Cryptographic processing device, cryptographic processing method, and cryptographic processing program

The cryptographic processing device optimizes division operations in fully homomorphic encryption by reducing BlindRotate calculations, enhancing computational efficiency and speed in integer-wise arithmetic processing.

JP7588423B2Active Publication Date: 2024-11-22AKUSERU KK
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2022114760
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-07-19
Publication Date
2024-11-22
Estimated Expiration
2042-07-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing methods for fully homomorphic encryption, such as TFHE, require significant computational resources for division operations, particularly due to the need for BlindRotate calculations, which are time-consuming and inefficient.

Method used

A cryptographic processing device that performs division between ciphertexts by multiplying the dividend by the reciprocal of the divisor and truncating lower bits, utilizing a method that reduces the number of BlindRotate operations and enhances computational efficiency.

Benefits of technology

The proposed method significantly reduces the time required for division operations in fully homomorphic encryption, achieving faster and more efficient processing of integer-wise arithmetic operations.

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Abstract

To achieve four arithmetic operations of integer-wise type TFHE.SOLUTION: An encryption processing apparatus processes a cryptography. The cryptography is a complete homomorphic cryptography having a value obtained by providing an error with a predetermined variance to a predetermined value as a plain sentence associated with integers, and allowing predetermined operation of the integers without decryption. The operation is a division of a first cryptography ca being a dividend by a second cryptography cb being a divisor, and the encryption processing apparatus calculates a third cryptography corresponding to an inverse number of the divisor by using a first polynomial expression for the second cryptography cb, performs multiplication based on the first cryptography ca and the third cryptography, and calculates a fourth cryptography cz corresponding to a division result by using a predetermined polynomial expression for a cryptography of a multiplication result.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 3
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a cryptographic processing device, a cryptographic processing method, and a cryptographic processing program for processing ciphertext. [Background technology]

[0002] Homomorphic encryption is an encryption method that allows data processing to be performed on encrypted data without decrypting the data. Additive homomorphic encryption is an encryption in which there is an operation between ciphertexts that corresponds to the addition between plaintexts, and multiplicative homomorphic encryption is an encryption in which there is an operation between ciphertexts that corresponds to the multiplication between plaintexts. Additive homomorphic encryption, which treats finite cyclic groups as integers and performs only additive operations (addition and subtraction), and multiplicative homomorphic encryption, which performs only multiplicative operations (multiplication), have long been known. Finite cyclic groups allow integer multiplication by repeated addition, which means that plaintext can be multiplied by an integer, and repeated multiplication makes it possible to calculate the exponentiation of plaintext. There is also Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), which processes both additive and multiplicative operations while keeping the data encrypted. One type of fully homomorphic encryption is based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, which involves adding small errors to the plaintext during encryption that do not affect decryption.

[0003] In fully homomorphic encryption based on the LWE problem, errors accumulate as calculations are performed, so bootstrapping is performed to reduce the error components while still encrypting the data before the errors become too large to make decryption possible. The computation time of bootstrapping accounts for most of the computation time in fully homomorphic encryption. In addition, bootstrapping requires a huge amount of data, so the amount of computation is enormous. Therefore, in fully homomorphic encryption, it is sometimes impossible to obtain the computation result within a practical time. A technique that dramatically improves this problem is TFHE (Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus), which is shown in Non-Patent Document 1 (referred to as the above paper in the following description). There are two types of homomorphic encryption: bit-wise homomorphic encryption, which has two values ​​as plaintext and is based on logical operations, and integer-wise homomorphic encryption, which uses an entire integer as plaintext as a single ciphertext. The TFHE described in Non-Patent Document 1 is a bit-wise type. Note that the plaintext of TFHE is a real number between 0 and 1 that is associated with a circular group. Therefore, by associating integers with intervals that divide the range of the circular group from 0 to 1 in order, it is possible to apply it as an integer-wise homomorphic encryption that has integers as plaintexts (see Non-Patent Document 2). If TFHE can be used as a homomorphic encryption method capable of integer-wise arithmetic operations, processing can be performed more efficiently than calculating each bit one by one. The above paper shows that the TLWE ciphertext used in TFHE is additively homomorphic to plaintexts in circular groups, and it is obvious that addition (subtraction) operations can be performed on it. Regarding division, a method has been proposed in which ciphertexts are divided by using an evaluation technique for an arbitrary two-variable function (Non-Patent Document 2), and a method has been proposed in which ciphertexts are divided by evaluating a lookup table using a technique called Tree PBS (Non-Patent Document 3). [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0004] [Non-Patent Document 1] TFHE:Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus. Journal of Cryptology, 33:34-91, 2020, I. Chillotti, N. Gama, M. Georgieva, and M. Izabachene [Non-Patent Document 2] Integerwise Functional Bootstrapping on TFHE, 2020, Hiroki Okada, Shinsaku Kiyomoto, and Carlos Cid [Non-Patent Document 3] Improved Programmable Bootstrapping with Larger Precision and Efficient Arithmetic Circuits for TFHE, 2021, I.Chillotti, D.Ligier, JB Orfila, and S. Tap Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005] The method disclosed in Non-Patent Document 2 requires BlindRotate twice the number of times for the number of plaintexts included in one ciphertext, which causes a problem that the calculation takes a long time due to the huge amount of calculation. In addition, the method disclosed in Non-Patent Document 3 can calculate division relatively quickly, but further speedup is required. One aspect of the present invention is to enable faster division between ciphertexts and more completely realize the four arithmetic operations of integer-wise TFHE. [Means for solving the problem]

[0006] The present invention is a cryptographic processing device that processes a ciphertext, the ciphertext having a value obtained by adding an error having a predetermined variance to a predetermined value as a plaintext associated with an integer, the ciphertext being a fully homomorphic ciphertext that allows a predetermined operation between integers without decryption, the predetermined operation being a division of a first ciphertext that is a dividend by a second ciphertext that is a divisor, a test vector created using a possible value of the plaintext of the second ciphertext and a previously calculated reciprocal value of the plaintext of the second ciphertext, according to the second ciphertext; of the first polynomial By cycling through the coefficients and extracting the desired terms, The cryptographic processing device is characterized in that it calculates a third ciphertext corresponding to the reciprocal of the divisor, performs multiplication based on the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and calculates, as a multiplication result, a fourth ciphertext corresponding to a division result of the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext. Effect of the Invention

[0007] According to one aspect of the present invention, the four arithmetic operations of an integer-wise TFHE can be more completely realized. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0008] [Figure 1] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration of the cryptographic processing device according to the present embodiment. [Diagram 2] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration of a multiplication unit. [Diagram 3] FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining a calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. [Figure 4] 3 is a diagram for explaining in detail the multiplication calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. 2. [Diagram 5] FIG. 1 is an image diagram for explaining a circular group that the TLWE cipher has as plaintext. [Figure 6] This is an image diagram of binary gate bootstrapping operation. [Figure 7] FIG. 1 is a diagram for explaining TFHE applied to an integer-wise type. [Figure 8] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an integer-wise TFHE according to the present embodiment. [Figure 9] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an integer-wise TFHE according to the present embodiment. [Figure 10] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration of a cryptographic processing device that speeds up division of 3-bit ciphertext. [Figure 11] 11 is a diagram for explaining a calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. 10. [Figure 12] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration of a cryptographic processing device that speeds up division of 4-bit ciphertext. [Figure 13] FIG. 13 is a diagram for explaining a calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. 12. [Figure 14] 13 is a flowchart illustrating a division process. [Figure 15]13 is a flowchart illustrating a multiplication process. [Figure 16] 10 is a diagram showing ciphertexts input and output to Gate Bootstrapping of the present embodiment. FIG. [Figure 17] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a computing device. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0009] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings. In the following description, alphanumeric characters enclosed in [] indicate that it is a vector, and alphanumeric characters enclosed in {} indicate that it is a set. In addition, in this specification, the term "logical operation" refers to a binary or multi-valued logical operation.

[0010] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of the cryptographic processing device of this embodiment. The cryptographic processing device 1 includes a control unit 10, a storage unit 20, a communication unit 25, and an input unit . The control unit 10 includes a receiving unit 11, a first bootstrap unit (calculation unit) 12, a second bootstrap unit (calculation unit) 13, a multiplication unit 14, and an output unit 16.

[0011] The reception unit 11 receives an input of a ciphertext to be subjected to an operation via the communication unit 25 or the input unit 26. Alternatively, the reception unit 11 receives an input of a ciphertext from another process executed by the cryptographic processing device 1. The first bootstrap unit 12 performs first gate bootstrap on the input ciphertext accepted by the acceptance unit 11 . The second bootstrap unit 13 performs second gate bootstrap on the input ciphertext accepted by the acceptance unit 11 . The multiplication unit 14 performs a division operation by multiplying the encrypted text of the multiplicand by the encrypted text of the reciprocal of the divisor.

[0012] The output unit 16 outputs the final calculation result to the outside of the cryptographic processing device 1 or to another processing process executed by the cryptographic processing device 1. The storage unit 20 can store input ciphertext, temporary files and temporary data used in operations on the ciphertext, and output ciphertext. Furthermore, the storage unit 20 can store an encrypted database 60 . The communication unit 25 connects the cryptographic processing device 1 to a network, enabling communication with external devices. By storing the encrypted database 60 in the storage unit 20 and providing the communication unit 25, the cryptographic processing device 1 can function as a database server. In this case, the cryptographic processing device 1 can accept an encrypted query from a terminal device as an external device, perform a search on the encrypted encrypted database 60, and respond with encrypted search results to the terminal device. The input unit 26 inputs, to the cryptographic processing device 1, ciphertext to be processed and a query for the encrypted database 60.

[0013] FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a functional configuration of the multiplication unit in FIG. The multiplication unit 14 includes a first calculation unit 30, a second calculation unit 31, a third calculation unit 32, a fourth calculation unit 33, a third bootstrap unit (calculation unit) 34, a fourth bootstrap unit (calculation unit) 35, a fifth bootstrap unit (calculation unit) 36, and a key exchange unit 38.

[0014] The first arithmetic unit 30 performs a first homomorphic operation on the ciphertext output from the third bootstrap unit . The second arithmetic unit 31 performs a second homomorphic operation on the ciphertext output from the first arithmetic unit 30. The third arithmetic unit 32 performs a third homomorphic operation on the ciphertext output during the processing by the fourth bootstrap unit 35 . The fourth arithmetic unit 33 performs a fourth homomorphic operation on the ciphertext output during the processing by the fifth bootstrap unit . The third bootstrap unit 34 performs third bootstrap on the ciphertext output from the key exchange unit 38 and the input ciphertext. The fourth bootstrap unit 35 performs fourth bootstrap on the ciphertext output from the second arithmetic unit 31. The fifth bootstrap unit 36 ​​performs fifth bootstrap on the ciphertext output from the fourth bootstrap unit 35 . The key exchange unit 38 performs Private Key Switching, which will be described later, to exchange the private key of the input ciphertext. Note that Private Key Switching is essentially performed to obtain a TRLWE ciphertext having a step-like polynomial as plaintext from the TLWE ciphertext of the multiplier, and the purpose is not to exchange the private key of the ciphertext itself. Another method may be used as long as it is possible to obtain a TRLWE ciphertext having a step-like polynomial as plaintext (plaintext polynomial).

[0015] 1 and 2, a first calculation unit 30, a second calculation unit 31, a third calculation unit 32, and a fourth calculation unit 33 are calculation processing units that realize homomorphic calculations described below by software. The first bootstrap unit 12, the second bootstrap unit 13, the third bootstrap unit 34, the fourth bootstrap unit 35, and the fifth bootstrap unit 36 ​​are arithmetic processing units that realize the Gate Bootstrapping process described below by software. The key exchange unit 38 is a calculation processing unit that realizes private key switching by software. At least one of the first calculation unit 30, the second calculation unit 31, the third calculation unit 32, the fourth calculation unit 33, the first bootstrap unit 12, the second bootstrap unit 13, the third bootstrap unit 34, the fourth bootstrap unit 35, the fifth bootstrap unit 36, and the key exchange unit 38 may be realized in hardware.

[0016] FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining a calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. The configuration shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 described later uses the Gate Bootstrapping proposed in the above paper. The Gate Bootstrapping of TFHE proposed in the above paper will be described in detail below. In the following description, a TLWE ciphertext ca is the ciphertext of a plaintext integer a that is a non-divisor, and a TLWE ciphertext cb is the ciphertext of a plaintext integer b that is a divisor. In FIG. 3(a), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs a TLWE ciphertext cb to a first bootstrap unit 12 to perform first bootstrap, thereby obtaining a TLWE ciphertext cf. In FIG. 3(b), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to the second bootstrap unit 13 to perform second bootstrap, thereby obtaining a TLWE ciphertext cg. In FIG. 3(c), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cg to the multiplication unit 14 and performs a multiplication process to obtain a TLWE ciphertext ch. In FIG. 3(d), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext ca and TLWE ciphertext cf to the multiplication unit 14 to perform a multiplication process, and performs a homomorphic operation between the TLWE ciphertext ch and 1 to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cz as a division result.

