Systems and methods for quantum-secured, private-preserving computations

A quantum-based method using entangled photons for secure data sharing and computation addresses the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities of existing technologies by ensuring unconditional privacy protection and efficient, trustless data processing among multiple parties.

KR103047306B1Active Publication Date: 2026-11-11THE TRUSTEES OF THE STEVENS INST OF TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
KR1020247001412
Authority / Receiving Office
KR · KR
Patent Type
Patents
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2019-10-18
Filing Date
2020-10-16
Publication Date
2026-11-11
Estimated Expiration
2040-10-16

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current secure multi-party computation methodologies fail to provide unconditional privacy protection, are inefficient, and require trusted setups or result in excessive proof sizes, especially in data mining and blockchain applications.

Method used

A quantum-based method utilizing entangled photons for secure data sharing, where private information is converted into measurement bases and computed on public channels without transmission, ensuring genuine random measurement results and correlation verification.

Benefits of technology

Enables unconditionally secure private communication and computation among multiple parties without exposing secret information, eliminating the need for trusted intermediaries and complex encryption processes.

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Abstract

Systems and methods for quantum-secured, private-protected computations The present invention relates to a method for secure computation and / or communication. Entangled photons (118) are generated so that each participating party receives a series of optical pulses. Each party has private information (110, 112) that is not transmitted through public or private communication channels. Instead, each party converts the individual private information (110, 112) into measurement bases through an encryption process (114, 116) subsequently applied to the entangled photons (118). After the measurement process, e.g., quantum frequency conversion (122, 124), reference indices (124, 126) are published (128) so that computation can be performed without directly or indirectly exposing the private information.
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Description

Technology Field

[0001] Cross-reference regarding related applications

[0002] This application claims the benefit and priority of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62 / 923,322 filed October 18, 2019, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

[0003] Technology field

[0004] The present invention relates to secure data sharing and processing between untrusted parties that minimizes the risk of privacy violations and damage to sensitive information. In particular, the present invention relates to privacy-protected computation and its quantum implementations, zero-knowledge data processing and its quantum implementations, and data mining, authentication, and verification.

[0005] Statement regarding federally funded research

[0006] doesn't exist Background Technology

[0007] Maintaining data security is becoming an increasingly urgent issue, particularly during the exchange of information. Current secure multi-party computation methodologies protect individual information by modifying the original data using techniques such as noise addition, information blocking, and data encryption. However, these techniques only guarantee privacy to a certain level through information distortion, as they extract distorted knowledge in some applications, such as data mining, rendering them inoperable or causing them to perform inefficiently. However, mitigating these arguments (e.g., by making it vulnerable to personal data leaks) often comes at the expense of information security.

[0008] Even with these techniques involving data modification, privacy is not verifiably (i.e., unconditionally) secured against known methods of privacy infringement. In other words, while these methods may prevent or challenge such privacy infringements, they do not guarantee information security or are secure only conditionally. In many existing cyber technologies, data at rest and data in transit are encrypted, but data in use may not be encrypted. Homomorphic encryption techniques may be applied to protect data in use. However, this is a complex process limited by applicability and capability.

[0009] Furthermore, current technologies typically require a trusted setup (i.e., a method involving a trusted third party acting as an intermediary for information) or result in excessive proof sizes. For example, blockchain privacy technology was one attempt to provide zero-knowledge proofs performed via Boolean circuits. While this does not require a trusted setup or interaction between a prover and a validator, the proof size is too large for use on blockchains or limited computing devices. It is also not verifiable secure.

[0010] Before summarizing the present invention, the following terms are defined to facilitate the discussion and consideration of the invention.

[0011] Measurement-basedIt is used to measure the state of each photon. The type of measurement basis can be selected as photon arrival times, spectral modes of photons, etc. The present invention is applicable to any selection of measurement basis insofar as quantum entanglement can be established for such basis. The type of measurement basis must be publicly disclosed to the parties in the computation pool. FIG. 3 illustrates an example of selecting a measurement basis based on photon arrival times.

[0012] Mutually unbiased foundations These are sets of state bases for a quantum system, each set forming a complete description of the system, and the inner product of any state base in one set and any state base in another has nearly the same amplitude.

