Method and system for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method and a system for authenticating an electronic component (KOMP) manufactured by a manufacturer, comprising the steps of: providing (S1; SA1; SB1) a unique identification (ID) and an associated individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component (KOMP), wherein the associated individual fingerprint (FP) provided for the manufactured component is introduced into the manufactured component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected manner and is stored in a database (DB-H) of the manufacturer as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP).

Description

[0001] Description

[0002] Method and system for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer

[0003] The present invention relates to a computer-implemented method and a system for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer.

[0004] Technical background

[0005] Field devices are sensors, actuators, flash memory, or other small electronic components with limited processing power. These components are used in many applications, particularly in industrial settings, and can be installed individually or in combination with other components in devices. A failure or malfunction of a field device in a process can lead to a production stoppage. Therefore, it is crucial for a user or buyer acquiring a field device as a component from a third party to determine whether the component is an original part from a specific manufacturer.

[0006] Due to the increasing networking of devices and electronic components, security in this area is becoming ever more important. Because of their limited resources and computing power, many electronic components, especially field components, usually offer no support for security functionality.

[0007] It is known to authenticate components using digital signature methods. However, these signature methods require sufficient resources on the components to be authenticated.

[0008] Traditionally, resource-constrained electronic components can be identified using so-called PUFs (Physical Uncloneable Functions) or by means of a fixed, unique, and unambiguous identity (e.g., a serial number). While such approaches using static fingerprints offer a means of integrity verification, they are vulnerable. An attacker can read the serial number or identity (stored or generated by a PUF) of an original component and apply it to multiple inferior clone components. Such an attack is difficult to prevent.

[0009] Physical Unclonable Functions (PLIFs) can generate a hardware-specific fingerprint in a CMOS circuit. This fingerprint (usually generated after error correction), or a derivation thereof, can be used either as a device-specific key or as an "identity / fingerprint".

[0010] There are PLIFs that provide different fingerprints depending on the challenge. With this type of PLIF, a large number of valid challenge-response pairs (previously generated in a secure environment and stored securely during the enrollment phase) can be used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the component, as long as each possible challenge is used only once. This guarantees compliance with the "freshness" property.

[0011] This conventional approach does not require any cryptographic functionality on the electronic component. However, a disadvantage of this approach is the need for a large dataset of challenge-response pairs, and this dataset must be stored securely. Furthermore, the use of a PUF introduces a certain degree of complexity.

[0012] Therefore, there is a need to identify counterfeit or manipulated electronic components with enhanced security (e.g., protection against replay attacks). This necessitates a solution with low resource and performance requirements to increase the security of industrial components.

[0013] Against this background, the present invention aims to create a method and system that makes it possible to efficiently and securely authenticate electronic components that have only extremely limited resources.

[0014] According to the invention, this problem is solved by a computer-implemented method with the features of claim 1 and / or by an authentication system with the features of claim 16. The invention provides a computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a producer, in which the electronic component is verified as originating from the producer if a first authentication tag (AT1), which is calculated by a computing unit or a computing routine of the electronic component depending on a fingerprint (FP) and a challenge (C) provided by a purchaser of the component, matches a second authentication tag (AT2), which is calculated depending on a stored reference fingerprint.

[0015] Preferably, the calculated authentication tag (AT) is a hash value (H) of a cryptographic hash function calculated based on the fingerprint (FP), or a Message Authentication Code (MAC), or a Message Integrity Code (MIC), or comprises one or more of the aforementioned data. Particularly preferably, the first calculated authentication tag is calculated based on the fingerprint (FP), and the second calculated authentication tag is calculated based on the reference fingerprint.

[0016] It is understood that the terms “authentication day” and “authentication day” are used synonymously within the scope of the present invention.

[0017] The calculated authentication tag (AT) can be a calculated hash value (H) or a value calculated by another algorithm. Example algorithms for calculating an authentication tag (AT) include MAC, CMAC, HMAC, GMAC, or AEAD for calculating an authentication tag MAC value (MAC).

[0018] In one possible embodiment, the fingerprint (FP) is assigned by the manufacturer of the electronic component (KOMP) and stored in the electronic component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected and trustworthy manner.

[0019] The fingerprint (FP) can be securely stored by the manufacturer when assigning the fingerprint FP to the component (KOMP). In a preferred embodiment, the calculated authentication tag AT includes a MAC authentication tag.

[0020] In another possible embodiment, the calculated authentication tag AT has a hash value H.

[0021] The first authentication tag is preferably issued by the component as a response to a challenge in a challenge-response procedure, which is linked to the fingerprint assigned to the component by the manufacturer.

[0022] According to one possible embodiment, the invention provides a computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a company, comprising the following steps:

[0023] Assigning a unique identifier (ID) and an associated individual fingerprint (FP) to a manufactured electronic component by a computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) of the electronic component, wherein the associated individual fingerprint (FP) assigned to the manufactured component is embedded in the manufactured component in an integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected manner and is stored in a database (DB-H) of the manufacturer or in other storage accessible to the manufacturer as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP);

[0024] Queries for the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component by a computing unit of a buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component, who has received the electronic component from its manufacturer via a supply chain;

[0025] Transmission of a challenge (C) by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) to the electronic component, which links the received challenge (C) with the integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected fingerprint (FP) to a link value and calculates a first authentication day (AT1) associated with the fingerprint (FP) based on the formed link value;

[0026] Transmission of the calculated first authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP) as a response (R) from the electronic component to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H); Calculation by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of a second authentication tag based on a link value, which is formed by linking the challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from the manufacturer's database (DB-H);

[0027] Comparison by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the first authentication tag (AT1) received as a response (R) from the electronic component with the calculated second authentication tag (AT2); and

[0028] Verifying the authenticity of the electronic component if the two authentication tags (AT1, AT2) compared by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) match.

[0029] The method according to the invention makes it possible to increase the security of the authentication and verification of electronic components that have limited resources and, in particular, no asymmetric crypto functionality.

[0030] The order of the above-mentioned steps may vary depending on the implementation and application of the computer-implemented method according to the invention.

[0031] This invention proposes a concept that enables the determination of the integrity, originality, and authenticity of an electronic component with minimal requirements. Furthermore, the method according to the invention offers increased security against replay attacks.

[0032] In the challenge-response method used in the inventive method, a participant (namely the computing unit RE_K of the buyer K) poses a task (challenge) which the component must solve (response) in order to prove that it knows a certain piece of information (common secret namely the fingerprint FP) without this information itself being transmitted.

[0033] The term hash function refers to a mapping that converts a large input set (key) into a smaller target set (hash values ​​or hash values). Hashing is the process of converting a string into a shorter, numerical value or key of a fixed length. The calculated hash value H, in turn, forms a fingerprint of the chain of operations created from the challenge C and the fingerprint FP.

[0034] A hash function is a one-way function. This means that it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the inputs from the function's output. Three important properties of hash functions are collision resistance, preimage resistance, and second preimage resistance.

