Robot-supported security cell for automated teller machines

Abstract

A robot-supported security cell for automated teller machines is characterised in that an automated teller machine including the operating surface thereof is locked off from the outside world by delimiting walls, and a robot which operates the automated teller machine is located within the delimiting walls next to the automated teller machine. The security cell provides preventive protection against a multiplicity of attacks, can be standardised and is compatible. It can be installed on new automated teller machines. It can also be retrofitted on existing automated teller machines without problems and without special knowledge.

Description

[0001] Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs

[0002] The invention relates to a robot-assisted security cell for ATMs (Fig. 1). It consists of a preferably transparent enclosure that completely and securely surrounds the operator side of the ATM. This security concept significantly reduces the probability of an illegal attack on the ATM.

[0003] In Germany alone, there are approximately 50,000 ATMs located in various places, with different designs and security standards. ATMs are targeted by criminals in a variety of ways. In 2023, there were more than 450 attempted and successful bombings. These illegal attacks are of particular concern, as these brutal acts can endanger people's lives. Furthermore, fraudulent manipulation of ATMs, both inside and outside the machine, as well as manipulation of machine processes, is also a known problem.

[0004] Experts distinguish between direct and indirect attacks on ATMs. Direct attacks include:

[0005] ■ Blowing up the ATM to gain direct access to the cash cassettes.

[0006] ■ Attacks using thermal and mechanical tools to gain direct access to the cash cassettes. ■ Theft of the entire ATM to later gain access to the cash cassettes in a low-risk environment.

[0007] Indirect attacks primarily target the manipulation of the machines or their environment. These include, among other things:

[0008] ■ Skimming, i.e., reading account data from the magnetic stripe while simultaneously fraudulently obtaining the associated PIN.

[0009] ■ Cash trapping, or the physical interception of cash during withdrawal transactions.

[0010] ■ Eavesdropping, i.e., eavesdropping on map data during transmission.

[0011] ■ Shimming - attacks on the chip interface of the bank card.

[0012] ■ Reversal fraud, i.e., aborting transactions in order to repeat them.

[0013] ■ Jackpotting or the manipulation of the hardware and software of the ATM to provoke unauthorized deposits or even the total emptying of the machine.

[0014] Explosions, in particular, usually lead to the complete destruction of the ATM, resulting in damages of approximately €30,000. Collateral damage to buildings and equipment quickly reaches six figures in euros in each incident. The total annual economic damage is difficult to quantify. However, considering all the aforementioned ATM-related crimes, a figure in the billions of euros is more than likely.

[0015] Banks and insurance companies have formulated specific security measures for ATMs. However, implementing these sustainably and comprehensively remains difficult. There are three main reasons for this:

[0016] The ATMs in use in Germany vary in age and meet different security standards, e.g., in their resistance to explosions. They are located not only in bank branches but also in third-party locations such as public buildings, containers, and pavilions; some are wall-mounted, while others are freestanding.

[0017] ■ The designs differ significantly. For cash refills, a distinction must be made between front-loading and rear-loading machines, which, due to their design, are already significantly more vulnerable to attacks.

[0018] In summary, it can be stated that the widely varying histories, designs and locations of ATMs make the standardized introduction of a sustainable crime prevention measure difficult.

[0019] The state of the art describes methods and devices that are useful for securing ATMs.

[0020] [DE 10 2019 125 601 A1] discloses a method for securing valuables within a safe, in particular an ATM, against gas attacks. A reservoir filled with a foamable plastic is kept ready. Upon receipt of a trigger signal, the foamable plastic is introduced from the reservoir into the interior of the safe and displaces any gas that may be present. The resulting foam bonds both the items inside the safe and the components of the safe together.

[0021] [DE 10 2018 009 303 A1] describes a method for protecting banknotes and coins in ATMs, in which the means of payment are destroyed upon mechanical impact on the ATM. The destruction is preferably effected by an acid. This acid is arranged in a shatterproof glass container above the banknotes and coins located in a cash cassette.

[0022] [DE 20 2022 000 103 U1] secures the ATM with internal protective devices. A potential gas attack is detected by a gas detector. An actuator then starts a pipe fan, through which the introduced gas mixture is vented to the outside via an installed pipe. In addition, explosion vents are installed on the ATM, which, equipped with predetermined breaking points, shear off in the event of an explosion. This ensures the rapid release of the explosion pressure and thus prevents major damage to the ATM.

[0023] [DE 20 2023 103 213 U1] (57) describes a device for preventing major damage during the illegal explosion of ATMs. It is characterized by the fact that a combination of contact detectors, motion detectors and / or gas detectors is installed in the ATM. During the illegal preparation of an ATM explosion, a controlled explosion is triggered early, before the amount of gas sufficient for an explosion that would destroy the ATM is reached.

