Data transmission method, apparatus, computer device and communication system

By using the method of generating authentication keys based on the authentication center in IoT devices, the vulnerability problem caused by limited resources of IoT devices is solved, and the security authentication and network security are improved.

WO2024240022A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-28HUAWEI TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/CN2024/093161
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-05-19
Filing Date
2024-05-14
Publication Date
2024-11-28

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

IoT devices have limited resources and cannot adopt traditional authentication mechanisms, which leads to vulnerability to network attacks and frequent communication security accidents.

Method used

The authentication key is generated based on the security credentials distributed by the authentication center, and the authentication key is generated through the elliptic curve algorithm and hash function. There is no need to transmit the authentication key between devices, which reduces the complexity of the key management and improves the security of the authentication key.

Benefits of technology

It realizes security authentication of IoT devices that are resource-constrained, reduces network attacks, improves the network security of IoT, and meets the resource performance requirements of devices.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present application relates to the field of communications. Disclosed are a data transmission method, an apparatus, a computer device and a communication system. The method comprises: generating an authentication key on the basis of a security certificate distributed by an authentication center; and after devices are mutually authenticated according to an authentication code generated by the authentication key, transmitting encrypted data obtained by means of processing on the basis of an encryption key. In this way, authentication based on the generated authentication key requires no transmission of the authentication key between the devices, thus preventing the authentication key from being acquired, enhancing the security of the authentication key, and reducing network attacks; the authentication center does not need to manage the authentication key and the security certificate, thus decentralizing the authentication mechanism, and reducing the complexity of key management; in addition, the data volume of the authentication key is small, which satisfies the storage requirement of Internet of Things devices having limited resources, thereby achieving security authentication of the Internet of Things devices having limited resources, reducing network attacks on the Internet of Things, and improving the network security of the Internet of Things.
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Description

Data transmission method, device, computer equipment and communication system

[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application filed with the State Intellectual Property Office on May 19, 2023, with application number 202310572263.9 and application name “Data transmission method, device, computer equipment and communication system”, all contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of communications, and in particular to a data transmission method, apparatus, computer equipment, and communication system. Background Art

[0003] With the development of the Internet of Things (IoT), the number and types of IoT devices have also increased. However, due to the limited resources (e.g., storage and computing power) of IoT devices, traditional authentication mechanisms cannot be used to authenticate IoT devices. This results in IoT devices providing a physical environment for cyberattacks, making the IoT vulnerable to cyberattacks and leading to frequent IoT communication security incidents.

[0004] Summary of the Invention

[0005] The present application provides a data transmission method, apparatus, computer equipment, and communication system, thereby achieving security authentication of resource-constrained IoT devices, reducing the vulnerability of IoT to network attacks, and improving the network security of IoT.

[0006] In a first aspect, a data transmission method is provided, comprising: generating an authentication key based on a security credential distributed by an authentication center, authenticating each other between devices according to an authentication code generated by the authentication key, and transmitting encrypted data processed according to the encryption key.

[0007] Compared with symmetric key encryption, the authentication center needs to store shared keys, and shared keys need to be transmitted between devices. Shared keys are difficult to manage and easy to be obtained, causing network attacks. Compared with asymmetric key encryption, certificates and public keys occupy a large amount of network bandwidth and storage resources. The solution provided by this application is based on the generated authentication key authentication. There is no need to transmit authentication keys between devices, which reduces bandwidth usage, prevents authentication keys from being obtained, improves the security of authentication keys, and reduces network attacks. The authentication center does not need to manage authentication keys and security credentials, making the authentication mechanism decentralized and reducing the complexity of key management. In addition, the data volume of the authentication key is small, which meets the storage requirements of resource-constrained IoT devices, thereby realizing the security authentication of resource-constrained IoT devices, reducing the IoT from being attacked by networks, and improving the network security of the IoT.

[0008] In one possible implementation, the method further includes generating an encryption key based on the security credential, thereby improving the security of the encryption key.

[0009] In another possible implementation, generating an authentication key based on the security credentials includes generating the authentication key based on the security credentials based on an elliptic curve algorithm. Because elliptic curve algorithms have the advantages of high security, fast processing speed, small storage space usage, and low bandwidth requirements, generating the authentication key based on the elliptic curve algorithm requires minimal computation and data size, thereby enabling lightweight security authentication for IoT devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) and meeting resource performance requirements for IoT devices.

[0010] In another possible implementation, generating an authentication key based on the security credential includes: generating a public key of the second device based on the public key of the authentication center and the security credential; and generating an authentication key based on the public key of the second device and the private key of the first device.

[0011] In this way, the other party's public key is generated based on the elliptic curve algorithm and hash function, and the authentication key is generated based on the other party's public key. That is, the same authentication key is generated based on different input parameters according to the asymmetric encryption algorithm. There is no need to transmit public keys and authentication keys to each other between devices, which prevents illegal devices (such as attack devices) from obtaining public keys and authentication keys, thereby improving the security of public keys and authentication keys.

[0012] In another possible implementation, the method further includes: generating an authentication code based on the authentication key pair and the random number calculation. Since the random number is used as an input parameter for generating the authentication code, the security of the authentication code is improved.

[0013] In another possible implementation, the security credential includes at least one of an identification of an authentication center, a security parameter, a hash function, and an elliptic curve identification.

[0014] In another possible implementation, the method further includes: when the security credential is verified to be legitimate, generating a public key and a private key of the first device according to the security credential.

[0015] In another possible implementation, verifying the legitimacy of the security credential includes: verifying the legitimacy of the security credential based on a public key of an authentication center, an identifier of the first device, and an identifier of the authentication center.

[0016] Therefore, by verifying the security credentials, the security of the key is further ensured, and the use of illegal security credentials to generate the public key and private key of the device is avoided.

[0017] In another possible implementation, the method further includes: updating the public key and the private key of the authentication center; or updating the public key and the private key of the first device.

[0018] In this way, based on the key update mechanism, before the end of the key's lifetime, or when it is known or possible that the key has been leaked, the key is updated to improve the security of the public key, private key, security credentials, authentication key and encryption key of devices in the Internet of Things.

[0019] In another possible implementation, the method further includes: receiving a revocation request, and performing a revocation operation according to the revocation request. The revocation request includes a revocation list and a public key of the authentication device, and the revocation list includes an identifier of the first device.

[0020] In a second aspect, a data transmission method is provided, comprising: receiving an authentication code sent by a first device; determining that authentication of the first device is successful when a check code generated based on a second authentication key is the same as the authentication code; and receiving encrypted data sent by the first device, wherein the authentication code is calculated based on a first authentication key generated based on a first security credential. The encrypted data is encrypted using the first encryption key, which is calculated based on the first security credential.

[0021] In this way, the authentication code sent by the first device is verified based on the authentication key generated by the second device. This eliminates the need for devices to transmit authentication keys to each other, preventing unauthorized devices from obtaining the authentication key and improving its security. Bidirectional authentication between the first and second devices based on the authentication key reduces the amount of ciphertext data and bandwidth usage. This enables secure authentication of resource-constrained IoT devices, reduces vulnerability to cyberattacks, and improves IoT network security.

