Mutually authenticated QUIC connection
The QUIC key update mechanism is extended to accept an external shared key for mutual authentication and re-keying, addressing the lack of efficient authentication and re-keying in QUIC connections, ensuring secure communication without re-establishment and preventing middleman attacks.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/IB2025/054738
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2025-05-06
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-12
AI Technical Summary
Existing QUIC connections lack efficient methods for mutual authentication and re-keying without requiring re-establishment, especially in non-3GPP access scenarios where QUIC replaces IKEv2+IPsec, and there is a need for secure communication between UE and network gateway.
Extend the QUIC key update mechanism to accept an external shared key for mutual authentication and re-keying, using new QUIC frames for authentication challenges and responses, and leverage existing QUIC packet features to verify knowledge of the shared key.
Enables mutual authentication and re-keying of established QUIC connections without re-establishing the connection, ensuring secure communication by verifying knowledge of the shared key, thus preventing middleman attacks and maintaining secure data transmission.
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Figure IB2025054738_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
P113091W001 1MUTUALLY AUTHENTICATED QUIC CONNECTIONTECHNICAL FIELD
[0001] The present disclosure relates to methods and network nodes that perform mutual authentication of QUIC connections in a wireless communications system.BACKGROUND
[0002] QUIC
[0003] QUIC is a general-purpose transport layer network protocol that improves performance of connection-oriented web applications that before QUIC used Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). This is done through establishment of a number of multiplexed connections between two endpoints using User Datagram Protocol (UDP). QUIC works nicely with multiplexed Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) HTTP / 3 connections, that allows multiple streams of data to reach all the endpoints independently. Hence, each stream is independent of packet losses involving other streams. This is not the case for HTTP / 2 hosted on TCP that can suffer head-of-line-blocking delays if multiple streams are multiplexed on a TCP connection, and any of the TCP packets on that connection are delayed or lost. Another goal with QUIC include reduced connection and transport latency, and bandwidth estimation in each direction to avoid congestion.
[0004] QUIC security is based on Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3, where TLS handshake is used by QUIC to establish keys for protecting application data, QUIC control data, etc. The TLS handshake handles the authentication of the QUIC connection end-points. TLS supports the TLS 1.3 handshake where pre-shared keys (PSKs) generated externally to TLS can be used in authentication of the end-points. Resumption of a connection is based on a secret derived during the initial establishment of the connection. It does not depend on any external PSK.
[0005] According to Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 9001 (“Using TLS to Secure QUIC”) section 4.4 it is required for the peer to authenticate the server when establishing a QUIC connection. Typically, this would be based on a server certificate.
[0006] QUIC performs encryption and integrity protection on QUIC packets (carrying QUIC messages) using Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm(s) negotiated during TLS handshake and based on keys derived from secrets obtained from the TLS handshake. The TLS record layer is not used for protection of packets, but QUIC has its own way of protecting its packets. The key derivation is performed in the same way as TLS is deriving keys, i.e., using Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) negotiated during the TLS handshake.P113091W001 2
[0007] There are different types of QUIC packets carrying different types of data, e.g., initial data, handshake data, Zero Round-Trip Time resumption (0-RTT) application data, 1-RTT application data (the normal application data). Each packet type corresponds to an encryption level and each level uses its own keys for protection. That is, for each encryption level a secret, a negotiated AEAD algorithm, and a negotiated KDF algorithm is obtained from TLS for use in deriving keys used in the protection of packets. In TLS 1.3 the HKDF-Expand-Label function is used for deriving keys and initial values (IVs) with the hash function from the negotiated cipher suite. In QUIC separate labels are used to have key separation from TLS. Separate keys are used for protecting packets in different directions.
[0008] For a particular encryption level, the AEAD algorithm is used to encrypt the QUIC packet payload and integrity protect the QUIC packet payload and (unprotected) header (unprotected header is associated data). Selected parts of the header are then also encrypted using a dedicated header protection key common for all QUIC packets.
[0009] A QUIC endpoint may initiate a key update resulting in that both of the QUIC endpoints update keys. Only keys for QUIC packets carrying 1-RTT application data can be updated. Keys for other encryption levels and header protection keys are never updated. In the key update a new secret for the 1-RTT application data encryption level is derived based on the old secret using the KDF (using a label dedicated for key update). New protection keys and IVs is then computed (using the same KDF again). The header protection key is never updated.
[0010] Non-3GPP Access to 5GC for UEs
[0011] When discussing non Third Generation Partnership Program (non-3GPP) access for a User Equipment (UE) to a core network such as Fifth Generation (5G) Core Network (5GC), this refers to a UE accessing the core network via a non-3GPP access such as a wireless local area network (LAN) instead of via the 3GPP radio access network, meaning the UE is communicating with the core network via, for example, a Wireless LAN access point instead of a gNB.
