Communication method and communication apparatus

Abstract

A communication method, comprising: a first communication apparatus receiving a first request message from a second communication apparatus, the first request message comprising first ciphertext and first indicating information, the first ciphertext being first data securely protected by means of a first security context, and the first indicating information being used for indicating that homomorphic encryption is to be performed on the first ciphertext. Performing homomorphic encryption on the first ciphertext to generate second ciphertext, and sending the second ciphertext to a second network element, wherein the first security context is determined by means of negotiation between the second communication apparatus and the second network element, and homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports being processed when in a ciphertext state. In the communication method, second ciphertext can be processed by a second network element, allowing a second communication apparatus to perform data security protection on the basis of a first security context without having to perform homomorphic encryption. This allows for the processing of terminal ciphertext data by a core network while reducing encryption overhead of the second communication apparatus.

Description

Communication method and communication apparatus

[0001] The present application claims priority to the Chinese patent application No. 202411259069.6, filed on September 9, 2024, and entitled "Communication method and communication apparatus", the content of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. TECHNICAL FIELD

[0002] The present application relates to the field of communications, and more particularly, to a communication method and a communication apparatus. BACKGROUND

[0003] Homomorphic encryption is an important means in privacy computing. Using homomorphic encrypted data, data processing can still be realized in the case of data ciphertext. One application mode of homomorphic encryption in a communication network is that the network side sends a request message to the terminal side to request the terminal side to provide data to be processed. After the terminal side determines the original data, the terminal side can perform homomorphic encryption processing on the original data, so that the network side processes the homomorphic encrypted data, thereby avoiding the terminal data from being known by the network side and improving security.

[0004] However, in the above homomorphic encryption method, the terminal needs to perform homomorphic encryption processing on the data, which increases the encryption overhead of the terminal. Therefore, how to realize the processing of the core network on the terminal ciphertext data under the premise of reducing the encryption overhead of the terminal becomes a problem to be solved. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application provides a communication method to realize the processing of the core network on the terminal ciphertext data under the premise of reducing the encryption overhead of the terminal.

[0006] In a first aspect, a communication method is provided. The method can be performed by a first communication apparatus. In the absence of special description, the "first communication apparatus" in the present application can refer to a first communication device (for example, a network device, a network node, etc.), a component (for example, a processor, a chip, or a chip system, etc., such as a circuit or a chip responsible for communication function in a network device (for example, a Modem chip, also known as a baseband chip, or a system on chip (SoC) chip or a system in package (SIP) chip containing a modem core)) in the first communication device, or a logic module or software capable of realizing all or part of the functions of the first communication device. For ease of description, the following description takes the first communication apparatus as an example.

[0007] The communication method comprises: receiving a first request message from a second communication device, the first request message being used for requesting a first network element to process data, the first request message comprising a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data that is protected by a first security context, and the first indication information being used for indicating that the first ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted; homomorphic encrypting the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext; and sending the second ciphertext to a second network element, wherein the first security context is a security context that is determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

[0008] Based on the technical solution, the first communication device can homomorphic encrypt the received first ciphertext and send the homomorphic encrypted second ciphertext to the core network (e.g., the second network element). Since the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state, the second network element that receives the second ciphertext can process the second ciphertext, and the second communication device that has a data processing requirement in the technical solution can protect data based on the first security context, without performing homomorphic encryption by the second communication device, but performing homomorphic encryption by the first communication device, so that the technical solution can realize processing of terminal ciphertext data by the core network on the premise of reducing encryption overhead of the second communication device.

[0009] In a possible design, the method further comprises: sending second indication information to the second network element, the second indication information being used for indicating that the second ciphertext is a homomorphic encrypted ciphertext.

[0010] Based on the technical solution, the first communication device can explicitly indicate, through the second indication information, that the second ciphertext sent to the second network element is a homomorphic encrypted ciphertext, so that the second network element can know that the received second ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted.

[0011] In another possible design, the homomorphic encrypting the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext comprises: homomorphic encrypting the first ciphertext based on an encryption key to generate the second ciphertext.

[0012] Based on the technical solution, the first communication device homomorphic encrypts the first ciphertext based on an encryption key.

[0013] In yet another possible design, the method further comprises: sending the encryption key to the second network element.

[0014] Based on the technical solution, the first communication device sends the encryption key to the second network element, so that the second network element can perform symmetric decryption processing on the received second ciphertext based on the encryption key and the first security context.

[0015] In yet another possible design, the method further includes receiving a second request message, the second request message being used to request generation of the encryption key, the second request message including a first identifier; and generating the encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message, wherein the first identifier includes at least one of an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

[0016] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device can generate the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption in response to the second request message. The encryption key can be at the granularity of the second communication device, e.g., data of the second communication device is homomorphic encrypted by the encryption key. Or, the encryption key can be at the granularity of a service, e.g., data of a first service of the second communication device is homomorphic encrypted by the encryption key, and the first data belongs to the first service. Or, the encryption key can be at the granularity of a service area, e.g., data of a communication device in a service area of the first communication device is homomorphic encrypted by the encryption key.

[0017] In yet another possible design, the method further includes sending a second request message, the second request message being used to request acquisition of the encryption key, the second request message including a first identifier; and receiving the encryption key associated with the first identifier, wherein the first identifier includes at least one of an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

[0018] Based on the above technical solution, the first communication device acquires the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption from another device (e.g., a control device).

[0019] In yet another possible design, the second request message further includes third indication information and / or an identifier of a first algorithm, the third indication information being used to indicate that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identifier of the first algorithm being used to indicate an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

[0020] Based on the above technical solution, the second request message can carry the identifier of the algorithm for generating the encryption key, so that the first communication device or the control device generates the encryption key based on the algorithm.

[0021] In yet another possible design, the encryption key is included in a second security context, the second security context further including a calculation key, and the method further includes sending the calculation key to the second network element, wherein the calculation key is used for calculation on ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key in a ciphertext state.

[0022] Based on the technical solution, the first communication device can provide the second network element with a calculation key, so that the second network element can perform calculation on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key in the ciphertext state.

[0023] In yet another possible design, the method further includes: sending, to the second network element, an identifier of the second communication device and / or an identifier of the first algorithm, the identifier of the first algorithm being used to indicate an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

[0024] In yet another possible design, the first request message includes at least one container, the first ciphertext is carried in a first container in the at least one container, and the first request message further includes a data label, the data label being used to indicate the first container.

[0025] Based on the technical solution, the first request message can include at least one container, and the first ciphertext is included in a container (e.g., the first container) in the at least one container. In order to enable the first communication device to explicitly know that the first ciphertext carried in the first container in the first request message is homomorphic encrypted, the first request message can carry information (e.g., a data label) indicating the first container. In addition, the first request message can further include a container other than the first container, and the first communication device does not perform homomorphic encryption on data in the container that is not indicated by the data label.

[0026] In yet another possible design, the method further includes: receiving a first response message, the first response message including an identifier of the second communication device and a data processing result that is homomorphic encrypted based on the first security context; performing re-encryption on the data processing result to obtain a data processing result that is secured based on the first security context; and sending, to the second communication device, the data processing result that is secured based on the first security context.

[0027] Based on the technical solution, the data processing result sent by the second network element to the first communication device can also be encrypted by using the homomorphic encryption method, and the first communication device performs re-encryption on the downlink data processing result, without the second communication device performing homomorphic calculation.

[0028] In yet another possible design, the first response message further includes fourth indication information, the fourth indication information indicating that the data processing result is homomorphic encrypted.

[0029] Based on the technical solution, the first response message can include fourth indication information indicating that the data processing result is homomorphic encrypted, so that the first communication device can explicitly know whether the received data processing result needs to be re-encrypted based on the fourth indication information.

[0030] In yet another possible design, the first network element and the second network element are the same.

[0031] In yet another possible design, the first security context includes a non-access stratum security context.

[0032] In yet another possible design, the homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext includes performing a re-encryption operation on the first ciphertext to obtain the second ciphertext, where the re-encryption operation includes conversion between a ciphertext in a non-homomorphic encryption state and a ciphertext in a homomorphic encryption state.

[0033] In a second aspect, a communication method is provided. The method can be performed by a second network element. In the absence of a special description, the "second network element" in the present application can refer to the second network element itself (e.g., an access and mobility management function (AMF), a perception function network element, a data analysis function network element, an analysis logic function network element, or a model training logic function network element, etc.), a component in the second network element (e.g., a processor, a chip, or a chip system, etc.), or a logic module or software capable of realizing all or part of the functions of the second network element. For ease of description, the following description takes the second network element as an example.

[0034] The communication method includes: receiving a third request message from a first communication device, the third request message being used to request a first network element to process data, the third request message including a second ciphertext, the second ciphertext being a ciphertext obtained by homomorphic encryption of a first ciphertext, the first ciphertext being first data that is securely protected by a first security context; decrypting the second ciphertext based on a first key to obtain a third ciphertext, the third ciphertext being the first data that is homomorphic encrypted, the first key being determined by homomorphic encryption of the first security context, obtaining a data processing result corresponding to the first data, the data processing result being determined based on the third ciphertext, wherein the first security context is a security context determined by negotiation between the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

[0035] Based on the technical solution, after the second network element receives the second ciphertext, the second ciphertext can be decrypted based on the first key to obtain the third ciphertext subjected to homomorphic encryption, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in the ciphertext state, so the third ciphertext supports being processed in the ciphertext state. In the technical solution, the second ciphertext is generated by the first communication device, and the second communication device with a data processing requirement can protect the data based on the first security context, without performing homomorphic encryption by the second communication device, but performing homomorphic encryption by the first communication device, so that the technical solution can realize processing of the terminal ciphertext data by the core network on the premise of reducing the encryption overhead of the terminal.

[0036] In a possible design, the first key is determined based on homomorphic encryption of the first security context by an encryption key, and the method further includes: receiving the encryption key from the first communication device; and determining the first key based on homomorphic encryption of the first security context by the encryption key.

[0037] Based on the technical solution, the second network element can obtain the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption from the first communication device, and then homomorphic encrypt the first security context based on the encryption key to generate the first key. The encryption key is the same as the encryption key used by the first communication device to homomorphic encrypt the first ciphertext, and the first communication device provides the required encryption key for the second network element, so that the second network element obtains the correct encryption key.

[0038] In another possible design, the encryption key is included in the second security context, and the second security context further includes a calculation key. The method further includes: receiving the calculation key from the first communication device; and performing calculation in the ciphertext state on the third ciphertext based on the encryption key, or sending the third ciphertext and the calculation key to the first network element.

[0039] Based on the technical solution, the first communication device can provide the calculation key to the second network element, so that the second network element can perform calculation in the ciphertext state on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key.

[0040] In another possible design, the obtaining of the data processing result corresponding to the first data includes: determining the data processing result based on the third ciphertext; or sending the third ciphertext to the first network element and receiving the data processing result from the first network element.

[0041] Based on the technical solution, the second network element can determine the data processing result corresponding to the first data by itself, or the first network element can process the third ciphertext and provide the data processing result corresponding to the first data to the second network element, which can be applied to different network architectures.

[0042] In another possible design, the method further includes: receiving fifth indication information from the second communication apparatus, where the fifth indication information indicates that the second communication apparatus has a homomorphic encryption requirement; and sending a second request message to the first communication apparatus, where the second request message is used to request generation of an encryption key, and the first identity is included in the second request message, and the encryption key is used to implement the homomorphic encryption.

[0043] Based on the above technical solution, the second network element can instruct the first communication apparatus to generate an encryption key required for performing homomorphic encryption based on the security protection requirement indication of the second communication apparatus, that is, in the case where the second communication apparatus has a homomorphic encryption requirement, the encryption key is generated, and for the apparatus without a homomorphic encryption requirement, the corresponding key does not need to be generated, thereby reducing unnecessary resource consumption.

[0044] In another possible design, the second request message further includes third indication information and / or an identity of a first algorithm, where the third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication apparatus has a homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identity of the first algorithm is used to indicate an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

[0045] In another possible design, the method further includes: performing security protection processing on the data processing result based on a second key, where the second key is determined based on homomorphic encryption of the first security context; and sending a first response message to the first communication apparatus, where the first response message includes the identity of the second communication apparatus and the data processing result that is protected based on the first security context and homomorphic encryption.

[0046] Based on the above technical solution, the data processing result sent by the second network element to the first communication apparatus can also be encrypted by using the homomorphic encryption method, and the downlink data processing result is re-encrypted by the first communication apparatus, without the need for the second communication apparatus to perform homomorphic computation.

[0047] In another possible design, the first response message further includes fourth indication information, where the fourth indication information indicates that the data processing result is subjected to homomorphic encryption.

[0048] Based on the above technical solution, the fourth indication information indicating that the data processing result is subjected to homomorphic encryption can be included in the first response message, so that the first communication apparatus can explicitly know whether the received data processing result needs to be re-encrypted based on the fourth indication information.

[0049] In another possible design, the method further includes: receiving a fourth request message from a third network element, the fourth request message being used to request the third ciphertext; and sending a fourth response message to the third network element, the fourth response message including the third ciphertext and an identifier of the first algorithm, the identifier of the first algorithm being used to indicate an algorithm of homomorphic computation.

[0050] Based on the above technical solutions, the homomorphic encrypted data can be opened to a third party (e.g., the third network element), so that the third party can obtain the homomorphic encrypted data and relevant computation information (e.g., an algorithm identifier of homomorphic computation) from the core network side, and the security of the private data is protected.

[0051] In a third aspect, a communication method is provided. The method can be performed by a second communication apparatus. In the absence of special description, the "second communication apparatus" in the present application can refer to the second communication device itself (e.g., a terminal device), a component in the second communication device (e.g., a processor, a chip, or a chip system, such as a circuit or a chip responsible for communication functions in a terminal device (e.g., a Modem chip, also known as a baseband chip, or a SoC chip or a SIP chip containing a modem core)), or a logic module or software capable of realizing all or part of the functions of the second communication device. For ease of description, the following description takes the second communication apparatus as an example.

[0052] The communication method includes: sending a first request message to a first communication apparatus, the first request message being used to request a first network element to process data, the first request message including a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data that is securely protected by a first security context, and the first indication information being used to indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted; and receiving a data processing result based on the first security context from the first communication apparatus, the data processing result being a data processing result corresponding to the first data, wherein the first security context is a non-access stratum security context that is determined by the second communication apparatus and a second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

[0053] Based on the above technical solutions, the second communication apparatus can indicate the first communication apparatus to homomorphic encrypt the received first ciphertext through the first indication information, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state. In this technical solution, the second communication apparatus can securely protect the data based on the first security context, without the need for the second communication apparatus to perform homomorphic encryption. On the premise of reducing the encryption overhead of the terminal, the core network can process the ciphertext data of the terminal.

[0054] In a possible design, the first request message includes at least one container, the first ciphertext is carried in a first container in the at least one container, and the first request message further includes a data label used to indicate the first container.

[0055] Based on the technical solution, the first request message includes at least one container, and the first ciphertext is included in a container (for example, the first container) in the at least one container. In order to enable the first communication device to explicitly know that the first ciphertext carried in the first container in the first request message is homomorphic encrypted, information (for example, a data label) indicating the first container can be carried in the first request message.

[0056] In another possible design, the method further includes: performing security verification on the data processing result that is securely protected based on the first security context, to obtain the data processing result.

[0057] In yet another possible design, the method further includes: sending fifth indication information to the second network element, where the fifth indication information indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0058] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, which has the functions of the first aspect to the third aspect, for example, the communication device includes modules or units or means corresponding to the operations of the first aspect to the third aspect, which can be implemented by software, or by hardware, or by a combination of software and hardware.

[0059] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides a communication device, which includes at least one processor and a memory. The memory is configured to store part or all of the computer programs or instructions necessary for implementing the functions of the first aspect to the third aspect. The at least one processor can execute the computer programs or instructions, and when the computer programs or instructions are executed, the communication device implements the method in any possible design or implementation manner of the first aspect to the third aspect.

[0060] In a possible design, the communication device can further include an interface circuit, and the processor is configured to communicate with other devices or components through the interface circuit.

[0061] In a possible design, the communication device can further include the memory. Optionally, the memory and the processor are integrated together.

[0062] The communication device can be a device, a communication module in the device, or a chip responsible for communication functions in the device, such as a Modem chip (also known as a baseband chip) or a SoC or SIP chip containing a modem module.

[0063] In a sixth aspect, the present application provides a chip, which includes a processor and a communication interface, the processor reads instructions through the communication interface, and executes the method provided in any of the implementation manners of the first aspect to the third aspect.

[0064] In a seventh aspect, the present application provides a communication system, which includes a first communication device for executing the method in the first aspect and a second network element for executing the method in the second aspect.

[0065] Optionally, the communication system further includes a second communication device for executing the method in the third aspect.

[0066] In an eighth aspect, the present application provides a computer readable storage medium, which stores computer readable instructions, when a computer reads and executes the computer readable instructions, the computer executes the method in any of the implementation manners of the first aspect to the third aspect.

[0067] In a ninth aspect, the present application provides a computer program product, when a computer reads and executes the computer program product, the computer executes the method in any of the implementation manners of the first aspect to the third aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0068] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture 100 provided by the present application.

[0069] FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication and perception integration.

[0070] FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a control plane protocol stack between a terminal device and an SMF.

[0071] FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a NAS security establishment process.

[0072] FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic processing process.