[0022] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: obtaining a second security credential from an authentication center; and generating a second authentication key based on the second security credential.

[0023] In this way, based on the generated authentication key authentication, there is no need to transmit authentication keys between devices, which reduces bandwidth usage, prevents authentication keys from being obtained, improves the security of authentication keys, and reduces network attacks; the authentication center does not need to manage authentication keys and security credentials, making the authentication mechanism decentralized and reducing the complexity of key management; in addition, the data volume of the authentication key is small, which meets the storage requirements of resource-constrained IoT devices, thereby realizing secure authentication of resource-constrained IoT devices, reducing the IoT from network attacks, and improving the network security of the IoT.

[0024] In another possible implementation, the method further includes: generating a second authentication key according to the second security credential based on an elliptic curve algorithm.

[0025] In another possible implementation, generating a second authentication key based on the second security credential includes: generating a public key of the first device based on the public key of the authentication center and the second security credential; and generating the second authentication key based on the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device.

[0026] In another possible implementation, generating the verification code based on the second authentication key includes: calculating an identifier of the first device and a random number based on the second authentication key to generate the verification code.

[0027] In a third aspect, a data transmission method is provided, the method comprising: generating a first security credential based on a random number, an identifier of a first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center; and feeding back the first security credential to the first device, the first security credential being used by the first device to generate an authentication key and authenticate the second device.

[0028] In this way, the authentication center distributes the first security credential to the first device, allowing the first device to generate its own public key, private key, and authentication key based on the security credential, thereby improving key security. The authentication center manages its own public and private keys, eliminating the need to manage the public and private keys and security credentials of the devices. This decentralizes the IoT authentication mechanism and reduces the complexity of key management.

[0029] In another possible implementation, a first security credential is generated based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center, including: when verifying the legitimacy of the first device, a first security credential is generated based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of an authentication center.

[0030] In this way, after the authentication center successfully verifies the first device to be connected to the Internet of Things, it distributes the first security certificate to the first device. Therefore, during the registration stage, the authentication center verifies the first device to ensure the security of the distributed security certificate and avoid distributing security certificates to illegal devices.

[0031] In another possible implementation, a first security credential is generated based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of an authentication center, including: when verifying the legitimacy of the first device, generating a first security credential based on an elliptic curve algorithm based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of an authentication center.

[0032] In a fourth aspect, a data transmission device is provided, comprising modules for executing the data transmission method of the first aspect or any possible design of the first aspect; or modules for executing the data transmission method of the second aspect or any possible design of the second aspect. For example, the data transmission device comprises a communication module, an authentication module, and an encryption module.

[0033] In a fifth aspect, a data transmission device is provided, which includes various modules for executing the data transmission method in the third aspect or any possible design of the third aspect; for example, the data transmission device includes a communication module and a registration module.

[0034] In the sixth aspect, a computer device is provided, which includes at least one processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a set of computer instructions; when the processor executes the set of computer instructions as the first device in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect, the operating steps of the data transmission method in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect are executed; when the processor executes the set of computer instructions as the second device in the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect, the operating steps of the data transmission method in the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect are executed; when the processor executes the set of computer instructions as the authentication center in the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect, the operating steps of the data transmission method in the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect are executed.

[0035] In a seventh aspect, a communication system is provided, comprising an authentication center, a first device, and a second device. The first device is configured to perform the steps of the data transmission method according to the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect. The second device is configured to perform the steps of the data transmission method according to the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect. The authentication center is configured to perform the steps of the data transmission method according to the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.

[0036] In the eighth aspect, a chip is provided, comprising: a processor and a power supply circuit; wherein the power supply circuit is used to power the processor; the processor is used to execute the operating steps of the method described in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect; the processor is used to execute the operating steps of the method described in the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect; the processor is used to execute the operating steps of the method described in the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.

[0037] In the ninth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, comprising: computer software instructions; when the computer software instructions are executed in a computer device, the computer device executes the operating steps of the method described in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect; or, executes the operating steps of the method described in the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect; or, executes the operating steps of the method described in the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.

[0038] In the tenth aspect, a computer program product is provided. When the computer program product is run on a computer, it enables the computer to perform the operating steps of the method described in the first aspect or any possible implementation of the first aspect; or, perform the operating steps of the method described in the second aspect or any possible implementation of the second aspect; or, perform the operating steps of the method described in the third aspect or any possible implementation of the third aspect.

[0039] The technical effects brought about by any design method in the fourth to tenth aspects can be referred to the technical effects brought about by the first to third aspects or different design methods, and will not be repeated here.

[0040] Based on the implementation methods provided in the above aspects, this application can be further combined to provide more implementation methods. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0041] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of an Internet of Things provided by this application;

[0042] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of another architecture of the Internet of Things provided by this application;

[0043] FIG3 is a schematic diagram of a security authentication of the Internet of Things provided by this application;

[0044] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a data transmission process in a registration phase provided by this application;

[0045] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of another data transmission process in the registration phase provided by the present application;

[0046] FIG6 is a schematic diagram of another data transmission process in the registration phase provided by the present application;

[0047] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of a data transmission process in an authentication phase provided by the present application;

[0048] FIG8 is a schematic diagram of another data transmission process in the authentication phase provided by the present application;

[0049] FIG9 is a schematic diagram of a key update process in the management phase provided by the present application;

[0050] FIG10 is a schematic diagram of a key revocation process in a management phase provided by the present application;

[0051] FIG11 is a schematic structural diagram of a data transmission device provided by the present application;

[0052] FIG12 is a schematic structural diagram of another data transmission device provided by the present application;

[0053] FIG13 is a schematic structural diagram of a computer device provided in this application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0054] To facilitate understanding, the main terms involved in this application are first explained.

[0055] The Internet of Things (IoT) is a crucial component of next-generation information technology, representing an internet of connected things. First, the core and foundation of the IoT remains the internet, representing an extension and expansion of the internet. Second, the IoT's user end extends and expands to encompass information exchange and communication between any object. Therefore, the IoT is a network that connects any object to the internet through information sensing devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID), infrared sensors, global positioning systems (GPS), and laser scanners, enabling information exchange and communication according to agreed protocols, enabling intelligent identification, location, and management of objects.

[0056] Secret key encryption is an encryption service provided to ensure network security in an open network environment. It is an encryption method in which the sender and receiver use asymmetric or symmetric keys to encrypt and decrypt plaintext.

[0057] For example, symmetric-key encryption (also known as private key encryption or shared key encryption) involves using the same key for encryption and decryption between devices. The key is a shared secret between the devices. Compared to asymmetric key encryption, requiring both parties to have the same key is one of its main drawbacks.

[0058] For example, asymmetric cryptography, also known as public-key cryptography, consists of a public key and a private key. The public key is used to encrypt plaintext to produce ciphertext. The private key is used to decrypt ciphertext to produce plaintext. Because encryption and decryption require two different keys, it is called asymmetric cryptography. The public key can be made public and freely available; the private key cannot be made public. Based on the characteristics of public-key cryptography, it also provides digital signature functionality, allowing electronic documents to be signed as if they were handwritten on paper.