[0024] [DE 10 2019 125 601 A1], [DE 10 2018 009 303 A1] and [DE 20 2023 103 213 U1] initiate destructive measures in the event of an attack on the ATM. In addition to the risk to life and limb, significant damage is also likely to be caused. Furthermore, the question of the proposed sensors' ability to correctly detect an attack remains open. Therefore, there is a high risk of the ATM being triggered and destroyed, and of significant endangerment to people, based on a false alarm. [DE 20 2022 000 103 U1] also reacts, but does not use destructive measures. The proposed extraction device and the proposed explosive flaps require modifications to the ATM itself. Furthermore, the question remains whether the proposed sensors will reliably trigger in the event of an attack.

[0025] All the cited disclosures describe reactive measures that are initiated during an illegal attack. All of the cited disclosures also address the potential for blowing up an ATM. The aforementioned further details of direct and indirect attacks are largely not addressed. Furthermore, the proposed measures require intervention in the ATM's system. Firstly, this cannot be standardized due to the different implementations. Secondly, intervention in the ATM's system will necessitate changes to the hardware and software, as well as the subsequent approval processes. Finally, the proposed solutions are absolutely unfeasible if the risk to individuals cannot be reliably ruled out.

[0026] The described situation gives rise to the objects of the invention. The main object is to provide a preventive and human-safe protection for ATMs that wards off or prevents the vast majority of the aforementioned direct and indirect attacks. A secondary object of the invention is to create a largely standardized solution that requires no intervention in the ATM's system and is applicable to all known designs and installation locations.

[0027] The problems of the invention are solved by the features of claim 1. Preferred embodiments are described by the further claims. For better explanation of the invention, features are illustrated in the figures.

[0028] They show:

[0029] Figure 1: Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in a schematic 2D view.

[0030] Figure 2: Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in the closed state (3D view).

[0031] Figure 3: Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs with missing side wall (right hand from the operator's side view).

[0032] Figure 4: Implementation of the robot-assisted security cell with the ATM in the front.

[0033] Figure 5: Implementation of the robot-assisted security cell with the ATM in a niche installation.

[0034] Figure 6: Implementation of the robot-assisted security cell with the ATM in a "through-the-wall" installation.

[0035] Figure 7: Embodiment of the robot-assisted safety cell with the smallest possible depth dimension L4 and optional door hinges. In a preferred embodiment, the robot-assisted safety cell is positively connected to the wall (111) but detachably. Furthermore, sealing elements ensure a hermetic seal of the cell elements (106-109) against the wall and floor. Contact sensors in the joints to the wall and floor trigger an alarm if the width of the joint changes, i.e., if the safety cell is to be forcibly removed.

[0036] Key elements of the robot-assisted security cell are the robot (102), a container with a tabletop (103), the secured drawer interface (104), and the customer control unit (105). Furthermore, the security elements (106-109), together with the wall (111) and floor (110), form a hermetically sealed cell around the ATM (101), the robot (102), and the container with the tabletop (103). The only interface for the transfer of bank cards and cash is the drawer interface (104). Its specially designed function prevents unauthorized access to the interior of the security cell.

[0037] Within the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs, a programmable, multi-axis drive, preferably a robot (102), is arranged. On the operator side of the security cell (107), a numeric keypad and a screen are arranged in combination (105). The screen is preferably equipped with a touchscreen.

[0038] The keypad and touchscreen on the user side of the security booth offer the same functions as the keypad and touchscreen on the ATM itself. Bank customers will therefore find the same familiar functions on the user side of the security booth. This is primarily to avoid compatibility issues during use.

[0039] The bank cards are handed over by the customers to the security cell at the secure drawer interface (104), grasped by the robot (102), and inserted into the ATM. The PIN code is then entered via the keypad (105) located on the operator side of the security cell. The PIN code is transmitted to the robot inside the security cell and entered by its gripper at the ATM itself. The process is the same for other desired functions. For example, the customer enters the desired amount of money on the touchscreen of the security cell and transmits it to the robot. The robot then transmits the information to the ATM in the usual way.

[0040] After completing the banking transaction, the robotic gripper removes the bank card and the cash. Both are returned to the secure drawer interface (104) and can be retrieved by the customers.

[0041] The robot in the enclosed security cell takes over the operating tasks that customers would otherwise perform directly at the ATM. This prevents customers and other individuals from coming into physical contact with the ATM, significantly contributing to its protection against illegal attacks. The protective function is enhanced when the boundary walls (106-109) are made of transparent safety glass (USG, ESH). This allows irregularities and foreign objects inside to be easily detected visually. Overall, the described arrangement of the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs acts preventively against attacks.

