Light-triggered transponder

Abstract

The optically triggered transponder includes one or more photocells, a clock recovery circuit, and a reverse antenna system. The clock recovery circuit includes a photoconductor having a source terminal and a drain terminal for receiving a voltage, the photoconductor having a resistance that varies depending on the received light intensity. The clock recovery circuit is configured to generate a recovered clock. The reverse antenna system is connected to the at least one photocell and configured to transmit data. The photoconductor is configured to have modulated light incident on the photoconductor to generate a modulated voltage signal. The clock recovery circuit includes an amplifier coupled to the source terminal of the photoconductor through a capacitor for receiving the modulated voltage signal and outputting an analog signal generated from the modulated voltage signal. The clock recovery circuit includes an inverter coupled to the amplifier and configured to digitize the analog signal of the amplifier to generate the recovered clock.

Description

Technical Field

[0001]

[0001] This disclosure relates to an optimized optical trigger transponder.

Background Art

[0002]

[0002] As described in U.S. Patent No. 7,098,394, very small optical trigger transponders (MTPs) are available for providing identifiers, for example, in combination for use in nucleic acid assays. These have been shown to be stable under physiological conditions. Thus, they can be used as implant tagging devices for animals, as described in more detail by U.S. Patent No. 8,353,917. MTPs can provide output signals either as RF or as light (U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018 / 0091224). Such MTPs are available as the p-Chip® transponder from PharmaSeq, Inc., Monmouth Junction, NJ.

[0003]

[0003] An optical MTP is triggered by a narrowly focused beam of light that can be pulsed to provide a data clock used by the MTP. Conventional MTPs may be equipped with a photodiode to acquire clock pulses from a modulated light beam. When the light is on, photogenerated charge is collected and charges the photodiode's junction capacitor, resulting in a voltage rise across the capacitor. When the light is turned off, the charge discharges through a resistor connected in parallel, so the voltage across the photodiode capacitor drops. The value of this resistor sets the RC time constants of the rising and falling edges of the pulse at the front end of the clock recovery circuit. If the resistance is too high, the length of time required to discharge flooding charges in the photodiode area during high illumination conditions can cause clock bit loss. If the resistance is too low, small amounts of photogenerated charge during very low illumination conditions can make it difficult to charge the photodiode capacitor. Moreover, these charges are rapidly lost through the resistor, resulting in clock failure. For this reason, an improved optical transponder clock recovery circuit is needed, among other things. [Overview of the project]

[0004]

[0004] According to some embodiments of the present disclosure, an optically triggered transponder is provided which includes a clock recovery circuit optimized to facilitate MTP signal transmission and MTP ID read enhancement.

[0005]

[0005] In some embodiments, the optically triggered transponder may include a reverse antenna system that provides accurate MTP signal transmission and processing and can be connected to an MTP ID reader having a larger reading distance with simpler processing.

[0006]

[0006] In some embodiments, a light-triggered transponder may be included in a security inlay for establishing the authenticity (bona fides) of an item. For example, a security inlay may be used to verify high-value items and / or items for which claims of food safety, fair trade, and sustainability have commercial value (e.g., lettuce, coffee beans, etc.). However, the security inlay is not limited to use with any particular item or class of items. The security inlay may include: (a) a bottom inlay segment; (b) a top inlay segment configured to fit into or be positioned on the bottom inlay segment; and (c) an optically triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side positioned between the two inlay segments, wherein the bottom side is glued to the bottom inlay segment and the top side is glued to the top inlay segment, and the security inlay is configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment would break the optically triggered transponder, and therefore the optically triggered transponder would not be read.

[0007]

[0007] In some embodiments, the optically triggered transponder may be configured with a durable self-destruct function to provide a super anchor for object authentication, object tracing, and tracking.

[0008]

[0008] In some embodiments, one or more super anchors can be used with various objects to implement smart paper contracts and improve document security.

[0009]

[0009] In some embodiments, one or more super-anchors may be integrated with blockchain technology for generating secure documents and smart contracts.

[0010]

[0010] It should be understood that the present disclosure is not limited in its application to the structural details and arrangements described below or illustrated in the drawings. The present disclosure is capable of being implemented and carried out in a variety of ways in addition to those described. It should also be understood that the expressions and terms used in this specification and abstract are for illustrative purposes only and should not be considered limiting.

[0011]

[0011] Please understand that both the above general description and the following embodiments for carrying out the invention are for illustrative purposes only and do not limit the subject matter claimed.

[0012]

[0012] Various purposes, features, and advantages of the disclosed subject matter can be more fully understood by referring to the following modes for carrying out the disclosed subject matter when considered in relation to the following drawings in which similar reference numbers identify similar elements. [Brief explanation of the drawing]

[0013] [Figure 1]

[0013] Block diagrams illustrating the operation of an MTP sensor system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure are provided. [Figure 2]

[0014] Schematic diagrams illustrating exemplary MTPs in several embodiments of this disclosure are provided below. [Figure 3]

[0015] The following are illustrative side view representations of an MTP according to several embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 4]

[0016] This is an illustrative top view representation of an MTP according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 5]

[0017] The following illustrates illustrative functional block diagrams of MTP according to several embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 6]

[0018] Schematic diagrams of clock recovery circuits according to some embodiments of this disclosure are provided as examples. [Figure 7]

[0019] Illustrate a cross-sectional view of a photoconductor according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 8]

[0020] Illustrate the timing diagrams of voltage signals and light intensities at each node in FIG. 6 according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 9]

[0021] Illustrate a functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 10A]

[0022] Illustrate in a simplified form how a character string is transmitted under a prior art system. [Figure 10B]

[0023] Illustrate in a simplified form how a character string is transmitted under a reverse antenna system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 11A]

[0024] Show one exemplary diagram reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 11B]

[0025] Show another exemplary diagram reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 12]

[0026] Illustrate a security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 13]

[0027] It is a cross-sectional view of an exemplary security inlay according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 14]

[0028] Show an enlarged view of an exemplary security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 15]

[0029] It is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary process configured to utilize an optically triggered transponder having a durable self-destruct function according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 16]

[0030] Illustrate a diagram of a process for implementing a smart paper contract according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 17]

[0031] This disclosure illustrates a practical system diagram demonstrating how blockchain integration can be used to generate secure documents and smart contracts, as described in several embodiments of this disclosure. [Modes for carrying out the invention]

[0014]

[0032] It should be understood that the subject matter disclosed is not limited in its application to the structural details and component arrangements described in the following description or illustrated in the drawings. Other embodiments of the disclosed subject matter are possible and can be implemented and performed in various ways. Furthermore, it should be understood that the expressions and terms used herein are for illustrative purposes only and should not be considered limiting. Therefore, those skilled in the art will recognize that the concepts upon which this disclosure is based can be readily used as a basis for designing other structures, methods, and systems to accomplish some of the purposes of the disclosed subject matter. Accordingly, the claims should be considered to include such equivalent structures, as long as they do not deviate from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0015]

[0033] Although the disclosed subject matter is described and illustrated in the illustrative embodiments described above, this disclosure is provided only as an example, and it should be understood that numerous changes in the details of the implementation of the disclosed subject matter may be made without departing from the intent and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0016]

[0034] Figure 1 illustrates a block diagram of an optical microtransponder (MTP) sensor system 100 ("System 100") according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. System 100 comprises an MTP reader 102 and an MTP 104. In some embodiments, the MTP 104 is bonded or attached to an object via an adhesive so as to act as an identifier for the object. The MTP 104 may be bonded to, embedded within, or otherwise mounted to an object 110, which may be any object requiring individual unique identification (ID) data, such as a microscope slide, a test animal or insect, clothing, or an electronic component. To illustrate the OTMP components of the substrate 160, the optical element 150, and the optical communication circuit 155, an enlarged view of the MTP 104 is illustrated in the breakout shown in Figure 1. The height of the MTP 104 may be, for example, about 20 μm to 60 μm and may depend on the number of stacked layers and sensors for a particular MTP 104. The MTP 104 may be an integrated circuit that is normally in a persistently dormant, non-powered state until it is powered on when irradiated with an excitation beam 132 from the MTP reader 102. When irradiated, the MTP 104 may power on (generally instantaneously, e.g., much shorter than 1 second) and transmit a data beam 133 to the MTP reader 102 via light or RF. The data beam 133 may be radiation (e.g., from a light-emitting diode (LED)) in some embodiments, and in other embodiments, it may be a reflection / absorption mechanism (e.g., shuttering via an LCD). In an alternative embodiment, the MTP 104 receives a separate stimulus, such as a modulated code on the excitation beam 132, which initiates the transmission of sensor data. Alternatively, receiving data from an internal sensor or a linked sensor triggers the transmission of the data beam 133. Some embodiments of the system 100 may include one or more subsystems powered by an onboard power supply, such as a battery and / or powered by the onboard power supply. Such subsystems may include, but are not limited to, volatile memory that can be sustained by battery power, one or more sensors in addition to the optical element 150, and / or other features.

[0017]

[0035] In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 is a visible focused light or laser beam, and the data beam 133 is an infrared light beam emission (e.g., from an infrared light-emitting diode). The data beam 133 may contain a signal that identifies a particular MTP 104 to an MTP reader 102, for example, using a unique identification number for that particular MTP 104. Using the unique identification information, the MTP reader 102 may transmit data to a computer (not shown) to uniquely identify an object 110. In some embodiments, a user operates the MTP reader 102 to irradiate the MTP 104 with light or other electromagnetic signals, causing the MTP 104 to transmit the data beam 133 via light or other electromagnetic signals. For example, in some embodiments, the range of the electromagnetic spectrum used by the MTP 104 for this signaling may include one or more subsets of the subterahertz portion of the spectrum, including infrared and longer wavelengths. The data beam 133 is then received by the MTP reader 102. The MTP reader 102 can then decode the data beam 133 carrying the identification data to clearly identify the object 110.

[0018]

[0036] "Laser" is defined herein as coherent directional light, which may be visible light. Light sources include light from light-emitting diodes (LEDs) for communications, solid-state lasers, semiconductor lasers, and the like. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may comprise visible laser light (e.g., 660 nm wavelength). In some embodiments, the operating excitation beam 132 may illuminate an area larger than the area occupied by the MTP 104, thereby allowing the user to easily locate and read the MTP 104. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may comprise light of other wavelengths in the visible and / or invisible spectrum necessary to supply sufficient power using the photocell of the MTP 104. The data beam 133 may be emitted at a different wavelength than the excitation beam 132. For example, the data beam 133 may be 1300 nm IR light, and the excitation beam may be 660 nm red light. However, other wavelengths, such as the near-infrared (NIR) band, may be used for optical communication, and alternative embodiments may use other communication techniques, such as reflection signaling methods, to return the modulated data signal to the MTP reader 102. In some alternative embodiments, the OTMP 104 is a microtransponder (MTP) equipped with an antenna (e.g., an integrated antenna) for communicating ID information to the corresponding reader via radio waves rather than optical signals.

[0019]

[0037] The clock recovery circuit 106 can extract a clock pulse signal from the received modulated light beam, as will be described in more detail below with reference to Figures 6-8. In one embodiment, the light from the excitation beam 132 is amplitude-modulated (e.g., pulsed) at about 1 MHz to provide a data clock that can be used by the MTP 104 to supply, for example, an operational clock pulse for transmitted ID data bits. The timing of the pulse group can be set so that the duty cycle and average power level fall within the requirements for registering as a Class 3R laser device.

[0020]

[0038] Exemplary MTPs, such as p-Chips, may be monolithic (single-element) integrated circuits (e.g., 600 μm × 600 μm × 100 μm) capable of transmitting their identification code over radio frequency (RF). Figure 2 illustrates schematic diagrams of exemplary MTPs according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. The MTP may include photocells (202a, 202b, 202c, 202d), a clock recovery circuit 206 (e.g., a clock signal extraction circuit), a logic state machine 204, a loop antenna 210, and a 64-bit memory (not shown) that supports, for example, more than 1.1 billion possible ID codes. When irradiated by a pulsed laser, the photocells can power the electronic circuits on the chip with an efficiency of about 10%. The chip can transmit its ID through a modulated current in the antenna 210. A fluctuating magnetic field around the chip may be received by a nearby coil in a reader, and the signal can be digitized, analyzed, and decoded. p-Chips can be manufactured on silicon wafers in a foundry using CMOS processes similar to those used in the manufacture of memory chips and computer processors. The wafers may undergo post-manufacturing processes, including laser coding, passivation, thinning, and dicing, to obtain individual p-Chips. The p-Chip surface may be made from silicon dioxide deposited as the final passivation layer.