[0059] In order to reduce the Internet of Things from being vulnerable to network attacks and improve the network security of the Internet of Things, this application provides a data transmission method, namely, generating an authentication key based on the security credentials distributed by the authentication center, and after the authentication code generated by the authentication key is used to authenticate each other between devices, the encrypted data obtained by processing based on the encryption key is transmitted.

[0060] Compared with symmetric key encryption, the authentication center needs to store shared keys, and shared keys need to be transmitted between devices. Shared keys are difficult to manage and easy to be obtained, causing network attacks. Compared with asymmetric key encryption, certificates and public keys occupy a larger network bandwidth and more storage resources. The solution provided by this application is that since IoT devices authenticate based on their own generated authentication keys, there is no need to transmit authentication keys between IoT devices, which prevents authentication keys from being obtained, improves the security of authentication keys, and reduces network attacks. The authentication center does not need to manage authentication keys and security credentials, making the authentication mechanism decentralized and reducing the complexity of key management. In addition, the data volume of the authentication key is small, which meets the storage requirements of resource-constrained IoT devices, thereby achieving secure authentication of resource-constrained IoT devices, reducing the IoT from network attacks, and improving the network security of the IoT.

[0061] The IoT devices described in this application may be referred to as lightweight devices or resource-constrained devices, including devices of the IoT device class defined in IETF-RFC7228. For example, the storage capacity of the random access memory (RAM) in the IoT device is less than or equal to 10K, and the storage capacity of the read-only memory (ROM) is less than or equal to 100K.

[0062] The data transmission method provided in this application can be applied to networks of any size, regardless of network size or type. For example, campus networks, the Internet of Things (IoT), local area networks (LANs), the Internet, and so on. For ease of illustration, the IoT is used as an example.

[0063] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the IoT architecture provided by this application. This description uses the IoT in a cloud computing deployment scenario. As shown in Figure 1, IoT 100 includes an end, edge, pipe, and cloud. The end is used to collect data and can serve as the perception layer in the IoT architecture. The end includes IoT devices 110, which include but are not limited to switches, temperature controllers, smoke detectors, lamps, tags, cameras, gates, perimeter sensors, access control systems, and other terminal devices.

[0064] Edges provide functions such as edge computing, software-defined IoT, and data transmission. For example, edges include infrastructure and edge devices. Pipes aggregate data and traffic, providing transmission channels for aggregated data. For example, edges and pipes include network devices 120. Network devices 120 include, but are not limited to, switches and gateways. Edges and pipes serve as the network layer in the IoT architecture, acting as a bridge between the edge and the cloud, transmitting data obtained by the perception layer to designated destinations.

[0065] The cloud can be a cloud data center, including multiple servers 130, that provides functions such as device management, terminal management, container management, application management, and secure access. For explanations of each function, please refer to existing related explanations. The cloud can serve as the platform and application layers in the IoT architecture. The platform layer is used for communication with and operational management of IoT devices. The application layer is used to provide intelligent services based on business domains, such as medical systems, access security, asset management, environmental monitoring, and personnel monitoring.

[0066] This application does not limit the connection methods and link protocols of IoT devices. IoT devices can be connected wirelessly or wired to facilitate data transmission between devices. Device link protocols include WiFi, Ethernet, Bluetooth, RS485, RS232, and other link protocols.

[0067] In this application, the cloud data center can act as a key distribution center (KDC) to distribute security credentials to devices in the Internet of Things. The edge and pipe can act as a key authentication agent (KAA) to verify, distribute, and transmit security credentials. The end acts as a key authentication edge (KAE) to generate an authentication key based on the security credentials. After mutual authentication between IoT devices based on the authentication code generated by the authentication key, the encrypted data processed based on the encryption key is transmitted.

[0068] For example, the IoT device 110 may deploy an operating system and a software development kit (SDK) for security authentication based on the solution provided in this application to facilitate secure communication between IoT devices.

[0069] In other embodiments, a small campus deploys the security authentication solution provided by this application in a server-client (C / S) architecture. Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of another Internet of Things provided by this application. Among them, the Internet of Things 200 includes a server 210 and a client 220. Data is transmitted between the server 210 and the client 220 based on the campus network. The server 210 integrates the functions of the key distribution center and the key authentication agent. The server 210 provides functions such as security authentication, configuration distribution, data reporting, version update, and registration query. The client 220 acts as a key authentication edge and provides the function of a key authentication edge. For example, the switch in the campus acts as the authenticated client and the controller acts as the server, and two-way authentication is completed based on the solution provided by this application for secure communication.

[0070] Next, the implementation scheme of the Internet of Things-based security authentication provided by this application is described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0071] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a security authentication for the Internet of Things provided by this application. The security authentication for the Internet of Things includes a registration phase, an authentication phase, and a management phase.

[0072] Registration phase: Register and apply for security credentials. For example, the authentication center verifies the device to be connected to the Internet of Things based on the whitelist. If the device passes the verification of the authentication center, it obtains the security credentials from the authentication center (step 310).

[0073] Authentication phase: The communicating parties negotiate authentication and data communication encryption and decryption. For example, the devices generate an authentication key based on the security credentials. After the devices authenticate each other using an authentication code generated using the authentication key (step 320), they transmit encrypted data processed using the encryption key (step 330).

[0074] Management phase: Key lifecycle management. For example, the authentication center updates its public key and private key. The device updates its public key and private key (step 340).

[0075] This application proposes a certificate-free, lightweight authentication scheme for the Internet of Things (IoT). It is suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices, i.e., those with limited computing and storage resources. This scheme enables secure authentication of IoT devices, reduces IoT network attacks, and improves IoT network security. It overcomes the challenges of traditional IoT authentication methods, such as the difficulties in key management, distribution, and maintenance, the excessive power of the authentication center, the high resource consumption, and the low performance.

[0076] The registration stage, authentication stage and management stage are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0077] FIG4 is a flow chart of data transmission during a registration phase provided by the present application. This is illustrated using the example of a first device accessing an authentication center. The first device may be the device described in FIG1 as a key authentication agent or key authentication edge. The authentication center may be the device described in FIG1 as a key distribution center. As shown in FIG4 , the method includes the following steps.

[0078] Step 410: The first device sends a registration request to the authentication center.

[0079] The registration request includes an identifier of the first device. The identifier of the first device is used to identify the first device. For example, the identifier of the first device includes an electronic serial number (ESN), manufacturer, and model.

[0080] Step 420: The authentication center sends a response message to the first device.

[0081] The authentication center stores a whitelist that includes the identifiers of multiple devices. After receiving the registration request, the authentication center queries the whitelist. If the whitelist includes the identifier of the first device, the authentication center determines that the first device is legitimate, and a response message, such as an acknowledgment (ACK), is fed back to the first device. If the whitelist does not include the identifier of the first device, the authentication center determines that the first device is illegitimate, and a response message, such as a non-acknowledgement (NACK), is fed back to the first device.

