Information transmission method, communication apparatus, storage medium, and chip system

Abstract

Provided are an information transmission method, a communication apparatus, a storage medium and a chip system. The method comprises: a first communication apparatus performing security processing on target signaling to obtain ciphertext of the target signaling; on the basis of plaintext of the target signaling, generating a CRC code; and outputting the ciphertext of the target signaling and the CRC code. That is to say, the ciphertext of the target signaling and the CRC code generated on the basis of the plaintext of the target signaling are transmitted by means of an air interface, so as to implement integrity protection on the target signaling, thereby saving air interface resources and reducing overhead. In addition, compared with the transmission of the plaintext of the target signaling, the transmission of the ciphertext of the target signaling is conducive to reducing the possibility that the target signaling is tampered, thereby improving the security of the target signaling.

Description

Information transmission methods, communication devices, storage media and chip systems

[0001] This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 202411222176.1, filed on August 30, 2024, entitled "Information Transmission Method, Communication Device, Storage Medium and Chip System", the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field

[0002] This application relates to the field of communications, and in particular to information transmission methods, communication devices, storage media, and chip systems. Background Technology

[0003] In wireless communication, the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer is responsible for protecting the integrity of user plane data and control plane data.

[0004] For example, at the PDCP layer, message integrity can be verified based on a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), which is generated based on parameters such as message content and key. For instance, the sender can generate a MAC-I using a cryptographic hash function based on the message content and key, append this MAC-I to the end of the message, and send it to the receiver. Upon receiving the message and MAC-I, the receiver recalculates the MAC-I using the same key and cryptographic hash function. If the receiver's calculated MAC-I matches the received MAC-I, the message has not been tampered with and originates from the intended sender; if the receiver's calculated MAC-I differs from the received MAC-I, the message has been tampered with or forged.

[0005] However, the lower-level signaling (such as layer 1 (L1) / layer 2 (L2)) lacks integrity protection, which could allow attackers to compromise the integrity of the communication system by tampering with the lower-level signaling. One possible design is to directly implement the integrity protection scheme of the aforementioned PDCP layer down to the lower level; however, the MAC-I is quite long, approximately 32 bits, which could consume a significant amount of air interface resources and incur substantial overhead. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This application provides an information transmission method, communication device, storage medium, and chip system, with the aim of achieving integrity protection while saving air interface resources and reducing overhead.

[0007] Firstly, this application provides an information transmission method, which can be executed by a first communication device. The first communication device can be a terminal, a component configured in the terminal (such as a chip, chip system, processor, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the terminal's functions; this application does not limit its scope in this regard. The aforementioned first communication device can also be a network device, or a component configured in a network device (such as a chip, chip system, or processor, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the network device's functions; this application does not limit its scope in this regard either.

[0008] The aforementioned first communication device can be regarded as the sender (or transmitter) of the signaling.

[0009] For example, the method includes: performing security processing on the target signaling to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling; generating a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code based on the plaintext of the target signaling; and outputting the ciphertext of the target signaling and the CRC code.

[0010] In the above technical solution, the air interface transmits the ciphertext of the target signaling and a CRC code generated based on the plaintext of the target signaling to achieve integrity protection of the target signaling. This eliminates the need for an additional MAC-I, helping to save air interface resources and reduce overhead. Furthermore, transmitting the ciphertext of the target signaling, compared to transmitting the plaintext, helps reduce the possibility of tampering with the target signaling, thereby improving its security.

[0011] In some possible implementations of the first aspect, the above-mentioned security processing of the target signaling to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling includes: encrypting the plaintext of the target signaling based on the first key to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling.

[0012] Encrypting the plaintext of the target signaling helps reduce the possibility of tampering with the target signaling, thereby improving its security.

[0013] In some possible implementations of the first aspect, the target signaling includes a bit to be transmitted and N zero-padding bits, which are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key, where N is an integer greater than or equal to zero.

[0014] Among them, the above-mentioned N padding bits can be located at the tail of the bit to be transmitted, at the head of the bit to be transmitted, or in the middle of the bit to be transmitted. This application does not limit the position of the padding bits.

[0015] By making the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key used to encrypt the target signaling, it is more in line with existing encryption mechanisms (in existing encryption mechanisms, the length of the encrypted signaling is equal to the length of the key). In this way, existing encryption mechanisms can be directly reused, reducing the impact on existing mechanisms and thus improving universal applicability.

[0016] In some possible implementations of the first aspect, the first key and the second key are different, wherein the second key is generated based on a key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

[0017] The first key used to encrypt the aforementioned control signaling can be different from the second key generated by the key generation mechanism based on the user plane and / or control plane. This improves security. For example, since the control plane and user plane share a set of key generation mechanisms, if an attacker cracks one of them, such as the user plane's key generation mechanism, the other will also be affected. By using a different key generation mechanism than the user plane and / or control plane to generate the first key, even if the key generation mechanism of one of the user plane or control plane is cracked, the key corresponding to the underlying signaling can be guaranteed to remain unaffected, thereby improving security.

[0018] In some possible implementations of the first aspect, the aforementioned first key is generated based on physical layer parameters.

[0019] In this application, the first key can be generated based on physical layer parameters, or in other words, the first key is related to physical layer parameters. A method for generating the first key is given, which can be different from the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane. In this way, even if the key generation mechanism of one of the user plane and control plane is cracked, the key corresponding to the underlying signaling can be guaranteed to remain unaffected, thereby helping to improve security.

[0020] In some possible implementations of the first aspect, the target signaling is control signaling or data.

[0021] In other words, the method provided in this application is applicable to both the integrity protection of control signaling and the integrity protection of user data. By protecting the integrity of control signaling or user data based on the above scheme, air interface resources can be saved, overhead can be reduced, and security can be improved.

[0022] In some possible implementations of the first aspect, the length of the aforementioned target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

[0023] When the target signaling length is short, the above scheme has a more significant effect on saving air interface resources and is more conducive to reducing the air interface resources occupied by security protection of signaling. In this way, the resources can be used for the transmission of other data, thereby improving resource utilization.

[0024] Secondly, this application provides an information transmission method, which can be executed by a second communication device. The second communication device can be a terminal, a component configured in the terminal (such as a chip, chip system, processor, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the terminal's functions; this application does not limit its scope in this regard. The aforementioned first communication device can also be a network device, or a component configured in a network device (such as a chip, chip system, or processor, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the network device's functions; this application does not limit its scope in this regard either.

[0025] The aforementioned second communication device can be regarded as the receiver of signaling (or the receiving end).

[0026] For example, the method includes: inputting ciphertext of a target signaling and a CRC code, wherein the CRC code is generated based on the plaintext of the target signaling; performing security processing on the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling; and verifying the plaintext of the target signaling based on the CRC code.

[0027] In the above technical solution, the air interface transmits ciphertext obtained by securely processing the plaintext of the target signaling and a CRC code generated based on the plaintext of the target signaling. This achieves integrity protection for the target signaling, eliminating the need to transmit MAC-I, which helps save air interface resources and reduce overhead. Furthermore, transmitting the ciphertext of the target signaling over the air interface, compared to transmitting the plaintext, helps reduce the possibility of tampering with the target signaling, thereby improving its security.

[0028] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the ciphertext of the target signaling is obtained by encrypting the plaintext of the target signaling based on the first key; and the above-mentioned security processing of the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling includes: decrypting the ciphertext of the target signaling based on the third key to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling, wherein the third key corresponds to the first key.

[0029] Encrypting the target signaling helps reduce the possibility of tampering with the target signaling, thereby improving its security.

[0030] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the target signaling includes bits to be transmitted and N zero-padding bits, which are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key.

[0031] Among them, the above-mentioned N padding bits can be located at the tail of the bit to be transmitted, at the head of the bit to be transmitted, or in the middle of the bit to be transmitted. This application does not limit the position of the padding bits.

[0032] By making the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key used to encrypt the target signaling, it is more in line with existing encryption mechanisms. In this way, existing encryption mechanisms can be directly reused, reducing the impact on existing mechanisms and thus improving universal applicability.

