Method and apparatus for increasing security level related to transmission of configuration information in wireless communication system

Abstract

The present disclosure relates to a 5G or 6G communication system for supporting a higher data transmission rate. Particularly, the present disclosure provides a method and an apparatus for increasing a security level when providing configuration information to a UE in a wireless communication system (or a mobile communication system).

Description

Method and device for increasing the security level for transmitting configuration information in a wireless communication system

[0001] The present disclosure relates to a method and device for enhancing the security level of configuration information transmission in a wireless communication system. Specifically, the present disclosure relates to a method and device for enhancing the security level when a network provides configuration information to a terminal in a wireless communication system.

[0002] 5G mobile communication technology defines a wide frequency band to enable fast transmission speeds and new services, and can be implemented not only in the sub-6GHz frequency band such as 3.5 gigahertz (3.5GHz), but also in the ultra-high frequency band called millimeter wave (mmWave) such as 28GHz and 39GHz ('Above 6GHz'). In addition, for 6G mobile communication technology, which is called the system after 5G communication (Beyond 5G), implementation in the terahertz (THz) band (for example, 3 THz band at 95GHz) is being considered to achieve a transmission speed that is 50 times faster than 5G mobile communication technology and an ultra-low latency time that is reduced to one-tenth.

[0003] In the early stages of 5G mobile communication technology, the goal is to support services and satisfy performance requirements for enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC). These include beamforming and massive MIMO to mitigate path loss of radio waves in ultra-high frequency bands and increase the transmission distance of radio waves, support for various numerologies (such as operation of multiple subcarrier intervals) and dynamic operation of slot formats for efficient use of ultra-high frequency resources, initial access technology to support multi-beam transmission and wideband, definition and operation of BWP (Bidth Part), new channel coding methods such as LDPC (Low Density Parity Check) codes for large-capacity data transmission and Polar Code for reliable transmission of control information, and L2 pre-processing (L2). Standardization has been made for network slicing, which provides dedicated networks specialized for specific services, and pre-processing.

[0004] Currently, discussions are underway to improve and enhance the initial 5G mobile communication technology in consideration of the services that 5G mobile communication technology was intended to support, and physical layer standardization is in progress for technologies such as V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) to help autonomous vehicles make driving decisions and increase user convenience based on their own location and status information transmitted by vehicles, NR-U (New Radio Unlicensed) for the purpose of system operation that complies with various regulatory requirements in unlicensed bands, NR terminal low power consumption technology (UE Power Saving), Non-Terrestrial Network (NTN), which is direct terminal-satellite communication to secure coverage in areas where communication with terrestrial networks is impossible, and Positioning.

[0005] In addition, standardization of wireless interface architecture / protocols is in progress for technologies such as intelligent factories (Industrial Internet of Things, IIoT) to support new services through linkage and convergence with other industries, Integrated Access and Backhaul (IAB) that provides nodes for expanding network service areas by integrating wireless backhaul links and access links, Mobility Enhancement technology including Conditional Handover and Dual Active Protocol Stack (DAPS) handover, and 2-step random access (2-step RACH for NR) that simplifies random access procedures. Standardization is also in progress for system architecture / services such as 5G baseline architecture (e.g., Service-based Architecture, Service-based Interface) for grafting Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN) technologies, and Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) that provides services based on the location of the terminal.

[0006] Once these 5G mobile communication systems are commercialized, an explosive increase in connected devices will be connected to the communication network, necessitating enhanced functionality and performance of 5G mobile communication systems and integrated operation of these connected devices. To this end, new research will be conducted on improving 5G performance and reducing complexity, supporting AI services, supporting metaverse services, and drone communications by utilizing eXtended Reality (XR), Artificial Intelligence (AI), and Machine Learning (ML) to efficiently support Augmented Reality (AR), Virtual Reality (VR), and Mixed Reality (MR).

[0007] In addition, the development of these 5G mobile communication systems includes new waveforms to ensure coverage in the terahertz band of 6G mobile communication technology, multi-antenna transmission technologies such as Full Dimensional MIMO (FD-MIMO), Array Antenna, and Large Scale Antenna, metamaterial-based lenses and antennas to improve the coverage of terahertz band signals, high-dimensional spatial multiplexing technology using Orbital Angular Momentum (OAM), Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface (RIS) technology, as well as full duplex technology to improve the frequency efficiency and system network of 6G mobile communication technology, satellite, AI (Artificial Intelligence) from the design stage and AI-based communication technology that realizes system optimization by internalizing end-to-end AI support functions, and ultra-high-performance communication and computing resources to provide services with complexity that exceeds the limits of terminal computing capabilities. It can serve as a basis for the development of next-generation distributed computing technologies that can be realized by utilizing them.

[0008] As described above and with the development of mobile communication systems, various services have become available, and methods for effectively providing these services are required.

[0009] The network can provide configuration information to a roaming terminal. Currently, the Steering of Roaming (SoR) or UE Parameters Update (UPU) method can be used for this. The above method is used when the AUSF of the Home PLMN (HPLMN) is K AUSFIt is transmitted to the Visited PLMN (hereinafter referred to as VPLMN) with only integrity protection using K, one of the keys that must be managed most securely. AUSF Using KAUSF directly for integrity protection and transmitting it to the VPLMN can be a security threat. For example, if enough data and its values ​​are protected by KAUSF, the VPLMN can transmit the KAUSF data to the VPLMN. AUSF , which creates the possibility of inferring K that must be safely managed only in HPLMN. AUSF The ability to infer information from the VPLMN may violate security requirements. Furthermore, the use of SoR and UPU to provide configuration information to roaming terminals is increasing the types of data being sent using these two mechanisms, and it is likely that this will include data that should not be exposed to the VPLMN.

[0010] Based on the discussion described above, the present disclosure seeks to address security concerns that may arise when a network provides configuration information to a terminal.

[0011] In a method performed by a terminal according to one embodiment of the present disclosure, the method comprises: an operation of transmitting an indicator indicating whether the terminal supports a new function; an operation of receiving an indicator indicating whether the network supports a new function; an operation of receiving an indicator indicating whether the setting information is encrypted; K AUSF An action to create a subkey from; which may include an action to decrypt and verify integrity protection with the created subkey.

[0012] In a method performed by an AUSF (or a first network entity) according to one embodiment of the present disclosure, the method comprises: receiving an indicator indicating whether a terminal supports a new function; transmitting an indicator indicating whether a network supports a new function; receiving an indicator indicating that encryption of configuration information is required from a UDM (or a second network entity); K AUSF The operation may include an operation of creating a subkey from; an operation of encrypting and integrity-protecting configuration information using the created subkey; an operation of generating an indicator that the configuration information has been encrypted and integrity-protected; and an operation of transmitting the encrypted and integrity-protected configuration information to the UDM.

[0013] A method performed by an AUSF entity according to one embodiment of the present disclosure includes the steps of receiving, from a unified data management (UDM) entity, configuration information and an instruction indicating encryption or integrity protection for the configuration information, generating a first subkey for encryption or a second subkey for integrity protection from a stored upper key, encrypting the configuration information using the first subkey or integrity-protecting the configuration information using the second subkey, and transmitting the encrypted or integrity-protected configuration information to the UDM entity.

[0014] In one embodiment, the method performed by the AUSF may further include transmitting to the UDM entity information about the first algorithm used for the encryption or information about the second algorithm used for the integrity protection.

