Secure communication of network traffic

By using hardware security modules to enforce communication policies and encrypt traffic with specific keys, the solution addresses internal and external network threats, enhancing network security by restricting unauthorized communication.

JP7595698B2Active Publication Date: 2024-12-06APPLE INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023075795
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2016-09-23
Filing Date
2023-05-01
Publication Date
2024-12-06
Estimated Expiration
2037-09-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing network security systems fail to adequately protect against both external and internal threats, particularly internal nodes that may become compromised, leading to unauthorized communication and potential network exposure.

Method used

Implementing hardware security modules (HSMs) within the network that encrypt and decrypt traffic using specific cryptographic keys, and enforce communication policies based on source and destination nodes, thereby restricting unauthorized communication.

Benefits of technology

The solution effectively limits unauthorized network communication by ensuring that only authorized nodes can encrypt and decrypt data, thereby enhancing network security and reducing exposure to internal threats.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

To provide an apparatus including a secure circuit coupled to a device and a method, for securely communicating traffic.SOLUTION: In a secure communication, an apparatus includes a secure circuit HSM storing keys usable to encrypt data communications between devices over a network. The secure circuit HSM stores information that defines a set of usage criteria for the keys. The set of usage criteria specifies that a first key is dedicated to encrypting data being communicated from the HSM to a second device (node). The secure circuit receives a request to encrypt a portion of a message with the first key, the request indicating that the message is being sent from the first device to the second device, and encrypts the portion of the message with the first key in response to determining that the set of usage criteria permits encryption with the first key for a message being sent from the first device to the second device.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 3
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present disclosure relates generally to computer networks, and more particularly to securely communicating traffic over a network. [Background technology]

[0002] Security issues are a common consideration when designing computer networks. In the case of a local area network (LAN), the network design may include a gateway device that couples the internal LAN to an external network, such as the Internet. To intercept the LAN, the gateway device may implement a firewall appliance that restricts the flow of incoming and / or outgoing traffic. For example, the appliance may analyze the source address of incoming traffic as well as the source and destination ports before allowing the traffic to pass through the firewall. For example, if a malicious entity attempts to access a network port associated with an unknown type of traffic, the gateway may block the traffic from entering the network. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This disclosure describes embodiments for securely communicating traffic between devices in a network. In various embodiments, a secure circuit stores a key usable to encrypt data communications between devices on the network. The secure circuit is configured to store information defining a set of usage criteria for the key. The set of usage criteria specifies that a first key is to be used exclusively to encrypt data communicated from the first device to a second device. The secure circuit is configured to receive a request to encrypt a portion of a message using the first key. In such an embodiment, the request indicates that a message is being sent from the first device to the second device. In response to determining that the set of usage criteria permits encryption with the first key for a message being sent from the first device to the second device, the secure circuit is configured to encrypt the portion of the message with the first key. In some embodiments, the secure circuit is coupled to the first device and configured to encrypt the portion of the message such that the encrypted portion is usable to establish that the message is sent by the first device. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0004] [Figure 1] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a secure network.

[0005] [Diagram 2] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example of a hardware security module in a secure network.

[0006] [Diagram 3] FIG. 2 is a communication diagram illustrating an example of secure communication between two nodes in a secure network.

[0007] [Figure 4] FIG. 2 is a communication diagram illustrating an example of secure communication of multiple blocks between two nodes.

[0008] [Diagram 5] FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating an example of using policies to enforce communications between nodes in a secure network.

[0009] [Figure 6A] 1 is a flow chart illustrating an example of a method for secure network communications. [Figure 6B] 1 is a flow chart illustrating an example of a method for secure network communications.

[0010] [Figure 7] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example of network provisioning.

[0011] [Figure 8A] FIG. 2 is a communication diagram illustrating example communications associated with network provisioning. [Figure 8B] FIG. 2 is a communication diagram illustrating example communications associated with network provisioning.

[0012] [Figure 9] 1 is a flow diagram of an example method for a diagnostic mode associated with a secure network.

[0013] [Figure 10A] 1 is a flow diagram of an example method associated with network provisioning. [Figure 10B] 1 is a flow diagram of an example method associated with network provisioning. [Figure 10C] 1 is a flow diagram of an example method associated with network provisioning.

[0014] [Figure 11] 1 is a block diagram illustrating an example computer system in which one or more components of a secure network may be implemented. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0015] This disclosure includes references to "one embodiment" or "an embodiment." The phrases "in one embodiment" or "in an embodiment" do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Particular features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner consistent with this disclosure.

[0016] Within this disclosure, various entities (which may be variously referred to as "units," "circuits," other components, etc.) may be described or claimed as being "configured" to perform one or more tasks or operations. The express phrase "entity" configured to perform one or more tasks is used herein to refer to structures (i.e., physical things, such as electronic circuits). More specifically, the express phrase is used to indicate that the structure is arranged to perform one or more tasks during operation. A structure may be said to be "configured to perform" a task even if the structure is not currently operating. A "network interface configured to facilitate communication over a wide area network," for example, is intended to encompass circuitry that performs this function during operation even if the computer system in question is not currently in use (e.g., the computer system is not connected to a power source). Thus, an entity described or explained as being "configured to perform" a task refers to a physical thing, such as a device, circuitry, memory that stores executable program instructions to accomplish the task. The phrase is not used herein to refer to intangible things. Thus, the phrase "configured to" is not used herein to refer to software entities such as application programming interfaces (APIs).

[0017] The term "configured to" is not intended to mean "configurable to." For example, an unprogrammed FPGA may be "configurable to" perform some particular function, but is not considered to be "configured to" perform that function; it may be said to be "configured to" perform that function after programming.

[0018] In the appended claims, describing a structure as "configured to" perform one or more tasks is expressly intended not to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) for that claim element. Accordingly, none of the claims in this application as filed are intended to be construed as having means-plus-function elements. If an applicant wishes to invoke 35 U.S.C. 112(f) during prosecution, it will recite a claim element using the construct "means for" [performing a function].

[0019] As used herein, the terms "first," "second," etc. are used as labels preceding nouns and do not imply any type of ordering (e.g., spatial, temporal, logical, etc.) unless specifically stated. For example, if a network node conveys a first frame and a second frame, the terms "first" and "second" do not imply that the first frame is transmitted before the second frame is transmitted. That is, the "first" and "second" frames may be transmitted in any suitable order or even in parallel.

[0020] As used herein, the term "based on" is used to describe one or more factors that influence the determination. This term does not exclude the possibility that additional factors may influence the determination. That is, the determination may be based only on the specified factor or based on the specified factor as well as other unspecified factors. Consider the phrase "determining A based on B." This phrase specifies that B is a factor that is used to determine A or that influences the determination of A. This phrase does not exclude that the determination of A may also be based on some other factor, such as C. This phrase is intended to cover embodiments in which A is determined only based on B. As used herein, the phrase "based on" is therefore synonymous with the phrase "based at least in part on."