[0082] If the first device is legitimate, the response message includes the public key of the authentication center, the hash function, and the elliptic curve identifier, so that the first device can generate the public key and private key. The public key and private key of the authentication center can be pre-configured. The elliptic curve identifier is used to indicate an elliptic curve, that is, the shape of the elliptic curve.

[0083] Step 430: The first device sends a first ciphertext to the authentication center.

[0084] After receiving the response message, the first device calculates the first device's identifier and random number based on the authentication center's public key to obtain a first ciphertext, so that the authentication center can verify the first device and provide feedback on the security credentials.

[0085] Optionally, the first device calculates the first device's identifier, random number, and fixed character string based on the public key of the authentication center to obtain the first ciphertext, thereby further reducing the possibility of the first ciphertext being deciphered and improving the security of the first ciphertext.

[0086] In some embodiments, the first device and the authentication center perform an encryption and decryption calculation based on the public key of the authentication center and the identifier of the first device, and then send the first ciphertext to the authentication center, thereby improving the security of the authentication center's registration process.

[0087] For example, as shown in FIG5 , the first device obtains the public key of the authentication center from the authentication center. The first device's identifier, encryption parameters, and fixed string are calculated based on the temporary key to obtain a true value (step 431). For example, the true value satisfies the following formula (1).

[0088] AuthenValue_i=AES-CMAC(n_i.ID_i∥R_i∥"MAC") Formula (1)

[0089] R_i=HKDF(K,ID_i∥nonce)

[0090] n_i=HKDF(K,R_i)

[0091] Where AuthenValue_i represents the true value, AES-CMAC and HKDF represent encryption algorithms, K represents the first random number, ID_i represents the device identifier, nonce and MAC represent fixed strings, R_i represents the first encryption parameter obtained based on the first random number, and n_i represents the temporary key.

[0092] The first device calculates the identity and the true value of the first device based on the public key of the authentication center to obtain a third ciphertext. For example, the third ciphertext is calculated as follows: ENC(PK1, ID_i|AuthenValue).

[0093] The first device sends the third ciphertext to the authentication center (step 432), and the authentication center decrypts the third ciphertext based on the authentication center's private key (step 433). The third ciphertext decryption calculation method is as follows: AuthenValue_i = Dec(SK1), where SK1 represents the authentication center's private key.

[0094] If the decryption is successful, it indicates that the first device is legitimate. The first device's identification and true value are obtained and saved so that the first device can be verified based on the identification and true value of the first device. The authentication center sends a confirmation feedback to the first device (step 434).

[0095] The first device calculates the first device's identifier, encryption parameters, and temporary key based on the authentication center's public key to obtain a first ciphertext, and sends the first ciphertext to the authentication center (step 435). For example, the first ciphertext is calculated as follows: ENC(PK1, ID_i|R_i|n_i|A_i), where PK1 represents the authentication center's public key, and A_i represents the second encryption parameter obtained based on the second random number. A_i = a_i*G, where a_i represents the second random number, and G represents the base point of the elliptic curve.

[0096] Step 440: The authentication center successfully verifies the first device and generates a first security certificate.

[0097] The authentication center decrypts the first ciphertext based on the authentication center's private key to obtain the first device's identification, encryption parameters, and temporary key. The first ciphertext decryption calculation method is as follows: ID_i|R_i|n_i|A_i=Dec(SK1).

[0098] The authentication center calculates the identifier of the first device, the encryption parameter, and the fixed string based on the temporary key obtained by decrypting the first ciphertext to obtain a true value. The authentication center and the first device can be pre-configured with the same fixed string.

[0099] If the true value generated by the authentication center is the same as the true value of the first device stored in the authentication center, it indicates that the first device is legal, and the security parameters of the first device are generated (step 440).

[0100] For example, if AuthenValue_i* == AuthenValue_i, AuthenValue_i* = AES-CMAC(n_i.ID_i||R_i||"MAC"), where AuthenValue_i* represents the true value generated by the authentication center.

[0101] In some embodiments, the authentication center generates a first security credential based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of the authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center. For example, the authentication center generates a first security parameter based on a hash function. The first security parameter satisfies the following formula (2).

[0102] S_i=b_i+Hash(ID_i|ID_center|B_i)·SK2 Formula (2)

[0103] B_i=b_i·G+A_i

[0104] Wherein, b_i represents the third random number, ID_center represents the identifier of the authentication center, and B_i and S_i represent the security parameters of the first device.

[0105] The first security credential includes at least one of an identifier of an authentication center, a security parameter of the first device, a hash function, and an elliptic curve identifier.

[0106] Step 450: The authentication center sends a second ciphertext to the first device, where the second ciphertext includes the first security credential.

[0107] The authentication center calculates the second ciphertext based on the temporary key, the first device's identifier, the authentication center's identifier, the encryption parameters, and the first device's security parameters. For example, the second ciphertext is calculated as follows: AES-GCM(n_i,lD_i|ID_center|A_i|B_i|S_i).

[0108] Step 460: The first device generates a public key and a private key of the first device according to the first security credential.

[0109] The first device decrypts the second ciphertext based on the temporary key to obtain the first device's identity, the authentication center's identity, encryption parameters, and the first device's security parameters. The second ciphertext decryption calculation method is as follows: ID_i|ID_center|A_i|B_i|S_i=Dec(n).

[0110] In some embodiments, the first device verifies the legitimacy of the first security credential based on the public key of the authentication center, the identifier of the first device, and the identifier of the authentication center, and generates the public key and private key of the first device based on the first security credential. For example, the first device verifies the first security credential and generates the public key and private key of the first device based on a hash function and an elliptic curve algorithm, and stores the public key and private key of the first device. The public key of the first device and the private key of the first device satisfy formula (3).

[0111] if S_i·G+Ai==T_i+B_i

[0112] T_i=Hash(ID_i|D_center|B_i)·PK2

[0113] pk_i=B_i+T_i sk_i=a_i+s_i Formula (3)

[0114] Here, pk_i represents the public key of the first device, and sk_i represents the private key of the first device.

[0115] In this way, after the authentication center successfully verifies the first device to be connected to the Internet of Things, it distributes the first security credential to the first device. During the registration phase, the authentication center verifies the first device, ensuring the security of the distributed security credential and preventing the distribution of security credentials to unauthorized devices. Furthermore, the first device generates its public and private keys based on an elliptic curve algorithm, effectively reducing the computing and storage resources used by the first device and avoiding the transmission of the first device's public and private keys, reducing the risk of their being obtained and enhancing the security of the first device's public and private keys.

[0116] It should be noted that any device to be connected to the Internet of Things can execute the registration process according to the description of the above embodiment, and obtain security credentials from the authentication center so as to generate public keys and private keys based on the security credentials. Each device in the Internet of Things stores its own public key and private key, and the public key and private key of each device are different. The authentication center manages its own public key and private key, and there is no need to manage the public key, private key and security credentials of the device, which decentralizes the authentication mechanism, reduces the complexity of key management, and improves the security of the public key and private key of the device. The authentication center can be configured with one pair of public keys and private keys, or two pairs of public keys and private keys. When the first device generates the first ciphertext and generates the public key and private key of the first device, the public keys of different authentication centers are used to improve the security of the registration process.