[0015] Additionally, in one embodiment, the method performed by the AUSF further includes a step of generating a MAC (massage authentication code) value using at least one of the upper key, the second lower key, or a counter value used for integrity protection, wherein the MAC value can be used to verify whether configuration information received from the user terminal has been tampered with.

[0016] Additionally, in one embodiment, the method performed by the AUSF may further include the steps of receiving terminal capability information indicating whether the user terminal can generate a first subkey or a second subkey from a parent key, and transmitting the terminal capability information to the UDM entity. Here, the parent key may be K_AUSF, the first subkey may be K_SoRenc, and the second subkey may be K_SoRint.

[0017] A method performed by a user equipment (UE) in a wireless communication system includes the steps of receiving, from an access and mobility management function (AMF) entity, encrypted or integrity-protected configuration information and an indicator indicating that the configuration information is encrypted or integrity-protected, generating a first subkey for decryption or a second subkey for integrity-protection verification from a stored upper key, and decrypting the encrypted configuration information using the first subkey or verifying the integrity-protection of the integrity-protected configuration information using the second subkey.

[0018] In one embodiment, the method performed by the user terminal may further include receiving, from the AMF entity, information about a first algorithm used for encryption or information about a second algorithm used for integrity protection.

[0019] Additionally, in one embodiment, the method performed by the user terminal further includes the step of generating a MAC (massage authentication code) value using at least one of a higher key, a second lower key, or a counter value used for integrity protection, and the step of transmitting the MAC value to an AMF entity, wherein the MAC value can be used to check whether configuration information received by the user terminal has been tampered with.

[0020] Additionally, in one embodiment, the method performed by the user terminal may further include the steps of transmitting terminal capability information indicating whether the user terminal can generate the first subkey or the second subkey from the upper key to the AMF entity, and receiving network capability information from the AMF entity indicating whether the network entity can generate the first subkey or the second subkey from the upper key.

[0021] Various embodiments of the present disclosure can provide a device and method for safely providing a service in a wireless communication system.

[0022] The effects that can be obtained from the present disclosure are not limited to the effects mentioned in the various embodiments, and other effects that are not mentioned can be clearly understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the present disclosure belongs from the description below.

[0023] FIG. 1A illustrates a communication network including core network entities in a wireless communication system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0024] FIG. 1b illustrates a wireless environment including a core network in a wireless communication system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0025] FIG. 2A illustrates an example of a functional structure of a terminal according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0026] FIG. 2b illustrates an example of a functional structure of a base station according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0027] FIG. 2c illustrates an example of a functional structure of a core network object according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0028] FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a process of safely providing setting information to a terminal using SoR during a registration process according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0029] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a process of safely providing setting information to a terminal using SoR after a registration process according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0030] FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a process of safely providing configuration information to a terminal using a UPU according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0031] The terms used in this disclosure are used only to describe specific embodiments and may not be intended to limit the scope of other embodiments. The singular expression may include plural expressions unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. Terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, may have the same meaning as commonly understood by those of ordinary skill in the art described in this disclosure. Terms defined in general dictionaries among the terms used in this disclosure may be interpreted as having the same or similar meaning in the context of the relevant technology, and shall not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unless explicitly defined in this disclosure. In some cases, even if a term is defined in this disclosure, it cannot be interpreted to exclude embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0032] The various embodiments of the present disclosure described below illustrate a hardware-based approach as an example. However, since the various embodiments of the present disclosure include techniques utilizing both hardware and software, the various embodiments of the present disclosure do not exclude a software-based approach.

[0033] 3GPP, responsible for cellular mobile communications standards, is standardizing a new core network architecture, dubbed 5G core (5GC), to facilitate the evolution of existing 4G LTE systems into 5G systems. Compared to the evolved packet core (EPC), the network core for existing 4G systems, 5GC supports the following differentiated features:

[0034] First, 5GC introduces network slicing. As a 5G requirement, 5GC must support various terminal types and services (e.g., eMBB, URLLC, or mMTC services). Each type of service has different requirements for the core network. For example, eMBB services require high data rates, while URLLC services require high reliability and low latency. One technology proposed to meet these diverse service requirements is network slicing.

[0035] Network slicing virtualizes a single physical network to create multiple logical networks. Each network slice instance (NSI) can have different characteristics. Therefore, each NSI can satisfy diverse service requirements by possessing a network function (NF) tailored to its characteristics. If each terminal is assigned an NSI that matches the characteristics of the service it requires, multiple 5G services can be efficiently supported.

[0036] Second, 5GC can facilitate support for the network virtualization paradigm by separating mobility management and session management functions. In 4G LTE (long term evolution), services were provided through signaling exchanges with a single core device called the mobility management entity (MME), which was responsible for registration, authentication, mobility management, and session management for all terminals. However, in 5G, the number of terminals increases explosively, and the mobility and traffic / session characteristics that must be supported for each terminal type become more specialized. Therefore, supporting all functions with a single device like the MME inevitably reduces scalability by adding entities for each required function. Therefore, various functions are being developed based on a structure that separates mobility management and session management functions to improve scalability in terms of functional / implementation complexity and signaling load of the core device responsible for the control plane.

[0037] Hereinafter, various embodiments will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Furthermore, when describing embodiments of the present disclosure, detailed descriptions of related known functions or configurations will be omitted if they are deemed to unnecessarily obscure the gist of the embodiments. Furthermore, the terms described below are defined in consideration of their functions in the embodiments, and may vary depending on the intent or custom of the user or operator. Therefore, their definitions should be based on the contents throughout this specification.

[0038] For the same reason, some components in the attached drawings are exaggerated, omitted, or schematically depicted. Furthermore, the dimensions of each component do not entirely reflect its actual size. Identical or corresponding components in each drawing are assigned the same reference numbers.

[0039] The advantages and features of the present disclosure, and methods for achieving them, will become clearer with reference to the embodiments described in detail below together with the accompanying drawings. However, the present disclosure is not limited to the embodiments disclosed below and may be implemented in various different forms. These embodiments are provided solely to ensure that the present disclosure is complete and to fully inform those skilled in the art of the scope of the disclosure, and the present disclosure is defined only by the scope of the claims. Like reference numerals designate like elements throughout the specification.

[0040] At this time, it will be understood that each block of the processing flowchart drawings and combinations of the flowchart drawings can be performed by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be installed in a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, or other programmable data processing equipment, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing equipment create a means for performing the functions described in the flowchart block(s). These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-available or computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to implement the functions in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-available or computer-readable memory can also produce a manufactured item that includes an instruction means for performing the functions described in the flowchart block(s). Since the computer program instructions can also be installed on a computer or other programmable data processing device, a series of operational steps can be performed on the computer or other programmable data processing device to create a computer-executable process, and the instructions that cause the computer or other programmable data processing device to perform can also provide operations for performing the functions described in the flowchart block(s).

[0041] Additionally, each block may represent a module, segment, or portion of code that contains one or more executable instructions for performing a specific logical function(s). It should also be noted that in some alternative implementation examples, the functions described in the blocks may occur out of order. For example, two blocks depicted in succession may actually be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in reverse order, depending on their respective functions.

[0042] Here, the term '~ unit' used in various embodiments of the present disclosure means a software or hardware component such as an FPGA or ASIC, and the '~ unit' can perform certain roles. However, the '~ unit' is not limited to software or hardware. The '~ unit' may be configured to be on an addressable storage medium and may be configured to play one or more processors. Accordingly, as an example, the '~ unit' may include components such as software components, object-oriented software components, class components, and task components, processes, functions, properties, procedures, subroutines, segments of program code, drivers, firmware, microcode, circuits, data, databases, data structures, tables, arrays, and variables. The functions provided within the components and '~ units' may be combined into a smaller number of components and '~ units' or further separated into additional components and '~ units'. Additionally, components and '~parts' may be implemented to regenerate one or more CPUs within a device or secure multimedia card.