[0021]

[0039] Figure 3 illustrates a side view representation of an exemplary MTP104 according to at least one embodiment of the present invention. The MTP104 may comprise a stack of individual integrated circuit layers 300, 302, 304, 306, and 308. Layer 302 may support a protective layer and a passivation layer. Layer 304 may comprise logic circuits, clock circuits, sensor circuits, and transmitter circuits. Layers 306 and 308 may comprise storage capacitors, and 300 is a substrate. Those skilled in the art will recognize that the functionality of the MTP104 can be organized into layers of other configurations. For example, the stack may comprise layers of different thicknesses that are uniformly stacked, so that they can be manufactured, for example, in a 3D IC process well known in the art.

[0022]

[0040] MTP104 can be manufactured using mixed-signal fabrication techniques typically used to create sensor electronics or analog-to-digital converters that include both analog and digital devices. In exemplary embodiments, each layer is approximately 12 μm thick and has dimensions of 100 μm × 100 μm. In one embodiment, the dimensions of MTP104 are 100 × 100 × 50 μm. Alternative embodiments may use more or fewer layers, for example, depending on the sensor application.

[0023]

[0041] Figure 4 illustrates an exemplary top view representation of the MTP 104. The diagram illustrated in Figure 4 is a diagram of the top layer 302 in Figure 3. In one embodiment, a transmissive element, such as an LED array 400 surrounding the MTP 104, is provided on top of the layer 302. In other embodiments, the LED array may be implemented as a single LED (illustrated as LED 420 by a dashed line) in the center of 410, or as other topography for directional emission. The arrangement of the LED array 400 illustrates an example of an embodiment that emphasizes light generation. Alternative embodiments may include various topographic layouts advantageous for power harvesting or sensor data acquisition, etc. In some embodiments, the LEDs may include focusing lenses or other optics.

[0024]

[0042] At the center of the uppermost layer 302 is an array 401 of photocells 402, 404, 406, and photoconductor 408. As illustrated, each photocell in the array 401 can be physically sized to generate power for a specific circuit within the MTP 104, one of which can be dedicated to clock / carrier signal extraction, as described below with respect to Figure 4. Photocell 402, which has the largest area, generates a voltage Vdd (a negative voltage, Vneg in some embodiments) to operate the output transistor 416 to drive an electron emission transmitter (implemented as an LED in some embodiments as an LED in the optical communication circuit 155). Photocell 404 generates a positive voltage for the logic / sensor circuit 410, and photocell 406 generates a negative voltage Vneg for the logic / sensor circuit block 410. Photoconductor 408 is used, for example, to extract a clock pulse to operate the logic / sensor circuit 410. As illustrated, the power cell is coupled to a capacitor, for example, in layer 306 or 308, to store the energy generated by the photocell when irradiated with laser light. In some embodiments, the energy extracted from the clock photoconductor 408 is applied to a differentiator (described below with respect to Figure 6), which extracts clock edges that are amplified and used to provide timing signals to logic and sensing circuits. As illustrated, a plurality of identification fuses 418 are located on surface 414. By opening selected fuses among these, the MTP 104 is provided with a range of unique identification codes beyond the default base page of code values ​​that can be hardcoded into the chip logic. In alternative embodiments, the ID values ​​may be electronically coded using electronic antifuse technology. Furthermore, there are also embodiments having electronic memory for data, signal processing, and identification storage.

[0025]

[0043] Figure 5 illustrates a functional block diagram of an exemplary MTP104 according to at least one embodiment of the present invention. The MTP104 may comprise an optical element 150, an energy storage 504, a clock / carrier extraction network 506 (i.e., a clock recovery circuit 106), a sensor 508, logic 510, a transmit switching circuit 512, and a transmit device 155 such as an IR LED 155. The optical element 150 may include dedicated photocells such as a clock extraction photoconductor 408, energy harvesting photocell arrays 404, 406, and a transmit photocell 402. The energy harvesting photocell arrays 404 and 406 may be coupled to the energy storage 504 and may comprise photovoltaic cells that convert light energy from irradiation into electric current.

[0026]

[0044] A clock photoconductor 408, which is part of the clock recovery circuit and can be physically located separately from the recovery circuit, can detect a clock pulse signal for the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506. In some embodiments, the energy storage 504 is a plurality of capacitors, each having at least one capacitor coupled to a photocell of the photocell array 404, 406. The energy stored in the energy storage unit 504 can be coupled to an electronic circuit. As the laser light is pulsed, energy from the laser can be stored, and the MTP 104 can operate with the stored energy. Unlike the photocell arrays 404 and 406, in some embodiments, the energy of the photocell 402 is not stored, and the transmitter switching circuit 512 can "dump" all of its energy to the transmitting element 155 via the output transistor 416. Once the received laser pulse energy is extracted by the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506, a logic state machine (i.e., logic 510) can form data packets comprising ID bits and sensor data, which can be provided to the transmit data switch 512 for the formation of an optical transmit signal. Logic 510 can directly integrate sensor signals and / or ID signals into a composite data frame of an OOK (on / off modulated) emitter. The modulation symbols can be applied to transmitter 512 and transmitted along with each pulse of energy.

[0027]

[0045] Sensor(s) 508 may comprise, if present, one or more sensors for measuring, for example, living cells or physiological properties. Any analog data from sensor(s) 508 may be converted into pulse-width modulated signals or other binary signaling methods that encode analog quantities in the time domain in a manner suitable for pulsing IR light-emitting diodes for direct transmission to the MTP reader 102, without requiring conventional power and area-intensive analog-to-digital conversion techniques. Exemplary sensors include, but are not limited to, dielectric sensors, absolute temperature proportional (PTAT) sensors, pH sensors, oxidation-reduction potential sensors, and / or optical sensors.

[0028]

[0046] Clock recovery circuit

[0029]

[0047] Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of a clock recovery circuit 506 according to one or more embodiments of the present invention. The clock recovery circuit 506 may include a photoconductor 602 (shown in detail in Figure 6) having a resistance R1 that varies according to the received light intensity, a reference resistor 604 having a fixed resistance R2, an amplifier 606, and an inverter 608. The source terminal of the photoconductor 602 is coupled to the first terminal of the resistor 604 at node A. Node A is coupled to the input of the amplifier 606, and the output of the amplifier 606 is coupled to the inverter 608 that generates a recovered clock circuit at its output.

[0030]

[0048] The series combination of the photoconductor 602 and the resistor 604 forms a voltage divider R coupled between the voltage VDD and ground. Specifically, in this embodiment, the drain terminal of the photoconductor 602 is coupled to the voltage VDD from the energy storage 504, which maintains the voltage when the irradiation is off, and the second terminal of the resistor 604 is coupled to ground. Since the resistance R1 of the photoconductor 602 varies according to the received light intensity, and the voltage at node A is determined by the ratio of resistances R1 and R2, the modulated light input incident on the photoconductor 602 generates a modulated voltage signal at the input of the amplifier 606.

[0031]

[0049] In some embodiments, a coupling capacitor 610 is added before the amplifier 606. The voltage divider R and coupling capacitor 610 form a differentiator that can extract the clock edge when the modulation frequency is as low as a few kilohertz (above about 1 MHz, which may not be necessary). The inverter 608 digitizes the analog output of the amplifier 606, resulting in an exemplary digital waveform as shown in Figure 8. Figure 8 illustrates the timing diagrams of the light intensity and voltage signals at each node of the clock recovery circuit 506 with the coupling capacitor of Figure 6.

[0032]

[0050] Figure 7 illustrates a cross-sectional view of an exemplary photoconductor 602 according to several embodiments of the present invention. In some embodiments, the size of the photoconductor 602 may be 5 μm × 5 μm or larger. As illustrated in Figure 6, the photoconductor 602 may use a long-channel n-MOSFET in a separated deep n-well bucket. The n-well and deep n-well (Dn-well) can completely seal the p-well in the p-substrate and the transistor components, i.e., the source, drain, and gate confined in the bucket. For example, the gate layer made from a polysilicon material may be placed on top of an insulating layer such as silicon dioxide (SiO2). Polysilicon material spectrally absorbs shorter wavelengths of light, such as blue light, but allows longer wavelengths of light, such as red light, to pass through. When using an excitation beam 132 having a longer wavelength, such as a red light beam, the polysilicon material filters and blocks the shorter wavelengths and allows the longer wavelengths to pass through. Therefore, it suppresses shorter wavelengths. For example, an indoor light (e.g., a fluorescent lamp) that flickers at a speed of 60 Hz may generate some interference or noise with more spectrum in the shorter wavelength (blue wavelength) range, and a polysilicon material can effectively block the flickering from the indoor light, allowing only the desired energy beam (e.g., red light) to pass through.

[0033]

[0051] Furthermore, the photoconductor 602 (also known as a photoresistor) allows the clock recovery circuit 106 to function under both low and high irradiation conditions, in contrast to the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit. For example, under sufficiently high irradiation, excess flooding charge in the photodiode cannot be adequately discharged, leading to malfunction of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit. In contrast, the photoconductor 602 can operate in current mode, and since photocharge is constantly discharged by the electric field in the photoconductor 602, it may be less affected by high-irradiation flooding phenomena. In addition, the deep n-well bucket of the photoconductor 602 is isolated such that the n-wells physically form a potential barrier that prevents charge generated outside the bucket from entering the bucket, ensuring that only photons reaching inside the bucket can contribute to the conductivity of the photoresistor 602. Thus, excess photogenerated charge under high irradiation, which can lead to malfunction of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit, is suppressed in the clock recovery circuit 106.

[0034]

[0052] In addition, this FET device can have a very small physical ground area. The inverter 608 can comprise a static CMOS inverter device having NMOS and PMOS transistors and having any two states of high or low. When the inverter input is above a reference voltage, it is considered high, and when it is below the reference voltage, it is considered low, and the output is then inverted. The static CMOS inverter can also function as an analog amplifier because it has sufficiently high gain in its narrow transition region to amplify the signal, allowing the clock recovery circuit 506 to have a very small ground area. In cases where the extracted clock pulse is extremely low, the amplification by amplifier 606 may not be sufficient to reach the threshold voltage for inverting the logic state, and in these cases, the inverter 608 can further increase the overall amplification to reach that threshold.

[0035]

[0053] The clock recovery system can be applied to MTPs that output signals via RF and MTPs that output signals via light (e.g., via LEDs), as described in U.S. Patent Application No. 14 / 631,321 filed on February 25, 2015.

[0036]

[0054] Reverse antenna system

[0037]

[0055] Each p-Chip may have a programmed unique serial number or identifier (ID). A p-Chip can be read by an MTP reader (e.g., a wand) without duplicate IDs. An MTP reader may be a handheld device connected to a standard Windows® PC, laptop, or tablet used to read MTPs and capable of reading the serial number or ID of individual p-Chips.

[0038]

[0056] Figure 9 illustrates a functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in Figure 9, an exemplary MTP ID reader may include a USB-powered, USB 2.0 transceiver microcontroller, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a power converter and tuner, a laser diode with a programmable current driver, an optical collimation / focusing module, and a tuned air coil pickup with a high-gain, low-noise differential RF receiver. The laser emits an average optical power of 60 mW modulated at 1 MHz at a wavelength of 658 nm when reading a p-Chip identifier (ID). The ID is read when the p-Chip is placed within appropriate proximity (e.g., <10 mm) of the reader. The p-Chip generated waveform is compared to a data clock (laser-modulated) used for synchronization of the transmitted ID data bits. The resulting ID readout from the p-Chip is rapid (<0.01 seconds) and reported on a PC or tablet. MTP ID readers may be able to read p-Chips under difficult conditions, such as through white paper sheets, blue glass (approximately 1 mm thick), or transparent plastic laminate sheets. Other MTP readers are being developed (e.g., devices for reading IDs with p-Chips in fluids). Another version may be a battery-powered Bluetooth® reader that can be used with a PC or mobile phone.

