Certificate management method and related apparatus

By introducing identity providers (IDPs) to verify the consistency of certificate application identity and public keys in the certificate issuance process, the problem of mismatch between certificate applicants and public keys in the existing technology is solved, and the security of the certificate issuance process is improved. and compatibility.

WO2024234642A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-21HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/CN2023/139453
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-06-15
Filing Date
2023-12-18
Publication Date
2024-11-21

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing automatic issuance of certificates only verifies the ownership of the certificate applicant's identity for the certificate application, which poses a security risk and fails to effectively verify the consistency between the certificate application identity and the public key, resulting in the possibility of mismatch between the identity information and the public key.

Method used

Introduce a trusted identity provider (IDP) to verify the identity of the certificate application, and obtain the public key corresponding to the identity of the certificate application through IDP, and compare it to ensure the consistency of the identity of the certificate application and the public key, and prevent tampering during the certificate signature request stage. Public key to improve the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

Benefits of technology

Through IDP verification, the identity information in the issued digital certificate matches the public key, which enhances the security of the certificate issuance process, reduces changes to the existing technology, and improves compatibility.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A certificate management method, which is applied to a scenario where digital certificates are automatically issued. In the method, in the process of applying for a digital certificate, a trusted identity provider is introduced to verify a certificate application identity and obtain a public key corresponding to the certificate application identity, so as to perform comparison to determine whether the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity is the same as a public key in a certificate signing request, thereby ensuring the consistency between the certificate application identity and the public key, preventing the public key from being tampered with at the stage of submitting the certificate signing request, and preventing a mismatch between identity information and the public key from occurring in an issued digital certificate, thus improving the security of a digital certificate issuing process.
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Description

A certificate management method and related device

[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application filed with the State Intellectual Property Office on May 15, 2023, with application number 202310545750.6 and invention name “A method for verifying identity consistency”, and the Chinese patent application filed with the State Intellectual Property Office on June 15, 2023, with application number 202310715320.4 and invention name “A certificate management method and related devices”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of computer security technology, and in particular to a certificate management method and related devices. Background Art

[0003] In cryptography, public key infrastructure (PKI) uses a certificate authority (CA) to bind a user's personal identity to their public key. The CA issues a digital certificate to each user using a public key. The digital certificate proves that the user listed in the certificate legally owns the public key listed in the certificate.

[0004] In order to obtain a digital certificate issued by a CA, users often need to apply to the CA for a digital certificate, and the CA will verify the user's identity. Only after the user's identity verification is passed will the CA issue a digital certificate to the user. At present, in order to improve the efficiency of certificate issuance, a solution for automatic certificate issuance has been proposed in related technologies, thereby eliminating the need for manual verification of the identity of the certificate applicant. In related technologies, the certificate applicant proves his or her ownership of the certificate application identity (for example, ownership of the domain name or email address), so that the CA can issue the corresponding digital certificate to the certificate applicant, and the entire certificate issuance process is completed automatically without the need for manual intervention.

[0005] However, the current automatic certificate issuance scheme only verifies the certificate applicant's ownership of the certificate application identity, and there are still certain security risks.

[0006] Summary of the Invention

[0007] This application provides a certificate management method that can improve the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

[0008] In a first aspect, the present application provides a certificate management method, which is applied to a certificate issuing device. In this method, the certificate issuing device obtains a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, and the certificate application request is used to request the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate to the certificate application device.

[0009] Then, based on the certificate request, the issuing device sends a challenge message to the requesting device. This challenge message instructs the requesting device to perform identity authentication with an identity provider (IDP). The IDP is a device trusted by the issuing device and pre-stores the mapping between identity information and public keys.

[0010] After the certificate requesting device passes identity authentication at the IDP, the certificate issuing device obtains the first public key sent by the IDP. This first public key is mapped to the identity corresponding to the certificate request. In other words, the IDP returns the corresponding first public key to the certificate issuing device based on the verified identity information of the certificate requesting device.

[0011] The certificate issuing device receives a certificate signing request from the certificate requesting device. The certificate signing request includes the second public key and is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate that includes the second public key. In other words, the certificate signing request is a request from the certificate requesting device to trigger the issuance of a digital certificate by the certificate issuing device after the certificate requesting device passes identity verification.

[0012] Finally, the certificate issuing device compares the first public key returned by the IDP with the second public key in the certificate signing request to determine the identity of the certificate requesting device requesting the digital certificate and whether the public keys match. Furthermore, in response to the first public key and the second public key being identical, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate requesting device.

[0013] In this solution, during the digital certificate application process, a trusted IDP is introduced to verify the certificate application identity and obtain the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity, so as to compare whether the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity is the same as the public key in the certificate signing request, thereby ensuring the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key, preventing the public key from being tampered with during the stage of submitting the certificate signing request, and avoiding the mismatch between the identity information and the public key in the issued digital certificate, thereby improving the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

[0014] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, which is the public key that the certificate application device requests to be included in the digital certificate. In other words, the certificate application request initially sent by the certificate application device must specify the public key that needs to be included in the requested digital certificate.

[0015] After the certificate issuing device receives the first public key from the IDP, it compares the first public key with the third public key. If the third public key matches the first public key, it sends a response message to the certificate requesting device, indicating that the identity verification of the certificate requesting device is successful. After receiving the response message, the certificate requesting device triggers the sending of a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device.

[0016] In addition, the first public key and the second public key are determined to be the same by comparing the third public key with the second public key. That is, the certificate issuing device determines whether the first public key and the second public key are the same by comparing the third public key in the certificate application request with the second public key in the certificate signing request.

[0017] In this solution, the certificate issuing device can verify the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key by comparing the first public key with the third public key in the certificate application request and the third public key with the second public key in the certificate signing request. It is no longer necessary to store the first public key returned by the IDP, which improves the security of the certificate issuance process while minimizing changes to existing technologies and improving the compatibility of the solution.

[0018] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes the first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes the second identity information. That is, the certificate application request includes both the third public key and the first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes both the second public key and the second identity information. Furthermore, the certificate issuing device also obtains the third identity information sent by the IDP, and this third identity information is mapped to the first public key.

[0019] In this case, the certificate issuing device not only compares the public keys obtained through various channels, but also the identity information obtained through various channels. Only when the public keys and identity information obtained through various channels are identical will the certificate issuing device issue a digital certificate to the certificate requesting device. Specifically, in response to the first and second public keys being identical, and the first identity information being identical to both the second and third identity information, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate requesting device.

[0020] In this solution, when both the public key and identity information are included in the certificate application request and the certificate signing request, the certificate issuing device will compare the public key and identity information obtained through various channels before issuing the digital certificate to ensure that the public key and identity information indicated by the certificate application device during the digital certificate application process match the public key and identity information actually verified by the certificate application device, thereby ensuring the security of the digital certificate issued by the certificate issuing device.

[0021] In one possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are contained within the same identifier. The identifier containing the third public key and the first identity information indicates the content to be verified by the certificate requesting device during the challenge process. In other words, when the certificate requesting device performs the challenge, the certificate issuing device actually verifies the content contained within the identifier in the certificate request.

[0022] In this solution, by defining a new type of identifier in the certificate application request so that the identifier can indicate the public key and identity information, it is possible to minimize changes to existing technologies and improve the compatibility of the solution while implementing verification of the public key and identity information.

[0023] In one possible implementation, after sending a challenge message to the certificate requesting device, the certificate issuing device receives an access request from the certificate requesting device. This access request is for access to the IDP and includes the identity information corresponding to the certificate request. Based on the access request, the certificate issuing device then redirects the certificate requesting device to the IDP so that the certificate requesting device can perform identity authentication with the IDP.

[0024] In this solution, the certificate issuing device obtains the access request sent by the certificate application device and redirects the certificate application device to the IDP based on the access request. This ensures that the public key and other information fed back by the IDP are subsequently associated with the certificate application device, thereby confirming the identity authentication process of the certificate application device.

[0025] In one possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and public keys, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key, thereby achieving identity authentication of the certificate application device.

[0026] In this solution, by verifying whether the certificate application device holds control of the private key corresponding to the public key, it is possible to verify the consistency between the identity corresponding to the certificate application device and the public key, thereby ensuring that the digital certificate obtained in subsequent applications matches the application identity and public key.

[0027] In one possible implementation, the IDP supports one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proofs, public key signatures, and authentication using an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol. These authentication methods eliminate the need for the certificate requesting device to return private key information to the IDP and prevent the use of a plaintext password to log in to the IDP, thus preventing the leakage of private information and ensuring the security of the authentication process.

[0028] In one possible implementation, the challenge message sent by the certificate issuing device includes information about multiple IDPs. The challenge message instructs the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through any one of these IDPs. By including information about multiple IDPs in the challenge message, the certificate requesting device can select any one of these IDPs to complete identity authentication, ensuring diverse options for the certificate requesting device and enabling efficient authentication.