[0013] Pulse index represents the time slot number of the detected photon. All parties in the communication pool are synchronized to a common reference signal to track their detected photon time slots. The system must be configured so that at most one pair of entangled photons is generated during each period of the reference pulse. Therefore, if Alice and Bob have common measurement bases, their photons are likely to be detected in the same time slots. To avoid being mistaken for quantum states, this time slot information must not contain any information about the mode bases; accordingly, it may be publicly exposed (see FIG. 7).

[0014] As used in connection with the present invention, the entangled photon generation process does not require or limit any specific method of generating entangled photons. In carrying out the present invention, any entanglement characteristics, such as a given time, frequency, polarization, etc., may be utilized.

[0015] Moving on to the summary of the present invention, common information regarding the states of photons is shared without any arbitrary exchange of information by utilizing the quantum entanglement of photons. Through the superposition of photon states, it becomes possible to utilize the true randomness and uniqueness of selected characteristics to be measured (e.g., photon arrival time, photon time mode, photon space mode, etc.). For example, through quantum frequency transformation, methods implemented according to the present invention use private information as a measurement basis and thus can determine the results of the quantum states. Entangled photons decay into the same states upon the termination of each communication. However, when they are measured, only the selection of the same measurement bases will return the same results. If the private information does not match (i.e., if the measurement bases are different), the detected photons return different results.

[0016] The present disclosure is unrelated to measurement-based encryption methods. Regardless of how information such as given time modes, space modes, etc. is encrypted, the central concept of the present invention involves using secret information as measurement bases of entangled photons.

[0017] A novel, privacy-protected computational method is presented in an embodiment of the present invention that leaks zero individual data, based on quantum entanglement, quantum measurement, and, in some embodiments, quantum frequency conversion. By deploying the intrinsic properties of quantum mechanics, the methods of the present invention constitute a fundamentally new method for securing privacy that is distinct from typical approaches. That is, the present invention involves a fundamentally new approach to addressing the challenges of private data sharing and data mining, which are becoming increasingly important as the data industry expands.

[0018] In fact, the present invention provides a methodology immune to attacks on encryption protocols because private information does not leave a local host on the network, either directly or under encryption cover. Furthermore, this methodology provides high efficiency because there are no complex encryption and decryption calculations.

[0019] The present invention provides a system and method for performing unconditionally secure private communication without the need to establish the integrity of any participant or use an honest third party. Three main essences enable the protocol established by the present invention to be unconditionally secure: First, private data remains on local hosts (i.e., it is not transmitted through public or private communication channels during the computation process). Second, entangled photons continuously provide genuine random measurement results from each local host to the entangled states for correlation verification. Third, the computation process takes place on a public channel (i.e., no private channels or keys are required).

[0020] Specifically, private information to be jointly computed or processed between the parties is converted into measurement bases locally selected by each party according to publicly disclosed and agreed-upon rules. Since the measurement bases are not mutually biased, at each party, quantum states are projected onto a specific set of mutually biased states. Measurement results can be correlated only if the parties select the same set. Entangled photons are transmitted to each party as a sequence of optical pulses during the computation. Subsequently, each party measures the state of each photon using its own measurement bases. Publicly, each party discloses the indices of the pulses in which the photons are detected. By comparing the correlations of each party's indices, the computation is completed without exposing secret private information.

[0021] By methods executed according to the present invention, it becomes possible to perform calculations based on information of multiple parties in a pool of data without exposing the actual information of each party and without any trusted third party. Thus, the present invention enables secure multi-party calculations used in data mining and blockchain, while constituting a solution to the zero-knowledge proof problem used for authentication and verification. The present invention also eliminates the need for any homomorphic encryption step, which is a process generally employed to protect data in use, while still maintaining the absolute security of the data in use.

[0022] The object of the present invention is to provide a privacy-protected verification method for comparing one or more data values, numerical values, or other things with respect to an equation (e.g., A=B).

[0023] Another object of the present invention is to provide a privacy-protected verification method for comparing one or more numerical values ​​to verify or establish one or more inequalities (e.g., A>B).

[0024] Another objective of the present invention is to allow calculations through the communication of indexes to prevent the exposure of secret and / or private information.

[0025] A further objective of the present invention is to provide genuine private-protected communications without the need for multiple honest communicating parties, any kind of honest communicating parties, or any additional parties.

