Method for preventing emission of environmental pollutants from thermal power plants

The system integrates mechanical noise-based true random numbers and physical interlocks to secure data integrity and enforce real-time compliance, addressing vulnerabilities in thermal power plant monitoring systems.

KR103045384B1Active Publication Date: 2026-11-11IL JIN POWER
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Patent Information

Application Number
KR1020260110691
Authority / Receiving Office
KR · KR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-06-17
Publication Date
2026-11-11
Estimated Expiration
2046-03-04

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Conventional environmental monitoring systems in thermal power plants are vulnerable to data manipulation at the source, lack mechanisms to verify data reliability with physical entities, and fail to prevent illegal pollutant emissions in real time, relying on post-incident detection and administrative sanctions.

Method used

A cyber-physical security system that generates true random numbers from mechanical equipment noise, integrates sensors and security modules in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and activates physical interlocks to block pollutant emissions upon authentication failure.

Benefits of technology

Ensures data integrity by synchronizing physical and digital data, defends against cyber attacks, and enforces real-time compliance with environmental regulations through hardware interlocks, preventing illegal emissions.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to a system and method for preventing the emission of environmental pollutants from a thermal power plant. It generates a true random number by utilizing the non-determinism of physical noise generated during the operation of mechanical equipment, cryptographically combines this with environmental sensor data within a Hardware Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to ensure data integrity, and forcibly activates a physical interlock device in the event of data tampering or authentication failure to fundamentally block the emission of pollutants.
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Description

Technology Field

[0001] The present invention relates to an environmental pollutant emission management system for a thermal power plant, and more specifically, to a system and method that utilizes the non-deterministic characteristics of physical noise inevitably generated during the operation of mechanical equipment within the power plant to fundamentally block the possibility of falsification or tampering of environmental sensor data collected from the thermal power plant and to prevent illegal pollutant emissions through abnormal operation of equipment in real time. Background Technology

[0002] The following description merely provides background information related to the present embodiment and does not constitute prior art.

[0003] Thermal power plants emit large amounts of air pollutants, such as sulfur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and fine dust, during the combustion process, and generate waste such as coal ash remaining after combustion. Accordingly, various environmental regulations, including the Air Environment Preservation Act and the Waste Management Act, impose an obligation on workplaces to measure pollutant emission concentrations in real time and manage them to remain below legal standards.

[0004] To comply with these regulations, most power plants install Tele-Monitoring Systems (TMS) to measure the concentration of exhaust gases and transmit the results to control agencies in real time. In addition, the treatment process for waste such as coal ash is required to record and report data, such as transfer and processing volumes, through a waste management system (e.g., Allbaro).

[0005] However, conventional environmental monitoring systems contain several structural vulnerabilities.

[0006] First, security technologies primarily focus on the data-in-transit process. In other words, while it is common practice to encrypt the communication channel through which measured data is transmitted to a central server (e.g., VPN), this leaves the system vulnerable to data manipulation at the very end where data is generated—namely, the physical sensor input (Data-at-Source). If a malicious administrator injects artificial values ​​into a sensor or conceals the abnormal state of a measuring device, distorted data can be transmitted through the encrypted network as if it were legitimate data. In particular, the physical connection point (Point of Entry) between the sensor element and the data-processing processor (MCU) is a vulnerable point susceptible to hacking or man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0007] Second, there is a lack of a mechanism to verify data reliability in conjunction with the operating status of physical entities. For example, if TMS data indicates that pollution control facilities are operating normally, but pollutants are actually being discharged unauthorizedly by opening a bypass, the current system finds it difficult to detect such a discrepancy between digital records and physical reality. Similarly, in waste management, there is a lack of effective means to prevent the generation of false transfer performance data while transport equipment, such as conveyor belts, is actually stopped.

[0008] Third, even when violations are detected, measures taken often remain limited to post-incident detection and administrative sanctions. Even if an alarm system is activated, managers may ignore it or intentionally disable the system. There is an urgent need to introduce an active fail-safe interlock system capable of physically and forcibly blocking pollutant emissions in real time.

[0009] Therefore, there is a demand for a new paradigm of security technology that goes beyond simple data encryption, uses the actual physical operating status of industrial equipment as a reliable token to determine the authenticity of environmental data, integrates sensors and security modules at the single-chip level to eliminate the possibility of manipulation, and can fundamentally prevent environmental pollution by imposing physical sanctions in the event of authentication failure. The problem to be solved

[0010] The present invention was devised to solve the problems of the aforementioned prior art, and its main purpose is to fundamentally block the possibility of falsification or tampering of environmental sensor data collected from thermal power plants and to prevent the illegal discharge of pollutants through the abnormal operation of facilities in real time.

[0011] One objective of the present invention is to provide a cyber-physical security-based system that generates a true random number by utilizing the non-deterministic characteristics of physical noise inevitably generated during the operation of mechanical equipment in a power plant as an entropy source, cryptographically combines this with environmental sensor data within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to prove the physical provenance of the data, and fundamentally blocks the emission path of pollutants by forcibly activating a predefined physical interlock device in the event of data tampering or authentication failure.

[0012] The present invention aims to solve the problem of providing physical proof of physical reality to digital environment data by utilizing the unique and unpredictable physical noise generated when specific mechanical equipment within a power plant is in operation as an entropy source for 'real-time operation proof'. In particular, it aims to ensure that "a security key is not generated without mechanical movement" by synchronizing physical phenomena such as hydrodynamic vortices and mechanical friction noise with the generation of a digital security key.

[0013] Furthermore, the present invention aims to solve the problem of establishing an advanced verification system capable of guaranteeing integrity from the time of data generation and defending against replay attacks, such as playing recorded noise, by cryptographically combining and signing the physical proof (noise random number) and environment data within a hardware Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) that is securely isolated from external attacks.

[0014] Furthermore, to overcome the limitations of a single sensor, the present invention aims to ensure security robustness by fusion of multiple sources such as acoustics, electromagnetic interference (EMI), and vibration (multimodal fusion), and by applying a state-aware algorithm that dynamically adjusts random number extraction parameters according to the operating status (load) of the equipment.

