Secure key provisioning with multiple secure component vendors
The method employs a cryptographic session key generated from a public provisioning key and an ephemeral key pair to securely provision data across secure components from multiple vendors, addressing the complexity of key management and resource efficiency in secure key provisioning.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/EP2023/063999
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-25
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-28
AI Technical Summary
Secure key provisioning becomes complex when multiple secure component vendors are involved, as each vendor generates independent class keys, leading to varying public keys across devices in the same batch, making it challenging to encrypt and decrypt secrets efficiently during device manufacturing and deployment.
A method is introduced that uses a processor and memory to generate a cryptographic session key from a public provisioning key and an ephemeral key pair, allowing for secure data provisioning across secure components from different vendors by selecting and encrypting a cryptographic key set using a key agreement protocol, minimizing computing resources and enabling secure key rotation or addition/removal of vendors without disrupting provisioning.
This approach allows for secure and efficient provisioning of secrets to secure components from multiple vendors, reducing manufacturing time and computing resource requirements while maintaining security, and enabling seamless key management without introducing additional security risks.
Smart Images

Figure EP2023063999_28112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] SECURE KEY PROVISIONING WITH MULTIPLE SECURE COMPONENT VENDORS
[0002] Technical Field
[0003] The present disclosure relates, in general, to secure key provisioning with multiple secure component vendors.
[0004] Background
[0005] Consumer devices, such as smart phones for example, can be used for secure transactions such as payment, secure email, end-user authentication and authorization, and so on. To achieve a high security level required for various use cases, it may be required to protect critical information used in such secure transactions using a Secure Component (SC), which is typically an independent chip inside a consumer device that is able to withstand most known physical and logical attacks. For example, to make a contactless credit card payment using a smart phone, it is most likely that the credit card information and payment transactions are managed by a certified Secure Element (SE) chip embedded into the smart phone.
[0006] Secure components, such as SEs, are typically obtained by consumer device manufacturers from third party secure component vendors. Secure component vendors can fabricate and assemble secure components. To protect the information inside a secure component, a secure component vendor, among other protection mechanisms, also usually provisions a class key to each secure component chip at an early stage during the chip manufacturing process. A class key is a symmetric cryptographic key of sufficient strength that is shared among a class (batch) of secure component chips. The purpose of the class key is often to further protect other material that would be provisioned to the secure component at later stages of manufacturing, during the manufacturing of the consumer devices by the device vendor, or even when the consumer devices and chips have been deployed in the field.
[0007] Although a class key can be used directly to encrypt other key materials using a cryptographically secure encryption algorithm, a far more secure and elegant way is to first derive one or multiple asymmetric key pairs from the class key in a reference chip or device, and only use the public keys of such key pairs for further provisioning. This can be particularly useful when a device vendor needs to provision secrets (such as cryptographic keys for example) into the secure component chips already integrated into the devices, either during device manufacturing or in the field, since it only requires that the device vendor knows the public provisioning key (derived from the class key) of the secure components to encrypt the secrets to be provisioned. When a secure component receives the encrypted data, it would derive the corresponding private key from its class key for decryption.
[0008] For the vendor of the consumer devices, such provisioning schemes would be sufficient when there is a single secure component vendor to provide all the secure component chips required for a same device batch, such as a specific device model or sub-model. However, the situation would be challenging if the secure component chips for the same device batch came from multiple secure component vendors. Since each secure component vendor would have generated their class keys independently, the corresponding public keys for provisioning would vary across devices in the same batch. As a result, the device vendor needs to encrypt the secrets to be provisioned in such a way that the encrypted data can be decrypted by secure components with different class keys. The situation would be even more complicated if adding a new secure component vendor, removing a secure component vendor, or allow secure component vendors to change their class keys.
[0009] Summary
[0010] An objective of the present disclosure is to enable secure provisioning to secure components supplied by multiple secure component vendors, by vendors of consumer devices where these secure component chips are integrated, so as to minimize manufacturing time overhead, computing resources required by the secure component chips, and that required by the provisioning server.
[0011] The foregoing and other objectives are achieved by the features of the independent claims.
[0012] Further implementation forms are apparent from the dependent claims, the description and the Figures.