[0073] FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic key generation.

[0074] FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption process.

[0075] FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic decryption process.

[0076] FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic calculation process.

[0077] FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of a homomorphic encryption scheme.

[0078] FIG. 11 is a schematic flow chart of a communication method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0079] FIG. 12 is a schematic flow chart of another communication method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0080] FIG. 13 is a schematic flow chart of yet another communication method according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0081] FIG. 14 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus 10 according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0082] FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram of another communication apparatus 20 according to an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0083] In order to facilitate understanding of the embodiments of the present application, the following points are first explained.

[0084] First, in the present application, "for indicating" can include for directly indicating and for indirectly indicating. When describing that certain indication information is for indicating A, it can include that the indication information directly indicates A or indirectly indicates A, and does not mean that A must be carried in the indication information.

[0085] The information indicated by the indication information is referred to as to-be-indicated information, and there are many ways to indicate the to-be-indicated information in the specific implementation process, for example but not limited to, the to-be-indicated information can be directly indicated, such as the to-be-indicated information itself or an index of the to-be-indicated information. The to-be-indicated information can also be indirectly indicated by indicating other information, where the other information and the to-be-indicated information have an association relationship. The to-be-indicated information can also be only indicated in part, and the other part of the to-be-indicated information is known or agreed in advance. For example, the indication of a specific information can also be achieved by means of the arrangement order of each information agreed in advance (for example, a protocol stipulates), thereby reducing the indication overhead to a certain extent. At the same time, the common part of each information can be identified and uniformly indicated, so as to reduce the indication overhead caused by separately indicating the same information.

[0086] Second, "at least one" in the present application means one or more, and "more than one" means two or more (including two). In addition, in the embodiments of the present application, "first", "second", and various numerical numbers (for example, "#1", "#2", and the like) are only used for the convenience of description and do not limit the scope of the embodiments of the present application. The size of the serial number of each process below does not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined according to its function and inherent logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that the objects thus described can be interchanged under appropriate circumstances, so as to be able to describe solutions other than the embodiments of the present application. In addition, in the embodiments of the present application, "S1110" and the like are only used for the convenience of description and do not limit the order of execution steps.

[0087] Third, in the embodiments of the present application, "exemplary" or "for example" and the like are used to represent an example, illustration or description. Any embodiment or design scheme described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the present application should not be interpreted as more preferred or more advantageous than other embodiments or design schemes. Rather, the use of "exemplary" or "for example" and the like is intended to present the relevant concept in a specific manner.

[0088] Fourth, in the embodiments of the present application, "saving" can mean saving in one or more memories. The one or more memories can be separately arranged or integrated in the encoder or decoder, processor, or communication device. The one or more memories can be partially separately arranged and partially integrated in the decoder, processor, or communication device. The type of memory can be any form of storage medium, which is not limited in the present application.

[0089] Fifth, in the embodiments of the present application, "protocol" can refer to a standard protocol in the communication field, which can include NR protocol and related protocols applied to future communication systems, which is not limited in the present application.

[0090] Sixth, in the embodiments of the present application, "of", "corresponding", "corresponding" and "associated" can be used interchangeably at times, and it should be pointed out that their meanings are consistent when their differences are not emphasized.

[0091] Seventh, in the embodiments of the present application, "in the case of", "when", "if" can be used interchangeably at times, and it should be pointed out that their meanings are consistent when their differences are not emphasized.

[0092] Eighth, the term "and / or" in this document is only a description of the association relationship of the associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, A and / or B can represent three cases of A alone, A and B together, and B alone. In addition, the character " / " in this document generally represents an "or" relationship between the associated objects before and after it.

[0093] Ninth, the terms "message", "information", or "information element (IE)" can be used interchangeably in this document, and the names of messages or information are not limited in any way as long as the corresponding functions can be implemented.

[0094] Tenth, in this application, "sending" and "receiving" represent the direction of signal transmission. For example, "sending information to XX" can be understood as the destination of the information being XX, and "sending information" can include direct sending or indirect sending through other units or modules. "Receiving information from YY" can be understood as the source of the information being YY, and "receiving information" can include direct reception from YY or indirect reception from YY through other units or modules. In addition to air interface sending or air interface receiving signals implemented by network devices or terminal devices at the whole machine level, "sending" can also be understood as the "output" of the chip interface, and "receiving" can also be understood as the "input" of the chip interface. For example, modems or system-level chips (such as system on a chip (SoC) chips or system in package (SIP) chips, etc.) send or receive signals. "Sending" or "receiving" can also be performed by device components, such as sending or receiving signals through several parts, modules, chips of a device using buses, wires or interfaces.

[0095] The technical solutions in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0096] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, for example: long term evolution (LTE) system, LTE frequency division duplex (FDD) system, LTE time division duplex (TDD), 5th generation (5G) system or new radio (NR), and future communication systems, vehicle-to-X (V2X), which can include vehicle-to-network (V2N), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), etc., long term evolution-vehicle (LTE-V), Internet of Vehicles, machine type communication (MTC), Internet of Things (IoT), long term evolution-machine (LTE-M), machine-to-machine (M2M), wireless local area network (WLAN), etc.

[0097] In addition, the technical solutions of the present application can be applied to satellite communication systems, high altitude platform (HAPS) communication, unmanned aerial vehicles and other non-terrestrial network (NTN) systems, such as integrated communication and navigation (IcaN) systems, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and ultra-dense low-orbit satellite communication systems, etc.

[0098] For the convenience of description, the embodiments of the present application will be described taking the public land mobile network (PLMN) or 5G network as an example.

[0099] FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication system applicable to the present application. Take the 5G network architecture based on service-oriented architecture in the non-roaming scenario defined in the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) standardization process as an example. As shown in the figure, the network architecture can include three parts, which are terminal device part, data network (DN) and operator network PLMN part respectively. The functions of the network elements of each part are briefly described below.

[0100] The terminal device part can include a terminal device 110, which can also be referred to as a user equipment (UE). The terminal device can access the above-mentioned communication system, and is a device or module with corresponding communication functions. The terminal device can also be referred to as a user equipment (UE), a terminal, a user apparatus, an access terminal, a subscriber unit, a subscriber station, a mobile station, a mobile station (MS), a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a user terminal, a terminal unit, a terminal station, a terminal apparatus, a wireless communication device, a user agent or a user apparatus. The terminal device is usually provided with a communication module, circuit or chip for executing corresponding communication functions. The terminal device is also configured with program instructions for executing corresponding communication functions.

[0101] For example, the terminal in the embodiments of the present application can be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA) computer, a laptop computer, a tablet computer (Pad), a drone, a computer with wireless transceiver function, a machine type communication (MTC) terminal, a virtual reality (VR) terminal, an augmented reality (AR) terminal, a smart point of sale (POS) machine, a customer-premises equipment (CPE), a light UE, a reduced capability UE (REDCAP UE), a wearable device (such as a smart watch, a smart bracelet, a pedometer, smart glasses, etc.), an internet of things (IoT) terminal, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self driving, a wireless terminal in remote medical, a wireless terminal in smart grid, a wireless terminal in transportation safety, a wireless terminal in smart city, a wireless terminal in smart home (such as a game console, a smart TV, a smart speaker, a smart refrigerator, and fitness equipment, etc.), a transport vehicle with wireless communication function, a communication module, a roadside unit (RSU) with terminal function, a flight device (such as a smart robot, a hot air balloon, a drone, an airplane). The terminal device can also be a vehicle device, such as a whole vehicle device, a vehicle-mounted module, a vehicle-mounted chip, an on-board unit (OBU), or a telematics box (T-BOX), etc.

[0102] The operator network PLMN part can include, but is not limited to, the RAN 120 and the core network (CN) part.

[0103] The RAN 120 is an implementation system between the service nodes of the operator network and the terminal device 110. To access the operator network, the terminal device 110 first passes through the RAN 120, and then can be connected with the service nodes of the operator network through the RAN 120.

[0104] The access network device can be a network-side device with wireless transceiver function. The access network device can be an apparatus in a radio access network (RAN) that provides wireless communication function for terminal devices, referred to as a RAN device. The RAN can be a 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP)-related cellular system, such as a 5G mobile communication system, or a future-oriented evolution system (such as a next-generation mobile communication system). The RAN can also be an open radio access network (O-RAN or ORAN), a cloud radio access network (CRAN), or a wireless fidelity (WiFi) system. For example, the access network device can be a base station, an evolved NodeB (eNodeB), a next-generation NodeB (gNB) in a 5G mobile communication system, a base station in a subsequent evolution of 3GPP, a transmission reception point (TRP), an access node in a WiFi system, a wireless relay node, a wireless backhaul node, etc. In a communication system using different radio access technologies (RATs), the name of the device with base station function can be different. For example, it can be referred to as an eNB or eNodeB in an LTE system, and as a gNB in a 5G system or an NR system. The specific name of the base station is not limited in the present application. The access network device can include one or more co-sited or non-co-sited transmission reception points. For another example, the access network device can include at least one of one or more central units (CUs), one or more distributed units (DUs), and one or more radio units (RUs). In different systems, the CU (or CU-CP and CU-UP), DU, or RU can also have different names, but those skilled in the art can understand their meanings. For example, in an open RAN (ORAN) system, the CU can also be referred to as an O-CU (open CU), the DU can also be referred to as an O-DU (open DU), the CU-CP can also be referred to as an O-CU-CP, the CU-UP can also be referred to as an O-CU-UP, and the RU can also be referred to as an O-RU. Any of the CU (or CU-CP, CU-UP), DU, and RU in the present application can be implemented by a software module, a hardware module, or a combination of a software module and a hardware module.Exemplarily, the functions of the CU can be implemented by one entity or different entities. For example, the functions of the CU are further divided, i.e., the control plane and the user plane are separated and implemented by different entities, namely a control plane CU entity (i.e., a CU-CP entity) and a user plane CU entity (i.e., a CU-UP entity), which can be coupled with the DU to jointly complete the functions of the access network device. For example, the CU is responsible for processing non-real-time protocols and services, implementing radio resource control (RRC), and the functions of the packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) layer. The DU is responsible for processing physical layer protocols and real-time services, implementing the functions of the radio link control (RLC) layer, the media access control (MAC) layer, and the physical (PHY) layer. In this way, part of the functions of the radio access network device can be implemented by multiple network function entities. These network function entities can be network elements in a hardware device, or software functions running on a dedicated hardware, or virtualized functions instantiated on a platform (e.g., a cloud platform). The access network device can also include an active antenna unit (AAU). The AAU implements part of the physical layer processing functions, radio frequency processing, and related functions of the active antenna. Since the information of the RRC layer will eventually become the information of the PHY layer, or be converted from the information of the PHY layer, in this architecture, high-layer signaling, such as RRC layer signaling, can also be considered as being sent by the DU, or by the DU+AAU. It can be understood that the access network device can be a device including one or more of the CU node, the DU node, and the AAU node. In addition, the CU can be divided into an access network device in the radio access network (RAN), or the CU can be divided into an access network device in the core network (CN), which is not limited in the present application. For another example, in the V2X technology, the access network device can be a road side unit (RSU). The multiple access network devices in the communication system can be the same type of base station, or different types of base stations. The base station can communicate with the terminal device, or communicate with the terminal device through a relay station. In the embodiments of the present application, the device for implementing the functions of the access network device can be the access network device itself, or a device capable of supporting the access network device to implement the functions, such as a chip system or a combination device or component that can implement the functions of the access network device, which can be installed in the access network device. In the embodiments of the present application, the chip system can be composed of a chip, or can include a chip and other discrete devices.

[0105] Additionally, exemplary, the access network device in this application can also include service management and orchestration (SMO), wherein the SMO includes a RAN intelligent controller (RIC). Optionally, the RIC includes both a non-real-time radio intelligent controller (non-RT-RIC) and a near-real-time radio intelligent controller (near-RT-RIC).

[0106] The non-RT-RIC is deployed in the SMO, and its main responsibilities are to provide policies, machine language (ML) model management, a large amount of information, and thus achieve intelligent RAN optimization; and to enable rApp functions. The rApp can collect information and take actions through the A1, O1, O2, and open fronthaul management plane (Open FH M-Plane) interfaces to achieve the purpose of RAN optimization. The rApp is a portable functional application.

[0107] The near-RT-RIC is deployed in the SMO, and its main responsibilities are to provide near-real-time (e.g., 10 ms-1 s) radio resource control and optimization to the base station based on the data collected by the E2 node.

[0108] The CN part can include, but is not limited to, the following network functions (NFs): user plane function (UPF) 130, network exposure function (NEF) 131, network function repository function (NRF) 132, policy control function (PCF) 133, unified data management (UDM) 134, unified data repository (UDR) 135, network data analytics function (NWDAF) 136, authentication server function (AUSF) 137, AMF 138, session management function (SMF) 139, application function (AF) 141, and sensing function (SF) 142.

[0109] The data network DN 140, which can also be referred to as a packet data network (PDN), is usually a network located outside the operator network, for example, a third-party network. Of course, in some implementations, the DN can also be deployed by the operator, that is, the DN belongs to a part of the PLMN. The present application does not limit whether the DN belongs to the PLMN. The operator network PLMN can access multiple data networks DN 140, and various services can be deployed on the data networks DN 140 to provide data and / or voice services for the terminal device 110. For example, the data network DN 140 can be a private network of a certain smart factory, and the sensors installed in the workshop of the smart factory can be terminal devices 110. A control server of the sensors is deployed in the data network DN 140, and the control server can provide services for the sensors. The sensors can communicate with the control server, obtain instructions from the control server, and transmit the collected sensor data to the control server according to the instructions, and the like. For another example, the data network DN 140 can be an internal office network of a certain company, and the mobile phones or computers of employees of the company can be terminal devices 110. The mobile phones or computers of the employees can access information and data resources on the internal office network of the company. The terminal device 110 can establish a connection with the operator network through an interface (for example, N1, etc.) provided by the operator network, and use data and / or voice services provided by the operator network. The terminal device 110 can also access the data network DN 140 through the operator network, use operator services deployed on the data network DN 140, and / or third-party services.

[0110] The CN includes the following NF functions, which are further briefly described below.

[0111] 1. The UPF 130 is a gateway provided by the operator and is a gateway for communication between the operator network and the data network DN 140. The UPF 130 includes functions related to the user plane, such as data packet routing and transmission, data packet detection, service usage reporting, quality of service (QoS) processing, uplink data packet detection, and downlink data packet storage.

[0112] 2. The NEF 131 is a control plane function provided by the operator, mainly enables third parties to use services provided by the network, supports network exposure of its capabilities, event and data analysis, provision of information for PLMN security from external applications, conversion of information between the inside and outside of the PLMN, provides an application programming interface (API) interface exposed by the operator network to the outside, and provides interaction between external service servers and internal operator networks.

[0113] 3. NRF 132 is a control plane function provided by an operator, which can be used to maintain real-time information of network functions, services in the network. For example, support network service discovery, maintain NF profile supported services, support service discovery of service communication proxy (SCP), maintain SCP profile of SCP instance, send notifications about newly registered, deregistered, updated NF and SCP, maintain health status of NF and SCP running, etc.

[0114] 4. PCF 133 is a control plane function provided by an operator, which supports a unified policy framework to govern network behavior, provides policy rules, subscription information related to policy decision to other control functions, etc.

[0115] 5. UDM 134 is a control plane function provided by an operator, which is responsible for storing information such as subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI) of a subscribed user in an operator network, generic public subscription identifier (GPSI) of a subscribed user, credential, etc. The SUPI will be protected in confidentiality during transmission, and the SUPI protected by confidentiality is called subscription concealed identifier (SUCI). The information stored by the UDM 134 can be used for authentication and authorization of the terminal device 110 accessing the operator network. Among them, the subscribed user of the operator network can be a user using a service provided by the operator network, for example, a user using a subscriber identity module (SIM) card of operator A, or a user using a SIM card of operator B, etc. The credential of the subscribed user can be a long-term key stored in the SIM card or a small file related to SIM card encryption information, etc. for authentication and / or authorization. It should be noted that the permanent identifier, credential, security context, authentication data (cookie), and token, etc. are related to the same verification / authentication, authorization information, which are not distinguished or limited in the embodiments of the present application for the sake of description.

[0116] 6. UDR 135 is a control plane function provided by an operator, which provides storage and retrieval of subscription data for UDM, storage and retrieval of policy data for PCF, storage and retrieval of user NF group identifier (group ID) information, etc.

[0117] 7、NWDAF 136 is a control plane function provided by an operator, and its main function is to collect data from NFs, external application functions AF, and operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) systems, and provide NWDAF services such as registration, data exposure, and analysis data for NFs and AFs. In this application, the NWDAF is mainly responsible for security-related data analysis, so in this application the NWDAF can also be understood as a network element with a security analysis function, and the network element with a security analysis function is referred to as NWDAF, which is only an example, and other network element names can also be used in the future, which are not limited in this application.

[0118] 8、AUSF 137 is a control plane function provided by an operator, and is usually used for primary authentication, i.e., authentication between the terminal device 110 (subscribed user) and the operator network. After receiving the authentication request initiated by the subscribed user, the AUSF 137 can authenticate and / or authorize the subscribed user through the authentication information and / or authorization information stored in the UDM 134, or generate authentication and / or authorization information of the subscribed user through the UDM 134. The AUSF 137 can feed back the authentication information and / or authorization information to the subscribed user.