[0015] Furthermore, the present invention aims to solve the problem of maximizing the effectiveness of compliance with environmental regulations through closed-loop control that receives feedback on the operation status of the interlock, by providing a powerful fail-safe mechanism that, in the event of a data integrity authentication failure, goes beyond a software warning to immediately and forcibly actuate a physical interlock device, such as a solenoid valve or magnetic contactor, to physically block the emission path of pollutants or stop the operation of related equipment.

[0016] Ultimately, the present invention aims to solve the problem of maximizing the effectiveness of environmental compliance by providing a robust fail-safe mechanism that, in the event of a data integrity failure, goes beyond a software warning to immediately and forcibly actuate a physical interlock device, such as a solenoid valve or magnetic contactor, to physically block the emission path of pollutants or stop the operation of related equipment.

[0017] The problems that the present invention aims to solve are not limited to those mentioned above, and other unmentioned problems will be clearly understood by a person skilled in the art from the description below. means of solving the problem

[0018] According to one aspect of the present disclosure, a system for preventing the emission of environmental pollutants by utilizing physical phenomena occurring during the operation of mechanical equipment within a thermal power plant comprises: an acoustic entropy collection unit installed adjacent to a noise source that generates turbulence noise or mechanical friction noise generated by the passage of a high-pressure fluid, and capturing an analog acoustic signal generated from the noise source; a high-pass filter that removes low-frequency components from the analog acoustic signal collected by the acoustic entropy collection unit, and an analog-to-digital converter that converts the filtered acoustic signal into a digital signal composed of a plurality of bits; and a random number generator that selectively extracts only a bit stream in the lowest 3-bit or 4-bit region where thermal noise and quantization noise are concentrated among the converted digital signals, and generates a true random number of uniform distribution by removing statistical bias from the extracted bit stream. An environmental data measuring unit that measures environmental data related to the emission of environmental pollutants in real time, such as a gas analysis sensor of a chimney automatic measuring device (TMS) installed on the chimney of the above-mentioned thermal power plant or a weight sensor attached to a waste transfer facility; and a processor that includes a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) that provides an independent security computing area that is hardware-separated from an external operating system, wherein the Trusted Execution Environment receives a genuine random number generated from the random number generator and environmental data measured from the environmental data measuring unit hardware-wise through an electrical path that does not pass through the general operating system, combines the received genuine random number and environmental data with a timestamp containing current time information to form a data packet, and generates an electronic signature for the formed data packet using a private key stored in a non-volatile security memory within the TEE.A data integrity verification server that receives a data packet containing the electronic signature from the above security computing unit via a wireless communication network, performs cryptographic verification to verify the validity of the electronic signature using a public key corresponding to the private key, and performs physical verification to determine the final integrity of the data by analyzing the frequency response characteristics of the acoustic signal included in the data packet and comparing them with an Acoustic Transfer Function (ATF) model previously modeled and stored in a normal state to determine whether a replay attack involving the playback of a recorded sound has occurred; and a hardware interlock driving unit that, if either the cryptographic verification or the physical verification of the data integrity verification server fails and the final authentication is determined to have failed, immediately generates a control signal and, in response to the control signal, forcibly drives one or more actuators installed on the pollutant emission path of the thermal power plant to physically block the emission of the pollutant.

[0019] In some examples, the one or more actuators include at least one of a fail-safe solenoid valve that controls the pneumatic line of a gate valve, a magnetic contactor that cuts off the power to the drive motor of a contaminant transfer facility, or a shutter blade that blocks the optical path of an optical measuring device, and the hardware interlock drive unit further includes a feedback sensor that detects the physical operating state of the actuator, and can perform a closed-loop interlock function that transmits an alarm to an upper monitoring system by determining that a normal operating signal is not received from the feedback sensor within a predetermined time after the generation of the control signal, thereby determining that there is a failure or operation of the interlock device itself.

[0020] In some examples, the random number generator may additionally receive signals from an EMI sensor that collects electromagnetic interference (EMI) noise generated during the operation of the machine equipment and an acceleration sensor that measures the vibration acceleration of the pipe, and generate the true random number by fusing bit streams extracted from the acoustic signal, the EMI noise signal, and the vibration acceleration signal, respectively, by performing an exclusive OR (XOR) on a bit-by-bit basis.

[0021] In some examples, the random number generator receives data such as the valve opening rate or the motor's rotational speed per minute (RPM) as information indicating the load status of the mechanical equipment from the distributed control system (DCS) of the thermal power plant into the TEE of the security calculation unit, and performs a state-aware random number extraction algorithm that dynamically adjusts the frequency band (Bandwidth) of the acoustic signal where entropy is most abundant or the number of least significant bits (LSB) to be extracted based on a predefined look-up table according to the received load status information, thereby maintaining a constant quality of entropy even if the operating conditions of the mechanical equipment change.

[0022] According to another aspect of the present disclosure, a method performed by an environmental pollutant emission prevention system to prevent the emission of environmental pollutants by utilizing physical phenomena occurring during the operation of mechanical equipment within a thermal power plant comprises: capturing an analog acoustic signal generated from a noise source using an acoustic entropy collector installed adjacent to the noise source, wherein the mechanical equipment is said to generate turbulence noise or mechanical friction noise generated by the passage of a high-pressure fluid; removing low-frequency components from the analog acoustic signal collected by the acoustic entropy collector using a high-pass filter; converting the filtered acoustic signal into a digital signal composed of a plurality of bits using an analog-to-digital converter; selectively extracting only a bit stream of the lowest 3-bit or 4-bit region in which thermal noise and quantization noise are concentrated among the converted digital signals, and generating a true random number of uniform distribution by removing statistical bias from the extracted bit stream. A process of measuring environmental data related to the emission of environmental pollutants in real time using a gas analysis sensor of a chimney automatic measuring device (TMS) installed on the chimney of the above-mentioned thermal power plant or a weight sensor attached to a waste transfer facility; a process of receiving the generated genuine random number and the environmental data measured by the environmental data measuring unit hardware-wise through an electrical path that does not pass through the general operating system by means of a processor containing a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) that provides an independent secure computing area hardware-separated from an external operating system, forming a data packet by combining the received genuine random number and environmental data with a timestamp containing current time information, and generating an electronic signature for the formed data packet using a private key stored in a non-volatile secure memory within the TEE;A method comprising: receiving a data packet containing the electronic signature from the above security computing unit via a wireless communication network, performing cryptographic verification to verify the validity of the electronic signature using a public key corresponding to the private key, and performing physical verification to determine the final integrity of the data by analyzing the frequency response characteristics of the acoustic signal included in the data packet and comparing them with an Acoustic Transfer Function (ATF) model previously modeled and stored in a normal state to determine whether a replay attack involving the playback of a recorded sound has occurred; and generating a control signal when either the cryptographic verification or the physical verification fails and the final authentication is determined to have failed, and in response to the control signal, forcibly driving one or more actuators installed on the pollutant emission path of the thermal power plant to physically block the emission of the pollutant. Effects of the invention

[0023] According to the present invention, the following significant effects can be expected.