[0012] There are two main flavors of non-3GPP access categories. The trusted non-3GPP access where the non-3GPP access network is trusted by the home operator and where the network provides the access point with a key to setup secure communication between the UE and the access point (AP). The access network is configured to establish secure communication between the AP and 5GC.
[0013] In the untrusted non-3GPP access network, the non-3GPP access network is not trusted by the home operator and security between UE and access network is out of scope. The UE connects to 5GC and secures the connection to 5GC using Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) via a network gateway called Non-3GPP Interworking Function (N3IWF). See for example, 3GPPP113091W001 3Technical Specification 33.501 (Security architecture and procedures for 5G system) V19.2.0 (2025-03-25). Separate IPsec tunnels are used for control plane data (also known as signaling data) and user plane data. The key used to secure the IPsec tunnels between UE and N3IWF is derived during primary authentication. Primary authentication is the network access authentication performed when attaching to 5GC and is based on subscriber credentials, e.g., credentials stored in a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card.
[0014] IPsec tunnels can be established for untrusted non-3GPP access. The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol is used for this purpose. Secure communication (encrypted, integrity protected, and authenticated) is established using IKEv2 and IPsec security associations for the individual IPsec tunnels are then created using the IKE SA that is the base for the IKEv2 secure communication.
[0015] The establishment of the IKEv2 secure communication follows the method as described in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), IETF RFC 7296. The IKEv2 mutual authentication between UE and network gateway (N3IWF) is based on a shared key obtained by running the primary authentication using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). For example, for 5G EAP-AKA’ is the only EAP method allowed for PLMNs for the primary authentication. For standalone non-public networks (SNPN), any key generating EAP method may be used, e.g., EAP-TLS.
[0016] The first phase is the so-called IKE_SA_INIT where a first pair of messages are exchanged between UE and the network gateway (N3IWF) to negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and do a Diffie-Hellman exchange such that following messages are encrypted and integrity protected. The IKE security association is established.
[0017] IKE_SA_INIT messages are followed by IKE_AUTH messages that authenticates the IKE_SA_INIT messages, exchanges identities, certificates (optional), and establish the first child SA. A pair of IKE_AUTH messages is enough for this purpose if using digital signatures with certificates or if using MACs based on a shared key.
[0018] Several IKE_AUTH messages (at least 6 messages) are needed in case EAP based authentication is used, where EAP messages are exchanged within the payload of IKE_AUTH messages. After successful EAP authentication a shared key is established. This shared key is used (by both sides) in a final pair of AUTH messages using MACs (computed based on the shared key) to authenticate the IKE_SA_INIT messages.
[0019] In addition to authentication of IKE_SA_INIT from the network gateway (N3IWF) using MAC based on the shared key, that message may in 5G also be authenticated using a network gateway signature with certificate.P113091W001 4
[0020] The IKE SA key material and child SA material, for IPsec tunnels for signaling and user plane data, is based on the Diffie-Hellman shared secret from the IKE_SA_INIT and exchanged nonces and is independent of the shared key.
[0021] NOTE: In 5GC, the EAP protocol for primary authentication is tunneled in Non-Access Stratum (NAS) signaling protocol between UE and 5GC. Since non-3GPP access networks (e.g. WLAN) does not support NAS, during primary authentication NAS is encapsulated in EAP which is supported by WLAN APs. This is for the transport of NAS messages between UE and network gateway until the IPsec tunnel for signaling is established that can carry NAS messages. The EAP-5G method is used for this purpose. So, EAP-5G can be tunneled inside IKEv2, NAS tunneled inside EAP-5G, and primary authentication e.g. using EAP-AKA’ tunneled inside NAS. The extra EAP-5G layer needs to be stripped off by the network gateway function (e.g. N3IWF) before reaching AMF. By having NAS tunneled in EAP-5G it is possible use the 5G AKA authentication method in addition to EAP based methods.
[0022] As a possible evolution towards 6G, QUIC may replace IPsec to protect the control plane and user plane data between the UE and network gateway (N3IWF). QUIC is a highly extensible protocol and supports arbitrary application layer protocols. In particular, the use of HTTP3 allows for flexible additions of new functionality, including various types of tunnelling and proxy modes. For user plane data, in the context of having QUIC between UE and UPF in 5GC, by also having QUIC between UE and network gateway enables optimizations for avoiding double encryption.