[0035] The calculated authentication tag (AT), in particular a calculated hash value, has the property that the fingerprint (FP) cannot be calculated from the calculated value of the authentication tag (AT) (one-way function).

[0036] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, in a first variant A the requested unique identification (ID) of the electronic component is sent via a secure communication channel to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the electronic component to request the associated individual fingerprint of the delivered electronic component.

[0037] The secure communication channel used can be a two-way authenticated channel, for example TLS / SSH.

[0038] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, the corresponding reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) is subsequently read from the manufacturer's integrity-protected database (DB-H) using the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) received by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) via the secure communication channel. The identification (ID) is used to identify the component in the manufacturer's database (DB-H). The identification (ID) of the electronic component does not correspond to the fingerprint (FP) of the electronic component (KOMP). In another embodiment of the method according to the invention, the electronic component (KOMP) does not have an identification (ID).In this case, the buyer's processing unit (RE-K) can initiate the process by sending a challenge C to the electronic component KOMP. A processing unit within the electronic component KOMP then calculates a response R. The buyer's processing unit (RE-K) can then establish a secure (particularly integrity-protected) channel to the manufacturer's processing unit (RE-H) and send both the challenge C and the response R calculated by component KOMP. The manufacturer's processing unit (RE-H) can then use this information to search for the matching reference fingerprint (REF-FP) (without knowing the ID).

[0039] For example, the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) can search the manufacturer's database (DB-H) for a Ref fingerprint that satisfies the following equation:

[0040] Response = Hash (Challenge | Ref-Fingerprint), where the challenge C and the response R are known. The solution is computationally intensive but also valid.

[0041] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, the reference fingerprint (FP) read from the manufacturer's integrity-protected database (DB-H) of the electronic component is then sent by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the secure communication channel to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) of the electronic component, which is stored in the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

[0042] The fingerprint FP of the electronic component and the Ref-Fingerprint (REF-FP) of the electronic component are always transmitted and stored in a manner that protects integrity and confidentiality.

[0043] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, in a second variant (B) the queried unique identification (ID) of the electronic component is stored in a memory of the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, in the second variant (B) the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) sends the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component, queried and stored by the electronic component, together with the challenge (C) and together with the first authentication tag (AT1) received by the electronic component as response (R), via a secure communication channel to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the electronic component to request verification of the component by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H).

[0044] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, in the second variant (B) the associated reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) is read from the manufacturer's integrity-protected database (DB-H) using the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component received by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the secure communication channel from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

[0045] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a producer, the challenge (C) transmitted to the electronic component by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) is chained with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) to form a link value, and based on the link value formed, the first authentication day (AT1) associated with the fingerprint (FP) is calculated.

[0046] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component has a generated random number.

[0047] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component, the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component has a hardware-specific fingerprint that is generated from the physical properties and manufacturing variations of the electronic component using a PUF (Physical Unclonable Function). In another possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component, the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component is integrated into the component's firmware code in an integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected manner and / or stored in the component's data memory in an integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected manner.

[0048] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, the secure communication channel existing between the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) and the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) has a bi-authenticated channel, in particular TLS or SSH.

[0049] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a company, the challenge is generated by a random number generator or by a counter of the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

[0050] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer's electronic component, each generated challenge is used only once. This is achieved, for example, using a counter that can only count up or down.

[0051] This successfully prevents or stops potential replay attacks.

[0052] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a company, the electronic component is installed as a component in a device of the buyer or has a standalone component.

[0053] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component, the electronic component includes a field component with limited computing power and storage capacity. A field device (FD) is a technical device in the field of automation technology that is directly related to a production process. In automation technology, the term "field" refers to the area outside of control cabinets or control rooms. Field components can therefore be both actuators (control elements, valves, etc.) and sensors (transmitters) in factory and process automation. The field devices are connected to a control system, usually via a fieldbus or real-time Ethernet.

[0054] According to a further aspect, the invention provides a system for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, comprising: a computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) of the electronic component, which is designed to assign a unique identification (ID) and an associated individual fingerprint (FP) for an electronic component manufactured by the manufacturer, wherein the associated individual fingerprint (FP) assigned to the manufactured component is integrated into the manufactured component in an integrity-protected and trust-protected manner and is stored in a database (DB-H) of the manufacturer as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP);a computing unit of a buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component, who has received the electronic component from its manufacturer via a supply chain, which is designed to query the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component and which is designed to transmit a challenge (C) to the electronic component; wherein the electronic component has an integrated computing unit which is designed to link the challenge (C) received from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) incorporated therein to form a link value and, based on the formed link value, to calculate a first authentication tag (AT1) associated with the fingerprint (FP) and to transmit this first authentication tag (AT1) as a response (R) to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H);wherein the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) is designed to calculate a second authentication tag (AT2) based on a linking value formed by linking the challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from the manufacturer's database, and wherein the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) is designed to verify the authenticity of the electronic component if the two authentication tags (AT1, AT2) compared by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) match.

[0055] In one possible embodiment of the authentication system for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, a secure communication channel is established between the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) and the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

[0056] Preferably, the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) receives not only the Ref-Fingerprint (Ref-FP) from the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the mutually authenticated and secure communication channel, but also additional information for the subsequent calculation, such as which hash function or other calculation function B should be used.

[0057] According to a further aspect of the invention, a computing unit (RE) for an authentication system for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer is provided, wherein the computing unit (RE) is designed to query the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component via an interface, and is designed to transmit a generated challenge (C) to the electronic component and to receive a first authentication tag as a response (R) from the electronic component, and is designed to calculate a second authentication tag based on a linkage value formed by linking the locally generated challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from a database of the manufacturer, and is further designed to verify the authenticity of the electronic component.if the two authentication tags compared by the processing unit (PU) match.

[0058] According to a further aspect of the invention, an electronic component is verifiable by an authentication system, wherein the electronic component has an integrated computing unit or integrated calculation routine designed to link a challenge (C) received from a computing unit (RE) of the authentication system with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) contained in the electronic component to form a link value, and to calculate a first authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP) based on the link value formed, and designed to transmit the calculated first authentication tag (AT1) as a response (R) to the computing unit (RE) of the authentication system.

[0059] In one possible embodiment of the electronic component, the electronic component is installed as a component in a device of the buyer.

[0060] The device could be, for example, an IT device, an IoT device (IoT: Internet of Things), or an OT device.

[0061] In one possible embodiment of the electronic component, the electronic component is a standalone component not installed in another device.

[0062] In one possible embodiment of the electronic component, the electronic component includes a field component with limited computing power and limited storage capacity, in particular a sensor, an actuator or a storage component.

[0063] Furthermore, according to another aspect, the invention provides a device with at least one electronic component according to the invention installed therein as a component.

[0064] In one possible embodiment of the device, the device has a wireless or wired interface to a computing unit (RE) of the authentication system.