[0119] 9、AMF 138 is a control plane network function provided by an operator network, responsible for access control and mobility management of the terminal device 110 accessing the operator network, including functions such as mobile state management, allocation of user temporary identity, authentication and authorization of users, etc.

[0120] 10、SMF 139 is a control plane network function provided by an operator network, responsible for managing protocol data unit (PDU) sessions of the terminal device 110. The PDU session is a channel for transmitting PDU, and the terminal device transmits PDU with the data network DN 140 through the PDU session. The PDU session is responsible for establishment, maintenance and deletion, etc. by the SMF 139. The SMF 139 includes session management functions (such as session establishment, modification and release, including tunnel maintenance between the user plane function UPF 130 and the RAN 120), UPF 130 selection and control, service and session continuity (SSC) mode selection, roaming, and other session-related functions.

[0121] 11、AF 141 is a control plane network function provided by an operator network, used to provide application layer information, and can interact with the policy framework through a network exposure function network element, or directly interact with the policy framework to request policy decision, etc. It can be located in the operator network or outside the operator network.

[0122] 12. SF 142 is a network element for processing and computing sensing data. It can be any network element capable of computing tasks, such as a network data analysis function network element, an analyze logical function (AnLF), a model trains logical function (MTLF) or other artificial intelligence (AI) function network element, or a location management function (LMF), and any future network element with computing tasks.

[0123] In this application, the SF can be deployed in the core network or in the non-core network, without limitation. The SF can use access network devices and / or terminal devices for sensing. The SF can be co-located with other network elements, or the functions of the SF can be implemented by other network elements, or the SF can be separately deployed, and the application does not limit this. Alternatively, the SF can also be referred to as a sensing control function (SCF) or other possible names.

[0124] Exemplarily, the SF can communicate sensing control signaling with the access network devices and / or terminal devices through the access and mobility management function network element. The sensing measurement data obtained by the access network devices and / or terminal devices can be transmitted to the SF via the control plane or the user plane, wherein the user plane can be forwarded to the SF through the user plane function network element or directly transmitted to the SF. For example, the above communication interfaces (such as N1, N2, N5, or N8, etc.) can support the transmission of sensing service related information, such as authentication information, sensing service type, sensing service quality requirement, sensing measurement data or sensing information, etc.

[0125] It can be understood that the above network elements or functions can be physical entities in hardware devices, software instances running on dedicated hardware, or virtualized functions instantiated on a shared platform (e.g., a cloud platform). In short, a NF can be implemented by hardware or software.

[0126] Nnef, Nnrf, Npcf, Nudm, Nudr, Nnwdaf, Nausf, Namf, Nsmf, Nran, N1, N2, N3, N4, and N6 in FIG. 1 are interface sequence numbers. For example, the meanings of the above interface sequence numbers can refer to the meanings defined in the 3GPP standard protocol, and the application does not limit the meanings of the above interface sequence numbers. It should be noted that the interface names between the various network functions in the figure are only an example, and the interface names of the system architecture in the specific implementation can also be other names, which are not limited in the application. In addition, the names of the messages (or signaling) transmitted between the above various network elements are also only an example, and do not constitute any limitation on the function of the message itself.

[0127] For the convenience of description, the network functions (such as NEF 131…SMF 139) in the embodiments of the application are collectively / referred to as NF, that is, the NF described hereinafter in the embodiments of the application can be replaced by any network function. In addition, FIG. 1 only schematically describes part of the network functions, and the NF described hereinafter is not limited to the network functions shown in FIG. 1.

[0128] It should be understood that the network architecture applied to the embodiments of the application is only a network architecture described from the perspective of service architecture, and the network architecture applicable to the embodiments of the application is not limited thereto, and any network architecture capable of realizing the functions of the above network elements is applicable to the embodiments of the application. For example, at least one of the network elements, access network devices, or terminal devices in the application can be deployed in an NTN.

[0129] It should also be understood that the AMF, SMF, UPF, NEF, AUSF, NRF, PCF, UDM, SF shown in the figure can be understood as network elements in the core network for realizing different functions, which can be combined into a network slice as needed, for example. These core network elements can be independent devices, or can be integrated into the same device to realize different functions, and the application does not limit the specific form of the above network elements. In addition, the network architecture shown in FIG. 1 can also include other network elements, for example, the network architecture can also include a perception function network element, an artificial intelligence logic function (such as a model training logic function, an analysis logic function) network element, etc.

[0130] It should also be understood that the above naming is only defined for the convenience of distinguishing different functions and should not constitute any limitation on the application. The application does not exclude the possibility of using other names in the 5G network and future other networks. For example, in future communication networks, part or all of the above network elements can use the terms in 5G, or other names, etc.

[0131] By way of example and not limitation, embodiments of the present application can be applied in the scenario of integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). By way of example, it can be applied in the scenario of sending sensing data to the network side for processing by the terminal, as shown in FIG. 2, it can be applied in the scenario of sensing data assisting in collision avoidance, as can be seen from FIG. 2, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) A and UAV B fly to their destinations under the guidance of the unmanned traffic management (UTM) network element with the assistance of the "5G sensing service" provided by the network operator. By way of example, UAV A will fly to the city center, and the UTM requests the "5G sensing service" of the network operator to provide sensing services for UAV A, and the required sensing results include the flight environment on its flight route, such as nearby buildings, obstacles, and the height of other UAVs. By way of example, UAV B will fly to the countryside, and the UTM requests the "5G sensing service" of the network operator to provide sensing services for UAV B, and the required sensing results include the flight environment along its route, such as obstacles, and other nearby UAVs.

[0132] The UTM requests reports on UAV A and UAV B, the base station can continuously send sensing signaling along the route of UAV A, and UE A on UAV A can use a 5G communication connection to send the 3GPP sensing data it collects for its surrounding environment back to the RAN. Then, the 5G network can obtain comprehensive sensing results for the flight environment of UAV A, such as building locations, heights, other nearby moving objects (such as other UAVs, relative locations, heights, moving angles, moving speeds, etc. with the UTM). The same sensing operation also applies to UAV B. The 5G network reports the sensing results periodically according to the request of the UTM. The UTM considers the received sensing results and other information as input, and adjusts and guides the flight route of the UAV.

[0133] It should be noted that the above FIG. 1 and FIG. 2 are only exemplary to show the scenarios to which embodiments of the present application can be applied, and do not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application. The embodiments provided by the present application can also be applied in other communication scenarios, for example, the SF network element described above can also be other computing network elements for processing data provided by the terminal, which will not be exemplified one by one here.

[0134] For the convenience of understanding the embodiments of the present application, some basic concepts related to the present application are briefly described. It should be understood that the basic concepts introduced below are described by taking the basic concepts defined in the NR protocol as an example, but the embodiments of the present application are not limited to only being applicable to the NR system. Therefore, the standard names appearing when the NR system is taken as an example for description are all functional descriptions, the specific names are not limited, and only represent the function of the device, which can be extended to other systems in the future.

[0135] 1. Privacy computation or Privacy computing: refers to a set of technologies for realizing data analysis and computation under the premise of protecting data itself from being disclosed to the outside, achieving the purpose of "available, invisible" to data; under the premise of fully protecting data and privacy security, realizing the transformation and release of data value.

[0136] 2. Homomorphic encryption: an important means in privacy computation, using homomorphic encrypted data, data computation and processing can still be realized in the case of data ciphertext. In the present application, the ciphertext after homomorphic encryption supports being processed in the ciphertext state; or, the data before homomorphic encryption and the data after homomorphic encryption have the same computing characteristics, such as the data before homomorphic encryption and the data after homomorphic encryption both have homomorphism.

[0137] 3. Non-access stratum message: refers to a message sent between terminal devices and subsequent nodes through a wireless access node, including: a message sent by a terminal device to a core network through an access network device, or a message sent by a terminal device to a CU through a DU. Because the access node does not process, it is called a non-access stratum message. In the present application, in order to facilitate description, the messages not processed by the access node are all called NAS (Non-Access Stratum) messages, but it should be understood that the name of the message in the present application is not limited, and the messages not processed by the access node can also have other names (such as other possible names defined in future communication protocols).

[0138] 4. NAS message classification: according to different core network elements sending the NAS message, the NAS message can be divided into mobility management (MM) NAS message, session management (SM) NAS message, short message service (SMS) NAS message, and call control (CC) NAS message.

[0139] As a possible implementation, in addition to MM NAS, other types of NAS messages are sent by the UE to the access and mobility management function network element through the access network, and then routed to other NFs through the access and mobility management function network element.

[0140] In the protocol stack, the RRC and radio access network application part (RANAP) layer and the protocol layers below them are called access layers, and MM, SM, or CC and the like above the RRC and RANAP are called non-access layers. Among them, the process in which the base station of the radio access layer participates is called the process of the access layer; the signaling that only the UE and the core network element need to process, and the radio access network base station only needs to route the signaling without processing the signaling is called the process of the non-access layer.

[0141] For ease of understanding, how the access and mobility management function network element routes the session management NAS message (NAS-SM) is briefly introduced in combination with FIG. 3. FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a control plane protocol stack between a terminal device and an SMF, as shown in FIG. 3, the NAS-SM protocol layer is the SM function of the NAS protocol, and supports the establishment, modification and release of the PDU session user plane. The NAS-SM protocol layer supports processing the session management between the UE and the session management function network element, and the NAS-SM signaling is transmitted through the access and mobility management function network element, the content of the NAS-SM signaling will not be analyzed by the access and mobility management function network element, and the NAS-SM signaling is processed (created and processed) between the UE and the session management function at the NAS-SM protocol layer.

[0142] The NAS-MM protocol layer processing NAS-SM signaling includes the following two points:

[0143] 1) Transmit NAS-SM signaling: the NAS MM protocol layer creates a NAS MM message, including a security header, an indication of transmitting NAS SM signaling, information on how to forward and to which NAS SM signaling is forwarded after receiving the NAS MM.

[0144] 2) Receive NAS-SM signaling: process the NAS MM part after receiving the NAS MM message, that is, perform integrity check, analyze the information on how to forward and to which NAS SM signaling is forwarded.

[0145] As another possible implementation, the UE and any network element (UE-any NF) can directly communicate. Without the channel for transmission by the AMF, different types of NAS messages are sent by the UE to different NFs through the access network, for example, MM NAS is sent by the UE to the AMF through the access network, and SM NAS is sent by the UE to the SMF through the access network.

[0146] 5. NAS security establishment: For ease of understanding, the NAS security establishment procedure defined by the existing protocol is explained in conjunction with FIG. 4. FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a NAS security establishment procedure.

[0147] As can be seen from FIG. 4, the NAS security establishment includes the following steps:

[0148] Step 1: The UE sends an initial NAS message to the access and mobility management function network element.

[0149] Exemplarily, if the UE does not have a NAS security context, the initial NAS message should only contain plaintext information elements (IEs), i.e., a subscription identifier (e.g., SUCI or Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI)), UE security capabilities, ngKSI, etc.

[0150] Exemplarily, if the UE has a NAS security context, the initial NAS message sent should contain the above plaintext information elements, and an encrypted complete initial NAS message in an encrypted NAS container. In the case that the initial NAS message is protected and the access and mobility management function network element has the same security context, steps 2 to 4 described below can be omitted, and in this case, the access and mobility management function network element should use the complete initial NAS message in the NAS container as the message to be responded.

[0151] Step 2: If the access and mobility management function network element cannot obtain the NAS security context locally or in the last visited access and mobility management function network element (last visited AMF) of the UE, or if the access and mobility management function network element fails the integrity check on the received initial NAS message, the access and mobility management function network element should initiate an authentication procedure with the UE (e.g., step 2b shown in FIG. 4). The specific authentication procedure is not limited in the present application, and will not be described here.

[0152] Exemplarily, if the access and mobility management function network element obtains the old NAS security context from the last visited access and mobility management function network element (e.g., step 2a shown in FIG. 4), the AMF can decipher the NAS container with the same security context and obtain the initial NAS message, and steps 2b to 4 can be omitted. If the access and mobility management function network element obtains a new K AMF from the last visited access and mobility management function network element (keyAmfChangeInd is received), step 2b can be omitted.

[0153] Step 3: If the UE authentication is successful, the Access and Mobility Management Function network element shall send a NAS Security Mode Command message.

[0154] If the initial NAS message is protected but does not pass integrity check (e.g. due to MAC failure or the Access and Mobility Management Function network element cannot find the security context used), or the Access and Mobility Management Function network element cannot decrypt the complete initial NAS message in the NAS container (e.g. due to receiving "keyAmfChangeInd" from the last visited Access and Mobility Management Function network element), the Access and Mobility Management Function network element shall include a flag in the NAS Security Mode Command message requesting the UE to send the complete initial NAS message in the NAS Security Mode Complete message.

[0155] Step 4: The UE shall send a NAS Security Mode Complete message to the Access and Mobility Management Function network element in response to the NAS Security Mode Command message. The NAS Security Mode Complete message shall be encrypted and protected for integrity. In addition, if the Access and Mobility Management Function network element requested or the UE sent an unprotected initial NAS message, the NAS Security Mode Complete message shall include the complete initial NAS message in the NAS container. The Access and Mobility Management Function network element shall use the complete initial NAS message in the NAS container as the message to respond to.

[0156] Step 5: The Access and Mobility Management Function network element shall send a response to the initial NAS message. This message shall be encrypted and protected for integrity.

[0157] 6. Homomorphic encryption and privacy computing: Data is one of the five major production factors in the digital society. With the convergence of communication and perception, perception as an endogenous capability of future communication networks provides a large amount of data for intelligent networks by perceiving the state of the network itself, the surrounding environment, and user / device behavior. From the perspective of data value mining, the network is not only a producer and provider of data, providing trusted data services for various intelligent applications, but also a consumer of network data, improving network performance and operational efficiency with the help of data-driven intelligent applications.

[0158] In future communication networks, computing resources will be distributed across various infrastructures, including central clouds, edge clouds, network devices, and even terminal devices. Computing resources, as well as artificial intelligence algorithms or specific functional applications attached thereto, can not only serve the network or device itself to improve performance and optimize network operation, but also be exposed to the outside through a unified interface to serve upper-layer applications. Nodes in communication network infrastructure provide not only basic connection functions but also additional computing functions.

[0159] With the progress of society and the increasing awareness of data ownership, the requirement for data privacy protection is also increasing. Data must meet the regulatory requirements of relevant laws and regulations during processing and use. If subjected to various security and privacy attacks from internal and external entities of the network, it will cause serious problems.

[0160] The global smart application industry has generally strengthened its focus on data security and privacy, and users have increased their demand for network autonomy. In the future, performance-related indicators will no longer be the only indicators of user concern. The demand for overhead, security, privacy, and autonomy will gradually deepen, thus becoming a new dimension for evaluating service quality.

[0161] How to fully exploit and realize the value of data while meeting high security and privacy requirements, and efficiently utilize communication resources and computing resources in the communication network. How to realize various new capabilities of future networks (such as endogenous intelligence and ubiquitous sensing) and new services (such as immersive extended reality (XR), digital twin, or cloud universe) while providing end-to-end data privacy and security protection technology. These problems indicate that the communication network needs stronger privacy-enhanced technology, and homomorphic encryption algorithms that provide privacy computing capabilities are the most concerned.

[0162] Homomorphic encryption (HE) aims to complete the calculation and processing of data ciphertext without exposing the plaintext of the data. It focuses on privacy-preserving computation. It is a technology that realizes data value mining under the premise of providing privacy protection.

[0163] Homomorphic encryption is based on basic encryption and adds homomorphic computing functions under ciphertext. It allows direct computation on ciphertext after encryption, and the computation result obtained by decrypting the ciphertext computation result is consistent with the computation result based on plaintext.

[0164] As shown in FIG. 5, the plaintext data m is calculated by the plaintext calculation function f to obtain the plaintext result f(m), and the plaintext data m is encrypted by homomorphic encryption to obtain the ciphertext data c=E pk (m). The ciphertext data is calculated by the homomorphic computing circuit C f to obtain the ciphertext result The ciphertext result can be obtained by homomorphic decryption to get the plaintext result f(m).

[0165] The encryption key based on which the homomorphic encryption process is based on is not limited in the present application. For example, the homomorphic encryption can be fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), the encryption key can be asymmetric public key encryption or symmetric encryption, as long as the ciphertext has certain algebraic structure; or in other words, the ciphertext has the feature of homomorphism.

[0166] 7. Homomorphic encryption process: including homomorphic encryption key generation (HE.Keygen), homomorphic encryption (HE.Enc), homomorphic decryption (HE.Dec) and homomorphic evaluation (HE.Eval). Exemplarily, the homomorphic encryption can be denoted as HE=(HE.Keygen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval), that is, HE is composed of four algorithms.

[0167] For ease of understanding, the following takes an asymmetric encryption scheme as an example (n is a security parameter) to briefly introduce each stage in the homomorphic encryption process:

[0168] (1) Key generation (key generation): (pk, evk, sk) <- HE.Keygen(1 n ), output public key (public key, pk), homomorphic evaluation key (homomorphic evaluation key, evk) and secret key (secret key, sk), wherein, the public key is denoted as pk, pk as homomorphic encryption key K enc = pk; the homomorphic evaluation key is denoted as K eval , the homomorphic evaluation key can also be called homomorphic computation key; the secret key is denoted as sk, sk as homomorphic decryption key K dec = sk.