[0043] Hereinafter, a base station is an entity that performs resource allocation of a terminal, and may be at least one of an eNode B (eNB), a Node B, a BS (base station), a RAN (radio access network), an AN (access network), a RAN node, a NR NB, a gNB, a wireless access unit, a base station controller, or a node on a network. The terminal may include a user equipment (UE), a mobile station (MS), a cellular phone, a smartphone, a computer, or a multimedia system capable of performing a communication function. In various embodiments of the present disclosure, a case where the terminal is a UE will be described as an example. In addition, although various embodiments of the present disclosure are described below using a system based on LTE, LTE-A, or NR as an example, various embodiments of the present disclosure may be applied to other communication systems having a similar technical background or channel type. In addition, various embodiments of the present disclosure may be applied to other communication systems with some modifications within a range that does not significantly depart from the scope thereof at the discretion of a person having skilled technical knowledge.

[0044] The terms used in the following description to identify connection nodes, terms referring to network entities, terms referring to messages, terms referring to interfaces between network entities, terms referring to various identification information, etc. are provided as examples for convenience of explanation. Therefore, the present disclosure is not limited to the terms described below, and other terms referring to objects with equivalent technical meanings may be used.

[0045] Additionally, while this disclosure describes various embodiments using terminology used in certain communication standards (e.g., 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)), these are merely illustrative examples. The various embodiments of this disclosure can be easily modified and applied to other communication systems. Below, some terms used in the core network of this disclosure are predefined.

[0046] AMF Access and Mobility Management Function

[0047] CN Core Network

[0048] CNF Containerized Network Function

[0049] DNN Data Network Name

[0050] PCF Policy Control Function

[0051] HSS Home Subscriber Server

[0052] SMF Session Management Function

[0053] UDM User Data Management

[0054] UPF User Plane Function

[0055] CNF Containerized Network Function

[0056] VNF Virtual Network Function

[0057] FIG. 1A illustrates a communication network including core network entities in a wireless communication system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The 5G mobile communication network may be configured to include a 5G user equipment (UE) (110), a 5G radio access network (RAN) (120), and a 5G core network.

[0058] The 5G core network may be configured to include network functions such as an access and mobility management function (AMF) (150) that provides a mobility management function of UE, a session management function (SMF) (160) that provides a session management function, a user plane function (UPF) (170) that performs a data transfer role, a policy control function (PCF) (180) that provides a policy control function, a unified data management (UDM) (153) that provides a data management function such as subscriber data and policy control data, or a unified data repository (UDR) that stores data of various network functions.

[0059] Referring to FIG. 1A, a user equipment (UE) (110) may communicate with a base station (e.g., an eNB, a gNB) via a wireless channel, i.e., an access network. In some embodiments, the UE (110) may be a device used by a user and configured to provide a user interface (UI). As an example, the UE (110) may be a terminal mounted (equipment) on a vehicle for driving. In some other embodiments, the UE (110) may be a device that performs machine type communication (MTC) that operates without user intervention, or may be an autonomous vehicle. UE may be referred to as a 'terminal', 'vehicle terminal', 'user equipment (UE)', 'mobile station', 'subscriber station', 'remote terminal', 'wireless terminal', or 'user device' or other terms having equivalent technical meanings, other than electronic devices. As the terminal, in addition to the UE, a customer-premises equipment (CPE) or a dongle-type terminal may be used. The CPE, while connected to the NG-RAN node like the UE, may also provide a network to other communication devices (e.g., a laptop).

[0060] Referring to FIG. 1A, the AMF (150) provides a function for connection and mobility management per terminal (110), and basically, one AMF (150) can be connected to one terminal (110). Specifically, the AMF (150) can perform at least one of signaling between core network nodes for mobility between 3GPP access networks, an interface (N2 interface) between wireless access networks (e.g., 5G RAN) (120), NAS signaling with the terminal (110), identification of the SMF (160), and provision of transmission of session management (SM) messages between the terminal (110) and the SMF (160). Some or all of the functions of the AMF (150) can be supported within a single instance of one AMF (150).

[0061] Referring to FIG. 1A, the SMF (160) provides a session management function, and when the terminal (110) has multiple sessions, each session may be managed by a different SMF (160). Specifically, the SMF (160) may perform at least one of the following functions: session management (e.g., session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between the UPF (170) and the access network node), selection and control of UP (user plane) functions, traffic steering setup for routing traffic to an appropriate destination in the UPF (170), termination of the SM portion of NAS messages, downlink data notification (DDN), and initiation of AN-specific SM information (e.g., delivery to the access network via the N2 interface via the AMF (150)). Some or all of the functions of the SMF (160) may be supported within a single instance of one SMF (160).

[0062] In the 3GPP system, conceptual links connecting NFs within a 5G system may be referred to as reference points. Reference points may also be referred to as interfaces. The following exemplifies reference points (hereafter, interchangeably referred to as interfaces) included in the 5G system architecture represented across various embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0063] - N1: Reference point between UE (110) and AMF (150)

[0064] - N2: Reference point between (R)AN(120) and AMF(150)

[0065] - N3: Reference point between (R)AN(120) and UPF(170)

[0066] - N4: Reference point between SMF (160) and UPF (170)

[0067] - N5: Reference point between PCF (180) and AF (130)

[0068] - N6: Reference point between UPF (170) and DN (140)

[0069] - N7: Reference point between SMF (160) and PCF (180)

[0070] - N8: Reference point between UDM (153) and AMF (150)

[0071] - N9: Reference point between two core UPFs (170)

[0072] - N10: Reference point between UDM (153) and SMF (160)

[0073] - N11: Reference point between AMF (150) and SMF (160)

[0074] - N12: Reference point between AMF (150) and authentication server function (AUSF) (151)

[0075] - N13: Reference point between UDM (153) and authentication server function (151)

[0076] - N14: Reference point between two AMFs (150)

[0077] - N15: For non-roaming scenarios, reference point between PCF (180) and AMF (150), for roaming scenarios, reference point between PCF (180) and AMF (150) within the visited network.

[0078] FIG. 1B illustrates a wireless environment including a core network in a wireless communication system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. Referring to FIG. 1B, the wireless communication system may include a radio access network (RAN) (120) and a core network (CN).

[0079] The wireless access network (120) is a network that is directly connected to a user device, for example, a terminal (110), and is an infrastructure that provides wireless access to the terminal (110). The wireless access network (120) includes a set of a plurality of base stations including a base station (125), and the plurality of base stations can communicate through interfaces formed between each other. At least some of the interfaces between the plurality of base stations can be wired or wireless. The base station (125) can have a structure that is divided into a central unit (CU) and a distributed unit (DU). In this case, one CU can control a plurality of DUs. The base station (125) can be referred to as an 'access point (AP)', 'next generation node B (gNB)', '5th generation node (5G node)', 'wireless point', 'transmission / reception point (TRP)', or other terms having an equivalent technical meaning thereto in addition to the base station. The terminal (110) can connect to a wireless access network (120) and communicate with a base station (125) via a wireless channel. The terminal (110) may be referred to as a 'user equipment (UE)', a 'mobile station', a 'subscriber station', a 'remote terminal', a 'wireless terminal', a 'user device', or other terms having an equivalent technical meaning.