[0024] First, fundamental integrity can be secured by proving the 'physical provenance' of environmental data. While conventional technology was limited to protecting the data-in-transit process, this invention inseparably combines the physical existence of the data with the mechanical operating state of the equipment from the data-at-source point of creation. By randomizing unpredictable acoustic signals that occur only during the actual operation of power plant machinery and combining them with environmental data at the hardware level, it is possible to fundamentally block the generation of false data or the arbitrary manipulation of sensor values ​​without operating the equipment. This enforces the congruence between 'digital data and physical entity,' thereby dramatically improving data reliability.

[0025] Second, security vulnerabilities are eliminated through a single-chip-based integration. Since the sensor elements and the security computing unit are connected within a single chip (SoC), Man-in-the-Middle attacks—where sensor data is extracted, manipulated, and then reinjected—are physically impossible. In other words, it provides robust security where data generation and security signatures are not separated spatially or temporally.

[0026] Third, compliance with environmental regulations can be enforced through powerful real-time physical sanctions. If an attempt at data tampering or authentication failure is detected, a hardware interlock is activated to immediately physically shut off discharge valves or conveyor belts, going beyond mere alerts or logging. This makes intentional disregard or system bypassing by administrators impossible, providing a robust fail-safe mechanism that prevents illegal pollutant emissions in real time.

[0027] Fourth, it has excellent defense capabilities against sophisticated cyber attacks. It can effectively defend against replay attacks that attempt to deceive the system by playing recorded sounds through Acoustic Transfer Function (ATF) modeling, and since cryptographic operations are performed within a hardware Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), the private key and signature process can be safely protected from malware or external hacking.

[0028] In conclusion, the present invention provides an innovative solution that organically integrates fluid dynamics, hardware security, and industrial control technologies—which were previously technically separate—to shift the existing environmental monitoring system, which is focused on post-detection, to a paradigm of 'real-time prevention and physical enforcement.' By supporting transparent environmental management for companies and contributing to the establishment of credible national environmental policies, this invention can significantly contribute to promoting sustainable industrial development.

[0029] The effects of the present disclosure are not limited to those mentioned above, and other unmentioned effects will be clearly understood by a person skilled in the art from the description below. Brief explanation of the drawing

[0030] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the schematic configuration of a thermal power generation system to which an embodiment of the present invention can be applied. FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the overall architecture of an environmental pollutant emission prevention system according to one embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an acoustic entropy-based true random number generation process according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 4 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an acoustic transfer function (ATF)-based replay attack verification model according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a system integration applied to an air pollutant emission monitoring system as a first embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a system integration applied to a waste transfer system as a second embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating a multimodal entropy fusion process according to another embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a state-aware random number extraction process according to another embodiment of the present invention. Specific details for implementing the invention

[0031] Some embodiments of the present disclosure are described in detail below with reference to exemplary drawings. It should be noted that in assigning reference numerals to the components of each drawing, the same components are given the same reference numeral whenever possible, even if they are shown in different drawings. Furthermore, in describing the present disclosure, if it is determined that a detailed description of related known components or functions could obscure the essence of the present disclosure, such detailed description is omitted.

[0032] In describing the components of the embodiments according to the present disclosure, symbols such as first, second, i), ii), a), b), etc., may be used. These symbols are intended only to distinguish the components from other components, and the essence, order, or sequence of the components is not limited by the symbols. When a part in the specification is described as 'comprising' or 'having' a component, this means that, unless explicitly stated otherwise, it does not exclude other components but may include additional components.

[0033] The detailed description set forth below, together with the accompanying drawings, is intended to describe exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure and is not intended to represent the only embodiment in which the present disclosure can be practiced.

[0034] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the schematic configuration of a thermal power generation system to which an embodiment of the present invention can be applied.

[0035] A thermal power generation system is broadly composed of a fuel supply system that stores and transports raw materials, a fuel processing system that processes the input fuel into a form suitable for combustion, a combustion air control system that preheats and supplies the air required for combustion, a power generation system that converts the thermal energy of fuel combustion into mechanical and electrical energy, and an exhaust system that processes and discharges exhaust gases generated after combustion.

[0036] Referring to FIG. 1, the fuel supply system includes a coal hopper (10), a coal feeder (11), and a coal chute (13). The coal hopper (10) receives and temporarily stores coal fuel to be used for power generation and performs a buffer function to stably supply fuel to a downstream process through a bottom discharge port. The coal feeder (11) is a device connected to the bottom of the coal hopper (10) that physically transports the stored coal toward the pulverizer, and plays a role in precisely adjusting the amount of coal supplied according to power generation load conditions. The coal chute (13) functions as a closed transport passage that guides the coal discharged from the coal feeder (11) to be smoothly fed into the downstream facility by its own weight, and prevents the leakage of dust generated during fuel transport.

[0037] The fuel processing system includes a pulverizer (30) and a rotary classifier (31). The pulverizer (30) performs a process of increasing the surface area of ​​the fuel by crushing the coal fed through the coal chute (13) into pulverized coal, which has maximized combustion efficiency. The rotary classifier (31) controls the process so that the pulverized coal, which has been processed in the pulverizer (30) and has become sufficiently fine, is transferred to the next process, and the coal particles that have been crushed coarser than the standard are sorted and returned to the pulverizer (30) for re-crushing.

[0038] The combustion air control system includes an air preheater (50) and a blower (51). The blower (51) performs a pumping function by forcibly drawing in external air to supply oxygen required for the combustion reaction of the boiler (100) and pushing it into the air preheater (50) inside the system. The air preheater (50) functions as a heat exchanger that significantly improves the combustion efficiency of the boiler by preheating the combustion air flowing in from the blower (51) using the heat held by the high-temperature exhaust gas heading toward the chimney (90).