[0042] ■ Blasting

[0043] ■ Attack with thermal tools

[0044] ■ Attack with mechanical tools

[0045] ■ Total theft of the ATM

[0046] ■ Cash trapping

[0047] ■ Jackpotting and, in extended forms, against the attacks: ■ Skimming

[0048] In a further preferred embodiment, if the boundary walls (106

[0049] - 109) are provided with a special coating, a so-called skimming blocker.

[0050] ■ Eavesdropping

[0051] In a further preferred embodiment, if the boundary walls (106

[0052] - 109) are provided with a special coating, a so-called skimming blocker.

[0053] ■ Reversal Fraud

[0054] In a further preferred embodiment, the robot is programmed to cease functioning after an unusual and unexpected command routine.

[0055] Fig. 2 shows the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in its closed state. Sealing elements are inserted into the joints to the floor (202) and the wall (201) for hermetic sealing. Preferably, positive-locking fastening elements (203) are integrated into the joint to the wall. Sensors are also integrated to detect changes in the dimensions of the joints and subsequently trigger an alarm.

[0056] In Fig. 3, the right-hand side boundary wall has been eliminated, so that the interior becomes visible.

[0057] Fig. 4 shows a view rotated relative to Fig. 3, providing an even clearer view of the interior. The ATM (101) extends significantly in depth (L1), indicating a projection in front of the closed wall.

[0058] Fig. 5 shows an embodiment of the ATM (101a) installed in a niche. The depth of the ATM in front of the wall is less than in the configuration shown in Fig. 4, so that the entire cell can be built at a smaller depth (L2). Fig. 6 shows a through-the-wall installation. The ATM has no depth extension in front of the wall, so that the entire cell is compact and has very small dimensions perpendicular to the wall (L3).

[0059] Figures 4 to 6 illustrate that the described robot-assisted security cell is compatible with all installation situations and designs of ATMs. The functions remain the same. Only the dimensions of the boundary walls differ. Robots or CNC drives with different reach may also be used. The proposed solution can be implemented without specialized knowledge of ATM technology, primarily because neither hardware nor software modifications to the ATM are required.

[0060] In another embodiment, the robot-assisted security cell is provided with a base plate in the floor area (202, Fig. 2), which is also mounted on wheels. Furthermore, a rechargeable battery is integrated into the container with the tabletop (103). In this way, the security cell can be operated flexibly and autonomously. For example, in a bank, the ATM can be operated without the security cell during business hours. After business hours, i.e., shortly before closing time, the security cell is wheeled into position and hermetically seals the ATM overnight. The ATM's functions remain unaffected.

[0061] In another embodiment, a security door or security flap is integrated into a boundary wall. This access is particularly necessary when the ATMs in question are so-called "front-loading" machines and are filled with cash on the operator side.

[0062] In another embodiment, the safety cell is equipped with two robots. The redundant function increases the reliability of the system.

[0063] In the last embodiment described here, the robot-assisted security cell is built as small and compact as possible. Figures 4 to 6 already show how the depth of the security cell decreases orthogonally to the wall depending on the installation method of the ATM. The smallest depth is achieved with the so-called "through-the-wall installation" in Fig. 6 (L1 > L2 > L3). If the dimensions of the elements contained in the security cell, essentially the robot (102), the container with tabletop (103), and the secured drawer interface (104), are further minimized, a security cell with a significantly smaller depth (L4, Fig. 7) can be designed. The very compact construction then allows the installation of hinges (701). These enable the security cell to take on the shape and dimensions of a security door.

[0064] The described embodiments are exemplary and describe the robot-assisted security cell for ATMs in detail, but not exhaustively. Further combinations of individual functions are conceivable, but do not alter the fundamental concept of the invention.

Claims

Patent claims 1) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs characterized in that an ATM together with its operating surface is sealed off from the outside world by boundary walls and a robot is located inside the boundary walls next to the ATM, which performs the operation of the ATM. 2) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the embodiment of the robot is an articulated arm device. 3) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the embodiment of the robot is a Cartesian device. 4) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the security cell has hinges and can be opened like a door. 5) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the cell has a self-sufficient power supply and can be operated independently of the power grid. 6) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the boundary walls consist of safety glass. 7) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the boundary walls are coated with a skimming blocker. 8) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the security cell has been retrofitted to an existing ATM. 9) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the security cell is already integrated upon delivery and is therefore part of the original equipment of the ATM. 10) Robot-assisted security cell for ATMs according to claim 1, characterized in that the security cell is on wheels. (Fig. 1)

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