[0033] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the third key and the fourth key mentioned above are different, and the fourth key is generated based on the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

[0034] The third key used to decrypt the aforementioned control signaling can be different from the fourth key generated by the key generation mechanism based on the user plane and / or control plane. This fourth key is used to decrypt user plane and / or control plane data, which improves security. For example, since the control plane and user plane share a set of key generation mechanisms, if an attacker cracks one of them, such as the user plane's key generation mechanism, the other will also be affected. By using a different key generation mechanism than the user plane and / or control plane to generate the third key, even if the key generation mechanism of one of the user plane or control plane is cracked, the key corresponding to the underlying signaling remains unaffected, thus improving security.

[0035] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the aforementioned third key is generated based on physical layer parameters.

[0036] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the above-mentioned verification of the plaintext of the target signaling based on the CRC code includes: if the target signaling is correct and the CRC code is correct, the above verification passes; or, if the target signaling is incorrect and / or the CRC code is incorrect, the above verification fails.

[0037] In other words, the verification will only pass if both the target signaling and the CRC code are correct. In other words, if the attacker tampers with the target signaling, the target signaling is incorrect, and / or the CRC code is incorrect, the verification will fail. This will help improve security.

[0038] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the target signaling is control signaling or data.

[0039] In other words, the method provided in this application is applicable to both the integrity protection of control signaling and the integrity protection of user data. By protecting the integrity of control signaling or user data based on the above scheme, air interface resources can be saved, overhead can be reduced, and security can be improved.

[0040] In some possible implementations of the second aspect, the length of the aforementioned target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

[0041] When the target signaling length is short, the above scheme has a more significant effect on saving air interface resources and is more conducive to reducing the air interface resources occupied by security protection of signaling. In this way, the resources can be used for the transmission of other data, thereby improving resource utilization.

[0042] Thirdly, this application provides a communication device that can implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof; or, can implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation thereof. The device includes corresponding modules for performing the above-described methods. The modules included in the device can be implemented in software and / or hardware.

[0043] The communication device may be a first communication device for implementing the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0044] In one possible implementation, the communication device may include modules or units that perform the methods / operations / steps / actions described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect. These modules or units may be hardware circuits, software, or a combination of hardware circuits and software.

[0045] The communication device may also be a second communication device for implementing the methods described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect. In one possible implementation, the communication device may include modules or units that perform the methods / operations / steps / actions described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect. These modules or units may be hardware circuits, software, or a combination of hardware circuits and software.

[0046] Fourthly, this application provides a communication device including a processor, which can be used to implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect, or to implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect, by executing a computer program in memory and / or by logic circuitry.

[0047] Optionally, the device further includes a communication interface. The communication interface is used to receive signals from other communication devices outside the device and transmit them to the processor, or to send signals from the processor to other communication devices outside the device. Exemplarily, the communication interface may be a transceiver, circuit, bus, module, pin, or other type of communication interface.

[0048] Optionally, the device further includes a memory. The memory stores program instructions and data. The memory is coupled to the processor, which, when executing the instructions stored in the memory, can implement the methods described in the preceding aspects. Optionally, the memory and the processor are integrated together.

[0049] Fifthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program or instructions that, when executed, implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof, or implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0050] In a sixth aspect, this application provides a computer program product including instructions that, when executed, implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof, or implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0051] In a seventh aspect, this application provides a chip system including at least one processor for supporting the implementation of the functions involved in the first aspect and any possible implementation of the first aspect, or for supporting the implementation of the functions involved in the second aspect and any possible implementation of the second aspect, such as receiving or processing data involved in the above methods.

[0052] In one possible design, the chip system also includes a memory for storing program instructions and data, which may be located within or outside the processor.

[0053] The chip system can consist of chips or include chips and other discrete components.

[0054] Eighthly, this application provides a communication system comprising a first communication device and a second communication device, wherein the first communication device is used to implement the method described in the first aspect and any possible implementation thereof, and the second communication device is used to implement the method described in the second aspect and any possible implementation thereof.

[0055] It should be understood that the third to eighth aspects of this application correspond to the technical solutions of the first and second aspects of this application, and the beneficial effects achieved by each aspect and the corresponding feasible implementation are similar, and will not be repeated here. Attached Figure Description

[0056] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of MAC-I provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0057] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of integrity protection based on CRC provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0058] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system applicable to the method provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0059] Figure 4 is a schematic flowchart of the signal transmission method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0060] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the key derivation mechanism provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0061] Figure 6 is a detailed flowchart illustrating the information transmission method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0062] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process of the second communication device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0063] Figure 8 is another detailed flowchart of the information transmission method provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0064] Figure 9 is another schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process of the second communication device provided in the embodiment of this application;

[0065] Figure 10 is another detailed flowchart of the information transmission method provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0066] Figure 11 is another schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process of the second communication device provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0067] Figure 12 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0068] Figure 13 is another schematic block diagram of the communication device provided in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0069] The technical solutions in this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0070] Before introducing the methods provided in the embodiments of this application, the following points should be noted.

[0071] First, in this application, the terms "first" and "second" are used to distinguish identical or similar items with essentially the same function and purpose. For example, "first communication device" and "second communication device" are used only to distinguish different communication devices and do not limit their order of execution. Those skilled in the art will understand that the terms "first" and "second" do not limit the quantity or execution order, and that "first" and "second" do not necessarily imply that they are different.

[0072] Second, in this application, the words "exemplarily" or "for example" are used to indicate that something is being described as an example, illustration, or illustration. Any embodiment or design that is described as "exemplarily" or "for example" in this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design. Specifically, the use of the words "exemplarily" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0073] Third, in this application, "at least one" means one or more, and "more than one" means two or more. "And / or" describes the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can mean: A alone, A and B simultaneously, or B alone, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates an "or" relationship between the preceding and following related objects, but it does not exclude the possibility of indicating an "and" relationship; the specific meaning can be understood in context. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, or c can mean: a, b, c; a and b; a and c; b and c; or a and b and c. Here, a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0074] Fourth, the method provided in this application can be applied to fourth-generation (4G) communication systems, such as long-term evolution (LTE) communication systems, as well as fifth-generation (5G) communication systems, such as 5G new radio (NR) communication systems, future communication systems, and also to Bluetooth systems, wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) systems, long-range (LoRa) Internet of Things (IoT) systems, or vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems.

[0075] To facilitate understanding of the embodiments of this application, the terminology involved in this application will be briefly explained below.

[0076] 1. Integrity protection: This refers to using technical means to ensure that messages are not tampered with, forged, or destroyed during transmission; in other words, it ensures the integrity and security of messages.

[0077] 2. Plaintext and Ciphertext: Plaintext refers to the original, unencrypted information. Plaintext can be any form of information, such as signaling, text, images, audio, and video. Ciphertext refers to information processed by an encryption algorithm. Ciphertext is generated to ensure the confidentiality of the plaintext, preventing it from being obtained or understood by unauthorized third parties during transmission or storage.

[0078] 3. Encryption Algorithm: An encryption algorithm is a method used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information. Encryption algorithms prevent unauthorized access and information leakage by converting plaintext into ciphertext.

[0079] Encryption algorithms can include, for example, symmetric encryption algorithms, asymmetric encryption algorithms, or hash functions. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for both encryption and decryption, while asymmetric encryption algorithms use a pair of keys (public and private keys). The public key is used for encryption, and the private key is used for decryption. The public key can be made public, but the private key must be kept secret. Hash functions can map data of arbitrary length to a fixed-length hash value, typically used for data integrity verification and digital signatures. Hash functions are generally one-way; in other words, it may be impossible to deduce the original data from the hash value. However, in this application, multiple hash functions can be combined to make the resulting function (denoted as the target function) reversible, such as a hash-based bidirectional randomness extractor (BRE), and control signaling can be securely processed based on the combined function. This application does not specifically limit the name of the target function.