[0039]

[0057] Some embodiments may provide an efficient means of increasing the signal intensity emitted by these small MTPs. p-Chip data may be transmitted using data coding that results in one-third to two-thirds of the transmitted bits having a value of 1. The average for all IDs may be half the data with a value of 1. A "1" digital signal is transmitted, for example, when the laser is on, and a "0" digital signal is transmitted when the laser is off (the energy stored in the photocell provides the small amount of energy transmitted). The signal power tracks the ratio of 1s to 0s in the data. Some embodiments may transmit the same "1" digital signal that is currently being transmitted, but the "0" digital signal is transmitted when the laser is on and the current is flowing in the opposite direction to the current for the "1" digital signal. This results in all IDs being transmitted with the same power. Data may be transmitted when the laser is on. This may result in twice the power in the transmitted signal (on average, 6 dB more signal at the receiver). This method may result in easier signal processing and easier distinction between 1s and 0s. This could lead to MTP ID readers with greater reading distances and simpler processing.

[0040]

[0058] For example, the p-Chip® MTP can be queried using light flashing at 1 MHz with a 50% duty cycle. This can be achieved using a laser or a focused LED, for instance.

[0041]

[0059] Figure 10A illustrates in a simplified form how the string "1101" is transmitted under the older system, and Figure 10B illustrates in a simplified form how the string "1101" is transmitted under the reverse antenna system described herein. For each off / on cycle such as c1, c2, c3, or c4 in Figures 10A-10B, the MTP ID reader looks for a radio signal that identifies the transmission of a "1" digital signal or a "0" digital signal. In the case of the first exemplary MTP output in Figure 10A illustrating a prior art system as shown in a simplified form, a 0 is transmitted when the light source is off. However, the photocell capacitance used to transmit the 0 is limited. In fact, this limited signal indicates a "0". The limited energy applicable to the 0 means that the signal-to-noise ratio in the MTP reader is suppressed by the SNR for the 0. This means that, in principle, a "1" can be read over a considerably longer distance, but the MTP signal may only be read over a shorter distance applicable to the "0" component of the signal. This specification provides a method that includes reversing the direction of the current in the RF output antenna to transmit a "0" digital signal so that substantially the same current is used for a "1" digital signal and a "0" digital signal (see Figure 10B). In some embodiments different from Figure 10B, any given bit ("1" or "0") or digital signal in the p-Chip® MTP may be transmitted within eight consecutive optical cycles.

[0042]

[0060] One means of reversing the antenna current is to use a switching circuit such as an H-bridge. Figure 11A shows an exemplary diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 11A, antenna 10 is connected to a voltage source V in The antenna can also be operated by the H-bridge 20. Selectively closing switches S1 and S4 can direct the current through the antenna 10 in the direction indicated by the arrow. Selectively closing switches S2 and S3 can direct the current through the antenna 10 in the opposite direction.

[0043]

[0061] Figure 11B shows another exemplary diagram illustrating the reversal of the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Another means of reversing the antenna current is to use two switches, such as S1A and S2A in Figure 11B, and two antennas (e.g., 10A, 10B). Selectively closing switch S1A can direct the current through antenna 10A in one direction indicated by the arrow. Selectively closing switch S2A can direct the current through antenna 10B in the opposite direction. When S1 is selectively closed, the current moves in direction D1. When S2A is selectively closed, the current moves in direction D2, opposite to direction D1. The antennas may be formed in separate metal layers or on the same layer. Only one FET (S1A or S2A) may be closed at any given time. When either FET is turned on, a reverse current may be coupled to the other antenna. The body diode of the off FET may provide a current path for the coupled signal.

[0044]

[0062] In some embodiments, the antenna options described herein can be achieved in a monolithic integrated circuit. In some embodiments, the monolithic integrated circuit may have a thickness of approximately 2 mm × 2 mm × 0.2 mm or less.

[0045]

[0063] In some embodiments, the signal strength for an MTP incorporating the two-phase transmission described above increases by approximately 6 dB. This would increase the reliable reading distance of the MTP reader. In some embodiments, the number of cycles involved in transmitting one bit is eight data periods. Each laser cycle is one data period. Each time the number of data periods doubles, there is a signal processing gain of 3 dB. Eight data periods is three doublings (2, 4, 8). This results in a signal processing gain of 9 dB. By increasing from 8 to 64 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64) or 128 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128), the signal processing gain can increase from 9 dB to 18 dB (for 64 iterations) or 21 dB (for 128 iterations). When using a 1MHz laser, a current p-Chip using 8 iterations for its 64 data cells can transmit IDs at a rate of 2,000 per second. By increasing the iteration rate to 128, the read rate can be reduced to 128 reads per second with a signal gain of 21dB. This can result in an increased read distance. The laser rate can be increased or decreased (for example, within the range of 500kHz to 5MHz). The iteration rate can be controlled by selecting one of eight iteration rates (three additional memory bits).

[0046]

[0064] Security Inlay

[0047]

[0065] MTPs can also be used to implement security features. These can be MTPs that output signals via RF or MTPs that output signals via optical signals.

[0048]

[0066] Such security features are enhanced when the MTP cannot be removed from its secure object without its MTP functionality being destroyed. An exemplary object that may require such security features is a bottle of fine wine. In this specification, wine is used as an exemplary object to facilitate the illustration and explanation of the structure and function of security inlays, but as stated above, security inlays are not limited to use with wine bottles. Provided herein are inlays that contain MTPs, which may be designed to break the MTP when the tape or foil seal is torn.

[0049]

[0067] In some embodiments, light-triggered transponders may be used in security inlays for security purposes. For example, security inlays may provide a reliable method for authenticating wine. In the wine industry, corks or stoppers may be sealed with capsules or foils designed to prevent the stopper from being removed without peeling off the capsule. This provides a degree of security. However, in the case of fine wines, obtaining equipment to replicate the capsule may be worthwhile for the unscrupulous. Additional sealing wax may be present, but these have the same drawback as increasing the monetary value of the counterfeit.

[0050]

[0068] An exemplary security inlay may include: (a) a bottom inlay segment; (b) a top inlay segment configured to fit into and position within the bottom inlay segment; and (c) an optically triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side positioned between the two inlay segments, wherein the bottom side is glued to the bottom inlay segment and the top side is glued to the top inlay segment. The security inlay is configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment breaks the optically triggered transponder so that it cannot be read.

[0051]

[0069] Figure 12 illustrates a security inlay fitted to a wine bottle. As illustrated in Figure 12, the inlay 10 is shown beneath the capsule 20 of the wine bottle 22. Figure 13 is a cross-sectional view of an exemplary security inlay design according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in Figure 13, the inlay 10 consists of two parts, a top 10A and a bottom 10B, with an MTP 18 installed between them. These parts can be made from transparent or partially transparent plastic by one of several techniques, such as 3D printing, molding, or pressing of heated plastic. In some embodiments, a specially prepared MTP 18 that is mechanically fragile is used. For example, the structural integrity of the MTP can be reduced by cuts 12 on the back of the MTP or by making the MTP very thin (e.g., about 10 to about 30 microns). The MTP can be glued to the inlay to ensure breakage. The adhesive spots can be asymmetrical, as illustrated, to ensure uneven force when the top inlay portion separates from the bottom inlay portion. As shown in Figure 13, one half of the MTP may be glued to the inlay bottom 10B (glue 16), and the other half may be glued to the inlay top 10A. Grooves may be made in both the top and bottom of the inlay to accommodate the glue. In one embodiment, as illustrated in Figure 13, the bottom inlay segment has a bottom groove for accommodating glue to adhere to the bottom side of the light-triggered transponder. The top inlay segment has a top groove for accommodating glue to adhere to the top side of the light-triggered transponder.

[0052]

[0070] The two inlay halves can be held in place by mechanical interlocking (including slight cuts and corresponding ridges) or by weaker elements such as droplets of weak adhesive appropriately placed around the periphery of the inlay (between the halves). The inlay design ensures that when the two inlay halves are pulled apart (when the capsule is removed from the bottle), the MTP breaks and is no longer electrically functional. If a would-be counterfeiter cuts the capsule around the inlay, the adhesive 26 may be selected to resist solvent washing (by polymerization, etc.). The adhesive 26 may also be applied in a neat pattern that can be visualized by the human eye or imaging equipment. The adhesive pattern may be on the most fragile surface of the top, or both the top and bottom may have an adhesive pattern. Such features would make any attempt to recycle the inlay visually detectable. At the same time, the inlay and the inner MTP are mechanically stable and may be easily manipulated by hand or robot, provided they are handled properly.

[0053]

[0071] Figure 14 shows a magnified view of an exemplary security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in Figure 14, the inlay 10, which may resemble a thin button, can be glued with adhesive 26 to both the stopper / cork 24 and the capsule 20. If the bottled wine is original, the MTP ID can be read using, for example, a custom ID reader (e.g., a wand) or a mobile phone-based attachment, cover, or application. However, removal of the capsule from the bottle (before the wine bottle is opened) divides the inlay into two parts and, at the same time, permanently damages the MTP located inside the inlay 10. The MTP may no longer be readable. Thus, validation of the wine bottle is no longer possible.

[0054]

[0072] The size of the inlay can be selected to cover all or most of the top surface of the stopper 24. In some embodiments, the inlay extends across the opening of the wine bottle. A counterfeiter may not be able to remove the inlay without disabling the MTP. When the bottle is properly opened, the top 10A peels off together with the capsule. The bottom does not substantially hinder the use of a corkscrew. In some embodiments, the bottom is made even thinner to further facilitate the use of a corkscrew.

[0055]

[0073] The winemaker may receive the inlay from a dedicated factory. The inlay may be glued to the cork and then to the capsule by the winemaker. The gluing may be done continuously, or the glue may be pre-placed on the top and bottom of the inlay. The glue may be cured by any number of mechanisms, including photopolymerization (since the inlay is at least translucent in some embodiments), chemical curing, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The capsule may be pressed onto the inlay to ensure that the inlay is properly glued.

[0056]

[0074] Alternatively, the capsule manufacturer may pre-glue the inlay to the inside of the capsule. The wine manufacturer may then glue the central portion of the capsule to the cork. This can be achieved by having the inlay inside a capsule that has been pre-treated with glue (and possibly protected by a removable plastic wrap). In this scenario, the only thing the manufacturer would need to do to certify the wine is to remove the wrap before placing the inlay capsule on the wine bottle.

[0057]

[0075] If the capsule is transparent, the MTP can be read immediately. If an opaque capsule is used, an opening may be made inside it to read the MTP in the inlay. The opening may be small so that the inlay 10 can still be properly glued to the capsule.

[0058]

[0076] In some embodiments, the top of the capsule includes a metal foil, except for a small window to allow querying by an MTP photodetector. The window may be covered with a clear plastic coating. In some embodiments, the capsule is a laminate of an opaque material and a clear material, with the opaque material missing at the window.

[0059]

[0077] In some embodiments, the MTP may be larger in one dimension than those marketed as p-Chip® transponders. This size can ensure good asymmetrical adhesion to the top and bottom inlay portions. Authentication is possible throughout the entire chain of control, from the winemaker through the distribution chain to the customer. At every step, reading the MTP ID can validate the authenticity of the wine.

[0060]

[0078] If necessary, a connection to the central wine database can be made via the internet, the MTP ID is provided to the database, and recorded in the database along with the timestamp and the identity of the MTP reader device. Thus, if the appropriate arrangements are made, the data provider can maintain a history of the wine bottle. If the end customer wants to check the authenticity of the wine, several approaches may be possible. Firstly, the fact that the supplier can read the ID in front of the customer provides reassurance. Secondly, the supplier can search the database and present the bottle history to the customer. Thirdly, the customer can enter the MTP ID and use an app on their smartphone to retrieve the bottle history. Fourthly, if the customer has their own ID reader, the customer can verify the information themselves.