[0029] The second aspect of the present application provides a certificate management method, which is applied to a certificate application device. The method includes: the certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the certificate issuing device, and the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate. Then, the certificate application device obtains the challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, and the challenge information is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed through the IDP. Based on the challenge information, the certificate application device performs identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines the first public key that has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request. After passing the identity authentication, the certificate application device sends a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, and the certificate signing request includes a second public key. The certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, and the second public key is the same as the first public key. Finally, the certificate application device obtains the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

[0030] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

[0031] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information and the second identity information are the same.

[0032] In a possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0033] In one possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key; identity authentication is performed through the IDP, including: logging in to the IDP based on the first identity information; obtaining an authentication request sent by the IDP, the authentication request being used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; and completing identity authentication in cooperation with the IDP based on the authentication request.

[0034] In one possible implementation, the authentication request includes an authentication method supported by the IDP, and the authentication request is used to request authentication to be performed based on any authentication method supported by the IDP;

[0035] IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0036] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

[0037] The third aspect of the present application provides a certificate issuing device, including: an acquisition module, used to acquire a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; a sending module, used to send challenge information to the certificate application device, the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through the IDP; the acquisition module is also used to acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, the first public key and the identity corresponding to the certificate application request have a mapping relationship; the acquisition module is also used to acquire a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; the sending module is also used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device in response to the first public key and the second public key being the same.

[0038] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key; the sending module is further used to send a response message to the certificate application device in response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, and the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; wherein, the first public key and the second public key are the same by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

[0039] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; the acquisition module is further used to obtain third identity information sent by the IDP; and the sending module is further used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key and the first identity information being the same as the second identity information and the third identity information.

[0040] In a possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0041] In a possible implementation, the obtaining module is further configured to obtain an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; and the sending module is further configured to redirect the certificate application device to the IDP.

[0042] In a possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

[0043] In one possible implementation, the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0044] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

[0045] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a certificate application device, including: a sending module, used to send a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; an acquisition module, used to obtain challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, the challenge information is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed through an IDP; a verification module, used to perform identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines a first public key that has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; the sending module is also used to send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, the second public key is the same as the first public key; the acquisition module is also used to obtain the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

[0046] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

[0047] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information and the second identity information are the same.

[0048] In a possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0049] In one possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key; the verification module is specifically used to: log in to the IDP based on the first identity information; obtain an authentication request sent by the IDP, where the authentication request is used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; and cooperate with the IDP to complete authentication based on the authentication request.

[0050] In one possible implementation, the authentication request includes an authentication method supported by the IDP, and the authentication request is used to request authentication based on any authentication method supported by the IDP; the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0051] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

[0052] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides an electronic device comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory being configured to store computer instructions, and when the processor executes the instructions, causing the electronic device to perform any of the methods described above. The electronic device may be the certificate issuing device described in the third aspect or the certificate application device described in the fourth aspect.

[0053] A sixth aspect of the present application provides a certificate management system, comprising a certificate issuing device as in any implementation of the third aspect, a certificate application device as in any implementation of the fourth aspect, and an IDP.

[0054] In a seventh aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores instructions. When the instructions are executed on an electronic device, the electronic device can execute any of the methods described above.

[0055] In an eighth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product comprising instructions, which, when executed on an electronic device, enables the electronic device to execute any of the methods described above.

[0056] In the ninth aspect of the present application, a chip is provided, which includes a processor and a communication interface, the communication interface is used to communicate with modules outside the chip shown, and the processor is used to run computer programs or instructions so that the device installed with the chip can execute any of the methods in the above aspects.

[0057] Among them, the technical effects brought about by any design method in the second to ninth aspects can refer to the technical effects brought about by different implementation methods in the above-mentioned first aspect, and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0058] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a PKI architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an ACME-based PKI provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] FIG3 is a schematic diagram of an interaction process based on the ACME protocol provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of an ACME client agent tampering with a public key according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of an architecture of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0063] FIG6 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device 601 provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0064] FIG7 is a flow chart of a certificate management method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0065] FIG8 is a schematic diagram of a process for performing identity authentication on a certificate application device based on zero-knowledge proof according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0066] FIG9 is a flow chart of a certificate application device performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0067] FIG10 is a flow chart showing another example of a certificate application device performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0068] FIG11 is a flow chart of a method for executing certificate management by extending the ACME protocol according to an embodiment of the present application;

[0069] FIG12 is a schematic diagram of comparing a public key when the identifier type is pk, provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0070] FIG13 is a schematic diagram of comparing a public key and identity information when the identifier type is CSR or selfsign-cert, provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0071] FIG14 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate issuing device provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0072] FIG15 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate application device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0073] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of this application more clear, the embodiments of this application are described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only embodiments of a part of this application, rather than all embodiments. It is known to those skilled in the art that with the emergence of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0074] The terms "first", "second", etc. in the specification and claims of this application and the above-mentioned drawings are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that the descriptions used in this way can be interchangeable where appropriate so that the embodiments can be implemented in a sequence other than that illustrated or described in this application. In addition, the terms "including" and "having" and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product or device that includes a series of steps or modules is not necessarily limited to those steps or modules clearly listed, but may include other steps or modules that are not clearly listed or that are inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices. The naming or numbering of steps in this application does not mean that the steps in the method flow must be executed in the time / logical sequence indicated by the naming or numbering. The named or numbered process steps can change the execution order according to the technical purpose to be achieved, as long as the same or similar technical effects can be achieved. The division of units in this application is a logical division. In actual application, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between each other shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection between units can be electrical or other similar forms, which are not limited in this application. Moreover, the units or sub-units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, may or may not be physical units, or may be distributed into multiple circuit units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this application.

[0075] To facilitate understanding, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of this application are first introduced below.

[0076] (1) Digital Certificate

[0077] A digital certificate, often referred to as a certificate, is a digital authentication that identifies the identities of the parties communicating on the internet. Essentially, it is an electronic document that uniquely identifies people and resources. A digital certificate enables secure and confidential communication between two entities.

[0078] Generally speaking, a digital certificate includes a public key, a name, and a digital signature of the CA. The name can be used to indicate the identity of the user or device applying for the digital certificate.

[0079] (2) Certificate Authority (CA)

[0080] A CA is an organization that issues digital certificates. Specifically, a CA is the authority responsible for issuing and managing digital certificates. As a trusted third party in e-commerce transactions, it is responsible for verifying the legitimacy of public keys in the public key system.

[0081] (3) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

[0082] Public key infrastructure is a collection of hardware, software, personnel, policies and procedures used to implement functions such as the generation, management, storage, distribution and revocation of keys and certificates based on public key cryptography.

[0083] The PKI system is a combination of computer hardware and software, authoritative organizations, and application systems. It provides basic security services for e-commerce, e-government, and office automation, enabling users who are unfamiliar or remote to communicate securely through a chain of trust.

[0084] (4) Order

[0085] An order is a certificate request object defined in the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol. In the ACME protocol, an order represents a user's request for a digital certificate and is used to track the processing of that request until the digital certificate is issued. In the ACME environment, an ACME client sends a certificate request to an ACME server. After confirming the ACME client's request, the ACME server creates an order for the request to track the certificate application process. The order contains information about the requested digital certificate and the authorizations required for the digital certificate application.

[0086] (5) Identifier

[0087] An identifier, defined in the ACME protocol, identifies the identity represented by the certificate being requested. The identifier in the order matches the Common Name (CN) field in the issued digital certificate, representing the identity represented by the requested certificate. An identifier is an object with two fields: type and value. Identifiers typically need to be unique to distinguish between different identities. Identifiers can be of various types, such as domain names, email addresses, and IP addresses.

[0088] (6) Authorization Object

[0089] Authorization refers to an identity or proof object defined in the ACME protocol. An ACME authorization object represents a server's authorization of an account, representing an identifier (e.g., a domain name).

[0090] (7) Challenge

[0091] In the ACME protocol, a challenge represents an ACME server's attempt to verify that the ACME client controls an identifier in a specific way. Each challenge belongs to a specific authorization, and a single authorization may contain multiple challenge objects.

[0092] (8) Token

[0093] In some cases, certain types of ACME challenge objects include a token to uniquely identify the challenge. This token is randomly generated when the challenge is created, and different challenges have different token values. Some challenge objects don't use tokens to uniquely identify the challenge, so a token may not be present in some challenge objects.

[0094] (9)Key Authorization

[0095] The key authorization field is used to confirm the consistency of the challenge between the ACME client and the ACME server. The key authorization is composed of a random token in the challenge object and the certificate applicant's private key, which can indicate the corresponding challenge object and certificate applicant's identity.

[0096] (10) Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocol

[0097] Authenticated key agreement protocol is an important research direction in the field of cryptography. It refers to the situation where there is an active attacker, in which two or more users generate a secret value in a certain way to achieve secure communication between them.

[0098] (11) Password-authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol

[0099] Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is an interactive method for two or more parties to establish cryptographic keys based on one or more parties' knowledge of a password. The two or more parties establish a cryptographic key using a message exchange based solely on their knowledge of a shared password. This prevents unauthorized parties (those who control the communication channel but do not possess the password) from participating in the method and minimizes brute-force password guessing. This allows the user and server to efficiently negotiate a secure key starting from a shared, low-entropy password.