[0021] While it is important to consider external threats when designing a network, it is also useful to consider internal threats, such as when an internal network node becomes compromised. For example, in an office environment, an employee may receive an email with a malicious attachment and initiate the execution of the attachment that compromises the employee's computer. This security breach could allow a malicious actor to gain access to that computer as well as other computers coupled through the office LAN. As another example, it has recently been noted that a miscreant actor could gain control over the functionality of a vehicle by compromising a navigation unit that has a cellular connection to the Internet to receive content. After compromising this unit, the actor could then issue commands to other control units of the vehicle, since they would not be subject to any of the constraints of an internal network.

[0022] This disclosure describes various techniques for securing a network, such as a LAN. As described below, in various embodiments, multiple nodes in the network are coupled to respective hardware security modules (HSMs) that are configured to encrypt and decrypt portions of traffic being communicated on the network. In some embodiments, the HSMs are also configured to store policy information that restricts the use of encryption keys based on the source and destination of the traffic. If a node attempts to communicate network traffic to an unauthorized destination, the HSM can refuse to encrypt the portion of the traffic based on the policy information. The destination HSM can also refuse to decrypt any traffic from the source node based on the policy information. By refusing to encrypt or decrypt traffic, the HSM can limit what communications may occur on the network. In some examples, restricting communications in this manner reduces the potential exposure of the network if a node becomes compromised. In some examples, it may also be possible to identify if a node has been compromised and / or determine if an unauthorized node has been inserted into the network.

[0023] The present disclosure begins with a description of components in a secure network with reference to Figures 1 and 2. Network communications between nodes are described with reference to Figures 3-6. Provisioning of network components is described with reference to Figures 7-10C. Finally, an exemplary computer system that can be used to implement one or more network components is discussed with reference to Figure 11.

[0024] 1, a block diagram of a secure network 100 is shown. In the illustrated embodiment, the network 100 includes a switch 110 coupled to a number of nodes 120A-D via links 112. The nodes 120A-D are further coupled to respective hardware security modules (HSMs) 130A-D via links 122. The switch 110 is also coupled to a gateway 140 via links 112. In various embodiments, the network 100 may be implemented differently than shown in the figure. Thus, for example, in some embodiments, there may be more (or fewer) switches 110 and nodes 120, and redundant links 112 between the nodes 120 may also be present.

[0025] In some embodiments, secure network 100 is a local area network (LAN) configured to communicate network traffic between nodes 120. In various embodiments, network traffic is routed between nodes 120 by switch 110. Thus, switch 110 may be configured to queue data frames received from nodes 120 and may analyze source and destination addresses specified by the frames in order to appropriately transmit the frames to their specified destination. In some embodiments, switch 110 is configured to route frames in accordance with IEEE 802.3 (i.e., Ethernet frames). However, in other embodiments, other networking protocols may be supported. In the illustrated embodiment, network 100 is coupled to an external network (e.g., the Internet) via gateway device 140. In some embodiments, gateway 140 is configured to implement a firewall and perform network address translation (NAT) for network 100.

[0026] Nodes 120 may correspond to any suitable device configured to communicate over a network. In some embodiments, nodes 120 may be devices in a home or office network, such as desktop and laptop computers, mobile devices, smart televisions, smart appliances, etc. In some embodiments, nodes 120 are machines in a manufacturing plant configured to perform various operations. In some embodiments, nodes 120 are electronic control units (ECUs) in vehicles, such as aircraft, boats, automobiles, recreational vehicles, etc. The term "electronic control unit (ECU)" as used herein should be interpreted according to its meaning as understood in the art and includes embedded systems (e.g., microcontrollers) that control one or more operations of a vehicle. In such embodiments, nodes 120 may include, for example, a motor ECU that communicates torque control messages and wheel speed messages to control operation of a motor, a brake system ECU that communicates brake control messages to apply brakes, a backup camera ECU that communicates video, a steering ECU that communicates steering wheel angle messages to control turning, etc.

[0027] In various embodiments, traffic communicated on network 100 may have some predictable characteristics. For example, a given node 120, when operating correctly as designed (e.g., node 120A can communicate with nodes 120B and 120C, but not with node 120D), may only communicate traffic with a subset of other nodes. As another example, a given node 120, when operating as designed, may only communicate traffic in one direction. For example, node 120B may multicast traffic to nodes 120C and 120D, but nodes 120C and 120D may not communicate any traffic back to node 120B. As described below, these predictable characteristics allow a policy 134 to be defined for a given node 120 to ensure that traffic is communicated as designed. If node 120 attempts to deviate from this policy (e.g., because it has been compromised), secure network 100 may be configured to limit its ability to deviate from the policy via HSM 130.

[0028] In one embodiment, the hardware security module (HSM) 130 is a secure circuit configured to encrypt and decrypt traffic communicated between the nodes 120 by using one or more internally stored keys 132. As used herein, the term "secure circuit" refers to circuitry that prevents isolated internal resources (e.g., keys 132) from being directly accessed by external entities (e.g., nodes 120). In some embodiments, a given HSM 130 may be responsible for all encryption performed for a given node 120. For example, in transmitting a set of data frames, node 120A may request that HSM 130A encrypt the payload of each frame. However, in other embodiments, a given HSM 130 may be responsible for only a portion of the encrypted data transmitted by a given node 120, and the given node 120 may handle the remaining encryption. In some embodiments, this may be due to a slow connection link 122 between the nodes 120 and the HSM 130. As a result, a given node 120 may perform the majority of the encryption in a given frame (e.g., payload) and the HSM 130 may encrypt the remaining small portion. In various embodiments, the HSM 130 is involved in at least a portion of the encryption and decryption because the HSM 130 is potentially more secure than a given node 120 and therefore less likely to be compromised. In some embodiments, this added security results from the HSM 130 presenting a limited attack surface and isolating internal components, as described below with respect to FIG. 2.