[0013] A first aspect of the present disclosure provides an apparatus for generating secure data, the apparatus comprising a processor, and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory configured to store program code executable by the processor, the program code comprising one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to receive a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor, generate a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor, select a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, encrypt the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, and generate an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
[0014] Accordingly, data (e.g., secret data such as a cryptographic key for example) can be securely provided or provisioned to secure components that originate from different secure component vendors. As such, computing resource requirement is minimized, without introducing additional security risks. Secure component vendors can also to join or leave, or revoke / rotate their keys, in the middle of device manufacturing without adversely affecting the subsequent secure provisioning of data.
[0015] In an implementation of the first aspect, the program code can comprise one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to generate a key encryption key, wherein the key encryption key comprises an encryption key used to encrypt data representing an existing encryption key or a secret, and use the key encryption key to encrypt data representing a secret for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted secret, wherein the encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor includes the encrypted secret.
[0016] The program code can comprise one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to encrypt the key encryption key using the cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted key encryption key. The program code can comprise one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to determine one or more invalid key sets from the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, wherein an invalid key set relates to a vendor of a secure component, and select the first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from the remaining symmetric cryptographic keys of the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys once the invalid key sets are disregarded. The program code can comprise one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to provide a structured set of data for at least one of the first secure component vendor and the device, wherein the structured set of data comprises a public portion of the ephemeral cryptographic key pair, the encrypted secret, and the encrypted key encryption key.
[0017] A second aspect of the present disclosure provides a machine-readable storage medium encoded with instructions for providing secure data, the instructions executable by a processor of a provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to receive a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor, generate a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor, select a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, encrypt the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, and generate an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
[0018] In an implementation of the second aspect, the machine-readable storage medium can be encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to generate a key encryption key, and use the key encryption key to encrypt data representing a secret for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted secret, wherein the encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor includes the encrypted secret. The machine-readable storage medium can be encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to encrypt the key encryption key using the cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted key encryption key. The machine- readable storage medium can be encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to determine one or more invalid key sets from the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, wherein an invalid key set relates to a vendor of a secure component, and select the first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from the remaining symmetric cryptographic keys of the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys once the invalid key sets are disregarded. The machine-readable storage medium can be encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to provide a structured set of data to the first secure component vendor and / or for the device comprising a public portion of the ephemeral cryptographic key pair, the encrypted secret, and the encrypted key encryption key.
[0019] A third aspect of the present disclosure provides a method for providing secure data, the method comprising receiving a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor, generating a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor, selecting a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, encrypting the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, and generating an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
[0020] In an implementation of the third aspect, the method can further comprise generating a key encryption key, and using the key encryption key to encrypt data representing a secret for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted secret, wherein the encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor includes the encrypted secret. The method can further comprise encrypting the key encryption key using the cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted key encryption key. The method can further comprise determining one or more invalid key sets from the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, wherein an invalid key set relates to a vendor of a secure component, and selecting the first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from the remaining symmetric cryptographic keys of the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys once the invalid key sets are disregarded. The method can further comprise providing a structured set of data to the first secure component vendor and / or for the device comprising a public portion of the ephemeral cryptographic key pair, the encrypted secret, and the encrypted key encryption key.
[0021] These and other aspects of the invention will be apparent from the embodiment s) described below.
[0022] Brief Description of the Drawings
[0023] In order that the present disclosure may be more readily understood, embodiments will now be described, by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0024] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a system for generating secure data, according to an example;
[0025] Figure 2 is a schematic representation of a provisioning process during manufacturing according to an example;
[0026] Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a system for generating secure data, according to an example;
[0027] Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a system for generating secure data, according to an example;
[0028] Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a two-stage provisioning process according to an example;
[0029] Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a forest structure according to an example; and
[0030] Figure 7 is a schematic representation of a machine according to an example. Detailed Description
[0031] Example embodiments are described below in sufficient detail to enable those of ordinary skill in the art to embody and implement the systems and processes herein described. It is important to understand that embodiments can be provided in many alternate forms and should not be construed as limited to the examples set forth herein.
[0032] Accordingly, while embodiments can be modified in various ways and take on various alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof are shown in the drawings and described in detail below as examples. There is no intent to limit to the particular forms disclosed. On the contrary, all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the scope of the appended claims should be included. Elements of the example embodiments are consistently denoted by the same reference numerals throughout the drawings and detailed description where appropriate.
[0033] The terminology used herein to describe embodiments is not intended to limit the scope. The articles “a,” “an,” and “the” are singular in that they have a single referent, however the use of the singular form in the present document should not preclude the presence of more than one referent. In other words, elements referred to in the singular can number one or more, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will be further understood that the terms “comprises,” “comprising,” “includes,” and / or “including,” when used herein, specify the presence of stated features, items, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, items, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or groups thereof. The term “and / or” is only an association relationship for describing associated objects and represents that three relationships may exist such that A and / or B may indicate that A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, or B exists alone. The character “ / ” generally represents that the associated objects are in an “or” relationship.