[0100] (12) Asymmetric Password Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocol

[0101] Passwords are typically simple and easy to remember, while keys are often complex and difficult to remember. The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol requires both communicating parties to convert their local low-entropy passwords into high-entropy keys before communicating. This prevents eavesdroppers or man-in-the-middles from obtaining sufficient information to brute-force guess the passwords. This means that weak passwords can achieve strong security. However, traditional password authentication requires server-side storage or requires the plaintext password to be transmitted to the server during authentication.

[0102] Therefore, the aPAKE protocol proposes that by establishing a mapping between passwords and keys, authentication can be completed without either party knowing the plaintext password in advance. However, if the mapping between passwords and keys is deterministic, or only uncertain through a plaintext random salt, an attacker can pre-compute the password based on the key. As a result, the aPAKE protocol cannot provide stronger security than the PAKE protocol.

[0103] (13)Opaque Protocol

[0104] The Opaque protocol is an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol that protects against precomputation attacks. The Opaque protocol allows for the storage of user keys on the server, ensuring authentication without exposing the password locally. This ensures that neither the server nor the carrier can access or crack the key. By combining the oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) with the aPAKE protocol, a method for resisting precomputation attacks is proposed.

[0105] (14) Public key and private key

[0106] A public key, short for public key, is the non-secret half of a key pair used with a private key algorithm. Public keys are typically used to encrypt session keys, verify digital signatures, or encrypt data that can be decrypted with the corresponding private key.

[0107] A private key, short for private key, is the secret half of a key pair used with a public key algorithm.

[0108] A public key and a private key are a key pair (one public key and one private key) derived through an algorithm. One key is publicly available, called the public key; the other is kept private, called the private key. This key pair is guaranteed to be unique worldwide. When using this key pair, if one key is used to encrypt data, the other key must be used to decrypt it. If data is encrypted with the public key, it must be decrypted with the private key. Similarly, if data is encrypted with the private key, it must be decrypted with the public key; otherwise, decryption will fail.

[0109] (15) Zero-knowledge proof

[0110] A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) allows a prover to convince a verifier that a claim is correct without providing any useful information to the verifier. A ZKP is essentially a protocol involving two or more parties, a series of steps required to complete a task. The prover proves to the verifier that they know or possess a piece of information, but the proof process does not reveal any information about the information being proven to the verifier.

[0111] In cryptography, zero-knowledge proof can be used by a prover to prove to a verifier that the prover has a certain private key, and the proof process does not leak any information about the private key to the verifier.

[0112] (16) Certificate Signing Request (CSR)

[0113] A CSR is essentially a block of encoded text that a certificate applicant sends to a CA when applying for a digital certificate. A CSR typically contains two pieces of information: the applicant's identity information and the public key that is required to be included in the digital certificate. Examples of this information include the following:

[0114] Common Name (CN): can be the domain name of the server, such as www.xxxx.com.

[0115] Organization Name: The legal name of the organization, for example, "xxxx Co., Ltd."

[0116] Organizational Unit: A department of an organization, such as the IT department.

[0117] City / Location: The city where the organization is located.

[0118] State / County / Region: The specific region where the organization is located, such as Beijing / Shandong.

[0119] Country: The country where the organization is located, such as China.

[0120] Email Address: The email address used to contact the organization.

[0121] (17) Redirect

[0122] Redirection refers to redirecting various network requests to other locations through various methods.

[0123] In cryptography, PKI uses a CA to bind a user's personal identity to their public key. Please refer to Figure 1, which is a schematic diagram of a PKI architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 1, the PKI architecture includes users, a Registration Authority (RA) server, and a CA server. Users are the ones who request digital certificates and need to apply for one to prove their identity.

[0124] The RA server is the auditor of certificate applications, responsible for reviewing user requests for digital certificates. In traditional PKI architectures, RA server work is usually performed manually. This means that the applicant must manually verify that the digital certificate applicant is consistent with the certificate being applied for before the applicant is allowed to apply for a digital certificate from the CA.

[0125] The CA server is the issuer of digital certificates and is responsible for issuing and managing digital certificates. The CA's digital signature prevents attackers from forging or tampering with digital certificates.

[0126] Generally speaking, the application process for a digital certificate is as follows: the user first submits a certificate application request to the RA server; the RA server verifies the user's identity and, after the user's identity is authenticated, sends a certificate signing request to the CA server to request the issuance of a digital certificate for the user; after receiving the certificate signing request, the CA server issues a digital certificate for the user's requested identity, allowing the user to obtain a digital certificate with the CA's digital signature.

[0127] Currently, in order to improve the efficiency of certificate issuance, the ACME protocol has been proposed in related technologies. Based on the ACME protocol, digital certificates can be issued to users in a fully automatic manner.

[0128] Please refer to Figure 2, which is a schematic diagram of the ACME-based PKI architecture provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 2, the ACME-based PKI architecture includes users, ACME servers, CA servers, and trusted third parties. The ACME server implements the functions of the RA server shown in Figure 1. Specifically, the ACME server verifies user identities through third parties (such as the Domain Name System (DNS) and mail servers) based on trust in the third party, thereby achieving user identity verification.

[0129] Please refer to Figure 3, which is a schematic diagram of an interaction process based on the ACME protocol provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 3, the process of implementing the ACME protocol requires an ACME client associated with the certificate applicant and an ACME server associated with the CA server. The ACME client and ACME server will implement the automatic issuance of digital certificates according to the basic process shown in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3, the process of implementing automatic issuance of digital certificates based on the ACME protocol includes the following steps 1-9.

[0130] In step 1, the ACME client registers an account on the ACME server and submits the public key associated with the registered account. When applying for a certificate, a certificate applicant typically needs to use an account to submit a certificate application request to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the certificate application request.

[0131] In step 2, the ACME client sends a certificate request to the ACME server to request that the ACME server create a certificate order. Furthermore, the certificate request sent by the ACME client includes an identifier representing the user's identity, such as a domain name or email address controlled by the user.

[0132] In step 3, to verify that the certificate applicant has control over the identifier in the certificate application request, such as the domain name, the ACME server generates a random number and requires the certificate applicant to place the random number on the domain name server.

[0133] In step 4, the ACME server sends the ACME client a token, a generated nonce, and a series of challenges supported by the identifier, asking the ACME client to select and complete a provisioning. Provisioning means asking the ACME client to place a specific resource at a specific location, such as placing the ACME server-generated nonce on a specific name server.

[0134] In step 5, the ACME client selects a challenge type and completes the challenge based on the selected challenge type, such as placing a random number generated by the ACME server on a specified domain name server.

[0135] Step 6: The ACME client notifies the ACME server to indicate that it has completed the challenge.

[0136] Step 7: The ACME server verifies the challenge content based on the challenge type selected by the ACME client.

[0137] For each identifier in the certificate application request, the above steps 4 to 7 need to be executed to verify the control of each identifier by the certificate applicant.

[0138] In step 8, the ACME client sends a request to the ACME server to complete the order and submit the CSR. The CSR includes the public key that the certificate applicant requests to be reflected in the digital certificate.

[0139] In step 9, the ACME server issues a digital certificate to the ACME client based on the identifier in the certificate request and the public key in the CSR.

[0140] In general, the fundamental concept of the ACME protocol is that a certificate applicant demonstrates ownership of the identity for which they are requesting a certificate, thereby allowing the CA to issue a digital certificate corresponding to this control. For example, if a certificate applicant requests a digital certificate from a CA for a domain name, since only the domain controller can modify the content on the name server, the ACME server returns a random number to the certificate applicant, requesting that the certificate applicant place the random number in a specific location on the name server. If the random number is placed in the specific location on the name server as requested by the ACME server, it indicates that the certificate applicant is indeed the domain controller, thus achieving identity verification.

[0141] The applicant's research revealed that the current ACME protocol proposes multiple methods for verifying a user's control over their identity. However, these verification methods only verify the user's control over the identity they are applying for, without further verifying the consistency of the public key submitted by the user with the identity they are applying for. In other words, the ACME protocol only verifies the user's identity as indicated in the certificate application request, without verifying that the public key in the CSR submitted by the user after authentication actually belongs to the user. This poses a security risk and makes it susceptible to public key substitution attacks. To facilitate understanding, the following describes these public key substitution attacks using multiple scenarios.

[0142] Scenario 1: Collaboration between internal and external personnel in an attack

[0143] In Scenario 1, there are three roles: Company A, Alice, an internal employee of Company A, and Bob, an external employee.

[0144] Company A issues a digital certificate to each employee to verify their identity. Company A requires employees to be physically present in certain scenarios, such as meetings / training sessions, employee exams, and daily attendance checks. Digital certificates are used to verify employee identities in these scenarios.