[0029] In various embodiments, HSM 130 is configured to encrypt and decrypt a portion of a frame that can be used to verify the integrity of the frame and / or authenticate the source node 120 of the frame. In some embodiments, this portion is a message authentication code (MAC) included in the frame communicated by node 120. (The term "message authentication code" as used herein should be interpreted according to its meaning as understood in the art and includes data that can be used to authenticate a message and that is computed via a keyed function.) For example, in some embodiments, node 120 is configured to communicate frames in compliance with IEEE 802.1AE (also referred to as Media Access Control Security (MACSec)). In generating the frame, node 120 may encrypt the frame payload using the Advanced Encryption Standard in Galois / Counter Mode (AES-GCM). As part of applying this algorithm, the node 120 generates a value that can be used to check the integrity of the frame (i.e., an integrity check value (ICV)), called a Galois message authentication code (GMAC). In such an embodiment, if a given node 120 is the source of a frame, its respective HSM 130 is configured to encrypt the GMAC in the frame with an encryption key 132. Then, when the frame is communicated to a recipient node 120, the HSM 130 of that node 120 decrypts the GMAC, so that the recipient node 120 can use the decrypted GMAC to verify the integrity of the received frame to ensure that the frame has not been tampered with and is from the correct source. In other embodiments, the HSM 130 may be configured to encrypt and decrypt other portions of the frame.Nodes 120 may also communicate using protocols other than MACsec. For example, in another embodiment, HSM 130 is configured to encrypt a frame check sequence (FCS) in an Ethernet frame. In yet another embodiment, HSM 130 may be configured to encrypt a header checksum in an Internet Protocol (IP) packet. Thus, although various embodiments are presented below in the context of a MAC, these descriptions may apply to other embodiments in which a MAC is not used.

[0030] In some embodiments, HSM 130 is configured to encrypt a portion of a frame (e.g., each MAC) separately from other frames in a stream of traffic, as described below with respect to FIG. 3. For example, in one embodiment, HSM 130 is configured to apply AES in Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode to each portion. In other embodiments, for a set of frames, HSM 130 may be configured to use block chaining to encrypt portions from multiple frames, such that later encrypted portions depend on earlier encrypted portions, as described below with respect to FIG. 4. For example, in one embodiment, HSM applies AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode to chain the portions together. In some examples, using block chaining can reduce the amount of traffic communicated over link 122 between node 120 and HSM 130.

[0031] In various embodiments, HSM 130 is configured to use different keys 132 based on the traffic communicated by node 120. That is, in some embodiments, each key 132 is associated with a respective node 120 or set of nodes 120. For example, if node 120A communicates different traffic with nodes 120B and 120C, HSM 130A may use a first key 132A to encrypt traffic corresponding to communication with node 120B and a second key 132A to encrypt traffic corresponding to communication with node 120C. However, if node 120A is multicasting the same stream to nodes 120B and 120C, the same key 132A may be used. In some embodiments, each key 132 is applicable to only one direction of traffic. Thus, HSM 130A may use a first key for traffic being sent by node 120A to node 120B and a second key for traffic being received by node 120A from node 120B. To limit the ability of a given node 120 to communicate with other nodes 120, in various embodiments, its HSM 130 is provisioned with only the keys 132 appropriate for its intended communications. Thus, if node 120A intends to communicate with node 120C but not with 120D, then HSM 130A will be provisioned with key 132A for node 120C but not for 120D. Furthermore, if node 120A intends to send traffic to node 120C but not to receive traffic from node 120C, then HSM 130A will be provisioned with key 132A for sending traffic but not for receiving traffic. Provisioning HSM 130 in this manner can prevent the corresponding node 120 from communicating in an unauthorized manner. That is, in the above example, HSM 130A does not have key 132A to communicate with node 120D, so even if node 120A were to be compromised, node 120A would not be able to communicate with node 120D.

[0032] In the illustrated embodiment, HSM 130 also includes policies 134 that further restrict the use of its keys 132. In various embodiments, policy 134 of HSM 130 defines a set of usage criteria for each of the keys 132 contained in HSM 130. These criteria may specify a node 120 that corresponds to a given key 132, for example, such that a particular key 132A is used to communicate only with node 120B. In some embodiments, node 120 may be identified in the usage criteria based on its network address. In various embodiments, these criteria also specify the cryptographic functions (i.e., encryption or decryption) that are allowed for a given key 132, thus limiting the direction of traffic. For example, policy 134A may specify that a particular key in keys 132A corresponds to node 120B and may only be used for encryption. Similarly, policy 134B may specify that a particular key in keys 132B corresponds to node 120A and may only be used for decryption. In this manner, a key can be used to send encrypted traffic from node 120A to node 120B, but not from node 120B to 120A. In some embodiments, the specific criteria for a given key can be expressed as a tuple that includes 1) an indication of whether the key is used for encryption or decryption, and 2) an indication identifying one or more nodes 120. In various embodiments, a given HSM 130 can verify that a cryptographic operation requested by a node 120 complies with its policy 134 before performing the requested operation. An example illustrating the use of policy 134 is provided below with respect to FIG. 5.

[0033] In some embodiments, provisioning of HSM 130 is handled by gateway 140. As described in more detail below with respect to Figures 7-9, gateway 140 may be configured to facilitate registration of components within network 100 and receipt of keys 132 and policies 134 from an entity external to network 100. In some embodiments, gateway 140 may facilitate establishment of a secure connection with this entity and distribution of keys 132 and policies 134 to the appropriate nodes 120. In various embodiments, provisioning may be performed during initial assembly of network 100 and following replacement of components in network 100, as described in more detail below.

[0034] 2, a block diagram of HSM 130 is shown. In the illustrated embodiment, HSM 130 comprises a network interface 210, one or more processors 220, read only memory (ROM) 230, non-volatile memory (NVM) 240, crypto accelerator 250, and key storage 260 coupled together via an interconnect 270. ROM 230 includes firmware 232. NVM 240 includes policy 134, public key certificates 242, and capabilities information 244. Key storage 260 includes keys 132, provisioning private keys 262, and identity keys 264. In some embodiments, HSM 130 may include more (or fewer) components than shown.

[0035] In one embodiment, network interface 210 is configured to facilitate communication with node 120. Interface 210 thereby encrypts and decrypts data over link 122, which in some embodiments is a serial peripheral interface (SPI) bus. In various embodiments, interface 210 is also configured to isolate internal components 220-260 from external entities, such as node 120, by filtering incoming read and write operations. In some embodiments, HSM 130 presents a limited attack surface by supporting only a small number of commands. For example, in one embodiment, HSM 130 supports a first command to request use of a particular key, a second command to request encryption with that key 132, a third command to request decryption with that key, and a fourth command to update key 132. If interface 210 receives data from node 120 that is not one of the supported commands, interface 210 can prevent the data from entering HSM 130.

[0036] In one embodiment, the processor 220 is configured to execute program instructions to perform the various operations described herein with respect to the HSM 130. In some embodiments, the processor 220 is hardwired to fetch from a specific address range at boot time to boot the firmware 232 from the ROM 230. Notably, because the memory 230 is a ROM (unlike some other types of memory that are easily writable), the firmware 232 is difficult to change and therefore difficult to tamper with. As a result, the HSM 130 can be restored to a default, trusted state by simply rebooting the processor 220, which in the illustrated embodiment can be initiated by asserting the reset signal 202. The processor 220 thereby further serves to isolate the components of the HSM 130.