[0026] Another objective of the present invention is to provide a system and method that guarantees zero probability of deception by any party. Consequently, establishing participants as honest parties is not a prerequisite for collaboration in calculating and / or verifying information. In such a protocol, even if some parties are engaging in misconduct, they cannot convince other parties that they are honest based on the results they transmit over public channels.

[0027] Another objective of the present invention is to provide truly privacy-protected computations for comparing data of more than two parties by enabling unconditionally secure private multi-party communication, for example by extending the linearity of emitted signals, although not necessarily final, wherein zero knowledge is exposed to the computation pool or to any party outside the computation pool. Brief explanation of the drawing

[0028] For a more complete understanding of the present disclosure, the following drawings are referenced: FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an exemplary system according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is a flowchart of an exemplary method according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 is a chart and table illustrating the basic transformation for an exemplary photon arrival time-based model. Figure 4 is a pair of tables that prove encryption using the arrival time basis of Figure 3. Figure 5 is a schematic chart illustrating the case where common time bins are selected as the basis by the two parties. Figure 6 is a schematic chart illustrating the case where different time bins are selected as the basis by the two parties. FIG. 7 is a schematic chart illustrating the process of index selection according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 8 is a schematic chart and table of alternatives illustrating the basic transformation for an exemplary photon arrival time-based model. Figure 9 is a system diagram illustrating an exemplary case where the private information of the two parties is different. Figure 10 is a schematic chart illustrating a case where private information is compared and the information of one party has a larger value than the information of the second party. Specific details for implementing the invention

[0029] The methods of the present invention provide unconditional security for private information by utilizing the properties of quantum mechanics. As a principle of operation, the information itself is converted into measurement bases for entangled photons where encryption occurs. Referring now to FIG. 1, an exemplary process is outlined. The data of interest remains with each party in the pool and is not transmitted through communication channels, whether private or public, during the computation process. Instead, the entangled photons received by each party in the pool provide a continuous, truly random entangled state that allows verification through the correlation of the entangled states. Meanwhile, the computational implementation can occur entirely on public channels without requiring access to unencrypted secret data. Therefore, private channels or encryption keys are not required.

[0030] For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion will assume that the computation pool for absolute security computations consists of only two parties; however, it should be understood that the methods of the present invention can also be applied to mutual computations of more than two parties. This can be achieved by using nonlinearities of higher orders, for example, by generating three entangled photons for three parties, generating four entangled photons for four parties, and so on.

[0031] FIG. 2 is a flowchart overview of a generalized method according to the present invention. Each set of private information (110, 112) undergoes a corresponding encryption (i.e., conversion) step (114, 116). Then, entangled photon generation (118) occurs. The present invention does not require or limit a specific method for generating entangled photons. Any entanglement property, such as a given time, frequency, polarization, etc., may be utilized. The generated photons then undergo quantum measurement modules (120, 122) (e.g., quantum frequency conversion) and are measured according to the encrypted bases (114, 116). Then, based on the application of the modules (120, 122), the publication of indices (124, 126) occurs, and finally, the public calculation (128) of the indices (124, 126) occurs.

[0032] In one embodiment of the present invention, it is desirable to compare data values ​​to determine whether such values ​​are the same (i.e., A=B). As a specific example, assume that two people (e.g., Alice and Bob) want to determine whether they have the same birthday. However, unless their birthdays are the same, privacy is required to the extent that neither party wishes to disclose their birthday to another person or anyone else while performing the comparison. An additional condition is that if their birthdays match, no one other than Alice and Bob should be able to collect their birthdays from communication between the two parties via conventional communication means and / or shared computing resources.

[0033] As an initial step of the exemplary process of the present invention, private information may be converted into measurement bases. This can be achieved by considering each bit of information as a base in a set. In one embodiment, the type of base used is the photon arrival time; however, it should be noted that any measurement base may be selected as long as quantum entanglement can be established for such bases. For example, spectral modes of entangled photons may constitute alternative measurement bases.

[0034] To prevent either party from attempting to guess the measurement base used by the other party or committing misconduct, the measurement bases will not be mutually biased. In other words, measurements will be performed under a set of mutually biased bases, as selected by each party in accordance with publicly announced and agreed rules.