[0117] Optionally, as shown in Figure 6, the device to be connected to the Internet of Things can also be pre-configured with the public key and private key of the authentication center. After the authentication center successfully verifies the device, the response message fed back to the device may not include the public key and private key of the authentication center, but include a hash function and elliptic curve identifier.

[0118] After the first device successfully registers with the authentication center, it can communicate with other devices in the Internet of Things through two-way authentication.

[0119] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of a data transmission process during the authentication phase provided by this application. This description uses the authentication and transmission of data between a first device and a second device as an example. The first device and the second device can be any device in the network, such as the device described in Figure 1 as a key authentication agent or key authentication edge. As shown in Figure 7, the method includes the following steps.

[0120] Step 710: The first device sends a first authentication request to the second device.

[0121] The first authentication request includes parameters related to the first device, for example, an identifier of the first device, a first security parameter, and a first encryption parameter.

[0122] Optionally, the first authentication request may be used as the payload content of a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) message.

[0123] Step 720: The second device sends a second authentication request to the first device.

[0124] The second authentication request includes parameters related to the second device, for example, an identifier of the second device, a second security parameter, and a second encryption parameter.

[0125] Step 730: The first device generates a first authentication key according to the first security credential.

[0126] The first device generates a first authentication key based on the first security credential using an elliptic curve algorithm. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a public key cryptography system whose mathematical foundation is the computational difficulty of elliptic discrete logarithms on the Abel additive group constructed using rational points on an elliptic curve. Due to its advantages of high security, fast processing speed, small storage space usage, and low bandwidth usage, generating authentication keys based on the elliptic curve algorithm enables lightweight security authentication of IoT devices in the Internet of Things, meeting the resource performance requirements of IoT devices.

[0127] In some embodiments, the first device generates a public key of the second device based on the public key of the authentication center and the first security credential; and generates a first authentication key based on the public key of the second device and the private key of the first device. Optionally, when generating the first authentication key, the first device uses the identifier of the first device and a random number obtained from the first device as input parameters. For example, as shown in FIG8 , the public key of the second device satisfies formula (4), and the first authentication key satisfies formula (5).

[0128] pk_2=B2+Hash(ID2|ID_center,B2)*PK2 Formula (4)

[0129] K_Auth=Hash(MK;W||“workKey”) Formula (5)

[0130] MK=(x+Hash(w)"sk_1)·(Y+Hash(W)·pk_2)

[0131] w=B1∥B2∥ID1∥ID2∥X∥Y

[0132] Among them, pk_2 represents the public key of the second device, B2 represents the second security parameter, ID2 represents the identifier of the second device, PK2 represents the public key of the authentication center, sk_1 represents the private key of the first device, B1 represents the first security parameter, ID1 represents the identifier of the first device, X and Y represent encryption parameters, X=x*G, Y=y*G, x represents the fourth random number, and y represents the fifth random number.

[0133] Optionally, the first device generates a first encryption key according to formula (5), K_Enc=Hash(MK; W / / "workKey").

[0134] Step 740: The second device generates a second authentication key based on the second security credential.

[0135] The second device generates a second authentication key based on the second security credential using an elliptic curve algorithm. The details of how the second device obtains the second security credential from the authentication center and generates the second device's public key and private key based on the second security credential can be found in the registration process above and are omitted here.

[0136] The second device generates the public key of the first device based on the public key of the authentication center and the second security credential; and generates the second authentication key based on the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device. Optionally, when generating the second authentication key, the second device uses the identifier of the second device and the random number obtained from the second device as input parameters. For example, as shown in Figure 8, the public key of the first device satisfies formula (6), and the second authentication key satisfies formula (7).

[0137] pk_1=B1+Hash(ID1|ID_center,B1)*PK2 Formula (6)

[0138] K_Auth=Hash(MK;W||“workKey”) Formula (7)

[0139] MK=(y+Hash(w)"sk_2)·(Y+Hash(W)·pk_1)

[0140] w=B1∥B2∥ID1∥ID2∥X∥Y

[0141] Here, pk_1 represents the public key of the first device, and sk_2 represents the private key of the second device.

[0142] Optionally, the second device generates a second encryption key according to formula (5), K_Enc=Hash(MK; W / / "workKey").

[0143] Step 750: The first device sends a first authentication code generated based on the first authentication key to the second device.

[0144] The first device generates a first authentication code based on the first authentication key and the random number. Using the random number as an input parameter for generating the authentication code improves the security of the authentication code. Since the attacking device may not be able to obtain the random number, the authentication code generated by the attacking device may not be recognizable, i.e., the authentication code is illegal data. The first authentication code satisfies the following formula (8).

[0145] Code1=C-MAC(K_Auth,B1|ID1|X|Y) Formula (8)

[0146] Code1 represents the first authentication code, C-MAC represents the encryption algorithm, and K_Auth represents the first authentication key.

[0147] Step 760: The second device successfully verifies the first authentication code and sends a second authentication code generated based on the second authentication key to the first device.

[0148] The second device can use the method used by the first device to generate the first authentication code, generate the first verification code based on the second authentication key, and verify whether the first authentication code is legal. For example, the second device determines whether the first verification code and the first authentication code are the same. When the first verification code and the first authentication code are the same, it is determined that the first device authentication is successful, indicating that the first authentication code is legal; when the first verification code and the first authentication code are different, it is determined that the first device authentication failed, indicating that the first authentication code is illegal. For example, if the first device is an attacking device, the first authentication key generated by the first device may be incorrect, resulting in authentication failure. The second authentication code satisfies the following formula (9).

[0149] Code1*=C-MAC(K_Auth,B1|ID1|X|Y) Formula (9)

[0150] Wherein, Code1* represents the first verification code, and K_Auth represents the second authentication key. If Code1=Code1*, it means that the first device is successfully authenticated.

[0151] After the second device successfully authenticates the first device, it generates a second authentication code based on the second authentication key, the first device's identifier, and a random number. The second authentication code satisfies the following formula (10).

[0152] Code2=C-MAC(K_Auth,B2|ID2|X|Y) Formula (10)

[0153] Code2 represents the second authentication code, C-MAC represents the encryption algorithm, and K_Auth represents the second authentication key.

[0154] Step 770: The first device successfully verifies the second authentication code and sends first encrypted data generated based on the first encryption key to the second device.

[0155] The first device can use the method used by the second device to generate the second authentication code, generate a second verification code based on the first authentication key, and verify whether the second authentication code is legal. For example, the second device determines whether the second verification code and the second authentication code are the same. When the second verification code and the second authentication code are the same, it is determined that the second device authentication is successful, indicating that the second authentication code is legal; when the second verification code and the second authentication code are different, it is determined that the first device authentication failed, indicating that the second authentication code is illegal. For example, if the second device is an attacking device, the second authentication key generated by the first device may be incorrect, resulting in authentication failure. The second verification code satisfies the following formula (11).