[0017] FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining in detail the multiplication calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cB as a multiplier to the key exchange unit 38, and performs private key switching on the ciphertext cB using the key switching key KS to obtain a TRLWE ciphertext cc having a step-like polynomial as plaintext. The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TRLWE ciphertext cc to the third Bootstrapping unit 34 and performs third Bootstrapping to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cc'. In detail, the third Bootstrapping unit 34 performs BlindRotate and SampleExtract using the TRLWE ciphertext cc and the TLWE ciphertext ca having a step-like polynomial as plaintext to obtain the ciphertext cc'.

[0018] Although the process of performing private key switching has been described as being performed by the key exchange unit 38, private key switching can also be considered as part of the third bootstrapping. In that case, the third bootstrapping unit 34 performs private key switching, and the cryptographic processing device 1 does not need to include the key exchange unit 38. The obtained ciphertext cc' is a ciphertext corresponding to aB, which is the result of multiplication of plaintext a and plaintext B. However, the plaintext of the ciphertext cc' has a denominator of t, as will be described later. 2 Therefore, it cannot be used for the next and subsequent multiplications. Therefore, the cryptographic processing device 1 continues the process of setting the denominator of the plaintext to t.

[0019] The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the ciphertext cc' to the first calculation unit 30 and performs a calculation to homomorphically add the ciphertext Y of the error adjustment value to generate a new ciphertext cc'. If addition of an error adjustment value is not necessary, 0 is added. The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the ciphertext cc' to the second arithmetic unit 31 and performs an operation of multiplying the ciphertext cc' by t. The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the t-multiplied ciphertext cc' to the fourth bootstrapping unit 35 and performs the fourth bootstrap to obtain the ciphertext cl. In detail, the fourth bootstrapping unit 35 performs BlindRotate and SampleExtract on the t-multiplied ciphertext cc' to obtain the ciphertext cd. The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the ciphertext cd to the third arithmetic unit 32 and performs an operation cc'×t+cd-(0,1 / 4) of adding the ciphertext cd to the t-multiplied ciphertext cc'. The cryptographic processing device 1 (fourth bootstrapping unit 35) performs Public Key Switching on the result and obtains the TLWE ciphertext cl corresponding to the lower bits of the multiplication result.

[0020] In order to obtain the higher bits of the multiplication result, the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the ciphertext cl corresponding to the lower bits of the multiplication result to the fifth bootstrap unit 36 ​​and performs the fifth bootstrap to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cu'. In detail, the fifth bootstrap unit 36 ​​performs BlindRotate and SampleExtract on the ciphertext cl to obtain the ciphertext cl'. The cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the ciphertext cl' and the ciphertext cc' to the fourth arithmetic unit 33 and performs an arithmetic operation cc'-cl' to subtract cl' from cc'. The cryptographic processing device 1 (fifth bootstrap unit 36) performs Public Key Switching on the arithmetic operation result of the third arithmetic unit 14 to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cu' corresponding to the higher bits of the multiplication result.

[0021] The higher bits or lower bits of the multiplication result are the lower specified number of bits and the remaining bits when the multiplication result is expressed in binary. Note that this is the expression when t is a power of 2, and even if the value is different, the expression only changes, but the essential meaning remains the same.

[0022] This section provides details on Gate Bootstrapping as explained in TFHE. Gate Bootstrapping is a technique for making fully homomorphic encryption practical, which was previously considered impractical due to the huge amount of data and computation time required. The TFHE in the above paper uses a cryptosystem called TLWE cryptosystem, which is an LWE (Learning with Errors) cryptosystem constructed on a circular group, to realize various homomorphic logical operations (and ultimately any operation such as addition and multiplication) between TLWE ciphertexts at high speed and with small data size while reducing errors during calculation.

[0023] The input for Gate Bootstrapping in TFHE is a TLWE ciphertext encrypted with a private key. In TFHE, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is realized based on TLWE ciphertext. TLWE cryptography is a special case of LWE cryptography, which is a type of lattice cryptography (LWE cryptography defined on a circular group). It is known that TLWE encryption is additively homomorphic, and additive operations between TLWE-encrypted plaintexts can be performed without decrypting the ciphertext.

[0024] FIG. 5 is an image diagram for explaining a circular group that the TLWE cipher has as a plaintext. The TLWE cipher advances from 0 with real number precision and returns to 0 when it reaches 1. Any point on the circle group {T} shown in Figure 5 is used as the plaintext, and the vicinity of 0 (including error) and the vicinity of μ (including error) are used as plaintext. Points on the circle group {T} are also referred to herein as "elements." A cryptographic processing device that handles TFHE performs common homomorphic operations such as additive operations between such TLWE ciphertexts, and by using Gate Bootstrapping to keep the error in the operation results within an appropriate range, it realizes fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that allows logical operations to be performed again (at a later stage). Regardless of whether the value of the exponent of X is positive or negative, multiplying an element F(X) of the quotient ring of a polynomial ring by X n times inverts the signs of all the terms, and multiplying it 2n times restores the signs of all the terms. Also, X -1Since multiplying by is the inverse operation of multiplying X, -1 If you continue to multiply it, the opposite change will occur compared to multiplying it by X, -1 Multiplying it n times inverts all the terms, and multiplying it 2n times returns it to its original state. From the above, we can see that the element F(X) of the quotient ring of the polynomial ring has the same structure as X or X -1 Multiplying it n times will invert the signs of all the terms, and multiplying it 2n times will restore the signs of all the terms. In this cyclic group, since it can be rotated in either direction, it is sometimes referred to as multiplying -n times or multiplying -2n times for convenience.

[0025] [TLWE cipher] Explain the TLWE cipher. As an element on the circle group {T}, prepare a vector [a] of N uniformly distributed random numbers. Also prepare a secret key [s] of N binary values, 0 and 1. If the mean is the plaintext μ and e is a random number with a Gaussian (normal) distribution and a predetermined variance α, then the set ([a],[s]·[a]+e) is an example of a TLWE ciphertext. The average value of e when an infinite number of TLWE ciphertexts are generated for the same plaintext μ is the plaintext μ, where μ is a plaintext without errors and e is a plaintext with errors. Note that "·" represents the inner product of vectors. The same applies hereafter. If we define the above [s]·[a]+e as b, the TLWE ciphertext can be expressed as ([a], b). φ s (([a],b))=b-[s]·[a]=e is the function that decrypts TLWE ciphertext. Since TLWE ciphertext encrypts plaintext by adding the inner product of the secret key vector and random number vector and an error, it is possible to decrypt the TLWE ciphertext with an error by calculating the inner product of the secret key vector and random number vector. At this time, if the secret key vector is unknown, the components that make up the inner product cannot be calculated, and therefore decryption is not possible.

[0026] This TLWE encryption is additively homomorphic, meaning that addition operations between TLWE ciphertexts can be performed without decrypting the ciphertexts. Add the two TLWE ciphertexts ([a],b) and ([a'],b') as is to obtain ([a]+[a'],b+b'), and then use the above decryption function φ s If you enter φ s (([a]+[a'],b+b'))=(b+b')-[s]·([a]+[a'])=(b-[s]·[a])+(b'-[s]·[a'])=φ s ([a],b)+φ s ([a'],b') This gives us the sum of the two plaintexts. This proves that the TLWE ciphertext is an "additively homomorphic encryption". In the TFHE described in the above paper, various calculations are achieved by repeatedly performing additive operations on the TLWE ciphertext with errors added to the plaintext, and reducing the errors by gate bootstrapping.

[0027] In what follows, a "trivial ciphertext" such as ([0],μ) is a TLWE ciphertext that can be decrypted with any private key, i.e., a ciphertext that can be decrypted with any private key to decrypt the same plaintext. In ([0],μ), [0] represents the zero vector. "Trivial ciphertext" can be treated as TLWE ciphertext, but it essentially contains the plaintext as is. The TLWE ciphertext ([0],μ) is decrypted by the decryption function φ s When multiplied by φ s Since (([0],μ))=μ-[s]·0=μ, and the secret key [s] is multiplied by the zero vector [0] and disappears, the plaintext μ can be easily obtained. Such a ciphertext is nothing but a trivial ciphertext for the plaintext μ.

[0028] We explain the finite cyclic groups used in Gate Bootstrapping of TFHE. In Gate Bootstrapping, the quotient ring of a polynomial ring is used as a finite cyclic group. Explain that the quotient ring of a polynomial ring is a finite cyclic group. A polynomial of degree n is generally n x n +a n-1 x n-1 It is expressed as +...+a0. All these sets form a commutative group for the sum of polynomials f(x) + g(x). Also, the product of polynomials, f(x)g(x), has properties similar to a commutative group, except that an inverse does not necessarily exist. Such a group is called a monoid. The distributive law holds for sums and products of polynomials as follows: f(x){g(x)+g'(x)}=f(x)g(x)+f(x)g'(x) Therefore, if we define the sum and product of polynomials as elements, they form a "ring", which is called a polynomial ring.

[0029] In TFHE, we use a polynomial ring whose coefficients are the circle group {T}, and denote such a polynomial ring as T[X]. Let T(X) be a polynomial ring, and let T[X](X n If we decompose it into the form X+T[X] and collect only the remainders, we obtain the remainder ring of the polynomial ring, since this is also a "ring". In TFHE, the quotient ring of a polynomial ring is defined as T[X] / (X n +1).

[0030] The polynomial ring T[X] / (X n +1), using any coefficient μ(μ∈T), Polynomial F(X)=μX n-1 +μX n-2 +···+μX+μ Take out. When we multiply an element F(X) in the quotient ring of a polynomial ring by X, we get μX n-1 +μX n-2 It becomes +···+μX-μ, and the coefficient of the top term changes from positive to negative and appears as a constant term. Multiplying it by X again gives us μX n-1 +μXn-2 +···+μX 2 The same thing happens again: -μX-μ (the coefficient of the top term flips from positive to negative and appears as a constant term). Repeat this process n times to get -μX n-1 -μX n-2 ...-μX-μ and the coefficients of all terms are negative.

[0031] If we continue multiplying by X, -μX n-1 -μX n-2 -μX+μ -μX n-1 -μX n-2 +μX+μ The coefficient of the top term flips from negative to positive and appears as a constant term. If you repeat this 2n times, you get the element F(X)=μX n-1 +μX n-2 Returning to +···+μX+μ, in this way, the top-order coefficient (μ) appears in the bottom-order constant term with its sign inverted (-μ), resulting in an overall shift of one term. That is, polynomial F(X)=μX n-1 +μX n-2 +···+μX+μ is the quotient ring T[X] / (X n +1), it is a finite cyclic group of order 2n. In TFHE, the cryptographic processing device realizes fully homomorphic encryption by utilizing the properties of a polynomial F(X) based on a remainder ring of such a polynomial ring. Regardless of whether the value of X is positive or negative, multiplying an element F(X) of the quotient ring of a polynomial ring by X n times inverts the signs of all the terms, and multiplying it 2n times restores the signs of all the terms.

[0032] [TRLWE cipher] In addition to the TLWE cipher, Gate Bootstrapping uses a cipher called the TRLWE cipher. This section explains the TRLWE encryption. The R in TRLWE stands for ring, and TRLWE is an LWE encryption scheme built on rings. Like TLWE, TRLWE is also an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. The ring in TRLWE cryptography is the remainder ring T[X] / (X n +1). To obtain the TRLWE encryption, we use the polynomial ring T[X] / (X n +1) at random. In practice, the n coefficients of the n-1 degree polynomial are selected from the circle group {T} as uniformly distributed random numbers. If the degree of the polynomial is n-1, then X n Let polynomial a(X) be a polynomial of degree n-1, since it cannot be divided by +1 and there is no need to consider the remainder.

[0033] Randomly collect n values ​​from the binary values ​​0 and 1 and construct the polynomial s(X) that will become the secret key below. s(X)=s n-1 X n-1 +s n-2 X n-2 +···s1X+s0 n random numbers e i The average value is the plaintext μ i Let the random numbers be Gaussian (normal) distributed with variance α, and then construct the following polynomial e(X) from these. e(X)=e n-1 X n-1 +e n-2 X n-2 +···e1X+e0 s(X) a(X) + e(X) is expressed as f(X)(X n +1)+b(X) to obtain b(X). As a result, the TRLWE ciphertext obtained is (a(X), b(X)). Like the TLWE encryption, the TRLWE encryption uses random numbers for encryption, so an infinite number of ciphertexts can be generated for the same secret key and plaintext. In addition, the TRLWE encryption code has the same structure as the TLWE encryption code. s ((a(X),b(X))=b(X)-s(X)·a(X)+g(X)(X n+1), φ s T[X] / (X n The decryption function is defined as g(X) being the element of b(X) + 1. In other words, (b(X)-s(X) a(X))mod(X n +1) serves as the decoding function. mod means the remainder of the division.