[0169] As shown in FIG. 6, the key generation device generates the keys required in the homomorphic encryption process based on the parameters and key generator required for homomorphic key generation, wherein the parameters required for homomorphic key generation can be called key material, as shown in FIG. 6, the key generation party inputs or generates the key material to the key generator, and outputs or stores the keys (such as the homomorphic encryption key K enc , the decryption key K dec and the computation key K eval shown in FIG. 6).

[0170] In particular, the homomorphic key generation device A generates a homomorphic encryption key K enc , a homomorphic computation key K eval , and a homomorphic decryption key K dec , wherein the homomorphic encryption key K enc is sent to the homomorphic encryption device B, the homomorphic computation key K eval is sent to the homomorphic computation device C, and the homomorphic decryption key K dec is sent to the homomorphic decryption device D.

[0171] In one homomorphic encryption task, there can be multiple homomorphic encryption devices to encrypt data from different sources, multiple homomorphic computation devices to perform homomorphic computation circuits, and single-hop or multi-hop homomorphic computation devices. There can also be multiple homomorphic decryption devices in one homomorphic encryption task, and the decryption results can be provided to multiple data using devices. Depending on the key deployment situation, the homomorphic decryption device and the data using device can be the same or different entities. The keys of multiple homomorphic encryption devices in one homomorphic encryption task can be the same or different.

[0172] (2) Homomorphic encryption: c←HE.Enc pk (m). The homomorphic encryption device uses the homomorphic encryption key K enc = pk to encrypt a single-bit plaintext message m∈{0,1} into ciphertext c.

[0173] As shown in FIG. 7, the homomorphic encryption device encrypts plaintext m into ciphertext c based on the homomorphic encryption key K enc . As shown in FIG. 7, the plaintext m is input or generated, and the plaintext m is encrypted by the homomorphic encryption key K enc , and the ciphertext c is output.

[0174] (3) Homomorphic decryption: m←HE.Dec sk (c). The homomorphic decryption device uses the homomorphic decryption key K dec = sk to decrypt ciphertext c to recover plaintext message m∈{0,1}.

[0175] As shown in FIG. 8, the homomorphic decryption device recovers plaintext m from ciphertext c based on the decryption key K dec . As shown in FIG. 8, the ciphertext c is input, and the ciphertext c is decrypted by the decryption key K dec , and the plaintext m is output or used.

[0176] (4) Homomorphic evaluation: c f ←HE.Eval evk (f,c1,…,c l ), which can also be referred to as homomorphic computation. Based on the input ciphertext c1,…,cl and homomorphic computation key K eval , the homomorphic computation device (may be referred to as HEcalc, or HEeval) performs a homomorphic computation function f: {0,1} l → {0,1} under ciphertext to obtain a homomorphic computation output ciphertext c f .

[0177] As shown in FIG. 9, based on the computation key K eval , the homomorphic computation device performs homomorphic computation on the input multiple ciphertexts c1,..., c l to obtain c f . As shown in FIG. 9, input ciphertexts c1,..., c l are processed by the computation key K eval , and output ciphertext c f is obtained.

[0178] The homomorphic computation function f described above represents an arithmetic circuit with addition and multiplication gates over a finite field (Galois field, GF). A general homomorphic computation HE.Eval is decomposed into multiple basic operators, such as being decomposed into a homomorphic addition c add ← HE.Add evk (c1, c2) and a homomorphic multiplication c mult ← HE.Mult evk (c1, c2).

[0179] Exemplarily, the entire homomorphic encryption scheme HE = (HE.Keygen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval) is as shown in FIG. 10, and the ciphertext computation result is equivalent to the plaintext computation result after being decrypted,

[0180] 8. Homomorphic encryption features: the currently standardized full homomorphic encryption algorithm in the industry is basically constructed based on a lattice, and the security thereof is mostly based on a learning with errors (LWE) problem or a learning with errors over ring (RLWE) problem in lattice cryptography.

[0181] A random vector as a key A positive integer n is a vector dimension, q is a ciphertext modulus, and a set is a uniformly distributed random matrix, and N>n. Noise e∈χ N, the noise distribution χ = χ(n) is a set of distributions on Z, which can be chosen as a discrete Gaussian distribution, and set the noise upper limit | χ | ≤ B. Then the ciphertext after homomorphic encryption can be c = (a, b), where b = [A · s + m + e] q , m is the plaintext message to be encrypted.

[0182] A full homomorphic encryption scheme has a feature that a random "noise" component e is added in the encryption process. Homomorphic computation on ciphertexts will cause these noises to grow, and when multiple ciphertexts are stacked together for homomorphic computation, the noise in each ciphertext will be stacked and expanded. In particular, the noise growth caused by homomorphic multiplication can reach exponential level, and there will be cross terms of noise multiplied by ciphertext. When the noise is within a controllable range, then the decryption algorithm can easily restore the plaintext from the ciphertext. If only simple calculations are performed on the ciphertext, the noise stacked together is still within an acceptable range. However, if the ciphertext calculation is too complex, once the noise range exceeds the critical value, the original plaintext will be completely covered, resulting in the failure of homomorphic decryption.

[0183] 9. Bootstrapping key: Bootstrapping is a special processing technique for ciphertexts, which can "refresh" a ciphertext with noise close to the critical value into a new ciphertext with very low noise. The main method is to use a high-noise ciphertext Re-encrypted into another full homomorphic ciphertext using a new key k2 Encrypt the old key k1 into ciphertext using the new key k2 That is, the bootstrapping key (BSK). Then the homomorphic computing device performs homomorphic computation on the corresponding homomorphic decryption circuit Decrypt the inner ciphertext to obtain a new low-noise FHE ciphertext under a new key

[0184] As a kind of homomorphic computing key, the bootstrapping key needs to be generated by a key generation device and distributed to a homomorphic computing device. In addition to the bootstrapping key, there is another kind of homomorphic computing key, which is the key switching key (KSK). Taking the RLWE homomorphic encryption scheme with a single key as an example, suppose the ciphertext The corresponding key is Homomorphically compute the multiplication of two ciphertexts ct and ct' The corresponding key is After the ciphertext multiplication, not only the ciphertext size is inflated, but also the key appears exponential cross terms. After each ciphertext calculation, the ciphertext product needs to be converted into a new ciphertext with the same dimension as the original ciphertext using a relinearization key (i.e., key switching key), and the cross terms of the corresponding key are eliminated, and then the next layer of circuit calculation is entered.

[0185] 10、trans chiper operation: the trans chiper operation involved in the present application can be understood as converting the ciphertext in the non-homomorphic encryption state into the ciphertext in the homomorphic encryption state, or converting the ciphertext in the homomorphic encryption state into the ciphertext in the non-homomorphic encryption state. For example, the process of homomorphic encryption of the first ciphertext by the first communication device in the following embodiment to generate the second ciphertext can be referred to as a trans chiper operation, wherein the first ciphertext is the ciphertext securely protected by the first security context, which belongs to the ciphertext in the non-homomorphic encryption state, and the second ciphertext is the ciphertext securely protected by the homomorphic encryption, which belongs to the ciphertext in the homomorphic encryption state; for another example, the process of homomorphic decryption of the data processing result by the first communication device in the following embodiment to obtain the data processing result securely protected by the first security context can be referred to as a trans chiper operation, wherein the data processing result is the ciphertext of the data processing result securely protected by the first security context and the homomorphic encryption, which belongs to the ciphertext in the homomorphic encryption state, and the data processing result securely protected by the first security context is the ciphertext securely protected by the first security context, which belongs to the ciphertext in the non-homomorphic encryption state.

[0186] It should be understood that the above-mentioned conversion operation between the ciphertext in the non-homomorphic encryption state and the ciphertext in the homomorphic encryption state is referred to as a trans chiper operation, which is only an example and does not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application, for example, it can also be referred to as a proxy re-encryption (PRE), a conversion operation between the non-homomorphic encryption ciphertext and the homomorphic encryption ciphertext, a trans chiper, or a first operation, etc.

[0187] The above briefly introduces the scenario to which the communication method provided by the embodiments of the present application can be applied in combination with FIG. 1 and FIG. 2, and introduces the basic concepts that can be involved in the embodiments of the present application, and introduces the homomorphic encryption process and the security of the homomorphic encryption in the basic concepts. As can be known from the above, the homomorphic encryption technology can support the calculation and processing of data in the case of data ciphertext, and the result generation.

[0188] A method for processing sensitive data of a user based on homomorphic encryption technology is: a network side sends a data statistics request, requests data, a UE receives the request, determines original data to be counted, and encrypts the original data based on a homomorphic encryption algorithm, provides the encrypted data to the network side, the network side calculates the encrypted data, and publishes the data to a demander (a publisher or a consumer needs to obtain a related homomorphic key and decrypt the result to obtain a plaintext statistical result).

[0189] However, the method for processing sensitive data based on homomorphic encryption technology has the following problems:

[0190] 1) Since the homomorphic algorithm has high complexity, the UE directly performing homomorphic encryption will increase a large amount of encryption overhead.

[0191] 2) The homomorphic encrypted user data transmitted will be ciphertext expansion, that is, the length of the ciphertext will be increased by several times compared with the plaintext. If the homomorphic ciphertext data is directly transmitted, the air interface transmission burden will be significantly increased.

[0192] Another method for processing confidential data based on homomorphic encryption technology is: a system log generator sends the system logs that have been encrypted by a symmetric encryption key to a system log analyzer, and sends the symmetric encryption key in parallel with a homomorphic encryption system public key. The system log analyzer performs a cryptographic conversion of the logs and then processes them in a homomorphic domain. The results processed in the homomorphic domain are then sent to a security center, or even directly to the system log generator for decryption there. The security center can build a security report or propose countermeasures before sending the security report to the system log generator in the form of encryption by a symmetric key.

[0193] The method for processing confidential data based on homomorphic encryption technology still has the above problems, that is, the terminal still needs to support the homomorphic algorithm and transmit the homomorphic ciphertext, which is difficult for the terminal.

[0194] In addition, as can be seen from the above description of homomorphic encryption, homomorphic encryption is an execution mode. Therefore, other security protection operations can be performed on the execution mode, for example, symmetric encryption and decryption operations can be performed under homomorphic encryption, such as performing encryption and decryption operations of the advanced encryption standard (AES). Therefore, a "hybrid encryption operation" can be performed, that is, a symmetric encryption and decryption operation is superimposed in the ciphertext state of homomorphic encryption.

[0195] Specifically, the hybrid encryption operation process includes the following steps:

[0196] Step one: the user uses symmetric encryption user data, uses homomorphic encryption technology to encrypt the symmetric key, and uploads.

[0197] Step two: in the homomorphic encryption algorithm, input the homomorphic encryption technology encrypted symmetric key and the symmetric encryption ciphertext. Perform homomorphic encryption algorithm calculation, output the homomorphic encryption and symmetric encryption ciphertext.

[0198] Step three: input the homomorphic encryption and symmetric encryption ciphertext, and the homomorphic encryption of the symmetric key, and perform symmetric decryption calculation in the homomorphic encryption state to generate the homomorphic encryption ciphertext.

[0199] Step four: perform homomorphic encryption calculation.

[0200] Step five: return the calculation result, and the user performs decryption.

[0201] However, the mixed encryption operation process has the following problems:

[0202] 1) It cannot be applied to NAS and other communication protocol stacks, because the network side of 5G or future networks has the original symmetric key. The network side and the terminal side both hold the original symmetric key, and if it is an untrustworthy network element, it may directly calculate without performing homomorphic encryption operation, and the UE cannot know it.

[0203] 2) The UE still needs to support homomorphic algorithms, and the overhead of homomorphic algorithms is complex, and many UEs are difficult to support. And the UE still needs to upload the homomorphic ciphertext of the symmetric key to the server side, and the ciphertext inflation multiple may still be large for air interface overhead.

[0204] In order to solve the problems existing in the method for processing user sensitive data based on homomorphic encryption technology, the present application provides a communication method, which can realize the processing of secret data under the premise of reducing the complexity of the terminal.

[0205] It should be understood that the embodiments shown below do not particularly limit the specific structure of the execution subject of the method provided by the embodiments of the present application, as long as the execution subject can communicate according to the method provided by the embodiments of the present application by running the program in which the code of the method provided by the embodiments of the present application is recorded. For example, the execution subject of the method provided by the embodiments of the present application can be a network element or a device; or, a functional module in the network element or the device which can call and execute the program.

[0206] FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a communication method provided by the present application. It includes the following steps:

[0207] S1110, the second communication device sends a first request message to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the first request message from the second communication device.

[0208] Exemplarily, the second communication device can be a terminal device, or a component in the terminal device. The specific form of the second communication device is not limited in the present application as long as the corresponding function can be implemented.

[0209] Exemplarily, the first communication device can be an access network device, or a component in the access network device; or, the first communication device can be a network node, or a component in the network node. The specific form of the first communication device is not limited in the present application as long as the corresponding function can be implemented.

[0210] Specifically, the first request message is used to request the first network element to process the data. The first network element can be a network element for processing and computing perception data, for example, the first network element can be a perception function network element, a network data analysis function network element, an analysis logic function network element, a model training logic function network element, or a positioning management function network element, etc. The specific form of the first network element is not limited in the present application as long as the corresponding function can be implemented. For example, the first network element can implement operations such as analyzing and / or processing data.

[0211] The first request message includes the first ciphertext and the first indication information, the first ciphertext is the first data securely protected by the first security context, and the first indication information is used to indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted. The first data securely protected by the first security context can be that the first data is encrypted and / or integrity protected based on the first security context.

[0212] Exemplarily, the first data includes but is not limited to AI perception data, point cloud data, UAV data, or computing data, etc.

[0213] The specific type of the first data is not limited in the present application, which can be data requested by the second communication device to be processed by the first network element. The security protection requirement of the first data is higher, so as to realize the processing of the data on the premise that the first data is not known by the network side.

[0214] Optionally, the first request message including the first ciphertext can be that the first request message includes a NAS container, which can be understood as a data plane message or any protocol stack that needs to be processed by the core network. The first ciphertext is included in the NAS container, for example, a certain NAS container of the first request message carries the first ciphertext, the first ciphertext is the first data securely protected by the first security context, and the first security context can be a symmetric security context. The NAS container can be referred to as a symmetric encryption ciphertext container.

[0215] Exemplarily, the NAS container included in the first request message in the present application can be referred to as a field, information, or payload, etc.

[0216] Exemplarily, the first request message includes at least one container, and the first ciphertext is carried in a first container in the at least one container. In order to enable the first communication device to explicitly obtain the first ciphertext that needs to be homomorphic encrypted after receiving the first request message, the first request message further includes a data label, and the data label is used to indicate the first container.

[0217] For example, the second communication device is a terminal device, the first communication device is an access network device, the first request message is an access stratum (AS) message, and the first ciphertext can be understood as the content of a NAS message carried in the AS message. Since the access network device does not read the specific content of the NAS message, the access network device can be instructed to perform homomorphic encryption processing on part of the NAS message in the AS message by using the data label.

[0218] Exemplarily, a data label is added in an AS message in a signalling radio bearer (SRB) of the second communication device, and the data label is used to instruct the access network device to perform homomorphic encryption processing on part or all of the NAS message. Optionally, the second communication device generates the data label and the NAS container in the following table 1:

[0219] Table 1

[0220] As shown in table 1, the NAS message includes a NAS container 1, a NAS container 2 and a NAS container 3. The ciphertext data 1 in the NAS container 1 can be mobile management control data that is securely protected by a NAS security context, the ciphertext data 2 in the NAS container 2 can be point cloud data that is securely protected by the NAS security context, and the ciphertext data 3 in the NAS container 3 can be session data that is securely protected by the NAS security context. Specifically, the ciphertext data 1 and the ciphertext data 2 are not subjected to homomorphic encryption processing, while the ciphertext data 2 needs to be subjected to homomorphic encryption processing. Therefore, the AS message further includes a data label, and the data label is used to indicate the NAS container 2. For example, the data label can be an address 2 of the NAS container 2, or can be other information that can indicate the NAS container 2. Wherein, the NAS container can be referred to as a field, and different NAS containers can be different fields.

[0221] Exemplarily, the first indication information indicating that the first ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted can be understood as: the first indication information indicates that the first communication apparatus performs a homomorphic re-encryption operation on the received first ciphertext, or the first indication information indicates that the first ciphertext has a homomorphic re-encryption requirement, etc. The specific indication content of the first indication information is not limited in the present application, as long as the first indication information can indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted.

[0222] In the present application, the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state; or in other words, the data before homomorphic encryption and the data after homomorphic encryption have the same computing characteristics. For example, the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext of data a is denoted as HE(a), which supports processing, i.e., a data processing device can process HE(a) to obtain a data processing result of data a. The characteristic of supporting processing in a ciphertext state can be referred to as homomorphism.

[0223] It should be noted that the encryption method in which the ciphertext has homomorphism is referred to as homomorphic encryption in the present application only as an example, and does not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application. For example, the homomorphic encryption can also be referred to as first encryption, privacy encryption, or computing encryption, etc.

[0224] In addition, the homomorphic encryption involved in the present application can be fully homomorphic encryption or non-fully homomorphic encryption (such as partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) or leveled fully homomorphic encryption, etc.), and the specific homomorphic encryption method is not limited.