[0156] Code2*=C-MAC(K_Auth,B2|ID2|X|Y) Formula (11)

[0157] Wherein, Code2* represents the second verification code, and K_Auth represents the first authentication key. If Code2=Code2*, it means that the second device authentication is successful.

[0158] The calculation method of the first encrypted data is as follows: AES-GCM (K_Enc, data1), where K_Enc represents the first encryption key.

[0159] Step 780: The second device sends second encrypted data generated based on the second encryption key to the first device.

[0160] The calculation method of the second encrypted data is as follows: AES-GCM (K_Enc, data2), where K_Enc represents the second encryption key.

[0161] In this way, the first and second devices generate each other's public keys based on an elliptic curve algorithm and a hash function, and then generate an authentication key based on each other's public keys. This means that the same authentication key is generated based on different input parameters using an asymmetric encryption algorithm. This eliminates the need to transmit public and authentication keys between devices, preventing unauthorized access to these keys and improving their security. Bidirectional authentication between the first and second devices based on the authentication key reduces the amount of ciphertext data and bandwidth usage. This enables secure authentication of resource-constrained IoT devices, reduces vulnerability to cyberattacks, and improves IoT network security.

[0162] Optionally, when a device in the Internet of Things is restarted or not joining the network for the first time, it does not need to register with the authentication center again, and can simply authenticate with the device that needs to communicate, thereby improving the performance of mutual authentication between devices.

[0163] In addition, the solution provided by this application does not require adding new devices to the Internet of Things, modifying hardware, or increasing memory capacity, reducing deployment costs. It can be configured using the terminal software SDK, making it simple and easy to deploy.

[0164] After an IoT device successfully registers with an authentication center, the authentication center can manage the key lifecycle within the system. Key update is a key component of key management and refers to the process of replacing an old key with a new one.

[0165] Figure 9 is a schematic diagram of a key update process during the management phase provided by this application. This example uses the first device updating its key as an example. The authentication center can function as a key distribution center. The first device can function as a key authentication agent or a key authentication edge. As shown in Figure 9, the method includes the following steps.

[0166] Step 910: The authentication center sends an update request to the first device.

[0167] The authentication center may send an update request to the first device according to the operation instruction of the system administrator. Alternatively, the authentication center may also periodically send an update request to the first device. The update request is used to indicate the update of the security credentials.

[0168] For example, the authentication center may periodically update its public key and private key. The authentication center sends the updated security credentials to the first device. The update cycle may be five years, and the update may be performed one month in advance. The first device generates an updated public key and an updated private key based on the updated security credentials, thereby updating the public key and private key of the first device.

[0169] The authentication center can record the version number of the security certificate to facilitate certificate updates. Before the version number wraps around, the device automatically re-negotiates.

[0170] Step 920: The first device updates the public key and private key of the first device.

[0171] The first device may update the public key and private key of the first device according to the update request of the authentication center. Alternatively, the first device may periodically update the public key and private key of the first device. The update cycle may be one year, and the update may be performed one week in advance.

[0172] Step 930: The first device sends a registration request to the authentication center.

[0173] After the first device updates the public key and private key of the first device, it re-registers with the authentication center. For a detailed explanation of the registration process, please refer to the explanation of the above embodiment and will not be repeated here.

[0174] In this way, based on the key update mechanism, before the end of the key's lifetime, or when it is known or suspected that the key has been leaked, the key is updated to improve the security of the public key, private key, security credentials, authentication key and encryption key of devices in the Internet of Things.

[0175] Figure 10 is a flowchart of a key revocation process in the management stage provided by the present application. Here, the first device updates the key as an example. The authentication center can serve as a key distribution center. The first device can serve as a key authentication agent and the second device can serve as a key authentication edge. As shown in Figure 10, the method includes the following steps. The authentication center sends a revocation request to the first device, and the revocation request includes the identifier of the first device, the public key of the authentication center, and a revocation list. (Step 1010). Optionally, the authentication center sends a revocation request to the first device according to the operating instructions of the system administrator. The first device saves the revocation list and the public key of the authentication center (step 1020). When the first device executes the authentication process, it checks whether the identifier of the second device is in the revocation list. If the identifier of the second device is in the revocation list, the authentication of the second device fails; if the identifier of the second device is not in the revocation list, the authentication of the second device succeeds (step 1030). When the first device performs the registration process, it sends a registration request to the authentication center. The authentication center checks whether the first device's identifier is on the revocation list. If the first device's identifier is on the revocation list, the first device registration fails. If the first device's identifier is not on the revocation list, the first device registration succeeds (step 1040). During the registration process, the credential application process, and the session establishment process, it is necessary to check whether the device has been revoked to avoid using revoked security credentials for authentication.

[0176] Optionally, the protocol based on which the message forwarding in the registration process, authentication process and management process described in this application can be a constrained application protocol with certificateless public key authentication (CLPKC over CoAP) or an alternative interactive protocol.

[0177] It is understood that in order to implement the functions in the above embodiments, the device includes hardware structures and / or software modules that perform the corresponding functions. Those skilled in the art should easily appreciate that, in combination with the units and method steps of each example described in the embodiments disclosed in this application, the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is executed in hardware or in a computer software-driven hardware manner depends on the specific application scenario and design constraints of the technical solution.

[0178] The data transmission method provided by the present application is described in detail above in conjunction with Figures 1 to 10. The data transmission device provided by the present application will be described below in conjunction with Figure 11.

[0179] Figure 11 is a schematic diagram of the structure of possible data transmission devices provided by this application. These data transmission devices can be used to implement the functions of the devices in the Internet of Things in the above-mentioned method embodiments, thereby also achieving the beneficial effects of the above-mentioned method embodiments. In this embodiment, the data transmission device can be a device as shown in Figure 4 or Figure 7, or a module (such as a chip) applied to a server.

[0180] As shown in Figure 11, data transmission device 1100 includes a communication module 1110, an authentication module 1120, an encryption module 1130, and a storage module 1140. Data transmission device 1100 is used to implement the functions of the first device or the second device in the method embodiment shown in Figure 4 or Figure 7 above.

[0181] The data transmission apparatus 1100 is used to implement the function of the first device in the method embodiment shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 7 .

[0182] The communication module 1110 is used to obtain the first security credential from the authentication center. For example, the communication module 1110 is used to execute steps 410, 430, and 460 in FIG4.

[0183] The authentication module 1120 is configured to generate a first authentication key according to the first security credential and to generate a first authentication code based on the first authentication key. For example, the authentication module 1120 is configured to execute steps 710, 730, and 750 in FIG. 7 .

[0184] The encryption module 1130 is configured to process the data to be transmitted according to the first encryption key to obtain first encrypted data after the second device passes the authentication based on the first authentication code. For example, the encryption module 1130 is configured to execute step 770 in FIG. 7 .

[0185] The data transmission apparatus 1100 is used to implement the function of the second device in the method embodiment shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 7 .