[0034] Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein are to be interpreted as is customary in the art. It will be further understood that terms in common usage should also be interpreted as is customary in the relevant art and not in an idealized or overly formal sense unless expressly so defined herein.
[0035] The following contains specific information related to implementations of the present disclosure. The drawings and their accompanying detailed disclosure are merely directed to implementations. However, the present disclosure is not limited to these implementations. Other variations and implementations of the present disclosure will be obvious to those skilled in the art.
[0036] The phrases “in one implementation,” or “in some implementations,” may each refer to one or more of the same or different implementations. The term “coupled” is defined as connected whether directly or indirectly through intervening components and is not necessarily limited to physical connections. The expression “at least one of A, B and C” or “at least one of the following: A, B and C” means “only A, or only B, or only C, or any combination of A, B and C.”
[0037] The terms “system” and “network” may be used interchangeably.
[0038] For the purposes of explanation and non-limitation, specific details such as functional entities, techniques, protocols, and standards are set forth for providing an understanding of the present disclosure. In other examples, detailed disclosure of well-known methods, technologies, systems, and architectures are omitted so as not to obscure the present disclosure with unnecessary details.
[0039] Persons skilled in the art will immediately recognize that any network fimction(s) or algorithm(s) disclosed may be implemented by hardware, software or a combination of software and hardware. Disclosed functions may correspond to modules which may be software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof.
[0040] A software implementation may include machine- and / or computer- readable and / or executable instructions stored on a machine- and / or computer-readable medium such as memory or other types of storage devices. One or more microprocessors or general-purpose computers with communication processing capability may be programmed with corresponding executable instructions and perform the disclosed network function(s) or algorithm(s).
[0041] The microprocessors or general-purpose computers may include Applications Specific Integrated Circuitry (ASIC), programmable logic arrays, and / or using one or more Digital Signal Processor (DSPs). Although some of the disclosed implementations are oriented to software installed and executing on computer hardware, alternative implementations implemented as firmware or as hardware or as a combination of hardware and software are well within the scope of the present disclosure. The computer readable medium includes but is not limited to Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM), Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), flash memory, Compact Disc Read-Only Memory (CD-ROM), magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage, or any other equivalent medium capable of storing computer-readable instructions.
[0042] As referred to herein, a class key comprises a symmetric key shared among a class (batch) of secure components (usually provisioned to the SC chips at an early stage of manufacturing).
[0043] A Platform Key comprises an asymmetric key pair derived from the class key.
[0044] Provisioning comprises a process where secrets, such as cryptographic keys or configuration data, are sent from a trusted server to target devices securely.
[0045] A naive method to support multiple secure component vendors is to simply apply the same method for a single vendor repeatedly. For example, if there are three secure component vendors, three different class keys and their derived public keys can be provided. In this case, encryption can be repeated three times to obtain three pieces of encrypted data, and the device or the secure component would need to choose one of them for decryption during manufacturing. However, this would require much more computing resources for the computation of encryption and the storage and transmission of the encrypted data. This would also potentially increase the amount of time required to manufacture a device, which is undesirable. All these issues would also be amplified by the number of devices being manufactured. Another seemly simple solution to this problem is to ask all the secure component vendors to use the same class key. This, however, would greatly increase the chance of key leakage and the difficulty of proper management of the keys.
[0046] According to an example, a device vendor can securely provision secrets to a class (batch) of consumer devices, where each device is equipped with a secure component supplied by one of multiple secure component vendors. The entities involved during the provisioning process ae as follows:
[0047] A consumer device, where a secure component integrated chip (IC) chip is integrated, hosting software and / or firmware necessary to retrieve a platform public key from a secure component, output such a public key, receive encrypted secrets from the provisioning server, and forward such encrypted secrets to the secure component. A secure component chip, where a symmetric class key is already provisioned, hosting software and / or firmware required to derive a platform key pair based on requests and parameters from the consumer device, transfer the public key of the key pair to the consumer device, receive encrypted secrets from the consumer device, decrypt the secrets and store the result for future use.
[0048] A provisioning server, hosted in a trusted computing environment, responsible for receiving platform public keys of the secure components for a target device class (batch) from all secure component vendors, generating the secrets to be provisioned, and encrypting the provisioned secrets using the platform public keys.