[0039] The power generation system includes a boiler (100), a steam turbine (70), and a generator (71). The boiler (100) is equipped with a combustion furnace and heat exchange tubes that generate high-temperature thermal energy by burning pulverized coal supplied from a rotary classifier (31) together with preheated air in an internal combustion chamber. The boiler (100) is responsible for heating water flowing inside the pipes using the high heat generated during combustion and converting it into high-temperature, high-pressure superheated steam. The steam turbine (70) converts the energy of the steam into mechanical rotational force by rotating internal blades at high speed using the energy of the high-temperature, high-pressure steam supplied from the boiler (100). At this time, the steam expanded in the steam turbine (70) can form a reheat cycle in which it is recirculated into a reheater inside the boiler (100), reheated, and then supplied back to the steam turbine (70). A high-pressure bypass valve (HP Bypass Valve) that diverts steam in an emergency may be installed between the boiler (100) and the steam turbine (70). The generator (71) is mechanically connected to the rotating shaft of the steam turbine (70) and produces power by converting the rotational motion of the turbine into final electrical energy through electromagnetic induction.

[0040] The exhaust system includes a chimney (90). The chimney (90) is a vertical structure that diffuses and discharges the final exhaust gas, which has passed through the air preheater (50) and completed the energy recovery process, to a high place in the atmosphere. The chimney (90) facilitates the smooth discharge of exhaust gas.

[0041] The exhaust system may further include environmental equipment such as flue gas desulfurization equipment and dust collectors placed upstream of the chimney (90) to reduce pollutants generated after combustion, and an automatic chimney measuring device (TMS), such as a gas analysis sensor for monitoring pollutant emission concentration in real time, may be installed along the final exhaust path including the chimney (90) and utilized as a point for collecting environmental management data.

[0042] Meanwhile, the coal ash remaining after combustion (Bottom Ash) can be discharged and processed outside the system through a submerged drag chain conveyor (SDCC) that scrapes and transports the coal ash through an underwater environment from the bottom of the boiler (100).

[0043] The present invention establishes a security system by linking physical phenomena occurring at specific points of such thermal power generation systems with environmental data. The key nodes targeted by the system of the present invention are as follows.

[0044] First, there is a 'physical signal source' in which unique acoustic entropy is generated. Representative examples include a high-pressure bypass valve (HP Bypass Valve) that discharges steam by bypassing a turbine, or a blower (51) that blows air into a boiler. These facilities generate broadband non-deterministic noise due to extreme turbulence caused as high-pressure fluid passes through a narrow passage. In addition, mechanical friction noise generated in the drive chain of the SDCC also has unpredictable unique acoustic characteristics. In the present invention, an acoustic entropy collection unit is installed at these points to collect source data for 'real-time operation verification' of the facility.

[0045] Second, there is the 'environmental data measurement point' subject to legal regulation. In the case of air pollutants, this corresponds to the gas analysis sensor of the chimney automatic measuring device (TMS) installed at the chimney (90), which is the final emission outlet. This sensor measures the concentration of SOx, NOx, dust, etc., in real time. In the case of waste, this corresponds to the weight sensor that measures the amount of coal ash transported through the SDCC. The present invention aims to ensure the integrity of digital data collected at these environmental data measurement points.

[0046] Third, there is an 'interlock execution point' capable of physically blocking illegal emissions. In the case of air pollutants, this can be a gate valve installed in an emergency discharge duct bypassing the environmental facility, or the drive unit of an Air Lock Feeder that discharges dust collected by a dust collector. In the case of waste, this applies to a magnetic contactor that controls the power supply to the SDCC drive motor or a gate valve that transports coal ash to the outside. The present invention installs a hardware interlock drive unit at these points to execute physical blocking measures in the event of authentication failure.

[0047] As such, the present invention establishes a trust chain between digital environment data and physical facility operations by organically integrating three core functions—acoustic entropy collection, data security computation, and physical interlock execution—into the existing power generation system infrastructure.

[0048] FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the overall architecture of an environmental pollutant emission prevention system according to one embodiment of the present invention.

[0049] As illustrated in FIG. 2, the system of the present invention is largely composed of a sensor unit (200), a control unit (220), a data integrity verification server (240), and a hardware interlock driving unit (260). The data has a flow that starts from a physical signal at the site, is converted into digital data, is cryptographically processed in a security area, and finally leads to a physical control command.

[0050] The sensor unit (200) performs the role of converting physical phenomena and environmental conditions into digital data and includes an acoustic entropy collection unit (202) and an environmental data measurement unit (204). The acoustic entropy collection unit (202) may be installed near mechanical equipment such as an HP bypass valve or a blower (51). At this time, the area around the turbine and boiler of the thermal power plant is always 100 Since the high temperature environment exceeds [the specified value], general microphones may experience signal distortion due to degradation or have their lifespan drastically shortened. Therefore, in a preferred embodiment, an industrial microphone of the ICP (Integrated Circuit Piezoelectric) type, capable of stable operation even at high temperatures of 125 degrees Celsius or higher, is adopted to accurately capture analog acoustic signals generated during equipment operation. The environmental data measurement unit (204) is a device for measuring environmental parameters related to legal regulations, such as the gas concentration sensor of the TMS or the weight sensor of the SDCC.

[0051] The control unit (220) acts as the core brain that processes data collected from the sensor unit (200) and performs security functions, and includes an analog-to-digital converter (222), a random number generator (224), and a security operation unit (226). The analog-to-digital converter (222) samples the analog acoustic signal from the acoustic entropy collection unit (202) at high speed and converts it into a digital bit stream.

[0052] The random number generator (224) extracts non-deterministic noise components concentrated in the least significant bit (LSB) region of this digital bit stream and processes them into high-quality true random numbers (TRNG) without statistical bias through a cryptographic hash function or an extractor.

[0053] The security computation unit (226) performs the core security logic of the present invention and is implemented on a processor that has a hardware-isolated Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), such as ARM TrustZone or RISC-V Keystone. The TEE is a safe area that cannot be accessed by a general operating system (Rich OS), and computations performed there are protected from external malware or improper access by administrators. The environment data measurement unit (204), analog-to-digital converter (222), random number generator (224), and security computation unit (226) are integrated and implemented in the form of a single chip or a system-on-chip (SoC). Through this, genuine random numbers and environment data can be provided to the security computation unit (226) via a hardware electrical trusted path.