[0080] Common symmetric encryption algorithms include, but are not limited to: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES (3DES), or stream encryption algorithms (such as ZUC, SNOW, and SNOW 3G encryption algorithms).

[0081] Common asymmetric encryption algorithms include, but are not limited to, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms or Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithms.

[0082] In this application, the security processing of the target signaling may include encrypting and / or decrypting the target signaling, and may also include processing the target signaling based on a target function (which may be obtained by combining multiple hash functions and the target function is reversible), and this application does not limit this.

[0083] 4. Hash-based bidirectional randomness extractor: Used to extract high-quality randomness from partially random or weakly random sources. Hash-based bidirectional randomness extractors are typically implemented using cryptographically secure hash functions. For example, in key exchange protocols, a hash-based bidirectional randomness extractor can be used to extract a high-quality shared key from the inputs of two participants; it can also be used in applications requiring high-quality random numbers to extract uniformly distributed random numbers from multiple weakly random sources; and it can also be used for secure processing of transmitted messages. For instance, in this application, a hash-based bidirectional randomness extractor can be used for secure processing of control signaling.

[0084] 5. CRC: A widely used error detection technique in communication systems. In the CRC process, a fixed-length CRC code is generated to detect whether an error has occurred during message transmission. CRC can be based on the principle of polynomial division. For example, the sender and receiver pre-agree on a generator polynomial (also called a polynomial generator) to generate and verify the CRC code. As an example, and not a limitation, CRC includes the following steps:

[0085] Step 1: Select a generator polynomial G(x).

[0086] Step two, polynomial representation, specifically, the message content to be transmitted is represented as a binary polynomial D(x).

[0087] Step 3, polynomial expansion, specifically, shifting the polynomial D(x) to the left (i.e. adding n zeros to its end), where n is the order of the generator polynomial G(x), and n is a positive integer.

[0088] Step four: Divide the expanded polynomial D(x) by the generator polynomial G(x) (which can be represented as a binary polynomial) to obtain the remainder R(x). This remainder is the CRC code.

[0089] Step 5: Append CRC code. Specifically, the generated CRC code R(x) is appended to the end of the message content to be transmitted to form the final message to be transmitted and sent to the receiver.

[0090] Accordingly: the receiver receives a message containing a CRC code.

[0091] Step six, polynomial division, more specifically, the receiver divides the received polynomial (which contains the CRC code) by the same generator polynomial G(x).

[0092] Step 7: Check the remainder. For example, if the remainder is zero, it means that no error occurred during the transmission of the message; if the remainder is not zero, it means that an error occurred during the transmission of the message.

[0093] Steps six and seven can also be replaced by: the receiver can truncate the CRC code of the received message to obtain the message content to be transmitted by the sender, calculate the CRC code based on the message content and the same generator polynomial, and if the calculated CRC code is consistent with the received CRC code, the verification passes; if the calculated CRC code is inconsistent with the received CRC code, the verification fails.

[0094] 6. MAC-I: This can be used to verify the integrity of transmitted messages. A MAC-I is generated by performing an encrypted hash operation on the message to be transmitted (hereinafter referred to as the message) and the key. If the message is tampered with or transmitted incorrectly during transmission, the MAC-I calculated by the receiver will not match the MAC-I attached by the sender. Currently, message integrity can be verified based on MAC-I at the PDCP layer. The process of verifying message integrity based on MAC-I will be described in detail below with reference to Figure 1.

[0095] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of MAC-I provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0096] For example, the process of generating MAC-I includes:

[0097] 1. Select a non-access stratum integrity algorithm (NIA). The cryptographic hash algorithm can be part of the NIA. For example, select the NIA based on network configuration and security policy.

[0098] 2. As shown in Figure 1a), input the following parameters: message content, key, counter (COUNT) (to prevent replay attacks), direction bit (DIR) (to distinguish uplink and downlink messages), message length, etc. Based on the above parameters, generate MAC-I through the selected NIA.

[0099] 3. As shown in Figure 1b), append MAC-I, that is, append the generated MAC-I to the end of the message content and send it to the receiver as part of the message. It can be understood that a CRC code is appended before MAC-1. The steps for generating the CRC code can be found in the relevant explanation of CRC, and will not be repeated here.

[0100] After receiving the message with the CRC code and MAC-I appended, the receiver performs MAC-I verification and CRC checksum. The CRC process can be found in the explanation above and will not be repeated here. The MAC-I verification process will be described in detail below.

[0101] The receiver recalculates the MAC-I based on the received message, the same key, and the cryptographic hash operation. If the calculated MAC-I is the same as the received MAC-I, it means that the message has not been tampered with and comes from the expected sender. If the MAC-I calculated by the receiver is different from the received MAC-I, it means that the message has been tampered with, forged, or transmitted incorrectly.

[0102] As previously mentioned, the PDCP layer can verify message integrity based on MAC-I. However, lower-level signaling (such as L1 / L2) lacks integrity protection, which could allow eavesdroppers to compromise the integrity of the communication system by tampering with the lower-level signaling. One possible design is to directly implement the integrity protection scheme of the PDCP layer down to the lower level, i.e., the message shown in Figure 1b) is lower-level signaling, such as control signaling. However, MAC-I is relatively long, approximately 32 bits, which could consume a large amount of air interface resources and incur significant overhead.

[0103] Another possible design is to implement the integrity protection of the underlying signaling based on a reference signal. For example, the sender (which is legitimate, or rather, the intended sender) sends a reference signal. If the actual measured value of the reference signal is inconsistent with the expected measured value (which may be pre-agreed upon by the sender and the receiver), then the reference signal has been tampered with or attacked.

[0104] Another possible design is to implement integrity protection based on CRC. This will be explained in detail below with reference to Figure 2. Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of integrity protection based on CRC provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0105] As shown in Figure 2, the legitimate sender combines the underlying signaling (such as control signaling) with the key (for example, by performing simple operations on the underlying signaling and the key), uses both as input to calculate the CRC code, and then appends this CRC code to the end of the control signaling before sending it to the receiver. When the control signaling is tampered with by an attacker, the attacker, not knowing the legitimate key, cannot calculate the correct CRC code. Therefore, the tampered control signaling will fail verification at the legitimate receiver.

[0106] In this application, to save air interface resources and reduce overhead, an information transmission method is provided. This method transmits the ciphertext of the target signaling and a CRC code generated based on the plaintext of the target signaling over the air interface. Compared to the method shown in Figure 1, it eliminates the need to send a MAC-I, thus saving air interface resources and reducing overhead. Furthermore, since the air interface transmits the ciphertext of the target signaling, compared to the method shown in Figure 2, it helps reduce the possibility of the target signaling being tampered with, thereby improving the security of the target signaling.

[0107] Before describing the information transmission method provided in this application in detail, the applicable scenario of this application will be described below with reference to Figure 3.

[0108] Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a communication system applicable to the method provided in the embodiments of this application. The application scenarios applicable to this application are illustrated using the communication system architecture shown in Figure 3 as an example. Figure 3 shows a possible, non-limiting system schematic diagram. As shown in Figure 3, the communication system 1000 includes a radio access network (RAN) 100 and a core network (CN) 200. RAN 100 includes at least one network device (110a and 110b in Figure 3, collectively referred to as 110) and at least one terminal (120a-120j in Figure 3, collectively referred to as 120). RAN 100 may also include other RAN nodes, such as wireless relay devices and / or wireless backhaul devices (not shown in Figure 3). Terminal 120 is wirelessly connected to network device 110. Network device 110 is connected to core network 200 wirelessly or via a wired connection. The core network equipment in core network 200 and the network equipment 110 in RAN 100 can be different physical devices, or they can be the same physical device that integrates core network logical functions and radio access network logical functions.

[0109] RAN 100 can be a cellular system related to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), such as 4G, 5G mobile communication systems, or future communication systems. RAN 100 can also be an open access network (O-RAN or ORAN), a cloud radio access network (CRAN), or a Wi-Fi system. RAN 100 can also be a communication system that integrates two or more of the above systems.