[0037] In one embodiment, the crypto accelerator 250 is a circuit configured to perform cryptographic operations for the HSM 130. The crypto accelerator 250 may implement any suitable cryptographic algorithm, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), etc. In some embodiments, the accelerator 250 may also implement elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In the illustrated embodiment, the accelerator 250 is configured to use keys stored in the key storage 260, however, the accelerator 250 may isolate the keys from being accessed by other components of the HSM 130. That is, in some embodiments, the accelerator 250 allows the keys 132 to be updated by the processor 220, but the keys 132 may not be read from the storage 260 by the processor 220. Additionally, when a request to use one of the keys 132 is received, the accelerator 250 may verify that the requested operation is permitted by the policy 134. In various embodiments, the accelerator 250 is also responsible for provisioning the HSM 130. This may include using the provisioning public key 262 to decrypt the received key 132 received from the provisioning server, as well as modifying the key 132 privately to the server and gateway 140, as described below with respect to FIG.

[0038] In some embodiments, the provisioning of the private key 262 and its corresponding public key certificate 242 is used to establish a secure connection with a provisioning server. That is, the HSM 130 can provide the provisioning server with the public key certificate 242, which includes the public key corresponding to the private key 262. The provisioning server can then encrypt the key 132 and the policy 134 using the public key, and the accelerator 250 can then decrypt the key 132 encrypted with the private key 262. In other embodiments, the certificate can be used to derive a temporary key via Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). In some embodiments, the accelerator 250 can generate a public key pair including the private key 262 during initial provisioning of the HSM 130 and register the key pair with the provisioning server to receive the certificate 242, as described below with respect to FIG. 8A. In some embodiments, the certificate 242 is an X.509 certificate. In some embodiments, when the accelerator 250 submits a certificate signing request to the provisioning server, it signs the public key with the identity key 264. In various embodiments, the identity key 264 is a cryptographic key that is unique to the HSM 130 and known to the provisioning server. In some embodiments, the identity key 264 is stored in the HSM 130 during manufacture of the HSM 130.

[0039] In some embodiments, the HSM 130 also sends capability information 244 when new keys 132 and policies 134 are provisioned. As described with respect to FIG. 8B, in various embodiments, the information 244 identifies one or more capabilities of the node 120 to which the HSM 130 is coupled. For example, in an embodiment in which the node 120 is a brake module ECU, the information 244 may identify the node 120 as itself. Similarly, the provisioning server may use this information to determine which keys 132 and policies 134 to provide to that HSM 130. In some embodiments, the information 244 may be signed by the provisioning server (and in some embodiments included in the certificate 242).

[0040] 3, there is shown a communication diagram of a secure communication 300. The secure communication 300 is an example of a secure communication between two nodes 120 communicating over a network 100. It should be noted that steps 302-318 may be performed in parallel or in a different order than shown in some embodiments.

[0041] As shown, communication 300 may begin at 302 with node 120A having encrypted message M to generate encrypted message M' and a corresponding MAC that can be used to verify the integrity of message M and authenticate that M is from node 120A. At 304, node 120A issues a request to HSM 130A to encrypt the MAC. In various embodiments, node 120A also indicates intent to send the MAC to node 120B. At 306, HSM 130A verifies that the requested operation is permitted by its policy 134. If the operation is permitted, HSM 130 selects the appropriate key 132 identified in policy 134 and encrypts the MAC (via accelerator 250, as described above) to generate an encrypted MAC', which it sends back at 308 to node 120A. If the requested operation is not permitted by HSM 130A's policy 134, HSM 130A may only respond with an indication that the request was denied. At 310, node 120A sends M' and MAC' to node 120B for processing.

[0042] At 312, node 120B forwards the MAC' to HSM 130B for decryption. In various embodiments, node 120B also indicates node 120A as the source of the MAC'. At 314, node 120B begins decrypting M' to recover M. Meanwhile, at 316, HSM 130B checks whether the requested decryption is permitted by its policy 134. If the operation is permitted, HSM 130B selects the appropriate key 132 to decrypt the MAC' and recover the MAC. This MAC is provided to node 120B at 318. If the operation is not permitted by HSM 130B's policy 134, HSM 130B can respond by indicating that the request was denied. At 320, node 120B checks M against the MAC. If the verification fails, this may mean that M has been tampered with and / or that M does not come from node 120A.

[0043] 4, there is shown a communication diagram of another secure communication 400. In some embodiments, as mentioned above, the link 122 between the node 120 and its HSM 130 may have a low transmission speed. The secure communication 400 attempts to reduce the amount of traffic communicated on the link 122 by chaining together the encryption of multiple MACs created during the transmission of multiple frames.

[0044] As shown, communication 400 begins at 402 with node 120A encrypting a first message M1 to generate an encrypted message M1' and a first message authentication code MAC1. At 404, node 120A issues an encryption request indicating that MAC1 is being sent to node 120B as part of a stream of messages. At 406, HSM 130A checks whether the requested action is permitted by its policy 134, and if so, proceeds to encrypt MAC1 with the appropriate key 132 to generate MAC1'. Notably, HSM 130A does not provide MAC1' to node 120A. Rather, HSM 130A only stores MAC1' for later use at 416. At 408, node 120A sends M1' and unencrypted MAC1 to node 120B, which forwards MAC1 to HSM 130B for storage. At 410, node 120B decrypts M1' and verifies it against MAC1. At 412, HSM 130B also verifies that the last MACN in the chain is authorized for decryption, and if so, encrypts MAC1, which is used to decrypt MACN at 426, described below.

[0045] At 414, node 120A encrypts the second message M2, generating M2' and MAC2, which is provided to HSM 130A for encryption at 416. At 418, HSM 130A verifies that encryption is permitted, and if so, encrypts MAC2 using cipher block chaining, using the encrypted MAC1' as an input to the encryption function. Thus, the encrypted MAC2' now depends not only on the contents of MAC2, but also on the contents of MAC1. Furthermore, MAC2' is not communicated to node 120A, but rather is stored for use in encryption operations of subsequent MACs associated with the message stream. By not communicating the encrypted MAC back to node 120A, HSM 130A can reduce the amount of traffic communicated on link 122. At 420, node 120A communicates M2' and the unencrypted MAC2 to node 120B, which forwards MAC2 to HSM 130B for storage.

