Electronic circuit and computer-implemented method for securing electronic communication

Abstract

The invention relates to an electronic circuit comprising a data storage element, a quantum random number generator, and a communication interface. The electronic circuit is designed to a) provide at least one true random number by means of the quantum random number generator, b) generate a cryptography key on the basis of the provided random number and to provide said key for adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner, c) provide information for the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method by means of the communication interface, and d) generate a block for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and to store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element.

Description

[0001] Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0002] 1 / 99

[0003] ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT AND COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED METHOD FOR SAFETY OF AN ELECTRONIC

[0004] COMMUNICATION

[0005] The following are provided: an electronic circuit, a computer-readable medium, a method for manufacturing an electronic circuit, a computer-readable interface, the use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between an IoT device and a communication partner, the use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit, a Trusted Platform Module, a control device for a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle, and a computer network. The embodiments are thus primarily in the field of cryptography and encrypted electronic communication.

[0006] It is known in the art to generate cryptographic keys based on pseudo-random numbers and to use these keys to encrypt electronic communication between multiple communication partners. Both symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods can be used. Random number generators based on thermal generation of random numbers can be employed. However, this often offers only a low degree of entropy and can also be susceptible to manipulation.

[0007] Providing truly random numbers presents a technical challenge, as deterministic computers cannot readily generate true randomness and, consequently, truly random numbers. Using pseudo-random numbers represents a compromise, allowing the provision of numbers that appear random at first glance but ultimately do not constitute true randomness. (Pseudo-Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025)

[0008] 2 / 99

[0009] Random number generators often pose a security risk if, through manipulation of the pseudo-random number generator, the generation of pseudo-random numbers becomes at least partially predictable.

[0010] Furthermore, optical quantum random number generators are known in the prior art, but these cannot be integrated into a semiconductor component.

[0011] Furthermore, quantum random number generators are known in the prior art in which a photon emitter and a photon detector are arranged side by side. These can only provide quantum random numbers at a low bit rate.

[0012] Furthermore, the current state of the art has the disadvantage that, with increasing computing power available for cracking encryption, the requirements for cryptographic keys and encryption methods become ever more stringent in order to effectively prevent unauthorized decryption of the encrypted data by third parties or to keep the effort at a high level. Accordingly, the requirements for cryptographic keys and the underlying random numbers for effective encryption are constantly increasing.

[0013] Furthermore, the current state of the art has the disadvantage that even when using cryptographic keys that generally meet high standards, some types of attacks or decryption attempts by unauthorized persons, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, cannot be effectively prevented. This is because existing interactions between third parties during the exchange of cryptographic keys for encrypting communication often cannot be effectively detected. Techniques that can reliably enable such detection, on the other hand, often require large amounts of data that cannot easily be stored on the internal data storage elements of integrated circuits. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0014] 3 / 99

[0015] These limitations prevalent in the state of the art make it difficult to widely use effective encryption for electronic communication and make it vulnerable to attacks, eavesdropping and / or manipulation by third parties.

[0016] Particularly in the field of security technology, as well as in the military sector, the conventional methods cannot always achieve the desired level of security in the encryption of electronic communication due to the disadvantages described above.

[0017] The present patent application cites the prior art mentioned below:

[0018] - The presentation “Auth. Key Exchange” by Dan Boneh from the online cryptography course at Stanford University describes methods for the secure exchange of information for encrypting communication;

[0019] - R. Muth et al. "SmartDHX: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange with Smart Contracts" describes a Diffie-Hellman key exchange;

[0020] - EP 3 529 694 relates to a (quantum) random number generator comprising a photon source, one or more photon detectors configured to detect at least one photon belonging to a stream of detected photons generated by the photon source, and electronic scanning means functionally connected to the photon detectors and configured to implement a logical procedure for extracting a binary sequence based on the arrival time of each of the detected photons. In the random number generator, the photon source and the photon detectors are arranged side by side and integrated into a single semiconductor substrate. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0021] 4 / 99

[0022] - WO 2016 / 016741 A1 concerns a (quantum) random number generator comprising a photon source and one or more SPAD-type photon detectors configured to detect a photon flux equal to Ä, with the photons being generated by the photon source. The random number generator also includes electronic scanning devices. These electronic scanning devices are configured to record the arrival time t of a photon incident on each SPAD photon detector for each of the observation windows Tw, and they are also configured to convert the arrival time t into a binary sequence. The photon source and the electronic scanning devices are configured such that the product A*Tw is less than or equal to 0.01.

[0023] The technical task is to provide an electronic circuit and a method suitable for advancing the state of the art. Optionally, the task may include providing an electronic circuit and a method suitable for increasing the security of encrypted electronic communication, simplifying the use of secure encryption, and / or simplifying or even enabling the integration of encrypted communication into electronic circuits.

[0024] The problem is solved by the subject matter of the respective independent claims. Optional embodiments are specified in the dependent claims and in the description.

[0025] An electronic circuit is provided, comprising a data storage element, a quantum random number generator, and a communication interface. The electronic circuit is configured to provide at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator and to generate a cryptographic key based on the provided random number. This key is then used to adapt an encryption method for encrypted communication with a Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025.

[0026] 5 / 99

[0027] to provide communication partners. The electronic circuit is further configured to provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface, and to generate a block to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and to store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element.

[0028] Furthermore, a computer-readable medium is provided which includes data defining an operating instruction adapted for controlling a semiconductor manufacturing device, such that the electronic circuit according to the disclosure is manufactured by means of the semiconductor manufacturing device when the data is output to the semiconductor manufacturing device.

[0029] Furthermore, a method for manufacturing an electronic circuit according to the disclosure is provided, wherein the method comprises manufacturing the electronic circuit using a semiconductor manufacturing device, optionally using a computer-readable medium according to the disclosure.

[0030] Furthermore, a computer-readable interface is provided, comprising an electronic circuit as disclosed, wherein the computer-readable interface is configured to be connected to a computer and, in a state connected to the computer, to provide a cryptographic key and / or to enable a secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication between the computer and a communication partner and / or to enable a secure communication link with the communication partner.

[0031] Furthermore, the use of a disclosed electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between an IoT device and a communication partner is provided. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0032] 6 / 99

[0033] Furthermore, the use of an electronic circuit as disclosed is provided for the provision of a cryptographic key and / or for the secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit.

[0034] Furthermore, a Trusted Platform Module comprehensively provides an electronic circuit as disclosed.

[0035] Furthermore, a control device for a motor vehicle is provided comprising an electronic circuit as disclosed.

[0036] Furthermore, a motor vehicle equipped with a control device as disclosed is provided. The control device may be configured to ensure communication between the control device and another component of the motor vehicle and / or with an external communication partner by means of an electronic circuit.

[0037] Furthermore, a computer network comprising several network nodes is provided, wherein the several network nodes each have at least one electronic circuit as disclosed, and wherein the computer network is configured to enable encrypted communication between the network nodes using the electronic circuits of the respective network nodes.

[0038] Furthermore, a computer-implemented method for securing electronic communication with a communication partner is provided. The method includes providing at least one true random number using a quantum random number generator, as well as generating a cryptographic key based on the provided random number. The method also includes adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with the communication partner.

[0039] Use of the generated random number, providing information for the Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

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[0041] Communication partners regarding the adaptation of the encryption method via a communication interface, and the generation of a block to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and the storage of the blockchain with the block in a data storage element.

[0042] An electronic circuit can be in the form of an electronic circuit.

[0043] Optionally, the electronic circuit can be in integrated form. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be designed as an integrated circuit. The electronic circuit can include all the components mentioned and optionally additional components. Optionally, all components of the electronic circuit can be...

[0044] The circuit can be integrated within an electronic circuit package. Optionally, the electronic circuit can include a processing unit designed to execute the process steps. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be implemented as a microcontroller or nanocontroller. Optionally, the electronic circuit can be implemented monolithically as a semiconductor component.

[0045] A data storage element is a component and / or an element integrated into the electronic

[0046] A circuit integrated element designed to store electronic data. This data storage element can be rewritable.

[0047] The data storage element may be configured as a data storage element and optionally as RAM. The data storage element may be configured as flash memory or include flash memory. Optionally, the data storage element may be configured to store a data volume of 10 kB or more. Optionally, the data storage element may be configured to store a data volume of

[0048] to store 2 MB or less. The data storage element can optionally be designed to store additional data besides the one or more blockchains, although this is not mandatory.

[0049] Optionally, the data storage element is designed to have sufficient storage capacity for storing one or more blockchains. However, the data storage element can be designed to have a storage capacity no larger than necessary to comply with Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025.

[0050] 8 / 99 to have the smallest possible installation space requirement in order to be integrated into the electronic circuit as easily as possible.

[0051] A communication interface is an interface that allows an electronic circuit to exchange electronic data with a communication partner. The communication interface can optionally conform to a conventional standard for electronic data communication. It can be designed to enable wireless and / or wired communication. Optionally, the communication interface can conform to one of the following standards: Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or USB.

[0052] Providing a true random number can involve generating and outputting the true random number. Providing a true random number can be done repeatedly and / or continuously, so that multiple random numbers and / or a stream of random numbers are provided sequentially over time. The true random number can consist of a bit sequence or be formatted as such.

[0053] A cryptographic key can be a cryptographic key. The cryptographic key can consist of a string of characters or be structured as such. The cryptographic key is generated based on the provided random number. Optionally, the cryptographic key can correspond to the provided random number. The cryptographic key can be used by the encryption process to modify data that is to be securely transmitted to the communication partner in such a way that it is encrypted and third parties cannot decrypt the data without knowledge of the corresponding cryptographic key.

[0054] Adapting the encryption method may involve or consist of changing, switching, or renewing the cryptographic key used for encryption. Adapting the encryption method may occur regularly or irregularly. (An adaptation of Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025)

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[0056] Encryption methods can offer the advantage that a previously used, possibly compromised cryptographic key is replaced by another cryptographic key, and any unauthorized third parties who may have obtained the previous cryptographic key and were able to decrypt the transmitted data will no longer be able to decrypt the data in the future.

[0057] The fact that the generated cryptographic key is made available for adapting the encryption method means that the elements responsible for carrying out the encryption process, which may be integrated into the electronic circuit, can use it for this purpose. This provision can optionally occur exclusively internally within the electronic circuit or for other components that are in close communication or physical contact with the electronic circuit. This can offer the advantage that no transmission of the generated cryptographic key to external recipients is necessary, thus reducing the risk of interception by third parties.

[0058] The information provided to the communication partner regarding the adjustment of the encryption method via the communication interface can be such that the communication partner can adjust their own encryption method in order to receive and decrypt encrypted messages after the adjustment. A conventional symmetric or asymmetric encryption method can be used. The information provided to the communication partner optionally does not include the generated cryptographic key. The communication interface can be the same communication interface used for communication with the communication partner, although this is not mandatory and a different communication interface can optionally be used. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

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[0060] The fact that the blockchain is stored within the data storage element of the electronic circuit means that computer-readable data, which comprises a copy of the blockchain, is stored within the data storage element itself. The blockchain can document a history of changes to the encryption method. The blockchain can contain multiple blocks. Optionally, each change to the encryption method can be confirmed or documented in a separate block of the blockchain. A block can be added to the blockchain for each change to the encryption method. Optionally, further events related to the encryption method can be confirmed or documented in the blockchain.The blockchain can serve to enable the authenticity of the blockchain and / or the encryption method and / or an adaptation of the encryption method by synchronizing and / or comparing the blockchain with copies of the blockchain from other participants in the blockchain.

[0061] A computer-readable medium is a technical object. This can be any computer-readable storage medium, such as a digital data storage device like a USB flash drive, hard drive, CD-ROM, SD card, or SSD. The computer-readable medium can also be a data signal. This means the data does not necessarily have to be stored on a computer-readable storage medium but can, for example, be accessed via the internet. The data can comprise a computer program, either designed as a control program or capable of being designed as one, containing instructions that, when executed by the semiconductor manufacturing device, cause it to manufacture the entropy source and / or the quantum random number generator and / or the integrated electronic circuit.Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025.

[0062] 11 / 99

[0063] A computer-readable interface (CLI) is a technical device. A CLI can be an external component that can be connected to a computer, enabling the computer to use its functions. Optionally, the CLI can be designed to allow the computer, when connected, to establish a communication link with an external communication partner via the CLI. The CLI can optionally be configured as a USB device to enable a connection to the computer via a USB interface.

[0064] An IoT device is a device that, within the framework of the "Internet of Things," has an internet connection or a connection to a local network and can optionally establish a communication connection with one or more external third parties via the internet. Optionally, the electronic circuitry can be used to encrypt communication over such a connection and / or to provide a cryptographic key for such encryption.

[0065] A military unit can be any unit deployable for military purposes and equipped to communicate with other military units. A military unit can consist of one or more persons or be unmanned. A military unit can be a soldier, a motor vehicle, a weapon system, an aircraft, a watercraft, an underwater vehicle, an explosive device, a measuring probe, or similar. Optionally, a military unit can comprise a combination of several such elements.

[0066] A motor vehicle can be in the form of a land vehicle, a watercraft, an aircraft and / or a spacecraft, such as a car, truck, train, motorcycle, bus, agricultural machine, tactical vehicle, land-based weapon system, ship, submarine, torpedo, Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

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[0068] The vehicle may be designed to carry an aircraft, helicopter, rocket, guided missile, cruise missile, drone, satellite, space station, or similar device. It may be designed for manned and / or unmanned and / or remotely controlled operation.

[0069] A control device for a motor vehicle can be a control device designed for use in a motor vehicle. Optionally, the control device can be designed to perform functions for controlling components of the motor vehicle, such as engine control and / or the control of safety systems. Optionally, the control device can be connected to a CAN bus and / or LIN bus. Optionally, the control device can be configured to establish an encrypted communication link with other components of the motor vehicle, optionally via a CAN bus and / or LIN bus.

[0070] The features and embodiments mentioned above and explained below are not only to be regarded as disclosed in the combinations explicitly mentioned, but are also covered by the disclosure content in other technically meaningful combinations and embodiments.

[0071] The fact that the process is computer-implemented means that at least one process step, optionally several process steps, and optionally all process steps can be executed by a computing unit or are executed by one. The computing unit can include a processor and a storage medium. Optionally, the computing unit can be a computer, a smartphone, a pager, a tablet computer, an embedded system, a microcontroller, a nanocontroller, an integrated circuit, a control unit, or similar device.

[0072] A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a chip or integrated component.

[0073] Circuit of a trained cryptographic processor, designed for cryptographic purposes Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0074] 13 / 99

[0075] The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is designed to perform certain operations. It can also be referred to as the Trusted Platform Module or TPM. The TPM can be configured to provide hardware-based, security-related functions. It can incorporate multiple physical security mechanisms to enhance its tamper resistance. The TPM can be designed to make it difficult or impossible for malware to manipulate it. The TPM can be configured to provide or perform one or more of the following functions:

[0076] - Generating and storing cryptographic keys and optionally restricting their use;

[0077] - Storing and / or providing unique RSA keys, which may be permanently stored in the TPM, to uniquely identify a device in which the TPM is installed;

[0078] - Performing and storing safety measurements of a startup process of an electronic device in which the TPMA is installed;

[0079] - Performing measurements to assess system integrity.

[0080] The TPM can be integrated into an electronic device to provide the device with security functions, in particular the functions mentioned above. Optionally, a disclosed electronic circuit can be combined with a conventional Trusted Platform Module chip.