[0080] The core network is a network that manages the entire system, controls the wireless access network (120), and can process data and control signals for terminals (110) transmitted and received through the wireless access network (120). The core network can perform various functions, such as controlling the user plane and the control plane, processing mobility, managing subscriber information, billing, and interworking with other types of systems (e.g., long term evolution (LTE) system). In order to perform the various functions described above, the core network can include a number of functionally separated entities having different network functions (NFs). For example, the core network (200) may include an access and mobility management function (AMF) (150), a session management function (SMF) (160), a user plane function (UPF) (170), a policy and charging function (PCF) (180), a network repository function (NRF) (159), a unified data management (UDM) (153), a network exposure function (NEF) (155), and / or a unified data repository (UDR) (157).

[0081] The terminal (110) can be connected to the AMF (150) that performs the mobility management function of the core network by being connected to the wireless access network (120). The AMF (150) is a function or device that is in charge of both the connection to the wireless access network (120) and the mobility management of the terminal (110). The SMF (160) is an NF that manages sessions. The AMF (150) is connected to the SMF (160), and the AMF (150) can route session-related messages for the terminal (110) to the SMF (160). The SMF (160) is connected to the UPF (170) to allocate user plane resources to be provided to the terminal (110), and can establish a tunnel for transmitting data between the base station (125) and the UPF (170). PCF (180) can control information related to policy and charging for the session used by the terminal (110).

[0082] The NRF (159) can store information about NFs installed in a mobile communication service provider network and perform a function of notifying the stored information. The NRF (159) can be connected to all NFs. When each NF starts operating in the service provider network, it registers with the NRF (159) to notify the NRF (159) that the NF is operating within the network. The UDM (153) is an NF that performs a role similar to the HSS (home subscriber server) of a 4G network, and can store subscription information of the terminal (110) or the context used by the terminal (110) within the network.

[0083] The NEF (155) may connect a third-party server and an NF within a 5G mobile communication system. It may also provide data to, update, or acquire data from the UDR (157). The UDR (157) may store subscription information for the terminal 120, store policy information, store data exposed externally, or store information required for a third-party application. Furthermore, the UDR (157) may also provide stored data to other NFs.

[0084] FIG. 2A illustrates an example of the functional structure of a terminal according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. The configuration illustrated in FIG. 2A can be understood as the configuration of a terminal (110). Terms such as "... unit" and "... device" used hereinafter refer to a unit that processes at least one function or operation, which can be implemented using hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

[0085] Referring to FIG. 2a, the terminal may include a communication unit (205), a storage unit (210), and a control unit (215).

[0086] The communication unit (205) can perform functions for transmitting and receiving signals via a wireless channel. For example, the communication unit (205) can perform a conversion function between a baseband signal and a bit stream according to the physical layer specifications of the system. For example, when transmitting data, the communication unit (205) can generate complex symbols by encoding and modulating a transmission bit stream. In addition, when receiving data, the communication unit (205) can restore a reception bit stream by demodulating and decoding a baseband signal. In addition, the communication unit (205) can upconvert a baseband signal to an RF band signal and transmit it through an antenna, and downconvert an RF band signal received through the antenna to a baseband signal. For example, the communication unit (205) can include a transmission filter, a reception filter, an amplifier, a mixer, an oscillator, a DAC, an ADC, etc.

[0087] In addition, the communication unit (205) may include a plurality of transmit / receive paths. Furthermore, the communication unit (205) may include at least one antenna array composed of a plurality of antenna elements. In terms of hardware, the communication unit (205) may be composed of digital circuits and analog circuits (e.g., radio frequency integrated circuits (RFIC)). Here, the digital circuits and analog circuits may be implemented in a single package. In addition, the communication unit (205) may include a plurality of RF chains. Furthermore, the communication unit (205) may perform beamforming.

[0088] The communication unit (205) can transmit and receive signals as described above. Accordingly, all or part of the communication unit (205) may be referred to as a "transmitter," a "receiver," or a "transmitting and receiving unit." Furthermore, in the following description, transmission and reception performed via a wireless channel are used to mean that processing as described above is performed by the communication unit (205).

[0089] The storage unit (210) can store data such as basic programs, application programs, and setting information for the operation of the terminal. The storage unit (210) can be composed of volatile memory, non-volatile memory, or a combination of volatile and non-volatile memory. In addition, the storage unit (210) can provide stored data upon request from the control unit (215).

[0090] The control unit (215) can control the overall operations of the terminal. For example, the control unit (215) can transmit and receive signals through the communication unit (205). In addition, the control unit (215) records and reads data in the storage unit (210). In addition, the control unit (215) can perform functions of the protocol stack required by the communication standard. To this end, the control unit (215) may include at least one processor or microprocessor, or may be a part of a processor. In addition, a part of the communication unit (205) and the control unit (215) may be referred to as a CP (communication processor). According to various embodiments, the control unit (215) can control to perform synchronization using a wireless communication network. For example, the control unit (215) can control the terminal to perform operations according to various embodiments described below.

[0091] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a terminal may be composed of a mobile equipment (ME) and a universal mobile telecommunications service (UMTS) subscriber identity module (USIM). The ME may include a mobile terminal (MT) and terminal equipment (TE). The MT may be a part where a wireless access protocol operates, and the TE may be a part where a control function operates. For example, in the case of a wireless communication terminal (e.g., a mobile phone), the MT and the TE may be integrated, and in the case of a laptop, the MT and the TE may be separate. The present disclosure may express the ME and the USIM as distinct entities depending on the operation of each component, but is not limited thereto, and may express the ME and the USIM as a terminal (e.g., UE) including the ME, or it is of course possible to describe various embodiments of the present disclosure by expressing the ME as a terminal.

[0092] FIG. 2B illustrates an example of the functional structure of a base station according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. The configuration illustrated in FIG. 2B can be understood as the configuration of a base station (125). Terms such as "... unit" and "... unit" used hereinafter refer to a unit that processes at least one function or operation, which can be implemented using hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

[0093] Referring to FIG. 2b, the base station may include a wireless communication unit (235), a backhaul communication unit (220), a storage unit (225), and a control unit (230).

[0094] The wireless communication unit (235) can perform functions for transmitting and receiving signals via a wireless channel. For example, the wireless communication unit (235) can perform a conversion function between baseband signals and bit streams according to the physical layer specifications of the system. For example, when transmitting data, the wireless communication unit (235) can generate complex symbols by encoding and modulating the transmitted bit stream. Furthermore, when receiving data, the wireless communication unit (235) can restore the received bit stream by demodulating and decoding the baseband signal.

[0095] In addition, the wireless communication unit (235) can upconvert a baseband signal into an RF (radio frequency) band signal and transmit it through an antenna, and downconvert an RF band signal received through the antenna into a baseband signal. To this end, the wireless communication unit (235) can include a transmission filter, a reception filter, an amplifier, a mixer, an oscillator, a digital to analog convertor (DAC), an analog to digital convertor (ADC), etc. In addition, the wireless communication unit (235) can include a plurality of transmission and reception paths. Furthermore, the wireless communication unit (235) can include at least one antenna array composed of a plurality of antenna elements.

[0096] In terms of hardware, the wireless communication unit (235) may be composed of a digital unit and an analog unit, and the analog unit may be composed of a plurality of sub-units depending on operating power, operating frequency, etc. The digital unit may be implemented with at least one processor (e.g., a digital signal processor (DSP)).