[0049] A secure component vendor, who manufactures secure components according to the requirements of the device vendor, including the provisioning of a class keys to all the secure component chips, and installation of the firmware / software needed to perform platform key derivation and further provisioning.
[0050] A consumer device vendor, who manufactures consumer devices with integrated secure components, where the manufacturing process involves retrieving platform public keys from the consumer devices, transferring the public key to the provisioning server, receiving encrypting secrets from the provisioning server, forwarding such encrypted data to the consumer devices for provisioning.
[0051] According to an example, there is provided a method for secure provisioning to secure components from different vendors, so that the computing resource requirement is minimized, without introducing additional security risks. Secure component vendors can join or leave, or revoke / rotate their keys, in the middle of device manufacturing. That is, a method of secure provisioning to secure components supplied by multiple secure component vendors is provided. The method can be implemented by vendors of consumer devices where such secure component chips are integrated, so as to minimize the manufacturing time overhead, the computing resources required by the secure component chips, and that required by the provisioning server.
[0052] In an implementation, a secure component (SC) manufacturing method is provided in which the SC vendor provisions a random class key to all SC chips in the same class, derives a provisioning public key (PPK) from a reference SC in the class, receives and provisions a first stage provisioning data to all chips in the class. Key provisioning to a SC can be implemented in two stages. According to an example, the first stage comprises generating a key set for each SC vendor, encrypting the key set for a SC vendor using the PPK from the SC vendor, sending the encrypted key set to an SC, where the key set is decrypted and stored. According to an example, the second stage comprises computing a provisioning key set (PKS) from the key sets of all legitimate (unrevoked) SC vendors, encrypting the secret to be provisioned by the PKS, sending the encrypted data to the target SC, where the secret is decrypted by the SC using the key set from the first stage, and the secret stored for future use. The secret can be a cryptographic key for example, or some other piece of information or data that it is desired to protect.
[0053] According to an example, a trusted provisioning server (TPS) can be used to generate provisioning data. A list of SC vendors can be registered with the TPS, where a PPK is obtained from each vendor for a specific device class. New SC vendors can be added as they become the SC supplier for the target device class, whilst SC vendors can be revoked when there is key leakage, or they are no longer SC suppliers. In an example, the TPS can be used to generate encrypted key sets and device keys as described above in respect of 2-stage provisioning.
[0054] Vendor key sets can be generated and a provisioning key set during provisioning. Vendors can be grouped into multiple trees, and a broadcast encryption algorithm can be applied to each tree. In an example, first stage provisioning data can be computed only once per vendor per SC class, which can be done either by the device or the SC vendor. Second stage provisioning data can be computed for each unique device key, which may or may not be shared among devices. A one-stage provisioning scheme can be provided, where a device key is encrypted by a key encryption key (KEK), which is in turn encrypted multiple times against all the PPKs from all the legitimate SC vendors for the target device class.
[0055] Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a system for generating secure data, according to an example. In the example of figure 1, multiple secure component vendors are provided. For each secure component vendor, a device vendor first retrieves a provisioning public key (PPK) 107, 109 from a reference device 101, 103 that is integrated with a secure component 111, 113 from that particular secure component vendor. Two of such devices are shown in figure 1, however it will be appreciated that more may be provided.
[0056] The provisioning public keys 107, 109 are then transferred to a provisioning server 105 to generate encrypted secrets for provisioning. A provisioning public key is the public portion of a platform key pair derived by the corresponding secure component 111, 113 using its class key. The platform key pair is an asymmetric key pair that supports a secure key agreement algorithm. For example, a platform key pair can be an Elliptic Curve (EC) key pair that supports the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
[0057] The provisioning server 105 first generates a secret 115 to be provisioned (e.g., a cryptographic key), and a random Key Encryption Key 117 to encrypt the generated secret 115. The provisioning server 105 then generates an Ephemeral Key Pair 119 that supports the same key agreement algorithm (e.g., ECDH). The Ephemeral Key Pair 119 is then used to compute key agreement against each of the provisioning public keys 107, 109 to obtain session keys (SKI and SK2 in figure 1). These session keys are then used to encrypt the randomly generated Key Encryption Key (KEK) 117.