[0081] The disclosure offers the advantage of providing secure and effective encryption for electronic communications. In particular, by combining the use of true random numbers instead of pseudo-random numbers (which are not based on true random numbers), the possibility of regularly adapting the encryption method, and securing this adaptation with a blockchain, a very wide range of attacks and attempts to circumvent the encryption method without authorization can be thwarted. The disclosure also offers the advantage that, optionally, unauthorized circumvention of the encryption can be completely prevented, or that any successful circumvention attempt will be detected immediately. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0082] 14 / 99 may result in the encryption and / or the communication link and / or the communication partner being identified as untrustworthy.

[0083] By providing truly random numbers through a quantum random number generator, it is possible to anticipate, through technical means and optionally through artificial intelligence, numbers used for a future planned adaptation of the encryption method that are not based on true randomness, and to prevent unauthorized third parties from guessing or otherwise determining a cryptographic key based on them.

[0084] By adapting the encryption method, repeated changes to the cryptographic key can be implemented. This offers the advantage that if an unauthorized third party manages to break the encryption and decrypt the transmitted communication, the encryption is renewed, and the unauthorized third party no longer has a suitable key to decrypt the communication. Thus, by adapting the encryption method, an unauthorized third party is forced to expend the effort required to break the encryption again. In particular, regular adjustments to the encryption, and optionally regular changes to the cryptographic key, can make it impossible for an unauthorized third party to break the encryption method in such short intervals as to be able to decrypt the communication promptly.

[0085] The use of a blockchain with blocks to confirm changes to the encryption method also offers the advantage that man-in-the-middle attacks can be successfully thwarted or the effort required for a man-in-the-middle attack can be significantly increased. This is because a change to the encryption method and, optionally, a change of the cryptographic key are confirmed or documented in the blockchain by a corresponding block (Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025).

[0086] Given that version 15 / 99 allows for the comparison and / or synchronization of the blockchains of multiple participants, an attacker would need to modify the blockchain copies of all participants to thwart the detection of a man-in-the-middle attack. However, since the number of blockchain participants, and thus the number of blockchain copies, can be very large, the attacker would need to manipulate all blockchain copies, which may reside on devices unknown to the attacker. Due to the sheer number of copies and the unknown storage locations, this could be impossible or extremely costly.Furthermore, the use of blockchain technology offers the advantage that manipulation of the blockchain would require manipulating not just a single block, but the entire blockchain, since the complete history of the blockchain is optionally included in every block. Blockchain technology thus offers the advantage that, through decentralized storage of copies of the blockchain and their regular comparison and / or synchronization, potential attacks and manipulation attempts, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, can be detected promptly, and the encryption and / or communication and / or one or more communication partners can be classified as compromised.

[0087] The disclosure also offers the advantage that the provision of true random numbers, the means for providing the cryptographic key, and the means for generating and storing the blockchain can be provided by the electronic circuit itself. This, in turn, offers the advantage that an effective adaptation of encryption methods can be integrated into electronic devices through an electronic circuit as disclosed, enabling the electronic devices to establish communication links with communication partners. Optionally, the disclosure offers the advantage that, particularly when the electronic circuit is provided as an integrated circuit, the electronic circuit can be integrated into other electronic devices and / or electronic circuits, as described in Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025.

[0088] 16 / 99 another microcontroller, computer, smartphone, motor vehicle, etc.

[0089] This allows the respective devices or electronic circuits to be extended to provide effective and secure encryption of communication.

[0090] Furthermore, the disclosure can offer the advantage that the electronic circuit can be retrofitted into existing devices and / or electronic circuits. Optionally, this can be achieved by connecting the electronic device and / or electronic circuit to a separate, disclosed electronic circuit, so that the connection extends the functionality of the existing electronic device and / or electronic circuit to include encryption adjustments, thereby significantly improving the security of communication against eavesdropping.

[0091] Furthermore, the disclosure offers the advantage that the disclosed provision of the encryption adaptation capability can optionally be fully integrated monolithically into a semiconductor component. This allows for minimal space requirements and the possibility of integrating a disclosed electronic circuit into small electronic devices and existing electronic circuits.

[0092] Furthermore, disclosure can offer the advantage that providing the capability to adapt the encryption can be achieved with low technical complexity and / or low manufacturing costs. This allows a large number of electronic devices and / or electronic circuits to be upgraded, either at the factory or subsequently, with a secure adaptation of the encryption method at low cost. The low costs can promote widespread adoption, thereby significantly improving the security of electronic communication in general. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0093] 17 / 99

[0094] Furthermore, the invention offers the advantage that by combining several aspects of encryption and communication security, a very high level of security can be provided, enabling the secure transmission of even highly classified information. This can offer the benefit of using disclosed functionality to adapt the encryption in the military sector or in other areas where highly sensitive information must be transmitted.

[0095] Furthermore, the disclosure offers the advantage that a zero-trust network can be created by generating the random numbers locally, since it is not necessary to generate the random numbers at a central location and then transmit them to the clients.

[0096] The electronic circuit can be designed as an integrated electronic circuit. This can offer the advantage that the electronic circuit can be provided in a compact design and / or as a single, optionally self-contained component. Optionally, this offers the advantage of easily integrating the integrated electronic circuit into another electronic device and / or another electronic circuit. Optionally, a circuit board of another electronic circuit can be populated with an electronic circuit as disclosed, and / or a semiconductor component can be designed such that an electronic circuit as disclosed is integrated into the semiconductor component.

[0097] The data storage element can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit as an internal data storage element. Alternatively, the data storage element can be integrated into the electronic circuit as a monolithic data storage element. This can facilitate a compact design and / or cost-effective manufacturing of the electronic circuit. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

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[0099] Optionally, the quantum random number generator and / or the communication interface can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit. This can facilitate a compact design and / or cost-effective manufacturing of the electronic circuit. The quantum random number generator can include a monolithically integrated entropy source, which can be designed to utilize randomly occurring events to generate the random number.

[0100] The data storage element can be designed to provide a minimum storage capacity of 10 kB and optionally a maximum of 2 MB for storing at least one blockchain. The chosen size of the data storage element can represent a compromise between sufficient storage capacity and the smallest possible footprint. Smaller storage capacities are also possible if space is extremely limited. Conversely, larger storage capacities are also possible if ample space is available for the data storage element.

[0101] The quantum random number generator can be configured to provide random numbers with a data stream of at least 10 kbit / s, optionally at least 50 kbit / s, optionally at least 100 kbit / s, and optionally at least 500 kbit / s. This can offer the advantage of providing a sufficient quantity and / or length of random numbers to generate a new cryptographic key at short intervals and / or to generate the cryptographic key using long random numbers.

[0102] Steps c) and d), and optionally steps a) to d), can be performed repeatedly. This allows for repeated generation of the cryptographic key and, optionally, adjustments to the encryption method. This can reduce or shorten the periods during which the same cryptographic key is used, thereby minimizing the risk of unauthorized circumvention of the Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

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[0104] The encryption method is reduced, and the amount of potentially unauthorized decryption of data is minimized. The repeated generation of the cryptographic key can be based on one or more existing random numbers and / or one or more newly generated random numbers. The electronic circuit can thus be configured to repeatedly adapt the encryption method by repeatedly executing steps c) and d), or optionally, repeatedly executing steps a) to d). The electronic circuit can be configured to adapt the encryption method at regular and / or irregular intervals.The time intervals can be 48 hours or less, optionally 24 hours or less, optionally 12 hours or less, optionally 6 hours or less, optionally 3 hours or less, optionally 1 hour or less, optionally 30 minutes or less, optionally 10 minutes or less, optionally 5 minutes or less, optionally 2 minutes or less, and optionally 1 minute or less. This can significantly increase the effort required for an unauthorized third party to decrypt the encrypted information.

[0105] The encryption method can be designed as a symmetric and / or asymmetric encryption method. Optionally, conventional encryption methods known in the prior art can be used. This can offer the advantage that the disclosed functionality for adapting the encryption method can be combined with conventional methods and systems, thereby enhancing the security of these methods and systems.

[0106] Optionally, the information regarding the adaptation of the encryption method can be provided using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange procedure. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

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[0108] The electronic circuit can be configured to perform a key selection and / or key exchange, optionally a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange, with the communication partner using the information provided to the communication partner regarding the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface. This offers the advantage that it is not necessary to transmit the cryptographic key itself, but only information that prevents a third party, who might intercept the communication without authorization, from intercepting and / or using the cryptographic keys.

[0109] The electronic circuit can also be configured to generate the cryptographic key based on at least one random number such that the cryptographic key has a length of at least 128 characters, optionally at least 256 characters, optionally at least 512 characters, optionally at least 1,024 characters, and optionally at least 2,048 characters. This can significantly increase the technical effort required to crack the cryptographic key and thus offer a high level of security.

[0110] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the cryptographic key based on at least one random number such that the random number provided by the quantum random number generator has a length of at least 16 bits, optionally at least 32 bits, optionally at least 64 bits, optionally at least 128 bits, optionally at least 256 bits, and optionally at least 512 bits. This can significantly increase the technical effort required to anticipate the random number and / or crack the cryptographic key, thereby offering a high level of security.

[0111] Generating the block to confirm the customization of the

[0112] Encryption method for at least one blockchain can be a Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

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[0114] This includes generating a hash value to confirm the change in the encryption method. The block can optionally consist of this hash value. A block can represent an entry or a segment of the blockchain.

[0115] The electronic circuit can further be configured to partially or fully synchronize the blockchain with a copy of another participant's blockchain and / or to compare it with a copy of another participant's blockchain. Based on this synchronization and / or comparison, the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner can be assessed. This can offer the advantage of verifying and ensuring the reliability and / or integrity of the encryption method, the communication, and / or the communication partner in a decentralized manner. This can significantly hinder manipulation of the encryption method, as it may be necessary for an attacker to manipulate a large number of blockchains, if possible, in order to remain undetected.This can be further complicated by the fact that the attacker may not know all the storage locations of the blockchain copies used for comparison and / or synchronization.

[0116] The communication partner can be another participant in the blockchain. The electronic circuit can be configured to partially or fully synchronize and / or compare the blockchain with the communication partner's copy, as described in feature e). This can simplify synchronization and / or comparison and integrate it into the communication with the communication partner.

[0117] The electronic circuit may also be configured to f) prevent communication with the communication partner and / or provide information about an anomaly in the encryption method, Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0118] 22 / 99, provided that the assessment of the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner concludes that the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner may be compromised. In other words, an anomaly in the synchronization and / or reconciliation of the blockchain with a copy from another participant in the blockchain may be considered an indication of a compromise of the encryption method and / or trigger the initiation of predetermined security measures. This may increase security.

[0119] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the block and / or the hash value for the blockchain in such a way that the block and / or the hash value, and optionally the entire blockchain, are encrypted and / or stored in encrypted form in the internal data storage element. The electronic circuit can also be configured to encrypt and / or store the block and / or the hash value and / or the blockchain using at least one of the random numbers provided by the random number generator. This can further hinder manipulation of the blockchain and increase security.

[0120] The electronic circuit can further be configured to delete the blockchain containing the blocks confirming the adaptation of the encryption method from the data storage element upon the occurrence of a predetermined event and to replace it with a new blockchain of shorter length and / or lower data volume. This can offer the advantage of limiting the data volume of the blockchain and thus the storage space required for the blockchain within the data storage element. This therefore offers the advantage of storing a blockchain on a data storage element with very limited storage capacity. This can be found in Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025.

[0121] 23 / 99

[0122] This enables or simplifies the storage of the blockchain in an integrated data storage element, particularly when the data storage element is integrated into an electronic circuit and, due to limited available space, can only be provided with a very limited storage capacity. This can therefore be particularly advantageous in that mobile electronic devices with a disclosed electronic circuit, which must be small in size, can also be enabled to store the blockchain on the integrated data storage element.

[0123] The predetermined event can optionally occur when the blockchain reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. Alternatively or additionally, other events can be defined that trigger the predetermined event, such as the expiration of a predetermined time period and / or a predetermined number of blockchain blocks and / or a predetermined number of encryption method adjustments.

[0124] The electronic circuit can be configured to partially or completely release the storage space occupied by the blockchain when it is deleted from the data storage element, optionally for storing the new blockchain. This limits or prevents the blockchain's data volume from growing and avoids the data storage element becoming overfilled. This allows the blockchain to be used even when storage capacity is limited.

[0125] The electronic circuit can be configured to generate a block for a parent blockchain to confirm the replacement of the blockchain by the new blockchain with a shorter length and / or smaller size, and to store the parent blockchain with the generated block in the internal data storage element. The parent blockchain can thus be Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0126] 24 / 99 serves to secure, document, and confirm the switching of blockchains that document, confirm, and secure the adjustments to the encryption methods. Optionally, a block is added to the parent blockchain for each blockchain switch. This allows the history of blockchain switches to be traced while keeping the overall storage space required for the blockchains low, and in particular, significantly lower than would be necessary for the continuous use of a single blockchain for encryption adjustments over the lifetime of the electronic circuit.

[0127] The electronic circuit can further be configured to generate the block confirming the encryption method adaptation as a block for a first blockchain and as a block for a second blockchain, and to store the first and second blockchains, each containing the generated block, in the internal data storage element. In other words, the electronic circuit can be configured to generate and / or store two or more blockchains in parallel to document, secure, and confirm the encryption method adaptations.

[0128] Furthermore, the electronic circuit can be configured to use the first and second blockchains in parallel, with staggered start and end times. In other words, the two blockchains can differ in the beginning and end of their use, so that the blockchains optionally differ at least in their first and / or last block. This means that a block that optionally documents a specific adaptation of the encryption method is not necessarily the first block of all blockchains, nor is it necessarily the last block of all blockchains. (Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025)

[0129] 25 / 99

[0130] The electronic circuit can be configured to use the first blockchain and the second blockchain up to a predetermined length and / or data volume, with the respective end of use occurring upon reaching the predetermined length and / or data volume of the first or second blockchain, respectively. The electronic circuit can be configured to delete the first blockchain upon reaching the end of its usage and replace it with a new first blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller size, and to delete the second blockchain upon reaching the end of its usage and replace it with a new second blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller size.

[0131] The electronic circuit can further be configured to continue using the second blockchain when the first blockchain is deleted and replaced upon reaching the end of its useful life, and conversely, to continue using the first blockchain when the second blockchain is deleted and replaced upon reaching the end of its useful life. This can offer the advantage that all blockchains can be limited in terms of storage space required, while still ensuring that at least one other blockchain remains available even when one of the blockchains is switched, documenting at least part of the history of encryption adjustments.

[0132] The electronic circuit can also be configured to release the storage space occupied by the first and / or second blockchain in the data storage element, optionally for a new first or second blockchain, when the first and / or second blockchain is deleted. This can enable efficient use of the available storage space. Furthermore, this can allow the use of blockchains to secure encryption even when the storage capacity of the data storage element is limited. Additionally, this can offer the advantage that the blockchains can be stored internally in the electronic circuit and not on external data storage devices. (Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO, March 31, 2025)

[0133] 26 / 99 must be outsourced. This allows a high level of security to be achieved.

[0134] The computer-readable medium can further be designed such that the data includes a digital representation of the electronic circuit, so that the integrated electronic circuit is manufactured using the digital representation when the data is output to the semiconductor fabrication device, in accordance with the operating instructions. Manufacturing the electronic circuit using the semiconductor fabrication device according to the operating instructions can include fabricating the electronic circuit on a wafer in a semiconductor process, optionally in a CMOS semiconductor process, a BiCMOS semiconductor process, a semiconductor process for bipolar devices, optionally using bipolar CMOS technology.