[0065] The invention further provides a secure component for a device designed to generate a challenge (C), receive a response (R), calculate authentication tags (AT), and compare authentication tags (ATs). Advantageous embodiments and further developments are described in the dependent claims and in the description with reference to the figures in the drawing.

[0066] They show:

[0067] Fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a possible embodiment of the method according to the invention;

[0068] Fig. 2 is a signal diagram to illustrate a first possible variant A of the method according to the invention;

[0069] Fig. 3 shows a signal diagram illustrating a second possible variant B of the method according to the invention.

[0070] The accompanying drawings are intended to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention. They illustrate embodiments and, in conjunction with the description, serve to explain the principles and concepts of the invention. Other embodiments and many of the advantages mentioned will become apparent with reference to the drawings. The elements of the drawings are not necessarily shown to scale.

[0071] In the figures of the drawing, identical, functionally equivalent and similarly acting elements, features and components - unless otherwise stated - are each provided with the same reference symbols.

[0072] An exemplary embodiment of the concept of the method according to the invention is shown in the flowchart according to Fig. 1. Two possible main variants A, B of the method according to the invention shown in Fig. 1 are shown in the signal diagrams of Figures 2 and 3.

[0073] According to a first aspect, the invention provides a computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer, in which the component KOMP is verified as originating from the manufacturer if a first authentication tag (AT1), which is calculated by a computing unit or a computing routine of the component KOMP depending on a fingerprint FP assigned to the component KOMP and a challenge REQ-FP (C) provided by a buyer of the component KOMP, matches a second authentication tag (AT2) (AT1 = AT2), which is calculated depending on a reference fingerprint Ref-FP stored at the manufacturer H, which can be stored in an integrity-protected manner when the fingerprint FP is assigned to the component KOMP.

[0074] In one possible embodiment of the method, a fingerprint FP is not assigned, but the component KOMP already contains an individual fingerprint FP.

[0075] The reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) can also be provided to the buyer of the KOMP component, who securely stores this reference fingerprint. After that, no further contact with the manufacturer of the KOMP component is required.

[0076] In one possible embodiment of the method according to the invention, the authentication tag AT has a calculated hash value H. In one possible embodiment, a concatenation (or chaining) or other linking of fingerprint FP and a challenge C takes place, and based on this, a hash value H is calculated as the authentication tag AT.

[0077] AT = H (C | FP)

[0078] The algorithm used, in particular the hash algorithm H, can be chosen arbitrarily depending on the specific application. Examples include SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-256, MD5, SHA-3, etc.

[0079] In an alternative embodiment of the method according to the invention, the fingerprint FP is used as a key, and an authentication tag AT is calculated from a challenge C, for example, using a MAC, HMAC, CMAC, GMAC, or AEAD algorithm. The generation of the response R can be performed using a MAC, HMAC, GMAC, or AEAD algorithm (AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data). Here, the fingerprint (e.g., FP and Ref-FP) can be used as a key, and a challenge C can be used as input data for such an algorithm.

[0080] AT = MAC (C; FP) In general, a first authentication tag AT 1 and a second authentication tag AT2 are calculated depending on a challenge C and a fingerprint (FP or Ref-FP) using a calculation algorithm B:

[0081] AT1 = B (C; FP)

[0082] AT2 = B(C; Ref-FP)

[0083] The first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the first hash value H1 or the first MAC authentication tag (MAC1), is preferably output by the component KOMP as a response R to a received challenge C in a challenge-response procedure. This challenge C is linked to the fingerprint FP assigned to the component KOMP by the manufacturer. The challenge C originating from the purchaser of the component KOMP is preferably used only once.

[0084] In a preferred embodiment, the invention provides a computer-implemented method for authenticating a manufacturer's electronic component KOMP, comprising the several main steps shown in the flowchart of Fig. 1.

[0085] In a first step S1 of the inventive method, a unique identification (ID) and an associated individual fingerprint (FP) are assigned (S1; SA1; SB1) to a manufactured electronic component KOMP by a processing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) of the electronic component KOMP. The associated individual fingerprint (FP) assigned to the manufactured component KOMP is integrated into the manufactured component KOMP in an integrity-protected and trust-protected manner and stored in a database (DB-H) or other storage unit of the manufacturer as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP).

[0086] In variant A of the method according to the invention, step S1 shown in the flowchart of Fig. 1 corresponds to step SA1, which is shown in the signal flowchart of Fig. 2.

[0087] In variant B of the method according to the invention, step S1 shown in the flowchart of Fig. 1 corresponds to step SB1, which is shown in the signal flowchart of Fig. 3. The embodiment variants A and B shown in Figures 2 and 3 can also be combined with each other.

[0088] During the manufacturing of a component KOMP, the manufacturer of the electronic component KOMP assigns a unique identity (ID) and an individual fingerprint (FP) or an individual digital fingerprint to each component KOMP manufactured in the first step S1 (SA1; SB1) of one possible embodiment. The identity (ID) of the electronic component KOMP is public and serves to uniquely identify the manufactured electronic component KOMP.

[0089] The fingerprint FP is used in the inventive method for the authentication and originality verification of the associated electrical component KOMP. The fingerprint FP assigned to component KOMP in step S1 (or SA1; SB1) cannot be read out.

[0090] The fingerprint FP can be generated as a random number during the manufacturing of the component KOMP and assigned to the component KOMP in step S1 (or SA1; SB1). The fingerprint FP assigned to the electronic component KOMP in step S1 is integer and confidential. The fingerprint FP can, for example, be integrated into the firmware code of the electronic component KOMP, which is not visible to the user.

[0091] Regardless of the method used to generate and store the component fingerprint FP, it is important according to the invention to store the resulting fingerprint FP at the manufacturer's database DB-H or elsewhere as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) in such a way that integrity and confidentiality are always guaranteed. Likewise, the associated identity ID of the electronic component KOMP is preferably stored in an integrity-protected manner at the manufacturer of the component KOMP.

[0092] Preferably, the component fingerprint FP is only readable in plaintext during manufacturing. Later, once the electronic component KOMP has been delivered and is in use, the fingerprint FP of the electronic component KOMP can only be read in a protected form – for example, within the framework of a challenge-response protocol. In a further step S2, the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component KOMP is queried (Fig. 1 S2; Fig. 2 SA2; Fig. 3 SB2) by a computing unit of a buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component KOMP, who has received the electronic component KOMP from its manufacturer via a supply chain.

[0093] In a further step S3, a generated challenge (C) is transmitted (Fig. 1 S3; Fig. 2 SA6; Fig. 3 SB4) by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) to the electronic component KOMP. The component KOMP links the received challenge (C) with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) to form a link value or link string and, using a hash function or other irreversible function, calculates a first authentication tag (AT1) associated with the fingerprint (FP), in particular a first hash value (H1) or a first MAC authentication tag (MAC1) with the fingerprint FP as the key, based on the resulting link value. The link preferably consists of concatenating the values ​​or strings in a specific order, for example, Challenge C | Fingerprint FP, where the character | is used for concatenation.The operation can also involve a logical operation of the values, for example, an XOR operation. The first authentication tag AT 1 can be calculated in step S3 (SA6; SB4) using a selectable calculation algorithm or function B by a calculation unit or routine of the component KOMP.