[0145] However, according to the current ACME protocol, after completing the ACME challenge, Company A's internal employee Alice submits her CSR using the public key of external employee Bob, while still using Alice's identity. Consequently, the digital certificate issued by the CA to internal employee Alice includes both internal employee Alice's identity information and external employee Bob's public key. Since external employee Bob now possesses the private key corresponding to Alice's identity certificate, he can act on behalf of employee Alice within Company A.

[0146] Scenario 2: Malicious administrators launch attacks

[0147] In Scenario 2, Company A asks administrator Carl to apply for a digital certificate for a website server. Furthermore, according to Company A's security specifications, the public and private keys for the digital certificate must be provided by key protection hardware. If Carl applies for a digital certificate for the website server in accordance with Company A's security specifications, he will be unable to obtain the private key from the key protection hardware because the public key is provided by the key protection hardware.

[0148] However, according to the current ACME protocol, when a malicious administrator, Carl, applies for a digital certificate for Company A, he also replaces the public key in the CSR request with his own public key when submitting the CSR. This gives the malicious administrator Carl the private key corresponding to Company A's website server's digital certificate, allowing him to exploit the digital certificate to launch attacks.

[0149] Scenario 3: Malicious Agents Create Attacks

[0150] In real-world business scenarios, multiple types of terminal devices often require certificate applications. However, given the limitations of secure channels and the significant workload associated with developing a corresponding ACME client for each type of terminal device, an ACME client proxy is often used to delegate the ACME-based digital certificate application process to various terminal devices.

[0151] Figure 4 shows a schematic diagram of an ACME client proxy tampering with a public key, as provided in an embodiment of the present application. In the ACME proxy scenario, the ACME client proxy executes the ACME client process on behalf of the terminal device, while the challenge is completed by the actual digital certificate applicant. In this scenario, the ACME client proxy can also replace the public key of the digital certificate applicant when submitting the CSR, thereby gaining control of the digital certificate applicant's identity and facilitating attack activities.

[0152] In view of this, an embodiment of the present application provides a certificate management method. During the application process for a digital certificate, a trusted identity provider (IDP) is introduced to verify the certificate application identity and obtain the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity, thereby comparing whether the public key corresponding to the certificate application identity is the same as the public key in the certificate signing request, thereby ensuring the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key, preventing tampering with the public key during the stage of submitting the certificate signing request, avoiding the mismatch between the identity information and the public key in the issued digital certificate, and improving the security of the digital certificate issuance process.

[0153] Please refer to Figure 5, which is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an application scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 5, the application scenario in which the certificate management method provided by an embodiment of the present application is applied includes a certificate application device, a certificate issuing device, and an IDP. During the digital certificate application process, the certificate application device first sends a request to the certificate issuing device, requesting that the certificate issuing device issue a digital certificate. The certificate application device then performs identity authentication through the IDP. Because the IDP pre-stores a mapping between identity information and public keys, after the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP can determine the public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate application device. After performing identity authentication, the IDP returns the public key corresponding to the verified identity to the certificate issuing device, allowing the certificate issuing device to determine whether the public key indicated by the certificate application device during the certificate application process is consistent with the public key returned by the IDP. Finally, if the certificate issuing device determines that the certificate application device has passed identity authentication and public key verification, it issues a digital certificate to the certificate application device.

[0154] In this embodiment, the certificate application device can be, for example, an electronic device such as a smartphone, a personal computer, a laptop, a tablet computer, a server, etc., the certificate issuing device can be, for example, a physical device such as a server or a virtual device such as a virtual machine running on a server, and the IDP can be, for example, a physical device such as a server or a virtual device such as a virtual machine running on a server.

[0155] Please refer to Figure 6, which is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device 601 provided in an embodiment of the present application. The electronic device 601 shown in Figure 6 can be the certificate issuing device or certificate application device mentioned above.

[0156] As shown in FIG6 , electronic device 601 includes a processor 603 coupled to a system bus 605 . Processor 603 can be one or more processors, each of which can include one or more processor cores. A display adapter (video adapter) 607 can drive a display 609 , which is coupled to system bus 605 . System bus 605 is coupled to an input / output (I / O) bus via a bus bridge 611 . An I / O interface 615 is coupled to the I / O bus. I / O interface 615 communicates with various I / O devices, such as an input device 617 (e.g., a touch screen), external memory 621 (e.g., a hard drive, floppy disk, optical disk, or USB flash drive), a multimedia interface, a transceiver 623 (capable of sending and / or receiving radio communication signals), a camera 655 (capable of capturing still and moving digital video images), and an external USB port 625 . Optionally, the interface connected to I / O interface 615 can be a USB interface.

[0157] The processor 603 may be any conventional processor, including a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processor, a complex instruction set computing (CISC) processor, or a combination thereof. Alternatively, the processor may be a dedicated device such as an ASIC.

[0158] The electronic device 601 can communicate with other electronic devices through the network interface 629 to realize data transmission during the screen projection process.

[0159] The processor 603 can communicate with the memory 635 through the system bus 605 and retrieve instructions and data in the application program from the memory 635 to implement program execution.

[0160] Please refer to Figure 7, which is a flow chart of a certificate management method provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 7, the certificate management method includes the following steps 701-706.

[0161] Step 701: The certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the certificate issuing device. The certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate.

[0162] When the certificate application device needs to apply for a digital certificate, the certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the certificate issuing device, requesting the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate to the certificate application device.

[0163] Optionally, an ACME client may be deployed on the certificate application device, and an ACME server may be deployed on the certificate issuing device. The certificate application device sends a certificate application request to the ACME server on the certificate issuing device through the ACME client.

[0164] Step 702: The certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate requesting device. The challenge message is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through the IDP.

[0165] After receiving a certificate request, the certificate issuing device must first verify the identity of the certificate requesting device. Only after the identity of the certificate requesting device is verified can a digital certificate be issued to the device. Therefore, in this embodiment, the certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate requesting device, instructing the device to perform identity authentication with the IDP.

[0166] The IDP is a device trusted by the certificate issuing device, and the IDP pre-stores the mapping between identity information and public keys. For example, a user can pre-register with the IDP using a certificate request device in a trusted manner and submit the public key corresponding to the registered identity, allowing the IDP to store the mapping between identity information and public keys.

[0167] In some embodiments, the IDP may also store a private key corresponding to the identity information or a ciphertext of the private key, that is, the IDP stores a public-private key pair corresponding to the identity information at the same time.

[0168] Optionally, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP. That is to say, there are multiple IDPs trusted by the certificate issuing device, and the certificate issuing device can carry the information of multiple trusted IDPs in the challenge information to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any IDP. As long as the certificate application device completes identity authentication on any IDP trusted by the certificate issuing device, it means that the certificate application device has completed trusted identity authentication. By indicating the information of multiple IDPs in the challenge information, the certificate application device can select any IDP to complete identity authentication, which ensures the diversity of choices for the certificate application device and ensures that the certificate application device can effectively perform the identity authentication process.

[0169] In addition, the identity information stored in the IDP may be a user identity or a device identity, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment.

[0170] Step 703: The certificate application device performs identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines a first public key that has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request.

[0171] In this embodiment, after receiving the challenge message, the certificate application device selects an IDP to perform identity authentication based on the instructions in the challenge message. Specifically, the certificate application device can log in to the IDP based on the identity used to apply for the issuance of the digital certificate (i.e., the identity corresponding to the certificate application request), and the IDP verifies the identity of the certificate application device. Because the IDP pre-stores the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys, after the certificate application device passes the IDP's identity authentication, the IDP can determine the corresponding first public key based on the verified identity information of the certificate application device.

[0172] Optionally, the IDP may verify the identity of the certificate requesting device by verifying whether the certificate requesting device possesses the private key corresponding to the indicated identity. That is, since the certificate requesting device logs into the IDP using the identity corresponding to the certificate request, if the identity of the certificate requesting device is indeed the identity corresponding to the certificate request, then the certificate requesting device will possess the private key corresponding to that identity. Therefore, after the certificate requesting device logs into the IDP using the identity corresponding to the certificate request, the IDP verifies whether the certificate requesting device possesses the private key corresponding to the logged-in identity.

[0173] Simply put, if the IDP stores the mapping between the identity corresponding to the certificate request and the first public key, the IDP verifies whether the identity corresponding to the certificate request has the private key corresponding to the first public key, thereby authenticating the certificate requesting device. By verifying whether the certificate requesting device controls the private key corresponding to the public key, the consistency between the identity corresponding to the certificate requesting device and the public key can be verified, thereby ensuring that the digital certificate obtained in subsequent applications matches the requested identity and public key.

[0174] For example, the certificate application device may first log in to the IDP based on the first identity information, for example, using the account and password corresponding to the first identity information, or using a password corresponding to the first identity information. After successfully logging in to the IDP, the certificate application device receives an authentication request from the IDP, which is used to request verification of the private key corresponding to the first identity information. Then, based on the authentication request sent by the IDP, the certificate application device cooperates with the IDP to complete the authentication. The process by which the certificate application device cooperates with the IDP to complete the authentication is determined by the authentication methods supported by the IDP.

[0175] Optionally, the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol, where the asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol can be, for example, the aPAKE or Opaque protocol described above.