[0135] Furthermore, the disclosure includes a method for manufacturing an electronic circuit according to the disclosure, wherein the method includes manufacturing the electronic circuit using a semiconductor manufacturing device, optionally using a computer-readable medium according to the disclosure.

[0136] The use of a disclosed electronic circuit for sharing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit may be designed such that the first and / or second military unit comprises or is configured as one of the following: a soldier; a military vehicle; an unmanned military vehicle; a weapon system; a missile; an explosive device; a mine; an element of a military swarm; an agent of a multi-agent system; a measuring probe and / or reconnaissance probe; a command center; a control device; and a satellite. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0137] 27 / 99

[0138] By using the disclosed adaptation of the encryption to encrypt communications between military units, interception and / or manipulation of the transmitted information can be made more difficult. This can offer the advantage of making it harder for adversaries to disrupt the operations of military units and / or repel them, thereby increasing the effectiveness and / or survivability of military units on a battlefield.

[0139] The quantum random number generator used by the method for adapting an encryption to secure electronic communication with a communication partner and / or by the electronic circuit can comprise a monolithically integrated entropy source, wherein the entropy source comprises a photon source configured to emit photons, the photon source comprising a first outer shell, the first outer shell being formed by a first base, a first top, and at least one first side connecting the first base and the first top. Furthermore, the monolithic entropy source can comprise a photon detector configured to detect the photons emitted by the photon source, the first base of the photon source being oriented towards the photon detector.Furthermore, the quantum random number generator can include an electronic circuit designed to generate a random bit depending on an output signal of the entropy source, and optionally to output the generated random bit, wherein a value of the output signal of the entropy source depends on a temporal frequency of the photons detected by the photon detector.

[0140] Furthermore, the disclosure includes an electronic circuit comprising a data storage element and a communication interface, wherein the electronic circuit is configured to provide information to the communication partner about the adjustment of the encryption method via the communication interface and to send a block to Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0141] 28 / 99

[0142] To generate confirmation of the encryption method adaptation for a blockchain and to store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element. The electronic circuit is configured to delete the blockchain with the blocks confirming the encryption method adaptation from the data storage element upon the occurrence of a predetermined event and to replace it with a new blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller data volume. The predetermined event can occur when the blockchain reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. The electronic circuit can be configured to partially or completely release the storage space occupied by the blockchain, optionally for storing the new blockchain, when the blockchain is deleted from the data storage element.The electronic circuit can be configured to generate a block for a parent blockchain to confirm the replacement of the blockchain by the new blockchain with a shorter length and / or smaller size, and to store the parent blockchain with the generated block in the internal data storage element.

[0143] Alternatively or additionally, the electronic circuit can also be configured to generate the block confirming the adaptation of the encryption method as a block for a first blockchain and as a block for a second blockchain, and to store the first and second blockchains, along with their respective generated blocks, in the internal data storage element. The first and second blockchains can be used in parallel with staggered start and end times. The electronic circuit can be configured to use the first and second blockchains up to a predetermined length and / or data volume, with the respective end of use occurring upon reaching the predetermined length and / or data volume of the first or second blockchain. The electronic circuit can be configured for this purpose (Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31).March 2025.

[0144] The electronic circuit may be configured to delete the first blockchain upon reaching the end of its useful life and replace it with a new first blockchain of shorter length and / or size, and upon reaching the end of its useful life, to delete the second blockchain and replace it with a new second blockchain of shorter length and / or size. The electronic circuit may further be configured to continue using the second blockchain when the first blockchain is deleted and replaced upon reaching the end of its useful life, and to continue using the first blockchain when the second blockchain is deleted and replaced upon reaching the end of its useful life. Upon deleting the first and / or second blockchain, the procedure may optionally release the storage space occupied by the first or second blockchain in the data storage element for a new first or second blockchain.Analogous to the electronic circuit which is set up according to the above explanations, the disclosure includes methods for adapting an encryption with the respective steps.

[0145] All disclosures provided are to be considered equally disclosed with respect to the electronic circuit, the computer-readable medium, the method for manufacturing an electronic circuit, the computer-readable interface, the use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between an IoT device and a communication partner, the use of an electronic circuit for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit and a second military unit, the Trusted Platform Module, the control device for a motor vehicle, the motor vehicle, and the computer network. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0146] 30 / 99

[0147] Further details and advantages will now be explained in more detail using the following examples and optional embodiments with reference to the figures.

[0148] They show:

[0149] Fig. 1 A a computer-implemented method for adapting an encryption to secure electronic communication with a communication partner according to an optional embodiment;

[0150] Fig. 1B is an illustration of a blockchain switch according to an optional embodiment;

[0151] Fig. 1C is an illustration of a blockchain switch according to a further optional embodiment;

[0152] Fig. 2 shows an electronic circuit according to an optional embodiment;

[0153] Fig. 3 shows a computer-readable storage medium according to an optional embodiment;

[0154] Fig. 4 shows a computer-readable interface according to an optional embodiment;

[0155] Fig. 5 shows a motor vehicle according to an optional embodiment;

[0156] Fig. 6 shows a Trusted Platform Module according to an optional embodiment;

[0157] Fig. 7 shows a computer network according to an optional embodiment: Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0158] 31 / 99

[0159] Fig. 8 shows a military unit according to an optional embodiment;

[0160] Fig. 9 shows a manufacturing process according to an optional embodiment;

[0161] Figure 10 shows a schematic representation of a BCD substrate provided by a method for providing low-lying pn junctions in a BCD process and a TCAD representation of the resulting dopant distribution;

[0162] Figure 11 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary first embodiment of an entropy source in a cross-sectional view;

[0163] Figure 12 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary second embodiment of the entropy source in a cross-sectional view;

[0164] Figure 13 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary third embodiment of the entropy source in a cross-sectional view;

[0165] Figure 14 shows a graphical representation of the dependence of a) the SPAD current and b) the ratio between SPAD current and Zener current as a function of the Zener reverse voltage at different SPAD reverse voltages (less than, equal to, greater than the breakdown voltage) within the entropy source from Figures 11 to 13;

[0166] Figure 15 is a schematic representation of a quantum random number generator with the entropy source from Figures 11 to 13;

[0167] Figure 16 is a schematic representation of an exemplary layout of an integrated electronic circuit with the entropy source from Figures 11 to 13 and / or the quantum random number generator from Figure 15 in a top view; and Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0168] 32 / 99

[0169] Figure 17 shows a schematic representation of a system with the entropy source from Figures 11 to 13 and / or the quantum random number generator from Figure 15 and a crypto-engine, optionally at least partially implemented in the form of the microelectronic integrated circuit 500 from Figure 16.

[0170] For the sake of simplicity, identical or similar elements in the various embodiments are designated with the same reference numerals in the following figures.

[0171] Figure 1A schematically illustrates a computer-implemented method 100 for securing electronic communication with a communication partner according to an optional embodiment.

[0172] The procedure 100 includes providing 102 at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator.

[0173] The procedure 100 also includes generating 104 a cryptographic key based on the provided random number.

[0174] Furthermore, the procedure 100 includes an adaptation 106 of an encryption method to provide encrypted communication with the communication partner using the generated random number.

[0175] Furthermore, the procedure 100 includes providing 108 information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via a communication interface.

[0176] Furthermore, procedure 100 includes generating 110 a block 150a to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0177] 33 / 99

[0178] Blockchain and storage 112 of blockchain 150 with block 150a in a data storage element 202. Generating 110 of the block to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for the at least one blockchain 150 may include generating a hash value to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method.

[0179] Furthermore, the procedure may include synchronizing and / or comparing 114 the blockchain 150 partially or completely with a copy of the blockchain of another participant in the blockchain, as well as assessing 116 the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner based on the synchronization and / or comparison.

[0180] The communication partner can be another participant in Blockchain 150, and step 114 can include partially or fully synchronizing and / or comparing the blockchain with the communication partner's copy of the blockchain.

[0181] Furthermore, the procedure 100 may include preventing 118 communication with the communication partner and / or providing 120 information about an anomaly in the encryption procedure, provided that the assessment 116 of the trustworthiness of the encryption procedure and / or the adaptation of the encryption procedure and / or the communication partner concludes that the trustworthiness of the encryption procedure and / or the adaptation of the encryption procedure and / or the communication partner may be compromised.

[0182] The electronic circuit 200 can further be configured to generate the block and / or the hash value for the blockchain in step 110 such that the block 150a and / or the hash value and optionally the entire blockchain 150 are encrypted and / or encrypted in the internal data storage element Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0183] 34 / 99

[0184] 202. The electronic circuit can also be configured to encrypt and / or store the block 150a and / or the hash value and / or the blockchain 150 using at least one of the random numbers provided by the random number generator.

[0185] Procedure 100 can further include, in step 120, deleting blockchain 150 containing blocks 150a from the data storage element to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method upon the occurrence of a predetermined event, and replacing it with a new blockchain of shorter length and / or smaller data volume. The predetermined event can occur when the blockchain reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. When deleting the blockchain from the data storage element, the storage space occupied by the blockchain can optionally be partially or completely released for storing the new blockchain.

[0186] Optionally, the procedure 100 includes a step 122 in which a block is generated for a higher-level blockchain to confirm the replacement of the blockchain by the new blockchain with a shorter length and / or smaller size, and the higher-level blockchain is stored with the generated block in the internal data storage element.

[0187] Steps 120 and 122 are schematically illustrated in Figure 1B. Arrow 160 indicates the progress of the encryption adjustments and can be viewed as a timeline. A first blockchain 150 with blocks 150a and a second blockchain 152 with blocks 152a are used sequentially. When the first blockchain 150 reaches the end of its lifespan, it is deleted, and the second blockchain 152 is used. The switch between blockchains 150 and 152, and optionally the deletion of blockchain 150, is documented or confirmed in a block 154a of the parent blockchain 154. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0188] 35 / 99

[0189] Alternatively or additionally, in step 110, the procedure 100 can generate block 150a, 152a to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method as block 150a for a first blockchain 150 and as block 152a for a second blockchain 152, and in step 112 store the first blockchain 150 and the second blockchain 152, each containing the generated block 150a, 152a, in the internal data storage element 202. The procedure 100 can use the first blockchain 150 and the second blockchain 152 in parallel with staggered start and end times (see Figure 1C). The first blockchain 150 and the second blockchain 152 can optionally each be used up to a predetermined length and / or up to a predetermined data volume, whereby the respective end of use occurs when the predetermined length and / or the predetermined data volume of the first blockchain 150 or the second blockchain 152 is reached.

[0190] Upon reaching the end of its lifespan, the procedure 100 in step 124 can delete the first blockchain 150 and replace it with a new first blockchain (or a third blockchain) of shorter length and / or smaller size. Similarly, upon reaching the end of its lifespan, the procedure 100 can delete the second blockchain 152 and replace it with a new second blockchain (or a fourth blockchain) of shorter length and / or smaller size. Replacing the blockchains with new ones does not necessarily have to occur immediately during or after the deletion of the respective blockchain, but can take place at a later time, as long as the new blockchain is available at the end of the lifespan of the other blockchain or, optionally, before the start of the upper-lobe section 170.

[0191] When deleting and replacing 124 of the first blockchain 150 at the end of its useful life, the procedure can continue to use the second blockchain 152, and when deleting and replacing 124 of the second blockchain 152 at the end of its useful life, the Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0192] 36 / 99 new first blockchain 150 or continue using a third blockchain. When deleting 124 the first and / or second blockchain 150, 152, the storage space occupied by the first or second blockchain 150, 152 in data storage element 202 is optionally released for a new first or second blockchain or a third or fourth blockchain.

[0193] Step 124 is schematically illustrated in Figure 1C. Arrow 160 indicates the progress of the encryption adjustments and can be viewed as a timeline. A first blockchain 150 with blocks 150a and a second blockchain 152 with blocks 152a are used in parallel within an overlap area 170. When the first blockchain 150 reaches the end of its lifespan, it is deleted, and only the second blockchain 152 continues to be used. A third blockchain (not shown) can then be created, which can be used when the second blockchain 152 reaches its end of life and is deleted. This process can be repeated indefinitely, ensuring that at least one blockchain is available at all times and that a new blockchain is ready to replace it towards the end of its lifespan. The overlap area can optionally consist of only one block or be omitted entirely.

[0194] Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of an electronic circuit 200 according to an optional embodiment. The electronic circuit 200 comprises a data storage element 202, a quantum random number generator 204, and a communication interface 206.

[0195] The electronic circuit 200 is designed to a) provide at least one true random number by means of the quantum random number generator 204.

[0196] Furthermore, the electronic circuit 200 is configured to b) a

[0197] to generate cryptographic keys based on the provided random number and Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0198] 37 / 99 to provide for an adaptation of an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner.

[0199] Furthermore, the electronic circuit 200 is configured to: c) provide information to the communication partner about the adjustment of the encryption method via the communication interface 206; and d) generate a block to confirm the adjustment of the

[0200] to generate an encryption method for a blockchain and to store the blockchain with the block in the data storage element 202.

[0201] The electronic circuit 200 can be designed as an integrated electronic circuit.

[0202] The data storage element 202 can be integrated as an internal data storage element into the integrated electronic circuit 200.

[0203] The quantum random number generator 204 and the communication interface 206 can be integrated into the integrated electronic circuit 200. The quantum random number generator 204 can be a monolithically integrated

[0204] The entropy source 208 includes the quantum random number generator 204, which can be configured to provide random numbers with a data stream of at least 10 Kbit / s, optionally at least 50 Kbit / s, optionally at least 100 Kbit / s, and optionally at least 500 Kbit / s.

[0205] The data storage element 202 can be integrated into the electronic circuit 200 as a monolithically integrated data storage element 202. The data storage element 202 can be configured to provide a storage capacity of at least 10 kB and optionally a maximum of 2 MB for storing at least one blockchain. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0206] 38 / 99

[0207] The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to repeatedly execute steps c) and d), optionally steps a) to d). The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to repeatedly adapt the encryption method by repeatedly executing steps c) and d), optionally by repeatedly executing steps a) to d). The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to adapt the encryption method at regular and / or irregular intervals. The intervals can be 48 hours or less, optionally 24 hours or less, optionally 12 hours or less, optionally 6 hours or less, optionally 3 hours or less, optionally 1 hour or less, optionally 30 minutes or less, optionally 10 minutes or less, optionally 5 minutes or less, optionally 2 minutes or less, and optionally 1 minute or less.The encryption method can be designed as a symmetric and / or asymmetric encryption method.

[0208] The electronic circuit 200 can be configured to perform a key selection and / or key exchange, optionally a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange, with the communication partner using the information provided to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface 206, on the generated cryptographic key.

[0209] The electronic circuit 200 can also be configured to generate the cryptographic key based on at least one random number such that the cryptographic key has a length of at least 128 characters, optionally at least 256 characters, optionally at least 512 characters, optionally at least 1,024 characters and optionally at least 2,048 characters.

[0210] The electronic circuit 200 is further configured to generate the cryptographic key based on at least one random number in such a way that the quantum random number generator 204 used for this purpose, Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0211] The random number provided in 39 / 99 has a length of at least 16 bits, optionally at least 32 bits, optionally at least 64 bits, optionally at least 128 bits, optionally at least 256 bits and optionally at least 512 bits.

[0212] The electronic circuit may also be configured to e) partially or completely synchronize the blockchain 150 with a copy of the blockchain 150 of another participant in the blockchain and / or to compare it with a copy of the blockchain of another participant in the blockchain 150 and, based on the synchronization and / or comparison, to assess the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner.