[0054] The security computation unit (226) performs the following procedure within the TEE:

[0055] 1) True random numbers generated from the random number generator (224) and environmental data from the environmental data measurement unit (204) are received through a direct trusted path inside the chip without the intervention of the OS. Since this process takes place inside the chip, a Man-in-the-Middle Attack, which intercepts or modifies data by cutting the wiring between the sensor and the processor, is physically impossible.

[0056] 2) Combine the received true random number, environmental data, and a timestamp indicating the current time into a single data packet. The packet may further include an acoustic signal converted into a digital bit stream. The true random number or acoustic signal may serve as a 'physical token' proving that the facility was in operation at that time.

[0057] 3) A digital signature for this data packet is generated using a private key issued by a government or certification authority, which is securely stored within the TEE. The 'signed data packet' generated in this way serves as strong evidence proving that the equipment was actually operated at that time and place.

[0058] The data integrity verification server (240) serves to verify the validity of signed data packets transmitted from the control unit (220). The server performs the following two verifications on the received packets. First, 'cryptographic verification' is performed to check if the digital signature is valid using a previously shared public key. This ensures that the data has not been tampered with during transmission. Second, 'physical verification' is performed to analyze whether the characteristics of the acoustic data included in the packet match a previously learned Acoustic Transfer Function (ATF) model. This is intended to defend against replay attacks that play back recorded sounds, and details will be described later in FIG. 4. Only data that passes all verifications is recognized as trustworthy data and stored in the database (242). The data integrity verification server (240) and the database (242) may be placed inside the control network (OT Network) within the power plant or in the DMZ (buffer zone), but are not limited to these examples. In other examples, the aforementioned configurations may be provided in a government TMS server or an external control center.

[0059] The hardware interlock drive unit (260) acts as the final execution unit of the system and takes physical action when it receives an authentication failure signal from the data integrity verification server (240) or the control unit (220). Authentication failure may include various situations such as signature verification failure, ATF verification failure, or loss of communication with the control unit (220). When an authentication failure signal is received, the hardware interlock drive unit (260) immediately operates an actuator, such as an electrical relay, a pneumatic solenoid valve, or a magnetic contactor, to physically force the cessation of pollutant discharge, such as by closing the gate valve described in FIG. 1 or cutting off the power to the conveyor motor.

[0060] The final security enforcement of the present invention comes from the hardware interlock drive unit (260). The hardware interlock drive unit (260) is not a simple single actuator, but can operate a multi-mode interlock device that uses a combination of various physical actuators depending on the target equipment and the purpose of blocking. This serves as a double or triple safety device to prepare for the possibility of failure or bypass of a single interlock device.

[0061] For example, when the hardware interlock drive unit (260) receives an authentication failure signal from the data integrity verification server (240) or the field control unit (220), it drives the connected actuators sequentially or simultaneously according to a pre-set scenario.

[0062] The representative actuator components are as follows.

[0063] 1. Electrical Interlock - Magnetic Contactor (MC): This is connected in series to the main power circuit of equipment using high power, such as motors, pumps, and heaters. Normally, the contacts are closed to supply power, but when a cutoff signal is received from the hardware interlock drive unit (260), the magnetic force of the coil is extinguished, and the contacts are physically separated (opened) by the force of a strong spring. This fundamentally cuts off the power to the equipment. It has a fail-safe characteristic that automatically opens in the event of power loss.

[0064] 2. Pneumatic Interlock - Safety Solenoid Valve: Large gate valves or dampers are often operated by the force of compressed air. A safety solenoid valve is installed in the main pipe or pilot pipe through which this compressed air flows. Upon a signal from the hardware interlock actuator (260), the valve operates to block the flow of air or release the pressure within the pipe into the atmosphere. As a result, the main valve loses its driving force and returns to a safe state (usually closed state) by means of a spring or its own weight. This is also based on a fail-safe design.

[0065] 3. Optical Interlock - Laser Shutter / Shutter Blade: Applied to optical-based measuring equipment that measures gas concentration using a laser or a specific light source, such as a TMS. This device is designed so that a physical blocking plate (Shutter Blade) blocks the optical path according to a signal from a hardware interlock drive unit (260). Since the sensor cannot obtain a valid measurement value when the optical path is blocked, attempts to distort the measurement value by creating a manipulated environment can be neutralized. It is designed to close automatically by the force of a spring when the power is cut off.

[0066] The hardware interlock drive unit (260) can maximize reliability by introducing the concept of a 'closed-loop interlock'. An open-loop method that simply issues a blocking command has a fatal weakness in that the system does not detect if an attacker physically interferes with the operation of the actuator. Therefore, in the present invention, a feedback sensor (e.g., valve position sensor, contact status check sensor) is attached to each actuator to verify whether it has actually operated. After issuing a blocking command, the hardware interlock drive unit (260) checks whether a signal indicating that the actuator has operated normally returns from this feedback sensor within a certain period of time. If there is no signal or an abnormal signal is detected, this is considered to be a failure of the interlock device itself or an attempt at manipulation, and additional measures are taken, such as immediately sending a warning to the upper system or activating a backup blocking device. In this way, the entire security system ensures a flawless level of reliability by including the execution status of commands in the monitoring system.

[0067] Through this architecture, the present invention guarantees the integrity of digital data (environmental measurements) by using physical phenomena (noise) as a trust anchor, and completes a closed-loop security system across the entire cyber-physical system by directly intervening in the physical world (interlock) when that trust is broken.

[0068] FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an acoustic entropy-based true random number generation process according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0069] Unlike pseudo-random numbers generated by software algorithms, true random numbers (TRNG) can only guarantee cryptographic security if they originate from unpredictable physical processes. The present invention utilizes physical phenomena that are virtually impossible to replicate, such as hydrodynamic vortices and mechanical friction sounds in power plant facilities, as sources of entropy.

[0070] The random number generation process consists of the following steps.

[0071] Step S310: Analog acoustic signal collection and amplification. First, the acoustic entropy collection unit (202) collects an analog noise waveform generated from the equipment. Since this signal may be weak, it is amplified to a level suitable for subsequent processing.