[0061]

[0079] This provides a reliable method for authenticating wine or other objects. The disclosed security inlay may be resilient to operations affecting the entire inlay, highly sensitive to separation of halves, easily installed, and inconspicuous in most situations.

[0062]

[0080] Although the present invention is illustrated with wine bottles, it can be used in any capsule or tape-sealed container such that the inlay containing part of the capsule or tape must be separated from the container. Such uses may include bottles containing pharmaceuticals, perfume bottles, or similar bottles. Other uses may include labels or other elements placed on or incorporated into plastics, metals, and / or composite materials containing CPG consumer goods. In the case of shipping boxes, the tape may be sufficiently adhesive that it cannot be removed without damaging the box's base material, such as cardboard. Similarly, the label may be sufficiently adhesive that it cannot be removed without damaging the label and / or the container underneath.

[0063]

[0081] If the wine bottle uses a screw-on closure such as a Stelvin® closure, the security inlay can be attached to the bottle below the threads and on the sides below the capsule. In some embodiments, the bottom of the inlay may have a curved bottom shape that fits the neck of the bottle. In some embodiments, the capsule can be glued to the wine neck in the area of ​​the security inlay.

[0064]

[0082] A capsule can refer to a tightly fitting metal or plastic foil that forms part of the closure of an object so that the object cannot be opened without breaking the capsule. Lamination is a bond, fusion, or adhesion between polymer layers, or between a polymer layer and a fabric layer, and therefore, within the range of expected applications, the laminate is a single structure.

[0065]

[0083] The disclosures described herein relate to MTPs with signal transmission enhancement and methods for forming or using them.

[0066]

[0084] Monolithic security features including MTP

[0067]

[0085] Monolithic security features can be created by casting, embedding, or incorporating MTPs into a substrate via additive manufacturing processes. Such security features can also be created by attaching MTPs to a substrate after the MTPs have been formed. Monolithic security features can be designed to carry MTPs to or over external features whose structure and composition cause cracking in the MTPs or permanently disable them in some way. As an example, MTPs can be embedded in heat-shrinkable tubing that seals a twist cap. MTPs can be deposited so that the twist cap is loosened. MTPs can encounter inclines, wedges, or other structures on a container. While heat-shrinkable substrates can be designed to deform as they pass through structures, they do not completely absorb or dissipate the increasing forces from the structures. As MTPs encounter and move over structures, resistance can forcefully break the MTPs or MTP subcomponents, thereby rendering them incapable.

[0068]

[0086] Multiple MTP indexed security features

[0069]

[0087] The present invention may establish a higher level of security by using authentication of multiple microtransponders, or combinations of microtransponders and tagants (e.g., QR codes®, barcodes, RFID tags, etc.) as matching pairs. All tagants must be present and readable to validate the content. Tagants may be placed next to each other, or at different locations on or within an object, and / or at least two different types of security markings may be combined to form a composite security marking. The inability of any microtransponder or other tagants to respond may indicate non-authentic content. At least one microtransponder in a multilevel indexing sequence may be a brittle chip that can be made physically unresponsive when the container is first opened. Brittle chips can be manufactured by post-manufacturing processing, i.e., by thinning the chip substrate to ensure that it breaks when bent or attempted to remove it from the substrate. In some embodiments, methods for ensuring chip disabling may be implemented by designing a fracture surface or by cutting a slot into the chip to cut an antenna.

[0070]

[0088] In one embodiment, a physical object (e.g., a container) may be attached to chips A and B from a regular pairing when both signals respond to interrogation.

[0071]

[0089] In one embodiment, if the physical object is fitted with only chip A and chip B is not physically present for interrogation by the reader, the reader may not authenticate this product because the database requires responses from both chips. If the physical object contains both chip A and chip B, but chip B may be damaged when opened, the reader may not authenticate this product because chip B is rendered incapable.

[0072]

[0090] In one embodiment, similar to the example of a physical object having chips A and B, a physical object may have different pairwise or canonical pairing indexing via chips C and D. The pairing of chips C and D may be canonical, but it may be unique and not equal to the pairing of chips A and B. If a counterfeiter obtains chips A and C and adds them to their package, the reader may be unable to authenticate the chips because chips A and C do not constitute a canonical pairing.

[0073]

[0091] Light-triggered microtransponder (MTP) with durable self-destructing super-anchor

[0074]

[0092] Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been identified and can be employed as a key element in physical and digital-based anti-counterfeiting and authentication systems. PUFs are physical entities embodied in physical structures that are easy to evaluate but difficult to predict, even for an attacker with physical access to them. A key element of PUFs is the use of naturally occurring, randomly occurring features or properties that can be used as unique, distinctive features of individual objects that are otherwise very similar. PUFs rely on the uniqueness of their physical microstructure, which typically includes random components that are already inherently present in the physical entity or explicitly introduced or generated during its manufacture. The nature of the physical microstructure associated with a PUF is substantially uncontrollable and unpredictable. A so-called challenge-response authentication scheme is used to evaluate PUFs. The "challenge" is a physical stimulus applied to the PUF, and the "response" is its reaction to the stimulus. The response depends on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure, and for this reason, it can be used to authenticate PUFs and the physical objects on which the PUFs partially form. A particular challenge and its corresponding response together form a so-called "challenge-response pair" (CRP).

[0075]

[0093] In practical applications, a PUF can be interrogated in some way called a challenge. The PUF has a response to the interrogation that explicitly reveals, identifies, or documents a unique random function. The response is then compared to a digital standard. If the unique random function of the PUF matches the digital standard, the result of the challenge is a positive authentication. If the unique random function of the PUF does not match the digital standard, the challenge may fail, and from this, the PUF and the corresponding physical object to which it is attached are considered not genuine or fake.

[0076]

[0094] The definition of a PUF (Potentially Uncontrollable Function) may focus on naturally occurring random physical structures or phenomena to achieve a uniqueness that depends on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure, which can make the degree of difficulty in replicating or cloning the chip exceptionally high. The challenge in revealing the randomness of on-chip PUFs lies in the fact that, based on ring oscillation and FPGA architecture, both can degrade over time and may not have long-term durability.

[0077]

[0095] Despite the wide range of devised features and use of PUFs, several significant problems remain to be addressed. While the initial digital standard of a PUF may be locked and virtually immutable over time, the physical PUF used to generate the digital standard can begin to degrade immediately. Over time, and / or as a result of handling, environmental conditions, or usage conditions, the original, genuine PUF may lose or be modified to the point where its unique characteristics can eventually fail to challenge its digital twin. In this case, a genuine article may be mistakenly identified as a counterfeit or forged item. Therefore, there is a need to provide a more durable method for guaranteeing the authenticity of an object.

[0078]

[0096] This disclosure provides an innovative method for assigning uniqueness by applying MTPs having unique IDs to a large number of similar objects. In some embodiments, non-random features may be assigned, embedded, or incorporated into the object. In some embodiments, the non-random features may be difficult to reach, and any attempt to manipulate or alter the unique features will result in them being disabled or destroyed. Furthermore, embodiments of this disclosure may be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive with a high level of durability and reliable functionality. The combination of ultra-durability and tamper-proof construction may lead to super-anchors (SAs).

[0079]

[0097] The main concept of this disclosure is that a unique embedded feature can be provided to an object (super-anchor) to increase the durability of the object. The super-durable object can be embedded in the matrix of a chip. Other attempts to utilize durable techniques for ICs, i.e., on-chip devices, involve various microstructures of the chip itself. In this disclosure, the super-anchor can have high durability because the MTP ID number is a unique fixed feature that may be integrated into the bulk medium (e.g., the chip structure) but may also be separate from it. The unique feature may be isolated from the degradation of the bulk. The super-anchor may provide a non-random bus secure feature. The super-anchor may be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive in response to an attempt to alter the unique ID. A further application of the self-destructive design may be used to ensure genuine packaging so that containers and vessels are not reused to hold counterfeit items. For example, an example of an end-use of a self-destructive super-anchor can be used in security inlays.

[0080]

[0098] Figure 15 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary process configured to utilize a super-anchor for physical object authentication according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. A durable, self-destructing super-anchor may be used for object authentication, object tracing, and tracking under the control of a digital security system, including a manufacturer database. The digital security system may include one or more computing devices to facilitate object authentication, object tracing, and tracking. The digital security system may include at least a security computing device that communicates with multiple user computing devices over a network. The security computing device may include a processor, memory, and a communication interface to enable communication over the network. The digital security system may receive MTP registration information from an MTP ID secure reader (e.g., an ID reader) over the network and process the MTP ID information.

[0081]

[0099] In step 1501, a super-anchor (SA) may be manufactured by embedding or incorporating an MTP having a unique ID on the tagant, on the tagant substrate, or within a layer of the tagant. The tagant may or may not have a PUF embodied in its physical structure. The super-anchor may be manufactured by incorporating the MTP into the tagant structure, while the tagant may be manufactured as part of a multilayer manufacturing process. An example of the co-manufacturing of the tagant and super-anchor may be the casting of a thermoplastic tag or label by an in-mold process. An example of multilayer co-manufacturing may include lamination of an MTP to a credit card, label, or tape, thereby making the MTP part of the monolithic structure of the tag or object. The resulting tag or tagant may be a label, dot, laminate, tape, or any physical structure. The primary purposes of Tagant may include: (1) providing a surface for attaching super anchors to physical objects in order to track physical objects, and / or (2) functioning as a passive or active part of a tamper-evident mechanism, tamper-proof mechanism, or self-destruct mechanism.

[0082]

[0100] For example, a superanchor may be described as an optically triggered MTP having a unique ID attached to or embedded within a chip tagant that has a physically difficult-to-replicate (PUF) function along with self-destruct and high durability functions.

[0083]

[0101] In step 1502, the MTP's unique ID number may be registered in the digital security system and / or manufacturer database and indexed to the MTP.

[0084]

[0102] In step 1503A, a manufactured SA having a unique ID number or unique serial number may be digitally indexed and attached to a physical object. The superanchor may or may not have acceptable means of attaching it to a physical object as part of its structure and composition. The means, methods, and processes for adhering the superanchor to a physical object can vary widely depending on the composition and usage conditions of the physical object receiving the superanchor. The superanchor may be attached directly to a physical object using known materials and processes such as adhesives, sealants, waxes, tapes, and films. The adhesive or other glue may be cured by any number of mechanisms, including photopolymerization, chemical curing, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The material may have immediate or latent effects. The attachment material may be reactive. Reactive materials may be activated by pressure, chemical, thermal, light, sound, or other radiation sources. Such materials and processes are illustrative and not limiting. The superanchor may be sutured or injected into an object.

[0085]

[0103] In some embodiments, superanchors may be supplied and used as unattached objects having reactive sites or substrates that may be modified for specific attraction and binding of chemical and / or biological species, after which the attached species may or may not be treated, interrogated, and identified. After identification, the bound species can be removed, thereby allowing the superanchor to be regenerated. Thus, superanchors may be able to form platforms and scaffolds for random or precision growth sequencing in automated or semi-automated processes. Unattached superanchors, with or without reactive sites or substrates, may be dispersed in a continuous medium such as a fluid. Dynamic object information of a superanchor can be identified by capturing its unique ID at one or more locations in a sealed container. Dynamic object information can be used to determine the flow properties of the continuous medium. Real-time rheological and tribological data can be calculated. Algorithms and software for computational fluid dynamics have been developed and can be used to document flow dynamics and velocity gradients in great detail. Modeling of flow and reaction conditions of industrial materials, documentation of mixing equipment capabilities, and design of fluid handling systems can be greatly improved.

[0086]

[0104] In step 1503B, data associated with a physical object stored in the digital security system may be updated using object index information, so that the physical object can be retrieved and read using the unique ID number and product data in the digital security system. The product data may include product serialization or identifiers associated with the physical object, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), QR codes, etc.

[0087]

[0105] In step 1504, upon receiving the manufactured physical object with the SA attached, the user may securely log in to the digital security system via their user computing device to initiate the authentication process for the physical object.

[0088]

[0106] In step 1505, a secure reader (e.g., an ID reader) may be used to illuminate an SA attached to a physical object and receive the SA signal.