[0213] Figure 3 shows a schematic representation of a computer-readable medium 300 comprising data 302 that defines an operating instruction adapted for controlling a semiconductor manufacturing device, such that the electronic circuit 200 is manufactured by means of the semiconductor manufacturing device when the data is output to the semiconductor manufacturing device.

[0214] The data 302 can include a digital representation of the electronic circuit 200, so that, with the operating instructions, the integrated electronic circuit 200 is manufactured using the digital representation when the data 302 is output to the semiconductor manufacturing device.

[0215] The fabrication of the electronic circuit 200 using the semiconductor fabrication device according to the operating instructions can include fabricating the electronic circuit 200 on a wafer in a semiconductor process, optionally in a CMOS semiconductor process, a BiCMOS semiconductor process, a semiconductor process for bipolar devices, optionally using bipolar CMOS technology. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0216] 40 / 99

[0217] Figure 4 schematically illustrates a computer-readable interface comprising an electronic circuit 200 according to an optional embodiment, wherein the computer-readable interface is configured to be connected to a computer 402 and, in a state connected to the computer 402, to provide a cryptographic key and / or to enable the secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication between the computer and a communication partner 404 and / or to enable a secure communication link with the communication partner 404. The communication partner 404 can be configured as a computer and may optionally have a similar computer-readable interface 400.

[0218] Figure 5 shows a schematic representation of a motor vehicle 500 according to an optional embodiment, wherein the motor vehicle 500 has a control device 502 according to an optional embodiment. The control device 502 has an electronic circuit 200 according to the embodiment shown in Figure 2. The control device 502 can be configured to ensure communication between the control device 502 and another component of the motor vehicle 500 and / or with an external communication partner by means of the electronic circuit 200.

[0219] Figure 6 shows a Trusted Platform Module 600 according to an optional embodiment, wherein the Trusted Platform Module 600 has an electronic circuit 200 according to the optional embodiment shown in Figure 2.

[0220] Figure 7 shows a schematic representation of a computer network 700 according to an optional embodiment comprising several network nodes 702, wherein the several network nodes 702 each have at least one electronic circuit 200 according to the embodiment shown in Figure 2, and wherein the computer network 700 is configured to use the electronic circuits 200 of the respective network nodes. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0221] 41 / 99

[0222] 702 enables encrypted communication between network nodes. The network nodes can optionally be configured as computers.

[0223] Figure 8 shows a military unit 800 according to an optional embodiment with an electronic circuit 200 according to the embodiment shown in Figure 2.

[0224] Figure 9 schematically illustrates a manufacturing process 900 according to an optional embodiment for manufacturing an electronic circuit 200, characterized in that the process 900 is a manufacturing 902 of the electronic circuit 200 by means of a semiconductor manufacturing device, optionally using a computer-readable medium according to the embodiment shown in Figure 3.

[0225] The following description, with reference to Figures 10 to 16, describes a quantum random number generator according to optional embodiments, as well as an entropy source according to optional embodiments, which may be encompassed by the quantum random number generator. Such a quantum random number generator may be used in the disclosed and claimed items, although this is not mandatory and the claimed items are not limited to the described embodiments.

[0226] Figure 10 shows a schematic representation of a (BCD) substrate 110* provided by a method for providing low-lying pn junctions 50* and 52* in a BCD process and a TCAD representation of the resulting dopant distribution.

[0227] The method for generating low-lying pn junctions 50* and 52* in a BCD process can include providing a support substrate 49*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0228] 42 / 99

[0229] The process can include introducing a first dopant to form a first region 22* (e.g. NBL) of the first conduction type (negative for NBL) into a surface S of the support substrate 49*.

[0230] The process can include introducing a second dopant to form a second region 32* (e.g. PBL) of the second conduction type (positive for PBL) into the surface S of the support substrate 49*, wherein the first region 22* (NBL) and the second region 32* (PBL) overlap at least partially.

[0231] The method can include growing an epitaxial layer 48* onto the surface S of the support substrate 49*, wherein the first region 22* (NBL) and the second region 32* (PBL) spread through diffusion of the first dopant and the second dopant in the epitaxial layer 48* and thereby form a (first) pn junction 50* located in the epitaxial layer 48*.

[0232] In the diagram, the first area 22* is a deep-lying NBL layer and the second area 32* is a deep-lying PBL layer. However, the order is interchangeable, so the first area 22* could also be a deep-lying PBL layer and the second area 32* a deep-lying NBL layer.

[0233] By appropriately adjusting the diffusion lengths of the individual dopants, the layer sequence of the pn junctions 50* and 52* can also be reversed, e.g. in Figure 10* the NBL and PBL layers at the pn junctions 50* and 52* could also be swapped.

[0234] The method can offer the advantage that the first region 22* (NBL) and the second region 32* (PBL) at least partially overlap. Optionally, immediately after the introduction of the second dopant, in a top view of the surface S of the support substrate 49*, either the first region 22* or the second region 32* can completely overlap the other region 32*, 22*. Therefore, Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0235] Figure 43 / 99 of the illustrated embodiment shows that immediately after the introduction of the second dopant to form the second region 32* (PBL), this region is completely contained within the first region 22* (NBL) in a top view of the surface S of the support substrate 49*. To form a pn junction 50* located in the epitaxial layer, the first and second dopants can exhibit different diffusion properties in the support substrate 49* and / or in the epitaxial layer 48*. Optionally, as shown, the second dopant in the second region 32* (PBL) can have a higher diffusion mobility (and thus diffusion length) in the support substrate 49* and in the epitaxial layer 48* than the first dopant in the first region 22* (NBL).

[0236] To enhance diffusion, the carrier substrate 49* can be heated after the introduction of the first dopant and / or the second dopant. Heating of the carrier substrate 49* can also be performed after the growth of the epitaxial layer 48* to enhance dopant diffusion.

[0237] The introduction of the first and / or second dopant can be performed either maskless or using a masking method in the presented process. In the BCD wafer shown, a complete overlap of the first region 22* (NBL) with a single second region 32* (PBL) can be assumed. However, conventionally, the first and second regions 22* and 32* are spatially separated. In particular, their distance is generally chosen to be at least large enough to ensure that no overlapping regions are created even after the individual dopants have diffused out.

[0238] The TCAD representation (Technology Computer-Aided Design, TCAD) shown below the schematic diagram illustrates an example of a dopant distribution within the contacted substrate 110* to simulate a corresponding integrated diode structure. Due to the dual structure shown in this embodiment, with an upper pn junction 50* in the epitactic layer 48* and a lower (second) pn junction 52* in the carrier layer, Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0239] In the side view shown, the substrate 49* effectively constricts the n-region (NBL) enclosed in the area of ​​the pn transitions 50* and 52* due to the two p-regions (PBL) surrounding this n-region (NBL). Both pn transitions 50* and 52* can be configured to provide independent SPADs with a doping density and field strength distribution suitable for generating an avalanche effect.

[0240] Using appropriate (semiconductor) substrates 110* suitable for use in BCD technologies, particularly deep SPADs ("deepSPADs") can be generated. Sufficient space remains above the SPADs for the integration of further optoelectronic components. A Zener-avLED positioned above the deep SPAD can therefore be used to realize a particularly compact, vertically structured entropy source 401*, in which individual photons 58* are optionally emitted vertically downwards by the Zener-avLED as photon sources 55* towards the upper pn junction 50*. These photons are then provided as a single-photon detector for detection by a SPAD positioned directly below the Zener-avLED as a photon detector 54* at the upper pn junction 50* (see Figures 11 to 13 with accompanying figure descriptions).

[0241] Figure 11 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary first embodiment of a (vertical) monolithically integrated entropy source 401*.

[0242] The entropy source 401* can comprise a substrate 110* with a support substrate 49* and an epitaxial layer 48*. The epitaxial layer 48* can have or comprise a first pn junction 50* and / or a third pn junction 554*. The support substrate 49* can have or comprise a second pn junction 52*.

[0243] The entropy source 401* comprises a photon source 55* configured to emit photons 58*. For this purpose, the photon source 55* includes a third p-layer 46* formed from a third p-layer 46* and a third n-layer 45*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0244] 45 / 99 n-junction 554*, wherein the third p-layer 46* and the third n-layer 45* are in contact with each other. The photon source 55*, more precisely its pn-junction 554*, comprises a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell is formed by a first base surface 551*, a first top surface 552*, and at least one first side surface 553* connecting the first base surface 551* and the first top surface 552*. The first base surface 551* can have the same area as the first top surface 552*. The first base surface 551* can have a larger or smaller area than the first top surface 552*. A normal vector perpendicular to the first base surface 551* can be parallel to a normal vector perpendicular to the first top surface 552*. The third pn transition 554* can have a cylindrical shape. One height of the cylinder can be parallel to the normal vectors.The height of the cylinder can be, optionally by a multiple, smaller than the radius of the first base surface 551* and / or the first top surface 552*. The third pn transition 554* can be a thin layer.

[0245] The entropy source 401* comprises a photon detector 54*, which is configured to detect the photons 58* emitted by the photon source 55*. For this purpose, the photon detector 54* includes a first pn junction 50* formed from a first p-layer 32* and a first n-layer 22*, wherein the first p-layer 32* and the first n-layer 22* are in contact with each other. The photon detector 54*, more precisely its first pn junction 50*, comprises a second outer shell, wherein the second outer shell is formed by a second base surface 541*, a second top surface 542*, and at least one second side surface 543* connecting the second base surface 541* and the second top surface 542*. The second base surface 541* can have the same area as the second top surface 542*. The second base surface 541* can have a larger or smaller area than the first top surface 542*.A normal vector perpendicular to the second base surface 541* can be parallel to a normal vector perpendicular to the second top surface 542*. The first pn transition 50* can have a cylindrical shape. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025.

[0246] exhibit 46 / 99. One height of the cylinder can be parallel to the normal vectors. The height of the cylinder can be, optionally by a multiple, smaller than a radius of the second base surface 541* and / or the second top surface 542*. The first pn transition 50* can be a thin layer.

[0247] The first base 541* of the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55* is oriented towards the second base 541* of the first pn junction of the photon detector 55*. That is, the norm vector perpendicular to the second base 541* is parallel to the normal vector perpendicular to the first base 551*. The distance between the first base 551* and the second base 541* is shorter than the distance between the first top surface 552* and the second base 541*.

[0248] The photon source 55* can be a silicon LED and / or a single photon source, optionally a SPAD or an avalanche Zener diode, the avalanche Zener diode optionally having a breakdown voltage of less than 10 V.

[0249] The photon detector 55* comprises an absorption region 10*, 47*, which is designed and arranged to absorb the photons 58* emitted by the photon source 55* such that the absorption region 10*, 47* generates, optionally exactly, one electron-hole pair per photon 58*. The absorption region 10*, 47* is in contact with the first pn junction 50* (and the third pn junction 554*).

[0250] The first pn junction 50* is designed to generate a charge avalanche due to the generated electron-hole pair. The photon detector 54* is designed to detect the respective photon 58* emitted by the photon source 55* based on the generated charge avalanche.

[0251] The photon detector 54* can include a single-photon detector, optionally a single-photon avalanche diode, and optionally a SPAD. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0252] 47 / 99

[0253] The absorption region 10*. 47* comprises a p-doped substrate or consists of the surface facing the photon source 55*, i.e. the second base surface 541*, of the first pn transition 50* being completely covered.

[0254] The absorption region 10*, 47* is in contact with the photon source 55*, here the p-doped substrate 46* of the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55*.

[0255] The photon detector 55* comprises a second pn junction 52* formed from a second p-layer 32* and the first n-layer 22*, wherein the second p-layer 32* and the first n-layer 22* are in contact with each other.

[0256] The entropy source 401* comprises a metal layer 53*, optionally together with an internal silicide layer or one facing a surface O, which shields the entropy source 401* from the outside.

[0257] The entropy source 401* can include at least two anodes 124*, 134* for the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54*, which can be conductively connected to each other via the metal layer 53*.

[0258] The photon source 55* and / or the photon detector 54*, optionally the entropy source 401* as a whole, can be designed rotationally symmetric along an axis. The axis can run parallel to the normal vectors described above, which are perpendicular to the first and / or the second base surface 541*, 551* and / or perpendicular to the surface O.

[0259] The entropy source 401* can be manufactured using BCD technology.

[0260] An upper and / or lower surface of the entropy source 401* can be mirrored and / or comprise a light-blocking layer, at least in the region of the photon source 55* and / or the photon detector 54*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0261] 48 / 99

[0262] During operation of the entropy source 401*, photons 58* can be emitted at random time intervals at the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55*, so that the photons 58* leave the third pn junction 554* of the photon source 55* via its first base 551* in the direction of the second base 541* of the first pn junction of the photon detector 54*, form an electron-hole pair in the absorption region 10*, 47* and trigger a charge avalanche at the first pn junction 50*.

[0263] In detail, the vertical entropy source 401* can be characterized, as described in this document, by a vertical arrangement of the photon source 55* opposite the photon detector 54*. The horizontal plane is defined by the surface O of the semiconductor substrate 110* with the epitaxial layer 48*. The line connecting the centers of gravity of the vertical arrangement consisting of the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54* is thus arranged vertically opposite the surface O of the substrate 49* with the epitaxial layer 48*, where "vertical" can be understood as an angle of more than 30°, optionally 90°, of this line relative to the surface O. The monolithically integrated entropy source 401* shown comprises the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54*, wherein the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54* can be arranged vertically one above the other in a common substrate 110* made of a semiconductor material.Optionally, the photon source 55* is a single-photon source configured to provide only one or a few photons 58* at a time (so-called single-photon source). Optionally, the photon source 55* is a light-emitting avalanche Zener diode (Zener-avLED) operated at an operating point below or near the breakdown voltage. Optionally, the photon detector 54* is a single-photon detector, such as a single-photon avalanche diode.

[0264] The entropy source 401* can be formed in a (BCD) substrate 110* using BCD technology. The substrate 110* can be the carrier substrate 49* and the one on the Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0265] 49 / 99

[0266] The support substrate 49* comprises an epitaxial layer 48* grown on it. The pn junctions 50*, 52* can be arranged as described with reference to Figure 10. The photon detector 55* can include an avalanche region formed in a region around the upper pn junction 50* of the photon detector 54* and an absorption region 10*, 47* with a high-voltage p-type well 10* and a p-type well 47* for converting photons into electron-hole pairs, wherein the absorption region 10*, 47* can be directly adjacent to the regions 22*, 32* forming the lower-lying pn junction 50*. The fully developed high-voltage p-tub 10* can enable optimal connection of the low-lying pn junction 50* from the anode 124*, 134*.

[0267] The upper low-lying pn junction 50* of the photon detector 54* can be formed between a low-lying n-layer 22*, which serves as the cathode 132*, and a low-lying p-layer 32* immediately adjacent to the low-lying n-layer 22*. The absorption region 10*, 47* can be directly adjacent to the low-lying p-layer 32* and can be essentially a p-region (optionally including an intrinsic region). The anode 46* (p-) of the uppermost or third pn junction 554* can be connected via the p-region 47* to a p+-region 51*, whereby the anode 32* of the middle or second pn junction 50* can also be connected via the region 10* and the region 47* to the p+-region 51*.