[0097] The wireless communication unit (235) can transmit and receive signals as described above. Accordingly, all or part of the wireless communication unit (235) may be referred to as a "transmitter," a "receiver," or a "transceiver." Furthermore, in the following description, transmission and reception performed via a wireless channel are used to mean that the wireless communication unit (235) performs the processing described above.

[0098] The backhaul communication unit (220) can provide an interface for performing communication with other nodes within the network. That is, the backhaul communication unit (220) can convert a bit string transmitted from a base station to another node, such as another access node, another base station, an upper node, a core network, etc., into a physical signal, and can convert a physical signal received from another node into a bit string.

[0099] The storage unit (225) can store data such as basic programs, application programs, and setting information for the operation of the base station. The storage unit (225) can be composed of volatile memory, non-volatile memory, or a combination of volatile and non-volatile memory. In addition, the storage unit (225) can provide stored data upon request from the control unit (230).

[0100] The control unit (230) can control the overall operations of the base station. For example, the control unit (230) can transmit and receive signals through the wireless communication unit (235) or the backhaul communication unit (220). In addition, the control unit (230) records and reads data in the storage unit (225). In addition, the control unit (230) can perform the functions of the protocol stack required by the communication standard. According to another implementation example, the protocol stack can be included in the wireless communication unit (235). For this purpose, the control unit (230) can include at least one processor. According to various embodiments, the control unit (230) can control to perform synchronization using a wireless communication network. For example, the control unit (230) can control the base station to perform operations according to various embodiments described below.

[0101] FIG. 2C illustrates an example of the functional structure of a core network object according to one embodiment of the present disclosure. It illustrates the configuration of a core network object in a wireless communication system according to various embodiments of the present disclosure. The configuration illustrated in FIG. 2C can be understood as a configuration of a device having the function of at least one of the network entities including the AMF (150) of FIG. 1. Terms such as "... unit" and "... device" used hereinafter mean a unit that processes at least one function or operation, and this can be implemented by hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

[0102] Referring to FIG. 2c, the core network object is configured to include a communication unit (240), a storage unit (245), and a control unit (250).

[0103] The communication unit (240) may provide an interface for performing communication with other devices within the network. That is, the communication unit (240) may convert a bit string transmitted from a core network object to another device into a physical signal, and may convert a physical signal received from another device into a bit string. That is, the communication unit (240) may transmit and receive signals. Accordingly, the communication unit (240) may be referred to as a modem, a transmitter, a receiver, or a transceiver. In this case, the communication unit (240) may enable the core network object to communicate with other devices or systems via a backhaul connection (e.g., a wired backhaul or a wireless backhaul) or via a network.

[0104] The storage unit (245) can store data such as basic programs, application programs, and setting information for the operation of core network objects. The storage unit (245) can be composed of volatile memory, non-volatile memory, or a combination of volatile and non-volatile memory. In addition, the storage unit (245) can provide stored data upon request from the control unit (250).

[0105] The control unit (250) can control the overall operations of the core network object. For example, the control unit (250) can transmit and receive signals through the communication unit (240). In addition, the control unit (250) records and reads data in the storage unit (245). For this purpose, the control unit (250) can include at least one processor. According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the control unit (250) can control synchronization using a wireless communication network. For example, the control unit (250) can control the core network object to perform operations according to various embodiments described below.

[0106] The terms used in the following description to identify connection nodes, terms referring to network entities, terms referring to messages, terms referring to interfaces between network entities, and terms referring to various identification information are provided as examples for convenience of explanation. Therefore, the present disclosure is not limited to the terms described below, and other terms referring to objects with equivalent technical meanings may be used.

[0107] For convenience of explanation, this disclosure may use terms and names defined in the 5GS (5G system) and NR (new radio) standards, the most recent standards defined by the 3GPP organization among the existing communication standards. However, this disclosure is not limited to the above terms and names and may be equally applied to wireless communication networks conforming to other standards. In particular, this disclosure may be applied to the 3GPP 5th generation mobile communication standards (e.g., 5GS and NR).

[0108] FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a process of safely providing setting information to a terminal using SoR during a registration process according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0109] Referring to FIG. 3, in operation 301, the UE may send an indicator in the registration request message indicating whether the UE supports a new capability for SoR protection. A new capability for SoR protection means that the UE supports AUSF or K AUSF K is a subkey obtained from SoRenc or K SoRint It can indicate an operation to encrypt / decrypt SoR data, or to protect or check integrity using a key, etc. For example, the indicator can be a new parameter, or it can utilize the remaining part of the previously sent data for future use. Here, K AUSF is referred to as the upper key, and K AUSFK saved from SoRenc or K SoRint A key may be referred to as a subkey.

[0110] In operation 302, the UE and the network (which may represent network entities such as the AMF of the VPLMN, the AUSF of the HPLMN, or the UDM of the HPLMN, and the VPLMN and the HPLMN may be the same) may perform an authentication process. During the authentication process, the UE and the network may share whether they support new capabilities for SoR protection. For example, they may share this information through new parameters or using existing parameters (e.g., a RAND value). If the AUSF of the HPLMN receives the UE's capability, it may forward it to the UDM of the HPLMN. If the UDM receives the UE SoR capability, it may forward the UDM's capability to the AUSF, and if the AUSF also has capability for the new function, it may forward the Network SoR capability to the UE. Alternatively, even if the Network SoR capability is not forwarded to the UE, the UE may know that the Network has the SoR capability if there is an additional indication received when receiving the SoR data or an indication that the SoR header is encrypted. During the authentication process, the AMF of the VPLMN may send the UE security capabilities (a list of encryption algorithms and a list of integrity protection algorithms supported by the terminal) received from the UE in operation 1 to the AUSF of the HPLMN, or the encryption algorithm or integrity protection algorithm selected by the AMF of the VPLMN based on that information.

[0111] In operation 303, the capabilities of the UE and the network can be exchanged through NAS SMC (NAS Security Mode Command, NAS Security Mode Complete) messages.

[0112] In action 304, the AMF of the VPLMN may request registration with the UDM using the Nudm_UECE_Registration message. If the AMF of the VPLMN received the UE's SoR capability in action 3, it may also provide the UE's SoR capability to the UDM of the HPLMN.

[0113] In action 305, the UDM of the HPLMN may send a registration response message to the AMF of the VPLMN.

[0114] In action 306, the AMF of the VPLMN may invoke the Nudm_SDM_Get service to receive Access and Mobility Subscription data for the corresponding UE from the UDM.

[0115] In operation 307, the UDM may decide to send SoR data (steering information) to the UE and determine whether the information to be sent requires encryption. According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, SoR data may include information necessary for the UE to roam (e.g., information such as a preferred PLMN list) and may represent data provided to the UE.

[0116] In operation 308, the UDM may send to the AUSF at least one of SUPI and SoR data, an ACK indication, or an indication (protection indication) indicating whether the SoR data requires encryption. The indication indicating whether the SoR data requires encryption may be an additional indication or may indicate that encryption is required in the SoR header. The condition for the UDM to send the indication indicating whether the SoR data requires encryption may be if it received UE SoR capability in one of the previous operations.