[0089]

[0107] In step 1506, the secure reader may receive the SA signal and decode the received SA signal to obtain a unique ID number or serial number indexed to the SA. The user computing device may run an application to communicate with the secure reader and receive the decoded ID of the SA associated with the physical object.

[0090]

[0108] In step 1507, the user computing device may communicate with the digital security system via the network and send the decrypted ID of the SA to the digital security system. The digital security system may compare the decrypted unique ID associated with the physical object with the ID number stored in the digital security system.

[0091]

[0109] In step 1508A, based on the comparison results, the digital security system may determine whether the decrypted unique ID number is registered.

[0092]

[0110] In step 1508B, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID is not registered, the digital security system may generate a “non-genuine” message to display on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0093]

[0111] In step 1508C, the digital security system may update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity validation.

[0094]

[0112] In step 1509A, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID number is registered in the digital security system, the digital security system may further determine whether the decrypted unique ID number matches a stored ID number associated with a physical object.

[0095]

[0113] In step 1509B, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID number does not match a stored ID number associated with a physical object, the digital security system may generate a “non-genuine” message to display on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0096]

[0114] In step 1509C, based on the determined authenticity result in 1509A, the digital security system may update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity validation.

[0097]

[0115] In step 1510A, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID matches a stored ID indexed on a physical object, the digital security system may generate a “genuine” message to be displayed on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0098]

[0116] In step 1510B, based on the determined authenticity result in 1510A, the digital security system may update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity validation.

[0099]

[0117] Embodiments of this disclosure may provide MTP with ultra-durable super-anchors for use in tagging, authenticating, and preventing counterfeiting of physical objects.

[0100]

[0118] In some embodiments, the manufactured super anchor (SA) may be combined with RFID or QR code technology and certain encryption technologies to further enhance physical object tracing and anti-counterfeiting protection.

[0101]

[0119] In some embodiments, the manufactured SA can be printed as a label on any type of surface of a physical object. In some embodiments, the manufactured SA can be printed as a label to replace RFID or QR codes for special security document transfer.

[0102]

[0120] Embodiments of this disclosure may provide MTPs with ultra-durable super-anchors combined with or integrated with business systems, databases for digital security systems, distributed ledgers, blockchains, blockchain interoperability, and interoperability of object and financial-based blockchains.

[0103]

[0121] In some embodiments, storing a secure, unique ID number for a manufactured SA indexed to an attached physical object can be implemented by storing the registered unique ID of the SA and associated data related to the physical object on a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger. In this way, the registered unique ID and associated data can be stored and remembered in a manner that makes it substantially impossible to tamper with. Furthermore, storing a secure, registered unique UD and associated super-anchor on a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger can enable, for example, remote object authenticity verification and tracing by an authorized recipient along the supply chain of the relevant physical object or group of objects.

[0104]

[0122] In some embodiments, the above process may be adapted for use in analyzing the flow characteristics and / or other features of a continuous medium. For example, in step 1503A, the SA may be dispersed in the continuous medium (e.g., rather than being physically attached to a solid medium). The SA may then be irradiated and may respond multiple times as described above. Each time may be recorded, and the position of the SA in the medium may also be recorded. These times-stamped SA positions may be processed to determine at least one flow characteristic of the continuous medium, as described above.

[0105]

[0123] Microtransponder-based smart paper contracts

[0106]

[0124] The authenticity of paper-based credit certificates can be insecure. Massive frauds can occur when authenticating paper-based credit certificates. For example, diplomas can be ordered online from universities anywhere in the world, printed, and sent directly anywhere. Fake credit certificates can be used and sent to doctors, psychologists, or other professionals for various fraudulent purposes. Authentication of documents is typically time-consuming and incurs significant costs for consumers, which should be avoided. Furthermore, record searches can delay housing and real estate transactions by days, disrupting business flows and revenue generation.

[0107]

[0125] p-Chip® MTP (for example, configured in some cases as a durable, self-destructing super-anchor) can be used to implement MTP-based smart paper contracts. Embodiments of this disclosure describe MTP-based paper contract techniques that can provide low-cost registration and authentication of processing devices while increasing the traceability and security of digital or printed paper items.

[0108]

[0126] MTP-based smart paper contracts can eliminate multiple steps and costs associated with creating secure and authentic digital records and smart contracts. MTP-based smart paper contracts offer low-cost registration and authentication of printers and marking devices, and can increase the traceability and security of printed items. MTP-based smart paper contracts can utilize machine tokenization for service payments, etc. Unlike watermarks embedded in paper documents and credit certificate substrates, or print-based security features from special dyes or pigments, as well as 2D codes such as QR codes and Data Matrix codes, p-Chip® MTP is not easily duplicated and offers a very affordable option for digital authentication.

[0109]

[0127] Adding documents or physical records to a digital security system or a similar functional database, data lake, or computer-based archiving and verification system requires that the documents be scanned and a unique ID or serial identifier be added. Smart paper contracts based on p-Chip® MTP may have a low-cost energy-activated identifier mounted and / or embedded in the MTP substrate that assigns a unique, physically immutable ID number to the document.

[0110]

[0128] As used herein, the terms “smart contract,” “smart paper contract,” “printed item,” or “printed object” may include, but are not limited to, all types of printable items, including, contracts, financial transactions, performance certificates, certificates, checks, secure credit certificates, medical records, quality records, deeds of assignment relating to residences, and title searches relating to automobiles, boats, agricultural equipment, and recreational vehicles, etc. For example, an MTP-based smart paper contract may be used to create documents such as secure credit certificates, contacts, certificates, quality records, etc. Specific raw material and product characteristics may be documented by analytical certificates, medical records, genomic certification such as variety or guaranteed seeds.

[0111]

[0129] As used herein, the term “paper” is used in a way that is easily understood, but does not limit embodiments of the present invention to include all printing-related substrates such as synthetic paper, film, cardboard, plastic, metalwood, and composite materials. Furthermore, the concepts of this disclosure may encompass printing of labels and packaging as a novel method for creating secure “smart labels,” secure “smart tags,” and secure “smart packages.” The present invention may encompass both conventional 2D and 3D printing processes for the aforementioned substrates and printed items.

[0112]

[0130] Figure 16 illustrates a functional diagram illustrating the implementation of smart paper contracts according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. As illustrated in Figure 16, the functional unit 16A may include databases and operations associated with sender and receiver activities. The smart contract sender (e.g., document sender) may register achievements or events with a digital security system via a first computing device (in block 1602). Sender and document data may be stored in database 1601 (e.g., DB1) as customer records. The sender may create a print order (in block 1603) and store the order and associated financial data in database 1604 (e.g., DB4) as customer financial data. The smart contract sender may transfer secure print data to the smart contract receiver (e.g., document receiver) (in block 1605).

[0113]

[0131] As illustrated in Figure 16, the functional unit 16B may include a database and operations performed by authorized printers and marking devices associated with the digital security system.

[0114]

[0132] In block 1613, authorized printers and marking devices may be registered in the digital security system using their respective assigned security serial numbers. Authorized printers may receive purchase orders from the sender. Authorized printers may convert the secure print data associated with the purchase order into machine-executable instructions (in block 1614). The received secure print data and purchase orders may be stored in database 1616 (e.g., DB2). Authorized printers may acquire security substrates (in block 1612) and print secure documents (in block 1615). The operations of printing security substrates (in block 1612) and secure documents (in block 1615) may be stored in database 1617 (e.g., DB4). Authorized marking devices may acquire security inks (in block 1618) and be configured to print 2D security marks on secure documents (in block 1619). The terms “security substrate” and “security ink” refer to legacy materials and processes for creating secure documents by printing. Many commercially available substrates and inks can exist. An example of a security substrate may be paper with a watermark or embossed structure. Another example may be paper pre-printed with "invisible ink." Under normal sunlight, the ink does not reflect in the visible spectrum. When exposed to UV light, the pre-printed lettering or mark will downconvert higher energy light into the visible spectrum, making it visible to the observer. Paper can be natural or synthetic, and therefore the more general term "substrate" may be used. Synthetic paper may be more expensive and can offer a different level of security, made with specific spectral responses designed to match their bulk properties. Incorporating color-changing (gonio-apparent) fibers into the paper or substrate to be printed can add another layer of security, as the threads exhibit a unique color reflectivity that can change as the viewing angle of the document changes. Color-changing is a feature of the material.This material is very expensive, and in the case of documents manufactured under official conditions, it may be a regulated substance. Security ink may be a specific physical structure of pigment or dye that can produce a change in reflectivity (observable color) to humans and / or machines. Both security substrates (block 1612) and security inks (block 1618) may be raw materials procured by the printer. Customers have the ability to specify security substrates and inks or any combination as part of their print orders in order to obtain secure documents.

[0115]

[0133] 2D security marking is the most advanced printing technique currently available. In addition to using secure inks and combinations of secure inks, printed designs can have highly detailed, intentionally printed structures. Careful inspection or low-magnification magnification can reveal microstructures that simple counterfeiters may not notice or be able to create. 2D security marks can also be PUFs, following the original definition by Virginia Tech, in that their microstructures are a function of variations in ink droplet dispersion, absorption into the printing substrate, and drying. 2D structures can be photographed and digitized. Digital features can be identified through a combination of combined edge detection algorithms for shape and other image factors such as area, color, and brightness. Digital files can be assigned a unique ID. The unique ID and file image can be archived in a database and indexed with the digital file. Furthermore, digital image captures can be compared with archived images to determine authenticity as a PUF challenge-response sequence.

[0116]

[0134] Recent developments in attaching or embedding RFID devices in printing paper provide an additional level of security for printed documents, thereby making the RFID tag number part of a digital identification number or digital ID for the printed document. RFID-enabled sheet paper is available for digital printing platforms such as HP Indigo printers. In some cases, RFID tags may be attached to documents after printing. The advantages of using RFID technology for the authentication of printed documents are consistent with their use in other security media. The disadvantages of this security mechanism are that it can be cloned by unauthorized entities, is not durable in use, and is expensive. The embodiments described herein may be used in conjunction with, or instead of, the 2D security marks described above, RFID-enabled sheet paper.

[0117]

[0135] A printed secure document having a 2D security mark and / or an embedded RFID tag may be shipped to the document recipient (in block 1620), and the associated records may be stored in database 1621 (e.g., DB5). A secure document having a 2D security mark may be sent to the smart contract recipient (in block 1622) along with an invoice. The smart contract recipient may both receive a digital copy of the secure document via email or text message over the network (in block 1606) and receive a printed secure document having a 2D security mark via postal mail. The smart contract recipient may receive and sign the secure document (in block 1607). A digital twin of the signed document may be created (in block 1608) and stored in database 1609 (e.g., DB6). The smart contract recipient may process or pay the invoice associated with the received document via a second computing device over the network and store the transaction record in customer finance database 1611 (e.g., DB7). The financial transaction record of the paid invoice may be sent to a digital security system via a second computing device (in block 1623) and stored in database 1624 (e.g., DB8). The MTP-based document security measures described herein may be used in place of, or in combination with, conventional 2D security marks and / or embedded RFID tags. In either case, smart paper contracts formed using the embodiments described herein may be more durablely secure than documents secured by conventional 2D security marks and / or embedded RFID tags alone.

[0118]

[0136] Generation of secure documents and smart contracts with blockchain integration

[0119]

[0137] In some embodiments, a blockchain may be used to apply a predetermined collision-tolerant hash function for tracing and tracking smart contract documents. As used herein, a collision-tolerant hash function refers to a special type of hash function, i.e., a mathematical function or algorithm that maps data of arbitrary size to a bit sequence of fixed-size hash values, and is designed to also be a one-way function, i.e., a function that is easy to compute for all inputs but difficult to reverse given a random input image. Preferably, the collision-tolerant hash function is designed such that it is difficult to find two different datasets d1 and d2 such that hash(d1) = hash(d2). These are hash functions for which a certain sufficient level of security can be mathematically proven. In this security solution, the security of the cryptographic hash function is further enhanced by the fact that the MTP ID number reading of a marking with a smart anchor, particularly a composite security marking, is performed at a specific location and time, as disclosed herein, and the physical object bearing the marking actually exists at such a location and time. This can be used to either increase the absolute security level that can be achieved, or to enable the use of collision-tolerant hash functions that work with smaller datasets, e.g., shorter data sequences as input and / or output, while still providing a given required security level.