[0058] The result is a piece of structured data 121 that includes the public key 123 of the ephemeral key pair 119, the secret encrypted by KEK 125, and the KEK encrypted by each of the computed session keys (127 in the case of the KEK encrypted by the computed session key SKI, and 129 in the case of the KEK encrypted by the computed session key SK2). Such encrypted secret data 121 can then be used for provisioning, such as in factories during the manufacturing of the devices or in-field, after devices are sold for example. In either case, when a device receives such a piece of structured encrypted data 121, a secure component integrated in the device can first compute the key agreement using the Ephemeral Public Key 123 and the private key of its own platform key, which gives the session key (SKI or SK2) used during encryption. The secure component can then choose the correct copy of the encrypted KEK 127, 129 and decrypt it using the computed session key. Finally, the secure component can decrypt the provisioned secret 115 using KEK 117, and store the result (i.e., the secret) for future use.
[0059] Note that the structured data 121 may contain other information that is needed during the provisioning process. For example, each copy of the encrypted KEK may be associated with a label or identifier to identify the provisioning public key used to derive the session key with which the KEK was encrypted. The secure component can then use this label or identifier to correctly identify the copy of the encrypted KEK that was meant for this secure component. Also, if the target secure component vendor is known beforehand, the copies of the encrypted KEK that are not meant for the target secure component may be omitted from the data sent to the device. Furthermore, the encrypted data may be further digitally signed by the trusted provisioning server 105 to prevent it from being modified after it leaves the trusted environment 131. The digital signature may be verified by the device or the secure component before the decryption starts. Figure 2 is a schematic representation of a provisioning process during manufacturing according to an example. With reference to figure 1, a secure component vendor 201 is provided and a device vendor 203 can retrieve the provisioning public key (PPK) (107; 109) from a reference device 205 that is integrated with a secure component 207 from that particular secure component vendor 201. That is, before mass production, a reference chip / device can be provisioned (1) with a class key. The PPK can be retrieved (3) by the provisioning server 105, and this can be repeated for all secure component vendors 201.
[0060] At the provisioning server 105, encrypted secrets can then be generated (5) against all of the PPKs. Data representing, e.g., a cryptographic key, 115 can be generated (5.1) and encryption keys can be derived (5.2) from the PPKs. The key material 115 can be encrypted (5.3) against all KEKs to provide the encrypted secret in the form of a set of structure data 121 that can be provided (6) to the device vendor 203. The set of structure data 121 can be provided (7) to a consumer device 205, which can follow the steps described above in order to determine (7.1, 7.2, 7.3 in figure 2) the data 115. The device 205 can provide a confirmation (8) to the device vendor 203 that the provisioning has been completed. These actions can be repeated for all devices that are to be provisioned.
[0061] Figure 3 is a schematic representation of a system for generating secure data, according to an example. According to an example, a first stage of provisioning occurs before a secure component is integrated into a device. That is, this stage requires a secure component vendor to provision some data from a device vendor before integration.
[0062] In the example of figure 3, a secure component vendor performs a platform key derivation and computes a provisioning public key, in a way similar to that described above with reference to figures 1 and 2. However, since this is done by the secure component vendor, who has the access to the class key directly, the provisioning public key may be computed from the class key directly instead of from a reference chip. In other words, this can be done before the actual secure component chips are manufactured.
[0063] Upon receiving the provisioning public keys 301, 303 from a secure component vendor (two of which are provided in figure 3, in respect of the 1stdevice and its corresponding 1stsecure component, and the 2nddevice and its corresponding 2ndsecure component) , the provisioning server 105 generates a Key Set (KS1, KS2) for each secure component vendor. According to an example, each Key Set can comprise a small subset of a pool of randomly generated symmetric keys. Note that the Key Sets may not be independent, in the sense that the same key may appear in more than one Key Set. That is, there may be overlap of keys. The process to assign keys to Key Sets is described in more detail below. Provisioning server 105 generates a random Ephemeral Key Pair 305, computes key agreement against each of the provisioning public keys to derive a session key (SKI, SK2) for each vendor. These keys (SKI, SK2) are then used to encrypt the Key Sets (KS1, KS2) associated with each vendor separately. The encrypted Key Sets 307, 309 are sent to secure component vendors. After receiving an encrypted Key Set, a secure component vendor can send it to each secure component chip during its manufacturing, where the Key Set is decrypted using similar steps as described above with reference to figures 1 and 2 and stored in a secure region on the chip.
[0064] Figure 4 is a schematic representation of a system for generating secure data, according to an example. In the example of figure 4, as process for a second stage of provisioning is provided, which occurs after the first stage process described above with reference to figure 3.