[0117] HPLMN's AUSF is K AUSF From K SoRenc Wow K SoRint You can also generate a key. K SoRenc or K SoRint The input values ​​for generating a key are an encryption algorithm and algorithm ID or an integrity protection algorithm and algorithm ID, K AUSF The back can be used, and functions such as HMAC-SHA256 can be used, or a function agreed upon in advance between the UE and AUSF can be used. K SoRenc and K SoRint Key is K AUSF K generated based on AUSF may be referred to as a subkey of K SoRenc can be the key used by AUSF / UE to encrypt / decrypt SoR data, and K SoRint may be a key used by AUSF / UE to verify integrity protection / integrity protection of SoR data.

[0118] Although the drawing shows this action after action 308, it can be generated at any action after the AUSF becomes aware of the UE SoR capability.

[0119] In operation 309, AUSF encrypts data in UDM, integrity protected data (e.g. SoR-MAC-I)AUSF ), Counter SoR , SoR-XMAC-I UE At least one of the SoR-MAC-I may be sent. AUSF is encrypted SoR data or SoR data is K SoRint Key, SoR header, Counter SoR , K AUSF A value can be integrity protected using at least one of the Counter SoR is a value managed by UE and AUSF, and may be used for integrity protection. SoR-XMAC-I UE is a value generated by AUSF when UDM sends an Ack indication, and later UDM receives SoR-XMAC-I from AUSF. UE SoR-MAC-I value calculated by UE and transmitted to UDM UE By comparing the data, it can be determined that the UE has received the data well without any modification. AUSF is K AUSF , K SoRint and Counter SoR SoR-XMAC-I using at least one of UE can be generated. AUSF receives SoR data from UDM in 8 operations. SoRenc The encryption algorithm may be one of the UE security capabilities received from the AMF in operation 2, or may use the encryption algorithm sent by the VPLMN AMF as is, or may be one agreed upon with the UE. The AUSF may encrypt the SoR data received from the UDM in operation 8 with K SoRintIntegrity protection can be achieved by using the following algorithm: one of the UE security capabilities received from the AMF in operation 2, the integrity algorithm sent by the VPLMN AMF can be used as is, or it can be one agreed upon with the UE. The method agreed upon in advance with the UE for integrity protection is the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm, 0x77, SoR header, length of SoR header, Counter SoR , Counter SoR The length of the string can be used as input, and the input key is K. SoRint This may be the case. The AUSF may also send the algorithms used for encryption or integrity protection. These may be included in the SoR header or indicated through additional indicators. The HPLMN AUSF may generate its own SoR header based on data received from the HPLMN UDM or send additional indications.

[0120] In operation 310, UDM sends encrypted SoR data, SoR data, integrity protected data, Counter to AMF of VPLMN. SoR A Nudm_SDM_Get_Response containing at least one of the following may be sent: UDM may also be sent along with the encryption or integrity protection algorithm used by AUSF.

[0121] In action 311, the AMF of the VPLMN may also send the value received from the HPLMN UDM in action 310 in the Registration Accept message.

[0122] UE is K in the same way as AUSF AUSF From K SoRenc Wow K SoRintKey generation may also occur. Although shown in the diagram after operation 311, this operation may be performed after the UE has learned of the Network SoR capability. Alternatively, if the UE has learned in operation 311 that the SoR data is encrypted or that the SoR data is integrity protected with a new key, the UE may generate K AUSF You can also generate new keys from .

[0123] In operation 312, the UE uses SoR-MAC-I AUSF After verifying and checking the integrity protection, if it is found to be encrypted with the SoR header or directive, the K generated in the above operation SoRenc Decryption can be done using the key. The UE SoR-MAC-I AUSF How to verify is that AUSF in operation 309 is SoR-MAC-I AUSF The same process as generating (encrypted SoR data or SoR data K SoRint Key, SoR header, Counter SoR , K AUSF The UE may include an operation to check whether the value calculated by the UE and the value received from the VPLMN AMF are the same after calculating the integrity protected value using at least one of the SoR-MAC-I AUSF Before verifying, you can also decide which key to use for integrity protection check through the SoR header or directive.

[0124] In operation 313, if the UDM sent an ACK indication and the UE succeeded in verification in operation 312, SoR-MAC-I UE can also be generated and sent in the registration completion message. The UE can send K AUSF , K SoRint and Counter SoR SoR-MAC-I using at least one of UE can also be created.

[0125] In operation 314, the AMF of the VPLMN receives SoR-MAC-I from the UE in operation 313. UE If received, the value can be sent to HPLMN UDM.

[0126] In operation 315, the HPLMN UDM receives SoR-MAC-I from the VPLMN AMF. UE SoR-XMAC-I received from AUSF in value and action 309 UE You can compare the values ​​to check if the UE has received it properly.

[0127] FIG. 4 is a flowchart illustrating a process of safely providing setting information to a terminal using SoR after a registration process according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0128] Referring to FIG. 4, in operation 401, the UDM may decide to send SoR data to the corresponding UE and may determine whether the information to be sent requires encryption. The UDM may determine the SoR capability of the UE (if the UE has K AUSF The UE may know the SoR capability of the Network through the registration request message or the authentication process or the NAS SMC process, and the UE may also know the SoR capability of the Network through the same process. The encryption or integrity protection algorithm protected by the new key may be the UE security capabilities (list of encryption algorithms and list of integrity protection algorithms supported by the UE) transmitted by the UE in the registration request message, or the encryption algorithm or integrity protection algorithm selected by the AMF of the VPLMN based on that information, or a method agreed upon in advance between the UE and the AUSF. Here, the SoR data may be referred to as configuration information.

[0129] In operation 402, the UDM may send the AUSF at least one of SUPI and SoR data (e.g., Steering List), an ACK indication, or an indicator indicating whether the SoR data requires encryption. The indicator indicating whether the SoR data requires encryption may be an additional indicator or may indicate that encryption is required in the SoR header. The UDM may send the indicator indicating whether the SoR data requires encryption if it has received UE SoR capability in one of the previous operations.

[0130] HPLMN's AUSF is K AUSF From K SoRenc Wow K SoRint You can also generate a key. K SoRenc or K SoRint The input values ​​for generating a key are an encryption algorithm and algorithm ID or an integrity protection algorithm and algorithm ID, K AUSF The back can be used, and functions such as HMAC-SHA256 can be used, or a function pre-agreed between the UE and the AUSF can be used. Although the drawing shows this operation after operation 402, it can be generated at any operation after the AUSF becomes aware of the UE SoR capability.

[0131] In action 403, AUSF sends encrypted data, integrity protected data (e.g. SoR-MAC-I) to UDM. AUSF ), Counter SoR , SoR-XMAC-I UE AUSF may send at least one of the SoR data received from UDM in action 402. SoRencThe encryption algorithm may be one of the UE security capabilities received from the AMF in operation 402, or may be the encryption algorithm sent by the VPLMN AMF, or may be one agreed upon with the UE. The AUSF may encrypt the SoR data received from the UDM in operation 402 with K SoRint Integrity protection can be achieved by selecting one of the UE security capabilities received from the AMF, using the integrity algorithm sent by the VPLMN AMF as is, or using one agreed upon with the UE. The method agreed upon in advance with the UE for integrity protection is the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm with 0x77, SoR header, length of SoR header, and Counter. SoR , Counter SoR The length of the string can be used as input, and the input key is K. SoRint This may be the case. The AUSF may also send the algorithms used for encryption or integrity protection. These may be included in the SoR header or indicated through additional indicators. The HPLMN AUSF may generate its own SoR header based on data received from the HPLMN UDM or send additional indications.