[0034] [Gadget Decomposition] Explain Gadget Decomposition. The coefficients of the polynomial used in the TRLWE ciphertext are real numbers between 0 and 1, which are elements of the circle group {T} in FIG. 5, and have only a decimal part. The operation of decomposing this into several bits in binary notation is defined as Gadget Decomposition (Dec) in TFHE of the above paper. For example, if the degree n of the polynomial F(X) of the TRLWE ciphertext is n=2, then one unit of division is Bg=2. 2 Then, decompose it into l=3 elements, where each element is between -Bg / 2 and Bg / 2. The TRLWE ciphertext is a combination of two polynomials, such as (a(X), b(X)) above. Therefore, the TRLWE ciphertext d can be regarded as a two-dimensional vector whose elements are polynomials that are the elements of the remainder ring of the polynomial ring. For example, d=[0.75X 2 +0.125X+0.5,0.25X 2 +0.5X+0.375] Therefore, in the following, each element is written as Bg -1 =Decompose into the form of a sum of powers of 0.25.

[0035] On the circle group {T}, 0.75=-0.25, so d=[0.75X 2 +0.125X+0.5,0.25X 2 +0.5X+0.375] =[-0.25X 2 +0.125X+0.5,0.25X 2 +0.5X+0.25+0.125] = [0.25 × (-X 2 +2)+0.25 2 ×2X+0.25 3 ×0,0.25×(X 2 +2X+1)+0.25 2 ×2+0.25 3 ×0] It can be broken down as follows. Therefore, when Gadget Decomposition is performed, Dec(d) = [-X 2 +2,2X,0,X 2 +2X+1,2,0] This becomes the vector.

[0036] We also define an operator H that converts a vector back to a ciphertext. Based on the above example, TIFF0007588423000001.tif3034 This matrix is ​​the inverse transform operator H. By calculating Dec(d) H, the TRLWE ciphertext d is obtained. The lower bits are rounded off.

[0037] For a TRLWE ciphertext d, the operation of obtaining [v] such that ||d-[v]·H|| is the minimum value can also be said to be a gadget decomposition, where || is the norm (length) of the vector. All coefficients of e(X) have a mean of 0 and a variance of α, so 2l ciphertexts Zi=(a(X),b(X)) are generated. Then, the plaintext μ is encrypted as follows to obtain the following ciphertext k. TIFF0007588423000002.tif2643 This ciphertext k is defined as the TRGSW ciphertext BK. The TRGSW ciphertext BK constitutes the Bootstrapping Key used below.

[0038] Explain Bootstrapping Key. The Bootstrapping Key is used to encrypt a private key for use in Gate Bootstrapping. In addition to the secret key [s] (Nth degree) used for the TLWE ciphertext, each element of the secret key [s'] for encrypting the secret key [s] for use in Gate Bootstrapping is selected as a binary value of 0 or 1. The degree of the private key [s'] must be the same as the degree n of the polynomial used in the TRLWE encryption. Create a TRGSW ciphertext BK for each element of the private key [s]. When decrypted with the private key [s'], φ s’ Create 2l (el) TRLWE ciphertexts Zj such that (Zj)=0. And, according to the structure of the TRGSW ciphertext above, TIFF0007588423000003.tif3149 Let us assume that. A set of N TRGSW ciphertexts, the same number as the degree of the secret key [s], is called a Bootstrapping Key.

[0039] The cross product of the TRGSW ciphertext BKi and the TRLWE ciphertext d is BKi×d=Dec(d)·BKi It is defined as: Gadget Decomposition is an operation to obtain [v] such that ||d-[v]·H|| is the minimum value for the TRLWE ciphertext d. Therefore, [v] = Dec(d) and the error (ε a (X),ε b Using (X), [v] H=d+(ε a (X),ε b (X)). As a result, BKi×d=Dec(d)·BKi TIFF0007588423000004.tif2243 It becomes. The left half calculates the dot product, and the right half calculates [v] H=d+(ε a (X),εb Substituting (X), we get TIFF0007588423000005.tif1490 This is the same as calculating the sum of the three ciphertexts c1, c2, and c3 below. TIFF0007588423000006.tif1945 Since TRLWE encryption is an additively homomorphic encryption, adding two ciphertexts is the same as adding two plaintexts. C1 is Z j Since it is the sum of several times, the plain text φ s’ The expected value of (c1) is 0. Also, the decoded φ s’ In (c3), since the magnitude of the absolute value of the plaintext can be restricted by system parameters, it is set to be sufficiently small, including the subsequent calculations.

[0040] Then, φ s’ (BKi×d)=φ s’ (s i × d), but s i Whether s is 0 or 1, the calculation result is the sum of the three ciphertexts c1, c2, and c3. i It is not possible to determine whether it is 0 or 1. Assuming there are two TRLWE ciphertexts d0 and d1 corresponding to plaintexts μ0 and μ1, and substituting d=d1-d0 and finally adding d0, the CMux function shown below is completed. CMux(BK i ,d0,d1)=BKi×(d1-d0)+d0=Dec(d1-d0)·BK i +d0 The CMux function is i If μ0 is 0, the ciphertext of the plaintext μ0 is output without being decrypted, and s i If is 1, the ciphertext of plaintext μ1 is output without decrypting it. The CMux function can compute the ciphertext of either the plaintext μ0 or the plaintext μ1, but it does not know which one it chose.

[0041] TFHE's binary gate bootstraping is performed using the various pieces of information described above. Binary Gate Bootstrapping consists of three steps: (1) BlindRotate, (2) SampleExtract, and (3) Public Key Switching, as described below.

[0042] FIG. 6 is a conceptual diagram of the operation of binary gate bootstrapping. Binary Gate Bootstrapping reduces the error of the homomorphic operation result between TLWE ciphertexts with respect to the plaintext through the three steps described below. In the following explanation, unless otherwise specified, the plaintext refers to the result of an operation between plaintexts that is the result of an operation between TLWE ciphertexts. In the circle group {T} in Figure 5, plaintexts in the ranges 0 to 0.25(1 / 4) and 0.75(3 / 4) to 1 are converted into a TLWE ciphertext of 0, and plaintexts in the range 0.25(1 / 4) to 0.75(3 / 4) are converted into a ciphertext of 0.25(1 / 4). During this conversion, the error added to the plaintext is within the range of ±1 / 16.

[0043] (1) BlindRotate BlindRotate is performed as the first step in Gate Bootstrapping. BlindRotate is the process that creates the TRLWE ciphertext. In BlindRotate, we convert the trivial TRLWE ciphertext (0,T(X)) with polynomial T(X) as plaintext into X -φs(c’) The TRLWE ciphertext multiplied by is obtained without decryption. 0 indicates the 0th degree polynomial 0. Here, φs(c') is the plaintext obtained by applying the LWE ciphertext c' below to the decryption function. In BlindRotate, the following polynomial F(X) is used as a test vector, which is a finite cyclic group as described above. F(X)=μX n-1 +μX n-2 +…μX+μ where μ=1 / 8 X n / 2 The following polynomial T(X) is obtained by multiplying T(X)=F(X) X n / 2 Prepare the following.

[0044] Suppose there is a TLWE ciphertext c obtained by encrypting plaintext μ1 with a secret key [s]. Each element of this TLWE ciphertext c = ([a], b) is multiplied by 2n and rounded off to obtain the LWE ciphertext c' = ([a'], b'). When the LWE ciphertext c'=([a'],b') is decrypted, μ1'=φ s (c') ≒ 2n × φ s (c) = 2nμ1. The larger n is, the smaller the error becomes relatively. Prepare a trivial TRLWE ciphertext (0,T(X)) with polynomial T(X) as plaintext, A0=X -b’ ×(0,T(X))=(0,X -b’ × T(X)). 0 indicates the 0th degree polynomial 0. In this case, b' is an integer, so the power can be naturally defined. Hereafter, the above-mentioned Bootstrapping Key, BK i Using, in order, A i =CMux(BK i ,A i-1 ,X a’i A i-1 ) is calculated. Here again, since a'i is an integer, the power of X can be naturally defined.

[0045] Then, s i When is 0, the plaintext remains unchanged, and s i When is 1, X a’i are multiplied in order. Therefore, TIFF0007588423000007.tif2849 And if you repeat, TIFF0007588423000008.tif749 It becomes. Where: TIFF0007588423000009.tif629 is equal to the decoded function φs(c') with its sign inverted, so TIFF0007588423000010.tif741 Here, φ s’ (A n ) is the polynomial T(X) plus X -1 This is the ciphertext of a polynomial obtained by multiplying μ1' times. For the plaintext μ1 of the TLWE ciphertext c related to BlindRotate, a unique value (n coefficients and up to 2n coefficients with their signs inverted) according to the number of times μ1' (=2nμ1) by which the polynomial T(X) is multiplied by X is obtained as the coefficient of the constant term of the plaintext polynomial, so this can be considered as a kind of look-up table.

[0046] (2)SampleExtract TRLWE ciphertext A obtained by BlindRotate in (1) n The plaintext polynomial φ obtained by decrypting s’ (A n ), counting from the lower terms, we get n / 2-φ s The coefficient of the (c')th term is -μ, and if it becomes negative, the coefficient of the term from the top down will be -μ. TRLWE Ciphertext A n The plaintext polynomial φ obtained by decrypting s’ (A n ), if we look only at the constant term of φ s (c') is greater than or equal to n / 2 and less than 3n / 2, i.e., φ s If (c) is 1 / 2±1 / 4, the constant term is μ. Otherwise, if φs(c) is ±1 / 4, the constant term is -μ. SampleExtract is the TRLWE ciphertext A obtained by BlindRotate in (1). n From this, we can obtain the plaintext polynomial φ without decrypting it. s’ (A n) to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cs.

[0047] The process for obtaining the TLWE ciphertext cs will now be described. All TRLWE ciphertexts have degree n, TIFF0007588423000011.tif1134 and a polynomial, it can be expressed as (A(X),B(X)). When this is decrypted with the private key [s'], the polynomial of the private key is Put it as TIFF0007588423000012.tif636, TIFF0007588423000013.tif7116 It can be expanded as follows.

[0048] For this, the following calculation is carried out: TIFF0007588423000014.tif82136 get. Since it is a "modulus ring of a polynomial ring", (X n +1), we get the remainder TIFF0007588423000015.tif18156 is obtained.

[0049] moreover, TIFF0007588423000016.tif1046 Further afield, TIFF0007588423000017.tif38143 And then, TIFF0007588423000018.tif776 From this, the coefficients of each term of the plaintext polynomial can be found. Of these, what we need is the coefficient of the constant term, so if we extract the coefficient for j=0, we get TIFF0007588423000019.tif638 is obtained. TIFF0007588423000020.tif620 Further afield, TIFF0007588423000021.tif8114 This can be transformed into the decryption function of the TLWE cipher as follows:

[0050] In other words, the TRLWE ciphertext A obtained by BlindRotate in (1) n =(A(X),B(X)), the coefficients are TIFF0007588423000022.tif1055 Then, the original TRLWE ciphertext A n A new TLWE ciphertext ([a”], b1) is obtained, whose plaintext is the same as the constant term of the plaintext polynomial corresponding to a. This new TLWE ciphertext is the output of SampleExtract, and has two plaintexts: -μ or μ. The obtained TLWE ciphertext is added to the trivial ciphertext ([0],μ) whose plaintext is μ to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cs=([a”],b1)+([0],μ). Specifically, since μ=1 / 8 in the polynomial F(X) serving as the test vector, ciphertexts of −1 / 8 and 1 / 8 are obtained at this stage. Adding to this the trivial TLWE ciphertext ([0],1 / 8) with plaintext μ=1 / 8 gives us -1 / 8+1 / 8=0 1 / 8+1 / 8=1 / 4 From this, a new TLWE ciphertext cs is obtained, which has one of the two plaintext values ​​0 or 1 / 4.