[0065] Provisioning server 105 generates the secret 401 to be provisioned (e.g., a cryptographic key), generates a random Key Encryption Key (KEK) 403, and encrypts the secret 401 using KEK 403 as described above with reference to figures 1 and 2. To encrypt KEK, the provisioning server loads the Key Sets (KS 1 , KS2 etc.) for the secure component vendors that are considered as valid at the time of provisioning, and computes a new set of keys referred to as the Provisioning Key Set (PKS) 405 out of these Key Sets. The computation is done in such a way that a secure component chip from a valid secure component vendor would have already been provisioned with at least one of the keys in PKS, whereas none of the chips from any invalid secure component vendor would have such a key. The PKS 405 are used to encrypt the KEK 403 encrypted secret 401 to provide a PKS encrypted KEK for each secure vendor, 407, 409.
[0066] A secure component vendor may become invalid at any time during the lifetime of the devices, for example, due to a key leakage or key rotation. A secure component vendor may also become invalid if it no longer supplies chips to the device vendor in the middle of the device manufacturing. On the other hand, new secure component vendors may start supplying chips to the device vendor during device manufacturing, which can be effectively considered as invalid at the beginning but becomes valid when the supply starts. All these scenarios are taken into considerations in this invention. More details can be found in the next embodiment.
[0067] Note that the box labelled PKS Encrypted KEK in figure 4 may further contain multiple copies of encrypted KEK. In fact, the encryption may need to be repeated for each key in the Provisioning Key Set (PKS). Figure 5 is a schematic representation of a two-stage provisioning process according to an example. During the first stage of the two-stage provisioning process, the secure component vendor 201 provisions (1) a class key to each secure component 207 (of respective devices 205) manufactured by the secure component vendor 201. A class key is a symmetric cryptographic key shared among the secure component 207 chips in the same class. The secure component vendor 207 further retrieves (3, 4) a provisioning public key PPK from a reference secure component 207 chip, where the provisioning public key PPK is derived from the provisioned class key. Alternatively, the provisioning public key PPK may be computed by the secure component vendor 207 directly from the class key. The secure component vendor 207 registers (5) the provisioning public key PPK with the device vendor at a provisioning server 105, which can be hosted by the device vendor. The provisioning server 105 generates (5.1) a new Key Set for the secure component vendor and encrypts the Key Set by the registered provisioning public key PPK. Upon receiving the encrypted Key Set, the secure component vendor provisions (6) the encrypted Key Set to each secure component 207, where the Key Set is decrypted and stored. The first stage (stage 1) provisioning process is repeated for each secure component vendor for the target device.
[0068] During the second stage (stage 2) of the two-stage provisioning process, the provisioning server computes a provisioning key set PKS, which is a set of selected keys from all the Key Sets generated for all the secure component vendors in the first stage. For each device to be manufactured, the provisioning server 105 generates the key materials to be provisioned, encrypts the key material using the keys in the provisioning key set PKS, and construct a Keybox containing the encrypted key material and other information required for provisioning (9.1, 9.2). The Keybox data for the devices is then transferred (10) to the factory equipment 203 of the device vendor, where each device 205 receives (11) a Keybox from the factory equipment 203 during the manufacturing process. Upon receiving a Keybox, the secure component 207 integrated into the device 205 chooses (11.1) an appropriate key from the Key Set already provisioned to the secure component 207 during the first stage of the provisioning, decrypts (11.2) the key material from the Keybox and stores the key material for future use.
[0069] It is advantageous to optimize processing time, in terms of the number of decryptions required by each secure component, and then the storage, in terms of the number of keys in each Key Set, and the message length, which is affected by the size of Provisioning Key Set (PKS) and the size of the Key Set. According to an example, a forest structure that contains multiple trees can be employed. Figure 6 is a schematic representation of a forest structure according to an example. Each node represents a symmetric cryptographic key, and leaf nodes of the trees (i.e., nodes labelled from 1 to 8) represent secure component vendors. For each secure component vendor, an assigned Key Set comprises of all the keys along the path from the root of the tree where the vendor is in. For example, vendor 1 601 will have a Key Set containing keys x, a and 1, and vendor 6 603 will be given a Key Set containing keys y, c and 5. When Provisioning Key Set (PKS) are computed during the second-stage provisioning as described above with reference to figures 4 and 5, the following actions can be performed:
[0070] 1. Remove all leaf nodes representing invalid secure component vendors from the tree;
[0071] 2. Remove all ancestor nodes of these removed leave nodes;
[0072] 3. The Provisioning Key Set is the set of all root nodes in the remaining forest.