[0120]

[0138] By utilizing blockchain technology, MTP IDs can be used in conjunction with collision-resistant hash functions to generate smart contracts. Generating smart contracts may involve multi-level indexing processes for object authentication, object tracing, and tracking. For example, combining a unique MTP ID number 1 associated with each printable page in a box of smart paper with a unique ID number 2 associated with the paper box containing all the smart paper may allow the smart paper to arrive at the printer with a predetermined identifier that can be immediately integrated into a blockchain collision-resistant hash function at the time of printing. Furthermore, in this disclosure, each authorized printer and / or marking device may have its own unique identification ID number 3. The unique MTP ID 1 from the paper can be combined with the unique ID 2 of the paper box and the unique serial ID number 3 of the authorized printer or marking device. Furthermore, all relevant MTP IDs can be applied to a collision-resistant hash function to create similar blockchain-enabled identification information. This identification information can be used as an additional level of security for registering printers or marking devices for machine tokenized payments. In some embodiments, the unique ID1 of the smart paper's MTP may be used to register the fax machine and increase the security of the fax machine for data transmission.

[0121]

[0139] Figure 17 illustrates an exemplary system diagram for generating secure documents (smart contracts) while integrating with a blockchain. The exemplary system 1700 may include multiple smart paper SP(Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, authorized printing device 1706, authorized p-Chip PUF reader 1707 (e.g., p-Chip identifier reader), and blockchain secure archive 1710. Multiple smart paper SP(Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, and authorized printing device 1706 may have their respective super-anchors embedded, each consisting of their respective p-Chip MTP and super-anchor. The authorized p-Chip super-anchor reader 1707 may be registered with a serial number in the digital security system. The authorized p-Chip super-anchor reader 1707 and collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be incorporated into the digital authorized printing device 1706.

[0122]

[0140] The unique serial number of the p-Chip of the authorized p-Chip super anchor reader 1707 may be used to generate a corresponding hash value by a collision-tolerant hash function 1708, thereby adding an additional layer of security. In some embodiments, the collision-tolerant hash function 1708 may be executed electronically in real time from a digitally authorized printing device 1706 by the printing entity, although it may be fully integrated with the printing workflow.

[0123]

[0141] In some embodiments, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be configured to receive secure document content 1701 and print commands 1702 from a user over a network to generate a secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be configured to load a smart paper container SP(Ni) 1703 from smart paper SPC(Mi) 1705 to create printed articles for the secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally authorized printing device 1706 may communicate with and automatically control an authorized p-Chip super anchor reader 1707 to read the super anchor IDs of the loaded smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705.

[0124]

[0142] In one embodiment, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 may have a super-anchor embedded or incorporated, which includes an MTP with an ID number, to enhance the security status of the printing device 1706. This incorporation may enable the digitally authorized printing device 1706 and its output to be recognized as verified and trusted sources.

[0125]

[0143] In one embodiment, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be registered through a blockchain trust center, enabling all subsequent printing to be secure within the blockchain, thereby eliminating costly and time-consuming steps. To generate highly secure document smart contracts, a collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be applied to the p-Chip MTP ID number associated with the digitally authorized printing device 1706, the print command 1702, and the print time and print date stamp generated by the printing device 1706.

[0126]

[0144] In one embodiment, integrating p-Chip into paper and paper containers can provide two additional levels of security, as both are associated with a unique super-anchor having their own unique ID number. For example, smart paper SP(Ni)1703 is produced by embedding a p-Chip MTP with a 2D super-anchor into the printing paper and can be linked to a 2D p-Chip ID number (e.g., a first ID and a second ID). Smart paper container SPC(M i )1705 is the third p-Chip MTP paper container SPC (M i ) is generated by embedding in 1705 and can be linked to a third ID number. Digitally authorized printing device 1706 may have an MTP with a fourth ID number embedded or incorporated. Collision-resistant hash function 1708 is generated by embedding in smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and smart paper container SPC(M) during manufacturing. i Applicable to 1705, and its partners or licenses, smart contracts can be created that are pre-printed for printing. Thus, existing physical records scanned for digital archiving purposes or newly created records can immediately become part of the smart contract data.

[0127]

[0145] The collision-resistant hash function 1708 can be applied to other entity or document-specific information, significantly increasing security at an exceptionally low cost. For example, there are various reasons to increase document security and reduce costs. 1) Using more than one print-based super anchor may not be cost-effective. 2) Using 2D security markings and p-Chip ID numbers from smart paper 1704, one p-Chip ID number from paper container 1705 and one p-Chip ID number from digitally authorized printing device 1706 can provide multiple levels (e.g., four levels) of unique identification information for a single security document. 3) Replacing existing 2D security markings with one to three or more p-Chips can significantly improve document security while substantially reducing operating costs for printing devices and the cost of secure printing for end users.

[0128]

[0146] In some embodiments, p-Chip authentication may be applied to individual print cartridges for security-grade inks that may be associated with different brands. Using a unique p-Chip ID number for each ink cartridge, along with a different p-Chip ID number for each printing device, could be another way to significantly increase security for existing 2D print-based systems.

[0129]

[0147] In some embodiments, smart paper and smart paper containers may be labeled with material lot numbers and container numbers. The lot number may have unique Certificate of Analysis (CoA) information that can identify multiple physical constants for a batch of product and / or material. Each p-Chip ID number indexed to or associated with smart paper and smart paper containers may be replaced with, or configured to include, the material lot number and container product number of the smart paper container. In one embodiment, any number of unique variable physical data points for a batch may be used as PUF. Furthermore, the super-anchors described above may be added to a 3D printing device to produce secure 3D prints.

[0130]

[0148] Authentication of 3D printed objects with embedded MTP utilizing a process to convert to smart contracts.

[0131]

[0149] This disclosure provides cost-effective methods and systems for identifying and authenticating parts and components produced by additive manufacturing. The proliferation of additive manufacturing processes, equipment, and techniques promises to revolutionize the physical production of objects. It increases speed while reducing the capital cost of equipment and the cost per unit of printed objects. The cost reduction may make it feasible to produce and sell non-original counterfeit products. The negative impacts of counterfeiting can be well established, including loss of revenue and taxes, as well as an increase in warranty claims. While these harmful consequences have a significant adverse impact on a global scale, there may be even greater problems related to human health and the safety of counterfeit parts, which could lead to substantial harm and death to humans and animals.

[0132]

[0150] Attaching a p-Chip® MTP to a printed object may provide the object with a unique identification number that can be protected from counterfeiting by utilizing the challenge-response mechanism described above. As described above, the p-Chip® MTP may be used to convert a printed object into smart paper and / or smart contract in the manner outlined in the smart paper described above.

[0133]

[0151] p-Chip® MTP can be directly incorporated into printed objects by being placed on the printing stage. For example, MTP may have an adhesive or tape that is activated by mechanical, thermal, or radiation-based methods and fuses to the object. MTP may be incorporated using a sacrificial medium that can be destroyed by the printing process, subprocesses, or post-printing processes. p-Chip® MTP can be directly incorporated into printed objects by tape, asset tags, or labels. Security inlays can be used to prevent MTP substitutes.

[0134]

[0152] In some embodiments, the p-Chip® MTP may be incorporated as a sub-component, and the p-Chip® may be attached or embedded in the matrix by a separate mechanical process or by additive manufacturing. For example, one manifestation may be a thin base with an embedded MTP. The base may be made of the same material as the material of the object being printed, or it may be interchangeable. Printing may occur on the thin base. Alternatively, the thin base may be attached by an adhesive, coating, or polymer material of an organic, inorganic, or hybrid composition. In some embodiments, similar materials and shapes such as pegs, tabs, labels, caps, or any other structural elements of a finished part, component, sub-component, or assembly may be used with the embedded MTP. In some embodiments, the structure may be attached to and fused with the printed portion as the outer surface. The MTP and the component containing the MTP may be intentionally overprinted to allow for the durability of the MTP during its service life as a covert security feature.

[0135]

[0153] MTP can be added to certain features of a printed article that may provide mechanical protection during use or act as an over or cover function for reading during the article's distribution, sale, and service life. Existing robots may be used to cut the object immediately after printing as a separate station in any workflow or separate process.

[0136]

[0154] As described above, MTP can be printed on or attached to an object and can be combined with 2D security marking, RFID, and other known PUF technologies for an additional layer of security to the object. MTP can be manufactured as a label printed on an object. MTP can be embedded in a paper document as a smart contract.

[0137]

[0155] Various materials can be used in end applications such as the additive manufacturing of metals, ceramics, plastics, polymer materials, single-component materials, multi-component mixtures, and combinations thereof, including medical and dental implants for humans and animals.

[0138]

[0156] Objects 3D printed using MTP may require specific usage conditions, temperature ranges, flexibility properties, etc., and may have limitations or limitations on their effectiveness. Bulk properties of the printing material, such as flexibility, bending radius, and coefficient of thermal expansion, may be carefully considered to ensure that no stresses are introduced that could render sub-components incapable, destroy the MTP chip, or release stress from the component during use. For example, an MTP label may be printed on an object to which RFID is applied to provide flexibility and an additional layer of security to the object. For example, depending on the materials and methods used in the manufacture of the transponder antenna, as well as the method and orientation of the chip bonding of the transponder on the substrate, all passive RF transponders may have a minimum (e.g., 3-inch diameter) allowable bending radius (radius of curvature). Bending or flexing the finished passive RFID transponder medium to a radius smaller than this minimum radius at any point in the application process may result in RFID failure, either from antenna breakage or chip-antenna bond failure. RFID label manufacturers may provide values ​​for the minimum bending radius. Objects printed with MTP labels may have extra flexibility than regular RFID labels. For example, the p-Chip has been successfully mounted and read on a 1 / 4-inch automotive brake line.

[0139]

[0157] Specific issues concerning additive manufacturing of ceramics and metals may apply. All materials and equipment common to additive manufacturing can be used for objects 3D printed by MTP. For example, laser marking of polymer materials can be used to create identification and 2D security marks. Laser marking is a commercial process in which laser marking pigments are embedded in a matrix (polymer, paint, adhesive, plastic, etc.).

[0140]

[0158] Pigments can be randomly dispersed in a composite material. The composite material can be irradiated with high-energy radiation, and the pigment, in response, heats and carbonizes the continuous phase surrounding the part or coating, thereby changing its color. Controlling the radiation beam can generate symbols, structures, or identification numbers embedded in or on the part. Laser marking can be an affordable way to add part numbers to an object, but laser marking pigments, radiation sources, and automated control devices are ubiquitous. This is not a very secure marking method. When laser marking is used and random features are characterized as described for printing smart contracts, they can create super-anchors that may be more secure than simple laser marks. These methods can be widely used in carbon-based materials and composites.

[0141]

[0159] Another method of laser marking is direct metal ablation. High-power lasers can erode the metal surface, changing its color (anodic oxidation) and leaving a permanent mark.

[0142]

[0160] Super Anchors can replace laser marking and 2D security marks for plastic and organic-based objects. They can be used for defensive security purposes. 3D printers for ceramics and metals may have high-power lasers for sintering. In some embodiments, Super Anchors can be attached to inorganic 3D printed articles that have 2D laser marks. In some embodiments, Super Anchors can be attached to inorganic 3D printed articles to replace 2D laser marks and increase security.

[0143]

[0161] In some embodiments, photoactivated MTPs may include longer waveforms developed for IC signaling, such as terahertz signals.

[0144]

[0162] In some embodiments, acoustic signals may be used instead of light to transmit and read the MTP chip ID. Compatible devices and circuit elements, including modulation-demodulation circuits, coding-decoding circuits, and MTP readers, may be developed via piezoelectric devices on the MTP chip associated with the corresponding acoustic signals.