[0225] For example, the homomorphic encryption algorithm involved in the present application includes but is not limited to:

[0226] RSA algorithm, ElGamal algorithm, Paillier algorithm, Boneh-Goh-Nissim algorithm, Gentry algorithm, BGV algorithm, BFV algorithm, GSW algorithm, THEW algorithm, fast HEM cryptosystem with worst-case to average-case reductions (FHEW) algorithm, or The Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song homomorphic encryption scheme (CKKS) algorithm, etc. The homomorphic algorithm based on which the homomorphic encryption is based is not limited in the present application. In order to facilitate the description, the CKKS algorithm can be taken as an example for description in the following.

[0227] Optionally, the first indication information can be a field carried in the first request message, for example, the first indication information can be a control bit, a parameter, or a bit in the first request message specially used for indicating that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted.

[0228] Optionally, the first indication information can be a name of the first request message, for example, the first request message is a re-encryption request message, and the first communication apparatus can learn that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted based on the name of the first request message after receiving the first request message.

[0229] It should be understood that the form of the first indication information is not limited in the present application, and information capable of indicating that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted is within the protection scope of the present application.

[0230] Specifically, the first security context described above is a security context negotiated and determined between the second communication apparatus and the second network element. The method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0231] S1101, the first security context is negotiated and determined between the second communication apparatus and the second network element.

[0232] Optionally, the second network element can be a NAS network element, for example, the second network element is denoted as NAS NF, and the second network element is a network element capable of establishing a NAS security connection with the second communication apparatus. The first security context can be a non-access layer security context, for example, the first security context includes a NAS security context, and the first ciphertext described above is a ciphertext encrypted by a NAS key (for example, the NAS key can be denoted as K NAS , K AMF , or K SF , etc.) in the NAS security context, and the first security context is stored in the second communication apparatus and the second network element.

[0233] As a possible implementation manner, the second network element can be the first network element described above, for example, the second communication apparatus can establish a NAS security connection with the first network element, and negotiate and determine the first security context.

[0234] As another possible implementation manner, the second network element is different from the first network element described above, for example, the second network element can be an access and mobility management function network element, and the second communication apparatus can establish a NAS security connection with the second network element, and negotiate and determine the first security context.

[0235] Exemplarily, the first security context negotiated and determined between the second communication apparatus and the second network element can be:

[0236] The second network element sends a NAS SMC to the second communication device, and the second communication device and selects a suitable key generation algorithm and key parameters. In addition, the second network element can also indirectly negotiate the key with the second communication device through other network elements (such as a RAN). The role of the key negotiation is to make the second communication device and the second network element have the same key, which is used to symmetrically encrypt (such as advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption, ZU Chongji (ZUC) encryption, and Snow encryption) data of the second communication device.

[0237] After the second network element and the second communication device negotiate to determine the key generation algorithm and the key parameters, the second network element and the second communication device can generate the first security context.

[0238] Exemplarily, the second communication device generates a symmetric key as the first security context according to the negotiated parameters. For example, a symmetric key generation method is: symmetric key = KDF (downlink count, Alg ID, Kamf), where Kamf represents an upper key, Alg ID represents an algorithm ID, and downlink count represents a count value. KDF is a key derivation function.

[0239] Exemplarily, the second network element can obtain the first security context in the following manner:

[0240] The second network element can generate a symmetric key as the first security context according to the negotiated parameters. The second network element can generate the first security context in the same manner as the second communication device, which will not be described herein again. Alternatively,

[0241] The second network element can provide the parameters required for generating the first security context to other network elements, and the other network elements generate the first security context and provide it to the second network element.

[0242] It should be understood that the process of negotiating and determining the first security context between the second communication device and the core network element (such as the first network element or the second network element) can refer to the description of the NAS security establishment in the foregoing basic concept, which will not be described herein again.

[0243] Further, after the first communication device receives the first request message, it can learn that the received first ciphertext needs to be homomorphically encrypted based on the first indication information in the first request message. Therefore, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0244] S1120, the first communication device homomorphically encrypts the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext.

[0245] Specifically, the manner in which the first communication device homomorphically encrypts the first ciphertext is determined based on the selected homomorphic encryption algorithm. For example, the first communication device homomorphically encrypts the first ciphertext based on the CKKS algorithm to generate a second ciphertext denoted as c, where c = HE(m), and HE() represents the homomorphic encryption process.

[0246] For example, assuming that m is a polynomial of the encoded input, i.e., m is the first ciphertext, υ is sampled in χ', and e0 and e1 are sampled in χ. Then, the ciphertext c after homomorphic encryption is c = υ·pk+ (m+e0,e1) mod q L . Wherein the encrypted ciphertexts are q L layers. Wherein χ is a noise distribution, which is a discrete Gaussian distribution on ring R related to the security level λ, and χ' is a uniform random distribution on ring R.

[0247] It should be understood that the specific process of homomorphic encryption in the present application is not limited in any way, and reference can be made to the description of homomorphic encryption in the current or future related technologies.

[0248] Exemplarily, the first communication device homomorphically encrypts the first ciphertext to generate the second ciphertext, comprising:

[0249] The first communication device homomorphically encrypts the first ciphertext based on an encryption key to generate the second ciphertext. Wherein the encryption key is a key required for homomorphic encryption in the homomorphic security context, for example, the encryption key can be a homomorphic public key.

[0250] As can be seen from the above, in the process of homomorphic encryption of the first communication device on the first ciphertext, the homomorphic encryption can be implemented based on the encryption key, and it can be understood that the first communication device obtains the encryption key before performing the homomorphic encryption. In the present application, the first communication device can obtain the encryption key in the following manner:

[0251] Method 1: The first communication device can generate the required encryption key by itself.

[0252] Optionally, in the case shown in this implementation manner 1, the first communication device can generate the encryption key based on the triggering of the second network element or the second communication device.

[0253] Method 1.1: The first communication device generates the encryption key based on the triggering of the second communication device.

[0254] In the case shown in method 1.1, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further comprises the following steps:

[0255] S1102, the second communication device sends a second request message to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the second request message from the second communication device.

[0256] The second request message is used to request generation of an encryption key, and the second request message includes the first identifier. For distinction, the second request message in the case shown in Mode 1.1 can be denoted as second request message #1.

[0257] Exemplarily, the first identifier can be at least one of the following identifiers:

[0258] An identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

[0259] If the first identifier is the identifier of the second communication device, it can be understood that the encryption key is of the granularity of the second communication device, for example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption processing on data from the second communication device based on the encryption key. The identifier of the second communication device can be a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI) of the second communication device, a Globally Unique Temporary Identity (GUTI), a SUPI of the second communication device, or other information for identifying the second communication device, etc.

[0260] If the first identifier is the identifier of the service corresponding to the first data, it can be understood that the encryption key is of the granularity of the service of the second communication device, for example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption processing on data of a computing service, an AI service, a sensing service, or a UAV service, etc. of the second communication device received based on the encryption key. The identifier of the service corresponding to the first data can be an ID of the service.

[0261] If the first identifier is the identifier of the service area to which the first communication device belongs, it can be understood that the encryption key is of the granularity of the service area, for example, the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption processing on data from devices within the service range of the first communication device based on the encryption key.

[0262] It should be understood that the above possible forms of the first identifier are only examples and do not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application. The first identifier can also be in other forms, for example, the first identifier can be an identifier of a type of the second communication device, which identifies data of a certain type of device that needs to be homomorphic encryption processed.

[0263] Optionally, in the case shown in manner 1.1, the second request message #1 can be the same as the first request message described above, for example, after the first communication device receives the first request message described above, it learns that the first ciphertext needs to be homomorphically encrypted based on the first indication information in the first request message, and then learns that the encryption key needs to be generated based on the first request message.

[0264] For example, the second request message #1 further includes third indication information and / or an identifier of the first algorithm, the third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has a re-encryption homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm for generating the encryption key. For example, the identifier of the first algorithm can be an ID of the first algorithm, information of the first algorithm, or indication information of the first algorithm, etc. capable of identifying the first algorithm. The specific form of the identifier of the first algorithm is not limited in the present application.

[0265] In the case shown in manner 1.1, the second communication device can also recommend the homomorphic algorithm based on which the encryption key is generated by carrying the identifier of the first algorithm in the second request message, for example, the second request message carries the identifier of the CKKS algorithm (such as the identifier of the CKKS algorithm can be identified by 0, 1, 2, etc. Numbers), indicating that the second communication device can generate the encryption key based on the CKKS algorithm.

[0266] In addition, the second communication device can carry the third indication information in the second request message #1 to indicate that the first communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0267] Optionally, the third indication information can be a field carried in the second request message #1, for example, the second indication information can be a control bit, a parameter, or a bit in the second request message specifically used to indicate that the first communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0268] Optionally, the third indication information can be the name of the second request message #1, for example, if the second request message is a re-encryption request message, the first communication device can learn that the first communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement based on the name of the second request message #1 after receiving the second request message #1.

[0269] It should be understood that the form of the third indication information is not limited in the present application, and information capable of indicating that the first communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement is within the protection scope of the present application.

[0270] S1103, the first communication device generates an encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message #1.

[0271] Specifically, the first communication device generates a homomorphic security context according to an indication of the second communication device, the homomorphic security context comprising a homomorphic public key, a homomorphic private key, or a computation key, wherein the encryption key can be the homomorphic public key, or can be the homomorphic private key, or can be a generated key based on the homomorphic public key and / or the homomorphic private key.

[0272] Optionally, the homomorphic algorithm based on which the first communication device generates the encryption key can be a homomorphic algorithm suggested by the first communication device, for example, the first communication device selects the homomorphic algorithm based on which the encryption key is generated based on the identification of the first algorithm carried in the second request message #1; or,

[0273] The first communication device can determine the homomorphic algorithm based on which the encryption key is generated in coordination with the second communication device; or,

[0274] The first communication device can determine the homomorphic algorithm based on which the encryption key is generated by itself.

[0275] It should be understood that the application does not make any limitation on the homomorphic algorithm based on which the first communication device generates the encryption key.

[0276] The application does not make any limitation on the way in which the first communication device generates the homomorphic security context, which can be referred to the introduction in the current or future homomorphic encryption related technologies.

[0277] For example, one generation way based on the homomorphic algorithm CKKS is as follows:

[0278] Suppose that the noise distribution χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on the ring R related to the security level λ, and χ' is a uniform random distribution on the ring R. S is sampled in the noise χ, and then the homomorphic private key sk=(1,s) is obtained. Then, a and a' are sampled in χ', e and e' are sampled in χ, and the homomorphic public key pk=(b=-as+e,a) and the auxiliary key evk=-a's+e'+Ps are calculated. 2 modP·q L where P is a large number.

[0279] It should be understood that the above-mentioned way in which the first communication device generates the homomorphic security context is only an example and does not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the application. The first communication device can also generate the homomorphic security context through other homomorphic algorithms, which will not be illustrated one by one here.

[0280] Method 1.2: The first communication device generates the encryption key based on the trigger of the second network element.

[0281] In the case shown in manner 1.2, the second network element can learn the security protection requirement of the second communication device based on the indication of the second communication device or the registration information of the second communication device, instruct the first communication device to generate the encryption key, and the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes the following steps:

[0282] S1104, the second network element determines that the second communication device has the requirement for homomorphic encryption.

[0283] As a possible implementation manner, the second network element learns the security protection requirement of the second communication device by querying or locally storing the information of the second communication device, and determines that the data of the second communication device has the requirement for homomorphic encryption based on the security protection requirement of the second communication device.

[0284] Exemplarily, the security protection requirement of the second communication device can be at least one of the following:

[0285] The core network side performs data processing of the second communication device in the ciphertext state, provides advanced privacy protection for the second communication device, or provides advanced privacy protection in specific services (such as computing services, AI services, sensing services, or UAV services, etc.). It can be understood that the security protection requirement of the second communication device can be the security protection requirement of the second communication device, or the security protection requirement of the service.

[0286] The second network element determines that the data of the second communication device has the requirement for homomorphic encryption based on the security protection requirement of the second communication device, which can be that the second network element determines that the second communication device has the requirement for homomorphic privacy computation according to the security protection requirement of the second communication device, that is, the second network element needs to perform subsequent processing in the ciphertext state.

[0287] As another possible implementation manner, the second network element can learn the security protection requirement of the second communication device based on the indication of the second communication device.

[0288] In this implementation manner, the second network element learns the security protection requirement of the second communication device in the following two manners:

[0289] Manner 1.2.1: The second network element is the same as the first network element described above, that is, the second network element is the network element performing processing, and then the second network element can learn the security protection requirement of the second communication device based on the indication of the second communication device, including the following step one and step two:

[0290] Step one: The second communication device sends fifth indication information to the second network element. The fifth indication information indicates that the second communication device has the requirement for homomorphic encryption.

[0291] For example, the second communication device sends a service request message to the second network element, the service request message is used to request the second network element to process a corresponding task and provide a data processing result, the service request message includes service type information and fifth indication information, wherein the service type information is used to indicate the second network element to process a certain type of service and provide a data processing result. For example, the service request message can be an ISAC task request or other service request, and the present application does not make any limitation on this.

[0292] Optionally, the fifth indication information can be a security requirement of the service or a security requirement of the second communication device.

[0293] Optionally, the fifth indication information explicitly or implicitly indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement. For example, the fifth indication information can be a message name or a parameter carried in the message.

[0294] Optionally, the second communication device can not carry the fifth indication information, and the network side defaults to open homomorphic encryption for all or part of the services of the second communication device according to a preconfigured strategy. For example, the network side can confirm that the second communication device is a certain type of device (for example, a device with a security requirement higher than a preset threshold), and by default, all services related to the second communication device use homomorphic encryption.

[0295] Step two: the second network element determines that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement based on the indication information of the second communication device.

[0296] Method 1.2.2: the second network element is different from the above-mentioned first network element, that is, the first network element is a network element for performing processing, and the second network element is a NAS network element (for example, an access and mobility management function or other NAS network element), and the second network element can learn the security protection requirement of the second communication device based on the indication of the first network element, including the following steps A, step B and step C:

[0297] Step A: the second communication device sends fifth indication information to the first network element. The fifth indication information indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0298] Exemplarily, the second communication device sends the fifth indication information to the first network element through the second network element. The specific sending method can refer to the description of the second communication device sending the fifth indication information to the second network element in the above-mentioned step one, which will not be described here.

[0299] Step B: the first network element sends indication information #1 to the second network element. The indication information #1 indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement. The indication information #1 can be the same as the above-mentioned fifth indication information, which indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0300] Optionally, before the first network element sends the indication information #1 to the second network element, the identity of the second network element can be determined, for example, by querying the UDM through the identity of the second communication device to obtain the identity of the second network element.

[0301] Optionally, the first network element can also send the identity of the first algorithm to the second network element, for indicating the homomorphic algorithm recommended by the first network element.

[0302] Step C: The second network element determines that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement based on the indication of the first network element.

[0303] Optionally, the second network element can determine that the access layer homomorphic encryption is needed for the second communication device according to the above-mentioned indication information #1 and the security protection requirement of the second communication device.

[0304] It should be understood that the above-mentioned manner in which the second network element learns that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement is only an example and does not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application. The second network element can also learn whether the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement through other manners, for example, based on historical communication data, etc., which will not be illustrated one by one here.

[0305] Further, in the case where the second network element learns that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement, the second network element can trigger the first communication device to generate the encryption key required for homomorphic encryption through the second request message. In the case shown in mode 1.2, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes the following steps:

[0306] S1105, the second network element sends a second request message to the first communication device, and correspondingly, the first communication device receives the second request message from the second network element.

[0307] The second request message is used to request the generation of the encryption key, and the first identity is included in the second request message. In order to distinguish, the second request message in the case shown in mode 1.2 can be recorded as second request message #2. The first identity is described in the above step S1102, which will not be repeated here.

[0308] Exemplarily, the second request message #2 further includes third indication information and / or the identity of the first algorithm, the third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has a rekey homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identity of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm for generating the encryption key. The third indication information and the identity of the first algorithm are described in the above step S1102, which will not be repeated here.

[0309] Optionally, the second network element can determine the first communication device serving the second communication device by itself, or can learn the first communication device serving the second communication device from other network elements. For example, the second network element determines the access network device where the second communication device currently or previously locates by directly paging the first communication device, triggering a downlink service request, or paging operation through other network elements (e.g., AMF).

[0310] S1106, the first communication device generates the encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message #2.

[0311] The description of step S1106 can refer to the description of step S1103 in the foregoing, and will not be repeated here.

[0312] Method 2: The first communication device can obtain the required encryption key from the control device.

[0313] Optionally, in this implementation manner, the first communication device can request the control device to obtain the encryption key through the second request message. For example, a key management center is deployed in the communication system, which can be referred to as a control device, a control equipment, a key control device, or a key management device.

[0314] For example, the control device in the present application can be deployed in the SMO framework of the access network equipment, such as non-RT-RIC or near-RT-RIC deployed in the communication system, for unified storage and obtaining of the key.

[0315] In the case shown in method 2, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes the following steps:

[0316] S1107, the first communication device sends the second request message to the control device, and correspondingly, the control device receives the second request message from the first communication device.

[0317] The second request message is used to request to obtain the encryption key, and the first identifier is included in the second request message. For distinction, the second request message in the case shown in method 2 can be referred to as the second request message #3. The description of the first identifier can refer to the description of the first identifier in step S1102 in the foregoing, and will not be repeated here.

