output up to the third element.

[0085] In this way, by sorting by placing the negation of the dummy flag in the most significant bit, the dummy record is made the lowest record, and by adding an if statement to the group boundary determination bit so that if the flag is 0, it does not become a boundary, it is possible to achieve group by count without decoding.

[0086] In addition, the secure computing device 11, …, 1 NThe fourth calculation units 141, . . . , 14 may perform so-called null processing. N This is realized, for example, by the process in the second line of "14:" in FIG.

[0087] That is, a plurality of fourth calculation units 141, . . . , 14 N teeth, 13:each 1≦i≦m do 14: [x i ]←IFTHEN([e' i ]:[m'],[i]) [k'' i ]←IFTHEN([e' i ]:[null],[k'' i ]) As a result, for example, the ciphertext [k'' shown in FIG. → ] is generated.

[0088] In addition, in Fig. 5(b), the ciphertext [[e'' → ]] is [[0]], in other words, the ciphertext [k'' → Records with [null] are dummy records.

[0089] [Variations] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described above, the specific configurations are not limited to these embodiments, and it goes without saying that the present invention includes appropriate design changes and the like as long as they do not deviate from the spirit of the present invention.

[0090] The various processes described in the embodiments may not only be executed in chronological order according to the order described, but may also be executed in parallel or individually depending on the processing capabilities of the devices executing the processes or as necessary.

[0091] For example, data exchange between components of the secure computing device may be performed directly, or may be performed via a storage unit (not shown).

[0092] [Programs, recording media] The processing of each unit of each of the above-mentioned devices may be realized by a computer, in which case the processing contents of the functions that each device should have are described by a program. Then, by loading this program into the storage unit 1020 of the computer 1000 shown in Fig. 8 and operating the arithmetic processing unit 1010, the input unit 1030, the output unit 1040, etc., various processing functions of each of the above-mentioned devices are realized on the computer.

[0093] The program describing the processing contents can be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium. The computer-readable recording medium is, for example, a non-transitory recording medium, specifically, a magnetic recording device, an optical disk, etc.

[0094] The program may be distributed, for example, by selling, transferring, lending, etc. portable recording media such as DVDs and CD-ROMs on which the program is recorded. Furthermore, the program may be distributed by storing the program in a storage device of a server computer and transferring the program from the server computer to other computers via a network.

[0095] A computer that executes such a program, for example, first stores a program recorded on a portable recording medium or a program transferred from a server computer in the auxiliary recording unit 1050, which is a non-transient storage device of the computer. Then, when executing a process, the computer reads the program stored in the auxiliary recording unit 1050, which is a non-transient storage device of the computer, into the storage unit 1020, and executes a process according to the read program. As another execution form of the program, the computer may directly read the program from the portable recording medium into the storage unit 1020 and execute a process according to the program, or may execute a process according to the received program each time a program is transferred from the server computer to the computer. Alternatively, the server computer may not transfer the program to the computer, but may execute the above-mentioned process by a so-called ASP (Application Service Provider) type service that realizes a processing function only by issuing an execution instruction and obtaining a result. Note that the program in this embodiment includes information used for processing by an electronic computer and equivalent to a program (data that is not a direct instruction to a computer but has a nature that specifies the processing of the computer, etc.).

[0096] In addition, in this embodiment, the present device is configured by executing a specific program on a computer, but at least a part of the processing contents may be realized by hardware.