[0186] The communication module 1110 is used to receive the first authentication code sent by the first device and the second security credential sent by the authentication center. For example, the communication module 1110 is used to execute steps 410, 430, and 460 in FIG4.

[0187] Authentication module 1120 is configured to generate a second authentication key based on the second security credential, generate a first verification code based on the second authentication key, and determine that authentication of the first device is successful when the first verification code and the first authentication code are identical. For example, authentication module 1120 is configured to execute steps 740 and 760 in FIG. 7 .

[0188] The encryption module 1130 is configured to process the data to be transmitted according to the second encryption key to obtain second encrypted data after the first device passes the authentication based on the second authentication code. For example, the encryption module 1130 is configured to execute step 780 in FIG. 7 .

[0189] Optionally, the authentication module 1120 is specifically configured to generate a first authentication key according to the first security credential based on an elliptic curve algorithm, and generate a second authentication key according to the second security credential.

[0190] The storage module 1140 is used to store encryption keys, public keys, private keys and authentication keys to facilitate two-way authentication with devices in the Internet of Things based on the authentication keys.

[0191] Figure 12 is a schematic diagram of the structure of possible data transmission devices provided by this application. These data transmission devices can be used to implement the functions of the authentication center in the Internet of Things in the above-mentioned method embodiments, thereby also achieving the beneficial effects of the above-mentioned method embodiments. In this embodiment, the data transmission device can be a device as shown in Figure 4, or it can be a module (such as a chip) applied to a server.

[0192] As shown in Figure 12, the data transmission device 1200 includes a communication module 1210, a registration module 1220, and a storage module 1230. The data transmission device 1200 is used to implement the functions of the authentication center in the method embodiment shown in Figure 4 above.

[0193] The communication module 1210 is used to receive a registration request and to feed back the public key and security credentials of the authentication center. For example, the communication module 1210 is used to execute steps 420 and 450 in FIG4 .

[0194] The registration module 1220 is configured to generate a first security credential based on the random number, the identifier of the first device, the identifier of the authentication center, and the private key of the authentication center. For example, the registration module 1220 is configured to execute step 460 in FIG. 4 .

[0195] Optionally, the registration module 1220 is specifically used to generate a first security credential based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of the authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center when verifying the legitimacy of the first device.

[0196] The storage module 1230 is used to store the public key and private key of the authentication center.

[0197] It should be understood that the data transmission device 1100 and the data transmission device 1200 of the embodiments of the present application can be implemented using an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or a programmable logic device (PLD). The PLD can be a complex programmable logical device (CPLD), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a generic array logic (GAL), or any combination thereof. Alternatively, when the heat dissipation control method shown in FIG. 4 or FIG. 7 is implemented using software, the respective modules thereof can also be software modules, and the data transmission device 1100 and the data transmission device 1200 and the respective modules thereof can also be software modules.

[0198] According to the embodiments of the present application, the data transmission device 1100 and the data transmission device 1200 may correspond to executing the methods described in the embodiments of the present application, and the above-mentioned and other operations and / or functions of each unit in the data transmission device 1100 and the data transmission device 1200 are respectively for implementing the corresponding processes of each method in Figure 4 or Figure 7. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0199] FIG13 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device 1300 provided in this application. As shown in FIG13 , computer device 1300 includes a processor 1310, a bus 1320, a memory 1330, a communication interface 1340, and a memory unit 1350 (also referred to as a main memory unit). Processor 1310, memory 1330, memory unit 1350, and communication interface 1340 are connected via bus 1320.

[0200] It should be understood that in this embodiment, the processor 1310 may be a CPU, but may also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), ASICs, FPGAs or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.

[0201] The processor may also be a graphics processing unit (GPU), a neural network processing unit (NPU), a microprocessor, an ASIC, or one or more integrated circuits for controlling the execution of the program of the present application.

[0202] Communication interface 1340 is used to enable communication between computer device 1300 and external devices or components. In this embodiment, when computer device 1300 is used to implement the functions of the IoT device shown in Figures 4 or 7, communication interface 1340 is used to obtain security credentials to facilitate bidirectional authentication between processor 1310 and the IoT device based on the authentication key.

[0203] The bus 1320 may include a path for transmitting information between the above-mentioned components (such as the processor 1310, the memory unit 1350, and the storage 1330). In addition to the data bus, the bus 1320 may also include a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus. However, for the sake of clarity, various buses are labeled as bus 1320 in the figure. The bus 1320 may be a Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) bus, an extended industry standard architecture (EISA) bus, a unified bus (Ubus or UB), a compute express link (CXL), a cache coherent interconnect for accelerators (CCIX), etc. The bus 1320 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc.

[0204] As an example, computer device 1300 may include multiple processors. The processor may be a multi-core (multi-CPU) processor. A processor herein may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and / or computing units for processing data (e.g., computer program instructions).

[0205] It is worth noting that FIG13 only takes the computer device 1300 including 1 processor 1310 and 1 memory 1330 as an example. Here, the processor 1310 and the memory 1330 are respectively used to indicate a type of device or equipment. In a specific embodiment, the number of each type of device or equipment can be determined according to business requirements.

[0206] Memory unit 1350 may be a volatile memory pool or a non-volatile memory pool, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Non-volatile memories may be read-only memories (ROMs), programmable read-only memories (PROMs), erasable programmable read-only memories (EPROMs), electrically erasable programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs), or flash memory. Volatile memories may be random access memories (RAMs), which serve as external cache memory. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous DRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous DRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct RAM bus RAM (DR RAM). Memory unit 1350 is used to store information such as security credentials, public keys, private keys, authentication keys, and encryption keys.

[0207] The memory 1330 may correspond to a storage medium used to store information such as elliptic curve algorithms and hash algorithms in the above method embodiments, for example, a disk such as a mechanical hard disk or a solid-state drive.

[0208] The computer device 1300 may be a general-purpose device or a dedicated device. For example, the computer device 1300 may be an edge device (e.g., a box carrying a chip with processing capabilities). Alternatively, the computer device 1300 may be a server or other device with computing capabilities.

[0209] It should be understood that the computer device 1300 according to this embodiment may correspond to the data transmission device 1100 or the data transmission device 1200 in this embodiment, and may correspond to executing the corresponding subject in any method in Figure 4 or Figure 7, and the above-mentioned and other operations and / or functions of each module in the data transmission device 1100 or the data transmission device 1200 are respectively for realizing the corresponding processes of each method in Figure 4 or Figure 7, and for the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.

[0210] An embodiment of the present application provides a chip, comprising: a processor and a power supply circuit; wherein the power supply circuit is used to supply power to the processor; and the processor is used to execute the operating steps of the data processing method described in the above method embodiment.

[0211] The method steps in this embodiment can be implemented by hardware or by a processor executing software instructions. The software instructions can be composed of corresponding software modules, which can be stored in random access memory (RAM), flash memory, read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), registers, hard disks, mobile hard disks, CD-ROMs, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor so that the processor can read information from the storage medium and write information to the storage medium. Of course, the storage medium can also be an integral part of the processor. The processor and storage medium can be located in an ASIC. In addition, the ASIC can be located in a computing device. Of course, the processor and storage medium can also exist as discrete components in a computing device.