[0051] (3) Public Key Switching The TLWE ciphertext cs obtained by SampleExtract in (2) is encrypted with the private key [s'], not the private key [s]. Therefore, it is necessary to replace the key of the TLWE ciphertext cs with the secret key [s] without decrypting the TLWE ciphertext cs, and return it to a state encrypted with the secret key [s]. Therefore, we will explain the Public Key Switching technique. The secret key [s] of the TLWE ciphertext used in TFHE is an N-dimensional vector. This is used to encrypt the secret key [s'] of the n-th vector used when creating the Bootstrapping Key. That is, TIFF0007588423000023.tif746 The elements of the circle group {T}, real numbers between 0 and 1, are encrypted as shifted values ​​for each digit when expressed in binary. The private key is [s]. The "number of digits" t is a system parameter. When decrypted with the private key [s], TIFF0007588423000024.tif737 This is the "key switching key." As mentioned above, the TLWE ciphertext cs = ([a], b) obtained in (2) is a value of 0 or 1 / 4 encrypted with the private key [s']. The number of elements of [a] is n, the same as the private key [s']. If we convert each of these into a t-bit fixed-point number, we get TIFF0007588423000025.tif735 It can be written in the form: At this stage the error increases, but the maximum absolute value can be constrained by system parameters. As part of the Public Key Switching process, the following TLWE ciphertext cx is calculated. TIFF0007588423000026.tif862 The term ([0],b) is trivial ciphertext, so when decrypted, it becomes b. When we calculate the result of decrypting the TLWE ciphertext cx, we get TIFF0007588423000027.tif8118 It is. s' i Since is a constant for j, we can factor it out as TIFF0007588423000028.tif749 Then, substitute the equation decomposed into fixed decimal points above. TIFF0007588423000029.tif977 the result, TIFF0007588423000030.tif530 This means the key change was successful.

[0052] The TLWE ciphertext cx obtained here is encrypted with the same secret key [s] as the TLWE ciphertext c that was input to Gate Bootstrapping. By performing the public key switching process, the TLWE ciphertext is restored to the TLWE ciphertext encrypted with the private key [s], and s If (c) is within ±1 / 4, then the plain text φ s (cx) is 0, φ s If (c) is in the range of 1 / 2±1 / 4, then the plaintext φ s (cx) is now 1 / 4. Through the above process, the result of Gate Bootstrapping was a TLWE ciphertext that was one of two values, 0 or 1 / 4, with an error within ±1 / 16. The maximum error does not depend on the input TLWE ciphertext c, but is fixed by the system parameters. Therefore, the system parameters are set so that the maximum error value is within ±1 / 16 of the input TLWE ciphertext. This makes it possible to perform NAND operations any number of times, making all kinds of operations possible, including addition and multiplication.

[0053] The errors in the "plaintext" of the TLWE cipher output from Gate Bootstrapping are the error added when the TLWE ciphertext is converted to an integer, the error added by CMux, the error when it is converted to a fixed-point number by Public Key Switching, etc. All of these errors can be constrained by system parameters, and the system parameters can be adjusted so that the error taking all of these into consideration is ±1 / 16. This completes the TFHE Gate Bootstrapping process.

[0054] As described above, TFHE is a bit-wise homomorphic encryption method that has 0 or non-0 as plaintext and performs logical operations. However, as explained in Figure 3, the plaintext is a real number between 0 and 1 that is associated with the circular group {T}. Therefore, by associating integers with the intervals that divide the circular group {T} in order, it can be used as an integer-wise homomorphic encryption method that has integers as plaintext. The above paper shows that the TLWE ciphertext used in TFHE is additively homomorphic to plaintexts in circular groups, and it is obvious that addition (subtraction) operations can be performed on it.

[0055] FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining the TFHE applied to the integer-wise type. As shown in Figure 7, the range of values ​​from 0 to 1 associated with the circular group {T} is divided into t parts. In a TLWE ciphertext, the possible values ​​of the plaintext are the t values ​​obtained by dividing the range of values ​​0 to 1, from -(t / 2) to (t / 2)-1, and (t / 2)-1 is the maximum value of an integer that can be recorded in one TLWE ciphertext. As shown in the example of FIG. 7, when t=10 and the range of 0 to 1 is divided into 10 parts, the ciphertext can express integers of -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. In this case, these integer values ​​are assigned to the intervals -5 / t, -4 / t, -3 / t, -2 / t, -1 / t, 0 / t, 1 / t, 2 / t, 3 / t, and 4 / t, which divide the range of values ​​0 to 1 of the cycle group {T} into t=10 intervals. By doing this, it is possible to assign consecutive integers counterclockwise from the area that contains 1 / 2.

[0056] As shown in Fig. 7, 0 (1) on the circular group {T} is within the range of -1 / 2t to 1 / 2t. The position within the range (position on the circular group {T}) of the plaintext of the ciphertext on the circular group {T} can be adjusted by adding or subtracting an offset based on 1 / 2t, for example, to the state in Fig. 7 as necessary. Although there is no essential difference, in the embodiment described below, the meaning of the division number t of the circle group is different from that described in FIG.

[0057] 8 and 9 are diagrams for explaining the integer-wise TFHE of this embodiment. As shown in FIG. 8, the encrypted texts of the divisor and dividend in this embodiment are obtained by dividing the entire range (0 to 1) of the circular group {T} into 2t parts. Increasing the value of t and dividing the circular group {T} into smaller parts allows for larger integer values ​​to be recorded in the TLWE ciphertext, but dividing it too finely results in a problem in that the margin of error added to the plaintext becomes too small, reducing the strength of the cipher. This point will be explained later. An integer value is assigned to each 1 / (2t) interval into which the circular group {T} is divided, and the possible plaintext integer values ​​of a TLWE ciphertext range from -t to t-1. t-1 is the maximum integer value that can be recorded in a single TLWE ciphertext, and -t is the minimum integer value that can be recorded in a single TLWE ciphertext. As in the case of Figure 5, Figure 8(b) shows the state where no offset is added to the plaintext (the offset to the plaintext is 0). Figure 8(a) shows the state where an offset of, for example, +1 / (4t) is added to the plaintext of the ciphertext shown in Figure 8(b). By adding an offset, it is possible to change the slicing of the circle group {T}. In the following description, the right and left halves of the circle group are assumed to conform to the state shown in FIG. 8(a) to which an offset of 1 / (4t) has been applied.

[0058] In the case where no offset is added, as shown in Figure 8(b), 0 (1) on the circle group {T} is within the slice from -1 / (4t) to 1 / (4t). By adding an offset, as shown in Figure 8(a), we can associate the integer 0 with the slice (0 / 2t) on the circle group {T} starting from 0. The other slices start from X / 2t (X is a plaintext integer). In Fig. 8(a), the plaintext with the offset is located in the center of each slice (e.g., the slice starting from 3 / (2t)) within the error range of ±1 / 4t. In this case, the mean of the normal distribution is, for example, 3 / (2t)+1 / 4t, and the plaintext is distributed within the error range of ±1 / 4t, so that the plaintext is distributed in the center of the slice starting from 3 / (2t). In Fig. 8(a), the plaintext with an offset is shown only for the slice 3 / (2t), but this is merely an example, and all slices have plaintext with an offset added to the starting value. The same applies to Fig. 7.

[0059] 8, the right half of the circular group {T} is divided into t pieces, and the left half is divided into t pieces. The right half of the circular group {T} corresponds to 0 and positive plaintext integers (0 to t-1). Integer values ​​are assigned to 2t slices of the range 0 to 1 (-1 / 2 to 2 / 1) of the circle group {T}, starting from -t / (2t) to (t-1) / (2t). These slices are centered on the starting value with an offset of +1 / (4t). The 1 / (4t) offset is equivalent to half the slice width of 1 / (2t). If the 1 / 4t offset is expressed as an integer, it can be conveniently expressed as an offset of +0.5.

[0060] As shown in Figure 8(a), when the range of the circular group is divided into 16 parts with 2t=16 (t=8), the right half of the circular group {T} can represent integers from 0 to 7 (=t-1), and the left half can represent integers from -8 (=-t) to -1. In other words, the entire ciphertext can represent integers from -8, -7, -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. These integer values ​​are assigned to the intervals that divide the range of the circle group {T} into 2t = 16 intervals, starting with -8 / (2t), -7 / (2t), -6 / (2t), -5 / (2t), -4 / (2t), -3 / (2t), -2 / (2t), -1 / (2t), 0 / (2t), 1 / (2t), 2 / (2t), 3 / (2t), 4 / (2t), 5 / (2t), 6 / (2t), and 7 / (2t). Integers are assigned counterclockwise from the range starting with 1 / 2.

[0061] The cryptographic processing device 1 sets the system parameters of TFHE. At this time, the cryptographic processing device 1 sets the range of error added to the plaintext in the ciphertext obtained after Gate Bootstrapping to ±1 / (8t 2 Set the system parameters so that the Suppose we have a TLWE ciphertext ca of the dividend (the number being divided) and a TLWE ciphertext cb of the divisor (the number being divided). The TLWE ciphertexts ca and cb of the multiplier and multiplicand are TLWE ciphertexts with the structure shown in FIG. 8(a), in which the right half plane is divided into t pieces and the entire circle group {T} is divided into 2t pieces. In this embodiment, in each of the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cb, the right half plane of the circle group {T} corresponds to a plaintext that is a positive integer. The TLWE ciphertext ca has as plaintext the real number a / (2t)+1 / (4t) corresponding to the integer a, which cannot be known without the private key. The TLWE ciphertext cb has as plaintext the real number b / (2t)+1 / (4t) corresponding to the integer b, which cannot be known without the secret key. The plaintexts of the TLWE ciphertexts ca and cb are a / (2t) and b / (2t) because the entire circular group is divided into 2t parts. As explained above, the +1 / (4t) offset added to the plaintext aligns the slice of the circular group starting from 0 with the integer 0, and positions the plaintext in the center of the slice.

[0062] As explained with reference to FIG. 8(a), in the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cb, offsets a / (2t)+1 / (4t) and b / (2t)+1 / (4t) are added to the plaintext. The offset value 1 / (4t) is an example and is not limited to this, but the polynomial and parameters must be adjusted depending on the offset value.

[0063] In Figure 8(a), on the right half of the circle group {T}, which handles 0 and positive numbers (non-negative numbers), integers 0 to t-1 are represented counterclockwise from the bottom using slices starting from 0 / (2t) to t-1 / (2t).

[0064] A method for performing division between ciphertexts will be described below with reference to Figures 2 and 4. By enabling division, TFHE can be used as homomorphic encryption that allows integer-wise arithmetic operations in a more complete form, in addition to the already known addition and some multiplication. Processing can be performed more efficiently than when calculating one bit at a time using bit-wise TFHE. In the method of this embodiment described below, division is basically performed (a quotient is obtained) by multiplying the dividend by the reciprocal of the divisor and truncating the lower bits. Since the cryptographic processing device 1 performs a specific multiplication involving truncation of lower-order bits in the process of division between ciphertexts, the specific multiplication method will be described prior to the description of the division method.

[0065] In the specific multiplication method, the cryptographic processing device 1 executes BlindRotate using a stepwise polynomial and simultaneously performs multiplication of Integer-wise ciphertexts. In order to obtain a stepwise polynomial for BlindRotate, the present embodiment uses Private Key Switching described in the above-mentioned paper (Non-Patent Document 1) as an example. First, Private Key Switching will be described. The key switching key used for private key switching is referred to as key switching key KS1 to distinguish it from the key switching key KS used for public key switching. The result of executing Private Key Switching using key switching key KS1 can be defined as f(c) = TRLWE_Enc(f'(TLWE_Dec(c)). In other words, the function f that can calculate the ciphertext obtained by applying the function f' to the plaintext obtained by the cryptographic processing device 1 decrypting the TLWE ciphertext c and performing the TRLWE encryption process without decryption is the private key switching performed using the key switching key KS1. The TRLWE ciphertext can be obtained from the TLWE ciphertext by using the key switching key KS1. A person who creates the key switching key KS1 knows the private keys [s] and [s'] and can generate the following key switching key KS1. TIFF0007588423000031.tif2064 A person performing private key switching, for example, the cryptographic processing device 1, can perform the following calculation from the TLWE ciphertext c([a], b) using the key switching key KS1, even without knowing the private keys [s] and [s']. Furthermore, since the key-switching key KS1 is essentially a collection of TRLWE ciphertexts, the private keys [s] and [s'] cannot be derived from the key-switching key KS1.