[0094] AT1 = B (C; FP)

[0095] In one possible embodiment, a first hash value H1 is calculated as the first authentication day AT1 using a hash value calculation algorithm:

[0096] H1 = H (C | FP) where the challenge C is chained with the fingerprint FP.

[0097] Alternatively, the challenge C can also be linked to the fingerprint FP in another way, for example in a logical XOR operation:

[0098] H1 = H (C xor FP) Alternatively, as the first authentication day AT1, a first MAC value MAC1 can also be calculated with the fingerprint FP as the key and the challenge C as the input value:

[0099] MAC1= MAC (C; FP)

[0100] In a further step S4, the first calculated authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP), for example, a first calculated hash value (H1) or first calculated MAC value (MAC1), is transmitted (S4; SA7; SB5) as a response (R) from the electronic component KOMP via an interface to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H). This can occur via a wireless or wired interface between the computing unit (RE) and the component (KOMP) and / or via a data network.

[0101] In a further step S5, the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) calculate (S5; SA8; SB8) a second authentication tag (AT2), for example, a second hash value (H2) or a second MAC value (MAC2), based on a linking value formed by linking the challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from the manufacturer's database (DB-H). The linking preferably consists of concatenating the challenge C with the read reference fingerprint Ref-FP (C | Ref-FP). The order of the concatenation can vary in different implementations of the procedure. Other arithmetic or logical combinations of the underlying values ​​C and Ref-FP are possible. It is also possible to use a specific calculation algorithm B for calculating the authentication tag AT, in particular any hash algorithm.The MAC algorithm must be used. However, the same calculation algorithm B must be used in the electronic component KOMP and in the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) to obtain the same authentication tag AT, specifically the same hash value H or the same MAC value MAC, for verification, or to ensure that AT1=AT2, H1=H2, or MAC1=MAC2 for the same challenge C and FP=REF-FP. The second authentication tag (AT2) is calculated in step S5 (SA8; SB8) by a processor of the computing unit RE using a suitable calculation algorithm.

[0102] AT2= B (C; Ref-FP)

[0103] In one possible embodiment, a second hash value (H2) is calculated as the second authentication tag AT2 using a hash value calculation algorithm:

[0104] H2 = H (C| Ref-FP) where the challenge C and the reference fingerprint Ref-FP are linked together in one possible embodiment (C | Ref-FP).

[0105] Alternatively, the challenge C and the reference fingerprint Ref-FP can also be linked in another way, for example in an XOR operation:

[0106] H2 = H (C xor Ref-FP)

[0107] Alternatively, in another embodiment, a second MAC value (MAC2) can be calculated as the second authentication tag AT2, using the reference fingerprint Ref-FP as the key:

[0108] MAC2 = MAC (C; Ref-FP)

[0109] In this process, the calculation of the second authentication tag (AT2), in particular the second hash value (H2) or the second MAC value (MAC2), is carried out in step SA8 by the buyer's computing unit RE-K in the first variant A of the inventive method shown in Fig. 2, and in step SB8 by the manufacturer's computing unit RE-H in the second variant B of the inventive method shown in Fig. 3.

[0110] In another possible embodiment, an authentication tag AT is preferably calculated using a symmetric AEAD algorithm. Examples of AEAD algorithms are AES-GCM and ASCON. AT1 = AEAD (C; FP)

[0111] AT2= AEAD (C; Ref-FP)

[0112] In one possible embodiment, a hash value H is calculated using a hash algorithm and can be used as an authentication tag.

[0113] In one possible implementation, a MAC value is calculated using a MAC / CMAC / HMAC / GMAC algorithm and can be used as an authentication tag.

[0114] In a further step S6, the first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the first hash value H1 or the first MAC value (MAC1), is compared (S6; SA9; SB9) with the second authentication tag (AT2), in particular with the second hash value (H2) or with the second MAC value (MAC2), by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the received first hash value (H1) or the received first MAC value (MAC1), received from the electronic component KOMP as a response (R), with the calculated second authentication tag (AT2), in particular the calculated second hash value (H2) or the calculated second MAC value (MAC2).

[0115] In the first variant A of the inventive method shown in Fig. 2, the comparison of the first authentication day (AT1) with the second authentication day (AT2) is carried out in step SA9 by the computing unit RE-K of the buyer K and in the second variant B of the inventive method shown in Fig. 3 by the computing unit RE-H of the manufacturer.

[0116] In a further step S7 (Fig.1) the authenticity of the electronic component KOMP is verified (S7; SA10; SB10) if the two authentication tags (AT1 , AT2) compared by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H), in particular the compared hash values ​​(H1 , H2) or the compared MAC values ​​(MAC1 , MAC2), match (AT1=A2; H1=H2; MAC1=MAC2).

[0117] In the first variant A of the inventive method shown in Fig. 2, verification is carried out in step SA10 by the computing unit RE-K of the buyer K, and in the second variant B of the inventive method shown in Fig. 3, verification is carried out in step SB10 by the computing unit RE-H of the manufacturer H.

[0118] In the second variant B shown in Fig. 3, the manufacturer's computing unit RE-H can report the result of the verification in step SB11 to the buyer's computing unit RE-K. The buyer's computing unit RE-K preferably has a user interface that indicates to the user or buyer whether the relevant component KOMP has been successfully verified as originating from the manufacturer.

[0119] Furthermore, the verification result can automatically trigger an error handling routine. For example, a component identified as inauthentic will not be installed in the device during assembly or will be rejected.

[0120] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer, in the first variant A shown in Fig. 2, the queried (S2) unique identification (ID) of the electronic component KOMP is sent (SA3) via a secure communication channel BAK to the computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) of the electronic component KOMP to request (REQ-FP (ID)) the associated individual fingerprint FP of the delivered electronic component KOMP.

[0121] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer, the following is then carried out in the first variant (A) of the method shown in Fig. 2: a reading (SA4) of the associated reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) from the integrity-protected database (DB-H) of the manufacturer is carried out on the basis of the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component KOMP received by the computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) via the secure communication channel BAK from the computing unit of the buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component KOMP.

[0122] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer, the first variant (A) of the method involves sending (SA5) the reference fingerprint (FP) read from the integrity-protected database of the manufacturer (DB-H) of the electronic component KOMP by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the secure communication channel BAK to the computing unit of the buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component KOMP, whereby the transmitted reference fingerprint Ref-FP is stored in the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) for further evaluation.