[0046] Node 120A may continue to send encrypted messages and MACs until it reaches the last message MN in the message stream. At 422, node 120A communicates the encrypted MN' but does not send the MACN. Instead, at 424, HSM 130A sends a chained MACN' that depends not only on MACN but also on all preceding MACs. That is, MACN' was encrypted using encrypted MACN-1' as input, which has been encrypted using MACN-2', and so on. At 426, HSM 130B verifies that it is in accordance with its policy 134 to decrypt MACN', and if so, attempts to decrypt MACN' using a previously stored MAC (i.e., MAC1-MACN-1). If node 120A were to insert a MAC that was never provided to HSM 130A (or change one of those provided to HSM 130A), HSM 130B would not be able to correctly decrypt MACN' and the verification would fail at 430. If the decryption is successful, the decrypted chained MAC is provided to node 120B at 428 for verification against the decrypted MN at 430.

[0047] Note that in other embodiments, secure communication 400 may not include node 120B validating the MN against the decrypted MACN received from node 120A at 430, as shown in Figure 4. Rather, the MACN may be transmitted by node 120A to node 120B at 422. HSM 130B may simply attempt to recalculate the encrypted MACN' from the previously received MAC and compare this encrypted MACN' to the MACN' received from HSM 130A at 426. If the two encrypted MACs do not match, HSM 130B may signal an error to node 120B and fail the validation at 430.

[0048] 5, there is shown an example of policy usage 500. In this example, HSMs 130A, 130B, and 130C are provisioned with respective policies 134A, 134B, and 134C to enable two streams of traffic 502A and 502B.

[0049] As shown, traffic 502A is being multicast from node 120A to nodes 120B and 120C and includes a MAC encrypted with key 132, shown as K1. Thus, because node 120A is the source of traffic 502A, its HSM 130A is provisioned with K1 and policy 134A indicating that encryption is permitted by K1 when nodes 120B and 120C are destinations for that traffic. In some embodiments, policy 134A may express this criteria as a tuple (encrypt, "network address of node 120B, network address of node 120C"), although for purposes of illustration it is expressed as "K1:encrypt MAC for 120B&C". Because nodes 120B and 120C are destinations for traffic 502A, HSMs 130B and 130C are provisioned with K1 and policies 134B and 134C indicating that decryption is permitted by K1 when node 120A is the source. In particular, nodes 120B and 120C, in this example, would not be allowed to send traffic to node 120A or other traffic using K1 because this would likely not be permitted by their respective policies 134. Thus, when node 120C becomes compromised and attempts to do so, node 120C would be restricted from doing so by HSMs 130A and 130B and their policies 134.

[0050] Continuing with the example of FIG. 5, traffic 502B is communicated from node 120B to node 120C and includes a MAC encrypted with another key 132K2. As shown, policy 134B indicates that if the destination is node 120C, HSM 130B is authorized to perform encryption with K2. Policy 134C also indicates that if the source is node 120B, HSM 130C is authorized to perform decryption with K2. Notably, in this example, HSM 130A is not provisioned with K2 (and its policy 134A does not specify any authorized use for K2) because node 120A is not intended to communicate traffic 502B there.

[0051] 6A, a flow diagram of a method 600 for communicating traffic over a network is shown. Method 600 is one embodiment of a method that may be performed by a secure circuit, such as HSM 130. In some examples, implementation of method 600 may enable more secure network communications. In some embodiments, steps 610-640 may be performed in parallel or in a different order than shown.

[0052] At step 610, the secure circuitry stores a number of encryption keys (e.g., keys 132) that can be used to encrypt data communications between a number of devices (e.g., nodes 120) over a network (e.g., secure network 100). In some embodiments, the secure circuitry is coupled to a first device of the number of devices (e.g., HSM 130A coupled to node 120A). In some embodiments, the encryption keys are received from a gateway (e.g., gateway 140) that facilitates communications over the wide area network and is configured to receive a set of replacement keys from an entity on the wide area network and distribute some of the replacement keys to the multiple devices.

[0053] At step 620, the secure circuit stores information defining a set of usage criteria (e.g., policy 134) for the plurality of encrypted keys. The set of usage criteria specifies that a first key of the plurality of keys (e.g., policy 134B referencing key K2 shown in FIG. 4) exclusively encrypts data being communicated from a first device of the plurality of devices (e.g., node 120B) to a second device of the plurality of devices (e.g., node 120C). In some embodiments, the stored information identifies a tuple for each of the plurality of keys such that each tuple 1) includes an indication of whether the key is dedicated to encryption or decryption, and 2) identifies one or more devices of the plurality of devices associated with that key. In some embodiments, the set of usage criteria indicates that the first key is dedicated to encrypting data communications in one direction, between the first device and the second device, and not in the other direction.

[0054] In step 630, the secure circuitry receives a request to encrypt a portion of a message (e.g., a MAC) with a first key. In some embodiments, the request indicates that a message is being sent from a first device to a second device.

[0055] In step 640, the secure circuitry encrypts a portion of the message with the first key in response to determining that the set of usage criteria permits encryption with the first key for a message being sent from the first device to the second device. In some embodiments, the secure circuitry is configured to encrypt a portion of the message such that the encrypted portion is usable to establish that the message is sent by the first device.

[0056] 6B, a flow diagram of another method 650 for communicating traffic over a network is shown. Method 650 is one embodiment of a method executable by an apparatus that includes one or more ECUs (such as node 120 in some embodiments) and one or more secure circuits (such as HSM 130). In some examples, implementation of method 650 enables more secure network communications.

[0057] In step 660, a first electronic control unit (ECU) generates a message authentication code (MAC) for a data frame transmitted from the first ECU to a second ECU.

[0058] In step 670, a first secure circuit coupled to the first ECU encrypts the MAC with a first encryption key (e.g., key 132). In some embodiments, the first ECU indicates to the first secure circuit that the second ECU is the destination of the data frame, and step 670 includes the first secure circuit determining whether to encrypt the MAC with the first encryption key based on the identified destination of the data frame. In some embodiments, the first secure circuit stores a plurality of encryption keys including the first encryption key, and for each key of the plurality of encryption keys, stores a policy (e.g., policy 134) specifying a respective use and a respective set of associated ECUs. In such an embodiment, the policy specifies that the first encryption key is used for encryption and is associated with a set of ECUs including the second ECU. In such an embodiment, the first secure circuit determines whether to sign the MAC with the first encryption key based on the stored policy. In some embodiments, the first secure circuit receives a first encryption key from a network gateway configured to receive the set of keys therefrom via a wireless network interface and distribute the set of keys to the secure circuit.

[0059] In step 680, the first ECU transmits the data frame with the encrypted MAC included in the data frame. In various embodiments, a second secure circuit coupled to the second ECU decrypts the encrypted MAC included in the data frame, and the second ECU verifies the integrity of the data frame using the decrypted MAC. In some embodiments, the first secure circuit is coupled to the first ECU via a first interconnect (e.g., link 122), and the first ECU transmits the data frame to the second ECU via a second interconnect (e.g., link 112) that is different from the first interconnect.