[0072] Step S320: Filtering. Noise in industrial sites contains periodic and predictable low-frequency components, such as the rotational frequency of a motor. Since these deterministic signals interfere with random number generation, a high-pass filter (HPF) is applied to remove low-frequency components, for example, below 100 Hz, leaving only non-deterministic high-frequency components mainly generated by fluid vortices.

[0073] Step S330: Sampling and quantization (analog-to-digital converter conversion). The filtered analog signal is converted into digital data through an analog-to-digital converter (222). According to the Nyquist theory, sampling is performed at a speed at least twice as fast as the maximum frequency of the signal, and each sample value is quantized into a digital value consisting of multiple bits (e.g., 16 bits or 24 bits). As a result, a raw bitstream is generated.

[0074] Step S340: Extraction of the least significant bit (LSB). The upper bits of the digital value converted through the analog-to-digital converter contain macroscopic information, such as the overall magnitude or shape of the signal, and are relatively predictable. On the other hand, the lower bit region, for example, the lower 3-4 bits, contains unpredictable stochastic elements such as minute fluctuations of the analog signal itself, thermal noise, and quantization noise. Therefore, only the bits in this LSB region are selectively extracted and used as a source of entropy. In some examples, a check may be first made based on the upper bits of the converted digital value to determine whether noise exceeding a threshold has occurred, and the bit stream may be extracted using the lower bit region only if that condition is satisfied.

[0075] Step S350: Entropy Distillation. The raw bit stream extracted from the LSB may have a slight bias. That is, the probability of occurrence of 0 and 1 may not be exactly 50:50. To remove this bias and create a statistically perfectly random sequence of random numbers, an entropy distillation process is performed. To do this, the input bit stream may be passed through a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-256, or an algorithm such as the von Neumann Extractor may be applied, which adopts only consecutive bit pairs ('01' or '10') and discards the rest.

[0076] Step S360: Generation of final true random number (TRNG) and quality verification. The high-quality true random number bit stream finally generated through entropy enrichment is passed to the secure computing unit (226) and used as a 'one-time key' or 'random number token' for digital signatures. The quality of the generated random number is periodically evaluated using standard statistical verification tools such as NIST SP 800-90B, and the reliability of the random number generator is maintained by verifying that the Shannon entropy value approaches the theoretical maximum value.

[0077] Through this process, the present invention transforms 'noise,' which was previously regarded merely as something to be eliminated, into 'entropy,' a core asset of security, thereby generating a unique security identifier in real time that cannot be duplicated or predicted by anyone. Furthermore, acoustic signals can physically synchronize the movement of mechanical equipment with the generation of security keys. In other words, since the equation holds that security key generation is possible only when there is mechanical movement, a valid security key is not generated when the equipment is not in operation, making data forgery impossible.

[0078] FIG. 4 is a conceptual diagram illustrating an acoustic transfer function (ATF)-based replay attack verification model according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0079] One attempt to neutralize the security system of the present invention is a replay attack in which equipment noise during normal operation is recorded in advance and then played back later through a speaker to deceive the control unit (220). The present invention effectively defends against such attacks by modeling and verifying the unique change characteristics that sound undergoes as it passes through a physical space, namely the Acoustic Transfer Function (ATF).

[0080] Referring to FIG. 4, sound generated from a noise source (S), namely mechanical equipment (400) such as an HP bypass valve or a blower (51), propagates through space and reaches a microphone (M) of an acoustic entropy collection unit (202). During this process, the sound signal is modified by physical characteristics of space, such as distance attenuation, reflection, diffraction, and sound absorption. These modifications can be modeled by a specific transfer function H(f) in the frequency domain. That is, the signal Y(f) measured by the microphone (M) can be expressed as the result of applying the transfer function H(f), which is the intrinsic filter characteristic of space, to the original signal X(f) (Y(f) = H(f) * X(f)).

[0081] At the beginning of installation, the system measures the reference transfer function H_model(f) between the noise source (S) and the microphone (M) in a normal state and stores it in the data integrity verification server (240). For example, by generating a standard sound source (e.g., a sine sweep signal) and analyzing the received signal, only the pure spatial transfer characteristics with ambient background noise removed can be extracted. At this time, the pure spatial transfer characteristics can be extracted by removing ambient background noise through the application of spectral subtraction. This model can be extended into a multidimensional model that includes phase difference or time difference of arrival information using multiple microphones.

[0082] If the attacker uses the speaker (402) to record a noise signal X rec Let's assume that a replay attack is attempted by playing (f) near the microphone (M). In this case, the signal Y reaching the microphone (M) att (f) is the frequency response characteristic H of the speaker itself sp (f) and a new spatial transfer function H between speaker (402) and microphone (M) new (f) The result of overlapping all (Y att (f) = H new (f) * H sp(f) * X rec (f)) becomes the transfer function H of this attack signal. att (f) = H new (f) * H sp (f) is the pre-modeled reference transfer function H model The probability of matching (f) is extremely low.

[0083] The data integrity verification server (240) analyzes the characteristics of the acoustic signal included in the data packet received from the control unit (220) and determines that the signal is a reference spatial characteristic H model Verify whether there is statistical agreement with the results that passed (f). The following verification methods may be used:

[0084] 1. Frequency response comparison: The frequency-dependent energy distribution of the received signal is H model Analyze whether it follows the attenuation and amplification patterns defined by the characteristic curve (Profile) of (f). Calculate the spectral deviation caused by bandwidth limitations or distortion in specific bands occurring during speaker playback to check whether the threshold is exceeded.

[0085] 2. Use of multiple microphones: In order to eliminate random noise X(f) entering during the actual operation phase and extract only spatial characteristics, the Relative Transfer Function (RTF) is preferably analyzed using multiple microphones. For example, when the signals Y1(f) = H1(f)X(f) and Y2(f) = H2(f)X(f) measured by each microphone are combined, the common factor, random noise X(f), is canceled out, leaving only the ratio of relative spatial characteristics between the two microphones. The data integrity verification server can determine whether the sound originated from a normal noise source (S) and passed through a designated path by comparing whether this ratio matches the ratios of previously measured models.