[0132] In the 404 action, the UDM sends encrypted SoR data, SoR data, integrity protected data, and Counter to the AMF of the VPLMN. SoR A Nudm_SDM_Get_Response containing at least one of the following may be sent: UDM may also be sent along with the encryption or integrity protection algorithm used by AUSF.

[0133] In action 405, the AMF of the VPLMN may also send the value received from the HPLMN UDM in action 404 by including it in the DL NAS Transport message.

[0134] UE is K in the same way as AUSF AUSF From K SoRenc Wow K SoRint Key generation may also occur. Although shown in the diagram after operation 405, this operation may be performed after the UE has learned of the Network SoR capability. Alternatively, if the UE has learned in operation 405 that the SoR data is encrypted or that the SoR data is integrity protected with a new key, the UE may generate K AUSF You can also generate new keys from .

[0135] In operation 406, the UE uses SoR-MAC-I AUSF After verifying and checking the integrity protection, if it is found to be encrypted with the SoR header or directive, the K generated in the above operation SoRenc You can decrypt it using the key.

[0136] In action 407, if the UDM sent an ACK indication and the UE succeeded in verification in action 406, SoR-MAC-I UE can also be generated and sent in a UL NAS Transport message.

[0137] In action 408, the AMF of the VPLMN receives SoR-MAC-I from the UE in action 407. UE If received, the value can be sent to HPLMN UDM.

[0138] In action 409, the HPLMN UDM receives the SoR-MAC-I from the VPLMN AMF. UE SoR-XMAC-I received from AUSF in value and 403 action UE You can compare the values ​​to check if the UE has received it properly.

[0139] FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a process of safely providing configuration information to a terminal using a UPU according to one embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0140] Referring to FIG. 5, in operation 501, the UDM may decide to send UPU data to the corresponding UE and may determine whether the information to be sent requires encryption. The UDM may determine whether the UE's UPU capability (the UE has K AUSF The UE may know whether there is a function for encryption / decryption and integrity protection using a subkey generated from the UE) through a registration request message or an authentication process or a process such as NAS SMC, and the UE may also know the UPU capability of the Network through the same process. The UPU (UE Parameters Update) according to one embodiment of the present disclosure is a method in which the UDM safely provides data to the UE using the control plane, and the UPU data means data provided using the UPU. The data may indicate information required for the UE, including, for example, a Routing indicator and a Default Configured NSSAI (Network Slicing Selection Assistance Information). The encryption or integrity protection algorithm protected by the new key may be an encryption algorithm or integrity protection algorithm selected by the AMF of the VPLMN based on the UE security capabilities (a list of encryption algorithms and a list of integrity protection algorithms supported by the UE) transmitted by the UE in the registration request message, or a method agreed upon in advance between the UE and the AUSF. The UE UPU capability or Network UPU capability may be K AUSF It can be shown that it has the ability to encrypt / decrypt UPU data and perform integrity protection check using a subkey generated from . Here, the UPU data can be referred to as configuration information.

[0141] In operation 502, the UDM may send the AUSF at least one of SUPI and UPU data, an ACK indication, or an indicator indicating whether the UPU data requires encryption. The indicator indicating whether the UPU data requires encryption may be an additional indicator or may indicate that encryption is required in the UPU header. The UDM may send the indicator indicating whether the UPU data requires encryption if it has received UE UPU capability in one of the previous operations.

[0142] HPLMN's AUSF is K AUSF From K UPUenc Wow K UPUint You can also generate a key. K UPUenc may be the key used by AUSF / UE to encrypt / decrypt UPU data, and K UPUint The AUSF / UE may be a key used to verify encrypted UPU data or integrity protection / integrity protection of UPU data. K UPUenc or K UPUint The input values ​​for generating a key are an encryption algorithm and algorithm ID or an integrity protection algorithm and algorithm ID, K AUSF The back can be used, and functions such as HMAC-SHA256 can be used, or a function previously agreed upon between the UE and the AUSF can be used. Although the operation is shown in the drawing after operation 502, it can be generated in any operation after the AUSF becomes aware of the UE UPU capability. Here, K_AUSF can be referred to as the upper key, and K_UPUenc and K_UPUint can be referred to as the lower keys.

[0143] In operation 503, AUSF encrypts data in UDM, integrity protected data (e.g. UPU-MAC-I) AUSF ), Counter UPU , UPU-XMAC-I UEAt least one of the UPU-MAC-I may be sent. AUSF is encrypted UPU data or UPU data is K UPUint Key, UPU Header, Counter UPU , K AUSF A value can be integrity protected using at least one of the Counter UPU is a value managed by UE and AUSF, and may be used for integrity protection. SoR-XMAC-I UE is a value generated by AUSF when UDM sends Ack indication, and later UDM receives UPU-XMAC-I from AUSF. UE The value and UPU-MAC-I calculated by the UE and transmitted to the UDM UE By comparing the data, it can be determined that the UE has received the data well without any modification. AUSF is K AUSF , K UPUint and Counter UPU UPU-XMAC-I using at least one of UE can be generated. AUSF receives UPU data from UDM in operation 502. UPUenc The encryption algorithm may be one of the UE security capabilities received from the AMF, or the encryption algorithm sent by the VPLMN AMF may be used as is, or it may be one agreed upon with the UE. The AUSF may encrypt the UPU data received from the UDM in operation 502 using the K UPUint Integrity protection can be achieved by selecting one of the UE security capabilities received from the AMF, using the integrity algorithm sent by the VPLMN AMF as is, or using one agreed upon with the UE. The method agreed upon in advance with the UE for integrity protection is the HMAC-SHA256 algorithm with 0x7B, UPU data, length of UPU data, and Counter. UPU , CounterUPU The length of the string can be used as input, and the input key is K. UPUint The AUSF may also send the algorithms used for encryption or integrity protection. These may be included in the UPU header or indicated through additional indicators. The HPLMN AUSF may generate its own UPU header based on data received from the HPLMN UDM or send additional indications.

[0144] In operation 504, UDM sends encrypted UPU data, UPU data, integrity protected data, Counter to AMF of VPLMN. UPU A Nudm_SDM_Get_Response containing at least one of the following may be sent: UDM may also be sent along with the encryption or integrity protection algorithm used by AUSF.

[0145] In action 505, the AMF of the VPLMN may also send the value received from the HPLMN UDM in action 504 by including it in the DL NAS Transport message.

[0146] UE is K in the same way as AUSF AUSF From K UPUenc Wow K UPUint Key generation may also occur. Although shown in the diagram after operation 505, this operation may be performed after the UE has learned of the Network UPU capability. Alternatively, if the UE has learned in operation 505 that the UPU data is encrypted or that the UPU data is integrity protected with a new key, the UE may generate K AUSF A new key (e.g. K) from UPUenc Wow K UPUint ) can also be created.

[0147] In operation 506, the UE uses UPU-MAC-I AUSFAfter verifying and checking the integrity protection, if it is found that it is encrypted with the UPU header or indicator, the K generated in the above operation UPUenc You can decrypt it using the key.

[0148] In action 507, if the UDM sent an ACK indication and the UE succeeded in verification in action 506, UPU-MAC-I UE can also be generated and sent in a UL NAS Transport message.

[0149] In action 508, the AMF of the VPLMN receives the UPU-MAC-I from the UE in action 507. UE If received, the value can be sent to HPLMN UDM.

[0150] In operation 509, the HPLMN UDM receives the UPU-MAC-I from the VPLMN AMF. UE UPU-XMAC-I received from AUSF in value and 503 action UE You can compare the values ​​to check if the UE has received it properly.