[0023] In 5G, IKEv2 is used as carrier for the primary authentication (based on EAP) in untrusted non-3GPP access. Assuming non-3GPP access will be based on primary authentication similar to 5G, if IKEv2 is replaced with some other protocol then that protocol needs to be able to carry the authentication protocol (e.g. EAP) being used for primary authentication.SUMMARY
[0024] In an embodiment, a method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node performed by the second QUIC peer node is disclosed. The method can include establishing a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node. The method can also include obtaining, after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key from a server, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and the server. The method can include deriving, based on the shared key and a secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection, a new secret, determining, based on the new secret, a write key and a first initial value, and a read key and a second initial value,P113091W001 5and transmitting a QUIC packet to the first QUIC peer node that is encrypted and integrity protected using the write key and the first initial value. The method can also include receiving, from the first QUIC peer node, another encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet and determining that the key update procedure is complete and that the first QUIC peer node is authenticated in response to decrypting and verifying the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet using the read key and the second initial value. A second QUIC peer node is also provided that is configured to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node. The second QUIC peer node can also include processing circuitry configured to cause the second QUIC peer node perform the method embodiments described above.
[0025] In an embodiment, the server is an authentication server and the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and the server following successful authentication.
[0026] In an embodiment, the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and the server following successful re-authentication and / or re-keying.
[0027] In an embodiment, during the establishing the QUIC connection, a transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node indicating support for mutual authentication of an already established QUIC connection based on an external key.
[0028] In an embodiment, during the establishing the QUIC connection, another transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node indicating support for the rekeying procedure.
[0029] In an embodiment, a header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet comprises an indication that the QUIC packet is associated with a key update procedure and another indication that the key update procedure is based on an external key.
[0030] In an embodiment, the new secret comprises a combination of the shared key and the secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection.
[0031] In an embodiment, the header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is protected using a header protection key determined during the establishing of the QUIC connection.
[0032] In an embodiment, the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet received from the first QUIC peer node comprises an acknowledgement that the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet was received and decrypted and verified by the first QUIC peer node.
[0033] In an embodiment, the first QUIC peer node is a User Equipment.
[0034] In an embodiment, the second QUIC peer node is a network gateway or a User Plane Function.P113091W001 6
[0035] In an embodiment, a method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node is provided that is performed by the first QUIC peer node. The method includes establishing a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node, deriving, after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and a server, and receiving, from the second QUIC peer node, an encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet. The method also includes deriving, based on the shared key and a secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection, a new secret, determining, based on the new secret, a read key and a first initial value, and attempting to decrypt and verify the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet using the read key and the first initial value. The method also includes in response to successfully decrypting and verifying the encrypted QUIC packet, determining, based on the new secret, a write key and a second initial value and transmitting another encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet to the second QUIC peer node, wherein the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is encrypted and integrity protected based on the write key and the second initial value. A first QUIC peer node that is configured to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node. The first QUIC peer node can also include processing circuitry configured to cause the first QUIC peer node perform the method embodiments described above.
[0036] In an embodiment, the server is an authentication server and the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and the server following successful authentication.
[0037] In an embodiment, the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and the server following successful re-authentication and / or re-keying.
[0038] In an embodiment, the method further includes determining that the key update procedure is complete and that the second QUIC peer node is authenticated in response to decrypting and verifying the encrypted QUIC packet with the read key and the first initial value.
[0039] In an embodiment, during the establishing the QUIC connection, a transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node indicating support for mutual authentication of an already established QUIC connection based on an external key.
[0040] In an embodiment, during the establishing the QUIC connection, another transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node indicating support for the rekeying procedure.
[0041] In an embodiment, the new secret comprises a combination of the shared key and the secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection.
[0042] In an embodiment, the header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet isP113091W001 7protected using a header protection key determined during the establishing of the QUIC connection.
[0043] In an embodiment, the first QUIC peer node is a User Equipment.
[0044] In an embodiment, the second QUIC peer node is a network gateway or a UPF.
[0045] In an embodiment, a header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet comprises an indication that the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is associated with a key update procedure and another indication that the key update procedure is based on an external key.
[0046] In an embodiment, a method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node, performed by the second QUIC peer node is provided. The method includes establishing a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node, obtaining, after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key from a server, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and the server, and generating a first authentication challenge and starting a first timer. The method also includes transmitting, to the first QUIC peer node, a first QUIC packet comprising the first authentication challenge and receiving, from the first QUIC peer node, one or more QUIC packets comprising a first authentication response to the first authentication challenge and a second authentication challenge. The method also includes determining that the first authentication response is valid based on the shared key, the first authentication challenge, and a read key and, upon successful validation, stopping the first timer, determining a second authentication response based on the second authentication challenge, the shared key, and a write key, and transmitting an additional packet to the first QUIC peer node comprising the second authentication response. A second QUIC peer node that is configured to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node is also provided. The second QUIC peer node can also include processing circuitry configured to cause the second QUIC peer node perform the method embodiments described above.