[0110] In this application, the first communication device may be, for example, the terminal 120 shown in FIG3, or the network device 110 shown in FIG3; the second communication device may be, for example, the terminal 120 shown in FIG3, or the network device 110 shown in FIG3. This application does not limit the specific types of the first and second communication devices. It is understood that FIG3 only shows one possible communication system architecture that can be applied to the embodiments of this application, and in other possible scenarios, the communication system architecture may also include other devices.

[0111] Network device 110 is a node in the RAN, also known as an access network device or RAN node (or device). Network device 110 assists terminals in achieving wireless access. Multiple network devices 110 in the communication system 1000 can be nodes of the same type or different types. In some scenarios, the roles of network device 110 and terminal 120 are relative. For example, network element 120i in Figure 3 can be a helicopter or drone, which can be configured as a mobile base station. For terminals 120j accessing RAN 100 through network element 120i, network element 120i is a base station; but for base station 110a, network element 120i is a terminal. Network device 110 and terminal 120 are sometimes referred to as communication devices. For example, network elements 110a and 110b in Figure 3 can be understood as communication devices with base station functions, and network elements 120a-120j can be understood as communication devices with terminal functions.

[0112] In one possible scenario, network equipment can be a base station, an evolved NodeB (eNodeB), a transmitting and receiving point (TRP), a transmitting point (TP), a next-generation NodeB (gNB), a base station in a future mobile communication system, a satellite, or an access point (AP) in a Wi-Fi system, an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) node, or network equipment in a mobile switching center non-terrestrial network (NTN) communication system, i.e., it can be deployed on a high-altitude platform or satellite, etc. Network equipment can be a macro base station (as shown in Figure 3, 110a), a micro base station or indoor station (as shown in Figure 3, 110b), a relay node or donor node, or a radio controller in a CRAN scenario. Network equipment can also act as a base station in device-to-device (D2D) communication, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, drone communication, and machine-to-machine (M2M) communication. Optionally, network equipment can also be a server, wearable device, vehicle, or in-vehicle equipment, etc. For example, the access network equipment in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology can be a roadside unit (RSU).

[0113] In another possible scenario, multiple network devices collaborate to assist terminals in achieving wireless access, with each network device performing a portion of the base station's functions. For example, network devices can be central units (CUs), distributed units (DUs), CU-control plane (CPs), CU-user plane (UPs), or radio units (RUs), etc. CUs and DUs can be set up separately or included in the same network element, such as a baseband unit (BBU). RUs can be included in radio equipment or radio units, such as remote radio units (RRUs), active antenna units (AAUs), or remote radio heads (RRHs). It is understood that network devices can be CU nodes, DU nodes, or devices comprising both CU and DU nodes. Furthermore, CUs can be classified as network devices in the access network (RAN) or the core network (CN), without limitation.

[0114] In different systems, CU (or CU-CP and CU-UP), DU, or RU may have different names, but those skilled in the art will understand their meaning. For example, in an ORAN system, CU can also be called O-CU (open CU), DU can also be called O-DU, CU-CP can also be called O-CU-CP, CU-UP can also be called O-CU-UP, and RU can also be called O-RU. For ease of description, this application uses CU, CU-CP, CU-UP, DU, and RU as examples. Any of the units among CU (or CU-CP, CU-UP), DU, and RU in this application can be implemented through software modules, hardware modules, or a combination of software and hardware modules.

[0115] In this embodiment, the form of the network device is not limited. The device used to implement the function of the network device can be the network device itself, or it can be a device that supports the network device in implementing the function, such as a chip system. The device can be installed in the network device or used in conjunction with the network device.

[0116] A terminal can also be called a terminal device, user equipment (UE), mobile station (MS), mobile terminal (MT), etc., or a device used to provide voice or data connectivity to users, and can also be an Internet of Things (IoT) device. For example, terminal devices include handheld devices with wireless connectivity, vehicle-mounted devices, etc. Currently, terminals can include, for example: mobile phones, tablets, laptops, PDAs, mobile internet devices (MIDs), wearable devices (such as smartwatches, smart bracelets, pedometers, smart glasses, etc.), in-vehicle equipment (such as cars, bicycles, electric vehicles, airplanes, ships, trains, high-speed trains, etc.), satellite terminals, virtual reality (VR) devices, augmented reality (AR) devices, point of sale (POS) machines, customer-premises equipment (CPE), light user equipment (UE), reduced capability user equipment (REDCAP UE), wireless terminals in industrial control, smart home devices (such as refrigerators, televisions, air conditioners, electricity meters, etc.), intelligent robots, robotic arms, workshop equipment, wireless terminals in autonomous driving, wireless terminals in smart healthcare, wireless terminals in smart grids, wireless terminals in transportation safety, wireless terminals in smart cities, or wireless terminals in smart homes, and flying equipment (such as intelligent robots, hot air balloons, drones, airplanes), etc. Terminal devices can also be vehicle devices, such as vehicle devices, vehicle modules, vehicle chips, on-board units (OBUs) or telematics boxes (T-BOXs). Terminal devices can also be other devices with terminal functions. For example, a terminal device can also be a device that performs terminal functions in D2D communication.

[0117] The embodiments of this application do not limit the device form of the terminal. The device used to implement the functions of the terminal can be the terminal itself; it can also be a device that supports the terminal in implementing the functions, such as a chip system. The device can be installed in the terminal or used in conjunction with the terminal. In the embodiments of this application, the chip system can be composed of chips or can include chips and other discrete devices.

[0118] In addition, network devices and terminals can be equipped with multiple antennas or a single antenna; this application does not limit this.

[0119] The information transmission method provided in this application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The method is described exemplified by the interaction between a first communication device and a second communication device, but this should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application. The first communication device may also be replaced by a component configured in the first communication device (such as a chip, chip system, processor, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the functions of the first communication device. The second communication device may be replaced by a component configured in the second communication device (such as a chip, chip system, processor, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the functions of the second communication device.

[0120] In this application, the first communication device can be regarded as the sender (or transmitter) of the target signaling. The first communication device can be a terminal or a network device, and this application does not limit the type of the first communication device. Similarly, the second communication device can be regarded as the receiver (or receiver) of the target signaling. The second communication device can be a terminal or a network device, and this application does not limit the type of the second communication device.

[0121] Figure 4 is a schematic flowchart of a signal transmission method 400 provided in an embodiment of this application. The method 400 shown in Figure 4 includes steps 410 to 450. The various steps in method 400 are described in detail below.

[0122] In step 410, the first communication device performs security processing on the target signaling to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling.

[0123] The aforementioned target signaling can refer to the signaling to be transmitted, or in other words, the signaling that the sender wishes to transmit. The target signaling can also be called target message, target information, target bit sequence, etc., and this application does not limit the name of the target signaling.

[0124] In this application, the target signaling can be lower-level signaling, such as L1 or L2 signaling, but this should not be construed as limiting the application. For example, the target signaling can also be PDCP layer signaling, etc.

[0125] Optionally, the target signaling mentioned above is control signaling or data.

[0126] The aforementioned target signaling can be control signaling, such as downlink control information (DCI), media access control (MAC) - control element (CE), etc.; the aforementioned target signaling can also be data, such as user data, and this application does not limit it in this regard.

[0127] The aforementioned security processing of the target signaling can be performed on all of the target signaling or on a portion of the target signaling; this application does not limit this.

[0128] For example, the target signaling includes M bits to be transmitted. Security processing of this target signaling can be performed on all M bits, or on a subset of those M bits, such as L bits. Here, M and L are positive integers greater than zero, and L is less than M.

[0129] Optionally, the length of the target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

[0130] The threshold mentioned above can be, for example, the threshold corresponding to the bits to be transmitted, such as denoted as K, where K is an integer greater than or equal to 1. For example, the target signaling mentioned above includes M bits to be transmitted, where M is less than or equal to K.

[0131] The first communication device performs secure processing on the target signaling to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling. One possible implementation is that the first communication device encrypts the target signaling based on the first key to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling.