[0073] For example, if no vendor is revoked, PKS is simply the root nodes of the original forest. That is, with reference to figure 6, PKS = {x, y}. If a single vendor, say vendor 1 601, is revoked, then node 1, a, and x will be removed in the first two steps, and that leads to PKS = {2, b, y}. In the worst case, e.g., when vendors 1 and 5 are revoked, PKS = {2, b, 6, d}. At most 4 keys are needed in PKS regardless of the revocation status of the secure component vendors. Note that the selection of PKS is done in such a way that each secure component will always find a key in PKS that it knows and is used directly to encrypt the KEK, thus making the decryption constant time.
[0074] Examples in the present disclosure can be provided as methods, systems or machine-readable instructions, such as any combination of software, hardware, firmware or the like. Such machine-readable instructions may be included on a computer readable storage medium (including but not limited to disc storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer readable program codes therein or thereon.
[0075] The present disclosure is described with reference to flow charts and / or block diagrams of the method, devices and systems according to examples of the present disclosure. Although the flow diagrams described above show a specific order of execution, the order of execution may differ from that which is depicted. Blocks described in relation to one flow chart may be combined with those of another flow chart. In some examples, some blocks of the flow diagrams may not be necessary and / or additional blocks may be added. It shall be understood that each flow and / or block in the flow charts and / or block diagrams, as well as combinations of the flows and / or diagrams in the flow charts and / or block diagrams can be realized by machine readable instructions.
[0076] The machine-readable instructions may, for example, be executed by a machine such as a general-purpose computer, a platform comprising user equipment such as a smart device, e.g., a smart phone, a special purpose computer, an embedded processor or processors of other programmable data processing devices to realize the functions described in the description and diagrams. In particular, a processor or processing apparatus may execute the machine-readable instructions. Thus, modules of apparatus (for example, a module implementing a provisioning apparatus and so on) may be implemented by a processor executing machine readable instructions stored in a memory, or a processor operating in accordance with instructions embedded in logic circuitry. The term 'processor' is to be interpreted broadly to include a CPU, processing unit, ASIC, logic unit, or programmable gate set etc. The methods and modules may all be performed by a single processor or divided amongst several processors.
[0077] Such machine-readable instructions may also be stored in a computer readable storage that can guide the computer or other programmable data processing devices to operate in a specific mode. For example, the instructions may be provided on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium encoded with instructions, executable by a processor.
[0078] Figure 7 is a schematic representation of a machine according to an example. The machine 700 can be, e.g., a system or apparatus, user equipment, or part thereof. The machine 700 comprises a processor 703, and a memory 705 to store instructions 707, executable by the processor 703. The machine comprises a storage 709 that can be used to store data 701 representing cryptographic keys and / or key sets, identifiers in respect of key sets for secure component vendors and so on as described above with reference to figures 1 to 6 for example.
[0079] The instructions 707, executable by the processor 703, can cause the machine 700 to receive a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor, generate a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor, select a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, encrypt the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, and generate an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
[0080] Accordingly, the machine 700 can implement a method providing and / or generating secure data.
[0081] Such machine-readable instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing devices, so that the computer or other programmable data processing devices perform a series of operations to produce computer-implemented processing, thus the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable devices provide an operation for realizing functions specified by flow(s) in the flow charts and / or block(s) in the block diagrams.
[0082] Further, the teachings herein may be implemented in the form of a computer or software product, such as a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, the computer software or product being stored in a storage medium and comprising a plurality of instructions, e.g., machine readable instructions, for making a computer device implement the methods recited in the examples of the present disclosure.
[0083] In some examples, some methods can be performed in a cloud-computing or network-based environment. Cloud-computing environments may provide various services and applications via the Internet. These cloud-based services (e.g., software as a service, platform as a service, infrastructure as a service, etc.) may be accessible through a web browser or other remote interface of the user equipment for example. Various functions described herein may be provided through a remote desktop environment or any other cloud-based computing environment.
[0084] While various embodiments have been described and / or illustrated herein in the context of fully functional computing systems, one or more of these exemplary embodiments may be distributed as a program product in a variety of forms, regardless of the particular type of computer- readable-storage media used to actually carry out the distribution. The embodiments disclosed herein may also be implemented using software modules that perform certain tasks. These software modules may include script, batch, or other executable files that may be stored on a computer-readable storage medium or in a computing system. In some embodiments, these software modules may configure a computing system to perform one or more of the exemplary embodiments disclosed herein. In addition, one or more of the modules described herein may transform data, physical devices, and / or representations of physical devices from one form to another.