[0123] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, in a second variant (B) of the method, the queried (S2) unique identification (ID) of the electronic component KOMP is stored (SB3) in a memory of the buyer's computing unit (RE-K), as shown in the signal diagram of Fig.3.

[0124] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, in the second variant (B) of the method shown in Fig. 3, the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) sends (SB6) the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component KOMP, queried and stored (SB3) by the electronic component KOMP, together with the challenge (C) and together with the first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the first hash value (H1), received by the electronic component KOMP as a response (R), via a secure communication channel BAK to the computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) of the electronic component KOMP to request verification of the component KOMP by the computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H).

[0125] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer H, in the second variant (B) shown in Fig. 3, the associated reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) is read (SB7) from the manufacturer's integrity-protected database (DB-H) using the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component KOMP received by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) via the secure communication channel BAK.

[0126] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a producer, the challenge (C) transmitted by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) to the electronic component in step S3 (S3; SA6; SB4) is chained with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) to form a link value, and based on the link value formed, the first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the first hash value (H1), belonging to the fingerprint (FP) is calculated.

[0127] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component KOMP, the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component KOMP has a generated random number.

[0128] In an alternative possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component KOMP, the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component KOMP has a hardware-specific fingerprint that is generated from the physical properties and manufacturing variations of the electronic component KOMP using a PUF (Physical Unclonable Function).

[0129] In another possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component KOMP, the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component KOMP is integrated in a firmware code of the component KOMP in an integrity-protected manner and / or in a data storage of the component KOMP in an integrity-protected manner.

[0130] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer, the secure communication channel BAK existing between the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) and the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) has a bi-mutually authenticated channel.

[0131] In another possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component (KOMP), the challenge (C) is generated by a random number generator or by a counter in the buyer's computing unit (RE-K). The generated random number guarantees the so-called freshness property in this context. The counter used preferably only counts up or down so that each generated counter value can only occur once. In this embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component (KOMP), each generated challenge (C) is used only once. This prevents replay attacks.

[0132] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a company, the electronic component KOMP is installed as a component in a device of the buyer K or has an independent component.

[0133] In one possible embodiment of the method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component, the electronic component KOMP has a field component with limited computing power and limited storage capacity.

[0134] Furthermore, according to another aspect, the invention creates a system ASYS for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer.

[0135] The ASYS authentication system comprises a manufacturer's processing unit (RE-H) for the electronic component KOMP. The manufacturer's processing unit (RE-H) is designed to assign a unique identifier (ID) and a corresponding individual fingerprint (FP) to the electronic component KOMP manufactured by the manufacturer (S1; SA1; SB1). The corresponding individual fingerprint (FP) assigned to the manufactured component KOMP is embedded in the component itself in an integrity-protected and trust-protected manner and stored confidentially and with integrity protection in the manufacturer's database (DB-H) as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP).

[0136] The ASYS authentication system comprises a buyer's computing unit (RE-K) of the electronic component KOMP, which the buyer has received from its manufacturer via a supply chain. The buyer's computing unit (RE-K) of the electronic component KOMP is designed to query the unique identifier (ID) of the electronic component KOMP (S2; SA2; SB2). The buyer's computing unit (RE-K) of the electronic component KOMP is also designed to transmit a challenge (C) to the electronic component KOMP (S3; SA6; SB4).The electronic component KOMP has an integrated processing unit or an integrated calculation routine designed to link the challenge (C) received from the buyer's processing unit (RE-K) with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) embedded within it to form a link value and, based on the resulting link value, to calculate a first authentication tag (AT1), in particular a first hash value (H1), associated with the fingerprint (FP). The electronic component KOMP can transmit this first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the first hash value (H1), as a response (R) to the buyer's processing unit (RE-K) and / or to the manufacturer's processing unit (RE) (S4; SA7; SB5).

[0137] The buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) is designed to calculate a second authentication tag (AT2), in particular a second hash value (H2), based on a linking value formed by linking the challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from the manufacturer's database (DB-H) (S5; SA8; SB8). The buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) are also designed to verify the authenticity of the electronic component KOMP (S7; SA10; SB10) if the two authentication tags ATs, in particular hash values ​​(H1 , H2) or MAC values ​​(MAC1 , MAC2), compared by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) (S6; SA9; SB9) match (AT1 = AT2).

[0138] In one possible embodiment of the ASYS authentication system for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer, a secure communication channel BAK is established between the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) and the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

[0139] Furthermore, according to another aspect, the invention provides a computing unit (RE) for an authentication system ASYS for authenticating an electronic component KOMP manufactured by a manufacturer.

[0140] The processing unit (PU) of the authentication system is designed to query the unique identifier (ID) of the electronic component KOMP via an interface (S2; SA2; SB2). The PU is further designed to transmit a generated challenge (C) to the electronic component KOMP (S3; SA6; SB4) and to receive a first authentication tag (AT1), in particular a first hash value (H1) or a first MAC value (MAC1), as a response (R) from the electronic component KOMP (S4; SA7; SB5).

[0141] The computing unit (RE) of the ASYS authentication system is also designed to calculate a second authentication tag (AT2), in particular a second hash value (H2) or a second MAC value (MAC2), based on a linking value which is formed by linking the locally generated challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from a database of the manufacturer (DB-H) (S5; SA8; SB8).

[0142] The computing unit (CU) of the authentication system ASYS is further designed to verify the authenticity of the electronic component KOMP (S7; SA10; SB10) if the two authentication tags (AT1 , AT2) compared by the computing unit (CU) (S6; SA9; SB9), in particular hash values ​​(H1 , H2) or MAC values ​​(MAC1 , MAC2), match.

[0143] The ASYS authentication system can form part of an automation system or a production plant for the manufacture or assembly of devices.

[0144] Furthermore, according to another aspect, the invention creates an electronic component KOMP which is verifiable by an authentication system ASYS according to the invention.

[0145] The electronic component KOMP has an integrated computing unit or an integrated computing routine which is designed to link a challenge (C) received from a computing unit (RE) of the authentication system ASYS with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) contained in the electronic component KOMP to form a linking value and, based on the formed linking value, to calculate a first authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP), in particular a first hash value (H1), or, based on the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) as a key, to calculate the first MAC value (MAC1) as the first authentication tag (AT1).

[0146] In one possible embodiment, the electronic component KOMP comprises a hardware component (HW-KOMP). In another possible embodiment, the electronic component comprises a software component (SW-KOMP), for example, a control program or the like.

[0147] The electronic component KOMP is designed to transmit the calculated first authentication tag (AT1), in particular the first hash value (H1) or first MAC value (MAC1), as a response (R) to the requesting computing unit (RE) of the authentication system ASYS (S4; SA7; SB5). For this purpose, the KOMP component has a transmission interface.

[0148] In one possible embodiment of the electronic component KOMP, the electronic component KOMP can be installed as a component in a device of the buyer or is already installed.

[0149] In one possible embodiment of the electronic component KOMP, the electronic component KOMP is a standalone component not installed in another device.