[0132] In this application, the first key is used to encrypt the target signaling, and the corresponding decryption key can be referred to as the third key. The first and third keys can be symmetric keys (in which case the first and third keys are the same) or asymmetric keys (in which case the first key can be a public key, the third key can be a private key, and the first and third keys are different). That is, in this application, the target signaling can be encrypted and decrypted using either a symmetric or asymmetric algorithm; this application does not limit this. Furthermore, this application does not limit the specific type of encryption algorithm used. For example, the first communication device can encrypt the target signaling using encryption algorithms such as AES, SNOW, SNOW 3G, or ZUC to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling. Detailed explanations of encryption algorithms can be found above and will not be elaborated here.

[0133] Taking the target signaling as including M bits to be transmitted as an example, one possible design is that the first communication device encrypts some bits (such as L bits to be transmitted) of the above M bits to be transmitted based on the first key to obtain the ciphertext of the above L bits to be transmitted, and the remaining (ML) bits to be transmitted can be in plaintext.

[0134] Another possible design is that the first communication device encrypts all of the M bits to be transmitted based on the first key to obtain the ciphertext of the M bits to be transmitted.

[0135] In this application, secure processing of the target signaling may include encrypting and / or decrypting the target signaling, and may also include processing the target signaling based on a target function (which may be a combination of multiple hash functions, and the target function is reversible). This application does not limit this. The target function being reversible can be understood as the receiver being able to restore the processed target signaling.

[0136] In step 420, the first communication device generates a CRC code based on the plaintext of the target signaling.

[0137] For example, the first communication device can determine the generator polynomial G(x) and represent the target signaling as a binary polynomial D(x). Further, the polynomial D(x) is shifted left (i.e., n zeros are added to its end), where n is the order of the generator polynomial G(x) and n is an integer greater than zero. Then, the extended polynomial D(x) is divided by the generator polynomial G(x) (which can be represented as a binary polynomial) to obtain the remainder R(x), which is the CRC code.

[0138] In step 430, the first communication device outputs the ciphertext of the target signaling and the CRC code.

[0139] After the first communication device obtains the CRC code of the ciphertext and plaintext of the target signaling, it can append the CRC code to the end of the ciphertext of the target signaling. However, this does not constitute any limitation on the embodiments of this application, and this application does not specifically limit the position of the CRC code.

[0140] The target signaling with the CRC code appended can be viewed as a bit sequence, and further, channel coding can be performed on this bit sequence. The first communication device outputs the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling, which can be understood as the first communication device outputting the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling to the encoding module. The encoding module can then perform channel coding on the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling, and further, transmit the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling based on air interface resources.

[0141] Accordingly, the second communication device receives the ciphertext and CRC code of the encoded target signaling, and then decodes the ciphertext and CRC code of the encoded target signaling to obtain the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling.

[0142] In step 440, the second communication device performs secure processing on the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling.

[0143] After obtaining the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling, the second communication device performs secure processing on the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling. It should be understood that if the target signaling is tampered with, damaged, or transmitted incorrectly, the ciphertext of the target signaling received by the second communication device will be different from the ciphertext of the target signaling sent by the first communication device. Correspondingly, the plaintext of the target signaling obtained by the second communication device after secure processing will also be different from the plaintext of the target signaling that the first communication device intended to transmit. Similarly, assuming an error in the CRC code, the CRC code obtained by the second communication device will also be different from the CRC code sent by the first communication device.

[0144] The second communication device performs secure processing on the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling. One possible implementation is that the second communication device decrypts the ciphertext of the target signaling based on a third key to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling, wherein the third key corresponds to the first key.

[0145] The third key corresponds to the first key. It can be understood that the first key is used to encrypt the target signaling, and the third key is used to decrypt the target signaling. The first key and the third key can be the same (such as a symmetric key), or the first key and the third key can be a pair of keys (asymmetric key). The first key is the public key used to encrypt the target signaling, and the third key is the private key used to decrypt the target signaling.

[0146] In step 450, the second communication device verifies the plaintext of the target signaling based on the CRC code.

[0147] After the second communication device obtains the plaintext of the target signaling, it can verify the plaintext of the target signaling based on the CRC code. For example, the second communication device divides the received polynomial h(x) (which contains a CRC code; the plaintext of the target signaling is obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the target signaling, and the plaintext of the target signaling is appended with the received CRC code to obtain the polynomial h(x)) by the same generator polynomial G(x). If the remainder is zero, the verification passes; if the remainder is not zero, the verification fails.

[0148] If the target signaling is incorrect (e.g., the target signaling is tampered with, damaged, or transmitted incorrectly), and / or the CRC code is incorrect, then the above remainder will not be zero, meaning the verification will fail; if the target signaling is correct and the CRC code is correct, then the above remainder will be zero, and the verification will pass.

[0149] In existing encryption mechanisms, the length of the encrypted signaling is equal to the length of the key. In this application, the length of the target signaling can also be equal to the length of the first key, so as to reuse existing encryption mechanisms and reduce the impact on existing mechanisms.

[0150] In one possible implementation, the target signaling includes bits to be transmitted and N zero-padding bits, which are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key, where N is an integer greater than or equal to zero.

[0151] When N = 0, it indicates that the target signaling includes bits to be transmitted, and the length of the target signaling is equal to the length of the first key. When N is greater than zero, it indicates that the length of the bits to be transmitted is less than the length of the first key, and the first communication device can pad with zeros to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key.

[0152] The aforementioned N padding bits can be located at the tail of the bit to be transmitted, at the head of the bit to be transmitted, or in the middle of the bit to be transmitted. This application does not limit the position of the padding bits.

[0153] The positions of the aforementioned N zero-padding bits can be predefined or indicated by the first communication device; this application does not limit this.

[0154] As an example, predefined zero-padding bits are placed at the end of the bits to be transmitted.

[0155] In another example, the first communication device sends a first indication message indicating the position of the padding bit. For example, the first indication message may occupy 1 bit, where a bit of 0 indicates that the padding bit is located at the end of the bit to be transmitted, and a bit of 1 indicates that the padding bit is located at the beginning of the bit to be transmitted. Alternatively, the first indication message may occupy more bits, with different bit values ​​representing different positions, which will not be detailed here.

[0156] Accordingly, the second communication device decrypts the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling. The plaintext of the target signaling may also contain padding bits. If the plaintext of the target signaling contains padding bits, the second communication device can remove the padding bits to obtain the bits to be transmitted.

[0157] As is known from existing technologies, the control plane and user plane share a common key generation mechanism. If an attacker cracks one of them, such as the key generation mechanism of the user plane, the other will also be affected. Therefore, in this application, a key generation mechanism different from that of the user plane and / or control plane can be used to generate the first key to improve the security of the target signaling.

[0158] In one possible implementation, the first key and the second key are different, with the second key being generated based on a key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

[0159] In other words, the key used to encrypt and decrypt target signaling can be a private key, and the key generation mechanism of this private key is different from the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

[0160] The key derivation mechanism for the user plane and control plane will be described in detail below with reference to Figure 5. Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the key derivation mechanism provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0161] As shown in Figure 5, the root key K can be derived from the master key K between the user equipment and the core network. SEAF K SEAF K can be derived AMF Among them, K SEAF It is used to generate access and mobility management related keys, K AMF It is a key used to protect the signaling of the access and mobility management function (AMF). K AMF K can be derived NASenc K NASint K gNB , where K NASenc Encryption for non-access stratum (NAS) signaling, K NASint K is used for integrity protection of NAS signaling. gNB K is used to protect communication between the terminal and the gNB. gNB K can be derived RRCint K RRCenc K UPenc K UPint , where K RRCint It is the radio resource control (RRC) signaling integrity protection key (i.e., the control plane integrity protection key), K RRCenc It is the RRC signaling encryption key (i.e., the control plane encryption key), K UPint It is the user plane integrity protection key, K UPenc This is the user-plane encryption key. Additionally, the nonce hash (NH) is the result of processing a random number using a hash function. Nonce combined with context (NCC) combines a random number with certain contextual information to enhance the security of key derivation, because contextual information (such as session identifiers, timestamps, etc.) can further ensure that each key derivation is unique. K gNB* This is used to protect communication between the terminal and the gNB during handover. In this application, the user plane and control plane keys can be the aforementioned K. RRCint KRRCenc K UPenc K UPint It could also be other high-level keys as shown in Figure 5, such as K. NASenc K NASint This application does not limit the scope of these provisions. However, the first key used for encrypting the target signaling is different from the aforementioned user plane and / or control plane keys.