[0085] The preceding description has been provided to enable others skilled in the art to best utilize various aspects of the exemplary embodiments disclosed herein. This exemplary description is not intended to be exhaustive or to be limited to any precise form disclosed. Many modifications and variations are possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the instant disclosure. The embodiments disclosed herein should be considered in all respects illustrative and not restrictive. Reference should be made to the appended claims and their equivalents in determining the scope of the instant disclosure.
Claims
Claims1. Apparatus for generating secure data, the apparatus comprising a processor, and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory configured to store program code executable by the processor, the program code comprising one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to: receive a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor; generate a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor; select a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys; encrypt the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor; and generate an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
2. The apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the program code comprises one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to: generate a key encryption key, wherein the key encryption key comprises an encryption key used to encrypt data representing an existing encryption key or a secret; use the key encryption key to encrypt data representing a secret for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted secret, wherein the encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor includes the encrypted secret.
3. The apparatus as claimed in claim 2, wherein the program code comprises one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to: encrypt the key encryption key using the cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted key encryption key.
4. The apparatus as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the program code comprises one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to: determine one or more invalid key sets from the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, wherein an invalid key set relates to a vendor of a secure component; and select the first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from the remaining symmetric cryptographic keys of the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys once the invalid key sets are disregarded.
5. The apparatus as claimed in claim 3, wherein the program code comprises one or more instructions, whereby to cause the apparatus to: provide a structured set of data for at least one of the first secure component vendor and the device, wherein the structured set of data comprises a public portion of the ephemeral cryptographic key pair, the encrypted secret, and the encrypted key encryption key.
6. A machine-readable storage medium encoded with instructions for providing secure data, the instructions executable by a processor of a provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to: receive a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor;generate a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor; select a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys; encrypt the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor; and generate an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
7. The machine-readable storage medium as claimed in claim 6, encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to: generate a key encryption key; use the key encryption key to encrypt data representing a secret for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted secret, wherein the encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor includes the encrypted secret.
8. The machine-readable storage medium as claimed in claim 7, encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to: encrypt the key encryption key using the cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted key encryption key.
9. The machine-readable storage medium as claimed in any of claims 6 to 8, encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to: determine one or more invalid key sets from the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, wherein an invalid key set relates to a vendor of a secure component; and select the first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from the remaining symmetric cryptographic keys of the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys once the invalid key sets are disregarded.
10. The machine-readable storage medium as claimed in claim 8, encoded with further instructions executable by the processor of the provisioning apparatus, whereby to cause the provisioning apparatus to: provide a structured set of data to the first secure component vendor and / or for the device comprising a public portion of the ephemeral cryptographic key pair, the encrypted secret, and the encrypted key encryption key.
11. A method for providing secure data, the method comprising: receiving a first public cryptographic provisioning key from a first reference secure component of a first secure component vendor, wherein the first public cryptographic provisioning key comprises a public portion of a cryptographic platform key pair derived by the first reference secure component using a cryptographic class key of the first secure component vendor; generating a first cryptographic session key using the first public cryptographic provisioning key and a private portion of an ephemeral cryptographic key pair derived by the apparatus, wherein the first cryptographic session key is generated using a key agreement protocol between the apparatus and the first secure component vendor; selecting a first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from a predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys;encrypting the selected first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor using the first cryptographic session key, whereby to generate a first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor; and generating an encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor using a cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor.
12. The method as claimed in claim 11, further comprising: generating a key encryption key; and using the key encryption key to encrypt data representing a secret for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted secret, wherein the encrypted set of data for the first secure component vendor includes the encrypted secret.
13. The method as claimed in claim 12, further comprising: encrypting the key encryption key using the cryptographic key selected from the first encrypted cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor, whereby to provide an encrypted key encryption key.
14. The method as claimed in any of claims 11 to 13, further comprising: determining one or more invalid key sets from the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys, wherein an invalid key set relates to a vendor of a secure component; and selecting the first cryptographic key set for the first secure component vendor from the remaining symmetric cryptographic keys of the predefined set of symmetric cryptographic keys once the invalid key sets are disregarded.
15. The method as claimed in claim 13, further comprising:providing a structured set of data to the first secure component vendor and / or for the device comprising a public portion of the ephemeral cryptographic key pair, the encrypted secret, and the encrypted key encryption key.
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