[0047] In an embodiment, received QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the read key is used in decrypting and verifying the received QUIC packets.
[0048] In an embodiment, transmitted QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the write key is used in encrypting and integrity protecting the transmitted QUIC packets.
[0049] In an embodiment, the method also includes in response to the first timer expiring before receiving the one or more QUIC packets from the first QUIC peer node, initiating closure of the QUIC connection.
[0050] In an embodiment, the first QUIC peer node is a User Equipment.P113091W001 8
[0051] In an embodiment, the second QUIC peer node is a network gateway or UPF.
[0052] In an embodiment, a method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node performed by the first QUIC peer node is provided. The method includes establishing a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node, deriving, after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node and a server, and receiving, from the second QUIC peer node, a first QUIC packet comprising a first authentication challenge. The method also includes determining a first authentication response based on the first authentication challenge, the shared key, and a write key, generating a second authentication challenge and starting a second timer, and transmitting, to the second QUIC peer node, one or more QUIC packets comprising the first authentication response to the first authentication challenge and the second authentication challenge. The method also includes receiving, from the second QUIC peer node, an additional QUIC packet comprising a second authentication response and determining that the second authentication response is valid based on the second authentication challenge, the shared key, and a read key and, upon successful validation, stopping the second timer. A first QUIC peer node is also provided that is configured to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and the second QUIC peer node. The first QUIC peer node can also include processing circuitry configured to cause the first QUIC peer node perform the method embodiments described above.
[0053] In an embodiment, received QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the read key is used in decrypting and verifying the received QUIC packets.
[0054] In an embodiment, transmitted QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the write key is used in encrypting and integrity protecting the transmitted QUIC packets.
[0055] In an embodiment, the method includes in response to the second timer expiring before receiving the additional QUIC packet from the second QUIC peer node, initiating closure of the QUIC connection.
[0056] In an embodiment, the first QUIC peer node is a User Equipment.
[0057] In an embodiment, the second QUIC peer node is a network gateway or UPF.BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0058] The accompanying drawing figures incorporated in and forming a part of this specification illustrate several aspects of the disclosure, and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the disclosure.
[0059] Figure 1 shows a message sequence chart of a method for performing ExtensibleP113091W001 9Authentication Protocol (EAP) over QUIC in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;
[0060] Figure 2 shows a message sequence chart of a method for performing mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;
[0061] Figure 3 shows a message sequence chart of a method for performing reauthentication, rekeying, and / or key updates between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;
[0062] Figure 4 shows a message sequence chart of another method for performing mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure;
[0063] Figure 5 shows a wireless device in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure; and
[0064] Figure 6 shows a network node in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0065] The embodiments set forth below represent information to enable those skilled in the art to practice the embodiments and illustrate the best mode of practicing the embodiments. Upon reading the following description in light of the accompanying drawing figures, those skilled in the art will understand the concepts of the disclosure and will recognize applications of these concepts not particularly addressed herein. It should be understood that these concepts and applications fall within the scope of the disclosure.
[0066] Some of the embodiments contemplated herein will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings. Embodiments are provided by way of example to convey the scope of the subject matter to those skilled in the art.
[0067] There currently exist certain challenge(s).
[0068] When performing Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as an authentication protocol for primary authentication, one option for carrying EAP between the User Equipment (UE) and network gateway (such as Non-Third Generation Partnership Program (N3GPP) Interworking Function - N3IWF) is that QUIC itself is used as transport for EAP, i.e., "EAP over QUIC" as illustrated in Figure 1 where the there is a UE 102, a N3GPP access network 104, a N3IWF 106 (or other type of network gateway such as an evolved Packet Data Gateway or User Plane Function (UPF)) and an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) 108. At step 1,P113091W001 10a QUIC connection is established, typically encrypted and integrity protected tunnel, server authenticated or possibly unauthenticated if the UE is not capable of verifying the N3IWF certificate, and then run the EAP in the tunnel. After completing the EAP run at steps 2 and 3a and 3b, proper mutual authentication (of the tunnel) should be performed at step 4 using the shared key obtained from running the EAP, but there is a problem in that how already established QUIC connection is mutually authenticated using the shared key obtained from EAP.
[0069] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake part of QUIC corresponds to the IKEv2 part in 5G solution but EAP cannot be tunneled inside TLS handshake like EAP is tunneled inside IKEv2 such that the shared key could be used in the authentication.