[0162] Correspondingly, for the second communication device, the third key used to decrypt the ciphertext of the target signaling can also be a special key. In other words, the third key is different from the fourth key. The fourth key is generated based on the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane. This fourth key is used to decrypt the user plane and / or control plane signaling.

[0163] In this application, the aforementioned first key can be based on K. gNB A key is derived that runs parallel to the keys for the user plane and control plane, wherein the first key is different from the keys for the user plane and control plane.

[0164] The first key mentioned above can also be generated based on physical layer parameters.

[0165] The physical layer parameters include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following: cell identifier, transmission configuration indicator (TCI) status information indicating the use of receiving or transmitting unicast physical channels, demodulation reference signal (DMRS) identifier, index indicating bandwidth part (BWP) or BWP configuration parameters, etc.

[0166] The aforementioned physical layer parameters can be one or more, and this application does not limit them. The aforementioned first key can be generated based on the physical layer parameters, or in other words, the aforementioned first key is related to the physical layer parameters. A method for generating the first key is given, which can be different from the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane. In this way, even if the key generation mechanism of one of the user plane and control plane is cracked, the key corresponding to the underlying signaling can be guaranteed to remain unaffected, thereby helping to improve security.

[0167] The first communication device generates a first key based on physical layer parameters. One possible implementation is that the first communication device can directly concatenate the aforementioned physical layer parameters as the first key.

[0168] Another possible implementation is that the first communication device can process the aforementioned physical layer parameters and use the processing result as the first key.

[0169] For example, the first communication device can process the aforementioned physical layer parameters and use the processing result as the first key, including: the first communication device performing operations on the aforementioned physical layer parameters and using the operation result as the first key. The operations on the aforementioned physical layer parameters include, but are not limited to, hash operations or key length expansion. Specifically, key length expansion of the physical layer parameters means that the first communication device can extend the length of the sequence of concatenated physical layer parameters, for example, by padding with zeros, and use the expanded sequence as the first key.

[0170] In another example, the first communication device can process the aforementioned physical layer parameters and use the processing result as the first key, including: the first communication device concatenating the aforementioned physical layer parameters as a root key, and deriving from the root key based on a key derivation mechanism, using the derived key as the first key. The key derivation mechanism can be, for example, the user plane / control plane key hierarchical derivation mechanism shown in Figure 5, or other key derivation mechanisms; this application does not limit this to any particular mechanism.

[0171] Another possible implementation is that the first communication device can perform channel estimation based on the aforementioned physical layer parameters, quantize the channel estimation result, or process the channel estimation result and quantize the processed channel estimation result, using the quantized result as the first key. Processing the channel estimation result can include performing calculations on the channel estimation result, and this application does not limit the specific processing method.

[0172] Accordingly, the third key mentioned above is also generated based on physical layer parameters. The method for generating the third key based on physical layer parameters can be found in the method for generating the first key, and will not be detailed here.

[0173] The following will describe in detail the specific process of information transmission and the verification process of the second communication device with reference to Figures 6 to 11. Figures 6 and 7 show the transmission and verification processes of the target signaling without zero padding; Figures 8 and 9 show the transmission and verification processes of the target signaling with zero padding; and Figures 10 and 11 show the transmission and verification processes of the target signaling based on dedicated key encryption and decryption.

[0174] Figure 6 is a detailed flowchart illustrating the information transmission method provided in an embodiment of this application. In Figure 6, the target signaling is illustrated using control signaling as an example, but this should not be construed as limiting the embodiments of this application in any way. For example, control signaling can also be replaced with data.

[0175] As shown in Figure 6, the first communication device performs security processing on the plaintext s of the control signaling to obtain the ciphertext c of the control signaling. It then performs a CRC check on the plaintext s to obtain the CRC code (denoted as CRC(s)). Further, the ciphertext c of the control signaling is concatenated with the CRC code, or in other words, the CRC code is appended to the end of the ciphertext. The first communication device sends the ciphertext with the appended CRC code. Correspondingly, the second communication device receives the ciphertext with the appended CRC code and decrypts and verifies it. The decryption and verification process of the second communication device will be described in detail below with reference to Figure 7.

[0176] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process of the second communication device provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 7a) shows an example of successful verification, and Figure 7b), Figure 7c), and Figure 7d) show examples of failed verification. The failed verification shown in Figure 7b) and Figure 7c) may be caused by tampering by an attacker, and the failed verification shown in Figure 7d) may be caused by a transmission error.

[0177] As shown in Figure 7a), after the second communication device receives the ciphertext c with CRC(s) attached, it performs security processing on it. For example, it can decrypt the ciphertext c of the control signaling based on the key to obtain the plaintext s of the control signaling, and perform CRC verification based on the plaintext s of the control signaling and CRC(s), and the verification passes.

[0178] As shown in Figure 7b), if the control signaling is tampered with or forged by an attacker, the second communication device receives a fake ciphertext c' with CRC(s) appended on it and performs further security processing on it. For example, it can decrypt the fake ciphertext c' of the control signaling based on the key to obtain the fake plaintext s' of the control signaling, and perform CRC verification based on the fake plaintext s' of the control signaling and CRC(s). If the verification fails, a security mechanism is triggered, such as triggering retransmission or interrupting the transmission.

[0179] As shown in Figure 7c), the control signaling is tampered with or forged by an attacker. The second communication device receives a fake ciphertext c' with CRC'(s) appended on it and performs further security processing. For example, it can decrypt the fake ciphertext c' of the control signaling based on a key to obtain a fake plaintext s' of the control signaling. Then, it performs a CRC check based on the fake plaintext s' and CRC'(s). If the check fails, a security mechanism is triggered, such as retransmission or interruption of transmission. Here, CRC'(s) represents an erroneous CRC code. For example, it can be a CRC code generated by an attacker based on fake plaintext or based on a generator polynomial different from that chosen by the legitimate sender. This application does not limit the cause of the CRC code error.

[0180] As shown in d) of Figure 7, when the control signaling transmission fails, the second communication device receives the erroneous ciphertext c” with CRC(s) attached and performs further security processing on it. For example, it can decrypt the erroneous ciphertext c” of the control signaling based on the key to obtain the erroneous plaintext s” of the control signaling, and perform CRC verification based on the erroneous plaintext s” of the control signaling and CRC(s). If the verification fails, a security mechanism is triggered, such as triggering retransmission or interrupting the transmission.

[0181] Figure 8 is another detailed flowchart of the information transmission method provided in an embodiment of this application. In Figure 8, the first communication device can pad the plaintext of the control signaling with zeros to make the length of the control signaling equal to the key length.

[0182] As shown in Figure 8, the first communication device can pad the end of the plaintext s of the control signaling to obtain the zero-padded plaintext s0 of the control signaling. The length of the zero-padded plaintext s0 of the control signaling is equal to the key length, which is more in line with the existing encryption mechanism. In this way, the existing encryption mechanism can be directly reused, reducing the impact on the existing mechanism and improving universal applicability.

[0183] The first communication device performs security processing on the zero-padded plaintext s0 of the control signaling. For example, it can encrypt the zero-padded plaintext s0 based on a key to obtain the zero-padded ciphertext c0 of the control signaling, and generate a CRC (denoted as CRC(s0)) based on the zero-padded plaintext s0. Further, the zero-padded ciphertext c0 is concatenated with the CRC(s0), or in other words, the CRC(s0) is appended to the end of the zero-padded ciphertext. The first communication device sends the ciphertext appended with CRC(s0). Correspondingly, the second communication device receives the ciphertext appended with CRC(s0) and verifies it. The decryption and verification process of the second communication device will be described in detail below with reference to Figure 9.