[0060] 7, a block diagram of a provisioning system 700 is shown. In various embodiments, the provisioning system 700 can be used to provision network components of the network 100, including provisioning the HSM 130 with keys 132 and policies 134. In the illustrated embodiment, the system 700 includes a factory provisioning server 710A, an in-field provisioning server 710B, and a gateway 140. In some embodiments, the system 700 may be implemented differently than shown. For example, a single provisioning server 710 may be used. The functions described below with respect to server 710 may be performed by a server other than the server that handles the provisioning of key blobs 720.

[0061] In the illustrated embodiment, the factory provisioning server 710A is a server configured to initially provision the network 100 when the network 100 is assembled. In various embodiments, the server 710A registers the private key 262 as described below with respect to FIG. 8A, assigns roles to the HSM 130 as described below with respect to FIG. 8B, provides firmware updates to the nodes 120, provides keys 132 and policies 134, and notifies the HSM 130 of revocation of any keys. In some embodiments, the server 710A is coupled to the network 100 via a wired connection 712A, since the server 710A may be collocated with the network 100 during assembly. For example, the network 100 and the server 710A may be collocated in the same factory. Thus, one or more operations performed by the factory provisioning server 710A may be repeated by the in-field provisioning server 710B for security considerations. That is, since the server 710A and the network 100 are collocated, a malicious party with access to both has an advantage in gaining access to the keys 132. As a result, the keys 132 and policies 134 issued by server 710A are valid for only a short period of time, for example 24 hours.

[0062] In the illustrated embodiment, the in-field provisioning server 710B is configured to perform any subsequent provisioning of the network 100. In some embodiments, the server 710B performs one or more of the same operations performed by the server 710A described above. However, in various embodiments, the server 710B is not collocated with the network 100 and may be coupled to the network 100 via a wireless connection 712B associated with a wide area network (WAN) such as the Internet. Thus, the provisioning performed by the server 710B is more secure than the provisioning performed by the server 710A. This allows the keys 132 and policies 134 issued by the server 710B to be valid for a longer period of time than those issued by the server 710A.

[0063] In various embodiments, the gateway 140 is configured to facilitate provisioning of the network 100 by establishing secure communications with the server 710. In some embodiments, the gateway 140 also performs distribution of keys 132 and policies 134 to the HSMs 130. In the illustrated embodiment, the keys 132 and policies 134 are implemented in a key blob 720, which is split into multiple portions 722, each associated with a respective one of the HSMs 130, as shown. For example, portion 722A includes key 132A and policy 134A for HSM 130A. Portion 722B includes key 132B and policy 134B. In such an embodiment, the gateway 140 can decrypt an encrypted version of the blob 720 received from the server 710, determine the association of each portion 722 to each HSM 130, and appropriately route each portion 722 to its respective HSM 130. In some embodiments, the key blob 720 may be received when the network 100 is initially assembled, when a new node 120 is added to the network 100, or when a firmware update of a node 120 occurs.

[0064] To prevent a compromised gateway 140 from gaining access to keys 132 and policies 134, several techniques can be used in some embodiments. First, the key blob can be encrypted, but for keys held by each HSM 130, each portion 722 may be further encrypted. In some embodiments, each portion 722 (e.g., portion 722A) is encrypted using a public key specified in certificate 242 and decryptable with private key 262 (e.g., private key 262A). In other embodiments, each portion 722 is encrypted and decrypted using the server 710's certificate and private key, and a temporary key derived from the HSM 130's certificate 242 and private key 262 via Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). Next, in some embodiments, each HSM 130 applies a modification function to key 132 to adapt the key to a new value. This allows the key 132 to be modified later by the HSM 130 that holds it, even if the gateway 140 can see the key 132. In particular, the altered key 132 is unknown even to the server 710 that originally provided the key, so that if a malicious party gains access to the key 132 at the server 710, the key 132 is subsequently altered and unknown to the malicious party.

[0065] 8A, a communication diagram of key registration 800 is shown. Key registration 800 is one embodiment of communication between HSM 130 and provisioning server 710 (or other server that handles key registration) to register a public key pair that can be used to communicate encrypted data. In various embodiments, key registration 800 is performed when node 120 is manufactured, when network 100 is assembled, or when a new node 120 is added to network 100.

[0066] As shown, key registration 800 begins at 802 with the HSM 130 generating a public key pair including the provisioning private key 262. At 804, the HSM 130 sends a certificate signing request (CSR) for a public key certificate 242. In the illustrated embodiment, the request includes the public key of the pair and a message authentication code calculated by applying a function keyed to the public key where the identity key 264 is used as the key for the function. In some embodiments, the request may include more (or less) content, such as capabilities information 244. In some embodiments, the request conforms to a standard such as public-key cryptographic standards (PKCS) 10. At 806, the provisioning server 710 verifies the request, including verifying the MAC calculated by the identity key 264. If the verification is successful, the server 710 signs the certificate 242 including the public key and certifies the validity of the public key. (Thus, in various embodiments, server 710 is configured to implement a certificate authority (CA).) At 808, server 710 sends signed certificate 242 to HSM 130, which can later present certificate 242 to server 710 in order to receive encrypted data from server 710.

[0067] 8B, a communication diagram of role assignment 850 is shown. Role assignment 850 is one embodiment of a communication that assigns a role to an HSM 130 that is unable to determine which keys 132 and policies 134 should next be provided to the HSM 130. In some embodiments, role assignment 850 may be performed when new nodes 120 are created at manufacturing time, during assembly of network 100, or after assembly.

[0068] As shown, role assignment 850 begins at 852 with the HSM 130 and the provisioning server 710 (or some other server involved in role assignment) establishing a secure connection. In some embodiments, this connection may be established using an identity key 246 over the EDCH. At 854, the HSM 130 transmits capability information 244 to the provisioning server 710. As described above, the capability information 244 may identify various functions of the node 120 coupled to the HSM 130. In some embodiments, this information 244 may be provided by the manufacturer of the node 120. At 856, the provisioning server 710 considers the capability information 244 and assigns a role to the node 120. For example, if the node 120 is capable of operating as a headlight or taillight, the server 710 may assign the node 120 the role of headlight. As shown, the server 710 may generate a digital signature from the data specifying the assigned role. At 858, the server 710 returns the signed capabilities information 244 to the HSM 130, which later provides the signed information to receive the appropriate keys 132 and policies 134. In some embodiments, the server 710 may also store a copy of the capabilities information 244.