[0150] In one possible embodiment of the electronic component KOMP, the electronic component KOMP includes a field component with limited computing power and limited storage capacity. The component KOMP comprises, for example, a sensor, an actuator, or a storage component.

[0151] Furthermore, according to another aspect, the invention provides a device with at least one electronic component according to the invention incorporated therein as a component.

[0152] In one possible embodiment of the device, the device has a wireless or wired interface to a computing unit (RE) of the ASYS authentication system.

[0153] In the authentication system SYS according to the invention, as schematically depicted in the signal diagrams of Figures 2 and 3, three different parties are involved: an electronic component KOMP (e.g., sensor, actuator, memory), a computing unit RE-H of a manufacturer (or a confidential party of the manufacturer, e.g., server or authority), and a computing unit RE-K of a buyer (user or operator) of this electronic component KOMP, who has obtained and has control of the component KOMP through a supply chain.

[0154] The buyer wishes to verify the originality, integrity, and authenticity of the KOMP component in their possession. The buyer wants to be certain that they obtained the KOMP electronic component from a trusted manufacturer along the supply chain, and that the component has not been replaced by a counterfeit or fake part.

[0155] In the inventive method, the buyer of component KOMP first contacts the electronic component KOMP, which he has purchased and possesses, via one of his computing units RE-K and queries its unique identity ID (REQ-ID) via an interface in steps S2 (Fig. 1), SA2 (Fig. 2), and SB2 (Fig. 3). Since the identity ID of component KOMP is public information, the component KOMP sends the identity ID back to the buyer's computing unit RE-K via the interface without any further action.

[0156] In one possible embodiment, the identity ID of each component (KOMP) can be signed by the component's manufacturer during production. The component then stores the corresponding identity ID along with the manufacturer's signature. Each time the identity ID is requested, the component can return this identity ID along with the manufacturer's signature. This allows other parties, such as the buyer of the component, to verify the manufacturer's signature via the identity ID and thus check its integrity. Furthermore, this also confirms that this identity ID was indeed assigned by the component's manufacturer.

[0157] In one possible implementation, the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) establishes a bidirectional authenticated channel (BAK) to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) (e.g., a TLS channel). In step SA3, it sends the identity ID of the component (KOMP) to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via this secure channel (BAK), requesting the fingerprint (FP) of the component (KOMP) in the call (REQ-FP (ID)). Using the received identity ID of the component (KOMP), the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) can identify the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) of the component (KOMP) in its protected database (DB-H) in step SA4. In step SA5, the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) is then securely transmitted (with regard to trustworthiness and integrity) from the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) via the authenticated channel (BAK) and then securely stored on the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).These two steps are protected with regard to integrity and confidentiality.

[0158] In the next phase, the buyer's RE-K computing unit will perform an integrity check of the KOMP component. During this process, the buyer's RE-K computing unit can verify the originality, integrity, and authenticity of the KOMP electronic component.

[0159] In the inventive method, this can be achieved in one possible embodiment using a challenge-response protocol. The buyer's computing unit RE-K generates a challenge C and sends it to the electronic component KOMP in step SA6.

[0160] The electronic component KOMP receives the challenge C and calculates an authentication tag AT1, in particular a first hash value H1 or a first MAC value (MAC1) as the corresponding response R:

[0161] H1 = H (C | FP) R := H1 or

[0162] MAC1 = MAC (C ; FP)

[0163] R:= MAC1

[0164] The symbol “|” denotes the concatenation or chaining of two values, where maintaining the correct order is relevant.

[0165] The algorithm used, in particular the hash algorithm H, can be chosen arbitrarily depending on the specific application. Examples include SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-256, MD5, SHA-3, etc. Crucially for the method according to the invention, the fingerprint FP from the electronic component KOMP can only be read in a protected form. The same algorithm is used for verification.

[0166] Consequently, in step SA7, the electronic component KOMP responds to the challenge C received from the buyer's computing unit RE-K with the calculated response R.

[0167] Ultimately, in the first variant A of the inventive method shown in Fig. 2, the buyer's computing unit RE-K can perform the same calculation with the reference fingerprint Ref-FP to determine a second authentication tag, in particular a second hash value H2 or a second MAC (MAC2), namely:

[0168] H2 = H (C | Ref-FP) or

[0169] MAC2 = MAC (C; Ref-FP)

[0170] The same Challenge C and the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) received by the manufacturer's computing unit RE-H via the secure channel BAK and securely stored at the buyer's computing unit RE-K are used.

[0171] If the first authentication tag received by the electronic component KOMP as response R, in particular the first hash value H1, matches the second authentication tag calculated by the buyer's computing unit RE-K, in particular the second hash value H2 (H1=H2), or if the two MAC values ​​match (MAC1=MAC2), the buyer's computing unit RE-K can determine the originality, integrity and authenticity of the electronic component in step SA 10, because only this electronic component KOMP knows the correct fingerprint FP.

[0172] In one embodiment of the method according to the invention, the challenge C can be generated by a random number generator of the buyer's RE-K computing unit. In another embodiment, the challenge C can be generated with a simple counter that can only count up or down. The bit length of the challenge C is arbitrarily selectable depending on the application. It is important that in the method according to the invention, a generated challenge C is used only once to prevent replay attacks.

[0173] In one possible embodiment of the method according to the invention, the identity ID of a component KOMP can be generated as the calculated hash value H of the fingerprint FP.

[0174] In the embodiment shown in Fig. 2, the identity ID assigned to or given to the component KOMP can be, for example, as follows:

[0175] ID = Hash (fingerprint)

[0176] The fingerprint FP can also be concatenated with a value before the hash value calculation, for example with the value 1 :

[0177] ID = Hash (1 | Fingerprint).

[0178] In this case, it is important to use the order of concatenating the two values ​​consistently for calculating the response R, for example always:

[0179] Response R = Hash H (Challenge | Fingerprint).

[0180] In a further embodiment of the method according to the invention, the fingerprint FP of the electronic component KOMP can be generated using a PUF from the physical properties and manufacturing variations of the component KOMP.

[0181] The integrity and confidentiality of the fingerprint FP on the KOMP component can be protected by hardcoding, preventing an attacker from directly accessing this component code. Other storage methods are not excluded. In any case, it is crucial to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the fingerprint FP stored on the electronic component KOMP. The hash function H used reduces a data set to a smaller string; that is, the calculated hash value is preferably shorter and more compact than the original value or the concatenation value, for example, shorter than the concatenation of Challenge C and Fingerprint FP.

[0182] In a further embodiment of the method according to the invention, the hash calculation for generating the response R and for verification can be replaced by a MAC, HMAC, or an AEAD algorithm (AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data). Here, the fingerprint (e.g., FP and Ref-FP) can be used as a key, and the challenge C can be used as input data for such algorithms.

[0183] The hash algorithm or other algorithm used in the method according to the invention depends on the available computing resources of the component KOMP.