[0035] Figure 3 is an example of a set of photon arrival time bases. In this example, Alice's birthday is February 25, 1995, while Bob's birthday is April 27, 1966. Figure 4 shows how their information is encrypted into measurement bases. This process is performed locally by each party.

[0036] Measurement bases are applied to a first pulse train of entangled photons (i.e., signal ("A")) and a second pulse train of entangled photons (i.e., idler ("B")) prepared by Alice, Bob, or any third party. Signal "A" is transmitted to Alice, while idler "B" is transmitted to Bob. The entangled state can be described as follows:

[0037]

[0038] Here is a superposition of states in which signal and idler photons can decay, and d is the number of dimensions of the photons in Hilbert space. In practice, actual quantum states will deviate from the ideal form above, but nevertheless, they will allow for computing and operation. For example, in time bin entanglement, d is the number of time bins (i.e., the number of possible time spans in which a photon might arrive). In this particular example, the set of photon arrival times has d = 36. In other words, the Hilbert space of the quantum superposition of states consists of 36 individual discrete time bins (i.e., t1, t2, t3...t 36 It is represented by 36 bases corresponding to ). As shown in FIGS. 3 and 4, each bit of data is converted into a corresponding time bin that depends on its value. Thus, each birthday is converted from 8 digits (2 digits for day, 2 digits for month, and 4 digits for year) into 8 corresponding quantum states (i.e., time bins).

[0039] When Alice and Bob receive entangled photons, each of them then measures them using the measurement bases they have prepared locally. To detect photons from the same pair, Alice and Bob must project them onto the entangled state using common measurement bases. It should be emphasized that the secret information itself is converted into measurement bases that are projected onto the entangled state.

[0040] Here

[0041] In one embodiment, the quantum measurement module is a summed frequency generation (SFG) process. The signal photon "A" is a frequency ω While having 1, the idler photon "B" has a frequency ω It has 1'. Each is ω 2 and ω Interacting with those individual measurement-based photons of 2' ω and It generates ω', where

[0042]

[0043] If Alice and Bob have the same private information (i.e., A=B), they must have the same selection of measurement bases, which means they select to transform the same time bins during the SFG. Figure 5 demonstrates this case where j = k. In this scenario where they transform the same time bins, the measurements taken are expected to observe the same detection or non-detection of photons following the decay of the arrival time superposition. Alternatively, as illustrated in Figure 6, if detection occurs for Alice but not for Bob, or vice versa, this implies that they have different selections of measurement bases ( j ≠ k It means having ).

[0044] FIG. 9 provides a system-level diagram of a computational process in which some of the selected measurement bases differ between the parties (i.e., the secret information is not identical). In one embodiment, the measurement base photon or pump photon has a very narrow time width compared to the entangled photon pulse width.

[0045] Following the application of the measurement bases, Alice and Bob sequentially and simultaneously announce the indices of the pulses in the pulse train to the air channel when photons are detected at their termination. For example, in FIG. 7, Alice announces REF #1, #2, #4, …, #(n + 1), while Bob announces REF #1, #2, …, #n, #(n + 1).

[0046] The pulse index indicates the time slot number of the detected photon. All parties in the communication pool are synchronized to a common reference signal to track their detected photon time slots. The system must be configured so that at most one pair of entangled photons is generated during each cycle of the reference pulse. Therefore, if Alice and Bob have common measurement bases, their photons are likely to be detected in the same time slots. In contrast to quantum states, this time slot information must not contain arbitrary information about the mode bases; thus, it can be publicly exposed without any consequences.

[0047] When the reference indices are publicly disclosed, a calculation step may be initiated. An exemplary process compares whether the amount of common reference indices is greater than a predetermined threshold. The threshold is determined by the confidence level and the system noise level. In one embodiment, the probability of a common reference P(A∩B) is defined as the number of common reference indices relative to the total number of pulses under test. The sample threshold may be set as P_threshold = 100 * P(A) * P(B), where P(A) and P(B) are the photon detection rates for Alice and Bob, respectively, calculated as the number of individual total pulses as detections relative to the total number of pulses under test. In this example, the threshold is set to 100 times the predicted theoretical probability that both Alice and Bob detect a photon at a specific index as calculated from the experimental probabilities P(A) and P(B). If both Alice and Bob have the experimental probability of detecting a photon at a specific index, P(A∩B) > P_threshold, then the two measurements are said to be correlated, which indicates that the same measurement bases were used by Alice and Bob and therefore their birthdays are the same. Alice and Bob achieve this comparison without leaving birthday information for either individual. Alternatively, the two measurement bases are not identical, or there is no definitive judgment as to whether they are identical.