[0070] A straight-forward solution is to terminate the QUIC connection after successful primary authentication and then establish a new QUIC connection where the shared key is used as PSK in the TLS handshake when establishing the new QUIC connection. But terminating and reestablishing a new connection takes time and requires a new TLS handshake and a solution where the connection could be kept, and where the shared key from the primary authentication could still be leveraged, would be beneficial. Making a TLS session resumption instead of a full handshake to speed up the establishment of the new connection is also not an option since TLS resumption does not allow external PSK input as explained above.
[0071] Note that the 5G AKA authentication protocol may be used instead of EAP in the primary authentication and to produce the shared key. 5G AKA can also be run on top of QUIC similar to EAP, i.e., “5G AKA over QUIC”. Similarly, a protocol exchanging NAS messages on top of QUIC may be used, i.e., “NAS over QUIC”. In 5G, both EAP and 5G AKA are tunneled in NAS messages.
[0072] In addition to the mutual authentication of the QUIC connection described above, QUIC connections may be long-lived, and, in the spirit of zero-trust architecture (ZTA), there may be a need for re- authentication and / or re -keying of the QUIC connection.
[0073] Certain aspects of the disclosure and their embodiments may provide solutions to these or other challenges. Two alternative solutions are proposed for how a shared key between two QUIC peers can be used in mutually authenticating or re-authenticating / re -keying an already established QUIC connection between the two peers. For both alternatives, a QUIC connection is established between the two peers. In the case of initial establishment of a QUIC connection, this can be a server authenticated QUIC connection or, for the purpose of only running an authentication protocol on top of QUIC until mutual authentication is established, the QUIC connection may even be unauthenticated. In the case of re-authentication / re -keying of a long-lived QUIC connection, the QUIC connection is typically already mutually authenticated.P113091W001 11
[0074] A shared key is established between the two peers, e.g., through primary authentication for non-3GPP access or some re-keying mechanism (not necessarily related to non-3GPP access) wherein re-authentication is performed. In the re-keying case, the shared key may for example be derived from a previous shared key at a higher protocol layer and data exchanged on the higher layer protocol between one of the QUIC peers and a server such as a nonce or sequence number. As another example, a re-authentication using EAP between a QUIC peer and a server in the network may be performed resulting in a shared key between the QUIC peer and the server. The new shared key is then sent from the server to the other QUIC peer.
[0075] In the first alternative a QUIC key update for the 1 round trip time (RTT) application data key is enforced where the QUIC key update mechanism is extended to accept an external key as input, and where the shared key is provided as the external key. It means the updated keys for protecting application data depends on the shared key and successful completion of the key update procedure means each side proves knowledge of the shared key to the other side.
[0076] In the second alternative, two new QUIC frames called RE-AUTHENTICATE_CHALLENGE and RE-AUTHENTICATE are defined for exchange of authentication challenges and authentication responses between the QUIC peers, where the authentication responses are based on the shared key.
[0077] In addition to authentication, the first option also provides update of the application protection keys, which is desirable for long-lived QUIC connections in the case of reauthentication but may not be necessary for the initial mutual authentication of the QUIC connection.
[0078] The new and inventive step of the first proposed solution is to leverage existing features of the QUIC packet to provide a cryptographic value, serving as a proof of knowledge of the shared key and used for authentication, from each peer of the QUIC connection to the other peer of the QUIC connection such that proof of knowledge can be verified by the other peer. In the first proposed alternative the inventive step is to extend the key update mechanism of QUIC such that the protected packets sent from one peer to the other peer during the key update procedure are based on the shared key and can be decrypted and verified at the receiving peer. In the second alternative, new QUIC frames for transporting authentication challenges and authentication responses, derived from the shared key, are defined.
[0079] Certain embodiments may provide one or more of the following technical advantage(s). The proposed solutions allow mutual authentication of an already established QUIC connection between two peers, based on a shared key established between the two peers, without re-establishment of the QUIC connection. Knowledge of the shared key is required for successfulP113091W001 12mutual authentication and the shared key is cryptographically bound to the authentication. The proposed solutions have advantages in the case of non-3GPP access where QUIC replaces IKEv2+IPsec and carries the authentication protocol for primary authentication (e.g., EAP). They also have advantages in situations where re-keying / re-authentication of a long-lived QUIC connection is required.
[0080] As described above, the solutions address how an already established QUIC connection between two peers can be mutually authenticated by leveraging a shared key established between the two peers after the connection has been established. The QUIC connection is assumed to be encrypted and integrity protected where the keys used for this purpose originates from exchange of ephemeral public-private key pairs during the TLS handshake. Two scenarios are considered. In scenario 1 , mutual authentication could not be performed while establishing the QUIC connection and is instead performed shortly after establishing the connection, when a shared key has been established, e.g. following a 5G primary authentication executed on top of the established QUIC connection. In scenario 2, mutual authentication of the QUIC connection has been performed but the QUIC connection is long-lived and after a long while there is a desire to re-key the QUIC connection based on the established shared key. Such a re-keying also means a re-authentication is performed.