[0176] In the case where the identity authentication method is zero-knowledge proof, the certificate application device needs to prove to the IDP that it owns the private key corresponding to the first public key, and does not disclose information about the private key to the IDP. Specifically, please refer to Figure 8, which is a flow chart of a process for performing identity authentication on a certificate application device based on zero-knowledge proof provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 8, the IDP can first generate a random number 1 and use the first public key to encrypt the random number 1 to obtain the ciphertext of the random number 1; then, the IDP sends the ciphertext of the random number 1 to the certificate application device, requiring the certificate application device to use the private key corresponding to the first public key to decrypt the ciphertext of the random number 1. The certificate application device uses the private key to decrypt the ciphertext of the random number 1, obtains the decrypted random number, and sends the decrypted random number to the IDP. In this way, the IDP can determine whether the certificate application device can pass the identity authentication by comparing whether the random number 1 is the same as the decrypted random number.

[0177] If the certificate application device can return the correct random number to the IDP, it means that the certificate application device can correctly decrypt the ciphertext of the random number, that is, the certificate application device has the private key of the first public key, so the certificate application device can pass the identity authentication; if the certificate application device cannot return the correct random number to the IDP, it means that the certificate application device cannot correctly decrypt the ciphertext of the random number, that is, the certificate application device does not have the private key of the first public key, so the certificate application device cannot pass the identity authentication.

[0178] When the authentication method is public key signature, the certificate application device generates a piece of random information, calculates a hash value for the random information, and then encrypts the calculated hash value using the private key to obtain a digital signature. The certificate application device then sends the digital signature and random information obtained based on the private key to the certificate issuing device. If the certificate issuing device can successfully decrypt the digital signature using the first public key and obtain the same random information, it means that the certificate application device has the private key of the first public key, and therefore the certificate application device can pass identity authentication; if the certificate issuing device cannot successfully decrypt the digital signature using the first public key and obtain the same random information, it means that the certificate application device does not have the private key of the first public key, and therefore the certificate application device cannot pass identity authentication.

[0179] In step 704, the IDP sends the first public key to the certificate issuing device. The first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request.

[0180] After the IDP verifies the identity of the certificate requesting device, it sends the certificate issuing device a first public key mapped to the identity corresponding to the certificate request. This allows the certificate issuing device to confirm that the first public key corresponds to the identity authenticated by the IDP. In other words, the certificate issuing device can trust the first public key as the public key corresponding to the verified identity.

[0181] Step 705: The certificate application device sends a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device. The certificate signing request includes the second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key.

[0182] After the certificate application device completes identity authentication through the IDP, it means that the certificate application device has completed the challenge issued by the certificate issuing device. Therefore, the certificate application device can send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device to trigger the certificate issuing device to issue a digital certificate for the certificate application device that has passed the identity authentication.

[0183] In addition, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the second public key is the public key requested by the certificate signing request and needs to be included in the digital certificate.

[0184] Step 706: In response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate requesting device.

[0185] After receiving the certificate signing request, the certificate issuing device compares the second public key in the certificate signing request with the first public key returned by the IDP to determine whether the identity and public keys of the certificate requesting device requesting the digital certificate match. If the first and second public keys are identical, the identity and public keys of the certificate requesting device requesting the digital certificate match, and the certificate issuing device can issue a digital certificate containing the second public key to the certificate requesting device.

[0186] Optionally, in some embodiments, the certificate application request includes a third public key, which is the public key that the certificate application device requests to be included in the digital certificate. In other words, the certificate application request initially sent by the certificate application device must specify the public key that needs to be included in the requested digital certificate.

[0187] In this way, after the certificate issuing device receives the first public key sent by the IDP, it can compare the first public key with the third public key to confirm whether the first public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate applying device is the same as the third public key requested by the certificate applying device. If the first public key and the third public key are the same, it means that the identity of the certificate applying device verified by the IDP is the same as the identity for which the certificate applying device applied for the digital certificate. Therefore, the certificate issuing device confirms that the certificate applying device has completed the challenge.

[0188] In response to the third public key being identical to the first public key, the certificate issuing device sends a response message to the certificate requesting device, indicating that the certificate requesting device's identity verification was successful, i.e., that the certificate requesting device has completed the challenge specified by the certificate issuing device. Upon receiving the response message, the certificate requesting device then triggers the sending of a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device.

[0189] Furthermore, after receiving the certificate signing request, the certificate issuing device compares the third public key in the certificate application request with the second public key in the certificate signing request to determine whether they are identical, thereby determining whether the first public key and the second public key are identical. That is, the identification of the first public key and the second public key is determined by comparing the third public key with the second public key. Since the third public key is identical to the first public key, if the third public key in the certificate application request is identical to the second public key in the certificate signing request, then it means that the first public key and the second public key are identical.

[0190] In this way, the certificate issuing device no longer needs to store the first public key returned by the IDP. Instead, by comparing the first public key with the third public key in the certificate application request and the third public key with the second public key in the certificate signing request, it can verify the consistency of the certificate application identity and the public key, thereby improving the security of the certificate issuance process while minimizing changes to existing technologies and improving the compatibility of the solution.

[0191] Optionally, in other embodiments, the certificate application request also includes the first identity information, and the certificate signing request also includes the second identity information. That is, the certificate application request includes both the third public key and the first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes both the second public key and the second identity information.

[0192] In addition, while obtaining the first public key from the IDP, the certificate issuing device also obtains third identity information from the IDP, and the third identity information is mapped to the first public key. That is, the identity information of the certificate requesting device that is verified on the IDP is the third identity information, and on the IDP, the third identity information corresponds to the first public key.

[0193] In this way, when both the certificate application request and the certificate signing request include identity information and a public key, and the IDP returns both identity information and a public key, the certificate issuing device first compares the first identity information and the third public key in the certificate application request with the third identity information and the first public key returned by the IDP. If the first identity information and the third identity information are identical, and the third public key and the first public key are identical, the certificate issuing device can determine that the identity of the certificate applying device and the requested public key match, thereby determining that the certificate applying device has completed the challenge. The certificate issuing device then compares the first identity information and the third public key in the certificate application request with the second identity information and the second public key in the certificate signing request. If the first identity information and the second identity information are identical, and the third public key and the second public key are identical, the certificate issuing device can determine that the identity information and public key submitted by the certificate applying device are identical and have passed verification. Therefore, the certificate issuing device can issue a digital certificate to the certificate applying device based on the second public key and the second identity information in the certificate signing request.

[0194] That is, in response to the first public key being identical to the second public key and the first identity information being identical to the second identity information and the third identity information, the certificate issuing device may issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate requesting device.

[0195] In general, when the certificate application request and certificate signing request only include the public key but not the identity information, and the IDP only returns the public key, the certificate issuing device can only compare the public key but not the identity information; when the certificate application request and certificate signing request include both the public key and the identity information, and the IDP returns both the public key and the identity information, the certificate issuing device can compare both the public key and the identity information.

[0196] In this solution, when both the public key and identity information are included in the certificate application request and the certificate signing request, the certificate issuing device will compare the public key and identity information obtained through various channels before issuing the digital certificate to ensure that the public key and identity information indicated by the certificate application device during the digital certificate application process match the public key and identity information actually verified by the certificate application device, thereby ensuring the security of the digital certificate issued by the certificate issuing device.

[0197] Optionally, in the certificate request, the third public key and the first identity information are contained within the same identifier. The identifier containing the third public key and the first identity information indicates the content to be verified by the certificate requesting device during the challenge process. In other words, when the certificate requesting device performs the challenge, the certificate issuing device actually verifies the content contained within the identifier in the certificate request.

[0198] It's understandable that related technologies also define identifiers in certificate request requests to indicate content to be verified during the challenge, such as the domain name or email address mentioned above. Therefore, this solution defines a new type of identifier in certificate request requests that can indicate both the public key and identity information. This allows verification of both public keys and identity information while minimizing changes to existing technologies and improving the solution's compatibility.

[0199] Furthermore, if the certificate request only includes the public key and no identity information, the public key can also be included in the certificate request via a specific type of identifier (i.e., an identifier type that only carries the public key). In this case, the certificate issuing device only needs to verify the public key obtained from various channels during the certificate application process.

[0200] The above describes the process by which a certificate issuing device compares the information submitted by a certificate requesting device with the information returned by an IDP to ensure security during the certificate issuance process. In actual applications, a certificate issuing device may correspond to multiple certificate requesting devices. That is, the certificate issuing device will receive certificate request requests from different certificate requesting devices and may instruct multiple different certificate requesting devices to implement identity authentication through the same IDP. In this case, the certificate issuing device often needs to associate the public key returned by the IDP with the corresponding certificate requesting device to facilitate comparison of the public key returned by the IDP with the public key submitted by the certificate requesting device in the certificate request.

[0201] In this embodiment, in order to facilitate the certificate issuing device to associate the public key returned by the IDP with the corresponding certificate requesting device, multiple implementation methods are provided to realize the interaction between the certificate issuing device, the certificate requesting device and the IDP.