[0151] It should be noted that the configuration diagrams, exemplary diagrams of control / data signal transmission / reception methods, and exemplary diagrams of operating procedures illustrated in FIGS. 1A to 5 are not intended to limit the scope of the embodiments of the present disclosure. That is, not all components, entities, or operations described in FIGS. 1A to 5 should be construed as essential components for the implementation of the disclosure, and the disclosure may be implemented without detriment to the essence of the disclosure even if only some components are included.

[0152] The operations of the embodiments described above can be realized by providing a memory device storing program code in any component within the device. That is, the control unit within the device can execute the operations described above by reading and executing the program code stored in the memory device through a processor or a CPU (Central Processing Unit).

[0153] The various components and modules of the entity or terminal device described in the present disclosure may be operated using hardware circuits, such as logic circuits based on complementary metal oxide semiconductors, firmware, software, and / or hardware and firmware and / or software embedded in a machine-readable medium. For example, various electrical structures and methods may be implemented using electrical circuits such as transistors, logic gates, and application-specific semiconductors.

[0154] The methods according to the embodiments described in the claims or specification of the present disclosure may be implemented in the form of hardware, software, or a combination of hardware and software.

[0155] When implemented in software, a computer-readable storage medium storing one or more programs (software modules) may be provided. The one or more programs stored in the computer-readable storage medium are configured for execution by one or more processors within an electronic device. The one or more programs include instructions that cause the electronic device to execute methods according to embodiments described in the claims or specification of the present disclosure.

[0156] These programs (software modules, software) may be stored in random access memory, non-volatile memory including flash memory, read only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM), magnetic disc storage devices, compact disc-ROMs (CD-ROMs), digital versatile discs (DVDs) or other forms of optical storage devices, magnetic cassettes, or may be stored in memories formed by a combination of some or all of these. In addition, each configuration memory may include multiple copies.

[0157] Additionally, the program may be stored on an attachable storage device that is accessible via a communication network, such as the Internet, an intranet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a storage area network (SAN), or a combination thereof. Such a storage device may be connected to a device implementing an embodiment of the present disclosure via an external port. Additionally, a separate storage device on the communication network may be connected to a device implementing an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0158] In the specific embodiments of the present disclosure described above, components included in the disclosure are expressed singularly or plurally, depending on the specific embodiment presented. However, the singular or plural expressions are selected to suit the presented situation for convenience of explanation, and the present disclosure is not limited to singular or plural components. Components expressed in plural may be composed of singular elements, or components expressed in singular may be composed of plural elements.

[0159] While the detailed description of this disclosure has described specific embodiments, it should be understood that various modifications are possible without departing from the scope of this disclosure. Therefore, the scope of this disclosure should not be limited to the described embodiments, but should be defined not only by the scope of the claims described below, but also by equivalents thereof.

Claims

1. A method performed by an authentication server function (AUSF) entity in a wireless communication system, A step of receiving, from a unified data management (UDM) entity, configuration information and an instruction indicating encryption or integrity protection for the configuration information; A step of generating a first subkey for encryption or a second subkey for integrity protection from a stored parent key; A step of encrypting the setting information using the first sub-key or protecting the integrity of the setting information using the second sub-key; and A step of transmitting the encrypted or integrity protected configuration information to the UDM entity, method.

2. In paragraph 1, Further comprising the step of transmitting to the UDM entity information about the first algorithm used for the encryption or information about the second algorithm used for the integrity protection, method.

3. In paragraph 1, Further comprising a step of generating a MAC (massage authentication code) value using at least one of the upper key, the second lower key, or a counter value used for integrity protection, The above MAC value is used to check whether the configuration information received from the user terminal has been tampered with. method.

4. In paragraph 1, A step of receiving terminal capability information indicating whether the user terminal can generate the first sub-key or the second sub-key from the upper key; and Further comprising the step of transmitting the terminal capability information to the UDM entity; method.

5. A method performed by a user equipment (UE) in a wireless communication system, A step of receiving encrypted or integrity protected configuration information and an indicator indicating that the configuration information is encrypted or integrity protected from an AMF (access and mobility management function) entity; A step of generating a first sub-key for decryption or a second sub-key for integrity protection verification from a stored upper key; and A step of decrypting the encrypted setting information using the first sub-key or performing integrity protection verification on the integrity-protected setting information using the second sub-key, method.

6. In paragraph 5, Further comprising a step of receiving, from the AMF entity, information about the first algorithm used for the encryption or information about the second algorithm used for the integrity protection. method.

7. In paragraph 5, A step of generating a MAC (massage authentication code) value using at least one of the upper key, the second lower key, or a counter value used for integrity protection; and Further comprising the step of transmitting the MAC value to the AMF entity; The above MAC value is used to check whether the configuration information received from the user terminal has been tampered with. method.

8. In paragraph 5, A step of transmitting terminal capability information indicating whether the user terminal can generate the first sub-key or the second sub-key from the upper key to the AMF entity; and Further comprising a step of receiving, from the AMF entity, network capability information indicating whether the network entity can generate the first sub-key or the second sub-key from the upper key; method.

9. As an authentication server function (AUSF) entity of a wireless communication system, Transmitter and receiver; and Including a control unit connected to the above transmitter and receiver, The above control unit: Receive from a unified data management (UDM) entity configuration information and a directive indicating encryption or integrity protection for said configuration information; Generate a first subkey for encryption or a second subkey for integrity protection from the stored parent key; Encrypting the setting information using the first subkey or protecting the integrity of the setting information using the second subkey; and configured to transmit the encrypted or integrity protected configuration information to the above UDM entity, Authentication server function entity.

10. In paragraph 9, The above control unit, is configured to transmit to the UDM entity information about the first algorithm used for the encryption or information about the second algorithm used for the integrity protection; Authentication server function entity.

11. In paragraph 9, The above control unit, is set to generate a MAC (massage authentication code) value using at least one of the upper key, the second lower key, or a counter value used for integrity protection; The above MAC value is used to check whether the configuration information received from the user terminal has been tampered with. Authentication server function entity.

12. In paragraph 9, The above control unit, Receive terminal capability information indicating whether the user terminal can generate the first sub-key or the second sub-key from the upper key; and Set to transmit the terminal capability information to the above UDM entity, Authentication server function entity.

13. As a user equipment (UE) of a wireless communication system, Transmitter and receiver; and Including a control unit connected to the above transmitter and receiver, The above control unit: Receive encrypted or integrity protected configuration information and an indicator indicating that the configuration information is encrypted or integrity protected from an AMF (access and mobility management function) entity; Generate a first subkey for decryption or a second subkey for integrity protection verification from the stored parent key; and It is set to decrypt the encrypted setting information using the first sub-key or to perform integrity protection verification on the integrity-protected setting information using the second sub-key. Terminal.

14. In paragraph 13, The above control unit, Set to receive from the AMF entity information about the first algorithm used for the encryption or information about the second algorithm used for the integrity protection. Terminal.

15. In paragraph 13, The above control unit, Transmitting terminal capability information to the AMF entity, indicating whether the user terminal can generate the first sub-key or the second sub-key from the upper key; From the AMF entity, receive network capability information indicating whether the network entity can generate the first sub-key or the second sub-key from the upper key; Generating a MAC (massage authentication code) value using at least one of the upper key, the second lower key, or a counter value used for integrity protection; and It is set to transmit the MAC value to the above AMF entity, The above MAC value is used to check whether the configuration information received from the user terminal has been tampered with. Terminal.

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