[0184] Verification can be performed by the buyer either directly on the device where the KOMP component is integrated as a part, or on another device at the buyer's site (e.g., backend).

[0185] In the second main variant B of the method according to the invention, as schematically illustrated in Fig. 3, the reference fingerprint Ref-FP does not need to be transmitted to the buyer K's computing unit RE-K. Instead, the verification of the originality, integrity, and authenticity of the electronic component KOMP is performed on the manufacturer's computing unit RE-H. The input data and the result of the verification are then transmitted by the manufacturer to the buyer's computing unit RE-K via a secure channel BAK in step SB11.

[0186] The input data for verification must first be read from the electronic component KOMP via an interface by the buyer's computing unit RE-K and must include the following information: The identity ID of the component KOMP, the last used challenge C, and the associated response R.

[0187] Verification of the authenticity of component KOMP can also be performed by any other trusted entity that possesses the identity ID of component KOMP and the associated secret reference fingerprint Ref-FP. Component KOMP does not necessarily have to be a hardware component in an IoT device. The concept according to the invention can also be implemented for software components.

[0188] The component KOMP can also be an IoT device or a component KOMP installed therein, which authenticates itself to another party using the method according to the invention.

[0189] In another embodiment, the buyer can be a device manufacturer who integrates the component KOMP, obtained from component manufacturer H via a supply chain, into a device he manufactures. In this case, the device manufacturer can securely store the reference fingerprint Ref-FP in the device (e.g., protected and unreadable in the Secure Element). The aforementioned verification of the component KOMP then takes place internally in the respective device using the method according to the invention.

[0190] In another embodiment, the manufacturer can be a device manufacturer who generates the fingerprint FP for the KOMP component and securely stores it in the device as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) (e.g., protected and unreadable in the Secure Element). The buyer can then verify the KOMP component on the device using the Secure Element. The buyer does not have access to the Reference Fingerprint Ref-FP in plaintext. However, the Secure Element can perform the verification according to the concept of the inventive method and provide the verification result.

[0191] In another variant, the manufacturer's RE-H computing unit can be replaced at one point in the protocols with a server or confidential authority that is solely responsible for verifications.

[0192] The various variants of the inventive method and the inventive authentication system can ensure the following after a successful run.

[0193] Component authentication: The KOMP component is only able to calculate the correct response R if the fingerprint (FP) matches the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) from the trusted manufacturer.

[0194] Protection against replay attacks:

[0195] The KOMP component is only able to generate the correct response R if the correct and freshly generated challenge C is used for the calculation. An attacker cannot reuse previously intercepted responses R.

[0196] Component authenticity check:

[0197] The KOMP component is only able to calculate the correct response R if the fingerprint (FP) matches the original reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) of the trusted manufacturer who has committed to supplying original components.

[0198] The above embodiments and further developments can be combined with one another as appropriate. Further possible embodiments, further developments, and implementations of the invention also include combinations of features of the invention described previously or subsequently with regard to the exemplary embodiments, even if not explicitly mentioned. In particular, the person skilled in the art will also add individual aspects as improvements or additions to the respective basic form of the present invention.

[0199] The concept of this invention describes a simple method for verifying the originality, integrity, and authenticity of an electronic component. The inventive method and system offer the possibility of increasing the security of many small field components (e.g., sensors, actuators, memory, etc.). The inventive method thus serves to increase the overall system security of a plant, which can comprise a large number of components.

[0200] The inventive method and authentication system ASYS do not require complex cryptographic methods (e.g., digital signatures) to authenticate and verify components (e.g., using the described challenge-response protocol based on hash functions or other algorithms, in particular MAC, HMAC, CMAC, GMAC, or AEAD). The hash calculations or other computations performed by the inventive method and authentication system ASYS can be implemented with minimal effort on small, resource-constrained electronic components (KOMP) to increase security.

[0201] The inventive method and the inventive authentication system ASYS are secured against replay attacks using the challenge-response protocol. The accompanying drawings are intended to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention. They illustrate embodiments and, in conjunction with the description, serve to explain the principles and concepts of the invention. Other embodiments and many of the aforementioned advantages become apparent with reference to the drawings. The elements of the drawings are not necessarily shown to scale.

[0202] Regardless of the grammatical gender of a particular term, persons with male, female or other gender identities are included.

[0203] Reference symbol list

[0204] FP Fingerprint

[0205] Ref-FP Reference Fingerprint C Challenge

[0206] R Response

[0207] RE computing unit

[0208] RE-H computing unit from the manufacturer

[0209] RE-K Buyer's Computing Unit AT Authentication Day

[0210] MAC MAC value

[0211] H hash value

[0212] COMP Component

[0213] BAK Secure Channel ASYS Authentication System

Claims

Patent claims 1. Computer-implemented method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component (KOMP), in which the electronic component (KOMP) is verified as originating from the manufacturer if a first authentication tag (AT1), which is calculated by a computing unit or by a computing routine of the electronic component (KOMP) depending on a fingerprint (FP) of the electronic component (KOMP) and a challenge (C) provided by a purchaser of the component (KOMP), matches a second authentication tag (AT2), which is calculated depending on a stored reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) of the electronic component (KOMP).

2. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to claim 1, wherein the calculated authentication day (AT) comprises a calculated hash value (H) or a calculated MAC value (MAC).

3. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the fingerprint (FP) is assigned by the manufacturer of the electronic component (KOMP) and is stored in the electronic component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected and trustworthy manner.

4. Computer-implemented method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component according to any one of claims 1 to 3 comprising the steps: Assignment (S1 ; SA1 ; SB1) of a unique identifier (ID) and an associated individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component (KOMP) by a computing unit of the manufacturer (RE-H) of the electronic component (KOMP), wherein the associated individual fingerprint (FP) assigned to the manufactured component (KOMP) is integrated into the manufactured component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected and trust-protected manner and is stored in a database (DB-H) of the manufacturer as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP); Queries (S2; SA2; SB2) of the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) by a computing unit of a buyer (RE-K) who has received the electronic component (KOMP) from its manufacturer via a supply chain; Transfer (S3; SA6; SB4) of a challenge (C) by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) to the electronic component (KOMP), which links the received challenge (C) with the integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected fingerprint (FP) to a link value and calculates a first authentication day (AT1) associated with the fingerprint (FP) based on the formed link value; Transmit (S4; SA7; SB5) the calculated first authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP) as a response (R) from the electronic component (KOMP) to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H); Calculate (S5; SA8; SB8) by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) a second authentication tag (AT2) based on a link value formed by linking the challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from the manufacturer's database (DB-H) or transferred from the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K); Comparison (S6; SA9; SB9) by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the first authentication tag (AT1) received as a response (R) from the electronic component (KOMP) with the calculated second authentication tag (AT2); and Verify (S7; SA10; SB10) the authenticity of the electronic component (KOMP) if the two authentication tags (AT1, AT2) compared by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) match.