[0202] For example, please refer to Figure 9, which is a flow chart of a certificate application device performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device according to an embodiment of the present application. The flow shown in Figure 9 includes the following steps 901-905.

[0203] In step 901, the certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to the certificate requesting device. The challenge message is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through the IDP.

[0204] Among them, step 901 is similar to the above-mentioned step 702. Please refer to the above-mentioned step 702 for details, and will not be repeated here.

[0205] In step 902, the certificate application device sends an access request to the certificate issuing device. The access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request.

[0206] Since the certificate issuing device indicates in the challenge information that the certificate requesting device needs to perform identity authentication through the IDP, the certificate requesting device can send an access request to the certificate issuing device and carry the identity information corresponding to the certificate application request (such as the account information or device information of the certificate requesting device) in the access request, and then request access to the IDP.

[0207] In the case where the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, the certificate application device can select one of the multiple IDPs and carry the information of the selected IDP in the access request, so that the certificate issuing device can confirm the IDP selected by the certificate application device to perform identity authentication.

[0208] In step 903, the certificate issuing device redirects the certificate requesting device to the IDP.

[0209] Since the access request sent by the certificate application device is a request for access to the IDP, the certificate issuing device redirects the certificate application device to the IDP during the process of processing the access request, thereby enabling the certificate application device to access the IDP.

[0210] In step 904 , the certificate requesting device interacts with the IDP to perform identity authentication.

[0211] After redirecting the certificate requesting device to the IDP, the certificate requesting device can interact with the IDP based on the protocol supported by the IDP to perform identity authentication of the certificate requesting device. The method for performing identity authentication of the certificate requesting device can be referred to the above description and will not be repeated here.

[0212] Step 905: After the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP redirects back to the certificate issuing device and carries the first public key of the certificate application device that passed identity authentication.

[0213] Specifically, after the certificate requesting device passes identity authentication at the IDP, the IDP can redirect the request back to the code location on the certificate issuing device that handles the access request, along with the authenticated first public key of the certificate requesting device. Because the IDP redirects the request back to the code location on the certificate issuing device that handles the access request, the certificate issuing device can associate the identity information corresponding to the certificate request included in the access request with the first public key returned by the IDP, and thus determine that the first public key needs to be compared with the third public key submitted by the certificate requesting device in the certificate request.

[0214] For example, please refer to Figure 10, which is a flow chart showing another example of a certificate application device performing identity authentication through an IDP based on instructions from a certificate issuing device according to an embodiment of the present application. The flow shown in Figure 10 includes the following steps 1001-1006.

[0215] In step 1001, a certificate issuing device sends a challenge message to a certificate requesting device. The challenge message is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through an IDP, and the challenge message carries the address of the IDP.

[0216] In this embodiment, the challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device to the certificate requesting device includes the address of the IDP, so the certificate requesting device can directly access the IDP based on the address of the IDP indicated in the challenge information.

[0217] Step 1002: The certificate requesting device accesses the IDP and performs identity authentication through the IDP.

[0218] Step 1003: After the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP sends identity credentials to the certificate application device.

[0219] Specifically, after the certificate application device passes identity authentication, the IDP can generate a temporary identity credential. This identity credential corresponds to the verified identity of the certificate application device. Based on this identity credential, the public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate application device can be queried on the IDP.

[0220] Step 1004: The certificate application device sends identity credentials to the certificate issuing device.

[0221] After obtaining the identity credentials returned by the IDP, the certificate application device forwards the identity credentials to the certificate issuing device so that the certificate issuing device can query the identity authentication status of the certificate application device.

[0222] In step 1005 , the certificate issuing device sends the identity credentials to the IDP to query the public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate requesting device.

[0223] Step 1006: The IDP sends the first public key to the certificate issuing device.

[0224] Since the identity credential corresponds to the verified identity of the certificate application device, the IDP may send the first public key corresponding to the verified identity of the certificate application device to the certificate issuing device based on the identity credential.

[0225] It should be noted that, in the case that the IDP still stores the third identity information corresponding to the first public key, the IDP will also return the third identity information to the certificate issuing device.

[0226] For ease of understanding, the following detailed description of the process of performing certificate management by extending the existing ACME protocol in this embodiment will be provided with specific examples. Please refer to Figure 11, which is a flow chart illustrating a method for performing certificate management by extending the ACME protocol, as provided in this embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 11, the process of performing the certificate management method by extending the ACME protocol includes the following steps 1101-1113. The ACME client is deployed on the certificate application device, and the ACME server is deployed on the certificate issuing device.

[0227] Step 1101: The ACME client sends a certificate request to the ACME server, where the certificate request includes public key 1.

[0228] Compared to certificate request requests in the prior art, this embodiment expands the types of identifiers in certificate request requests. Specifically, the identifier type in a certificate request can be a public key (PK), a certificate signing request (CSR), or a self-signed certificate (selfsign-cert). When the identifier type is PK, the value of the identifier is the public key listed in the digital certificate requested by the ACME client, i.e., the value of the identifier only includes the public key. When the identifier type is CSR or Selfsign-cert, the value of the identifier is the public key and identity information listed in the digital certificate requested by the ACME client, i.e., the value of the identifier includes both the public key and identity information.

[0229] For example, when the identifier type is pk, the certificate application request can carry public key 1 through the identifier. For example, the identifier can be specifically: "identifier":{"type":"pk","value":"MIGfMA0GC***GbQIDAQAB"}. When the identifier type is csr or selfsign-cert, the certificate application request can carry public key 1 and identity information 1 through the identifier. For example, the identifier can be specifically: "identifier":{"type":"selfsign-cert","value":"MIIHSDCC***AU1GH3xQ="}; or the identifier can be specifically: "identifier":{"type":"csr","value":"MIICljCCA***RL64+taHbP"}.

[0230] In general, in practice, an ACME client can determine the identifier type based on the content it requests the ACME server to sign in the digital certificate. If the ACME client requires the ACME server to sign only the public key in the digital certificate, the ACME client can use the identifier type pk in the certificate request. For example, if a user owns multiple devices and needs to request a digital certificate for use only on that device, the user may expect the ACME server to sign only the public key in the digital certificate, without reflecting the identity of the user or device.

[0231] If the client needs to request that the ACME server sign both the public key and identity information in a digital certificate, the ACME client can use the identifier type of csr or selfsign-cert in the certificate request. For example, when a user applies for a digital certificate using their own identity information or for a device with a specific identity, the user expects the ACME server to sign both the public key and identity information in the digital certificate, thereby reflecting the user or device's identity information in the digital certificate.

[0232] Specifically, in the certificate application request, the identity information 1 carried by the identifier can be user identity information, such as user mobile phone number, user email address or user ID; the identity information 1 carried by the identifier can also be device identity information, such as the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) of a smartphone or the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of a vehicle.

[0233] In this embodiment, the public key 1 may correspond to the third public key in the above embodiment, and the identity information 1 may correspond to the first identity information in the above embodiment.

[0234] In step 1102, the ACME server creates an ACME order according to the certificate application request and sends the created ACME order to the ACME client.

[0235] After receiving a certificate request, the ACME server creates an ACME order based on the request to track the digital certificate application process. The ACME order records the identifier in the certificate request, which is the public key, or the public key and identity information.

[0236] After creating an ACME order, the ACME server also creates an authorization object based on the ACME order and a challenge object included in the authorization object based on the type of the identifier in the ACME order. The challenge object contains the content information that the ACME client needs to execute the challenge.

[0237] Among them, the challenge object includes the challenge type, the address information for conducting the challenge, and the information of the IDP that executes the challenge. Exemplarily, the content of the challenge object can be specifically {type: "pk-01", pk_url: "", pk_provider: ""}. Among them, type represents the challenge type of the challenge object, and the challenge type of the challenge object is specifically the newly defined pk-01. pk-01 requires the ACME client to conduct the pk challenge by accessing the specified "pk-url" and complete the verification of the control of the private key corresponding to the declared public key; pk_url is used to indicate the address for conducting the challenge (i.e., performing identity authentication), i.e., the uniform resource locator (url). The pk-url contains sufficient information to allow the request to be associated with a specific challenge and to be able to point to a specific IDP; pk_provider is an optional field used to distinguish between different IDPs.

[0238] Step 1103: The ACME client sends the ACME authorization object identifier in the ACME order to the ACME server to request specific information about the ACME authorization object.

[0239] After receiving the ACME order from the ACME server, the ACME client sends the ACME authorization object identifier to the ACME server to request the specific information of the ACME authorization object, thereby triggering the authorization process required in the digital certificate application process.

[0240] In step 1104, the ACME server sends an ACME authorization object including one or more challenge objects to the ACME client.

[0241] Specifically, through steps 1103 and 1104, the ACME client obtains each challenge object under the authorization object by querying the authorization object in the ACME order, that is, obtains all challenges supported by the authorization object.

[0242] Different challenge objects may indicate that identity authentication is completed through different IDPs.

[0243] Step 1105 : The ACME client selects a challenge object to initiate the challenge.