[0268] In the illustrated embodiment, the respective anodes 124*, 134* of the photon source 55* and the photon detector 54* are combined. These can then be electrically contacted, for example, via the common metallization 53* on the surface O of the substrate 110*. A common and continuous metallization 53* can also provide shielding against electromagnetic radiation from above. The associated cathodes 122*, 132* are each implemented separately as an example and can be electrically contacted via a first associated further metallization 141*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0269] 50 / 99

[0270] The entropy source 401* can be formed as a circular structure (corresponding to a spatial rotation of the depicted plane around an imaginary central axis in the vertical direction). However, other forms of the entropy source 401* are also possible.

[0271] Figure 12 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary second embodiment of the entropy source 401*. The embodiment shown in Figure 12 largely corresponds to the first embodiment shown in Figure 11 and described above. The reference numerals and their respective assignment to individual features therefore apply accordingly.

[0272] In the second embodiment, the absorption region 10*, 47*, which has the p-doped substrate, is designed such that it only partially covers the surface or second base 541* of the first p-n junction 50* facing the photon source 55* and forms a channel extending from this second base 541* of the first pn junction 50* towards the photon source 55*, which is laterally bounded by an n-doped substrate 29*.

[0273] This means that, compared to the first embodiment, the high-voltage p-well 10* is structurally tapered and an additional (weakly) n-doped region 29* is provided. The high-voltage p-well 10* of the absorption region 10*, 47* forms a channel between the upper p-well 47* (also shown in Figure 11) and the (lower) p-layer 32* of the second pn junction 50*. The channel's surroundings are defined by the (weakly) n-doped region 29*. Through this channel, the lower upper pn junction 50* is electrically connected to the upper pn junction 45*, 46* without an additional punch through the n-doped region 29* and is irradiated with photons 58* by the photon source 54*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0274] 51 / 99

[0275] Figure 13 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary third embodiment of the entropy source 401*. The third embodiment shown largely corresponds to the first and second embodiments shown in Figures 11 and 12 and described above. The reference numerals and their respective assignment to individual features therefore apply accordingly.

[0276] However, the absorption region 10*, 47* has (or consists of) an n-doped substrate 29* that completely covers the base surface 541* of the first pn transition 50* facing the photon source 55*.

[0277] In contrast to the second embodiment, the third embodiment does not include a channel-shaped high-voltage p-trough 10* in the absorption region 10*, 47*. The weakly n-doped region 29* formed in the epitaxial layer 48* extends over the entire lower area between the second p-n junction 50* and the photon source 54*. In this respect, compared to the second embodiment, the high-voltage p-trough 10* in this region has been structurally replaced by the (weakly) n-doped region 29*. The lower-lying upper p-n junction 50* is thus connected to the photon source 54* only after an additional penetration / punch through the weakly n-doped region 29*, which results in the decoupling of potentially several parallel entropy sources 401*.

[0278] Figure 14 shows a graphical representation of the dependence of a) the SPAD current and b) the ratio between SPAD current and Zener current as a function of the Zener reverse voltage at various SPAD reverse voltages (less than, equal to, greater than the breakdown voltage) within the entropy source 401*. The dependence shown under a) clearly demonstrates that the SPAD current increases exponentially with the Zener reverse voltage in the range of 5.6 V to 6.6 V. This applies to all operating modes of the SPAD, i.e., below its own breakdown voltage (< VBD, linear region), near the breakdown voltage (~ VBD, avalanche region), and also above the breakdown voltage (> VBD), and thus also in Geiger operation. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0279] 52 / 99

[0280] The lower curve shown under b) (< VBD) shows that the measured current ratio between the SPAD current and the Zener current is approximately 1:4000 for various Zener blocking voltages in the range of 5.8 to 6.6 V. In the region of the breakdown voltage Above the breakdown voltage (VBD), the ratio of the photocurrent and Zener current of the SPAD increases to values ​​around 1:10. This is due to the SPAD's multiplication factor, which deviates from a linear range in the region of the breakdown voltage. The upper curve represents the corresponding ratio for the SPAD operated above its breakdown voltage (> VBD) (approximately 1:1). This means that when the SPAD is operated above its breakdown voltage (> VBD), the generated photocurrent and the Zener current of the Zener-avLED are approximately equal, and a clear measurement signal can be obtained by coupling photons to the SPAD.

[0281] Figure 15 shows a schematic representation of a quantum random number generator 400* for generating and outputting a digital random number sequence, e.g. in the form of a random bitstream ZBS (see also Figure 17) and / or, optionally by means of a finite automaton 404.8*, a random bit data word 418*.

[0282] The quantum random number generator 400* is described in more detail below.

[0283] The quantum random number generator 400* includes the entropy source 401* described above. The entropy source 401* of the quantum random number generator 400* can be supplied with a voltage relative to a reference potential on a reference potential line GND via a supply voltage line VENT, which can be connected to a voltage converter 408*.

[0284] An output signal or voltage signal 405* generated by the entropy source 401* can first be digitized in an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) 403*, which can optionally be supplied via a reference voltage line VREF, and then passed as a digital output signal 407* to a pulse extension circuit 406*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0285] 53 / 99

[0286] The output signal 405* of the entropy source 401* can be obtained, for example, by positively biasing region 45* relative to region 51* (via breakdown voltage). This enables the third pn junction 554* to emit photons 58*. Region 22* is positively biased relative to region 32* (in reverse bias). When the third pn junction 554* emits a photon 58* and this photon 58* is detected by the second pn junction 50*, a current pulse can be tapped at the cathode 132*, which can then be converted into a voltage pulse. This voltage pulse can correspond to the output signal 405* of the entropy source 401*.

[0287] The supply voltage line VENT and / or the reference voltage line VREF can be monitored via a voltage monitor 413*, whereby the voltage transformer 408* and / or the voltage monitor 413* can be supplied with voltage via a positive supply voltage line VDD relative to the reference potential on the reference potential line GND. The voltage transformer 408* can be connected to the voltage monitor 413* via a voltage transformer line 421*.

[0288] The pulse extension circuit 406* can be a monostable multivibrator (monoflop, MF). The monoflop can be used to extend a pulse on the line of the digital output signal 407* of the ADC 403* depending on a specific predefined system clock, for example, to a duration of at least one clock period of the system clock.

[0289] The pulse extension circuit 406* can output a synchronized voltage signal 415*, i.e., for example, a pulse with a specific minimum length, and optionally pass it to a pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0290] 54 / 99

[0291] The pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be a time-to-pseudorandom number converter (TPRC). This can be a single-stage or multi-stage converter. For example, the TPRC can include an analog instrument, a time-to-analog converter (TAG), and / or an analog-to-pseudorandom number converter (APRC). The TPRC can include a feedback shift register which, depending on its design, shifts its values ​​one position left or right with each clock cycle of the system clock and feeds the feedback value of a predefined feedback polynomial into the freed bit. The feedback polynomial can be a simple, primitive one. One advantage of such a TPRC is its speed and small chip area, as well as the fact that an attacker can hardly measure its success.Instead of the TPRC, a time-to-digital converter (TDC) can also be used, which is typically a binary start-stop counter that is started with a first pulse of the synchronized voltage signal 415* and stopped with a second pulse of the synchronized voltage signal 415*. The pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be (optionally directly) connected to an internal data bus 419*. An output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can also be fed to an entropy extraction unit 404.4*.

[0292] To generate the output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*, starting with a seed value of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*, exactly one pseudorandom number from the pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be assigned (bijectively) to each clock cycle of the system clock after a falling edge of the synchronized voltage signal 415*. This means that the value of the pseudorandom number can then be used to determine the time position of the corresponding clock cycle of the system clock after the falling edge of the synchronized voltage signal 415*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0293] 55 / 99

[0294] Thus, a pseudorandom number generator 404.3* can be used. One advantage of this is that even if an attacker successfully injects a disturbance into the synchronized voltage signal 415*, the randomness of the quantum random bit at the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4* is only marginally affected, since the attacker would need to know the corresponding feedback polynomial of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. The feedback polynomial can, for example, be randomly selected from a multitude of possibilities. The same applies to the seed value of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*, which an attacker would also have to determine. Another advantage of a pseudorandom number generator 404.3* over a simple digital counter is the smaller footprint of the feedback logic using a simple, primitive feedback polynomial compared to a binary counter.If the linearly feedback shift register of the pseudorandom number generator is long enough, then each clock cycle between two pulses of the voltage signal 405* generated by the entropy source 401* is typically assigned a unique pseudorandom number.

[0295] The entropy extraction 404.4* can be used to detect an error (i.e., an undesired state) in the output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. For this purpose, the entropy extraction 404.4* can have two linearly feedback-controlled shift registers that are comparable via a comparator. Here, too, conventional binary counters can be dispensed with. Depending on the register depth, feedback can also be provided via simple primitive polynomials as generator polynomials or feedback polynomials. The length of the linearly feedback-controlled shift registers can be freely adjustable. Longer shift registers generally exhibit good random statistics or random distribution. Shorter shift registers allow for a high data rate.The use of shift registers at this point can have the advantage that few gates are required, the logic depth of the circuits can be small, and thus the clock rate can be high. This reduces the probability of two identical numbers occurring and increases the random bit rate. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025.

[0296] 56 / 99

[0297] A corresponding method for entropy extraction can provide that two values ​​of the output signal 410* of the pseudorandom number generator 404.3* are first determined and stored in shift registers of the entropy extraction device 404.4*. Once two values ​​are stored in the shift register of the entropy extraction device 404.4*, the entropy extraction device 404.4* can compare these two values. The values ​​in the shift registers of the entropy extraction device 404.4* thus comprise a first value and a second value, both of which were determined by the pseudorandom number generator 404.3*. Subsequently, the entropy extraction device 404.4* can evaluate the two values. If the first value is smaller than the second value and the difference between the first value and the second value is greater than a minimum difference e, then the entropy extraction 404.4* can set the value of its output 41 T to a first logical value.If the first value is greater than the second value and the difference between the first and second values ​​is greater than the minimum difference e, then the entropy extraction 404.4* can set its output 411* to a second logical value that differs from the first logical value. If the difference between the first and second values ​​is less than the minimum difference e, then the entropy extraction 404.4* can discard both the first and second values. In such a case, the entropy extraction 404.4* can cause a so-called watchdog 404.5* to increment an error counter by a first error counter increment. The first error counter increment can be negative. Conversely, the entropy extraction 404.4* can decrement the error counter of the watchdog 404.5* by a second error counter increment if the difference between the first and second values ​​is greater than the minimum difference e.The second error counter increment can be the same as the first. The respective logical value (e.g., 0 or 1) to which the entropy extraction 404.4* sets its output 411* corresponds to a random number. Since the entropy extraction 404.4* continuously outputs random numbers, a random number stream ZBS is generated. This random number stream ZBS can be used for a crypto engine 800*, as described in more detail later. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025.

[0298] 57 / 99

[0299] The Watchdog 404.5* can be connected to the internal data bus 419* as a transport medium for the random bit stream ZBS. The internal data bus 419* can be connected, for example, to a Crypto Engine 800* and / or one or more memories and / or one or more CPUs (see also the description for Figure 17). The Watchdog 404.5* can be connected to the Voltage Monitor 413* via one or more optional digital input / output signal lines 414*. The Watchdog 404.5* can monitor voltage values ​​determined by the Voltage Monitor 413*. The Voltage Monitor 413* can be configured to determine and / or monitor one or more voltages in the Quantum Random Number Generator 400*, and optionally also one or more voltages within a specific application circuit, such as the Crypto Engine 800* and / or a System 1000*. The voltage monitor 413* could, for example, be an ADC.

[0300] One task of the watchdog 404.5* can be to monitor the entropy quality of the random numbers at the output 411* of the entropy extraction unit 404.4*, which form the random bit stream ZBS. The watchdog 404.5* can be configured to detect at least three defined error cases. The watchdog 404.5* can pass valid quantum random bits 411*, generating a seed value S, via a line 412* to a (backup) pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) 404.6*, which may include another linearly feedback shift register. The watchdog 404.5* can prevent the use of the valid quantum random bits by a finite-state machine 404.8*. This is shown here as an example connected to the internal data bus 419*. If an error occurs, the watchdog 404.5* can set certain error bits for further evaluation, which another bus participant (e.g.,a micro-controller (MCU)) can read and / or write via an external data bus DB, a data bus interface DBIF and the internal data bus 419*.

[0301] If, for example, the Watchdog 404.5* detects a fault in the quantum random number generator 400*, it can, for example, put the quantum random number generator 400* into a failsafe state. For this purpose, the Watchdog 404.5* can [Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025]

[0302] 58 / 99 e.g. a selection signal 416* of one of the signal multiplexers 404.7* downstream of the random number generation is set such that the signal multiplexer 404.7* instead of the random numbers RN at the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4* applies the pseudorandom number PRN of the optional PRNG 404.6* in the form of a stream of pseudorandom bits via a pseudorandom signal line 417* as a replacement for the at least potentially erroneous random number RN of the output 411* of the entropy extraction 404.4* to the input of the finite-state machine 404.8*.

[0303] The optional additional linear feedback shift register of the PRNG 404.6* can be configured to generate pseudorandom numbers PRN. The seed value S can contain the last valid quantum random bits of the output 411* of the entropy extraction unit 404.4*. The watchdog 404.5* can then apply or output these last valid quantum random bits 411* to the input of the optional PRNG 404.6*. The seed value S can thus be used as a random, safe starting value for a generator polynomial of the feedback loop of the optional additional linear feedback shift register of the PRNG 404.6* for generating the pseudorandom number PRN and signaling it via the pseudorandom signal line 417*. The generator polynomial and its degree can be freely selected. The optional backup pseudo-random number generator 404.6* allows for the provision of secure random numbers, at least temporarily, in case of an error.

[0304] The finite-state machine 404.8* can be configured to receive the random numbers forming the random bit stream ZBS, or optionally the pseudorandom number PRN (optionally at the output of the signal multiplexer 404.7*), and to generate at least one quantum random data word 418* based on this. Optionally, the quantum random data word 418* can be written from the machine 404.8* to a memory 404.9*, optionally a volatile memory (RAM) or a FIFO (First In - First Out) memory, via a pseudorandom signal line 417*. It is conceivable that the automaton 404.8* sets a finish flag 404.10* via the internal data bus 419* as soon as the quantum random data word 418* is written to memory 404.9*. Subsequently, a processor can... Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0305] 59 / 99

[0306] (MCU), for example, can access memory 404.9* and read the quantum random word 418* and use it, for example, for encryption. This means that, in addition to or as an alternative to the random bit data stream ZBS, the crypto engine 800* (see Figure 17) can also use the quantum random data word 418* for encryption. The description below, referring to the random bit data stream ZBS, therefore applies analogously to the quantum random data word 418*.

[0307] Figure 16 shows a schematic representation of an exemplary layout of an integrated electronic circuit 500* with the quantum random number generator 400* with the entropy source 401* in a pad frame 503* in a top view.

[0308] The integrated electronic circuit 500*, for example a microcontroller with a CPU, can have an inner area 505*. Subcircuits of the integrated electronic circuit 500* can be located within the inner area 505*.

[0309] The inner area 505* can be surrounded by a wiring area 504*. Supply voltage lines, data bus lines and / or other lines can be routed or located within the wiring area 504*.

[0310] The wiring area 504* and the inner area 505* of the integrated electronic circuit 500* can be surrounded by a pad frame 503* (also referred to as a pad border). The pad frame 503* can include connection pads 502* (connection surfaces) (optional for electrical bond connections and / or other electrical connection points).