[0086] 3. Multi-microphone phase analysis: When multiple microphones are used, the difference in phase difference patterns between the spherical wave radiated from the location of the noise source (S) and the plane wave reproduced by the speaker is verified. Since this shows a distinct pattern difference at close range, it serves as an indicator proving the validity of the physical distance.

[0087] 4. Reverberation Pattern Analysis: Analyzes the unique reverberation pattern of the space to detect abnormal patterns in which the reverberation already included in the recorded signal and the reverberation of the actual space are double-mixed.

[0088] Acoustic signals that fail to pass this ATF verification are considered replay attacks, and the final authentication is treated as a failure even if the digital signature is valid. This is akin to extending physical uncopy protection technology (PUF) to a spatial dimension, further enhancing the security reliability of the system by physically proving that the signal originated 'here and now.'

[0089] Meanwhile, the acoustic characteristics of the space may change slightly due to variations in temperature and humidity or mechanical vibrations inside the power plant. To ensure the reliability of the ATF model, the system uses data identified as normal at regular intervals (e.g., every hour) to H model An adaptive algorithm that gradually updates (f) can be implemented. This minimizes false positives and ensures long-term operational stability.

[0090] This sophisticated ATF verification system is equivalent to extending physical uncopy protection technology (PUF) to a spatial dimension, further enhancing the security reliability of the system by physically proving that the signal originated 'here and now.'

[0091] FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a system integration applied to an air pollutant emission monitoring system as a first embodiment of the present invention.

[0092] This embodiment presents a specific implementation plan to technically enforce the operational management standards and prohibition of manipulation provisions for measuring instruments specified in Article 32 of the Air Environment Preservation Act. The primary objective is to prevent the illegal emission of air pollutants through the manipulation of TMS data.

[0093] Referring to FIG. 5, the system is applied to a path in which combustion gas generated from a boiler (100) is discharged through an environmental facility (500) to a chimney (90).

[0094] The acoustic entropy collection unit (202) is installed near the drive unit of the blower (51) or around a valve through which high-pressure steam passes. The strong aerodynamic noise generated when the blower (51) is operating normally is utilized as an entropy source for the system. In another example, the acoustic entropy collection unit (202) may collect acoustic entropy by utilizing an exhaust blower (502) installed in the exhaust system to forcibly discharge combustion gases toward the chimney (90) as a noise source.

[0095] The environmental data measurement unit (204) is a TMS sensor (510) installed in the chimney (90). This sensor measures the concentration of SOx, NOx, dust, etc. in the exhaust gas in real time. The control unit (220) generates a real random number from the driving sound of the blower (51), combines it with the gas concentration data measured by the TMS sensor (510) within the TEE to generate a digital signature, and then transmits it to the data integrity verification server (240).

[0096] The core of this embodiment lies in the arrangement and operation method of the hardware interlock drive unit (260). Many workplaces have a bypass duct (520) that bypasses the environmental facility (500) for maintenance or emergency situations, and a gate valve (522) that should normally be closed is installed in this path. It is possible to assume a situation where an operator secretly opens this valve (522) to discharge pollutants without authorization in order to reduce the operating costs of the environmental facility (500), and manipulates the data of the TMS sensor (510) to appear normal.

[0097] In the system of the present invention, the data integrity verification server (240) immediately generates an authentication failure signal if TMS data is generated even though the driving sound of the blower (51) is not detected, or if the signature of the data is invalid. Upon receiving this signal, the hardware interlock drive unit (260) cuts off the power to the security solenoid valve (524) installed in the pneumatic line controlling the bypass gate valve (522). This solenoid valve is designed in a fail-safe manner, so that when the power is cut off, it blocks the pneumatic line and forcibly keeps the gate valve (522) in a closed state. Therefore, any attempt to discharge pollutants by operating the facility abnormally is physically blocked at the source.

[0098] FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a system integration applied to a waste transfer system as a second embodiment of the present invention.

[0099] This embodiment focuses on preventing acts of manipulating treatment records or unauthorized removal of designated waste, such as coal ash, which must be legally disposed of in accordance with the Waste Management Act.

[0100] Referring to FIG. 6, the system is applied to an immersed drag chain conveyor (SDCC) (600) that transports bottom ash generated at the bottom of a boiler (100) to a treatment plant. The SDCC (600) is a facility that drives a metal chain inside a water-filled enclosure to scrape and transport the bottom ash, and generates a characteristic mechanical friction sound and vibration when driven. An acoustic entropy collection unit (202) is installed near the drive motor (610) or chain drive unit of the SDCC to collect this noise.

[0101] The environmental data measurement unit (204) may be a weight sensor (620) that measures the amount of coal ash being transported or a conveyor operating time recorder that can estimate the transport amount. The control unit (220) uses a genuine random number generated from the driving sound of the SDCC as a 'transport proof token', combines it with the measured transport amount data, signs it, and transmits it to the data integrity verification server (240).

[0102] If an administrator attempts to input only false transfer performance data into the waste management system without actually operating the SDCC (600), the control unit (220) at the site cannot generate a valid 'transfer proof token' because there is no SDCC operation sound (physical evidence). Consequently, a signed data packet cannot be created, and the server can immediately detect this as abnormal behavior.

[0103] In this embodiment, the hardware interlock drive unit (260) can control the magnetic contactor (MC) installed on the main power supply line of the SDCC drive motor (610). If the data integrity verification server (240) receives a signal that the coal ash discharge gate has opened while the SDCC drive sound is not detected, or if data authentication fails, it immediately sends a signal to the hardware interlock drive unit (260) to forcibly open the magnetic contactor. As a result, the power to the SDCC drive motor (610) is physically cut off, making it impossible to transport or discharge the coal ash further. This fundamentally prevents waste disposal without evidence of physical equipment operation, thereby ensuring transparency and reliability in waste management.

[0104] FIG. 7 is a block diagram illustrating a multimodal entropy fusion process according to another embodiment of the present invention.

[0105] Relying on a single sensor may make it vulnerable to sensor failure or noise injection attacks in specific frequency bands. To compensate for this, this embodiment utilizes physical phenomena other than acoustic signals as additional entropy sources.