5. Computer-implemented method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component according to any one of claims 1 to 4, comprising the steps: Sending (SA3) the queried (S2) unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) via a secure integrity-protected communication channel (BAK) to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the electronic component (KOMP) to request the associated individual fingerprint (FP) of the delivered electronic component (KOMP); Reading (SA4) the associated reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) from the manufacturer's integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected database (DB-H) using the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) received by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the secure communication channel (BAK) from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K); Sending (SA5) the reference fingerprint (FP) read from the integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected database of the manufacturer (DB-H) of the electronic component (KOMP) by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the secure and confidentiality-protected communication channel (BAK) to the computing unit of the buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component (KOMP), which is stored in the computing unit of the buyer (RE-K).

6. Computer-implemented method for authenticating a manufacturer-produced electronic component according to any one of claims 1 to 5, comprising the steps: Storing (SB3) the queried (S2) unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) in a memory of the buyer's computing unit (RE-K); Sending (SB6) by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) queried and stored (SB3) by the electronic component (KOMP) together with the challenge (C) and together with the first authentication tag (AT1) received by the electronic component (KOMP) as response (R) via a secure communication channel (BAK) to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the electronic component (KOMP) to request verification of the component (KOMP) by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H); Reading (SB7) the associated reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) from the manufacturer's integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected database (DB-H) using the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) received by the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) via the secure integrity-protected communication channel (BAK) from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

7. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of the preceding claims 2 to 6, wherein the (S3; SA6; SB4) challenge (C) transmitted by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) to the electronic component (KOMP) is combined with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) to form a link value, in particular chained, concatenated or logically linked, and the first authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP) is calculated based on the link value formed.

8. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 7, wherein the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component (KOMP) comprises a generated random number.

9. Computer-implemented method for authenticating a manufacturer's electronic component according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 8, wherein the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component (KOMP) comprises a hardware-specific fingerprint generated by means of a PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) from the physical properties and manufacturing variations of the electronic component (KOMP).

10. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 9, wherein the individual fingerprint (FP) for a manufactured electronic component (KOMP) is integrated in a firmware code of the component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected manner or is stored in a data storage of the component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected manner.

11. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to one of the preceding claims 5 up to 10, wherein the secure communication channel (BAK) existing between the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) and the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) has a bi-authenticated channel.

12. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of the preceding claims 4 to 11, wherein the challenge (C) is generated by a random number generator or by a counter of the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

13. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of claims 2 to 12 above, wherein each challenge (C) is used only once.

14. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 13, wherein the electronic component (KOMP) is installed as a component in a device of the buyer or has a standalone component.

15. Computer-implemented method for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to any one of the preceding claims 1 to 14, wherein the electronic component (KOMP) comprises a field component with limited computing power and limited storage capacity.

16. Authentication system (ASYS) for authenticating an electronic component (KOMP) manufactured by a manufacturer, comprising: a manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) of the electronic component (KOMP) designed to assign a unique identification (ID) and an associated individual fingerprint (FP) to an electronic component (KOMP) manufactured by the manufacturer (S1; SA1; SB1), wherein the associated individual fingerprint (FP) assigned to the manufactured component (KOMP) is embedded in the manufactured component (KOMP) in an integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected manner and is stored in a database (DB-H) or other storage as a reference fingerprint (Ref-FP); a computing unit of a buyer (RE-K) of the electronic component (KOMP), who has received the electronic component (KOMP) from its manufacturer via a supply chain designed to query the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (KOMP) (S2; SA2; SB2) and designed to transmit a challenge (C) to the electronic component (KOMP) (S3; SA6; SB4);wherein the electronic component (KOMP) has an integrated computing unit designed to link the challenge (C) received from the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) with the integrity-protected and confidentiality-protected fingerprint (FP) embedded in it to form a link value and, based on the formed link value, to calculate a first authentication tag (AT1) belonging to the fingerprint (FP) and to transmit this first authentication tag (AT1) as a response (R) to the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or to the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) (S4; SA7; SB5);wherein the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) is designed to calculate a second authentication tag (AT2) based on a linking value formed by linking the challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) read from the manufacturer's database (DB-H) (S5; SA8; SB8), and wherein the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) is designed to verify the authenticity of the electronic component (KOMP) (S7; SA10; SB10) if the two authentication tags (AT1.AT2) compared by the buyer's computing unit (RE-K) and / or the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) (S6; SA9; SB9) match.

17. Authentication system (ASYS) for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer, according to claim 16, wherein a secure communication channel (BAK) is established between the manufacturer's computing unit (RE-H) and the buyer's computing unit (RE-K).

18. Computing unit (CU) for an authentication system (ASYS) for authenticating an electronic component manufactured by a manufacturer according to claim 16, wherein the computing unit (CU) is designed to query the unique identification (ID) of the electronic component (COMP) via an interface (S2; SA2; SB2) and which is designed to transmit a generated challenge (C) to the electronic component (KOMP) (S3; SA6; SB4) and to receive a first authentication tag (AT1) as a response (R) from the electronic component (KOMP) (S4; SA7; SB5), and which is designed to calculate a second authentication tag (AT2) based on a link value formed by linking the locally generated challenge (C) with the reference fingerprint (Ref-FP) (S5; SA8; SB8), and which is further designed to verify the authenticity of the electronic component (KOMP) (S7; SA10; SB10) if the two authentication tags (AT1, AT2) compared by the computing unit (RE) (S6; SA9; SB9) match.

19. Component (KOMP) that is verifiable by an authentication system (ASYS) according to claim 16, wherein the component (KOMP) has an integrated computing unit or computation routine designed to link a challenge (C) received from a computing unit (RE) of the authentication system (ASYS) with the integrity-protected fingerprint (FP) contained in the component (KOMP) to form a link value and to calculate a first authentication tag (AT1) associated with the fingerprint (FP) based on the link value formed, and designed to transmit the calculated first authentication tag (AT1) as a response (R) to the computing unit (RE) of the authentication system (ASYS) (S4; SA7; SB5).

20. Component according to claim 19, wherein the electronic component (KOMP) comprises a hardware component.

21. Component according to claim 20, wherein the electronic hardware component is installed as a component in a device of the buyer or comprises an independent component.

22. Component according to claim 20 or 21, wherein the electronic hardware component comprises a field component with limited computing power and limited storage capacity, in particular a sensor, an actuator or a storage component.

23. Component according to claim 19, wherein the electronic component (KOMP) comprises a software component.

24. Device comprising at least one component (KOMP) according to any one of claims 19 to 23.

25. Device according to claim 24, wherein the device has a wireless or wired has an interface to a computing unit (RE) of the authentication system (ASYS) according to claim 16.

26. Secure component for a device according to claim 25, designed to generate a challenge (C), receive a response (R), calculate authentication tags (AT), and compare authentication tags (ATs).

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