[0318] For example, the second request message #3 further includes third indication information and / or an identifier of the first algorithm, the third indication information is used to indicate that the second communication device has a re-encryption homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identifier of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm for generating the encryption key. The description of the third indication information and the identifier of the first algorithm can refer to the description of the third indication information and the identifier of the first algorithm in step S1102 in the foregoing, and will not be repeated here.

[0319] S1108, the control device sends the encryption key to the first communication device, and the first communication device receives the encryption key from the control device.

[0320] It should be understood that the above-mentioned implementation modes 1 and 2 are only exemplary and do not limit the protection scope of the present application, for example, the first communication device can obtain the encryption key based on historical communication data (for example, the first communication device has obtained and stored the encryption key in the historical communication process).

[0321] Exemplarily, after the first communication device obtains the encryption key, the first communication device can provide the encryption key to the second network element, so that the second network element can process the ciphertext after receiving the ciphertext from the first communication device. Then, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0322] S1121, the first communication device sends the encryption key to the second network element, and the second network element receives the encryption key from the first communication device.

[0323] Specifically, the encryption key is used by the second network element to generate the homomorphic encryption of the first security context, for example, the encryption key is used by the second network element to generate the homomorphic encryption of the symmetric key.

[0324] Exemplarily, corresponding to the above-mentioned mode 2.2, after the first communication device receives the second request message #2 of the second network element, the encryption key is generated in response to the second request message #2, then the first communication device can send the second response message #2 to the second network element, the second response message #2 is used to respond to the second request message #2, and the encryption key is included in the second response message #2.

[0325] Optionally, the second response message #2 further includes at least one of the following information:

[0326] The identity of the second communication device, the identity of the first algorithm, or the calculation key.

[0327] The identity of the second communication device is used to associate the encryption key, for example, the second network element receives a plurality of encryption keys, and different encryption keys are used for processing data of different second communication devices, then the different encryption keys can be associated with the different second communication devices through the identity of the second communication device. Optionally, the second response message #2 can also not carry the identity of the second communication device, for example, the second network element associates different encryption keys and different second communication devices according to a pre-configured rule.

[0328] The identity of the first algorithm is used to indicate the homomorphic algorithm based on which the encryption key is generated. Optionally, the identity of the first algorithm can also not be carried in the second response message #2. For example, the second request message #2 described above carries the identity of the first algorithm, and the second response message #2 can carry the identity of the first algorithm for secondary confirmation, or can not carry it.

[0329] The calculation key is used to perform homomorphic calculation in the ciphertext state. Illustratively, the partial homomorphic algorithm needs to perform homomorphic calculation based on the calculation key in the process of performing calculation. For example, the encryption key is contained in the second security context, the second security context further includes the calculation key, and the first communication device can further provide the calculation key to the second network element. The second security context can be referred to as a homomorphic security context, and the calculation key is used to perform calculation in the ciphertext state on the ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key. Optionally, if the selected homomorphic algorithm does not need to perform homomorphic calculation, the second response message #2 can also not carry the calculation key.

[0330] As described above, the second network element and the first network element can be the same network element or different network elements. If the first network element and the second network element are different network elements, the second network element can forward the calculation key and / or the identity of the first algorithm to the first network element after receiving the calculation key and / or the identity of the first algorithm, to support the first network element to subsequently perform homomorphic calculation in the ciphertext state. The method flow shown in FIG. 11 can further include:

[0331] S1122, the second network element sends the calculation key and / or the identity of the first algorithm to the first network element, and correspondingly, the first network element receives the calculation key and / or the identity of the first algorithm from the second network element.

[0332] Further, after the first communication device generates the second ciphertext, it can send a third request message to the second network element, that is, forward the data processing request of the second communication device to the second network element. The method flow shown in FIG. 11 can further include:

[0333] Illustratively, the second network element can determine the first security context under homomorphism based on the encryption key received in the above step S1121 and the first security context determined by negotiation with the second communication device. The method flow shown in FIG. 11 can further include:

[0334] S1123, the second network element determines the first key.

[0335] The first key is determined by homomorphic encryption of the first security context. Illustratively, the first key is determined by homomorphic encryption of the first security context based on the encryption key.

[0336] Exemplarily, the second network element determines the first security context (e.g., an AES key) for symmetric encryption through the negotiation between the second communication device and the second network element in the step S1101, and then receives the encryption key through the step S1121, so as to encrypt the AES key by using the encryption key, and obtain the homomorphically encrypted AES key, i.e., the first key.

[0337] For example, the second network element homomorphically encrypts the AES key based on the CKKS algorithm, and generates the first key denoted as k, where k = HE(k1), and k1 is the AES key, and HE() represents the homomorphic encryption processing.

[0338] For example, it is assumed that m is a polynomial of the encoded input, i.e., m is the AES key, υ is sampled in χ', and e0 and e1 are sampled in χ. Then, the first key c after the homomorphic encryption is c = υ·pk+(m+e0,e1)modq. L The encrypted key is q L layer. Wherein χ is a noise distribution, which is a discrete Gaussian distribution on the ring R related to the security level λ, and χ' is a uniform random distribution on the ring R.

[0339] In the step S1130, the first communication device sends a third request message to the second network element, and correspondingly, the second network element receives the third request message from the first communication device.

[0340] The third request message is used to request the first network element to process the data. Specifically, the second ciphertext is included in the third request message.

[0341] Exemplarily, the third request message further includes second indication information, which is used to indicate that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext. The second indication information can be the same as or different from the first indication information carried in the first request message, for example, the second indication information can be a field carried in the third request message, such as a control bit, a parameter, or a bit position, etc. information in the third request message specially used to indicate that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext. Or, for example, the second indication information can be the name of the third request message, such as the third request message is a re-encryption message, and the second network element can know that the second ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted ciphertext based on the name of the third request message after receiving the third request message.

[0342] Specifically, after the second network element receives the third request message to obtain the second ciphertext, the second ciphertext can be subjected to a symmetric decryption calculation under homomorphism. It should be understood that the second ciphertext subjected to a symmetric decryption calculation under homomorphism in the present application can also be understood as being processed in a ciphertext state, i.e., the symmetric decryption calculation under homomorphism can be understood as one form of processing in a ciphertext state. In the present application, the data before homomorphic encryption and the data after homomorphic encryption have the same calculation characteristics (e.g., homomorphism), and therefore the second ciphertext can be subjected to a symmetric decryption operation.

[0343] It should be understood that the sequence of the above steps S1121 and S1130 is not limited in time sequence, and the first communication device can provide the encryption key to the second network element after sending the third request message to the second network element; or the first communication device can send the third request message to the second network element after sending the encryption key to the second network element; or the first communication device can carry the encryption key in the third request message. In addition, the sequence of the above steps S1123 and S1130 is not limited in time sequence, and the sequence of the above steps S1123 and S1122 is not limited in time sequence.

[0344] Further, after the second network element determines the first key, the second ciphertext can be subjected to a symmetric decryption calculation under homomorphism based on the first key to generate a third ciphertext, and the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0345] S1131, the second network element decrypts the second ciphertext based on the first key to obtain a third ciphertext.

[0346] The third ciphertext is the first data subjected to homomorphic encryption.

[0347] In the present application, the specific manner in which the second network element decrypts the second ciphertext based on the first key is not limited, and can be understood as follows: the first key is the first secure context after homomorphic encryption, and the second ciphertext is the first ciphertext after homomorphic encryption, i.e., the first key and the second ciphertext are both under homomorphism and support processing, and the symmetric decryption calculation can be understood as one form of processing.

[0348] For example, the decryption flow can be understood as follows: there is an algorithm box, the first key and the second ciphertext are input into the algorithm box, an AES decryption flow is performed in the algorithm box, and finally the ciphertext subjected to homomorphic encryption (i.e., the third ciphertext) is output.

[0349] Optionally, if the first network element and the second network element are different, the second network element can send parameters (such as the first security context, the encryption key, and the second ciphertext) required for performing the symmetric decryption operation to the first network element, the second network element plays a transparent function between the first communication device and the first network element, does not process the received ciphertext, and the symmetric decryption operation is performed by the first network element. After the first network element obtains the first security context and the encryption key, the first key can be determined, and the second ciphertext is symmetrically decrypted based on the first key to obtain the third ciphertext. In this embodiment, it is mainly introduced that the symmetric decryption operation and the data processing operation are both in the second network element (such as the first network element and the second network element are the same), or the symmetric decryption operation is performed by the second network element and the data analysis operation is performed by the first network element, and the scenario in which the second network element plays a role of transparent transmission is not described in detail.

[0350] Specifically, the third ciphertext obtained by the second network element in the present application is homomorphic encrypted ciphertext, that is, the third ciphertext supports processing in the ciphertext state, and the network side can directly process the third ciphertext to obtain a data processing result, which is homomorphic encrypted.

[0351] Exemplarily, the second network element obtaining the data processing result corresponding to the first data in the present application includes the following two possible implementation manners:

[0352] As a possible implementation manner, the second network element and the first network element are the same network element, and then the second network element can process the third ciphertext to obtain the data processing result. In this manner, the symmetric decryption operation and the data processing operation are both implemented by the second network element.

[0353] In this implementation manner, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0354] S1141, the second network element determines the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

[0355] As can be seen from the above, the third ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted ciphertext, and the third ciphertext supports processing in the ciphertext state, so the second network element can process the third ciphertext to obtain the data processing result.

[0356] As another possible implementation manner, the second network element and the first network element are different, and the second network element is a NAS network element (such as AMF), and the third ciphertext is processed by the first network element. In this manner, the symmetric decryption operation is implemented by the second network element, and the data processing operation is implemented by the first network element.

[0357] In this implementation manner, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0358] S1151, the second network element sends the third ciphertext to the first network element.

[0359] For example, the second network element sends a data processing request message to the first network element, and the data processing request message includes the third ciphertext. For example, the data processing request message includes a homomorphic ciphertext container, and the container includes the third ciphertext.

[0360] S1152, the first network element determines the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

[0361] The description of step S1152 can refer to the description of step S1141 above, which will not be repeated here.

[0362] S1153, the first network element provides the data processing result to the second network element. For example, the data processing result includes but is not limited to the following two possible implementation manners:

[0363] As a possible implementation manner, the data processing result is used to determine a service indication. The service indication does not need to be homomorphic.

[0364] For example, the third ciphertext can be ciphertext of perceptual data homomorphic encryption. For example, this embodiment can be applied to the communication and perception integrated scenario shown in FIG. 2 above. The second network element can determine the collision and driving instruction of the UAV based on the data processing result of the third ciphertext.

[0365] For another example, the third ciphertext can be AI data. For example, this embodiment can be applied to federated learning with other data. The calculation data is gradient, and the encrypted gradient is used for average operation. It can also be a geo-fencing operation. The encrypted geographic location information is used to determine whether the specified geo-fence is entered.

[0366] It should be understood that the specific type of the third ciphertext is not limited in the present application, and the ciphertext state can be processed.

[0367] Optionally, if the data processing result is determined by the second network element, the second network element can generate a specific service indication as a response based on the data processing result and other control information.

[0368] The service indication includes but is not limited to:

[0369] The control instruction of the UAV, the model information in the training, or the geo-fencing information, and the like.

[0370] Optionally, the service indication can be encrypted and protected, for example, the second network element can encrypt and protect the service indication based on the first security context.

[0371] Optionally, if the data processing result is determined by the first network element, the first network element can provide the data processing result to the second network element, and the service indication is determined by the second network element; or,

[0372] The first network element can provide the data processing result to other network elements, and the other network elements generate the service indication information and send it to the second network element, in which case the service indication can be sent to the second network element by a network element other than the first network element; or,

[0373] The first network element can determine the service indication based on the data processing result, and then provide the service indication to the second network element. For example, the first network element obtains the homomorphically encrypted point cloud data and the calculation key, and the first network element can initiate calculation on the homomorphically encrypted point cloud data according to the calculation key to generate a specific obstacle avoidance indication as the service indication, and then send it to the second network element. The second network element can encrypt the specific obstacle avoidance indication information based on the first security context, and then send it to the second communication device.

[0374] As another possible implementation, the data processing result includes part of the original data (for example, part of the point cloud data as a geofence), and since the first network element processes the third ciphertext in the ciphertext state, the result obtained is in the homomorphic encryption state, and the point cloud data without homomorphic encryption cannot be obtained because the first network element does not have the plaintext point cloud data. If the data processing result after homomorphic calculation includes part of the data transmitted by the second communication device to the first network element, since the uplink uses homomorphic ciphertext, the downlink is also in the state of homomorphic ciphertext. In this application, "uplink" is understood as the second communication device sending information to the first network element through the first communication device and the second network element, and "downlink" is understood as the first network element sending information to the second communication device through the first communication device and the second network element.

[0375] For ease of understanding, the following will introduce in detail how the downlink is homomorphically encrypted in combination with FIG. 12.

[0376] Exemplarily, after the second network element obtains the service indication or the downlink feedback through the above-mentioned manner, the second network element can send the service indication or the downlink feedback to the second communication device through the first communication device through the first response message. The method flow shown in FIG. 11 further includes:

[0377] S1140, the second network element sends the first response message to the second communication device, and correspondingly, the second communication device receives the first response message from the second network element.

[0378] In addition, the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext can also be provided to a third party, for example, the third ciphertext mentioned above can be provided to a third party. Optionally, the method flow shown in FIG. 11 can further include:

[0379] S1160, the third network element sends a fourth request message to the first network element, and correspondingly, the first network element receives the fourth request message from the third network element.

[0380] The fourth request message is used to request to provide the third ciphertext, and the fourth request message can be referred to as a service data exposure request message. The third network element is a network element with data demand, for example, the third network element can be an AF.

[0381] Specifically, the fourth request message includes sixth indication information, and the sixth indication information is used to indicate service data required by the third network element. For example, the sixth indication information can be referred to as demand description.

[0382] Optionally, the sixth indication information can indicate that certain specific exposure data, such as point cloud data, is required. For ease of description, the third network element is taken as an example to request to obtain the third ciphertext described above through the fourth request message, for example, the third ciphertext is ciphertext of homomorphic encrypted point cloud data.

[0383] Further, after the first network element receives the fourth request message of the third network element, the first network element can determine, according to a data exposure rule, that the service data required by the third network element can expose homomorphic encrypted data. For example, the data exposure rule includes that for point cloud data, ciphertext of homomorphic encrypted point cloud data, that is, the third ciphertext, can be exposed.

[0384] If the first network element has not collected homomorphic encrypted data (such as the third ciphertext) before receiving the fourth request message, the first network element can collect the service data required by the third network element in response to the request of the third network element. For example, the first network element dynamically requests data from the second communication device according to the demand of the third network element, for example, the first network element sends a homomorphic data request message to the second communication device, the homomorphic data request message is used to request to obtain the third ciphertext described above, the second communication device sends a NAS message, and the first network element receives the homomorphic encrypted data (such as the third ciphertext) through the NAS message, that is, executes the above-mentioned process of obtaining the third ciphertext, which will not be described here.

[0385] Specifically, the first network element determines the homomorphic encrypted data (such as the third ciphertext) that can be sent to the third network element, and associates the homomorphic encrypted data with an exposure data type or an identifier (for example, PDU session (PDU session), connection ID (connection ID), and the like).

[0386] From the above process of obtaining the third ciphertext, it can be known that the first communication device side generates a homomorphic security context based on the first algorithm, the homomorphic security context can include a homomorphic public key, a homomorphic private key and a calculation key, and the homomorphic public key and the calculation key can be transmitted to the first network element through a message, and the identification of the homomorphic algorithm (such as the aforementioned first algorithm) based on which the homomorphic security context is generated can be transmitted to the first network element.

[0387] If the identification of the first algorithm in the aforementioned process of obtaining the third ciphertext is not transmitted to the first network element, the first network element can send a homomorphic algorithm information request message to the second network element and / or the first communication device, the homomorphic algorithm information request message being used to request to obtain the identification of the first algorithm.

[0388] Specifically, the homomorphic algorithm information request message includes an open data type or identification associated with the third ciphertext, so as to facilitate the second network element and / or the first communication device to provide the first network element with the accurate identification of the algorithm associated with the third ciphertext. For example, the second network element and / or the first communication device determine the identification of the first algorithm through the open data type or identification associated with the relevant first communication device response information, and provide the first network element with the identification of the first algorithm through a homomorphic algorithm information response message.

[0389] Further, after the first network element obtains the third ciphertext and the identification of the first algorithm, the first network element can provide the third network element with the third ciphertext and the identification of the first algorithm through a fourth response message, and the method flow shown in FIG. 11 can further include:

[0390] S1170, the first network element sends a fourth response message to the third network element, and correspondingly, the third network element receives the fourth response message from the first network element.

[0391] The fourth response message includes the third ciphertext and the identification of the first algorithm, and the identification of the first algorithm is used to indicate the algorithm of homomorphic calculation. It should be understood that the first algorithm is a homomorphic algorithm, which can be used for the aforementioned homomorphic encryption and homomorphic calculation.

[0392] Optionally, the fourth response message can further include a calculation key, which is used for homomorphic calculation of the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext.

[0393] From the above steps S1132 and S1133, it can be known that the third network element can obtain the homomorphic encrypted data and the related calculation information (such as the calculation key and the identification of the first algorithm) from the first network element side, support the opening of data and calculation, and at the same time protect the data of the second communication device from being known by the network side.