[0066] The cryptographic processing device 1, in a manner similar to the case of the above-mentioned Public Key Switching, converts the elements of the TLWE ciphertext into TIFF0007588423000032.tif1833 and breaks it down into: a i,j and b j is a iOr, it is the value of each digit when b is expressed in binary and can take the value 0 or 1. Then, the cryptographic processing device 1 TIFF0007588423000033.tif1075 Calculate the following. To see what this would be calculated without the private key, we rearrange the formula to get: TIFF0007588423000034.tif59137 It becomes. From the above calculation results, the TRLWE ciphertext c' is obtained by substituting the plaintext of the TLWE ciphertext for f' without decrypting the initial TLWE ciphertext c. The function f' needs to be a function that can be used without any problem even if the order of the encryption process, decryption process, and evaluation process of the function f' are switched. In this embodiment, a function that obtains the following stepped polynomial is set as f'(x), and the key switching key KS1 is calculated in advance. TIFF0007588423000035.tif1153

[0067] The cryptographic processing device 1 uses this Private Key Switching to generate a TRLWE ciphertext having a step-like polynomial as a plaintext from the TLWE ciphertext of the multiplier. Then, the cryptographic processing device 1 realizes multiplication by performing Blind Rotation on the obtained TRLWE ciphertext using the TLWE ciphertext of the multiplicand. The steps (1) to (6) for performing the multiplication process will now be described. In the following description, the TLWE ciphertext cB corresponds to the TLWE ciphertexts cg, cf, cs, and cp by which the multiplicand TLWE ciphertext ca is multiplied in the multiplication performed in the first, second, and third examples of this embodiment. In each example, the TLWE ciphertexts cg, cf, cs, and cp are appropriately replaced with the TLWE ciphertext cB. The plaintexts g, f, s, and p of the TLWE ciphertexts cg, cf, cs, and cp are also replaced with the plaintext B. In addition, even if the ciphertexts cc, cc', cd, cl, cu, cu', etc. obtained in the multiplication process have the same sign, they have different values ​​depending on the TLWE ciphertexts cg, cf, cs, cp that serve as multipliers.

[0068] (1) The ciphertext cB is a ciphertext obtained by dividing the right half of the circular group (0 to 0.5) into t=8 parts, and integers from 0 to (t-1) correspond to the right half of the circular group divided into t=8 parts. The circular group as a whole is divided into 2t parts. On the other hand, the ciphertext cB' is a ciphertext in which the number of divisions of the ciphertext cB is transformed, although the integer value itself corresponding to the plaintext remains unchanged from that of the ciphertext cB. The ciphertext cB' is 2 = 64, the right half of the circular group (0 to 0.5) is divided into integers from 0 to (t-1). The whole circular group is 2t 2 This means that it is divided into pieces. Test Vector Polynomial T(X) TIFF0007588423000036.tif1055 Another method is to perform BlindRotate on the TLWE ciphertext cB using the above to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cB'(LEVEL1).

[0069] In contrast, in this embodiment, 1 / (2t 2 ) is stored in a lookup table. By referencing such a lookup table, we can obtain the TLWE ciphertext cB', and therefore omit bootstrap- ping for the ciphertext cB. The number of bootstraps required for the multiplication can be a total of three: one for the ciphertext cc obtained by Private Key Switching (described below) (the third bootstrap), and two for decomposing the upper and lower bits (the fourth and fifth bootstraps).

[0070] The encryption / decryption processing device 1 (key exchange unit 38) performs private key switching on the ciphertext cB' using the key switching key KS to obtain a TRLWE ciphertext cc. The private key of the ciphertext cc is [s']. The result of decrypting the TRLWE ciphertext cc with the private key [s'] is as follows: TIFF0007588423000037.tif10137 The plaintext of the ciphertext cc is the plaintext polynomial TIFF0007588423000038.tif1143 By dividing the right half of the circular group into t parts (0, 1, 2, 3...), a polynomial is obtained whose coefficients increase stepwise for each value of the plaintext of the ciphertext cB. When the ciphertext cB has a plaintext value of 3, as a result of private key switching, a plaintext polynomial is obtained in which the coefficients of the degree terms corresponding to the right half of the circular group are 0, 3, 6, 9, and 12, which are multiples of the plaintext (3) of the ciphertext cB.

[0071] (2) As the third bootstrap, the cryptographic processing device 1 (the third bootstrap unit 34) performs BlindRotate on the TRLWE ciphertext cc (LEVEL 1) using the TLWE ciphertext ca (LEVEL 0) and performs SampleExtract to obtain the ciphertext cc' (LEVEL 1). The private key of the ciphertext cc' is [s']. The TLWE ciphertext ca' obtained by multiplying the TLWE ciphertext ca by 2n has an / t as the plaintext, since {a / (2t)}×2n. Therefore, φ s’ Among the plaintext polynomials in (cc), the terms whose exponents are close to an / t+n / (2t) are obtained as constant terms. That is, φ s’ (cc')=aB / (2t 2 ) and the ciphertext cc' is aB / (2t 2 ) The product of plaintext a and plaintext B has been obtained, and ciphertext cc' is the ciphertext corresponding to the product of plaintext a and plaintext B.

[0072] The ciphertext cc' obtained as the result of multiplication in the middle of the process shown in Fig. 9 is the entire range of 0 to 1 in the example of t=8, which is 2t 2 = 128 parts, and the ciphertext can represent the integers -64, -63..., -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4..., 62, and 63. On the right half of the circle group, t 2 =64 integers, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, ... 63, can be represented. These integer values ​​are divided into 2t 2 1 / 2t divided into pieces 2 Each section is assigned to a different time slot. In the ciphertext corresponding to the multiplication result, the right half of the circle group is t 2 The whole circle group is divided into 2t 2 It is divided into pieces. For t=8, the right half of the circle group is t 2 =64 divisions can be used to represent integers from 0 to 63. The entire circular group is 2t 2 = 128 divisions.

[0073] For t=8, 2 3 = 8, the TLWE ciphertexts ca and cB of the multiplier and multiplicand record 3-bit integers in the circular group (right half). The multiplication result of 3-bit integers is a 6-bit integer, and the TLWE ciphertext that records this is 6 = 64 divisions, i.e. t 2 Divide into pieces. In this way, the encrypted text of the multiplication result differs from the encrypted texts of the multiplier and multiplicand in the number of divisions of the circular group. In this embodiment, since only the portion of the multiplication result corresponding to the quotient is needed, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs a conversion to obtain the quotient of the division result in order to match the number of divisions of the circular group before and after the multiplication of the ciphertext. The cryptographic processing device 1 is, for example, a 6-bit (2t 2 From the multiplication result (2t division), the lowest 3 bits (2t division) and the highest 3 bits (2t division) are extracted to obtain the same 2t-division ciphertext as before the multiplication. The highest 3 bits are the quotient.

[0074] For example, if t=8, 0 to 63 (8 2 Even if bootstrapping t = 64) with a sawtooth polynomial (coefficients 0123 to 67012...) and a step polynomial (coefficients 000011112222...), it is possible to obtain the quotient and remainder when dividing the multiplication result by t. However, since the degree N of the vector used in TFHE is considered to be 635 and the degree n of the polynomial is considered to be 1024, the rounding error of 635 is accumulated at the stage where the 635 coefficients of the TLWE ciphertext are multiplied by 2n just before BlindRotate. In addition, the interval obtained by dividing the degree n of the polynomial according to the division number of the interval from 0 to 0.5 corresponds to one integer, but with 64 divisions, the width is only 16, so only an error of ±8 is allowed. This causes a problem that the calculation error rate is too high.

[0075] There is an option to increase the degree of the polynomial n or reduce the degree of the vector N, but this would sacrifice encryption strength and computation speed. Increasing the degree of the polynomial increases the computational complexity of the multiplications performed by CMux to O(n 2 ) while decreasing the degree of the vector reduces the freedom in analysis, making the cipher easier to decode. Therefore, in this embodiment, the following method is used to sufficiently suppress the error rate while ensuring that the denominator of the plain text is 2t 2 Calculate the ciphertext (quotient ciphertext, remainder ciphertext) whose denominator is 2t from the plaintext.

[0076] (3) The cryptographic processing device 1 (second calculation unit 31) converts the ciphertext cc' into a ciphertext whose plaintext denominator is t. First, the ciphertext cc' is multiplied by t. The t-fold multiplication of the ciphertext cc' is an integer multiple, and as explained above, the integer multiple of a ciphertext is defined on a circular group. Therefore, the t-fold multiplication of the ciphertext cc' can be obtained by a conventionally known method. The plaintext of the t-fold multiplied ciphertext cc' is aB / (2t 2 )×t=aB / 2t, with t as the denominator.

[0077] The cryptographic processing device 1 (fourth bootstrap unit 35) performs BlindRotate and SampleExtract on the t-multiplied ciphertext cc' using a test vector polynomial with coefficient μ=1 / 4 to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cd (secret key is [s']). At this point, since public key switching has not been performed, the secret key of the TLWE ciphertext cd is [s']. t 2 If BlindRotate is simply applied to the divided TLWE ciphertext cc', the ciphertext will be corrupted due to rounding errors, so the ciphertext cc' is multiplied by t as explained above. t 2 By multiplying the divided TLWE ciphertext cc' by t and processing it as a ciphertext divided into t parts, the width of the value on the circular group corresponding to the integer symbol becomes 1 / 2t as shown in Figure 9. 2 The range of the t-fold expansion is from t to 1 / 2t in Figure 6(a). Therefore, the interval (error range) between plaintexts on the circular group can be made sufficiently wide, the error due to rounding can be suppressed to an acceptable range, and the error rate during BlindRotate can be sufficiently reduced. Furthermore, as a result of multiplying the ciphertext cc' by t, the plaintext that used to be in the interval from 0 to 0.5 (right half plane) on the circular group is now distributed in the interval from 0.5 to 1 in the TLWE ciphertext cd. The TLWE ciphertext cd has 1 / 4 as the plaintext in the interval from 0 to 0.5 (right half plane) on the circular group, and -1 / 4 as the plaintext in the interval from 0.5 to 1 (left half plane).

[0078] (4) The cryptographic processing device 1 (third calculation unit 32) calculates cc'×t+cd-(0,1 / 4). The cryptographic processing device 1 (fourth bootstrap unit 35) performs public key switching on the calculation result to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cl with the secret key [s]. This obtains the lower bits of the multiplication result. The TLWE ciphertext cl is decrypted to φ s The ciphertext is (cl)=(aB mod t) / (2t)+1 / (4t).

[0079] If we consider that the remainder is always positive, then even if the plaintext of the ciphertext cc' is negative, the plaintext of the ciphertext cl will be positive. Once the quotient is calculated, t × quotient + remainder = ab holds regardless of whether it is positive or negative, so there is no mathematical contradiction. When the result of the multiplication is stored in a single variable and a modular division instruction is used to calculate it on a computer, the result will vary depending on the language processing system and CPU architecture, but it will be exactly the same as the process of decomposing t as a power of 2 using shift and AND operations, that is, expressing it in binary and simply dividing the bits. Since the calculation is performed using t-times the TLWE ciphertext, the range of values ​​corresponding to one integer symbol is expanded by t times, making it possible to relatively tolerate errors due to rounding. Also, by performing addition and multiplication using the TLWE ciphertext with the secret key [s'], the effect of public key switching, which adds a relatively large error, can be reduced.

[0080] To obtain the higher order bits of the multiplication result, the following operation is performed. (5) The information processing device 1 (the fifth bootstrap unit 36) performs the following test vector polynomial on the TLWE ciphertext cl of the lower bits: TIFF0007588423000039.tif1149 Then, BlindRotate and SampleExtract are performed using [s'] to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cl' (LEVEL1). The TLWE ciphertext cl' has a secret key [s']. The TLWE ciphertext cl' has a plaintext denominator of 1 / 2t 2 This is a ciphertext that holds the lower bits of the multiplication result (aB mod t) using the range 0 to 1 / (2t). Since it is assumed that the remainder is not a negative number, it is thought to use only the right half of the circular group.

[0081] (6) The cryptographic processing device 1 (the fourth calculation unit 33) calculates cu=cc'-cl'+(0,1 / 4t) to obtain the ciphertext cu. Public key switching is performed on the ciphertext cu, and the private key is switched from [s'] back to [s] to obtain the ciphertext cu'. In other words, aB / 2t 2 From (aB mod t) / 2t 2 By subtracting , we make the numerator a multiple of t, and then reduce the numerator and denominator by t. And then, TIFF0007588423000040.tif1184 is obtained. In this case, the error components added to the plaintexts cc' and cl' follow a normal distribution, so the error added to the plaintext cu by reproducibility also follows a normal distribution. Therefore, the ciphertext cu' can be used as is for the next calculation. In other words, by subtracting the ciphertext that is a remainder modulo 8 from the ciphertext in which the right half is divided into 64, the ciphertext will always have a plaintext that is a multiple of 8. In other words, every 8th block is used. When comparing this with the ciphertext in which the right half is divided into 8, the division method is the same, and only the variance of the given error is different, so the ciphertext cu can be treated as a ciphertext in which the right half is effectively divided into 8. This is because the error components added to the plaintext in the ciphertext cc' and ciphertext cl' follow a normal distribution. The error added to the plaintext in the ciphertext cu obtained by ciphertext cc'-ciphertext cl' also follows a normal distribution due to a property called reproducibility. Therefore, the ciphertext cu' of the most significant digits (bits) of the multiplication can be used as is in the next calculation without bootstrapping. Both the ciphertext cu' and the ciphertext cl are at LEVEL 0, with the private key restored to [s] by public key switching at the end. By eliminating this process and performing public key switching on the ciphertext ca and the ciphertext cb during pre-processing, it is possible to use LEVEL 1 as the input and output.