[0069] In particular, in signing the capabilities 244, the server 710 prevents malicious entities from changing the roles assigned to the nodes 120. The server 710 also prevents fake devices from being used; that is, in some embodiments, if the HSM 130 lacks the signed capabilities 244, it cannot be provisioned with keys 132 and policies 134 and therefore cannot communicate with other nodes 120. Furthermore, a fake device may lack the identity key 246, which in some embodiments is a prerequisite for establishing a secure connection with the provisioning server 710.

[0070] 9, a flow diagram of a diagnostic mode 900 is shown. In some embodiments, the gateway 140 is configured to support a diagnostic mode 900 in which the gateway 140 provides various information about the network 100 and allows a user to select various operations including possible provisioning of the network 100. Thus, in some embodiments, the diagnostic mode 900 may be invoked during network assembly, firmware updates in the nodes 120 and / or HSM 130, and replacement of nodes 120 in the network 100. FIG. 9 illustrates a sequence of steps that may be performed by the gateway 140 and / or the provisioning server 710 when instructed to enter the diagnostic mode 900.

[0071] As shown, the diagnostic mode 900 is initiated at step 910 with the detection of any node 120 inserted into the network 100. In response to detecting the node 120, the gateway 140 collects the public key certificate 242 from its HSM 130 at step 920. In some examples, the gateway 140 may determine that the HSM 130 does not have a certificate 242 or has an invalid certificate. In such a case, the gateway 140 may instruct the HSM 130 to perform key registration as described above with respect to FIG. 8A. In some embodiments, if the gateway 140 has difficulty communicating with the node 120 or the HSM 130, the gateway 140 may identify a communication error. At step 930, the gateway 140 sends the collected certificate 242 to the provisioning server 710.

[0072] In step 940, the provisioning server 710 performs a fraud check with the nodes 120 connected to the network 100 to determine if there are any problems. (In other embodiments, some or all of step 940 may be performed by the gateway 140.) As shown, this check may include performing steps 942-946, which in some embodiments may include more (or less) steps than those shown in FIG. 9. In step 942, it is determined whether the certificate 242 sent is for a complete system. For example, in some embodiments where the node 120 is an ECU, step 942 may include determining whether there is a complete set of ECUs for the vehicle based on the certificate 242. In some embodiments, step 942 may include the test capability information 244 included in the certificate 242 as described above. If the certificate 242 is not found, this may be due to one or more nodes 120 not being present in the network 100 or a fake node 120 being inserted in the network 100. In step 944, a determination is made whether the certificate 242 sent belongs to the same system. If certificates 242 for two different systems are received, someone may be trying to take a node 120 from one system and combine it with another node 120, indicating a potential security problem. Another determination is made in step 946 whether any certificates are associated with a stolen system. In some embodiments, if a system is reported as stolen, the provisioning server 710B can add the certificate 242 to a blacklist and refuse to provision any network 100 that includes an HSM 130 with a certificate on the blacklist. The provisioning server 710 can also instruct the HSM 130 to revoke any key 132 used to communicate with an HSM 130 that has a blacklisted certificate 242. By doing so, the server 710 can prevent communication on the network 100, effectively bricking the system that includes the network 100.

[0073] If the fraud check fails, the gateway 140 receives information from the provisioning server 710 identifying why the check failed and provides that information to the user who initiated the diagnostic mode 900. However, if the fraud check is completed successfully, the gateway 140 can receive and distribute the key blob 720 in step 950, as described above with respect to FIG.

[0074] 10A, a flow diagram of a method 1000 for provisioning one or more nodes of a network is shown. Method 1000 is one embodiment of a method that may be performed by a computing device, such as gateway 140. In some examples, performing method 1000 may enable more secure network communications.

[0075] In step 1010, the computing device receives an indication that one of the ECUs has been replaced. In various embodiments, the electronic control units (ECUs) control the operation of the vehicle, and this operation control includes communicating data (e.g., MAC) between the ECUs encrypted using a set of keys (e.g., key 132).

[0076] In step 1015, the computing device, in response to the instruction, issues a request to an entity (eg, the provisioning server 710) on a wide area network (WAN) to exchange a set of keys.

[0077] In step 1020, the computing device receives a set of replacement keys (e.g., key blob 720) from an entity on the WAN. In some embodiments, step 1020 also includes receiving policy information (e.g., policy 134) that defines use for the replacement keys in the set. In such embodiments, the policy information identifies, for a first key in the set, 1) one of a plurality of ECUs that is authorized to send data encrypted with the first key, and 2) one or more of a plurality of ECUs that are authorized to receive data encrypted with the first key. In some embodiments, step 1020 also includes receiving an indication that one or more of the replacement keys have been revoked.

[0078] In step 1025, the computing device distributes the set of replacement keys to the plurality of ECUs. In some embodiments, a first secure circuit coupled to a first ECU of the plurality of ECUs (e.g., HSM 130A coupled to node 120A) receives the replacement key distributed to the first ECU and services a request from the first ECU to encrypt data with the replacement key. In some embodiments, before servicing a request from the first ECU, the secure circuit modifies the replacement key in a manner that renders the replacement key unknown to the gateway. In some embodiments, step 1025 also includes distributing the policy information received with the set of replacement keys in step 1020. In some embodiments, step 1025 also includes notifying the plurality of ECUs to cease using one or more replacement keys indicated as revoked in step 1020.

[0079] 10B, a flow diagram of a first method 1030 for detecting unauthorized nodes is shown. In some embodiments, the method 1030 may be performed by the gateway 140 or the interim server 710 during a diagnostic mode to identify potentially fake nodes 120 inserted into the network 100.

[0080] The method 1030 begins with a computer system detecting a plurality of nodes (e.g., node 120) coupled to a network (e.g., network 100) at step 1040. In some embodiments, the plurality of nodes includes an electronic control unit (ECU) configured to control operation of a vehicle. At step 1045, the computer system issues a request for one of the plurality of nodes to provide a certificate (e.g., certificate 242) attesting to the node's authenticity. In some embodiments, the method 1030 includes the computer system receiving a certificate from a certificate authority (CA) (e.g., via key registration 800) and receiving a certificate associated with one of the plurality of nodes from a secure circuit (e.g., HSM 130) configured to store certificates for the node. At step 1050, the computer system identifies one or more of the nodes that fail to provide a certificate in response to the request. In some embodiments, the identification includes indicating that the one or more nodes are not authorized for use with the network.

[0081] 10C, a flow diagram of a second method 1060 for detecting unauthorized nodes is shown. In some embodiments, the method 1060 may be performed by the interim server 710 or the gateway 140 during a diagnostic mode to identify a node 120 that has been removed from one network 100 and inserted into another network 100 (e.g., an ECU removed from a potentially stolen vehicle and inserted into another vehicle).