[0394] In the communication method shown in FIG. 11, the first communication device can homomorphically encrypt the received first ciphertext, and send the second ciphertext after homomorphic encryption to the core network (e.g., the second network element). Since the ciphertext after homomorphic encryption supports processing in the ciphertext state, the second network element receiving the second ciphertext can process the second ciphertext, and in this technical solution, the second communication device that has data processing needs can perform security protection on the data based on the first security context, without the second communication device performing homomorphic encryption by itself, but the first communication device performs homomorphic encryption, so that this technical solution can realize the processing of terminal ciphertext data by the core network on the premise of reducing the encryption overhead of the second communication device.

[0395] FIG. 12 is a schematic flowchart of a communication method provided by the present application. Taking the difference between the first network element and the second network element as an example, the following steps are included:

[0396] S1210, the first network element determines a data processing result.

[0397] Specifically, the first network element processes the third key in the ciphertext state to obtain the data processing result. For example, the first network element performs homomorphic calculation on the homomorphically encrypted point cloud data based on the calculation key, and generates downlink homomorphic ciphertext service information. The downlink homomorphic ciphertext service information is used for the second communication device to perform subsequent service steps after processing (e.g., the downlink homomorphic ciphertext service information is the point cloud data that may be the UAV obstacle avoidance identifier after processing).

[0398] It should be understood that the communication method shown in FIG. 12 can be combined with the communication method shown in FIG. 11, for example, the first network element determines the data processing result based on the method flow shown in FIG. 11.

[0399] S1220, the first network element sends a message #1 to the second network element.

[0400] The message #1 includes the data processing result and the seventh indication information, and the seventh indication information indicates that the data processing result needs to be homomorphic decrypted. The data processing result includes the downlink homomorphic ciphertext service information that needs to be homomorphic decrypted.

[0401] Optionally, the seventh indication information can be a field carried in the message #1, for example, the seventh indication information can be a control bit, a parameter, or a bit in the message #1 that is specifically used to indicate that the data processing result is homomorphic decrypted.

[0402] Optionally, the seventh indication information can be the name of the message #1, for example, if the message #1 is a re-encryption request message, the first communication device can know that the data processing result is homomorphic decrypted based on the name of the message #1 after receiving the message #1.

[0403] It should be understood that the form of the seventh indication information is not limited in the present application, and any information capable of indicating the homomorphic decryption of the data processing result is within the protection scope of the present application.

[0404] S1230, the second network element performs security protection processing on the data processing result based on the second key.

[0405] The second key is determined by homomorphic encryption of the first security context. Optionally, the generation manner of the second key can refer to the description of the determination of the first key by the second network element, which will not be described here.

[0406] Exemplarily, the second key can be the same as the first key described above, for example, the second network element can store the first key for use in the downlink process; or the second key can be different from the first key described above, for example, the parameters in the homomorphic encryption process of the first security context are different.

[0407] Specifically, the security protection processing of the data processing result by the second network element based on the second key can be understood as the reverse operation of the second network element obtaining the third ciphertext in the above step S1131, the second key is the first security context after homomorphic encryption, and the data processing result is information in the homomorphic encryption state, that is, the second key and the data processing result are both in the homomorphic state, supporting processing, and the execution of symmetric encryption calculation can be understood as a form of processing.

[0408] For example, there is a selected homomorphic algorithm calculation box, and free calculation of homomorphic ciphertext can be performed in the calculation box, the second key and the data processing result are input, and then in the homomorphic algorithm calculation box, the symmetric encryption algorithm is executed to generate the first security context security protection and the homomorphic encryption data processing result.

[0409] Exemplarily, after the second network element generates the first security context security protection and the homomorphic encryption data processing result, the second network element can send the data processing result to the first communication device currently serving the second communication device. As an example but not limitation, based on whether the base station handover occurs, the manner of the second network element sending the data processing result includes the following manner one and manner two:

[0410] Manner one: no base station handover occurs. The first communication device currently serving the second communication device is the source first communication device, for example, after the second communication device sends uplink data to the first network element through the source first communication device, no movement occurs; also for example, after the second communication device sends uplink data to the first network element through the source first communication device, movement occurs, but after the movement, it is still within the service range of the source first communication device.

[0411] In the case shown in this manner one, the method flow shown in FIG. 12 further includes:

[0412] The second network element sends a first response message to the source first communication device.

[0413] The first response message includes an identifier of the second communication device and a data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption. The identifier of the second communication device is used to determine the second communication device by the source first communication device.

[0414] The source first communication device performs a re-encryption operation.

[0415] Specifically, the source first communication device performs homomorphic decryption on the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption based on a decryption key to obtain a data processing result based on the first security context security protection. The process of homomorphic decryption on the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption to obtain the data processing result based on the first security context security protection can be referred to as a re-encryption operation.

[0416] For example, the first response message includes multiple NAS containers, and a certain NAS container is processed according to the access layer homomorphic ciphertext indication information using a homomorphic security context and replaced with the original container.

[0417] The source first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device.

[0418] Exemplarily, the target first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the second communication device through a downlink NAS message.

[0419] Mode two: base station switching occurs. The first communication device currently providing services for the second communication device is the target first communication device. For example, after the second communication device sends uplink data to the first network element through the source first communication device, the second communication device moves and is located within the service range of the target first communication device after the movement.

[0420] Optionally, the manner in which the second network element determines the target first communication device serving the range covering the second communication device can be that the second network element initiates downlink paging to determine the target first communication device where the second communication device is located, or determines the target first communication device where the second communication device is located based on the current connection between the first communication device and the second communication device.

[0421] In the case shown in the mode two, the method flow shown in FIG. 12 further includes:

[0422] The second network element sends a first response message to the target first communication device.

[0423] The first response message includes the identity of the second communication device and the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption. The identity of the second communication device is used to enable the first communication device to determine the second communication device.

[0424] Optionally, the first response message further includes fourth indication information, and the fourth indication information indicates that the data processing result is subjected to homomorphic encryption. The fourth indication information can be understood as access layer homomorphic ciphertext indication information, which functions in the same way as the data label in the first request message in FIG. 11, and is used to enable the first communication device to know that the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption should be subjected to re-encryption operation.

[0425] For example, the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption is located at the NAS layer, and the fourth indication information is carried in the access network control information, which is used to enable the first communication device to acquire and process the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption. Optionally, the second network element can also request other network elements to add the access network control information, such as adding the access network control information through the operation administration and maintenance (OAM) device of the first communication device.

[0426] After the target first communication device receives the first response message, it can know that the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption needs to be subjected to homomorphic decryption operation. In this embodiment, the target first communication device can not locally save the decryption key required for the homomorphic decryption operation. Therefore, in the case that the target first communication device does not locally save the decryption key, the target first communication device can perform the following operation:

[0427] As a possible implementation manner, the target first communication device acquires the decryption key. Therefore, the method flow shown in FIG. 12 includes the following steps.

[0428] S1250, the target first communication device acquires the decryption key.

[0429] Specifically, the target first communication device determines whether there is a decryption key for performing homomorphic decryption according to the identity of the second communication device and the fourth indication information.

[0430] It should be understood that, due to the mobility of the second communication device, the first communication device currently serving the second communication device can not have the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device, and needs to acquire the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device.

[0431] As a possible implementation, the first communication device can obtain the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device from a source first communication device. The source first communication device can be a communication device that provides services for the second communication device before the second communication device moves to the target first communication device. For example, the source first communication device can be the first communication device shown in FIG. 11.

[0432] For example, in this implementation, if the target first communication device knows the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can request the source first communication device to obtain the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device through a homomorphic security context transfer request message. The homomorphic security context transfer request message includes the identity of the second communication device.

[0433] For another example, in this implementation, if the target first communication device does not know the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can request the second network element to obtain the homomorphic security context corresponding to the second communication device through a homomorphic security context transfer request message.

[0434] The source first communication device and / or the second network element sends a homomorphic security context transfer response message to the target first communication device, and the homomorphic security context transfer response message includes a decryption key (such as a homomorphic private key) and / or a key factor required for performing homomorphic decryption.

[0435] Optionally, the second network element can obtain the homomorphic security context including the homomorphic private key from the source first communication device, and directly send the homomorphic security context to the target first communication device.

[0436] Optionally, the target first communication device obtains the key factor of the homomorphic security context, for example, generates an intermediate parameter of the homomorphic security context, and the target first communication device has other parameters pre-configured, and generates the homomorphic security context by itself according to the key factor. For example, taking CKKS as an example, assuming that the noise distribution χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on the ring R related to the security level λ, and χ' is a uniform random distribution on the ring R. Sampling S from the noise χ, then the homomorphic private key sk=(1,s). The noise distribution can be pre-configured by the target first communication device, and the sampling data can be transmitted to the target first communication device as the key factor, so that the target first communication device samples S from the noise χ through the information, and then the private key sk=(1,s).

[0437] Optionally, if the homomorphic security context in the source first communication device is forwarded to the target first communication device by the second network element, the source first communication device and the target first communication device can pre-configure a shared security protection key to protect the transmitted homomorphic security context, so that the security context information is known only to the first communication device.

[0438] Optionally, there can be a unified security key center, such as a non-RIC or near-ric network element, which stores and obtains keys uniformly, and the target first communication device can obtain the decryption key from the security key center.

[0439] As another possible implementation, the target first communication device requests the source first communication device to perform the re-encryption operation. Then the method flow shown in FIG. 12 includes:

[0440] S1260, the target first communication device sends a first response message to the source first communication device.

[0441] If the target first communication device knows the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can directly send the first response message to the source first communication device, and the source first communication device performs the homomorphic decryption processing; or,

[0442] If the target first communication device does not know the address of the source first communication device, the target first communication device can send the first response message to the source first communication device through other network elements (such as the second network element), and the source first communication device performs the homomorphic decryption processing.

[0443] S1270, the source first communication device performs the re-encryption operation.

[0444] Specifically, the source first communication device performs homomorphic decryption on the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption based on the decryption key, to obtain the data processing result based on the first security context security protection. The process of homomorphic decryption on the data processing result based on the first security context security protection and homomorphic encryption to obtain the data processing result based on the first security context security protection can be referred to as re-encryption operation.

[0445] For example, the first response message includes multiple NAS containers, and a certain NAS container is processed according to the access layer homomorphic ciphertext indication information using the homomorphic security context, and the original container is replaced.

[0446] S1280, the source first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context security protection to the target first communication device.

[0447] Further, after the target first communication device obtains the decryption key and / or the target first communication device locally saves the decryption key required for the re-encryption operation, the method flow shown in FIG. 12 further includes:

[0448] S1290, the target first communication device performs the re-encryption operation.

[0449] Reference to the description of the source first communication device performing the re-encryption operation in step S1270 above, here will not be repeated.

[0450] It should be understood that the target first communication device locally saves the decryption key required to perform the homomorphic decryption operation. During the process of the second communication device switching from the source first communication device to the target first communication device, the homomorphic security context has been migrated to the target first communication device through the Handover message, and the target first communication device saves the homomorphic security context locally. Among them, the key or the key factor that can be used to determine the decryption key described above may be migrated in the handover process.

[0451] S1291, the target first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context to the second communication device.

[0452] Exemplarily, the target first communication device sends the data processing result based on the first security context to the second communication device through a downlink NAS message.

[0453] Further, the second communication device can use the first security context to decrypt the NAS message, determine the current service operation according to the received downlink service information, for example, identify the flight prohibition identifier, and make an evasion action.

[0454] In the communication method shown in FIG. 12, the downlink data processing result is in a homomorphic encryption state, and the first communication device performs homomorphic decryption on the downlink data processing result, without the second communication device performing homomorphic calculation, thereby reducing the decryption overhead of the second communication device.

[0455] In order to facilitate understanding, the technical solutions of the present application will be described below in conjunction with a specific example. In this example, the first network element and the second network element described above are different, the first network element is represented by SF, the second network element is represented by NAS NF, the first communication device is an access network device represented by RAN, and the second communication device is a terminal device represented by UE. In addition, the RAN can generate an encryption key by the above-mentioned way 1.2, and the symmetric decryption operation is implemented by the NAS NF, and the data processing operation is implemented by the SF.

[0456] FIG. 13 is a schematic flowchart of another communication method provided by the present application. It includes the following steps: S1301, the UE and the NAS NF negotiate to determine the first security context.

[0457] The description of step S1301 can refer to the description of step S1101 above, which will not be repeated here.

[0458] S1302, the UE sends a service request message to the SF through the NAS NF.

[0459] The description of step S1302 can refer to the description of step A of mode 1.2.2 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0460] S1303, the SF sends an indication information #1 to the NAS NF.

[0461] The description of step S1303 can refer to the description of step B of mode 1.2.2 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0462] S1304, the NAS NF determines that the UE has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

[0463] The description of step S1304 can refer to the description of step C of mode 1.2.2 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0464] S1305, the NAS NF sends a second request message #2 to the RAN.

[0465] The description of step S1305 can refer to the description of step S1105 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0466] S1306, the RAN generates an encryption key.

[0467] The description of step S1306 can refer to the description of step S1106 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0468] S1307, the RAN sends the encryption key to the NAS NF.

[0469] The description of step S1307 can refer to the description of step S1121 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0470] S1308, the NAS NF determines a first key.

[0471] The description of step S1308 can refer to the description of step S1123 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0472] S1309, the NAS NF sends the calculation key and / or the identification of the first algorithm to the SF.

[0473] The description of step S1309 can refer to the description of step S1122 in the above, which will not be repeated here.

[0474] S1310, the SF sends a service response message to the UE through the NAS NF.

[0475] S1311, the UE generates a NAS container and a data label.

[0476] Specifically, the first ciphertext is included in the NAS container, and the description about the first ciphertext and the data label can refer to the description about the parameters carried in the first request message in step S1110, which will not be repeated here.

[0477] S1312, the UE sends a first request message to the RAN.

[0478] The description of step S1312 can refer to the description of step S1110 in the foregoing, which will not be repeated here.

[0479] S1313, the RAN generates a second ciphertext.

[0480] The description of step S1313 can refer to the description of step S1120 in the foregoing, which will not be repeated here.

[0481] S1314, the RAN sends a third request message to the NAS NF.

[0482] The description of step S1314 can refer to the description of step S1130 in the foregoing, which will not be repeated here.

[0483] S1315, the NAS NF obtains a third ciphertext.

[0484] The description of step S1315 can refer to the description of step S1131 in the foregoing, which will not be repeated here.

[0485] S1316, the NAS NF sends the third ciphertext to the SF.

[0486] The description of step S1315 can refer to the description of step S1131 in the foregoing, which will not be repeated here.

[0487] S1317, the SF determines a data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

[0488] S1318, the SF sends a first response message to the UE through the NAS NF.

[0489] Optionally, in the process of the SF sending the first response message to the UE through the NAS NF, if the homomorphic calculation data processing result includes a part of the uplink data, since the uplink homomorphic ciphertext is used, the downlink is also in the state of the homomorphic ciphertext. The downlink homomorphic ciphertext transmission and re-encryption process can refer to the description of FIG. 12 in the foregoing, which will not be repeated here.

[0490] FIG. 13 is only for the convenience of understanding and does not constitute any limitation on the protection scope of the present application. For example, the NAS NF in FIG. 13 does not exist, and the symmetric decryption operation and the data processing operation can be performed by the SF; for another example, the execution order of the steps in FIG. 13 can be adjusted, such as step S1308 can be executed after step S1314, and the like, which will not be described here again.

[0491] It should be understood that the size of the serial number of each process described above does not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined according to its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0492] It should also be understood that in various embodiments of the present application, the terms and / or descriptions of different embodiments are consistent and can be referred to each other if there is no special description and logical conflict. In addition, the technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments according to their inherent logical relationship.

[0493] The above, in combination with FIGS. 11 to 13, describes the communication method provided by the embodiments of the present application in detail. The above communication method is mainly introduced from the perspective of interaction between each entity. It can be understood that the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device etc. contain the corresponding hardware structure and / or software module for executing each function in order to realize the above functions.

[0494] Those skilled in the art should realize that the units and algorithm steps of the examples described in combination with the embodiments disclosed herein can be realized in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a certain function is realized in the form of hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional technicians can use different methods to realize the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of the present application.

[0495] The communication device provided by the present application is described in detail below in combination with FIGS. 14 and 15. It should be understood that the description of the device embodiment corresponds to the description of the method embodiment. Therefore, the content not described in detail can be referred to the above method embodiment, and part of the content will not be described again for the sake of brevity.

[0496] The embodiments of the present application can divide the functional modules of the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device according to the above method examples. For example, each functional module can be divided according to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated in one processing module. The integrated module can be realized in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional module. It should be noted that the division of the modules in the embodiments of the present application is illustrative, and is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, another division mode can be used. The following will be described taking the division of each functional module according to each function as an example.

[0497] FIG. 14 is a schematic block diagram of the communication device 10 provided by the embodiments of the present application. The device 10 includes a transceiver unit 11 and a processing unit 12. The transceiver unit 11 can realize corresponding communication functions, and the processing unit 12 is configured to perform data processing. In other words, the transceiver unit 11 is configured to perform operations related to receiving and sending, and the processing unit 12 is configured to perform operations other than receiving and sending. The transceiver unit 11 can also be referred to as a communication interface or a communication unit.

[0498] Optionally, the device 10 can further include a storage unit 13, which can be configured to store instructions and / or data. The processing unit 12 can read the instructions and / or data in the storage unit, so that the device realizes the actions of the equipment in the foregoing various method embodiments.