[0244] After obtaining all challenge objects under the authorization object, the ACME client can select one of the challenge objects to execute the challenge. The ACME client can select the challenge object based on a selection policy predefined by the user or randomly, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment.

[0245] Step 1106: Based on the IDP information indicated in the challenge object, the certificate requesting device sends an access request to the ACME server.

[0246] Specifically, when the ACME client selects a challenge object, it obtains the pk_url in the challenge object, which indicates the address where the challenge will be launched. The ACME client can then pass this pk_url to the certificate request device, which triggers the browser to enter the pk_url, thereby sending an access request to the ACME server.

[0247] The pk_url entered by the certificate requester in the browser actually points to the address of the ACME server, but the request is for access to the IDP. Because the pk_url contains enough information, the ACME server can associate the access request with a specific challenge and redirect it to the specific IDP.

[0248] In step 1107, the ACME server redirects the certificate requesting device to the IDP.

[0249] In step 1108 , the certificate requesting device interacts with the IDP to perform identity authentication.

[0250] In step 1109, after the authentication device passes the authentication, the IDP redirects back to the ACME server and carries the public key 2 of the certificate requesting device that passed the authentication.

[0251] In this embodiment, steps 1107 to 1109 are similar to the above-mentioned steps 903 to 905. Please refer to the above-mentioned steps 903 to 905 for details, which will not be repeated here.

[0252] In addition, since the IDP stores the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys, the IDP can also return identity information 2 corresponding to public key 2 to the ACME server, so that the ACME server can perform subsequent identity information comparison processes.

[0253] In this embodiment, the public key 2 may correspond to the first public key in the above embodiment, and the identity information 2 may correspond to the third identity information in the above embodiment.

[0254] In step 1110, the ACME server compares the public key 1 in the order with the public key 2 returned by the IDP to see if they are the same, and modifies the authorization status of the order based on the comparison result.

[0255] Specifically, if Public Key 1 in the order and Public Key 2 returned by the IDP are identical, this means the public key listed in the digital certificate requested by the certificate applicant is the same as the public key corresponding to the applicant's identity. In other words, the public key used for the signature requested by the certificate applicant matches the applicant's actual identity. Therefore, based on the comparison results, the ACME server can change the order's authorization status to Authorized, triggering the subsequent certificate application process.

[0256] In addition, if the order includes both public key 1 and identity information 1, the IDP returns public key 2 and identity information 2 to the ACME server. The ACME server needs to compare public key 1 with public key 2, and identity information 1 with identity information 2. Only if public key 1 and public key 2 are the same, and identity information 1 and identity information 2 are the same, will the ACME server change the authorization status of the order to authorized.

[0257] During the execution process, upon receiving the ACME client's response to the challenge within the validity period, the ACME server immediately sets the challenge status to "processing." If the ACME client completes authentication and the ACME server verifies that the public key declared by the ACME client is the same as the public key returned by the IDP, the challenge status is set to "valid." If the ACME client fails to complete authentication, or if the ACME server verifies that the public key declared by the ACME client is different from the public key returned by the IDP, the challenge status is set to "invalid."

[0258] Specifically, the order recorded in the ACME server can be as follows:

[0259] In step 1111 , the ACME server feeds back the authorization status of the modified order to the ACME client, indicating that the challenge is complete.

[0260] In step 1112 , the ACME client sends a certificate signing request to the ACME server. The certificate signing request includes public key 3 .

[0261] In addition, when the certificate application request sent by the ACME client includes both the public key and identity information (that is, the identifier type in the certificate application request is csr or selfsign-cert), the certificate signing request sent by the ACME client also includes identity information 3, that is, the certificate signing request includes both public key 3 and identity information 3.

[0262] In this embodiment, the public key 3 may be the second public key corresponding to the above embodiment, and the identity information 3 may be the second identity information corresponding to the above embodiment.

[0263] In step 1113, the ACME server compares the public key 1 in the order and the public key 3 in the certificate signing request to see if they are the same, and decides whether to issue a digital certificate based on the comparison result.

[0264] Specifically, when the identifier type in the order is pk, if the public key 1 in the order and the public key 3 in the certificate signing request are the same, it means that the public key in the certificate signing request has not been tampered with. Therefore, the ACME service can issue a digital certificate to the ACME client, and the digital certificate is signed by public key 3.

[0265] If the identifier type in the order is csr or selfsign-cert, and if public key 1 in the order and public key 3 in the certificate signing request are the same, and identity information 1 in the order and identity information 3 in the certificate signing request are the same, then the public key and identity information in the certificate signing request have not been tampered with. Therefore, the ACME service can issue a digital certificate to the ACME client, and public key 3 and identity information 3 are signed in the digital certificate.

[0266] For example, please refer to Figures 12 and 13. Figure 12 is a schematic diagram of comparing public keys when the identifier type is pk, provided in an embodiment of the present application; Figure 13 is a schematic diagram of comparing public keys and identity information when the identifier type is csr or selfsign-cert, provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0267] As shown in Figure 12, when the identifier type is pk, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device first compares public key 1 in the certificate request with public key 2 provided by the IDP. If public key 1 and public key 2 are confirmed to be identical, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device then compares public key 1 in the certificate request with public key 3 in the certificate signing request. Finally, if public key 1 and public key 3 are confirmed to be identical, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate signed by public key 3 to the certificate requesting device.

[0268] As shown in Figure 12, when the identifier type is csr or selfsign-cert, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device first compares public key 1 in the certificate request with public key 2 provided by the IDP, and also compares identity information 1 in the certificate request with identity information 2 provided by the IDP. Upon confirming that public key 1 and public key 2 are identical, and identity information 1 and identity information 2 are identical, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device then compares public key 1 in the certificate request with public key 3 in the certificate signing request, and also compares identity information 1 in the certificate request with identity information 3 in the certificate signing request. Finally, upon confirming that public key 1 and public key 3 are identical, and identity information 1 and identity information 3 are identical, the ACME server in the certificate issuing device issues a digital certificate signed by public key 3 and identity information 3 to the certificate applying device.

[0269] In general, as shown in FIG11 , the certificate management method provided in this embodiment is obtained by expanding upon the existing ACME protocol execution process. It primarily optimizes the two processes of the certificate application device initiating the challenge and the ACME server completing the order. This prevents tampering with the public key in the certificate signing request during the ACME order completion phase, ensuring that the ultimately applied-for digital certificate matches the certificate application identity and public key.

[0270] The above mainly introduces the solution provided by the embodiment of the present application from the perspective of method. It is understandable that, in order to realize the above functions, the electronic device includes a hardware structure and / or software module corresponding to the execution of each function. Those skilled in the art should easily realize that, in combination with the modules and algorithm steps of each example described in the embodiments disclosed herein, the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in a hardware or computer software driven hardware manner depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

[0271] The embodiment of the present application can divide the functional modules of the electronic device according to the above method example. For example, each functional module can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiment of the present application is schematic and is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation.

[0272] The following is a detailed description of the device used to execute the above method in the embodiment of the present application.

[0273] Please refer to Figure 14, which is a structural diagram of a certificate issuing device provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 14, the certificate issuing device provided in this embodiment includes: an acquisition module 1401, which is used to acquire a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; a sending module 1402, which is used to send a challenge message to the certificate application device, the challenge message is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through the IDP; the acquisition module 1401 is also used to acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, the first public key and the identity corresponding to the certificate application request have a mapping relationship; the acquisition module 1401 is also used to acquire a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; the sending module 1402 is also used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device in response to the first public key and the second public key being the same.

[0274] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key; the sending module 1402 is also used to send a response message to the certificate application device in response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, and the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; wherein, the first public key and the second public key are the same by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

[0275] In one possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; the obtaining module 1401 is further used to obtain third identity information sent by the IDP; and the sending module 1402 is further used to issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key and the first identity information being the same as the second identity information and the third identity information.

[0276] In a possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0277] In one possible implementation, the obtaining module 1401 is further configured to obtain an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; and the sending module 1402 is further configured to redirect the certificate application device to the IDP.

[0278] In a possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

[0279] In one possible implementation, the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0280] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

[0281] Please refer to Figure 15, which is a schematic diagram of the structure of a certificate application device provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 15, the certificate application device includes: a sending module 1501, which is used to send a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; an acquisition module 1502, which is used to obtain challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, the challenge information is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed through the IDP; a verification module 1503, which is used to perform identity authentication through the IDP so that the IDP determines that the first public key with which the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a mapping relationship; the sending module 1501 is also used to send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, the second public key being the same as the first public key; and the acquisition module 1502 is also used to obtain the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

[0282] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

[0283] In a possible implementation, the certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information and the second identity information are the same.

[0284] In a possible implementation, the third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

[0285] In one possible implementation, the IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key; the verification module 1503 is specifically used to: log in to the IDP based on the first identity information; obtain an authentication request sent by the IDP, where the authentication request is used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; and cooperate with the IDP to complete authentication based on the authentication request.