[0081] In scenario 1 , the established QUIC connection may be server authenticated wherein peer 1 authenticates peer 2 by verifying the server certificate (peer 2 certificate) using a certificate installed as a trusted certificate at peer 1 (QUIC demands at server authentication to be performed). If the client lacks such a trusted certificate, such that certificate verification is not possible, the client may omit to verify the certificate knowing that mutual authentication will anyway be performed in a later step. In this case, the QUIC connection may at this point be regarded as unauthenticated allowing an attacker to act as a middleman. An active attacker can exchange ephemeral public keys sent between the two QUIC peers in the TLS handshake towards his own ephemeral key, and sending his own certificate, allowing him to read and modify data between the two peers.
[0082] Alternatively, the server certificate may be a self-signed certificate simply for allowing a certificate verification to be performed during the TLS handshake without a trusted certificate installed at the client, knowing that an attacker can also here act as a middleman (by exchanging ephemeral keys as described above) and the connection may be considered as unauthenticated.
[0083] In yet another variant to avoid the client having to be configured with a trusted certificate, a dummy pre-shared key may be used in the TLS handshake performed by the two peers. Such a dummy pre-shared key would also be known to the attacker resulting in anP113091W001 13unauthenticated connection where the attacker can act as a middleman (also here by exchanging ephemeral keys as described above and use the dummy PSK).
[0084] The mutual authentication based on the shared key must be such that each peer receives proof that the other peer knows the shared key and that an attacker acting as a middleman according to above will be detected.
[0085] In scenario 2, consider a long-lived QUIC connection where it is assumed that mutual authentication of the QUIC connection has been performed, for example, according to scenario 1 or by using a shared key between the two peer as pre-shared key (PSK) in the TLS handshake. Hence, any attacker according to what was described for scenario 1 has already been detected. For an attacker to act as a middleman, the attacker must have managed to retrieve key material for protecting the QUIC packets exchanged between the two entities. Re-keying leveraging an external shared key must be such that each peer receives proof that the other peer knows the shared key and that the attacker can no longer read and modify the QUIC packets.
[0086] Figure 2 shows a message sequence chart of a method that corresponds to first alternative solution in scenario 1 for performing mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0087] In the first alternative solution the QUIC key update mechanism is extended to support mutual authentication of an established QUIC connection according to scenario 1 above. The solution is described in Figure 2 and, for example, provides a solution to problem of non-3GPP access to 5GC for UEs.
[0088] The mutual authentication performed in Fig. 2 for example, can be between a first QUIC peer 202 and a second QUIC peer 204, along an authentication server 206. In an embodiment, the QUIC peer 202 can be a UE or other wireless device, and the second QUIC peer 204 can be a network gateway, such as an N3IWF.
[0089] At step 208, the QUIC peers establishes a QUIC connection, where peer 1 is acting as a TLS client in the TLS handshake and peer 2 is acting as a TLS server. The QUIC connection may be server authenticated or unauthenticated as explained in scenario 1 above. During connection establishment the QUIC peers include a transport parameter that indicates support for mutual authentication based on an external key. When the QUIC connection is established both peers protects QUIC packets and shares a key for header protection and a current secret from which keys and I Vs for protection of QUIC packets carrying of 1-RTT application data.
[0090] At step 210, an authentication protocol, e.g. EAP, carried on top of the QUIC connection is run between the first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206. TheP113091W001 14authentication server 206 may be the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) possibly in combination with a Unified Data Management (UDM). Mutual authentication is performed and may, for example, be performed using EAP-AKA’ where first QUIC peer 202 comprises AKA-based network subscription credentials stored in a Subscriber Identify Module (SIM) card or eSIM.
[0091] Upon successful authentication, at step 212a and step 212b, first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206 derives a shared key. The key is provided from the authentication server to QUIC peer 2. Note that the key may be delivered from the authentication server to second QUIC peer 204 at step 213 via other network nodes such as Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and may involve several steps of key derivation. For example, the AMF receives a first shared key from another entity (e.g. the AUSF) and the AMF derives a second shared key from the first shared key and where the second shared key is delivered to second QUIC peer 204 and where first QUIC peer 202 derives both the first shared key and then the second shared key.
[0092] At step 214 second QUIC peer 204 derives a new secret for protection of QUIC packets carrying 1-RTT application data. The new secret is derived from the current secret generated in step 208 and the shared key obtained in step 213. For example, the HKDF-Expand-Label function used in TLS 1.3 and described in RFC 9001 for QUIC key update may be used in the derivation and where the current secret is replaced by a combination of the current secret and the shared key (in various embodiments, the combination could be a concatenation of the secret and the shared key or some other operation).