[0499] In one design, the device 10 can correspond to the first communication device in the above method embodiments, or be a constituent component (such as a chip) of the first communication device.

[0500] The device 10 can realize the steps or processes performed by the first communication device corresponding to the above method embodiments. In this case, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the transceiving-related operations of the first communication device in the above method embodiments, and the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing-related operations of the first communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0501] In one possible implementation, the transceiver unit 11 is configured to receive a first request message from a second communication device, the first request message being used to request a first network element to process data, the first request message including a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data that is protected by a first security context, and the first indication information being used to indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted. The processing unit 12 is configured to homomorphically encrypt the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext. The transceiver unit 11 is further configured to send the second ciphertext to a second network element, wherein the first security context is a security context negotiated by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

[0502] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 11, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and / or receiving information in the method, such as steps S1110, S1102, S1105, S1107, S1108, S1121, S1122 and S1130; the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1103, S1106 and S1120.

[0503] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 12, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and / or receiving information in the method, such as steps S1240, S1260, S1280 and S1291; the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1250, S1270 and S1290.

[0504] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 13, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and / or receiving information in the method, such as steps S1305, S1307, S1310, S1312, S1314 and S1318; the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing steps in the method, such as steps S1306 and S1313.

[0505] It should be understood that the specific procedures of the units performing the corresponding steps have been described in the above method embodiments, and thus will not be repeated here for brevity.

[0506] In another design, the apparatus 10 can correspond to the second network element in the above method embodiments, or be a component (e.g., a chip) of the second network element.

[0507] The apparatus 10 can implement the steps or procedures performed by the second network element in the above method embodiments, where the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the operations related to transmitting and / or receiving of the second network element in the above method embodiments, and the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the operations related to processing of the second network element in the above method embodiments.

[0508] In a possible implementation, the transceiver 11 is configured to receive a third request message from the first communication device, the third request message being used to request the first network element to process data, the third request message comprising a second ciphertext, the second ciphertext being a ciphertext of the first ciphertext after homomorphic encryption, the first ciphertext being the first data secured by the first security context. The processor 12 is configured to decrypt the second ciphertext based on a first key to obtain a third ciphertext, the third ciphertext being the first data after homomorphic encryption, the first key being determined by homomorphic encryption on the first security context. The transceiver 11 is configured to obtain a data processing result corresponding to the first data, the data processing result being determined based on the third ciphertext, wherein the first security context is a security context determined by negotiation between the second communication device and the second network element, and the ciphertext after homomorphic encryption supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

[0509] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 11, the transceiver 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1105, S1121, S1122, S1130, S1151, S1153, and S1140; and the processor 12 can be configured to perform the steps of processing in the method, such as steps S1104, S1123, S1131, and S1141.

[0510] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 12, the transceiver 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1220 and S1240; and the processor 12 can be configured to perform the steps of processing in the method, such as step S1230.

[0511] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 13, the transceiver 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1302, S1305, S1307, S1314, and S1316; and the processor 12 can be configured to perform the steps of processing in the method, such as steps S1304, S1308, and S1315.

[0512] It should be understood that the specific processes by which the units perform the corresponding steps described above have been described in detail in the method embodiments, and thus will not be described here for brevity.

[0513] In yet another design, the apparatus 10 can correspond to the second communication device in the above method embodiments, or be a component (such as a chip) of the second communication device.

[0514] The apparatus 10 can implement the steps or procedures performed by the second communication device in the above method embodiments, wherein the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the transceiving related operations of the second communication device in the above method embodiments, and the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing related operations of the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0515] In a possible implementation, the transceiver unit 11 is configured to send a first request message to the first communication device, the first request message being used to request a first network element to perform data processing, the first request message comprising a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data that is protected by a first security context, and the first indication information being used to indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted. The transceiver unit 11 is further configured to receive a data processing result based on the first security context from the first communication device, the data processing result being a data processing result corresponding to the first data, wherein the first security context is a non-access stratum security context determined by the second communication device and a second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

[0516] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 11, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1110, S1102 and S1140; and the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing steps in the method.

[0517] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 12, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as step S1291; and the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing steps in the method.

[0518] When the apparatus 10 is configured to perform the method in FIG. 13, the transceiver unit 11 can be configured to perform the steps of transmitting and receiving information in the method, such as steps S1302, S1310, S1312 and S1318; and the processing unit 12 can be configured to perform the processing steps in the method, such as step S1311.

[0519] It should be understood that the specific processes by which the units perform the corresponding steps are described in detail in the above method embodiments, and thus are not described herein again for brevity.

[0520] It should also be understood that the apparatus 10 herein is embodied in the form of a functional block diagram. The terminology used herein, such as "unit", can refer to an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an electronic circuit, a processor (e.g., a shared processor, a dedicated processor, or a group processor, etc.) and a memory for executing one or more software or firmware programs, a combination of logic circuitry and / or other suitable components that support the described functions. In an optional example, those skilled in the art can understand that the apparatus 10 can be embodied as the mobility management network element in the above embodiments, and can be used to execute the processes and / or steps corresponding to the mobility management network element in the above method embodiments; or the apparatus 10 can be embodied as the terminal device in the above embodiments, and can be used to execute the processes and / or steps corresponding to the terminal device in the above method embodiments, which will not be described herein again to avoid repetition.

[0521] The apparatus 10 of each of the above schemes has the function of performing the corresponding steps performed by the entities (such as the first communication apparatus, the first network element, the second network element, and the security network element) in the above methods. The function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more units corresponding to the above functions; for example, the transceiving unit can be replaced by a transceiver (for example, the transmitting unit in the transceiving unit can be replaced by a transmitter, and the receiving unit in the transceiving unit can be replaced by a receiver), and other units, such as the processing unit, can be replaced by a processor, which respectively performs the transceiving operations and related processing operations in each of the method embodiments.

[0522] In addition, the transceiving unit 11 described above can also be a transceiving circuit (for example, which can include a receiving circuit and a transmitting circuit), and the processing unit can be a processing circuit.

[0523] FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram of another communication apparatus 20 provided by the embodiments of the present application. The apparatus 20 includes a processor 21, which is configured to execute computer programs or instructions stored in a memory 22, or read data / signaling stored in the memory 22, to perform the methods in the above method embodiments. Optionally, the processor 21 is one or more.

[0524] Optionally, as shown in FIG. 15, the apparatus 20 further includes the memory 22, which is configured to store computer programs or instructions and / or data. The memory 22 can be integrated with the processor 21, or can be separately arranged. Optionally, the memory 22 is one or more.

[0525] Optionally, as shown in FIG. 15, the apparatus 20 further includes a transceiver 23, which is configured to receive and / or transmit signals. For example, the processor 21 is configured to control the transceiver 23 to receive and / or transmit signals.

[0526] As an option, the apparatus 20 is configured to implement one or more of the operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element, and the second communication device in the various method embodiments described above.

[0527] It should be understood that the processor mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can be one or a combination of central processing units (CPUs), other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), microprocessor units (MPUs), microcontroller units (MCUs), graphics processing units (GPUs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), artificial intelligence processors (AI processors), or neural network processors (NPUs); or the processor mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can be an ASIC or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic device, a discrete hardware component, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or the processor can also be any conventional processor.

[0528] It should also be understood that the memory mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can be a volatile memory and / or a non-volatile memory. Among them, the non-volatile memory can be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically EPROM (EEPROM) or a flash memory. The volatile memory can be a cache, a random access memory (RAM). For example, the RAM can be used as an external cache. As an example but not limitation, the RAM includes the following various forms: static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchlink DRAM (SLDRAM) and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).

[0529] It should be noted that when the processor is a general processor, a DSP, an ASIC, a FPGA or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic device, a discrete hardware component, the memory (storage module) can be integrated in the processor.

[0530] It should also be noted that the memory described herein is intended to include, but not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0531] The embodiments of the present application also provide a chip system, which can also be referred to as a processing system, including a logic circuit and an input / output interface.

[0532] Among them, the logic circuit can be a processing circuit in the chip system. The logic circuit can be coupled to the storage unit to call the instructions in the storage unit, so that the chip system can realize the methods and functions of the embodiments of the present application. The input / output interface can be an input / output circuit in the chip system, which outputs the processed information of the chip system or inputs the data or signaling information to be processed into the chip system for processing.

[0533] As a solution, the chip system is configured to implement operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0534] For example, the logic circuit is configured to implement processing-related operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device in the above method embodiments; and the input / output interface is configured to implement sending and / or receiving-related operations performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0535] The embodiments of the present application further provide a computer readable storage medium, having stored thereon computer instructions for implementing the method performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0536] For example, the computer program, when executed by a computer, enables the computer to implement the method performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0537] The embodiments of the present application further provide a computer program product, comprising instructions, which, when executed by a computer, implement the method performed by the first communication device, the first network element, the second network element and the second communication device in the above method embodiments.

[0538] The embodiments of the present application further provide a communication system, comprising the first network element and the second network element described above. Optionally, the communication system further comprises the first communication device described above. Optionally, the communication system further comprises the second communication device described above.

[0539] The above-described any device-related content can refer to the corresponding method embodiments provided above for explanation and beneficial effects, which will not be repeated here.

[0540] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the units and algorithm steps of the examples described in combination with the embodiments disclosed herein can be realized by electronic hardware or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether the functions are realized in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solutions. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of the present application.

[0541] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of the description, the specific working processes of the above-described system, device and unit can refer to the corresponding processes in the above method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0542] In several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus and method can be implemented by other manners. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are only illustrative, for example, the division of the units is only a logical function division, and actual implementation can have another division manner, for example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the units or components shown or discussed can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, apparatuses or units, and can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0543] The units described as separate components can or can not be physically separated, and the components shown as units can or can not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place or distributed on a plurality of network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiment.

[0544] In addition, the functional units in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can be physically present separately, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit.

[0545] If the functions are realized in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the present application or the part of the present application that essentially contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solutions can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The foregoing storage medium includes various program code storage media, such as U disk, mobile hard disk, ROM, RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk, etc.

[0546] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily think of changes or replacements within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be covered within the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A communication method characterized by comprising: The method applied to a first communication device comprises: receiving a first request message from a second communication device, the first request message being used for requesting a first network element to process data, the first request message comprising a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data secured by a first security context, and the first indication information being used for indicating that the first ciphertext is homomorphically encrypted; homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext; sending the second ciphertext to a second network element, wherein the first security context is a security context determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphically encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further comprises: sending second indication information to the second network element, the second indication information being used for indicating that the second ciphertext is a homomorphically encrypted ciphertext.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext to generate a second ciphertext comprises: homomorphically encrypting the first ciphertext based on an encryption key to generate the second ciphertext.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The method further comprises: sending the encryption key to the second network element.

5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that, The method further comprises: receiving a second request message, the second request message being used for requesting to generate the encryption key, the second request message comprising a first identifier; generating the encryption key associated with the first identifier in response to the second request message, wherein the first identifier comprises at least one of the following: an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

6. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that, The method further comprises: sending a second request message, the second request message being used for requesting to obtain the encryption key, the second request message comprising a first identifier; receiving the encryption key associated with the first identifier, wherein the first identifier comprises at least one of the following: an identifier of the second communication device, an identifier of a service corresponding to the first data, or an identifier of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

7. The method according to claim 5 or 6, characterized in that, The second request message further comprises third indication information and / or an identifier of a first algorithm, the third indication information being used for indicating that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identifier of the first algorithm being used for indicating an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

8. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 7, characterized in that, The encryption key is contained in a second security context, the second security context further comprising a calculation key, and the method further comprises: sending the calculation key to the second network element, wherein the calculation key is used for performing calculation on a ciphertext encrypted by the encryption key in a ciphertext state.

9. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 8, characterized in that, The method further comprises: sending an identifier of the second communication device and / or an identifier of a first algorithm to the second network element, the identifier of the first algorithm being used for indicating an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

10. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that, The first request message comprises at least one container, the first ciphertext being carried in a first container in the at least one container, and the first request message further comprises a data label, the data label being used for indicating the first container.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 10, characterized in that, The method further comprises: receiving a first response message, wherein the first response message comprises an identity of the second communication device and a data processing result based on the first security context and homomorphic encryption; performing homomorphic decryption on the data processing result to obtain a data processing result based on the first security context; sending the data processing result based on the first security context to the second communication device.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein, The first response message further comprises fourth indication information, and the fourth indication information indicates that the data processing result is homomorphic encrypted.

13. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 12, characterized in that, The first network element and the second network element are the same.

14. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 13, characterized in that, The first security context comprises a non-access stratum security context.

15. A method of communication, comprising: The method is applied to a second network element, and the method comprises: receiving a third request message from a first communication device, wherein the third request message is used to request a first network element to perform data processing, and the third request message comprises second ciphertext, the second ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by performing homomorphic encryption on first ciphertext, and the first ciphertext is first data of a second communication device that is protected by a first security context; decrypting the second ciphertext based on a first key to obtain third ciphertext, the third ciphertext is the first data that is homomorphic encrypted, obtaining a data processing result corresponding to the first data, wherein the data processing result is determined based on the third ciphertext, wherein the first security context is a security context determined by the second communication device and the second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein, The first key is determined based on an encryption key homomorphic encryption on the first security context, and the method further comprises: receiving the encryption key from the first communication device; performing homomorphic encryption on the first security context based on the encryption key to determine the first key.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein, The encryption key is contained in a second security context, and the second security context further comprises a calculation key, and the method further comprises: receiving the calculation key from the first communication device; performing calculation on the third ciphertext in a ciphertext state based on the encryption key, or sending the third ciphertext and the calculation key to the first network element.

18. The method of any one of claims 15-17, wherein, The obtaining of the data processing result corresponding to the first data comprises: determining the data processing result based on the third ciphertext.

19. The method of any one of claims 15-17, wherein, The obtaining of the data processing result corresponding to the first data comprises: sending the third ciphertext to the first network element; receiving the data processing result from the first network element.

20. The method of any one of claims 15-19, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving fifth indication information from the second communication device, wherein the fifth indication information indicates that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement; sending a second request message to the first communication device, wherein the second request message is used to request generation of an encryption key, and the second request message comprises a first identity, wherein the encryption key is used to implement the homomorphic encryption, and the first identity comprises at least one of the following: an identity of the second communication device, an identity of a service to which the first data corresponds, or an identity of a service area to which the first communication device belongs.

21. The method of claim 20, wherein, The second request message further comprises third indication information and / or an identity of a first algorithm, the third indication information being used to indicate that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement, and the identity of the first algorithm being used to indicate an algorithm for generating the encryption key.

22. The method of any one of claims 15-21, wherein, The method further comprises: performing secure protection processing on the data processing result based on a second key, the second key being determined by homomorphic encryption on the first security context; sending a first response message to the first communication device, the first response message comprising an identity of the second communication device and the data processing result that is securely protected based on the first security context and homomorphic encryption.

23. The method of any one of claims 15-22, wherein, The method further comprises: receiving a fourth request message from a third network element, the fourth request message being used to request the third ciphertext; sending a fourth response message to the third network element, the fourth response message comprising the third ciphertext and an identity of a first algorithm, the identity of the first algorithm being used to indicate a homomorphic computation algorithm.

24. A method of communication, comprising: The method applied to a second communication device comprises: sending a first request message to a first communication device, the first request message being used to request a first network element to perform data processing, the first request message comprising a first ciphertext and first indication information, the first ciphertext being first data that is securely protected by a first security context, and the first indication information being used to indicate that the first ciphertext is homomorphic encrypted; receiving a data processing result from the first communication device, the data processing result being a data processing result corresponding to the first data and being securely protected based on the first security context, wherein the first security context is a non-access stratum security context that is determined by negotiation between the second communication device and a second network element, and the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext supports being processed in a ciphertext state.

25. The method of claim 24, wherein, The first request message comprises at least one container, the first ciphertext being carried in a first container in the at least one container, and the first request message further comprises a data label, the data label being used to indicate the first container.

26. The method of claim 24 or 25, wherein, The method further comprises: sending fifth indication information to the second network element, the fifth indication information indicating that the second communication device has a homomorphic encryption requirement.

27. A communications device, characterized by one or more functional modules for performing the method of any one of claims 1 to 14, or one or more functional modules for performing the method of any one of claims 15 to 23, or one or more functional modules for performing the method of any one of claims 24 to 26. comprise at least one processor coupled to a memory, the at least one processor being configured to execute a computer program in the memory to cause the apparatus to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 14, or to cause the apparatus to perform the method of any one of claims 15 to 26, or to cause the apparatus to perform the method of any one of claims 24 to 26.

28. A communications device, characterized by ​ 29. A computer program product, characterised in that, The computer program product comprises instructions for performing the method of any of claims 1 to 26.

30. A computer-readable storage medium, comprising: comprising: The computer readable storage medium stores a computer program; the computer program, when running on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method of any of claims 1 to 26.

31. A chip, characterized by The chip is installed in a communication device, the chip comprises a processor and a communication interface, the processor reads instructions and runs through the communication interface, so that the communication device performs the method of any of claims 1 to 26.

32. A communication system, characterized by comprising a first device for performing the method of any of claims 1 to 14, and a second network element for performing the method of any of claims 15 to 26.

33. The communication system of claim 32, wherein, Also comprising a second communication device for performing the method of any of claims 24 to 26.

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