[0082] <First Example> 1 to 4, a method of dividing a TLWE ciphertext ca of an integer a as a dividend by a ciphertext cb of an integer b as a divisor will be described as a first embodiment. This first embodiment corresponds to the configuration in FIG. As explained in Fig. 8, the maximum integer value that the TLWE ciphertext can contain is t-1, the dividend a can take a value from 0 to t-1, and the divisor b can take a value from 1 to t-1. The divisor cannot be 0. The cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the ciphertext of the dividend by the ciphertext of the reciprocal of the divisor, and obtains a division result (quotient) by leaving only the most significant bits from the multiplication result, thereby performing ciphertext division. The quotient z of the dividend a and divisor b is TIFF0007588423000041.tif1115 As described in FIG. 8, the division result z that can be expressed in the TLWE ciphertext is an integer whose maximum value is t-1. The formula to find z is TIFF0007588423000042.tif109 Transform the above using the maximum integer (t-1), (Formula 1) TIFF0007588423000043.tif25113 This can be expressed as:

[0083] Here, the function for the divisor b in (Equation 1) is TIFF0007588423000044.tif1137 Each of TIFF0007588423000045.tif2036 Far away. The value of t, which is the number of divisions of the ciphertext, is determined by a system parameter, and the divisor b, which is the argument of the functions f(x) and g(x), is a limited number of integers between 0 and t-1 (0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 when t is 8). However, since the divisor cannot be 0, the value of the divisor b actually excludes 0. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs the following in each case where the value of x (the value of the divisor b) is from 1 to t-1: TIFF0007588423000046.tif2135 Calculate in advance and create a table that associates each calculation result with the value of x as shown below. TIFF0007588423000047.tif15139 TIFF0007588423000048.tif15139 The calculation result f of f(x) corresponds to the reciprocal of the divisor b, and the calculation result g of g(x) corresponds to an error adjustment value for the division result. Using the above f(x) and g(x), Equation 1 is as follows: (Formula 2) TIFF0007588423000049.tif1538 It can be transformed into:

[0084] t 2 Homomorphic addition can be performed on the ciphertext cc' during the multiplication, which can hold integers up to -1. Therefore, the ciphertext cu' of the upper bits of the multiplication result of the ciphertext ca and the ciphertext cb according to Figure 4 can be written as a formula using the following function m, TIFF0007588423000050.tif1037 This is an evaluation of the above. Using the function m, the above (Equation 2) becomes: (Formula 3) z=m(a,f(b),m(a,g(b),0)+1) This can be expressed as: As described above, the values ​​of f(b) and g(b) are stored in a table in association with the value of the divisor b. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs gate bootstrapping using test vectors created based on these tables, and executes division to obtain the quotient z.

[0085] Specifically, as shown in FIG. 3(a), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to the first bootstrap unit 12, performs the first bootstrap using the test vector created from the above , and obtains the ciphertext cf having the reciprocal f of the divisor b as the plaintext. Furthermore, as shown in FIG. 3(b), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to the second bootstrap unit 13 and performs second bootstrap using the test vectors created from the above Table 2 for the function g(b), thereby obtaining a ciphertext cg having the error adjustment value g as plaintext. As a result of the above, (Equation 3) becomes: z=m(a,f,m(a,g,0)+1) This can be expressed as: The cryptographic processing device 1 has performed BlindRotate twice on the TLWE ciphertext cb up to this point.

[0086] Next, the cryptographic processing device 1 calculates the function m(a, g, 0) in (Equation 3). TIFF0007588423000051.tif935 Then, as shown in FIG. 3(c), the cryptographic processing device 1 TIFF0007588423000052.tif1015 The cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the ciphertext ca and the ciphertext cg according to Fig. 4. The cryptographic processing device 1 homomorphically adds 0 to the ciphertext cc', and obtains the ciphertext cu' of the most significant bits of the result. This is the ciphertext ch that has the error adjustment value h as plaintext. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate three times in the calculation of the ciphertext ch.

[0087] As a result of the above, (Equation 3) becomes: (Formula 3') z=m(a,f,h+1) It becomes. TIFF0007588423000053.tif1047 Therefore, as shown in FIG. 3(d), the cryptographic processing device 1 TIFF0007588423000054.tif1021 Calculate. The cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the ciphertext ca by the ciphertext cf according to Fig. 4. The cryptographic processing device 1 homomorphically adds the ciphertext ch and 1 to the ciphertext cc', and obtains the ciphertext cu' of the most significant bits of the result. This is the ciphertext cz that has the division result (quotient) z as plaintext. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate three times in the calculation of the ciphertext cz. According to this method, the cryptographic processing device 1 can perform division with a total of eight BlindRotates in the case of 3-bit, 4-bit, and 5-bit Integer-wise ciphertexts. The time required is approximately 365 ms. This is a significant speedup compared to the 719 ms required for table lookup using the Tree PBS (Non-Patent Document 3) mentioned above. By using multiplication that discards the lower bits (using the decomposition into the higher-order lower bits after multiplication as a shift operation) and by performing the multiplication process twice, reciprocal multiplication is performed with 2n-bit (6-bit in the above explanation) width precision for n-bit (3-bit in the above explanation) width plaintext. This allows for a division result that matches exactly with integer precision.

[0088] <Second embodiment (3bit)> FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of a cryptographic processing device that speeds up division of 3-bit ciphertext in particular. The same components as those in FIG. 1 are denoted by the same reference numerals and their explanations are omitted. The control unit 10 of the cryptographic processing device shown in FIG. 10 includes a reception unit 11, a seventh bootstrap unit 41, an eighth bootstrap unit 42, a multiplication unit 14, and an output unit 16.

[0089] FIG. 11 is a diagram for explaining a calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. 11(a), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to the seventh bootstrap unit 41 to perform the seventh bootstrap, and obtains a TLWE ciphertext cs having the reciprocal s of the divisor b as a plaintext. The seventh bootstrap is performed using a test vector created from a table described later. 11(b), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to the eighth bootstrap unit 42 to perform the eighth bootstrap, and obtains a TLWE ciphertext cw having the error adjustment value w of the divisor b as a plaintext. The eighth bootstrap is performed using a test vector created from a table described later. As shown in Fig. 11(c), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cs to the multiplication unit 14 and performs multiplication. The cryptographic processing device 1 homomorphically adds the ciphertext cw of the error adjustment value to the ciphertext cc', and obtains the ciphertext cu' of the most significant bits of the result. This is the TLWE ciphertext cz that has the division result (quotient) z as plaintext.

[0090] The second embodiment will be described in detail with reference to FIGS. 2, 4, 10 and 11. FIG. As explained in Figure 8, the maximum integer value that the TLWE ciphertext can contain is t-1. The dividend a can take a value from 0 to t-1, and the divisor b can take a value from 1 to t-1 (the divisor cannot be 0). Here, t=8, and the dividend is an integer between 0 and 7 that can be expressed in 3 bits. Since the divisor cannot be 0, the value of divisor b actually excludes 0. Divisor b is an integer between 1 and 7. The above TIFF0007588423000055.tif1036 So, we can write the formula for the quotient z as follows: (Formula 4) z=m(a,s[b],w[b]) Far away. s[b], w[b] are tables in which the reciprocal s and the error adjustment value w are calculated in advance when the divisor b is an integer between 1 and 7, and are associated with the value of the divisor b. In the case of 3 bits, the error adjustment value can be expressed as a table of w[b]. Even if the error adjustment value is determined only by the divisor b, calculations can be performed with integer precision. <table s[b]> TIFF0007588423000056.tif15139 <table w[b]> TIFF0007588423000057.tif15139 In the second embodiment, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs division using these tables s[b] and w[b]. Unlike the Tree PBS in Non-Patent Document 3, when performing 3-bit division, instead of preparing a 6-bit table, two 3-bit tables are prepared, which reduces the table capacity and the number of BlindRotate operations.

[0091] Specifically, as shown in FIG. 11(a), the cryptographic processing device 1 generates a test vector T s The seventh bootstrap is performed using (X) to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cs having the reciprocal s of the divisor b as plaintext. s / t is a value that is close to the reciprocal of the divisor b. Next, the cryptographic processing device 1 generates a test vector T w The eighth bootstrap is performed using (X) and the TLWE ciphertext cw corresponding to the error adjustment value w is obtained by multiplying the inverse of the divisor b. As a result, (Equation 4) becomes: z=m(a,s,w) This can be expressed as: Up to this point, the cryptographic processing device 1 has performed BlindRotate on the TLWE ciphertext cb twice. (3) TIFF0007588423000058.tif1139 Therefore, the cryptographic processing device 1 TIFF0007588423000059.tif1017 We can then calculate the quotient z. The cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext ca by the TLWE ciphertext cs according to Fig. 4. The cryptographic processing device 1 homomorphically adds the TLWE ciphertext cw to the ciphertext cc' to obtain the ciphertext cu' of the most significant bits of the result. This is the TLWE ciphertext cz that has the division result (quotient) z as plaintext.

[0092] Since we get the exact division result in the form as+w, we can use this. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate three times in the calculation of the TLWE ciphertext cz. As a result, the time required to perform BlindRotate five times is approximately 227 ms. Although this is limited to the case where the divisor and dividend are 3-bit integers, the time required for one division calculation has been further reduced compared to the first embodiment.

[0093] <Third Example (4bit)> FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of a cryptographic processing device that speeds up division of 4-bit ciphertext in particular. The same components as those in FIG. 1 are denoted by the same reference numerals and their explanation will be omitted. The control unit 10 of the cryptographic processing device 1 includes a reception unit 11, a 9th bootstrap unit 51, a 10th bootstrap unit 52, an 11th bootstrap unit 53, a 12th bootstrap unit 54, a fifth calculation unit 55, a multiplication unit 14, and an output unit 16.

[0094] FIG. 13 is a diagram for explaining a calculation process based on the functional configuration of FIG. As shown in FIG. 13(a), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext ca to a ninth bootstrap unit 51 to perform the ninth bootstrap, thereby obtaining a TLWE ciphertext ca'' having a'' as a plaintext. As shown in FIG. 13(b), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext ca'' and the TLWE ciphertext cb to a fifth arithmetic unit 55 and performs homomorphic arithmetic to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cb' having b' as plaintext. As shown in Figure 13 (c), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb' to the 10th bootstrap unit 52, performs the 10th bootstrap using a test vector created from a table described below, and multiplies the result by the TLWE ciphertext ca'' to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cp having p as the plaintext. As shown in FIG. 13(d), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to an eleventh bootstrap unit 53, and performs the eleventh bootstrap using a test vector created from a table described later, to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cq having q as a plaintext. As shown in FIG. 13(e), the cryptographic processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext cb to the 12th bootstrap unit 54, and performs the 7th bootstrap using a test vector created from a table described below, to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cr having r as plaintext. As shown in Fig. 13(f), the encryption processing device 1 inputs the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cs to the multiplication unit 14 and performs multiplication. The encryption processing device 1 performs homomorphic addition of the homomorphic operation result of the TLWE ciphertext cp and the TLWE ciphertext cr as an error adjustment value to the ciphertext cc', and obtains the ciphertext cu' of the most significant bits of the result. This is the TLWE ciphertext cz having the division result (quotient) z as plaintext.

[0095] The third embodiment will be described in detail with reference to FIGS. 2, 4, 12 and 13. FIG. As explained in Figure 8, the maximum integer value that the TLWE ciphertext can contain is t-1. The dividend a can take a value from 0 to t-1, but the divisor cannot take a value of 0, so the value of the divisor b actually excludes 0. The divisor b can take a value from 1 to t-1. Here, t=16, the dividend a is an integer in the range of 0 to 15 that can be expressed in 4 bits, and the divisor b is an integer in the range of 1 to 15. In the same procedure as in the second embodiment, the error is large and it is not possible to create a table that matches perfectly. Table t[a] = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1] We perform gate bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext ca using a test vector based on the above, and prepare a TLWE ciphertext ca'' such that if the dividend a is 8 or less, the plaintext a'' is -1, and if not, the plaintext a'' is 1. The cryptographic processing device 1 converts (Equation 3) into (Formula 5) z=m(a,p[b],a''×q[b']+r[b]+1) and transforms. In formula 5, p[b], q[b], and r[b] are a table in which p, q, and r for each of the divisor b values ​​of 0 to 15 are calculated in advance and associated with the value of the divisor b. <table t[a]> TIFF0007588423000060.tif15141 <table p[b]> TIFF0007588423000061.tif15138 <table q[b']> TIFF0007588423000062.tif15137 <table r[b]> TIFF0007588423000063.tif15147 In the third embodiment, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs division using these tables p[b], q[b'], and r[b]. When performing 4-bit division, instead of preparing an 8-bit table, three 4-bit tables are prepared, which reduces the table capacity and the number of times BlindRotate is performed.