[0048] In contrast to comparisons for an equation (A=B), for scenarios determining inequalities (e.g., A > B or A < B), the protocol is based on the following assumption: there is no loss or the loss is equal when transmitting entangled photons from the source to each party. The procedure is similar to the scenario of verifying whether A = B prior to performing the computational step described in the preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, an appropriate measurement-based encryption process must still be provided. Figure 8 is an example of how secret information can be encrypted to be used as measurement bases for the case of inequalities. In this example, if Alice and Bob want to compare their ages, Alice is 21 years old and Bob is 15 years old. Since Alice is older, she is encrypted with a larger pulse width relative to Bob's age. The transformation of measurement bases for pulse widths is illustrated in Figure 10.

[0049] When the calculation step mentioned above is reached, reference indices are collected and conditional probability is performed as follows:

[0050] and

[0051] Here, P(A|B) is the probability of detecting a photon when Alice's detection is set, assuming a photon has already been detected for Bob's side, P(B|A) is the probability of detecting a photon when Bob's detection is set, assuming a photon has already been detected for Alice's side, P(B) is the probability of detecting a photon when Bob's detection is set, P(A) is the probability of detecting a photon when Alice's detection is set, and P(A ∩ B) is the probability of detecting a photon for both Alice's side and Bob's side, and these latter three probabilities are calculated as previously explained.

[0052] Since Alice's measurement bases correspond to larger pulse widths for this example, P(A|B) > P(B|A). Therefore, from the reference indices published by Alice and Bob on the public channel, it can be determined that A > B.

[0053] The method and system described herein can perform unconditionally secure private computation between parties because the private information to be computed is converted locally by each party into measurement bases. When entangled photons are transmitted to each party as a sequence of optical pulses during the computation, each party can independently measure the state of each photon using its own measurement bases. Then, each party can publish the indices of the pulses in which the target state is detected. By comparing the correlations of the indices of each party, the computation process is completed without exposing secret / private information. This makes the methods of the present invention immune to attacks on encryption protocols because the private information does not leave a local host on the network, either directly or under encryption cover.

[0054] Additionally, the system and method of the present invention achieve true private-protected communications without requiring any number of honest communicating parties, any kind of honest communicating parties, or any additional parties. The present invention also minimizes the probability of any party being deceived to nearly zero. The system and method may be further extended to provide private-protected computations for multiple communicating parties where absolute zero knowledge is exposed to any party in the computation pool or to another person outside the computation pool.

[0055] In such protocols, no private information is exposed under any type of encrypted data over a public channel. Therefore, meaningful attacks against the protocol can only originate from dishonest parties within the communication pool. The following describes attack models and specifies design requirements for unconditionally protecting the system.

[0056] Attack 1: On Bob's local host, instead of preparing quantum MUBs corresponding to his private information, Bob uses a beam splitter (BS) to split light into k branches and then uses k single-photon detectors to simultaneously measure all given k MUBs. Thus, if N photons are expected to be detected in the correct MUBs, this attack model allows Bob to detect N / k photons per branch. This attack enables Bob to obtain information about Alice's measurement bases and, consequently, her private information by calculating the correlation between the REF IDs Bob obtains from each channel and the REF IDs by Alice. To secure the system against this type of attack, the size of the MUBs must be large enough so that N / k is less than or similar to 1, or so that the correlation between the REF IDs by Alice and Bob cannot be reliably derived.