[0082] Method 1060 begins at step 1070 with a computer system receiving a certificate (e.g., certificate 242) from a plurality of nodes (e.g., node 120) coupled to a first network (e.g., network 100). In step 1075, the computer system analyzes the certificate to determine whether it is associated with the first network. In some embodiments, method 1060 includes a computer system receiving a request to issue a certificate to a first node of the plurality of nodes, the request identifying the first node as associated with the first network. The computer system issues the certificate to the first node and stores an indication of the certificate in a list of certificates associated with the first network. In such embodiments, step 1075 further includes analyzing the list. In some embodiments, method 1060 includes a computer system receiving a request to issue a certificate to a first node of the plurality of nodes, the request identifying the first node as associated with the first network. The computer system issues a certificate to the first node such that the certificate includes an indication that the first node is associated with the first network. In such an embodiment, step 1075 includes analyzing the indication included in the certificate. In step 1080, the computer system identifies one of the plurality of nodes as associated with the second network based on the analysis. Exemplary Computer System

[0083] 11, a block diagram of an exemplary computer system 1100 is shown. Computer system 1100 is one embodiment of a computer system that may be used to implement one or more of nodes 120, gateways 140, servers 710, etc. In the illustrated embodiment, computer system 1100 comprises a processor subsystem 1120 coupled to a system memory 1140 and an I / O interface 1160 via an interconnect 1180 (e.g., a system bus). The I / O interface 1160 is coupled to one or more I / O devices 1170. Computer system 1100 may be any of a variety of types of devices, including, but not limited to, a server system, a personal computer system, a network computer, an embedded system, etc. For convenience, a single computer system 1100 is shown in FIG. 11, however system 1100 may be implemented as two or more computer systems operating together.

[0084] Processor subsystem 1120 may include one or more processors or processing units. In various embodiments of computer system 1100, multiple instances of processor subsystem 1120 may be coupled to interconnect 1180. In various embodiments, processor subsystem 1120 (or each processor unit within 1120) may include a cache or other form of on-board memory.

[0085] The system memory 1140 may store program instructions executable by the processor subsystem 1120 to cause the system 1100 to perform various operations described herein. The system memory 1140 may be implemented using various physical, non-transitory storage media, such as hard disk storage devices, floppy disk storage devices, removable disk storage devices, flash memory, random access memory (RAM-SRAM, EDO RAM, SDRAM, DDR SDRAM, RAMBUS RAM, etc.), read-only memory (PROM, EEPROM, etc.), and the like. The memory of the computer system 1100 is not limited to primary storage devices such as the memory 1140. Rather, the computer system 1100 may also include other forms of storage devices, such as cache memory in the processor subsystem 1120 and secondary storage devices on the I / O devices 1170 (e.g., hard drives, storage arrays, etc.). In some embodiments, these other forms of storage devices also store program instructions executable by the processor subsystem 1120 to perform the operations described herein.

[0086] I / O interface 1160 may be any of a variety of types of interfaces configured to couple and communicate with other devices according to various embodiments. In one embodiment, I / O interface 1160 is a bridge chip (e.g., a southbridge) from a front side to one or more back side buses. I / O interface 1160 may be coupled to one or more I / O devices 1170 via one or more corresponding buses or other interfaces. Examples of I / O devices 1170 include storage devices (hard drives, optical drives, removable flash drives, storage arrays, SANs, or associated controllers thereof), network interface devices (e.g., local or wide area networks), or other devices (e.g., graphics, user interface devices, etc.). In one embodiment, computer system 1100 is coupled to a network via network interface device 1170 (e.g., configured to communicate via WiFi™, Bluetooth™, Ethernet, etc.). ***

[0087] Although specific embodiments have been described above, these embodiments are not intended to limit the scope of the disclosure, even if only a single embodiment is described for a particular function. The examples of functions provided in this disclosure are exemplary in nature and are not intended for limiting purposes, unless otherwise stated. The above description is intended to cover such alternatives, modifications, and equivalents as will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art having the benefit of this disclosure.

[0088] The scope of the present disclosure includes all features or combinations of features or generalizations thereof disclosed (explicitly or implicitly) in the present application, regardless of whether they alleviate some or all of the problems addressed in the present application. Accordingly, new claims may be formulated during the prosecution of this application (or an application claiming priority to this application) to such combinations of features of the present application. In particular, with respect to the claims, features of the dependent claims may be combined with features of the independent claims, and the features of each independent claim may be combined in any suitable manner and not simply in the specific combinations recited in the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for detecting a vehicle comprising: a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs) within a vehicle and configured to control operation of the vehicle, wherein controlling the operation includes communicating data between the ECUs, the data being encrypted using a set of keys; A computing device in the vehicle, receiving an indication that one of the plurality of ECUs has been replaced; In response to the indication, issuing a request over a wide area network (WAN) to an entity to exchange the set of keys; receiving a set of replacement keys from the entity over the WAN; a computing device configured to distribute the set of replacement keys to the plurality of ECUs.

2. a first secure circuit coupled to a first ECU of the plurality of ECUs, receiving a replacement key distributed to the first ECU; The apparatus of claim 1 , further comprising a first secure circuit configured to service a request from the first ECU to encrypt data with the substitute key.

3. The first secure circuit comprises:

3. The apparatus of claim 2, configured to modify the substitution key in such a way that the substitution key is unknown to the entity prior to servicing a request from the first ECU.

4. The computing device comprises: receiving policy information governing use of replacement keys in the set, the policy information for a first key in the set: 1) identifying one of the plurality of ECUs as authorized to transmit data encrypted with the first key; and 2) identifying one or more of the plurality of ECUs as authorized to receive data encrypted with the first key; The apparatus of claim 1 , configured to distribute the received policy information along with the set of replacement keys.

5. The computing device comprises: receiving an indication that one or more of the replacement keys have been revoked; The apparatus of claim 1 , configured to notify the plurality of ECUs to discontinue use of the one or more replacement keys.

6. A method performed by an in-vehicle computing device, comprising: receiving an indication that one of a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs) within the vehicle and configured to control operation of the vehicle has been replaced, the controlling operation including communicating data between ECUs encrypted using a set of keys; In response to the indication, issuing a request over a wide area network (WAN) to an entity to exchange the set of keys; receiving a set of replacement keys from the entity over the WAN; and distributing the set of replacement keys to the plurality of ECUs.

7. A computing device in a vehicle, receiving an indication that one of a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs) within the vehicle and configured to control operation of the vehicle has been replaced, the controlling operation including communicating data between ECUs encrypted using a set of keys; In response to the indication, issuing a request over a wide area network (WAN) to an entity to exchange the set of keys; receiving a set of replacement keys from the entity over the WAN; distributing the set of replacement keys to the plurality of ECUs.

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