[0311] The entropy source 401* and / or the quantum random number generator 400* can be located wholly or at least in substantial part within the pad frame 503*, more precisely between at least two connection pads 502*. This is possible because gaps between the individual connection pads 502* do not comply with Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0312] 60 / 99 of the electronic circuit components can be filled. However, these gaps must still be processed during the manufacturing of the integrated electronic circuit 500* and can therefore incur manufacturing costs. Placing the entropy source 401* and / or the quantum random number generator 400* entirely or at least substantially within the pad frame 503* can therefore reduce the additional costs for their provision.

[0313] At least the photon source 55* and / or the photon detector 54* can be placed or arranged in the pad frame 503* (optionally between two connection pads 502*). Furthermore, the ADC 403*, the voltage converter 408* for supplying energy to the entropy source 403*, the pulse lengthening circuit 406* and / or other analog components of the quantum random number generator 400* can be placed in the pad frame 503* (optionally between two connection pads 502*).

[0314] Figure 17 shows a schematic representation of a system for encrypted communication 1000* with a quantum random number generator, optionally the quantum random number generator 400* described above, a crypto engine 800* and a data interface 600*.

[0315] The system 1000* is connected to an external data processing device or an external computer system 700*, optionally a microprocessor or an MCU, via the data interface 600* and a data bus 601*.

[0316] The quantum random number generator 400* has at least the entropy source 401* described above. The quantum random number generator 400* could be the quantum random number generator 400* described above, meaning that, in addition to the entropy source 401*, the quantum random number generator 400* could include one or more of the units described above with reference to Figure 14. The above description therefore also applies analogously to the system 1000*. Insofar as individual units of the quantum random number generator 400* with reference to Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0317] 61 / 99, which is described again below in Figure 17, this description also applies to the quantum random number generator 400* described above.

[0318] The quantum random number generator 400* is designed to output the random bit data stream ZBS generated as described above to the crypto engine 800*.

[0319] The Crypto Engine 800* can be configured to encrypt an initial folded bit portion of the random bit data stream ZBS into an encrypted random bit data stream VZS. For this purpose, the Crypto Engine 800* can use a key that can be stored in a memory 801* of the Crypto Engine 800*.

[0320] The MCU 700* can be configured to retrieve encrypted random bits as encrypted random numbers via the data bus 601* and the data interface 600*.

[0321] The crypto engine 800* can be configured to decrypt encrypted commands from the external computer system 700* to the system 1000*, which the MCU 700* outputs to the system 1000* via the data bus 601* and the interface 600*.

[0322] The Crypto Engine 800* can be configured to output the decrypted commands to the System 1000* or to use them itself if the Crypto Engine 800* is the intended recipient of such a decrypted command. This allows the MCU 700* to securely control the System 1000*.

[0323] The watchdog 404.5* or a similar device can be configured to measure the entropy of the random bit stream ZBS, the operating voltage of the entropy source 401* and / or the voltage converter 408*, ​​which provides the supply voltage VSUP for the entropy source 401*, an externally applied supply voltage and / or a supply voltage device CLV for supply. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0324] 62 / 99 Monitor the voltage of the digital device components for correct function or correct values.

[0325] Additional monitoring circuits 1001* may be configured to detect further anomalies.

[0326] A voltage pre-regulator 1002* can be designed to supply further voltage regulators with electrical energy and to keep the current constant (to exclude side channels via power consumption).

[0327] A 1003* test interface can enable a fabrication test.

[0328] Figure 17 shows a schematic representation of a system for encrypted communication 1000* with a quantum random number generator, optionally the quantum random number generator 400* described above, a crypto engine 800*, and a data interface 600*. The system 100* is connected to an external data processing device, optionally a microprocessor or MCU 700*, via the data interface 600* and a data bus 601*. The quantum random number generator 400* includes at least the entropy source 401* described above.

[0329] In detail, the quantum random number generator 400* generates a random bitstream ZBS of random bits, which are used in the crypto engine 800* for key generation and / or other cryptographic operations. The entropy source 401* described above enables a high random bit rate in the random bitstream ZBS, which improves the security of the cryptographic operations of the crypto engine 800*.

[0330] The 400* quantum random number generator can enable a high random bit rate, which can form the basis for secure cryptographic operations. This high random bit rate can significantly increase security against quantum attacks. The high random bit rate can ensure high security and efficiency. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0331] 63 / 99 gen, by providing the basis for fast and secure key generation and encryption operations.

[0332] The crypto engine 800* can include an encryption unit 801*, which is configured to generate at least one cryptographic key based on an initial random bit component of the random bit stream ZBS. The encryption unit 801* can be configured to encrypt data that the system 1000* sends to other bus participants via a data bus 600* in the form of an output data stream VZS, based on the generated key. Encryption in the crypto engine 800* can be performed by a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm.

[0333] The Crypto Engine 800* can optionally be implemented entirely as a computer-implemented device.

[0334] The crypto engine 800* can have a memory 802*. The computer-implemented encryption algorithm, more precisely the program code, can be stored at least temporarily in memory 801*.

[0335] The Crypto Engine 800* can include a CPU 803*. When executing the computer-implemented algorithm, the CPU 803* can execute the algorithm's program code stored in memory 802*. This can have a technical effect in the form of secure encryption of data that the System 1000* sends via data bus 601* to another bus participant (e.g., the MCU 700*). The CPU 803* is not exclusively a component of the Crypto Engine 800*, but can also be part of System 1000* and / or the Quantum Random Number Generator 400*.

[0336] The data sent or output by System 1000* can include a second random bit component of the random bit stream ZBS. The intersection of the first set of the first random bit component of the random bit stream ZBS and the second set of the second random bit component of the random bit stream ZBS can be tar or Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0337] 64 / 99 should be zero, so that no random bits are sent from the system 1000* to other bus participants (e.g., the MCU 700*) of the data bus 601*, which the system 1000* used for encrypting the data.

[0338] The quantum random number generator 400* can include an entropy module – also called watchdog 404.5* – which can be configured to monitor the entropy of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS generated by the quantum random number generator 400*, or of random data derived therefrom. The entropy module 404.5* can be configured to determine and / or monitor a measurement for a predetermined parameter of the entropy of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS. Such measurements can be, for example, the mean, standard deviation, etc. The entropy module 404.5* can be configured to compare the measurement with a permissible range of values ​​and to take a predetermined countermeasure if the measurement is outside the permissible range. In this way, the entropy module 404.5* can...5* ensure that sufficient randomness is present to guarantee secure cryptographic operations using the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS. If necessary, the entropy module 404.5* may also require deviations from randomness that are sensible from a security-practical point of view. For example, it may invert the random bit stream ZBS for the subsequent random bits of the random bit stream ZBS whenever the quantum random number generator 400* has generated a predetermined number of consecutive random bits in the random bit stream ZBS with the same logical content. Optionally, this function of targeted deviation from an ideal random bitstream (ZBS) can be switched on and off via the data interface 601* of the system 1000* by means of an encrypted write command to a register or a flag of the quantum random number generator 400* or one of its device components. The entropy module 404.5* can perform this monitoring using a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm. The program code of the computer-implemented algorithm can be stored in a memory 404.9* of the quantum random number generator 400*. The program code can be executed by a CPU of the quantum random number generator 400 or Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025.

[0339] 65 / 99 of the system 1000* can be executed. The use of an entropy module 404.5* can offer the advantage of increased security for the cryptographic processes of the crypto engine 800* and improved usability of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS of the quantum random number generator 400*.

[0340] The quantum random number generator 400* can include a filter module – also known as entropy extraction 404.4*. The filter module 404.4* of the quantum random number generator 400* can be designed to improve the statistical properties of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS by removing systematic patterns and / or ensuring the uniform distribution of the random bits. Here, too, a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm can be used (with the above descriptions regarding algorithms applying analogously). Optionally, the filter module is part of a control logic. The filter module 404.4* can offer the advantage of optimizing the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS for cryptographic applications. Optionally, the filter module 404.4* can...5* include a digital high-pass filter that limits the ideal white noise of an ideal random bit data stream to low frequencies, which has the effect of avoiding too many consecutive random bits in the random bit stream ZBS of the same logical content.

[0341] System 100* can include an interface unit—also referred to as a data bus interface 600*—which can be configured to enable encrypted communication between System 1000*, specifically the crypto engine 800*, and an external system connected as bus participants on a common data bus 601*. The interface unit 600* can be configured to support at least one or more different communication protocols. This allows System 1000* to be used in various networks. Optionally, the interface unit 600* can be configured for this purpose via a voltage level at designated external terminals and / or via special cryptographic commands. The interface unit 600* can ensure that encrypted data (VZS) is securely transmitted by System 1000* and thus by the crypto engine 800*. (Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31) March 2025

[0342] 66 / 99 can be. The control of the communication protocols can comprise a computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithm (whereby what is described above with reference to the algorithms applies analogously) and / or software programs (unless explicitly stated otherwise herein, computer-implemented also means machine-implemented). This enables secure data transmission between the quantum random number generator 400* and / or the crypto engine 800* and / or other bus participants (e.g., MCU 700*) of the shared data bus 601*.The data that the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* transmit as part of the system 1000* to other bus participants 700* of the data bus 601* can again include the aforementioned second random bit component of the random bits of the random bit stream ZBS of the quantum random number generator 400* and / or status information of the quantum random number generator 400* and / or its device components and / or status information of the crypto engine 800* and / or status information of other device components of the system 1000*. The data that the system 1000* and / or the crypto engine 800* receive from other bus participants (e.g. MCU 700*) via the data bus 601* can again include the aforementioned control data for configuring the quantum random number generator 400* and / or the crypto engine 800*.

[0343] The System 1000* and / or the Crypto Engine 800* and / or the Quantum Random Number Generator 400* may include one or more CPU cores and / or one or more memories in which program code for a computer- and / or machine-implemented emulation of device parts of the System 1000* and / or the Crypto Engine 800* and / or the Quantum Random Number Generator 400* and / or other device parts of the System 1000* is stored, at least temporarily.

[0344] In operation, the quantum random number generator 400* can continuously generate random bits of the random bit stream ZBS. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0345] 67 / 99

[0346] The generated random bits can be monitored by the entropy module 404.5* to ensure that they actually have sufficient entropy.

[0347] The monitored random bits can be filtered by the 404.4* filter module, optionally to ensure that they do not contain systematic patterns, are evenly distributed and / or do not include random structures that could ultimately result in the random sending of messages in plaintext over a period of time.

[0348] The first random bit component of the filtered random bits can be fed to the encryption unit 801* of the crypto engine 800*, which uses the random bits of the first filtered random bit component to generate cryptographic keys and / or to encrypt data of the system 1000*.

[0349] The interface unit 600* can ensure the secure transmission of encrypted data to external systems or other bus participants (e.g. MCU 700) of the external data bus 601*.

[0350] The cooperation of these device components can ensure a high level of security for the System 1000* and the Crypto-Engine 800*, since the generated random bits are highly random and the cryptographic operations are therefore very difficult to compromise.

[0351] The Crypto Engine 800* can include a Key Management Unit 804*. The Key Management Unit 804* can be configured to manage the generated cryptographic keys, store them, and / or make them available to the necessary processes or units that require them. This has the advantage of securely managing the keys of the Crypto Engine 800*.

[0352] System 1000* may include a line control unit which may be configured to monitor signals on communication lines between the various Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0353] 68 / 99, which run through modules of the System 1000* and / or the Crypto Engine 800*. This ensures that data integrity is maintained.

[0354] The performance control unit can be part of a so-called watchdog of the System 1000*, which monitors the correct function of the System 1000* (Health Check) and, if necessary, detects attacks or measures the probability of an attack currently taking place and, if necessary, determines a corresponding measurement value.

[0355] It is conceivable that the Crypto Engine 800* is implemented as, or includes, a post-quantum crypto engine. This would protect the Crypto Engine 800* against attacks by quantum computers and, potentially, modern artificial intelligence algorithms. The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* could include a Post-Quantum Coprocessor 805* for this purpose. The Post-Quantum Coprocessor (PQK) could be defined as a special processor designed to execute computer- and / or machine-implemented post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Optionally, the Post-Quantum Coprocessor 805* is a component of the Crypto Engine 800*. The Post-Quantum Coprocessor 805* could also be a component of the System 1000* and interact with the Crypto Engine 800*. This allows for increased resistance to quantum attacks.

[0356] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* can use one or more of the following methods for PQC encryption:

[0357] 'BIKE1-L1-CPA', 'BIKE1-L3-CPA', 'BIKE1-L1-FO', 'BIKE1-L3-FO', 'Kyber512', 'Kyber768', 'Kyber1024', 'Kyber512-90s', 'Kyber768-90s', 'Kyber1024-90s', 'LEDAcryptKEM-LT12', 'LEDAcrypt-KEM-LT32', 'LEDAcryptKEM-LT52', 'NewHope-512-CCA', 'NewHope-1024-CCA', 'NTRU-HPS-2048-509', 'NTRU-HPS-2048-677', 'NTRU-HPS-4096-82T, 'NTRU-HRSS-70T, 'LightSaber-KEM', 'Saber-KEM', 'FireSaber-KEM', 'BabyBear', 'BabyBearEphem', 'Mama-Bear', 'MamaBearEphem', 'PapaBear', 'PapaBearEphem', 'FrodoKEM-640-AES', 'FrodoKEM-640-SHAKE', 'FrodoKEM-976-AES', 'FrodoKEM-976-SHAKE', 'FrodoKEM-1344-AES', Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 . March 2025

[0358] 69 / 99

[0359] 'FrodoKEM-1344-SHAKE', 'SIDH-p434', 'SIDH-p503', 'SIDH-p610', 'SIDH-p751',

[0360] 'SIDH-p434-compressed', 'SIDH-pSOS-compressed', 'SIDH-p610-com pressed', 'SIDH-p751 -compressed', 'SIKE-p434', 'SIKE-p503', 'SIKE-p610', 'SIKE-p75T',

[0361] 'SIKE-p434-compressed', 'SIKE-p503-compressed', 'SIKE-p610-compressed', 'SI KE-p751 -compressed'.

[0362] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* can use one or more of the following PQC signature methods for signing data messages:

[0363] 'DIUTHIUM_2', 'DILITHIUM_3', 'DIUTHIUM_4', 'MQDSS-31-48', MQDSS-31-64' SPHINCS+-Haraka-128f-robust', SPHINCS+-Haraka-128f-simple', 'SPHINCS+- Haraka-128s-robust', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-128s-simple', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-192f- robust', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-192f-simple', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-192s-robust' 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-192s-simple', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-256f-robust', 'SPHINCS+- Haraka-256f-simple', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-256s-robust', 'SPHINCS+-Haraka-256s- simple', 'SPHINCS+-SHA256-128f-robust', 'SPHINCS+-SHA256-128f-simple'

[0364] 'SPHINCS+-SHA256-128s-robust', 'SPHINCS+-SHA256-128s-simple'

[0365] 'SPHINCS+-SHA256-192f-robusf, ’SPHINCS+-SHA256-192f-simple’

[0366] ’SPHINCS+-SHA256-192s-robust’, ’SPHINCS+-SHA256-192s-simple'

[0367] ’SPHINCS+-SHA256-256f-robust’, ’SPHINCS+-SHA256-256f-simple’

[0368] 'SPHINCS+-SHA256-256s-robust', ’SPHINCS+-SHA256-256ssimple’

[0369] 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128f-robust', ’SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128f-simple'

[0370] 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128s-robust', ’SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128s-simple'

[0371] ’SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192f-robust’, ’SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192fsimple’

[0372] 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192s-robusf, 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192s-simpte'

[0373] ’SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256f-robust', ’SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256fsimpie’

[0374] 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256s-robust', 'SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256s- simple', m'picnic_J_1_FS', 'picnic_L1__UR', 'picnic L3 FS', 'picnic_L3_UR'

[0375] 'picnic_L5_FS', 'picnic_L5_UR', 'picnic2_L1_FS', ! picnic2_L3_FS' 'picnic2_L5_FS', 'qTesla-p-l', 'qTesla-p-lll'. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0376] 70 / 99

[0377] The second random bit component of the random bit stream ZBS can be used to generate the relevant signatures and keys.