[0057] Attack 2: Given the size of the MUBs as k, on Bob's local host, instead of preparing quantum MUBs corresponding to his private information, Bob uses a beam splitter to split the incoming light into m branches (m <k) 로 스플릿한 다음, m개의 단일 광자 검출기(들)을 사용하여 m개의 MUB 를 동시에 측정한다. 이것은 사설 정보를 포함하는 MUB들이 그가 선정한 m개의 MUB 의 세트에 있게 되는 경우 매칭된 REF ID들의 노이즈 레벨을 이기는 기회를 Bob 에게 제공한다. 측정 동안 k개의 MUB 중에서 m개의 MUB 의 모든 상이한 세트들을 통해 지속적으로 스와이프함으로써, Bob 은 사설 정보의 일부를 수집할 기회를 갖는다. 이러한 공격에 대해 보안을 유지하기 위해, 비밀 공유 암호화 방법들을 사용하여 사설 정보가 양자 측정 기반들로 암호화될 수 있다. 이 방식은 Bob 이 n개 미만의 조각을 수집하는 경우, 그는 제로 조각을 수집하는 것처럼 사설 정보에 관한 정보를 더 이상 갖지 않도록 n개의 조각으로 사설 정보를 배포한다. 모든 n개의 조각들의 수집만이 사설 정보를 복구할 수 있다. 비밀 공유 암호화 방법들의 예들은 여기: https: / / en.wikipedia.org / wiki / Secret_sharing 에서 알 수 있다.

[0058] Attack 3: Bob creates a forged list of REF IDs to pass the correlation test, thereby pretending to share the same information as Alice or retaining the information Alice is looking for. To maintain security against this attack, Alice and Bob distribute their individual private information into n fragments, either directly or using secret shared encryption, the latter being adopted to guarantee zero information exposure. Subsequently, as Alice and Bob publish their respective REF IDs in turn, they will perform private computing sequentially on each of the n fragments of information. For example, for the first fragment, Alice will publish the REF IDs first, followed by Bob. For the second fragment, Bob will publish the REF IDs first, followed by Alice. Each party will choose to terminate communications with the other at any time if the correlation test fails. In this way, neither party can create forged lists of REF IDs and pretend to possess the information.

[0059] For the reasons mentioned above, the present invention may be useful in various contexts. In data mining, multiple databases can enable collaborative communication while protecting privacy. In the context of electronic auctions, bidders can keep bid prices secret while allowing the auctioneers to still recognize the highest bid. Another envisioned use is to enable zero-knowledge authentication, where one party can prove their identity by indicating a password without exposing the knowledge of the password to any other party. A fourth application, which does not necessarily have to be final, may involve blockchain multi-party communication, where multiple participants collaborate on computation via an existing blockchain without the need for a trusted external party.

[0060] Although the present invention has been described above in relation to specific embodiments and examples, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the invention is not necessarily limited thereto and that numerous other embodiments, examples, uses, modifications, and deviations from the embodiments are intended to be encompassed by the invention as described herein.