[0145]

[0163] Furthermore, the mobile application may be provided to be compatible with a corresponding MTP reader for scanning MTPs attached to physical objects. The mobile application may be configured to communicate with a digital security system for registering physical objects to which MTP labels are attached or to which MTPs are embedded. The mobile application may be configured to communicate with a digital security system for tracking and authenticating physical objects that are repeated within the digital security system. The mobile application may be configured to read the MTP ID printed on an object with a corresponding MTP reader and send the read ID directly to the digital security system or a similar functional database for object authentication processing as described in Figure 15.

[0146]

[0164] Enhanced reading distance microtransponder (MTP)

[0147]

[0165] Current-generation MTPs may have limited readability when mounted directly to a metal substrate. The modulated light required to activate the MTP's solar cell can interact with the metal substrate, which can generate eddy currents in the metal. These generated eddy currents can reduce the RF signal intensity response from the MTP. The ability to successfully acquire and decode the RF signal containing the MTP's unique identity number is a function of the signal distance between the MTP and its reader.

[0148]

[0166] Embodiments of this disclosure describe techniques for enhancing the read distance for MTPs by eliminating eddy currents. The signal distance for p-Chips directly mounted on a metal surface can be reduced by up to 30% compared to non-metallic substrates. Enhanced read distance MTPs can have durable self-destructing PUF functionality embedded, as described. It may be possible to construct a physical gap between the metal substrate and the object affected by eddy currents. Such a scheme may rely on tapes, shims, or filler polymer adhesives, laminates, or films located outside the integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing and construction. Given the wide range of substrates and mounting methods for the end-use of p-Chip® MTPs, a single high-capacity, affordable solution may not be feasible for post-manufacturing isolation of MTPs from metal substrates. Achieving resistance to eddy currents from the metal substrate as part of an on-chip structure can be highly advantageous.

[0149]

[0167] In some embodiments, successful eddy current removal can be achieved with active or passive materials, and / or a combination thereof. Active materials can absorb, scatter, disrupt, or reflect eddy currents away from the chip and its signals. Filler materials such as ferrite are also known to act as active materials. Passive materials do not interact with eddy currents at all and can provide physical isolation between the substrate and the IC signals. Glass, ceramics, and inorganic media are known materials that provide passive isolation and are compatible with IC manufacturing.

[0150]

[0168] In some embodiments, the base layer or near-base layer of the IC design may be manufactured from a passive material or filled with an active material. The base layer is formed after the foundry by mounting a passive or active substrate to the MTP chip.

[0151]

[0169] Various methods or techniques may be used for the base layer of IC design, but are not limited to the following: 1) Physical construction processes by vapor phase or chemical deposition. While most passivation layers are constructed to remove corrosion from ICs and components, extending the thickness of the chip back surface by depositing a non-conductive inorganic layer acts as a physical spacer to isolate the IC and its circuitry from the metal substrate that could cause interference. 2) Physical layer construction process from a liquid medium, followed by thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry. The two chemical properties described make it possible to create durable, non-conductive films and structures with excellent adhesion to other inorganic surfaces. Such sol-gel systems can be applied as liquid coatings by casting, spraying, dipping, or application on a rotating base to a precise film. 3) Attachment of active or passive monolithic layers to wafers using liquid, gel, or solid media, followed by thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry. The same sol-gel system can be used as an adhesive to bond other structures, such as glass sheets, to the back surface of the IC wafer. In some embodiments, the passive monolithic layer may be a glass or filled glass structure. 4) Hybrid organic-inorganic polymer matrices may be considered to have greater flexibility and could be an organic pathway to lower temperature applications. One drawback of sol-gel films is that they can be brittle. Adding small amounts of organic material to an inorganic sol-gel system can reduce brittleness. A material trade-off in creating hybrid sol-gels is the degradation of high-temperature resistance.

[0152]

[0170] All end uses may involve metals or may include metal-filled layers or particles.

[0153]

[0171] This disclosure may identify known or perceived usage conditions, scope or limitations of effectiveness. While high-temperature usage conditions are a key feature of p-Chip® MTP, metallic objects used in low-temperature or ambient temperature applications, such as asset tagging, are equally important. Therefore, organic-based eddy current rejection methods can also be used in low-temperature to ambient temperature applications. Various materials may be used during the manufacturing process of MTPs with enhanced signal distance, but are not limited to inorganic films, coatings and adhesives, high-temperature hybrid organic-inorganic matrices and materials, and high-temperature organic insulating materials.

[0154]

[0172] Certain products or techniques that may be used in combination with the disclosed MTP. Various elements, devices, modules, and circuits are described above in relation to their respective functions. These elements, devices, modules, and circuits are considered means for performing their respective functions as described herein.

[0155]

[0173] While the foregoing describes embodiments of the present invention, other and further embodiments of the present invention may be conceived without departing from its basic scope, which is determined by the following claims.

[0156]

[0174] Publications and references, including patents and patent applications, cited herein are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety, as if each individual publication or reference were specifically and individually indicated to be incorporated herein by reference as being fully described. Any patent application for which this application claims priority is also incorporated herein by reference, as described above with respect to publications and references.

[0157]