[0097] Needless to say, other modifications can be made without departing from the spirit of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure computing system including a plurality of secure computing devices, m is the number of records and is an integer equal to or greater than 1, and k → is the vector of keys k → =(k 1 ,…,k m ), and f → is a vector of flags f → =(f 1 ,…,f m ) where α is an arbitrary value or vector, [α] is the ciphertext of α, and a predetermined operation can be performed using α as the ciphertext. The plurality of secure computing devices The vector f → The ciphertext of [f → ] and the vector k → The ciphertext [k → ] to obtain the vector f → Negation of and the vector k → The vector f → and the vector k → The vector f' is a sorted version of → and vector k' → The ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → [0036] A plurality of first calculation units for generating The ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ], for i = 1, ..., m-1, f' i = 1 and k' i ≠k' i+1 or f' i =1 and f' i+1 When =0, e' i =0, otherwise e' i = 1, and f' m When =1, e' m =0, otherwise e' m e' such that =1 m The ciphertext [e' m ], e i Vector e' with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext [e' → [0036] a plurality of third calculation units that use at least the m to generate a ciphertext [m'] of m' by subtracting the number of records whose flag is 0 from the m; The ciphertext [e' → ], where i = 1, ..., m, the vector e → Element e of i = 0, the value is i, and the vector e → Element e of i = 1, then x has value m' i The ciphertext of [x i ], x i Vector x with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [x → [0046] The ciphertext [e' → ], the ciphertext [x → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ] to obtain the vector e' → With the key, the vector x → , the vector k' → and the vector e' → The vector x' is a sorted version of → , the vector k'' → and the vector e'' → The ciphertext [x' → ],ciphertext[k'' → ] and the ciphertext [e'' → A plurality of fifth calculation units for calculating The ciphertext [x' → ] to obtain the vector x' → Element x' of 1 The ciphertext [x' 1 ] into the ciphertext [c 1 ], where i = 2, ..., m, the vector x' → Element x' of i to element x' i-1 The value obtained by subtracting i The ciphertext of [c i ], c i Vector c with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [c → [0046] and The ciphertext [e'' → ] to obtain the vector e'' → A vector e''' consisting of the values ​​of each element of → The ciphertext [e''' → [0046] and a plurality of seventh calculation units for calculating A secure computing system including:

2. The secure computing system of claim 1, The plurality of secure computing devices → ], the ciphertext [c → ] and the ciphertext [e''' → ], Secret calculation system.

3. The secure computing system of claim 1, The plurality of secure computing devices → ], the ciphertext [c → ] and the ciphertext [e''' → ] to obtain the ciphertext [k'' → ] and the ciphertext [c → ] to vector e''' → Element e of i a plurality of output units for outputting the data obtained by deleting elements corresponding to elements indicating dummy records from the data set, Secret calculation system.

4. A secure computing device of the secure computing system according to any one of claims 1 to 3.

5. m is the number of records and is an integer equal to or greater than 1, and k → is the vector of keys k → =(k 1 ,…,k m ), and f → is a vector of flags f → =(f 1 ,…,f m ) where α is an arbitrary value or vector, [α] is the ciphertext of α, and a predetermined operation can be performed using α as the ciphertext. A plurality of first calculation units calculate the vector f → The ciphertext of [f → ] and the vector k → The ciphertext [k → ] to obtain the vector f → Negation of and the vector k → The vector f → and the vector k → The vector f' is a sorted version of → and vector k' → The ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → a first computational step generating A plurality of second calculation units calculate the ciphertext [f' → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ], for i = 1, ..., m-1, f' i = 1 and k' i ≠k' i+1 or f' i =1 and f' i+1 When =0, e' i =0, otherwise e' i = 1, and f' m When =1, e' m =0, otherwise e' m e' such that =1 m The ciphertext [e' m ], e i Vector e' with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext [e' → a second computational step generating a third calculation step in which a plurality of third calculation units use at least the m to subtract the number of records whose flag is 0 from the m to obtain m', and generate a ciphertext [m'] of m'; A plurality of fourth calculation units calculate the ciphertext [e' → ], where i = 1, ..., m, the vector e → Element e of i = 0, the value is i, and the vector e → Element e of i = 1, then x has value m' i The ciphertext of [x i ], x i Vector x with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [x → a fourth computational step of generating A plurality of fifth calculation units calculate the ciphertext [e' → ], the ciphertext [x → ] and the ciphertext [k' → ] to obtain the vector e' → With the key, the vector x → , the vector k' → and the vector e' → The vector x' is a sorted version of → , the vector k'' → and the vector e'' → The ciphertext [x' → ],ciphertext[k'' → ] and the ciphertext [e'' → A fifth calculation step of calculating A plurality of sixth calculation units calculate the ciphertext [x' → ] to obtain the vector x' → Element x' of 1 The ciphertext [x' 1 ] into the ciphertext [c 1 ], where i = 2, ..., m, the vector x' → Element x' of i to element x' i-1 The value obtained by subtracting i The ciphertext of [c i ], c i Vector c with elements (i=1,…,m) → The ciphertext of [c → a sixth computational step of generating A plurality of seventh calculation units calculate the ciphertext [e'' → ] to obtain the vector e'' → A vector e''' consisting of the values ​​of each element of → The ciphertext [e''' → a seventh computational step of computing A secret computation method including:

6. A program for causing a computer to function as each step of the secure computation method of claim 5.

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