[0093] At step 216, the second QUIC peer 204 derives new write key and an initial value (IV) and new read key and IV for 1-RTT application data based on the new secret derived in step 214. For example, the HKDF-Expand-Label function used in TLS 1.3 and described in RFC 9001 for QUIC key update may be used in the derivation. Note that current read key and IV are kept for a while in order to be able to receive lost or re-ordered packets.
[0094] At step 218, the second QUIC peer 204 transmits to the first QUIC peer 202 a QUIC packet carrying 1-RTT application data that is encrypted and integrity protected using the new write key and IV derived in step 216. The Key Phase bit in the QUIC header is toggled to indicate a key update to first QUIC peer 202. An indication in the QUIC header, e.g. an bit / flag in the QUIC header is set indicating that the key update is based on an external shared key (external key bit / flag). The QUIC header is protected using the header protection key. The QUIC packet is sent to first QUIC peer 202.
[0095] At step 220, upon decrypting the QUIC header and detecting a toggled Key Phase bit, first QUIC peer 202 is notified of a key update and the external key bit indicates key update based on external key. QUIC peer 1 derives a new secret for protection of QUIC packets carrying 1-RTTP113091W001 15application data, in the same way as was done by QUIC peer 2 in step 214.
[0096] At step 222, first QUIC peer 202 derives new read key and IV for 1-RTT application data based on the new secret derived in step 220. Note that first QUIC peer 202 read key and IV corresponds to second QUIC peer 204 write key and IV. The current read key and IV are kept for a while in order to be able to receive lost or re-ordered packets. First QUIC peer 202 uses the new read key and IV to decrypt and verify the QUIC packet.
[0097] At step 224, upon successful verification, first QUIC peer 202 acknowledges the key update and that second QUIC peer 204 knows the shared key.
[0098] At step 225, first QUIC peer 202 derives new write key and IV based on the new secret. The current secret for 1-RTT application data is replaced by the new secret derived in step 220.
[0099] At step 226, first QUIC peer 202 prepares a QUIC packet containing an acknowledgement (ACK) for the packet received in step 218 and where the write key and IV of step 225 are used in the protection. The Key Phase bit in the QUIC header is according to Key Phase bit of QUIC packet in step 218 and external key bit / flag is set. The QUIC header is protected using the header protection key. The QUIC packet is sent to second QUIC peer 204.
[0100] At step 228, upon decrypting the QUIC header and detecting the Key Phase bit, external key bit, and ACK of packet 6, first QUIC peer 202 is notified by second QUIC peer 204 that the new read keys based on the external key shall be used to decrypt and verify the QUIC packet and at step 230, upon successful verification, second QUIC peer 204 is notified that key update is complete and that second QUIC peer 204 knows the shared key. The current secret for 1-RTT application data is replaced by the new secret derived in step 214.
[0101] In the message sequence chart in Fig. 2, it is proposed that second QUIC peer 204 starts the key update procedure in order to authenticate first QUIC peer 202. This makes sense since there has not been any authentication of peer 1 earlier in the flow (authentication of second QUIC peer 204 by first QUIC peer 202 may have been done in step 1). It is also not until second QUIC peer 204 has received the shared key from the authentication server that the key update can be performed, and it is assumed that first QUIC peer 202 is notified about successful authentication by the authentication server before the shared key is delivered to second QUIC peer 204. Assuming that it can be ensured the key update procedure does not start until both peers has access to the shared key, the procedure could be started by first QUIC peer 202 instead.
[0102] An attacker acting as an on-path attacker would like to prevent the key update procedure based on the shared key to be performed. With the attacker acting as a middleman, the QUIC connection established in step 208 is actually two QUIC connections: one between first QUIC peer 202 and the attacker and another one between the attacker and second QUIC peer 204.P113091W001 16The attacker has access to all keys, IVs, and secrets used for protecting the QUIC packets except for the shared key. Hence, the attacker may modify the header of packets to change the Key Phase bit or external key bit. For example, the attacker may change the external key bit of the QUIC packet in step 218 to indicate an external key is not involved in the key update, i.e., key update is independent of the external key. Since the attacker cannot decrypt the payload of the QUIC packet in step 218, the attacker generates a dummy payload and encrypts it with the key update keys of the QUIC packet in step 218. Second QUIC peer 204 processes the key update (without involvement of shared key) and it is not until second QUIC peer 204 receives the QUIC packet containing the ACK in step 226 that it discovers that the QUIC packet cannot be correctly decrypted and verified. Note that second QUIC peer 204 protects all its packet following the QUIC packet in step 218 in the same way as the one in step 218. If the attacker modifies all QUIC packets as described above, it means decryption and verification of all received packets will fail. Eventually, second QUIC peer 204 will timeout, while waiting for a correct resend of packets containing ACKs, and will terminate the QUIC connection.