[0175] While several embodiments have been discussed above, other implementations and applications are also within the scope of the following claims. Although the present invention has been described herein with reference to specific embodiments, it should be understood that these embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles and uses of the present invention. Accordingly, it should be understood that numerous modifications can be made to the exemplary embodiments and other configurations can be devised without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the following claims. More specifically, it should be understood that any embodiment described herein, as will be recognized by those skilled in the art, may advantageously possess and be described as having the sub-features of another embodiment. The following is a direct reproduction of the claims as originally filed. [C1] It is a transponder, One or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation, A clock recovery circuit comprising a photoconductor, wherein the photoconductor comprises a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power supply, the photoconductor has a resistance configured to vary according to the received radiation intensity, and the clock recovery circuit is configured to generate a recovered clock. A transponder equipped with this feature. [C2] The transponder described in C1, further comprising a reverse antenna system connected to at least one photocell and configured to transmit data. [C3] The transponder according to C1, wherein the photoconductor is configured to generate a modulated voltage signal at the source terminal of the photoconductor in response to a modulated radiation signal incident on the photoconductor. [C4] The clock recovery circuit is An amplifier, coupled to the source terminal of the photoconductor via a capacitor, receives the modulated voltage signal and outputs an analog signal generated from the modulated voltage signal. An inverter coupled to the amplifier and configured to digitize the analog signal of the amplifier to generate the recovered clock, A transponder as described in C3, comprising: [C5] The transponder according to C3, wherein the clock recovery circuit comprises a resistor having a first terminal connected to the source terminal of the photoconductor and a second terminal connected to ground, and the modulated voltage signal at the source terminal of the photoconductor is determined by the ratio of the resistance of the photoconductor to the resistance of the resistor. [C6] The transponder is the transponder described in C1, having a unique identifier. [C7] The transponder is a monolithic integrated circuit with a thickness of less than approximately 2 mm × less than 2 mm × less than 0.2 mm, as described in C1. [C8] The transponder according to C1, wherein the electromagnetic radiation comprises one or more subsets of the subterahertz portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. [C9] It is a transponder, One or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation, A reverse antenna system connected to at least one photocell and configured to transmit data, A transponder equipped with this feature. [C10] The transponder according to C9, wherein the transponder is configured to transmit its identifier in a modulated current through the reverse antenna system. [C11] The transponder according to C9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises one or more antennas and a plurality of electrical switches, and the system is configured to perform two-phase transmission to guide current flow through the antennas and the plurality of electrical switches. [C12] The transponder according to C11, wherein the two-phase transmission is performed such that a "1" bit digital signal is transmitted in one direction through one of the antennas in a first current flow, and a "0" bit digital signal is transmitted in the opposite direction through one of the antennas in a second current flow. [C13] The transponder according to C9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises a forward antenna and a reverse antenna. [C14] The reverse antenna system is the transponder described in C9, comprising a single antenna. [C15] The transponder according to C9, wherein the reversible antenna system is configured to perform the two-phase transmission to transmit a "1" bit digital signal and a "0" bit digital signal with substantially the same power. [C16] The transponder according to C9, wherein the reverse antenna system comprises at least one loop antenna surrounding one or more photocells. [C17] The transponder described in C9, comprising encoding such that the number of cycles involved in transmitting one bit is eight data periods. [C18] The transponder described in C9, comprising encoding such that the number of cycles involved in transmitting one bit is 64 data periods. [C19] It is a transponder, Monolithic integrated circuits with dimensions of less than approximately 2mm x less than 2mm x less than 0.2mm (thickness), A reversible antenna system comprising one or more antennas and a plurality of electrical switches, wherein the antennas and switches are configured to perform two-phase transmission to guide current flow through the antennas and the plurality of electrical switches. A transponder equipped with this feature. [C20] The transponder according to C19, wherein the two-phase transmission is performed such that a "1" bit digital signal is transmitted in one direction through the antenna in a first current flow and a "0" bit digital signal is transmitted in the opposite direction through the antenna in a second current flow. [C21] The transponder according to C19, wherein the antenna comprises a forward antenna and a reverse antenna. [C22] The antenna system comprises a single antenna, as described in C19. [C23] The transponder according to C19, wherein the reversible antenna system is configured to perform the two-phase transmission to transmit a "1" bit digital signal and a "0" bit digital signal with substantially the same power. [C24] The transponder according to C19, wherein the one or more antennas are loop antennas surrounding one or more photocells. [C25] It is a security inlay, Bottom inlay segment and A top inlay segment configured to fit into the bottom inlay segment; an electromagnetic radiation-triggered transponder having a top side and a bottom side and mounted between the two inlay segments; the bottom side being positioned on the bottom inlay segment, the top side being positioned on the top inlay segment, and the security inlay being configured such that the separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the electromagnetic radiation-triggered transponder, preventing the transponder from being read. A security inlay equipped with this feature. [C26] The security inlay according to C25, wherein the transponder includes a cut configured to guide a cleavage line of the transponder so as to damage the electronic equipment in operation. [C27] The security inlay according to C25, wherein the bottom inlay segment includes a bottom groove configured to contain adhesive for bonding to the bottom side of the transponder, and the top inlay segment has a top groove configured to contain adhesive for bonding to the top side of the transponder. [C28] The security inlay according to C27, wherein the bottom groove and the top groove are located on both sides of the cut, respectively. [C29] The security inlay according to C25, wherein the top and bottom sides of the transponder each have adhesives disposed on the non-adjacent portions of the top and bottom sides of the transponder, respectively. [C30] The security inlay according to C25, wherein the two segments are configured not to be easily separated when manipulated before being bonded to the object requiring the security inlay. [C31] A method for securing an object, comprising: adhering the security inlay described in C25 to the object via a bottom inlay segment; and adhering the bottom inlay segment to a tape or capsule that provides a closure to the object. [C32] Monolithic security inlay, Inlay segment and, An electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP) coupled to the inlay segment and having at least one monolithic security self-destruct function and It features a monolithic security inlay. [C33] The monolithic security inlay according to C32, wherein the MTP is attached directly to or cast into a molded label configured to be attached to a physical object. [C34] The security inlay according to C32, wherein the MTP is attached directly to or cast into a molded label, and a physical object is subsequently formed on or around the molded label containing the MTP. [C35] The monolithic security inlay according to C32, wherein at least one monolithic security self-destructing feature is configured to carry the MTP to or over an external structural feature in order to disable the MTP. [C36] At least one monolithic security self-destructing function is configured to rotate or engage with a foreign object or structure and come into contact with the MTP, which is then rendered incapable of inducing stress, as described in C32, monolithic security inlay. [C37] A method for fixing an object, To generate at least one canonically matching pair, embed at least two microtransponders (MTPs) in a tagant, multiple tagants, packaging, or the object, or a combination thereof, and each MTP is configured with its respective identifier. The object is to be indexed with the respective identifiers of the MTP, The database of the digital security system stores the MTP and indexing information associated with the object, Reading each of the aforementioned identifiers via an identifier reader, A method for fixing an object, comprising verifying the indexing information based on the reading to determine whether each of the identifiers is associated with the canonical matching pair. [C38] A method for securing an object according to C37, wherein at least one canonically matching pair is associated with the tagant, the plurality of tagants, the packaging, or the object, or at least two different MTPs embedded in the combination thereof. [C39] Each MTP is, One or more photocells configured to receive light, A clock recovery circuit comprising a photoconductor, wherein the photoconductor comprises a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power supply, the photoconductor has a resistance configured to vary according to the received light intensity, and the clock recovery circuit is configured to generate a recovered clock. A reverse antenna system connected to at least one photocell and configured to transmit data, A method for fixing the object described in C37, comprising the following: [C40] A method for securing the object described in C37, each MTP being embodied by at least one monolithic security self-destructing function. [C41] A method for fixing an object, To generate at least one canonically matching pair, the object is to embed or attach at least one microtransponder (MTP) and at least one tagant, and the MTP and tagant are each configured using their respective identifiers. The object is to be indexed with the respective identifiers of the MTP and Tagant, The database of the digital security system stores the MTP and tagant, as well as indexing information associated with the object. Reading each of the aforementioned identifiers via an identifier reader, A method for fixing an object, comprising verifying the indexing information based on the reading to determine whether each of the identifiers is associated with the canonical matching pair. [C42] The method according to C41, wherein the at least one tagant includes a QR code, a barcode, an RFID tag, or a combination thereof. [C43] The method according to C41, wherein the embedding or mounting is performed to position the at least one MTP and the at least one tagant next to each other or at different locations on the surface of the object or within the object. [C44] The method according to C41, wherein the embedding or mounting is performed to combine the at least one MTP and the at least one tagant in a single composite security marking. [C45] A method for authenticating a physical item, A super anchor having a first identifier is configured, and the super anchor is equipped with an electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP). The server computing device's processor registers and stores the first identifier associated with the physical item, which is indexed to a first item number stored in the database of the digital security system, and the super-anchor device is embedded in a tagant attached to the physical item, and the database is configured to store multiple identifiers and multiple item numbers indexed to each physical item. Irradiating the super anchor device with an identifier reader, To obtain a second identifier associated with the physical item, the identifier reader receives and decodes a response signal from the super-anchor, and the processor of the server computing device determines, based on the second identifier, whether the physical item is authenticated. A method that includes [a certain feature]. [C46] Determining whether the physical item is authenticated is: Determining whether the second identifier is registered in the database, and in response to determining that the second identifier is registered in the database, determining whether the second identifier matches the first identifier indexed to the item number of the physical item. The method described in C45, which further includes the following: [C47] Determining whether the physical item is authenticated is: In response to determining that the second identifier matches the first identifier indexed to the item number of the physical item, display an authentication message on the identifier reader. The method described in C45, which further includes the following: [C48] The method according to C45, wherein the MTP is embedded in the substrate of the tagant during a multilayer manufacturing process. [C49] A method for authenticating a physical item, To generate at least one canonically matching pair, a super-anchor is configured on an object having at least one microtransponder (MTP) and at least one tagant, wherein the MTP and tagant are each configured using their respective first and second identifiers. The server computing device's processor registers and stores the first and second identifiers associated with the physical item, which are indexed to a first item number stored in the database of the digital security system, and the database is configured to store multiple identifiers and multiple item numbers indexed to each physical item. Irradiating the super anchor device with an identifier reader, In order to obtain a third identifier associated with the physical item, the identifier reader receives and decodes a response signal from the super-anchor, and the tag reader reads the super-anchor device. To obtain a fourth identifier associated with the physical item, the tagant leader receives and decodes a response signal from the super-anchor, and the processor of the server computing device determines whether the physical item is authenticated based on the third and fourth identifiers. A method that includes [a certain feature]. [C50] Determining whether the physical item is authenticated is: To determine whether the third and fourth identifiers are registered in the database, In response to determining that the third and fourth identifiers are registered in the database, it is determined whether the third and fourth identifiers match the respective first and second identifiers indexed to the item number of the physical item. The method described in C49, which further includes the following: [C51] Determining whether the physical item is authenticated is: Displaying an authentication message on the identifier reader or tagant reader in response to determining that the third and fourth identifiers match the respective first and second identifiers indexed to the item number of the physical item. The method described in C49, which further includes the following: [C52] A system for generating secure documents and smart contracts, Multiple super-anchors, each equipped with an electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP) having an identifier, each MTP linked to its respective identifier and registered in the security system. A smart paper having at least one super-anchor embedded with a first identifier, A smart paper container embedded with a second super-anchor having a second identifier, and an authorized printing device registered in a security system and embedded with a third MTP having a third identifier, An identifier reader registered in the security system using a reader identifier, wherein the identifier reader is incorporated in the authorized printing device and configured to read the first super-anchor to obtain the first identifier and to read the second super-anchor to obtain the second identifier. A system equipped with these features. [C53] The aforementioned authorized printing devices are Receiving secure document content and print commands from a user over a network; generating printed materials for the secure document smart contract based on the said document content and print commands. The system described in C52 is configured to perform the following actions. [C54] The system as described in C52, wherein the authorized printing device communicates with a processor configured to execute a hash function to generate each hash value associated with the secure document smart contract, the respective hash values ​​being stored in a blockchain secure archive and linked to the secure document smart contract in the blockchain secure archive for printing the item authentication. [C55] The system according to C54, wherein each of the hash values ​​is associated with the first identifier of the smart paper and the second identifier of the smart paper container. [C56] The system according to C54, wherein each of the hash values ​​is associated with the first identifier of the smart paper, the second identifier of the smart paper container, the third identifier of the authorized printing device, and the reader identifier. [C57] The system described in C52, wherein the approved printing device is a 3D printing device. [C58] The system according to C52, wherein the first identifier of the smart paper is configured to include the material lot number of the smart paper. [C59] The system according to C52, wherein the second identifier of the smart paper container is replaced with or configured to include the container product number of the smart paper container. [C60] The system according to C52, wherein the MTP is manufactured in a process that removes eddy currents in order to enhance the MTP reading distance. [C61] The system according to C60, wherein the process comprises applying an active or passive monolithic layer to an MTP wafer by means of a liquid, gel, or solid medium, and then performing thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry. [C62] The system according to C61, wherein the passive monolithic layer includes a glass or a filled glass structure. [C63] The smart paper further comprises a 2D security mark, an RFID tag, or a combination thereof, as described in C52. [C64] A system for generating secure smart contracts, Multiple super-anchors, each equipped with an electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP) having an identifier, each MTP linked to its respective identifier and registered in the security system. At least one super-anchor having a first identifier, An authorized 3D printing device registered in a security system and having a second MTP having a second identifier embedded within it, wherein the 3D printer is Receiving secure content and print commands from a user over a network, and generating 3D printed items for the secure smart contract based on the secure document content and print commands. Configured to perform, An identifier reader registered in the security system using a reader identifier, wherein the identifier reader is incorporated in the authorized printing device and configured to read at least the first super anchor in order to obtain the first identifier. A system equipped with these features. [C65] The system according to C64, wherein the 3D printed article includes the first super anchor and a 2D laser mark. [C66] The system according to C64, wherein the 3D printed article includes the first super-anchor which does not have a 2D laser mark. [C67] A method for monitoring a continuous medium, A super anchor having a first identifier is configured, and the super anchor is equipped with an electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP). Dispersing the super anchor in the continuous medium, When the super anchor is in a first position within the continuous medium, the identifier reader irradiates the super anchor device for a first time period. The identifier reader receives and decodes the first response signal from the super anchor. In response to the first response signal, first data indicating the first time and the first position is stored, When the super anchor is in a second position within the continuous medium, the identifier reader irradiates the super anchor device at a second time interval. The identifier reader receives and decodes the second response signal from the super anchor. In response to the second response signal, second data indicating the second time and the second position is stored, To determine at least one fluid characteristic of the continuous medium, the first data and the second data are processed. A method that includes [a certain feature].

Claims

1. It is a transponder, One or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation, A clock recovery circuit comprising a photoconductor, wherein the photoconductor comprises a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power supply, the photoconductor has a resistance configured to vary according to the received radiation intensity, and the clock recovery circuit is configured to generate a recovered clock. A transponder equipped with this feature.

2. The transponder according to claim 1, further comprising a reverse antenna system connected to at least one photocell and configured to transmit data.

3. The transponder according to claim 1, wherein the photoconductor is configured to generate a modulated voltage signal at the source terminal of the photoconductor in response to a modulated radiation signal incident on the photoconductor.

4. The aforementioned clock recovery circuit is An amplifier, coupled to the source terminal of the photoconductor via a capacitor, receives the modulated voltage signal and outputs an analog signal generated from the modulated voltage signal. An inverter coupled to the amplifier and configured to digitize the analog signal of the amplifier to generate the recovered clock, The transponder according to claim 3, comprising:

5. The transponder according to claim 3, wherein the clock recovery circuit comprises a resistor having a first terminal connected to the source terminal of the photoconductor and a second terminal connected to ground, and the modulated voltage signal at the source terminal of the photoconductor is determined by the ratio of the resistance of the photoconductor to the resistance of the resistor.

6. The transponder according to claim 1, wherein the transponder has a unique identifier.

7. The transponder according to claim 1, wherein the transponder is a monolithic integrated circuit with a thickness of less than approximately 2 mm x less than 2 mm x less than 0.2 mm.

8. The transponder according to claim 1, wherein the electromagnetic radiation comprises one or more subsets of the subterahertz portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.

9. It is a security inlay, Bottom inlay segment and A top inlay segment configured to fit into the bottom inlay segment, an electromagnetic radiation-triggered transponder comprising a top side and a bottom side, mounted between the two inlay segments, the bottom side positioned on the bottom inlay segment, the top side positioned on the top inlay segment, the security inlay configured such that separation of the top inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment destroys the electromagnetic radiation-triggered transponder, and the electromagnetic radiation-triggered transponder is, One or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation, The system comprises a clock recovery circuit with a photoconductor, the photoconductor having a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power supply, the photoconductor having a resistance configured to vary according to the received radiation intensity, and the clock recovery circuit configured to generate a recovered clock. A security inlay equipped with this feature.

10. The security inlay according to claim 9, wherein the transponder includes a cut configured to guide a cleavage line of the transponder so as to damage the electronic equipment in operation.

11. The security inlay according to claim 10, wherein the bottom inlay segment includes a bottom groove configured to contain adhesive for bonding to the bottom side of the transponder, and the top inlay segment has a top groove configured to contain adhesive for bonding to the top side of the transponder.

12. The security inlay according to claim 11, wherein the bottom groove and the top groove are located on both sides of the cut, respectively.

13. The security inlay according to claim 9, wherein the top and bottom sides of the transponder are each provided with adhesive disposed on the non-adjacent portions of the top and bottom sides of the transponder, respectively.

14. The security inlay according to claim 9, wherein the two segments are configured not to be easily separated when manipulated before being bonded to the object requiring the security inlay.

15. A method for securing an object, comprising: adhering the security inlay described in claim 9 to the object via a bottom inlay segment; and adhering the bottom inlay segment to a tape or capsule that provides closure to the object.

16. It is a monolithic security inlay, Inlay segment and, An electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP) coupled to the inlay segment and having at least one monolithic security self-destruct function, and the MTP is One or more photocells configured to receive electromagnetic radiation, The system comprises a clock recovery circuit with a photoconductor, the photoconductor having a source terminal and a drain terminal coupled to a power supply, the photoconductor having a resistance configured to vary according to the received radiation intensity, and the clock recovery circuit configured to generate a recovered clock. It features a monolithic security inlay.

17. The monolithic security inlay according to claim 16, wherein the MTP is directly attached to or cast into a molded label configured to be attached to a physical object.

18. The security inlay according to claim 16, wherein the MTP is attached directly to or cast into a molded label, and a physical object is subsequently formed on or around the molded label encompassing the MTP.

19. The monolithic security inlay according to claim 16, wherein at least one monolithic security self-destruct function is configured to carry the MTP to or over an external structural feature in order to disable the MTP.

20. The monolithic security inlay according to claim 16, wherein at least one monolithic security self-destruct function is configured to rotate or engage with a foreign object or structure and come into contact with the MTP, which is then rendered incapable of inducing stress.

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