Claims

Claim 1 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, comprising: converting private information into measurement bases; generating a plurality of sets of entangled photons, wherein each photon of the plurality of sets of entangled photons represents a corresponding optical pulse or a quantum mechanical superposition state of optical pulses; transmitting the plurality of sets of entangled photons to a plurality of communication parties as one set of entangled photons at a time, wherein each of the plurality of communication parties receives a photon from each of the plurality of sets of entangled photons in the order in which the plurality of sets of entangled photons are transmitted; applying the measurement bases to the optical pulses and detecting the photons for the measurement bases to obtain individual data for each of the plurality of communication parties in the order in which the optical pulses are received by each party; and calculating a secure communication by comparing the individual data for each of the plurality of communication parties. Claim 2 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the application is performed independently by each of the multiple communication parties. Claim 3 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, comprising, in claim 1, a step of establishing rules for carrying out the conversion step. Claim 4 A method for secure communications between multiple parties according to claim 1, further comprising the step of continuously transmitting a reference signal to each of the plurality of communication parties, wherein the reference signal has a predetermined period, and during each of the predetermined periods of the reference signal, one optical pulse is transmitted to each of the plurality of communication parties. Claim 5 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the calculating step is performed publicly and the private information does not extend beyond the plurality of communicating parties. Claim 6 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the calculating step comprises determining whether individual private information is the same for each of the plurality of communication parties and evaluating the inequality between the individual private information of each of the plurality of communication parties. Claim 7 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein, in claim 1, the measurement bases include photon arrival times having discrete time bins, spectral modes, time modes, or spectral-time modes of the photons. Claim 8 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the application comprises processing the photons in a quantum measurement module, and the quantum measurement module comprises generating a sum frequency. Claim 9 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein, in claim 1, the private information is a set of private data required for a multi-party computation function, and the method further comprises the step of verifying shared knowledge of the private information without communicating the private information. Claim 10 In claim 1, the calculating step constitutes data processing with zero knowledge, a method for secure communications between multiple parties. Claim 11 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the calculating step involves data mining. Claim 12 A method for secure communications between multiple parties according to claim 1, wherein the photons of each set of the plurality of sets of entangled photons are received simultaneously or at different times by the respective parties of the plurality of communication parties. Claim 13 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the step of converting the private information into measurement bases includes the step of performing a calculation of the information such that the context of the secure communication is not limited to numbers, and the step of performing the calculation of the information includes the step of performing at least one of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, and the parties of the plurality of communication parties process public data using a private calculation algorithm and convert the results into measurement bases in which the calculation algorithms are compared among the communication parties. Claim 14 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, comprising: converting private information into measurement bases; generating a plurality of sets of entangled photons, wherein each photon of the plurality of sets of entangled photons represents a corresponding optical pulse or a quantum mechanical superposition state of optical pulses; transmitting the plurality of sets of entangled photons to a plurality of communication parties as one set of entangled photons at a time, wherein each of the plurality of communication parties receives a photon from each of the plurality of sets of entangled photons in the order in which the plurality of sets of entangled photons are transmitted; assigning an index number to each of the sets of entangled photons based on the order in which the plurality of sets of entangled photons are transmitted to the plurality of communication parties, wherein the optical pulses corresponding to photons from the same corresponding set of entangled photons are associated with the same index numbers; applying the measurement bases to the optical pulses and detecting the photons for the measurement bases in the order in which the optical pulses are received by each party A method for secure communications between multiple parties, comprising: a step of obtaining individual data for each of the plurality of communication parties; and a step of generating corresponding lists of related indices for each of the plurality of communication parties from the individual data. Claim 15 In claim 14, the above application is a method for secure communications between multiple parties, which is performed independently by each of the multiple communication parties. Claim 16 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, comprising, in addition to the step of establishing rules for carrying out the conversion step in claim 14. Claim 17 A method for secure communications between multiple parties according to claim 14, further comprising the step of continuously transmitting a reference signal to each of the plurality of communication parties, wherein the reference signal has a predetermined period, and during each of the predetermined periods of the reference signal, one optical pulse is transmitted to each of the plurality of communication parties. Claim 18 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, further comprising the step of publishing corresponding lists of the relevant indices in claim 14. Claim 19 In claim 14, the private information is a method for secure communications between multiple parties that does not extend beyond the plurality of communicating parties. Claim 20 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the measurement bases comprise photon arrival times having discrete time bins, spectral modes, time modes, or spectral-time modes of the photons. Claim 21 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the application comprises processing the photons in a quantum measurement module, and the quantum measurement module comprises generating a sum frequency. Claim 22 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein, in claim 14, the private information is a set of private data required for a multi-party computation function, such as passwords, authentication codes, data strings, values, or a multi-party computation function, and the method further comprises the step of verifying shared knowledge of the private information without communicating the private information. Claim 23 A method for secure communications between multiple parties according to claim 14, wherein the photons of each set of the plurality of sets of entangled photons are received simultaneously or at different times by the respective parties of the plurality of communication parties. Claim 24 A method for secure communications between multiple parties, wherein the step of converting the private information into measurement bases includes the step of performing a calculation of the information such that the context of the secure communication is not limited to numbers, and the step of performing the calculation of the information includes the step of performing at least one of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, and the parties of the plurality of communication parties process public data using a private calculation algorithm and convert the results into measurement bases in which the calculation algorithms are compared among the communication parties. Claim 25 A method for secure communications between multiple parties according to claim 14, wherein corresponding lists of the relevant indices by the communication parties are analyzed to estimate the relationship between the private information, the private information corresponds to a private number maintained by each communication party, the statistical relationship includes a conditional probability of a list of relevant indices reported by one communication party for a list of relevant indices reported by another party, and the statistical relationship is used to determine the ranking of the number maintained by each communication party, but the values ​​of the private numbers are not exposed during the process.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

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