[0378] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* can include a (quantum-resistant) key generator 806*. This key generator 806* is optionally part of the Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* and can be configured to generate a key that is resistant to quantum attacks (according to current technological standards). The quantum-resistant key generator 806* achieves this by using random bits from the first random bit portion of the random bit stream ZBS for key generation. This allows for the creation of secure, quantum-resistant keys.

[0379] The quantum random number generator can be designed to provide a random bit rate of the random bit stream ZBS that is high enough to generate quantum-resistant keys.

[0380] These keys can be generated by the quantum-resistant key generator 806* and subsequently used by the post-quantum coprocessor 805* to encrypt the data transmitted by the system 1000* and / or its crypto engine 800* and / or its device components.

[0381] The 600* interface unit can be designed to ensure that the quantum-resistant keys are transmitted securely.

[0382] This ensures the security of data transmission to and from System 1000*.

[0383] The System 1000* can be designed for applications requiring high computing power, such as high-frequency trading systems or other time-critical applications. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0384] 71 / 99

[0385] The System 1000* and / or the Crypto Engine 800* can include a parallel encryption processor 807*. This parallel encryption processor 807* enables the Crypto Engine 800* to perform multiple encryption operations simultaneously to minimize processing time. The system can include more than one CPU and / or more than one quantum random number generator 400* to operate or execute the encryption operations, which are optionally implemented as algorithms. This can have the advantage of enabling the System 1000* to process data more quickly.

[0386] System 1000* can have a (fast) clock line 808* (or a clock line 808* operating at a higher frequency compared to the other clock lines). Clock line 808* can be configured to synchronize an operation of the parallel encryption processor 807* with the other modules of the crypto engine 800* and / or System 1000*. This avoids delays and can achieve the desired synchronization.

[0387] The quantum random number generator 400* can provide the required random bits at a high random bit rate, which are directly passed to the parallel encryption processor 807*. The parallel encryption processor 808* can be configured to use these random bits to perform parallel encryption operations. The clock line 808* can be configured to ensure that the operations of the device components of the system 1000* are synchronized. Performing the parallel encryption by the parallel encryption processor 807* can offer the advantage of increased processing speed for the system 1000*. This can provide high computing power and enable the simultaneous execution of multiple cryptographic operations, which can be advantageous in time-critical applications. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0388] 72 / 99

[0389] An energy-efficient Crypto Engine 800* can be provided, e.g. for use in a mobile device (e.g. smartphone, tablet etc.) and / or an IoT system.

[0390] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* may include an Energy Saving Module 809*. This Energy Saving Module 809* may be configured to monitor and / or regulate the energy consumption of the System 1000* and / or the Crypto Engine 800*. It is conceivable that the Energy Saving Module 809* is configured to deactivate unused modules of the System 1000* and / or the Crypto Engine 800* and / or reduce their performance. This can achieve the desired energy savings.

[0391] It is conceivable that the system 1000* receives encrypted commands via the data bus 601*, which necessitate a restriction and / or cessation of the generation of random bits. The system 1000* may also, for example, have a power-down pin to reduce energy consumption. This can be advantageous, among other things, because the entropy source 401* may require increased voltages. This, in turn, can optimize energy consumption.

[0392] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* can include a (low-energy) clock line 810*, i.e., a special clock line that operates at a (lower) frequency (or a frequency that is low or small compared to the other frequencies used). This can reduce energy consumption.

[0393] Function and Interaction: The internal random number generator (RNG) operates either in a power-saving mode with lower energy consumption and typically a lower random bit rate (which can then also be zero) or in a normal operating mode with increased energy consumption and a higher random bit rate, whereby the power-saving module ensures that only the necessary random bits are generated. The low-energy clock line synchronizes the operations of the RNG and the crypto engine KE at low energy. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0394] 73 / 99 consumption. The technical effect of this variant is the significant reduction in energy consumption while simultaneously maintaining the security of cryptographic operations. Advantages: This variant is particularly suitable for use in battery-powered devices, as it reduces energy consumption to a minimum.

[0395] Disadvantages: The reduced performance may not be sufficient in applications that require high computing power.

[0396] A security-focused Crypto Engine 800* can be provided. The Crypto Engine 800* can meet the highest security requirements.

[0397] The Crypto Engine 800* and / or the System 1000* can include a Security Monitor 811*. The Security Monitor 811* can be configured to continuously monitor the state of the Quantum Random Number Generator 400*, the Crypto Engine 800*, and / or other components of the System 1000*. The Security Monitor 811* can be configured to, in the event of a (detected) attack and / or error, shut down and / or reconfigure the Quantum Random Number Generator 400*, the Crypto Engine 800*, and / or other components of the System 1000*, and / or put them into a predetermined safe mode and / or an emergency state. The Security Module 811* can be configured to allow one or more bus participants (e.g.,The MCU 700*) on the data bus 601* can signal such an incident (for example, via an interrupt line and / or an interrupt line in conjunction with setting a specific register flag and / or an interrupt in conjunction with setting a specific register value in a register of the system 1000* and / or by setting a specific register and / or flag value in a register of the system 1000*). This improves and ensures the security of the entire crypto engine 800* and the system 1000*. The security monitor 811* can be part of the watchdog 404.5* described above, which performs the health check. The security monitor - Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025.

[0398] 74 / 99 tor 811* can be implemented entirely or at least in substantial part in hardware to reduce its susceptibility to manipulation.

[0399] The crypto engine 800* and / or the system 1000* can include a (secure) communication unit 812*, which can be designed to ensure encrypted and / or eavesdropping-proof communication via the interface 600*, optionally all external interfaces of the system 1000*. This enables secure communication.

[0400] Encrypted or tap-proof communication can refer to the use of technologies and procedures that ensure the confidentiality and integrity of information during transmission. Such communication technologies protect messages from unauthorized access, eavesdropping, and / or manipulation by third parties.

[0401] Encryption can be understood as the process by which a message (plaintext) is converted into unreadable text (ciphertext) using an algorithm. An unauthorized third party who intercepts the message cannot read it without the corresponding decryption key. Examples of encryption methods include symmetric encryption (e.g., AES) and / or asymmetric encryption (e.g., RSA).

[0402] The quantum random number generator 400* can continuously supply random bits, which can be monitored for integrity by the security monitor 811*. The communication unit 812* can ensure that (legacy external) data transmissions via the data bus 601* are encrypted and / or protected against eavesdropping. A high level of security for the crypto engine 800* and the system 1000* can be achieved through computer- and / or machine-implemented monitoring algorithms of the security monitor 811* and / or encryption software of the communication unit 812*. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO March 31, 2025

[0403] 75 / 99

[0404] Each module can be implemented in hardware and / or software. The control of one, several, or all of the modules described herein can be achieved by one or more computer- and / or machine-implemented algorithms. A CPU of the Quantum Random Number Generator 400*, the Crypto Engine 800*, and / or the CPU of the System 1000* can be configured to execute the respective program code of the algorithm(s). The algorithm(s) can be stored in a memory of the Quantum Random Number Generator 400*, the Crypto Engine 800*, and / or the CPU of the System 1000*. The term "control" also includes regulation, i.e., control with feedback.

[0405] The following disclosure relates to the quantum random number generator according to an optional embodiment and to an entropy source which may be included by the quantum random number generator. One or more quantum random number generators, which may optionally have the optional features presented below, may be included by an electronic circuit and / or used by a disclosed method and / or integrated into the other disclosed items, although this is not mandatory. The optional features of the quantum random number generator and the entropy source are specified in the following clauses:

[0406] 1. Quantum random number generator (400*), characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) comprises:

[0407] - a monolithically integrated entropy source (401*), wherein the entropy source (401*) comprises:

[0408] - a photon source (55*) configured to emit photons (58*), wherein the photon source (55*) comprises:

[0409] - a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell consists of a first base surface (551*), a first top surface (552*) and at least one first side surface (553*), which form the first Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0410] 76 / 99

[0411] The base surface (551*) and the first top surface (552*) are connected, and

[0412] - a photon detector (54*) designed to detect the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*),

[0413] - wherein the first base surface of the photon source (55*) is arranged facing the photon detector (54*), and

[0414] - an electronic circuit designed to generate a random bit (411*) depending on an output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*), and optionally to output the generated random bit (411*),

[0415] - wherein a manifestation of the output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*) depends on a temporal frequency of the photons (58*) detected by the photon detector (54*).

[0416] 2. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 1 , characterized in that the photon detector (54*) comprises:

[0417] - a second outer shell, wherein the second outer shell is formed by a second base (541*), a second top surface (542*) and at least one second side surface (543*) connecting the second base (541*) and the second top surface (542*),

[0418] - wherein the first base (541*) of the photon source (55*) is arranged facing the second base (541*) of the photon detector (55*).

[0419] 3. Monolithically integrated entropy source (401*), optionally for a quantum random number generator (400*), wherein the entropy source (401*) comprises:

[0420] - a photon source (55*) designed to emit photons (58*), and Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0421] 77 / 99

[0422] - a photon detector (54*) configured to detect the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*), wherein the photon detector (54*) comprises:

[0423] - a second outer shell, wherein the second outer shell is formed by a second base surface (541*), a second top surface (542*) and at least one second side surface (543*) connecting the second base surface (541*) and the second top surface (542*), characterized in that

[0424] - the second base surface (541*) of the photon detector (54*) is arranged facing the photon source (55*).

[0425] 4. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the photon source (55*) is a silicon LED and / or a single photon source, optionally a SPAD or an avalanche Zener diode, wherein the avalanche Zener diode optionally has a breakdown voltage of less than 10 V.

[0426] 5. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the photon source (55*) comprises:

[0427] - a third pn junction (554*) formed from a third p-layer (46*) and a third n-layer (45*),

[0428] - wherein the third p-layer (46*) and the third n-layer (45*) are optionally in contact with each other.

[0429] 6. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 5, characterized in that the photon detector (54*) comprises a single-photon detector, optionally a single-photon avalanche diode, optionally a SPAD.

[0430] 7. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 6, characterized by the fact that the photon detector (55) comprises: Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0431] 78 / 99

[0432] - a first pn junction (50*) formed from a first p-layer (32*) and a first n-layer (22*),

[0433] - wherein the first p-layer (32*) and the first n-layer (22*) are optionally in contact with each other.

[0434] 8. Entropy source (401 *) according to clause 7, characterized in that the photon detector (55*) comprises:

[0435] - an absorption region (47*) designed and arranged to absorb the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*) in such a way that the absorption region (47*) generates, optionally exactly, one electron-hole pair per photon (58*),

[0436] - wherein the absorption region (47*) is in contact with the first pn junction (50*) and the first pn junction (50*) is designed to generate a charge avalanche due to the generated electron-hole pair, and

[0437] - the photon detector (54*) is designed to detect the respective photon (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*) based on the generated charge avalanche.

[0438] 9. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 8, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) has or consists of a p-doped substrate (10*) that completely covers a surface of the first pn transition (50*) facing towards the photon source (55*).

[0439] 10. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 8, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) has a p-doped substrate (10*) which only partially covers a surface of the first pn junction (50*) facing the photon source (55*) and forms a channel extending from this surface of the first pn junction (50*) towards the photon source (55*), which is laterally bounded by an n-doped substrate (29*). Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0440] 79 / 99

[0441] 11. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 8, characterized in that the absorption region (47*) has or consists of an n-doped substrate (29*) that completely covers a surface of the first pn transition (50*) facing towards the photon source (55*).

[0442] 12. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 8 to 1 1. characterized by the fact that the absorption region (47*) is in contact with the photon source (55*), optionally a p-doped substrate (46*) of the photon source (55*).

[0443] 13. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 12, characterized in that the photon detector (55*) comprises:

[0444] - a second pn junction (52*) formed from a second p-layer (32*) and another or the first n-layer (22*),

[0445] - wherein the second p-layer (32*) and the further or the first n-layer (22*) are optionally in contact with each other.

[0446] 14. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 13, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) has a metal layer (53*), optionally together with an internal silicide layer, which shields the entropy source (401*) from the outside.

[0447] 15. Entropy source (401*) according to clause 14, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) has at least two anodes (124*, 134*) for the photon source (55*) and the photon detector (54*) which are conductively connected to each other via the metal layer (53*).

[0448] 16. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the photon source (55*) and / or the photon detector (54*), optionally the entropy source (401*) as a whole, is rotationally symmetric along an axis that is perpendicular to the first and / or the second base surface (541*, 551*). Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0449] 80 / 99

[0450] 17. Entropy source (401*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) is produced using BCD technology.

[0451] 18. Entropy source (401*) according to one of clauses 1 to 17, characterized in that the entropy source (401*) comprises:

[0452] - a substrate (110*) with a support substrate (49*) and an epitaxial layer (48*),

[0453] - wherein, as far as referenced back to any one of claims 7 to 13, the epitaxial layer (48*) has the first pn junction (50), and, as far as referenced back to claim 13, the support substrate (49*) has the second pn junction (52*).

[0454] 19. Entropy source (401 *) according to one of clauses 1 to 18, characterized in that a top and / or bottom surface of the entropy source (401*) is mirrored at least in the area of ​​the photon source (55*) and / or the photon endor (54*) and / or comprises a light-blocking layer.

[0455] 20. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to one of the preceding clauses, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) comprises a pseudorandom number generator (404.3*) configured to generate a digital output signal (410*) based on the output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*) and a generator polynomial that is optionally predetermined or adjustable.

[0456] 21. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 20, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) includes an entropy extraction (404.4*) designed to extract the random bit. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0457] 81 / 99

[0458] (411*) based on the digital output signal (410*) of the pseudorandom number generator (404.3*).

[0459] 22. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 21, characterized in that the entropy extraction (404.4*) is designed to generate the random bit (411*) by:

[0460] - a first value and a second value of the digital output signal (410*) are determined,

[0461] - sets a value of an output of the random bit generation unit (404.4*) to a first logical value if the first value of the digital output signal (410*) is less than the second value of the digital output signal (410*) and the difference between the first value of the digital output signal (410*) and the second value of the digital output signal (410*) is greater than a minimum difference (e),

[0462] - sets the value of the output of the random bit generation unit (404.4*) to a second logical value if the first value of the digital output signal (410*) is greater than the second value of the digital output signal (410*) and the difference between the first value of the digital output signal (410*) and the second value of the digital output signal (410*) is greater than the minimum difference (e).

[0463] 23. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 22, characterized in that the random bit generation unit (404.4*) is designed to discard the first value of the digital output signal (410*) and the second value of the digital output signal (410*) of the digital signal (410*) if a difference between the first and the second value is less than a predetermined minimum difference (e).

[0464] 24. Quantum random number generator (400*) according to clause 23, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (400*) has a monitoring Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0465] 82 / 99 includes a monitoring unit (404.5*) designed to monitor the output of the random bit generation unit, optionally to detect a malfunction of the quantum random number generator (400*) when a number of discarded values ​​of the random bit generation unit (404.4*) exceeds a predetermined limit.