[0106] Referring to FIG. 7, in addition to the acoustic entropy collection unit (202), the system further includes an EMI sensor (700) that collects electromagnetic interference (EMI) noise generated during the operation of mechanical equipment and an acceleration sensor (710) that measures micro-vibrations of the pipe. The analog signals collected from each sensor are converted into digital bit streams through respective analog-to-digital converters (222-1, 222-2, 222-3).

[0107] A random number generator (224) performs bit-level exclusive OR (XOR) operations on LSB bit streams output by each analog-to-digital converter (222-1, 222-2, 222-3) to fuse the entropies extracted from these different sources. The XOR operation has the characteristic that if at least one of the input sources has randomness, the output also maintains randomness, thereby providing robustness that can maintain the quality of the entire random number even if a specific sensor fails or outputs a predictable signal. Finally, the fused bit streams are passed through a hash function to generate a truly random number.

[0108] FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a state-aware random number extraction process according to another embodiment of the present invention.

[0109] Power plant equipment does not always operate in a constant state, and the magnitude and frequency characteristics of noise change depending on load fluctuations. This embodiment presents a method for extracting optimal entropy by actively responding to such changes in operating conditions.

[0110] Referring to FIG. 8, the random number generator (224) receives current operation information of the equipment (e.g., motor RPM, valve opening rate, power output, etc.) in real time from the distributed control system (DCS) of the power plant (810).

[0111] Next, based on the received operation information, an internal look-up table is referenced to determine random number extraction parameters optimized for the current state (820). For example, if the equipment is in a low-load state and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is low, the number of LSB extraction bits is reduced to 2 bits to increase the purity of the noise, and if the equipment is in a high-load state and the signal is strong and entropy is rich, the LSB is extended to 4 bits to increase the speed of random number generation. In addition, if a periodic signal caused by resonance appears strongly in a specific RPM band, parameters for filtering that frequency band can be dynamically applied.

[0112] By applying the parameters determined in this way to extract random numbers (830), it is possible to stably secure high-quality entropy of a certain level or higher even in an environment where the operating conditions of the equipment change frequently.

[0113] Each component of the device or method according to the present invention may be implemented in hardware or software, or in a combination of hardware and software. Additionally, the function of each component may be implemented in software, and a microprocessor may be implemented to execute the function of the software corresponding to each component.

[0114] Various embodiments of the systems and techniques described herein may be realized as digital electronic circuits, integrated circuits, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), computer hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. These various embodiments may include being implemented as one or more computer programs executable on a programmable system. A programmable system comprises a storage system, at least one input device, and at least one programmable processor (which may be a special-purpose processor or a general-purpose processor) coupled to receive data and instructions from and transmit data and instructions to at least one output device. Computer programs (which are also known as programs, software, software applications, or code) include instructions for the programmable processor and are stored on a "computer-readable recording medium."

[0115] Computer-readable recording media include all types of recording devices in which data that can be read by a computer system is stored. Such computer-readable recording media may be non-volatile or non-transitory media such as ROM, CD-ROM, magnetic tape, floppy disk, memory card, hard disk, magneto-optical disk, and storage device, and may also include transitory media such as data transmission media. Additionally, computer-readable recording media may be distributed across networked computer systems, and computer-readable code may be stored and executed in a distributed manner.

[0116] Although the flowcharts and timing diagrams in this specification describe each process as being executed sequentially, this is merely an illustrative explanation of the technical concept of one embodiment of the present disclosure. In other words, a person skilled in the art to which one embodiment of the present disclosure belongs may modify and adapt the flowcharts and timing diagrams in various ways, such as changing the order described in the flowcharts and timing diagrams or executing one or more of the processes in parallel, without departing from the essential characteristics of one embodiment of the present disclosure; therefore, the flowcharts and timing diagrams are not limited to a chronological order.

[0117] The above description is merely an illustrative explanation of the technical concept of the present embodiment, and a person skilled in the art to which the present embodiment belongs would be able to make various modifications and variations within the scope of the essential characteristics of the present embodiment. Accordingly, the present embodiments are intended to explain, not limit, the technical concept of the present embodiment, and the scope of the technical concept of the present embodiment is not limited by these embodiments. The scope of protection of the present embodiment shall be interpreted by the claims below, and all technical concepts within an equivalent scope shall be interpreted as being included within the scope of rights of the present embodiment. Explanation of the symbols

[0118] 10: Coal hopper 11: Coal feeder 13: Coal Chute 30: Differentiator 31: Rotary classifier 50: Air preheater 51: Blower 70: Steam turbine 71: Generator 90: Chimney 100: Boiler

Claims

Claim 1 A method performed by an environmental pollutant emission prevention system comprises: capturing an analog acoustic signal generated from a noise source using an acoustic entropy collector installed adjacent to a noise source, including a blower of a thermal power plant or a valve through which steam passes; removing low-frequency components from the analog acoustic signal collected by the acoustic entropy collector using a high-pass filter; converting the filtered acoustic signal into a digital signal composed of multiple bits using an analog-to-digital converter; selectively extracting only the bit stream of the lowest 3-bit or 4-bit region where thermal noise and quantization noise are concentrated among the converted digital signals, and generating a true random number of uniform distribution by removing statistical bias from the extracted bit stream; and measuring environmental data related to environmental pollutant emissions in real time using a gas analysis sensor of an automatic chimney measuring device installed on the chimney of the thermal power plant. A process of hardware-receiving the generated genuine random number and the measured environment data through an electrical path that does not pass through the external operating system, by a processor embedded in a trusted execution environment that provides an independent secure computation area hardware-separated from an external operating system, forming a data packet by combining the received genuine random number and environment data with a timestamp containing current time information, and generating an electronic signature for the formed data packet using a private key stored in a non-volatile secure memory within the trusted execution environment;A method comprising: a process of determining the final integrity of data by performing cryptographic verification to verify the validity of the digital signature using a public key corresponding to the private key, and physical verification to determine whether a replay attack involving the playback of a recorded sound occurs by analyzing the frequency response characteristics of an acoustic signal included in the data packet and comparing them with an Acoustic Transfer Function (ATF) model previously modeled and stored in a normal state; and a process of physically blocking the discharge of pollutants by forcibly driving a fail-safe solenoid valve installed on the pollutant discharge path of the thermal power plant and controlling the pneumatic line of a gate valve, if either the cryptographic verification or the physical verification fails and the final authentication is determined to be a failure.

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