[0184] Figure 9 is another schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process of the second communication device provided in the embodiments of this application. Figure 9a) shows an example of successful verification, and Figure 9b), Figure 9c), and Figure 9d) show examples of failed verification. The failed verification shown in Figure 9b) and Figure 9c) may be caused by tampering by an attacker, and the failed verification shown in Figure 9d) may be caused by a transmission error.

[0185] The difference between Figure 7 and Figure 9 is that, in Figure 7, the length of the control signaling can be different from the length of the key. In Figure 9, the control signaling is zero-padded, and its length is equal to the key length. For a description of the various cases shown in Figure 9, please refer to Figure 7; it will not be elaborated further here.

[0186] Furthermore, in the scenario shown in Figure 9, if the plaintext verification of the zero-padded control signaling passes, the second communication device can remove the zero-padded bits to obtain the control signaling. As mentioned earlier, one possibility is to pad the control signaling with zeros at the end. In this case, the second communication device can truncate the zero-padded bits at the end of the control signaling. Another possibility is that the first communication device can pad the control signaling with zeros at any position and indicate the position of the zero-padded bits through the first indication information. In this case, the second communication device can determine the position of the zero-padded bits according to the first indication information, remove the zero-padded bits, and obtain the control signaling.

[0187] Figure 10 is another detailed flowchart illustrating the information transmission method provided in this application embodiment. In Figure 10, the first communication device can encrypt control signaling based on a dedicated key (this dedicated key refers to a key used for integrity protection of underlying signaling, different from the keys generated by the security mechanisms of the control plane and user plane). The keys in Figures 6 to 9 can be keys generated based on the security mechanisms of the control plane and user plane. Encrypting control signaling with a dedicated key improves security. More specifically, since the control plane and user plane share a set of key generation mechanisms, if an attacker cracks one of them, such as the user plane, the other will also be affected. By using a key generation mechanism different from that of the user plane and control plane to generate a dedicated key, even if the key of one of the user plane or control plane is cracked, the key of the underlying signaling can still be protected from being cracked, thereby improving security.

[0188] As shown in Figure 10, the first communication device performs secure processing on the plaintext s of the control signaling, such as encrypting the plaintext s of the control signaling based on a dedicated key (e.g., performing XOR encryption on the plaintext s of the control signaling based on a dedicated key), to obtain the ciphertext c of the control signaling. Then, it performs a CRC operation on the plaintext s of the control signaling to obtain the CRC code of the plaintext of the control signaling (denoted as CRC(s)). Further, it concatenates the ciphertext c of the control signaling with the CRC(s), or in other words, appends the CRC(s) to the end of the ciphertext of the control signaling. The first communication device sends the ciphertext appended with CRC(s). Correspondingly, the second communication device receives the ciphertext appended with CRC(s) and verifies it. The decryption and verification process of the second communication device will be described in detail below with reference to Figure 11.

[0189] Figure 11 is another schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process of the second communication device provided in the embodiments of this application. Figure 11a) shows an example of successful verification, and Figure 11b), Figure 11c), and Figure 11d) show examples of failed verification. The failed verification shown in Figure 11b) and Figure 11c) may be caused by tampering by an attacker, and the failed verification shown in Figure 11d) may be caused by a transmission error.

[0190] The difference from Figure 7 is that in Figure 11, control signaling is encrypted and decrypted based on a dedicated key. For a description of the various cases shown in Figure 11, please refer to Figure 7; further details will not be provided here.

[0191] In addition, in the scenario shown in Figure 11, the plaintext of the control signaling after zero padding can also be encrypted and decrypted based on a dedicated key. For details, please refer to the descriptions in Figures 8 and 9, which will not be repeated here.

[0192] The methods provided in the embodiments of this application have been described in detail above with reference to the accompanying drawings. The apparatus provided in the embodiments of this application will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0193] It should be understood that the devices shown in Figures 12 and 13 can be used to implement the functions of the first communication device or the second communication device in the above method embodiments, and thus can also achieve the beneficial effects of the above method embodiments.

[0194] Figure 12 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 1200 provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0195] As shown in Figure 12, the device 1200 includes a processing module 1210 and a transceiver module 1220. The device 1200 can be used to implement the functions of the first communication device or the second communication device in any of the method embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11.

[0196] The modules included in the device 1200 can be implemented in software and / or hardware.

[0197] One possible implementation is that the device 1200 can be used to implement the steps performed by the first communication device in any of the method embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11. The first communication device can be a terminal, a component in the terminal (e.g., a chip, a chip system, or a circuit), or a device that can be used with the terminal, or a logic module or software that can implement all or part of the terminal's functions. Alternatively, the first communication device can be a network device, a component in the network device (e.g., a chip, a chip system, or a circuit), or a device that can be used with the network device, or a logic module or software that can implement all or part of the network device's functions.

[0198] Another possible implementation is that the device 1200 can be used to implement the steps performed by the second communication device in any of the method embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11. The second communication device can be a terminal, a component within the terminal (e.g., a chip, a chip system, or a circuit), a device compatible with the terminal, or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the terminal's functions. Alternatively, the second communication device can be a network device, a component within the network device (e.g., a chip, a chip system, or a circuit), a device compatible with the network device, or a logic module or software capable of implementing all or part of the network device's functions.

[0199] For example, the communication device 1200 may include modules or units that correspond one-to-one with the methods / operations / steps / actions described in the method embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11. The modules or units may be hardware circuits, software, or a combination of hardware circuits and software.

[0200] For example, when the device 1200 is used to implement the function of the first communication device in the method embodiment shown in FIG4, the processing module 1210 is used to perform security processing on the target signaling to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling; the processing module 1210 is also used to generate a CRC code based on the plaintext of the target signaling; the transceiver module 1220 is used to output the ciphertext and CRC code of the target signaling.

[0201] In one possible implementation, the processing module 1210 is specifically used to encrypt the plaintext of the target signaling based on the first key to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling.

[0202] In one possible implementation, the target signaling includes bits to be transmitted and N zero-padding bits, which are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key, where N is an integer greater than or equal to zero.

[0203] In one possible implementation, the first key and the second key are different, with the second key being generated based on a key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

[0204] In one possible implementation, the first key mentioned above is generated based on physical layer parameters.

[0205] In one possible implementation, the target signaling mentioned above is either control signaling or data.

[0206] In one possible implementation, the length of the aforementioned target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

[0207] For example, when the device 1200 is used to implement the function of the second communication device in the method embodiment shown in FIG4, the transceiver module 1220 is used to input the ciphertext of the target signaling and the CRC code, the CRC code being generated based on the plaintext of the target signaling; the processing module 1210 is used to perform security processing on the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling; the processing module 1210 is also used to verify the plaintext of the target signaling based on the aforementioned CRC code.

[0208] In one possible implementation, the ciphertext of the target signaling is obtained by encrypting the plaintext of the target signaling based on the first key; and the processing module 1210 is specifically used to decrypt the ciphertext of the target signaling based on the third key to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling, wherein the third key corresponds to the first key.

[0209] In one possible implementation, the target signaling includes bits to be transmitted and N padding bits, which are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key.

[0210] In one possible implementation, the third key and the fourth key are different, with the fourth key being generated based on a key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

[0211] In one possible implementation, the aforementioned third key is generated based on physical layer parameters.

[0212] In one possible implementation, the above-mentioned plaintext verification of the target signaling based on the CRC code includes: if the target signaling is correct and the CRC code is correct, the verification passes; if the target signaling is incorrect and / or the CRC code is incorrect, the verification fails.

[0213] In one possible implementation, the target signaling mentioned above is either control signaling or data.