[0096] Specifically, the cryptographic processing device 1 generates a test vector T based on the above table t[a] for the TLWE ciphertext ca. aThe 9th gate bootstrap is performed by (X) to obtain the TLWE ciphertext ca''. The TLWE ciphertext ca'' is a ciphertext that has -1 as plaintext a'' if the dividend a is 8 or less, and has 1 as plaintext a' otherwise. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs a homomorphic operation corresponding to b+a''×8-4 to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cb'. a''×8 is 1 / 4 or -1 / 4 on the circular group, and the TLWE ciphertext cb' has as plaintext the value obtained by rotating this by a quarter of a revolution and adding it to b. In the TLWE ciphertext cb', if the dividend a is 8 or less, the plaintext b' remains on the right half plane on the circular group, and if the dividend a is 9 or more, the plaintext b' rotates half a revolution to the left half plane.

[0097] The cryptographic processing device 1 generates a test vector T q By performing the eleventh bootstrap by (X), a TLWE ciphertext cq having the error adjustment value q as plaintext multiplied by the TLWE ciphertext ca'' (plaintext a'' is -1 or 1) is obtained. As a feature of this embodiment, in the 11th Bootstrapping, BlindRotate is performed using ciphertext cb' obtained by adding 0 or 1 / 2 to ciphertext cb. This makes it possible to perform multiplication of TLWE ciphertext ca'' (plaintext a'' is -1 or 1) simultaneously with BlindRotate. The method of multiplying the ciphertext ca'' after the 11th Bootstrapping, which performs a table lookup, requires an additional BlindRotate. In this case, it is necessary to multiply the ciphertext cq by the TLWE ciphertext ca'' (plaintext a'' is -1 or 1) taking into consideration that the plaintext of the ciphertext cq is located in the left half of the circular group. According to the above method, the multiplication is not performed after the 11th Bootstrapping but is consolidated into the 11th Bootstrapping, reducing the number of BlindRotates and speeding up the calculation.

[0098] The cryptographic processing device 1 generates a test vector T pThe tenth bootstrap is performed using (X) to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cp having p corresponding to the reciprocal of the divisor b as a plaintext.

[0099] The cryptographic processing device 1 generates a test vector T r A 12th bootstrap is performed using (X) to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cr having the error adjustment value r as plaintext. As a result, (Equation 5) can be expressed as z = m(a, p, q + r + 1).

[0100] TIFF0007588423000064.tif1052 from TIFF0007588423000065.tif1023 We can calculate this to get the quotient z. The cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext ca by the TLWE ciphertext cp according to Fig. 4. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs homomorphic addition of the TLWE ciphertext cp, the TLWE ciphertext cr, and 1 to the ciphertext cc', and obtains the ciphertext cu' of the most significant bits of the result. This is the TLWE ciphertext cz having the division result z as plaintext. Here, instead of adding 1, the values ​​of the table r may be incremented by 1 each. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate three times in the calculation of the ciphertext cz. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate seven times in total, taking approximately 300 ms. Although this is limited to the case where the divisor and dividend are 4-bit integers, the time required for one division calculation can be reduced compared to the first embodiment.

[0101] A method called Tree PBS was also able to evaluate lookup tables (LUTs). However, with Tree PBS, for example, when dividing a 3-bit ciphertext, eight 3-bit (8 word) tables were required. As a result, nine BlindRotates were required, and each division took about 719 ms. Each of the eight tables is looked up with b, and from the results, one table is created as the second stage and looked up with a. The time required to create the second stage table and the time required to perform all nine table lookups are required. In the method of this embodiment, the number of bits in the table is reduced, the number of times BlindRotate is performed is reduced, and reciprocal multiplication of the lower bits is performed, making it possible to significantly reduce the time required compared to the conventional method.

[0102] It is also possible to obtain the remainder of a division from the multiplication result of the dividend and divisor. Using the ciphertext cc' resulting from the multiplication, homomorphic subtraction is performed on cc' from the ciphertext c to extract only the lower bits. The procedure is written as a formula: m'(a, b, c) = (ca × b) mod t This can be considered as the evaluation of a function of The remainder can be obtained by calculating m'(z, b, a) using the encrypted text cz of the multiplication result z in the first to third embodiments, the encrypted text ca of the dividend a, and the encrypted text cb of the divisor b. The cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext cz and the TLWE ciphertext cb according to FIG. 4, homomorphically subtracts the ciphertext cc′ resulting from the multiplication from the TLWE ciphertext ca, and obtains the lower-order bits of the result as a remainder ciphertext.

[0103] FIG. 14 is a flowchart illustrating the division process of this embodiment. FIG. 14(a) is a flowchart illustrating the division process according to the first embodiment. In step S11, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs a first bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext cb of the divisor to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cf of the reciprocal of the divisor. In step S12, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs second bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext cb of the divisor to obtain the ciphertext cg of the error adjustment value. In step S13, the cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext ca of the dividend by the TLWE ciphertext cg to obtain a TLWE ciphertext ch of the error. In step S14, the cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cf (by truncating the lower bits) to obtain the division result.

[0104] FIG. 14B is a flowchart illustrating the division process according to the second embodiment. In step S21, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs seventh bootstraping on the TLWE ciphertext cb of the divisor to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cs of the reciprocal of the divisor. In step S22, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs the eighth bootstrap and obtains a TLWE ciphertext cw of the error adjustment value. In step S23, the cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext ca by the ciphertext cs of the reciprocal of the divisor obtained in step S21, to obtain the division result.

[0105] FIG. 14C is a flowchart illustrating the division process according to the third embodiment. In step S31, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs the ninth bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext ca of the dividend to obtain a TLWE ciphertext ca''. In step S32, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs a homomorphic operation on the divisor TLWE ciphertext cb and the TLWE ciphertext ca'' to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cb'. In the homomorphic operation, the TLWE ciphertext ca'' is scalar-multiplied (8 times) and the result is homomorphically added to the TLWE ciphertext cb, and 4 is subtracted. In step S33, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs tenth bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext cb' to obtain the TLWE ciphertext cp. In step S34, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs eleventh bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext cb to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cq. In step S35, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs 12th bootstrap on the TLWE ciphertext cb to obtain a TLWE ciphertext cr. In step S36, the cryptographic processing device 1 multiplies the TLWE ciphertext ca and the TLWE ciphertext cp to obtain the division result.

[0106] FIG. 15 is a flowchart illustrating the multiplication process. In step S101, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs private key switching on the TLWE ciphertext cB of the multiplier to obtain a TRLWE ciphertext cc. In step S102, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate on the TRLWE ciphertext cc by using the TLWE ciphertext ca, and in step S103 performs SampleExtract to obtain the ciphertext cc'. In step S104, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs homomorphic addition of the ciphertext Y serving as the error adjustment value to cc' to obtain new ciphertext cc', and performs cc'×t in step S105. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate on the t-fold ciphertext cc' in step S106 and SampleExtract in step S107 to obtain a ciphertext cd. The cryptographic processing device 1 performs cc'×t+cd(0,1 / 4) in step S108, and performs public key switching in step S109 to obtain ciphertext cu'. Through the above process, the lower-order bits (3 bits) of the multiplication result of integer-wise TLWE ciphertexts can be obtained. Furthermore, in step S110, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs BlindRotate on the ciphertext cl by using the TLWE ciphertext ca, and in step S111 performs SampleExtract to obtain the ciphertext cl'. In step S112, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs cc'-cl' to obtain the ciphertext cu. In step S113, the cryptographic processing device 1 performs public key switching on the ciphertext cu to obtain the ciphertext cu'. Through the above process, the most significant bits of the multiplication result of integer-wise TLWE ciphertexts can be obtained.

[0107] FIG. 16 is a diagram showing ciphertexts input and output to and from Gate Bootstrapping of this embodiment. In the above description, it has been described that Gate Bootstrapping is performed in the order of BlindRotate, SampleExtract, and Public Key Switching, particularly in the first Bootstrapping, as shown in FIG. 16(a). Alternatively, as shown in FIG. 16(b), Public Key Switching can be executed first in Gate Bootstrapping, and then BlindRotate and SampleExtract can be executed. TLWE ciphertext has a concept of levels according to security strength. In Gate Bootstrapping in Fig. 16(a), the input and output TLWE ciphertexts are LEVEL 0. When BlindRotate is performed on the LEVEL 0 TLWE ciphertext and SampleExtract is performed on the output TRLWE ciphertext, the TLWE ciphertext obtained is LEVEL 1, but as a result of Public Key Switching, a LEVEL 0 TLWE ciphertext is output. In contrast, in the method shown in Figure 16(b), the TLWE ciphertext that is the input and output of Gate Bootstrapping is set to LEVEL 1, and first Public Key Switching is performed to lower it to LEVEL 0, and then BlindRotate is performed. When SampleExtract is performed on the output TRLWE ciphertext, a TLWE ciphertext of LEVEL 1 is output.

[0108] The ciphertext of LEVEL0 consists of an N-order vector [a] of elements on the circular group {T} encrypted with an N-order secret key [s]. On the other hand, the ciphertext of LEVEL1 obtained as a result of SampleExtract consists of an n-order vector [a'] of elements on the circular group {T} encrypted with an n-order secret key [s']. The LEVEL0 ciphertext has a smaller number of coefficients (the degree of the vector), which is the difficulty of the LWE problem, than the LEVEL1 ciphertext, so the amount of computation required for homomorphic addition is smaller than that of LEVEL1. On the other hand, the problem with LEVEL0 ciphertext is that the security strength is likely to decrease if the allowable error added to the plaintext is reduced, because the security of LWE-based ciphers is guaranteed by the error added to the plaintext. The larger the error added to the plaintext and the greater the number of coefficients (the degree of the vector), the more difficult it becomes to calculate (decrypt) the TLWE cipher. On the other hand, the smaller the error added to the plaintext and the fewer the number of coefficients (the degree of the vector), the easier it is to calculate (decrypt) the TLWE cipher. In particular, in the case of TFHE applied to the integer-wise type, the larger the plaintext (integer) value stored in the TLWE ciphertext becomes, the more finely it is necessary to divide the range of values ​​from 0 to 1 in the circular group {T}, and there is also the problem of errors during decryption, which will be described later, so the error needs to be reduced. In that case, as mentioned above, the security strength is likely to decrease, so in order to reduce the error, it is necessary to ensure security by increasing the number of coefficients in the ciphertext (the degree of the vector).

[0109] In order to ensure the security of ciphertexts that are easier to calculate (decrypt) by reducing the error added to the plaintext, it is desirable to move Public Key Switching to the beginning of Gate Bootstrapping and use LEVEL1 ciphertexts, which have a large number of coefficients (vector order) and are therefore easier to reduce the error range, as the input and output of Gate Bootstrapping. Then, after converting to LEVEL0 at the beginning of Gate Bootstrapping, the ciphertext is not returned to LEVEL0 at the end. By not returning to LEVEL0, the calculation of the TLWE ciphertext can be performed safely in the next stage as well. The time required for BlindRotate is proportional to the number of coefficients (vector degree) of the input TLWE ciphertext, because the number of CMux is the same as the degree. Therefore, when the ciphertext of LEVEL1 is input, the time required for BlindRotate is longer in proportion to the number of coefficients (vector degree) than when the ciphertext of LEVEL0 is input. Even if the LEVEL1 ciphertext is used as the input for Gate Bootstrapping to ensure the security of the ciphertext, the increase in the required time can be avoided by performing BlindRotate using the LEVEL0 TLWE ciphertext converted by Public Key Switching as the input.

[0110] Furthermore, reducing the error added to the plaintext poses the problem of errors during decryption in addition to the security strength mentioned above. As described above, in TFHE applied to the integer-wise type, the range of values ​​from 0 to 1 corresponding to the circular group {T} is divided into t parts. By increasing the value of t and dividing the circular group into smaller parts, the integer values ​​that can be recorded in the TLWE ciphertext can be made larger. The maximum value that can be stored is determined by the number of parts t into which the circular group is divided, but if a large value is to be stored, the error range must be made smaller, which can lead to problems such as a decrease in security strength and an increase in the decryption error rate. In homomorphic encryption of the LWE system, including TFHE, the errors added to the plaintext are normally distributed, and it is not possible to strictly set the "error range." Although the error still tends to be concentrated near 0, in principle, this simply makes it possible to concentrate the error more in the specified range. If the error falls outside the set range, the plaintext will be interpreted as a different plaintext, which may result in unexpected calculation results. The calculation itself does not become impossible, but rather a different result is obtained. How much of a probability of obtaining a different calculation result can be tolerated is up to the application to which homomorphic encryption is applied.