[0212] In the above embodiments, they can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, they can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer programs or instructions. When the computer program or instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is executed in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, a network device, a user device or other programmable device. The computer program or instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer program or instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server or data center to another website, computer, server or data center via wired or wireless means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium, such as a floppy disk, a hard disk, or a tape; it can also be an optical medium, such as a digital video disc (DVD); it can also be a semiconductor medium, such as a solid state drive (SSD). The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of various equivalent modifications or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, and such modifications or substitutions should be included in the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A data transmission method, characterized in that: include: Obtain security credentials from a certification authority; generating an authentication key based on the security credential; After the authentication code generated based on the authentication key passes the authentication of the second device, the data to be transmitted is processed according to the encryption key to obtain encrypted data; The encrypted data is sent.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The encryption key is generated based on the security credentials.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: Generating an authentication key according to the security credential includes: The authentication key is generated according to the security credential based on an elliptic curve algorithm.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that Generating an authentication key according to the security credential includes: generating a public key of the second device according to the public key of the authentication center and the security credential; The authentication key is generated according to the public key of the second device and the private key of the first device.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that The method further comprises: The authentication code is generated based on the authentication key pair and the random number calculation of the first device.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that The security credential includes at least one of an identification of the authentication center, a security parameter, a hash function, and an elliptic curve identification.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that The method further comprises: When the security credential is verified to be legitimate, a public key and a private key of the first device are generated according to the security credential.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that Verify that the security credentials are legitimate, including: The security credential is verified to be legitimate based on the public key of the authentication center, the identifier of the first device, and the identifier of the authentication center.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that The method further comprises: Update the public and private keys of the certification authority; or / and, The public key and the private key of the first device are updated.

10. A data transmission method, characterized in that: include: Receiving an authentication code sent by the first device, where the authentication code is calculated based on a first authentication key generated based on the first security credential; generating a verification code based on the second authentication key; When the verification code and the authentication code are the same, determining that the first device is successfully authenticated; Encrypted data sent by the first device is received, where the encrypted data is encrypted by a first encryption key, where the first encryption key is calculated based on the first security credential.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The method further comprises: Obtain a second security certificate from a certification authority; The second authentication key is generated based on the second security credential.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that Generating the second authentication key according to the second security credential includes: generating a public key of the first device according to the public key of the authentication center and the second security credential; The second authentication key is generated according to the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device.

13. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, characterized in that: Generating a verification code based on the second authentication key includes: The verification code is generated based on the identification of the first device and a random number calculation using the second authentication key.

14. A data transmission method, characterized in that: include: Generate a first security credential based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of the authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center; The first security credential is fed back, where the first security credential is used by the first device to generate an authentication key for authentication with the second device.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that Generating a first security credential according to a random number, an identifier of a first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center includes: When verifying the legitimacy of the first device, the first security credential is generated according to a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of the authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center.

16. A data transmission device, characterized in that: The device comprises: A communication module, used to obtain security credentials from an authentication center; An authentication module, configured to generate an authentication key according to the security credential, and generate an authentication code based on the authentication key; An encryption module, configured to process the data to be transmitted according to the encryption key after the authentication of the second device based on the authentication code to obtain encrypted data; The communication module is further used to send the encrypted data to the second device.

17. The device according to claim 16, characterized in that The authentication module is further used for: The encryption key is generated based on the security credentials.

18. The device according to claim 16 or 17, characterized in that When the authentication module generates an authentication key according to the security credential, it is specifically used to: The authentication key is generated according to the security credential based on an elliptic curve algorithm.

19. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 18, characterized in that When the authentication module generates an authentication key according to the security credential, it is specifically used to: generating a public key of the second device according to the public key of the authentication center and the security credential; The authentication key is generated according to the public key of the second device and the private key of the first device.

20. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 19, characterized in that When the authentication module generates an authentication code based on the authentication key, it is used to: The authentication code is generated based on the authentication key pair and the random number calculation of the first device.

21. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 20, characterized in that The security credential includes at least one of an identification of the authentication center, a security parameter, a hash function, and an elliptic curve identification.

22. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 21, characterized in that The authentication module is also used to: When the security credential is verified to be legitimate, a public key and a private key of the first device are generated according to the security credential.

23. The device according to claim 22, characterized in that When the authentication module verifies that the security credential is legitimate, it is used to: The security credential is verified to be legitimate based on the public key of the authentication center, the identifier of the first device, and the identifier of the authentication center.

24. The device according to any one of claims 16 to 23, characterized in that The authentication module is also used to: Update the public and private keys of the certification authority; or / and, The public key and the private key of the first device are updated.

25. A data transmission device, characterized in that: The device comprises: a communication module, configured to receive an authentication code sent by a first device, wherein the authentication code is calculated based on a first authentication key generated based on a first security credential; An authentication module, configured to generate a verification code based on a second authentication key; The authentication module is further configured to determine that authentication of the first device is successful when the verification code and the authentication code are the same; The communication module is further used to receive encrypted data sent by the first device, where the encrypted data is encrypted by a first encryption key, and the first encryption key is calculated based on the first security credential.

26. The device according to claim 25, characterized in that The communication module is further used to obtain a second security certificate from the authentication center; The authentication module is further configured to generate the second authentication key according to the second security credential.

27. The device according to claim 26, characterized in that When the authentication module generates the second authentication key according to the second security credential, it is specifically used to: generating a public key of the first device according to the public key of the authentication center and the second security credential; The second authentication key is generated according to the public key of the first device and the private key of the second device.

28. The device according to any one of claims 25-26, characterized in that When the authentication module generates a verification code based on the second authentication key, it is specifically used to: The verification code is generated based on the identification of the first device and a random number calculation using the second authentication key.

29. A data transmission device, characterized in that: The device comprises: A registration module, configured to generate a first security credential based on a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of an authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center; A communication module is used for the first security credential, and the first security credential is used for the first device to generate an authentication key and authenticate with the second device.

30. The device according to claim 29, characterized in that When the registration module generates the first security credential according to the random number, the identifier of the first device, the identifier of the authentication center and the private key of the authentication center, it is specifically used to: When verifying the legitimacy of the first device, the first security credential is generated according to a random number, an identifier of the first device, an identifier of the authentication center, and a private key of the authentication center.

31. A computer device, characterized in that: The computer device includes a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store a set of computer instructions; when the processor executes the set of computer instructions, it executes the operating steps of the method described in any one of claims 1 to 9, or executes the operating steps of the method described in any one of claims 10 to 13, or executes the operating steps of the method described in claim 14 or 15.

32. A communication system, characterized in that: The communication system includes an authentication center, a first device and a second device, the first device is used to execute the operating steps of the method described in any one of claims 1 to 9, the second device is used to execute the operating steps of the method described in any one of claims 10 to 13, and the authentication center is used to execute the operating steps of the method described in claim 14 or 15.

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