[0214] In one possible implementation, the length of the aforementioned target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

[0215] For a more detailed description of each of the above modules, please refer directly to the relevant descriptions in the method embodiment shown in Figure 4, which will not be repeated here.

[0216] It should be understood that the module division in the embodiments of this application is illustrative and only represents a logical functional division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods. Furthermore, the functional modules in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into a single processor, exist as separate physical entities, or be integrated into a single module. The integrated modules described above can be implemented in hardware or as software functional modules.

[0217] Figure 13 is another schematic block diagram of the communication device 1300 provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0218] The device 1300 can be a chip system, or it can be a device configured with a chip system to implement the methods described in the above-described method embodiments. In the embodiments of this application, the chip system can be composed of chips, or it can include chips and other discrete devices.

[0219] As shown in FIG13, the device 1300 may include a processor 1310, which can be used to execute computer programs or instructions in memory to implement the steps performed by the first communication device or the second communication device in any of the embodiments shown in FIG4, FIG6 to FIG11.

[0220] Optionally, the device 1300 further includes a communication interface 1320. The communication interface 1320 can be used to communicate with other devices via a transmission medium, thereby enabling the device 1300 to communicate with other devices. The communication interface 1320 may be, for example, a transceiver, interface, pin, bus, circuit, or a device capable of transmitting and receiving functions. The processor 1310 can use the communication interface 1320 to input and output data, and to implement the steps executed by the first or second communication device in any of the embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11.

[0221] Optionally, the device 1300 further includes at least one memory 1330 for storing program instructions and / or data. The memory 1330 is coupled to the processor 1310. The coupling in this embodiment is an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices, units, or modules, and can be electrical, mechanical, or other forms, used for information exchange between devices, units, or modules. The processor 1310 may operate in conjunction with the memory 1330. The processor 1310 may execute program instructions stored in the memory 1330. At least one of the at least one memory may be included in the processor.

[0222] It should be understood that the coupling in the embodiments of this application is an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices, units, or modules, which can be electrical, mechanical, or other forms, used for information interaction between devices, units, or modules. The processor 1310 may operate in conjunction with the memory 1330. The embodiments of this application do not limit the specific connection medium between the processor 1310, communication interface 1320, and memory 1330. Optionally, the processor 1310, communication interface 1320, and memory 1330 are connected via a bus 1340. The bus 1340 is represented by a thick line in Figure 13. The connection methods between other components are only illustrative and not intended to be limiting. The bus can be a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus or an extended industry standard architecture (EISA) bus, etc. The bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of illustration, only one thick line is used in Figure 13, but this does not indicate that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0223] In one possible implementation, the device 1300 is a system-on-a-chip (SoC). Alternatively, the processor 1310 is an SoC. For example, the device 1300 or the processor 1310 could be a circuit or chip responsible for communication functions in a terminal device (such as a modem chip, also known as a baseband chip, or an SoC chip or system-in-package (SIP) chip containing a modem core).

[0224] This application also provides a communication system comprising a first communication device and a second communication device as described above. In one possible implementation, the first communication device may, for example, implement the steps performed by the first communication device in the method shown in FIG4, and the second communication device may, for example, implement the steps performed by the second communication device in the method shown in FIG4.

[0225] This application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program (also known as code or instructions) that, when run, can implement the steps executed by the first communication device or the second communication device in any one of the embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11.

[0226] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program (also referred to as code or instructions). When the computer program is run, it can implement the steps performed by the first or second communication device in any of the embodiments shown in Figures 4, 6 to 11.

[0227] It should be understood that the processor in the embodiments of this application can be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In implementation, each step of the above method embodiments can be completed by the integrated logic circuitry in the processor's hardware or by instructions in software form. The processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a microprocessor unit (MPU), a microcontroller unit (MCU), a graphics processing unit (GPU), an artificial intelligence processor (AI processor) or a neural processing unit (NPU), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or a combination of one or more discrete hardware components. It can implement or execute the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this application. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the methods disclosed in the embodiments of this application can be directly embodied in the execution of a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module can reside in a mature storage medium in the field, such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, or registers. This storage medium is located in memory, and the processor reads information from the memory and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above method.

[0228] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. The volatile memory can be a cache, random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous linked dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory used in the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0229] The terms "unit," "module," etc., used in this specification can be used to refer to computer-related entities, hardware, firmware, combinations of hardware and software, software, or software in execution. In the embodiments of this application, "unit" and "module" have the same meaning and can be used interchangeably.

[0230] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the various illustrative logical blocks and steps described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application. In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus, devices, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for example, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the shown or discussed mutual couplings or direct couplings or communication connections may be through some interfaces; indirect couplings or communication connections between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0231] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0232] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit.

[0233] In the above embodiments, the functions of each functional unit can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, it can be implemented entirely or partially in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions (programs). When the computer program instructions (programs) are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that integrates one or more available media. The available media may be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., digital video discs, DVDs), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid-state drives, SSDs), etc.

[0234] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the technology, or a portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, ROM, RAM, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0235] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. An information transmission method, characterized in that, include: The target signaling is processed securely to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling; Based on the plaintext of the target signaling, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) code is generated; Output the ciphertext of the target signaling and the CRC code.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The step of performing secure processing on the target signaling to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling includes: encrypting the plaintext of the target signaling based on a first key to obtain the ciphertext of the target signaling.

3. The method as described in claim 2, characterized in that, The target signaling includes bits to be transmitted and N zero-padding bits. The N zero-padding bits are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key, where N is an integer greater than or equal to zero.

4. The method as described in claim 2 or 3, characterized in that, The first key and the second key are different; the second key is generated based on the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

5. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 4, characterized in that, The first key is generated based on physical layer parameters.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, The target signaling is control signaling or data.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, The length of the target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

8. An information transmission method, characterized in that, include: Input the ciphertext of the target signaling and the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code, wherein the CRC code is generated based on the plaintext of the target signaling; The ciphertext of the target signaling is processed securely to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling; The plaintext of the target signaling is verified based on the CRC code.

9. The method as described in claim 8, characterized in that, The ciphertext of the target signaling is obtained by encrypting the plaintext of the target signaling based on the first key; as well as, The step of performing secure processing on the ciphertext of the target signaling to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling includes: Based on the third key, the ciphertext of the target signaling is decrypted to obtain the plaintext of the target signaling, wherein the third key corresponds to the first key.

10. The method as described in claim 9, characterized in that, The target signaling includes bits to be transmitted and N zero-padding bits. The N zero-padding bits are used to make the length of the target signaling equal to the length of the first key, where N is an integer greater than or equal to zero.

11. The method as described in claim 9 or 10, characterized in that, The third key is different from the fourth key. The fourth key is generated based on the key generation mechanism of the user plane and / or control plane.

12. The method according to any one of claims 9 to 11, characterized in that, The third key is generated based on physical layer parameters.

13. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 12, characterized in that, The verification of the plaintext of the target signaling based on the CRC code includes: If the target signaling is correct and the CRC code is correct, the verification passes; or, In the event of a target signaling error and / or a CRC code error, the verification fails.

14. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 13, characterized in that, The target signaling is control signaling or data.

15. The method according to any one of claims 8 to 14, characterized in that, The length of the target signaling is less than or equal to the threshold.

16. A communication device, characterized in that, It includes modules for implementing the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7, or includes modules for implementing the method as described in any one of claims 8 to 15.

17. A communication device, characterized in that, The method includes a processor configured to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 7, or the method of any one of claims 8 to 15, by means of logic circuits and / or by executing a computer program stored in a memory.

18. The apparatus according to claim 17, characterized in that, It also includes the memory.

19. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a computer program or instructions, which, when executed by a computer, implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7, or the method as described in any one of claims 8 to 15.

20. A computer program product, characterized in that, The computer program product includes instructions that, when executed by a computer, implement the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7, or implement the method as described in any one of claims 8 to 15.

21. A chip system, characterized in that, It includes at least one processor for performing the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7, or performing the method as described in any one of claims 8 to 15.

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