[0111] In order to best balance the three goals of reducing the probability of errors occurring in calculations, reducing the number of BlindRotates to speed up calculations, and maintaining high security, it is necessary to set the system parameters so that the overlap of the error ranges falls within a certain value. The error may be set so as to satisfy conditions that are of particular importance depending on the system or device to which this embodiment is applied. [Application example] The processing performed by the cryptographic processing device 1 can be applied as follows. For example, consider a case where you want to aggregate data for a specific field within a certain range from a database where the fields and records are encrypted with TLWE encryption (for example, you want to find the average annual income of people aged 30 to 39). In this case, the cryptographic processing device 1 is a database server that manages an encrypted database, accepts queries encrypted with TLWE encryption from a terminal device connected via a network, etc., and returns a response to the query to the terminal device in a state encrypted with TLWE encryption. In an encrypted database, division is necessary, for example when you want to find an average value.

[0112] The cryptographic processing device 10 performs a comparison operation to compare all records in the encrypted database with the query using the functions of the first calculation unit 12, the second calculation unit 13, the third calculation unit 14, the first bootstrap unit 15, the second bootstrap unit 16, the third bootstrap unit 17, the fourth bootstrap unit 18, and the key exchange unit 38. The comparison operation is a subtraction between the ciphertexts of the record and the query, and the positive or negative result of the subtraction indicates the equivalence of the comparison operation. The cryptographic processing device 1 can further perform an aggregation operation on records that match the query in the comparison operation. In the aggregation operation, the cryptographic processing device 1 calculates a sum by adding up the records that match the query in the comparison operation, and further calculates an average value using division. Thus, processing a query against an encrypted database requires the four basic arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, etc., on the integers that make up the ciphertext, as well as comparisons (which are equivalent to checking whether the result of a subtraction is positive or negative). In particular, when calculating a weighted average value, division is required when dividing the product of a record and a weighting coefficient by the number of records. When using bit-wise ciphertext, full adder operations are likely to be used frequently in processing. The number of full adders required increases as the bit length of the integers handled increases. The four arithmetic operations are homomorphic arithmetic operations between encrypted numerical values ​​that are regarded as the ciphertext of each bit when the permutation using the input ciphertext is expressed in binary. The cryptographic processing device 1 of this embodiment does not perform arithmetic operations on a bit-by-bit basis using a full adder on bit-wise ciphertext, but performs arithmetic operations and comparisons between integer-wise ciphertexts that have integers as plaintext, thereby making it possible to significantly reduce the execution time of a query.

[0113] Not only in database aggregation, but also in various data processing applications using ciphertext, arithmetic operations and comparisons between integers are frequently used. Other examples include fuzzy authentication and fuzzy search. Fuzzy authentication is, for example, biometric authentication using biometric data, and it is an absolute requirement that the biometric data, which remains unchanged throughout a person's life, be encrypted and kept secret. Fuzzy authentication performs authentication based on the correspondence between the biometric authentication data presented as an authentication request and the biometric authentication data registered in a database, but it does not check for a perfect match between the two, but rather judges whether they match based on a threshold value. Fuzzy search is a vague search method that presents data close to the query from a database as a search result even if the query and the record do not match exactly. In fuzzy authentication and fuzzy search, like the comparison and aggregation operations in the encrypted database, the encrypted database and the query are compared, and the comparison operation must be performed using data encrypted by homomorphic encryption. In addition, the average must be calculated to normalize the sensor values ​​and evaluation values, and in this case, the sum of the sensor values ​​and evaluation values ​​is divided by the number of values.

[0114] In addition, Euclidean distance is often used for comparison in fuzzy authentication and fuzzy search. Calculating Euclidean distance requires square operations. Therefore, in bit-wise homomorphic encryption, multiplication takes time of O(N 2 ) full adders. Even a simple subtraction and comparison operation requires O(N) full adders. The cryptographic processing device 1 of this embodiment can significantly reduce the processing time required for fuzzy authentication and fuzzy search by performing arithmetic operations and comparisons between integer-wise ciphertexts that have integers as plaintext, rather than performing arithmetic operations on a bit-by-bit basis using a full adder on bit-wise ciphertexts.

[0115] FIG. 17 is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a computer system. The configuration of the computer device 100 will be described with reference to FIG. The computer device 100 is, for example, a cryptographic processing device that processes various types of information. The computer device 100 includes a control circuit 101, a storage device 102, a reading / writing device 103, a recording medium 104, a communication interface 105, an input / output interface 106, an input device 107, and a display device 108. The communication interface 105 is connected to a network 200. The components are connected to each other via a bus 110. The cryptographic processing device 1 can be configured by appropriately selecting some or all of the components described in the computer device 100.

[0116] The control circuit 101 controls the entire computer device 100. The control circuit 101 is, for example, a processor such as a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), or a Programmable Logic Device (PLD). The control circuit 101 functions as, for example, the control unit 10 in FIG.

[0117] The storage device 102 stores various data. The storage device 102 is, for example, a memory such as a Read Only Memory (ROM) and a Random Access Memory (RAM), a Hard Disk (HD), or a Solid State Drive (SSD). The storage device 102 may store an information processing program that causes the control circuit 101 to function as the control unit 10 in Fig. 1. The storage device 102 functions as, for example, the storage unit 20 in Fig. 1.

[0118] When performing information processing, the cryptographic processing device 1 reads out a program stored in the storage device 102 into the RAM. The cryptographic processing device 1 (first embodiment) executes a program read into the RAM in the control circuit 101, thereby executing processes including one or more of the reception process, the first bootstrap processing, the second bootstrap processing, the multiplication process (the first arithmetic process, the second arithmetic process, the third arithmetic process, the fourth arithmetic process, the third bootstrap processing, the fourth bootstrap processing, the fifth bootstrap processing, the key exchange process), and the output process. In addition, the cryptographic processing device 1 (second embodiment) executes a program read into the RAM in the control circuit 101, thereby executing processes including one or more of the reception process, the seventh bootstrap processing, the eighth bootstrap processing, the multiplication process (the first arithmetic process, the second arithmetic process, the third arithmetic process, the fourth arithmetic process, the third bootstrap processing, the fourth bootstrap processing, the fifth bootstrap processing, and the key exchange process), and the output process. In addition, the cryptographic processing device 1 (third embodiment) executes a program read into the RAM in the control circuit 101, thereby executing processes including one or more of the reception process, the fifth arithmetic process, the ninth bootstrapping process, the tenth bootstrapping process, the eleventh bootstrapping process, the twelfth bootstrapping process, the multiplication process (the first arithmetic process, the second arithmetic process, the third arithmetic process, the fourth arithmetic process, the third bootstrapping process, the fourth bootstrapping process, the fifth bootstrapping process, the key exchange process), and the output process. The program may be stored in a storage device of a server on the network 200 as long as the control circuit 101 can access the program via the communication interface 105 .

[0119] The reading / writing device 103 is controlled by the control circuit 101 and reads / writes data from / to a removable recording medium 104 . The recording medium 104 stores various data. For example, the recording medium 104 stores an information processing program. For example, the recording medium 104 is a non-volatile memory (non-transient recording medium) such as a Secure Digital (SD) memory card, a Floppy Disk (FD), a Compact Disc (CD), a Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), a Blu-ray (registered trademark) Disk (BD), or a flash memory.

[0120] The communication interface 105 communicably connects the computer device 100 to other devices via the network 200. The communication interface 105 functions as, for example, the communication unit 25 in FIG. The input / output interface 106 is, for example, an interface that is detachably connected to various input devices. The input devices 107 connected to the input / output interface 106 include, for example, a keyboard and a mouse. The input / output interface 106 communicably connects the various input devices connected to the computer device 100. The input / output interface 106 outputs signals input from the various input devices connected to the control circuit 101 via the bus 110. The input / output interface 106 also outputs signals output from the control circuit 101 to the input / output devices via the bus 110. The input / output interface 106 functions as, for example, the input unit 26 in FIG. 1.

[0121] The display device 108 displays various information. The display device 108 is, for example, a cathode ray tube (CRT), a liquid crystal display (LCD), a plasma display panel (PDP), an organic electroluminescence display (OLED), etc. The network 200 is, for example, a LAN, wireless communication, a P2P network, or the Internet, and communicatively connects the computer device 100 to other devices. It should be noted that the present embodiment is not limited to the embodiment described above, and various configurations or embodiments can be adopted without departing from the spirit of the present embodiment. [Explanation of symbols]

[0122] 1 encryption processing device, 10 control unit, 20 memory unit, 25 communication unit, 26 input unit, 100 computer device, 101 control circuit, 102 storage device, 103 reading / writing device, 104 recording medium, 105 communication interface, 106 input / output interface, 107 input device, 108 display device, 110 bus, 200 network

Claims

1. A cryptographic processing device for processing a ciphertext, comprising: the ciphertext is a fully homomorphic ciphertext that has a value obtained by adding an error having a predetermined variance to a predetermined value as a plaintext associated with an integer and that enables a predetermined operation between integers without decryption, the predetermined operation is a division of a first ciphertext which is a dividend and a second ciphertext which is a divisor, calculating a third ciphertext corresponding to the reciprocal of the divisor by extracting a predetermined term by cycling through coefficients of a first polynomial, the first polynomial being a test vector created using a possible value of the plaintext of the second ciphertext and a previously calculated reciprocal of the plaintext of the second ciphertext, according to the second ciphertext; performing multiplication based on the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and calculating, as a multiplication result, a fourth ciphertext corresponding to a result of division of the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; 4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

2. 2. The cryptographic processing device according to claim 1, calculating a fifth ciphertext corresponding to a value that adjusts an error due to the multiplication by applying a second polynomial to the second ciphertext; When calculating the fourth ciphertext, a result of performing a homomorphic operation on the fifth ciphertext with respect to a ciphertext resulting from a multiplication based on the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext is output.

4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

3. 3. The cryptographic processing device according to claim 2, calculating a binary ciphertext according to the value of the dividend using a third polynomial, and multiplying the second ciphertext by the calculated ciphertext, and using the second polynomial on the second ciphertext; 4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

4. 3. The cryptographic processing device according to claim 2, By performing a predetermined addition on the second ciphertext and then using the second polynomial, the second ciphertext is multiplied by the ciphertext having the binary value at the same time as using the second polynomial.

4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

5. In the cryptographic processing device according to claim 1, generating a sixth ciphertext having a step-like polynomial as a plaintext based on the third ciphertext, and multiplying the first ciphertext by the third ciphertext by performing a predetermined operation based on the sixth ciphertext and the first ciphertext which is a dividend; 4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

6. In the cryptographic processing device according to claim 1, a calculation unit that calculates a new ciphertext by using a predetermined polynomial on the ciphertext, the calculation unit performing a process of reducing the number of coefficients on the input ciphertext before calculating the new ciphertext by using the predetermined polynomial; 4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

7. In the cryptographic processing device according to claim 1, By performing the predetermined calculation, a process related to fuzzy authentication or fuzzy search is performed using the input ciphertext.

4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

8. In the cryptographic processing device according to claim 1, Processing a query to an encrypted database based on the input ciphertext by performing the predetermined operation.

4. A cryptographic processing device comprising:

9. A cryptographic processing method for processing a ciphertext, the method being executed by a processor, comprising: the ciphertext is a fully homomorphic ciphertext that has a value obtained by adding an error having a predetermined variance to a predetermined value as a plaintext associated with an integer and that enables a predetermined operation between integers without decryption, the predetermined operation is a division of a first ciphertext which is a dividend and a second ciphertext which is a divisor, The processor, calculating a third ciphertext corresponding to the reciprocal of the divisor by extracting a predetermined term by cycling through coefficients of a first polynomial, the first polynomial being a test vector created using a possible value of the plaintext of the second ciphertext and a previously calculated reciprocal of the plaintext of the second ciphertext, according to the second ciphertext; performing multiplication based on the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and calculating, as a multiplication result, a fourth ciphertext corresponding to a result of division of the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; 13. A cryptographic processing method comprising:

10. A cryptographic processing program for causing a processor to execute a cryptographic processing method for processing a ciphertext, comprising: the ciphertext is a fully homomorphic ciphertext that has a value obtained by adding an error having a predetermined variance to a predetermined value as a plaintext associated with an integer and that enables a predetermined operation between integers without decryption, the predetermined operation is a division of a first ciphertext which is a dividend and a second ciphertext which is a divisor, The processor, calculating a third ciphertext corresponding to the reciprocal of the divisor by extracting a predetermined term by cycling through coefficients of a first polynomial, the first polynomial being a test vector created using a possible value of the plaintext of the second ciphertext and a previously calculated reciprocal of the plaintext of the second ciphertext, according to the second ciphertext; performing multiplication based on the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and calculating, as a multiplication result, a fourth ciphertext corresponding to a result of division of the first ciphertext and the second ciphertext; 4. A cryptographic processing program comprising:

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