[0286] In one possible implementation, the authentication request includes an authentication method supported by the IDP, and the authentication request is used to request authentication based on any authentication method supported by the IDP; the IDP supports any one or more of the following authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

[0287] In a possible implementation, the challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate requesting device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

[0288] It should be noted that the information interaction, execution process, etc. between the modules and / or components in the above device are based on the same concept as the method embodiments corresponding to Figures 7 to 13 in this application. For specific contents, please refer to the description in the method embodiments shown above in this application, and will not be repeated here.

[0289] It should be noted that for the specific implementation of the device and the beneficial effects brought about, reference can be made to the descriptions in the corresponding method embodiments of Figures 7 to 13, and no further details will be given here.

[0290] The present application also provides an electronic device comprising: a processor and a memory; the memory is configured to store computer instructions, and when the processor executes the instructions, the electronic device performs any of the above-described methods. The electronic device may be the certificate issuing device described in the embodiment corresponding to FIG. 14 or the certificate application device described in the embodiment corresponding to FIG. 15 .

[0291] An embodiment of the present application also provides a certificate management system, including the certificate issuing device described in the embodiment corresponding to FIG14 , the certificate application device described in the embodiment corresponding to FIG15 , and an IDP.

[0292] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, including instructions, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to control an electronic device to execute any one of the implementation methods shown in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0293] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes computer program code. When the computer program code runs on a computer, it enables the computer to execute any one of the implementation methods shown in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0294] An embodiment of the present application also provides a chip system, including a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store computer programs, and the processor is used to call and run computer programs from the memory, so that the chip executes any one of the implementation methods shown in the aforementioned method embodiments.

[0295] It should also be noted that the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the present embodiment. In addition, in the drawings of the device embodiments provided in this application, the connection relationship between the modules indicates that there is a communication connection between them, which can be specifically implemented as one or more communication buses or signal lines.

[0296] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the present application can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware, and of course can also be implemented by dedicated hardware including application-specific integrated circuits, dedicated CPUs, dedicated memories, dedicated components, etc. In general, all functions performed by computer programs can be easily implemented with corresponding hardware, and the specific hardware structures used to implement the same function can also be diverse, such as analog circuits, digital circuits, or dedicated circuits. However, for the present application, software program implementation is a better implementation method in most cases. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a readable storage medium, such as a computer's floppy disk, USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk, etc., and includes a number of instructions for enabling a computer device to execute the methods described in each embodiment of the present application.

[0297] In the above embodiments, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented by software, all or part of the embodiments may be implemented in the form of a computer program product.

[0298] The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from a website, a computer, a communication device, a computing device or a data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) mode to another website, a computer, a communication device, a computing device or a data center. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can store or a data storage device such as a communication device, a data center that includes one or more available media integrations. The available medium can be a magnetic medium, (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid-state drive (SSD)).

[0299] It should be understood that “one embodiment” or “an embodiment” mentioned throughout the specification means that the specific features, structures or characteristics related to the embodiment are included in at least one embodiment of the present application. Therefore, “in one embodiment” or “in an embodiment” appearing throughout the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, these specific features, structures or characteristics can be combined in one or more embodiments in any suitable manner. It should be understood that in the various embodiments of the present application, the size of the sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0300] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. In order to clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the composition and steps of each example have been generally described in terms of function in the above description. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

Claims

1. A certificate management method, It is characterized in that include: Obtaining a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; Sending a challenge message to the certificate application device, wherein the challenge message is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through an identity provider IDP; Acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, where the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; Obtaining a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, wherein the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; In response to the first public key being identical to the second public key, issuing a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device.

2. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key; The method further comprises: In response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, sending a response message to the certificate application device, the response message being used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; The fact that the first public key is the same as the second public key is determined by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

3. The method according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; The method further comprises: Obtaining third identity information sent by the IDP; In response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, issuing a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device comprises: In response to the first public key being identical to the second public key and the first identity information being identical to the second identity information and the third identity information, a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information is issued to the certificate application device.

4. The method according to claim 3, It is characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: Obtaining an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; Redirect the certificate request device to the IDP.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, It is characterized in that The IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, It is characterized in that The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, It is characterized in that The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

9. A certificate management method, It is characterized in that include: Sending a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; Obtaining challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, wherein the challenge information is used to instruct to perform identity authentication through the IDP; Performing identity authentication by the IDP so that the IDP determines a first public key having a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; Sending a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request including a second public key, the certificate signing request being used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, the second public key being the same as the first public key; Acquire a digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

10. The method according to claim 9, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

11. The method according to claim 10, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information is the same as the second identity information.

12. The method according to claim 11, It is characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

13. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 12, It is characterized in that The IDP is used to store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys; The performing identity authentication by the IDP includes: Logging in to the IDP based on the first identity information; Obtaining an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, where the identity authentication request is used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; Based on the identity authentication request, cooperate with the IDP to complete the identity authentication.

14. The method according to claim 13, It is characterized in that The identity authentication request includes an identity authentication method supported by the IDP, and the identity authentication request is used to request to perform identity authentication based on any one of the identity authentication methods supported by the IDP; The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

15. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 14, It is characterized in that The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

16. A certificate issuing device, It is characterized in that include: An acquisition module, used to acquire a certificate application request sent by a certificate application device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; A sending module, used to send challenge information to the certificate application device, wherein the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through the IDP; The acquisition module is further used to acquire a first public key sent by the IDP, where the first public key has a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; The acquisition module is further used to acquire a certificate signing request sent by the certificate application device, wherein the certificate signing request includes the second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request the issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key; The sending module is further configured to, in response to the first public key being the same as the second public key, issue a digital certificate including the second public key to the certificate application device.

17. The device according to claim 16, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key; The sending module is further used to send a response message to the certificate application device in response to the third public key being the same as the first public key, wherein the response message is used to indicate that the identity authentication of the certificate application device is successful; The fact that the first public key is the same as the second public key is determined by comparing the third public key with the second public key.

18. The device according to claim 17, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, and the certificate signing request includes second identity information; The acquisition module is further used to acquire the third identity information sent by the IDP; The sending module is further configured to issue a digital certificate including the second public key and the second identity information to the certificate application device in response to the first public key being identical to the second public key and the first identity information being identical to the second identity information and the third identity information.

19. The device according to claim 18, It is characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

20. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 19, It is characterized in that The acquisition module is further used to acquire an access request sent by the certificate application device, where the access request is used to request access to the IDP, and the access request includes identity information corresponding to the certificate application request; The sending module is further used to redirect the certificate application device to the IDP.

21. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 20, It is characterized in that The IDP is used to store a mapping relationship between identity information and a public key, and the IDP is used to verify whether the identity corresponding to the certificate application request has a private key corresponding to the first public key.

22. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 21, It is characterized in that The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

23. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 22, It is characterized in that The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

24. A certificate application device, It is characterized in that include: A sending module, used to send a certificate application request to a certificate issuing device, wherein the certificate application request is used to apply for a digital certificate; An acquisition module, used to acquire challenge information sent by the certificate issuing device, wherein the challenge information is used to instruct to perform identity authentication through the IDP; a verification module, configured to perform identity authentication through the IDP, so that the IDP determines a first public key having a mapping relationship with the identity corresponding to the certificate application request; The sending module is further used to send a certificate signing request to the certificate issuing device, the certificate signing request includes a second public key, and the certificate signing request is used to request issuance of a digital certificate including the second public key, where the second public key is the same as the first public key; The acquisition module is further used to acquire the digital certificate including the second public key sent by the certificate issuing device.

25. The device according to claim 24, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes a third public key, and the third public key is the same as the first public key and the second public key.

26. The device according to claim 25, It is characterized in that The certificate application request includes first identity information, the certificate signing request includes second identity information, and the first identity information is the same as the second identity information.

27. The device according to claim 26, It is characterized in that The third public key and the first identity information are carried in the same identifier.

28. The device according to any one of claims 24 to 27, It is characterized in that The IDP is used to store the mapping relationship between identity information and public keys; The verification module is specifically used for: Logging in to the IDP based on the first identity information; Obtaining an identity authentication request sent by the IDP, where the identity authentication request is used to request verification of a private key corresponding to the first identity information; Based on the identity authentication request, cooperate with the IDP to complete the identity authentication.

29. The device according to claim 28, It is characterized in that The identity authentication request includes an identity authentication method supported by the IDP, and the identity authentication request is used to request to perform identity authentication based on any one of the identity authentication methods supported by the IDP; The IDP supports any one or more of the following identity authentication methods: zero-knowledge proof, public key signature, and identity authentication based on an asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange protocol.

30. The device according to any one of claims 24 to 29, It is characterized in that The challenge information includes information of multiple IDPs, and the challenge information is used to instruct the certificate application device to perform identity authentication through any one of the IDPs.

31. A certificate management system, It is characterized in that include: The certificate issuing device as described in claims 16-23, the certificate application device and IDP as described in claims 24-30.

32. A computer storage medium, It is characterized in that The computer storage medium stores instructions, which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to implement the method of any one of claims 1 to 15.

33. A computer program product, It is characterized in that The computer program product stores instructions, which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 15.

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