[0466] 25. Integrated electronic circuit (500*), characterized in that the circuit (500*) comprises a quantum random number generator (400*) according to one of the preceding clauses, wherein the integrated electronic circuit (500*) is optionally a microelectronically integrated circuit.

[0467] Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0468] 83 / 99

[0469] Reference symbol list

[0470] 100 Computer-implemented method for securing electronic communication with a communication partner

[0471] 102 - 124 procedural steps

[0472] 150 first blockchain

[0473] Block 150a of the first blockchain

[0474] 152 second blockchain

[0475] Block 152a of the second blockchain

[0476] 154 overarching blockchain

[0477] Block 154a of the parent blockchain

[0478] 160 Direction of travel

[0479] 170 overlap

[0480] 200 electronic circuits

[0481] 202 Data storage element

[0482] 204 Quantum Random Number Generator

[0483] 206 Communication interface

[0484] 208 Entropy source

[0485] 300 computer-readable media

[0486] 302 data

[0487] 400 computer-readable interface

[0488] 402 Computer

[0489] 404 communication partners

[0490] 500 motor vehicles

[0491] 502 Control device

[0492] 600 Trusted Platform Modules

[0493] 700 Computer Network Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO March 31, 2025

[0494] 84 / 99

[0495] 702 network nodes

[0496] 800 military unit

[0497] 900 manufacturing processes

[0498] 902 Procedure step

[0499] 10* p-doped substrate

[0500] 29* n area (HVNW / NEPI)

[0501] 22* first area (e.g. NBL)

[0502] 32* second area (e.g. PBL)

[0503] 45* n+ area (N+)

[0504] 46* p+ area (PBODY)

[0505] 47* Absorption area

[0506] 48* epitaxial layer

[0507] 49* Carrier substrate

[0508] 51* p+ area (P+)

[0509] 50* first pn transition

[0510] 52* second pn transition

[0511] 53* Metallization or metal layer

[0512] 54* Photon detector

[0513] 541* floor area

[0514] 542* Cover area

[0515] 543* Side surface / Shell surface

[0516] 55* photon source

[0517] 551* floor area

[0518] 552* Cover area

[0519] 553* Side surface / Shell surface

[0520] 554* third pn transition

[0521] 58* Photon (en)

[0522] 110* substrate

[0523] 122* Cathode Photon Source

[0524] 132* Cathode Photon Detector

[0525] 124* 134* Anode Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025

[0526] 85 / 99

[0527] 141* Metallization

[0528] 142* Metallization

[0529] 400* Quantum Random Number Generator

[0530] 401* Entropy source

[0531] 403* Analog-to-Digital Converter

[0532] 404.3* Pseudorandom number generator

[0533] 404.4* Entropy extraction or filter module

[0534] 404.6* (Backup) Pseudo-random number generators

[0535] 404.7* Signal Multiplexer

[0536] 404.8* finite automaton

[0537] 404.9* memory

[0538] 404.10* Finish Flag

[0539] 405* Output signal Entropy source

[0540] 406* Pulse extension circuit

[0541] 407* Output signal Analog-to-digital converter

[0542] 408* Voltage converter

[0543] 410* Output signal of the pseudorandom number generator

[0544] 411* Output Entropy extraction or filter module

[0545] 412* Line WatchdogZ (Backup) Pseudo-random number generators

[0546] 413* Voltage monitor

[0547] 414* Input / Output Signal Lines

[0548] 415* synchronized voltage signal

[0549] 416* Selection signal

[0550] 418* Quantum random data word

[0551] 419* internal data bus

[0552] 421* Voltage converter cable

[0553] 500* integrated electronic circuit

[0554] 501* Frame / Outer edge

[0555] 502* Connection pad

[0556] 503* Pad frame Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0557] 86 / 99

[0558] 504* Wiring area

[0559] 505* inner area

[0560] 600* Data interface

[0561] 601* external data bus

[0562] 700* external data processing device

[0563] 800* Crypto Engine

[0564] 801* Crypto Engine Memory

[0565] 802* memory

[0566] 803* CPU

[0567] 804* Key Management Unit

[0568] 805* Post-Quantum Coprocessor

[0569] 806* (quantum-resistant) key generator

[0570] 807* (parallel) encryption processor

[0571] 808* (fast) clock line

[0572] 809* Energy saving module

[0573] 810* (Low-energy) clock line

[0574] 811 * Security Monitor

[0575] 812* (secured) communication unit

[0576] 1000* System for encrypted communication

[0577] 1001* monitoring circuits

[0578] 1002* Voltage regulator

[0579] 1003* Test interface

[0580] VDD supply voltage line

[0581] VENT power supply line

[0582] VREF Reference Voltage Line

[0583] GND reference potential line Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131P11WO 31 March 2025

[0584] 87 / 99

[0585] ZBS random bit (data) stream

[0586] VZS encrypted random bit data stream O surface of the substrate

[0587] S surface of the support substrate

Claims

Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 88 / 99 Patent claims 1. Electronic circuit (200), comprising - a data storage element (202); - a quantum random number generator (204); and - a communication interface (206); characterized in that the electronic circuit (200) is configured to: a) provide at least one true random number by means of the quantum random number generator (204); b) generate a cryptographic key based on the provided random number and make it available for adapting an encryption method for encrypted communication with a communication partner (404); c) provide information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method by means of the communication interface (206); and d) generate a block (150a) to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain (150) and store the blockchain (150) with the block (150a) in the data storage element (202).

2. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 1, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is designed as an integrated electronic circuit (200).

3. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 2, wherein the data storage element (202) is integrated into the integrated electronic circuit (200) as an internal data storage element (202).

4. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the quantum random number generator (204) and the communication interface (206) are integrated into the integrated electronic circuit (200). Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 89 / 99 5. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 2 to 4, wherein the data storage element (202) is integrated into the electronic circuit (200) as a monolithically integrated data storage element (202).

6. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the quantum random number generator (204) comprises a monolithically integrated entropy source (208).

7. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the data storage element (202) is configured to provide a storage space of at least 10 kB and optionally a maximum of 2 MB for storing the at least one blockchain (150).

8. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the quantum random number generator (204) is configured to provide random numbers with a data stream of at least 10 KBit / s, optionally at least 50 KBit / s, optionally at least 100 KBit / s and optionally at least 500 KBit / s.

9. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to perform steps c) and d), optionally steps a) to d), repeatedly.

10. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 9, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to repeatedly perform the adaptation of the encryption method by repeatedly performing steps c) and d), optionally by repeatedly performing steps a) to d).

11. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 10, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to adapt the Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 90 / 99 Encryption procedures are carried out at regular and / or irregular intervals.

12. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 11, wherein the time intervals are 48 hours or less, optionally 24 hours or less, optionally 12 hours or less, optionally 6 hours or less, optionally 3 hours or less, optionally 1 hour or less, optionally 30 min or less, optionally 10 min or less, optionally 5 min or less, optionally 2 min or less, and optionally 1 min or less.

13. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the encryption method is designed as a symmetric and / or asymmetric encryption method.

14. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to perform a key selection and / or key exchange, optionally a Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange, with the communication partner (404) using the information provided to the communication partner (404) about the adaptation of the encryption method via the communication interface (206) on the generated cryptographic key.

15. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the cryptographic key has a length of at least 128 characters, optionally at least 256 characters, optionally at least 512 characters, optionally at least 1,024 characters and optionally at least 2,048 characters. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 91 / 99 16. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to generate the cryptographic key based on the at least one random number such that the random number provided by the quantum random number generator (204) for this purpose has a length of at least 16 bits, optionally at least 32 bits, optionally at least 64 bits, optionally at least 128 bits, optionally at least 256 bits and optionally at least 512 bits.

17. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein generating the block (150a) to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for the at least one blockchain (150) comprises generating a hash value to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method.

18. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit is further configured to: e) partially or completely synchronize the blockchain (150) with a copy of the blockchain (150) of another participant in the blockchain (150) and / or compare it with a copy of the blockchain (150) of another participant in the blockchain (150) and, based on the synchronization and / or comparison, assess the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner.

19. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 18, wherein the communication partner (404) is another participant in the blockchain (150) and wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to synchronize and / or compare the blockchain (150) partially or completely with the copy of the blockchain (150) of the communication partner (404) in feature e).

20. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 18 or 19, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to: Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 92 / 99 f) to stop communication with the communication partner (404) and / or to provide information about an anomaly in the encryption method if the assessment of the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner (404) concludes that the trustworthiness of the encryption method and / or the adaptation of the encryption method and / or the communication partner (404) may be compromised.

21. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to generate the block (150) and / or the hash value for the blockchain (150) such that the block (150a) and / or the hash value and optionally the entire blockchain (150) are encrypted and / or are stored encrypted in the internal data storage element (202).

22. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 21, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to encrypt and / or store the block (150a) and / or the hash value and / or the blockchain (150) using at least one of the random numbers provided by means of the quantum random number generator (204).

23. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to delete the blockchain (150) containing the blocks (150a) confirming the adaptation of the encryption method from the data storage element (202) upon the occurrence of a predetermined event and to replace it with a new blockchain (150) of shorter length and / or lower data volume.

24. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 23, wherein the predetermined event occurs when the blockchain (150) reaches a predetermined length and / or a predetermined data volume. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 93 / 99 25. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to partially or completely release the storage space occupied by the blockchain, optionally for storing the new blockchain, when the blockchain (150) is deleted from the data storage element.

26. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 23 to 25, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to generate a block (154a) for a higher-level blockchain (154) to confirm the replacement of the blockchain (150) by the new blockchain (152) of shorter length and / or size, and to store the higher-level blockchain (154) with the generated block (154a) in the internal data storage element (202).

27. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the electronic circuit (202) is further configured to generate the block (150a) for confirming the adaptation of the encryption method as a block (150a) for a first blockchain (150) and as a block (152a) for a second blockchain (152) and to store the first blockchain (150) and the second blockchain (150) with the respective generated block (150a, 152a) in the internal data storage element (202).

28. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 27, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to use the first blockchain (150) and the second blockchain (152) in parallel with staggered start and end times of use.

29. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 27 or 28, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to utilize the first blockchain (150) and the second blockchain (152) each up to a predetermined length and / or up to a predetermined data volume, wherein the respective end of use occurs upon reaching the predetermined length and / or the Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 94 / 99 predetermined data volume of the first or second blockchain (150, 152) occurs.

30. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 29, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is configured to delete the first blockchain (150) upon reaching the end of its useful life and to replace the first blockchain with a new first blockchain of shorter length and / or size, and upon reaching the end of its useful life the second blockchain (152) reaches the end of its useful life and to replace the second blockchain with a new second blockchain of shorter length and / or size.

31. Electronic circuit (200) according to claim 30, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to continue using the second blockchain (152) when the first blockchain (150) is deleted and replaced at the end of its useful life, and to continue using the first blockchain (150) when the second blockchain (152) is deleted and replaced at the end of its useful life.

32. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 30 and 31, wherein the electronic circuit (200) is further configured to release the storage space in the data storage element (202) occupied by the first and / or second blockchain (150, 152) upon deletion of the first and / or second blockchain (150, 152), optionally for a new first and second blockchain (150, 152).

33. Computer-readable medium (300), characterized in that the computer-readable medium (300) comprises data (302) defining an operating instruction adapted for controlling a semiconductor manufacturing device, such that the electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 1 to 32 is manufactured by means of the semiconductor manufacturing device when the data are output to the semiconductor manufacturing device. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 95 / 99 34. Computer-readable medium (300) according to claim 33, characterized in that the data (302) comprise a digital representation of the electronic circuit (200), such that the integrated electronic circuit (200) is manufactured using the digital representation with the operating instructions when the data (302) are output to the semiconductor manufacturing device.

35. Computer-readable medium (300) according to claim 33 or 34, characterized in that the manufacturing of the electronic circuit (200) by means of the semiconductor manufacturing device comprises: - Manufacturing the electronic circuit on a wafer in a semiconductor process, optionally in a CMOS semiconductor process, a BiCMOS semiconductor process, a semiconductor process for bipolar devices, optionally using the Bipolar CMOS technique.

36. Method (900) for manufacturing an electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 1 to 32, characterized in that the method (900) comprises: - Manufacturing (902) the electronic circuit (200) using a semiconductor manufacturing device, optionally using a computer-readable medium (300) according to one of claims 33 to 35.

37. Computer-readable interface (400) comprising an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 32, wherein the computer-readable interface (400) is configured to be connected to a computer (402) and, in a state connected to the computer (402), to provide a cryptographic key and / or to enable a secure adaptation of an encryption method for communication between the computer (402) and a communication partner (404) and / or to enable a secure communication connection with the communication partner (404). Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 96 / 99 38. Use of an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 32 for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between an IoT device and a communication partner (404).

39. Use of an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 32 for providing a cryptographic key and / or for securely adapting an encryption method for communication between a first military unit (800) and a second military unit (800).

40. Use according to claim 39, wherein the first and / or second military unit (800) comprises or is configured as one of the following elements: - a soldier; - a military vehicle; - an unmanned military vehicle; - a weapon system; - a missile; - an explosive device; - a mine; - an element of a military swarm; - an agent of a multi-agent system; - a measuring probe and / or reconnaissance probe; - a command center; - a control device; and - a satellite.

41. Trusted Platform Module (600) comprising an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 32. Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 97 / 99 42. Control device (502) for a motor vehicle (500) comprising an electronic circuit (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 32.

43. Control device (502) according to claim 42, wherein the control device (502) is configured to secure communication between the control device and another component of the motor vehicle and / or with an external communication partner by means of the electronic circuit (200) and / or to provide an adaptation of an encryption to secure the communication.

44. Motor vehicle (500) comprising a control device (502) according to claim 42 or 43.

45. Computer network (700) comprising several network nodes (702), wherein the several network nodes (702) each have at least one electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 1 to 32 and wherein the computer network (700) is configured to enable encrypted communication between the network nodes (702) using the electronic circuits (200) of the respective network nodes (702).

46. ​​Computer-implemented method (100) for adapting an encryption to secure electronic communication with a communication partner (404), characterized in that the method (100) comprises: - Providing (102) at least one true random number using the quantum random number generator (204); - Generating (104) a cryptographic key based on the provided random number; - To adapt (106) an encryption method to provide encrypted communication with the communication partner using the generated random number; Tautz & Schuhmacher Law EMO1131 P11WO 31 March 2025 98 / 99 - Providing (108) information to the communication partner about the adaptation of the encryption method via a communication interface; and - Generating (110) a block to confirm the adaptation of the encryption method for a blockchain and storing (112) the blockchain with the block in a data storage element.

47. Electronic circuit (200) according to one of claims 1 to 32, characterized in that the quantum random number generator (204, 400*) comprises: - a monolithically integrated entropy source (401*), wherein the entropy source (401*) comprises: - a photon source (55*) configured to emit photons (58*), wherein the photon source (55*) comprises: - a first outer shell, wherein the first outer shell is formed by a first base surface (551*), a first top surface (552*) and at least one first side surface (553*) connecting the first base surface (551*) and the first top surface (552*), and - a photon detector (54*) designed to detect the photons (58*) emitted by the photon source (55*), - wherein the first base surface of the photon source (55*) is arranged facing the photon detector (54*), and - an electronic circuit designed to generate a random bit (411*) depending on an output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*), and optionally to output the generated random bit (411*), - wherein a manifestation of the output signal (405*) of the entropy source (401*) depends on a temporal frequency of the photons (58*) detected by the photon detector (54*).

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