[0103] Figure 3 shows a message sequence chart of a method, which corresponds to the first alternative solution, for performing rekeying (including re-authentication) or key updates between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node in accordance with some embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0104] The message sequence chart in Fig. 3 addresses the problem of how to rekey a long-lived QUIC connection according to scenario 2.
[0105] At step 208, two QUIC peers (first QUIC peer 202 and second QUIC peer 204) have established a QUIC connection which is mutually authenticated. For example, such mutual authentication may have been based on the method described in Figure 2. In another example, the QUIC connection is mutually authenticated leveraging a shared key between the two peers that is provided as pre-shared key (PSK) in the TUS handshake when creating the QUIC connection and where the shared key has been agreed between the QUIC peer 1 and the authentication server following a protocol exchange and transferred to QUIC peer 2 before the QUIC connection establishment. Also in this case, first QUIC peer 202 may be a UE, second QUIC peer 204 may be network gateway such as an N3IWF, and server may be a network function / node such as an AMF. Another example is where the first QUIC peer 202 may be a UE, second QUIC peer 204 may be User Plane Function such as an UPF, and the server may be a network function / node such as an AMF, SMF or AUSF. When the QUIC connection has been established both peers protects QUIC packets and shares a key for header protection and a current secret from which keys and IVs for protection of QUIC packets carrying of 1-RTT application data. During connectionP113091W001 17establishment the QUIC peers include a transport parameter that indicates support for re-keying.
[0106] At step 302a and 302b, a shared key is known to both the first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206 that can be leveraged for re-keying the QUIC connection.
[0107] At step 304, in order to re-key the long-lived QUIC connection, a re-keying procedure is performed at a higher protocol layer between the first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206 wherein a new shared key is derived by first QUIC peer 202 at step 306a and the authentication server 206 at step 306b. For example, a re-authentication involving the shared key may be performed and where a new shared key is derived based on the re-authentication. Or, as another example, the new shared key is derived based on the current shared key and data exchanged on the higher layer protocol between first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206 such as a nonce or sequence number. The new shared key is sent from the server to second QUIC peer 204 at step 308.
[0108] At step 310, key update and proof of knowledge of the new shared key derived in steps 304 is performed according to the steps 214-230 of Fig. 2.
[0109] EAP OVER QUIC
[0110] Note that the description below, while using EAP as an example, can be generalized to several authentication protocols such as 5G-AKA over QUIC or NAS over QUIC wherein EAP or 5G-AKA is tunneled within NAS.
[0111] EAP and similar authentication protocols usually require reliable message delivery, fragmentation and reassembly support, and robustness to message reordering. These are properties that can be satisfied by using QUIC as the underlying transport protocol.
[0112] An important decision when designing EAP over QUIC is whether the EAP procedures should be performed at the QUIC layer or by an application layer on top of QUIC.
[0113] One could consider modifying the QUIC handshake itself to incorporate EAP, but that is deemed too large of a change which essentially would require a new version of QUIC. It is therefore preferable to perform mutual authentication after the QUIC handshake has completed.
[0114] A QUIC extension that supports EAP would require:• A new transport parameter included during the initial QUIC handshake, that indicates support of the EAP extension. The transport parameter could be associated with a value that indicates the supported authentication protocol (e.g., EAP, 5G-AKA etc.).• Support for reliable transmission of EAP messages. This can be achieved by using QUIC streams for the EAP messages.• Message delineation could be achieved by sending each EAP message (or request-response pair) in a unique stream; hence no additional message boundary processing would beP113091W001 18needed.
[0115] Once QUIC peers have completed a handshake and negotiated the use of EAP (or other selected mutual authentication method), they enter a state where they only accept streams with EAP (or equivalent) messages until the authentication is complete.• Each request is sent in a new bi-directional stream, responses are sent in the same stream.• Reception of any unexpected stream data results in connection failure.
[0116] After EAP-Success (or equivalent) is sent / received the connection is ready to use for application layer transactions.
[0117] Alternatively, an application layer protocol can be defined on top of QUIC for the purpose of the Mutual Authentication procedures. This, however, has several complications, if the QUIC connection itself is to be authenticated:• It requires that the key material is passed from the application layer to the QUIC layer. • If the connection should be reused for sending data after the EAP authentication is complete, the EAP procedures must be mapped to the specific application protocol, otherwise there can be mismatches in ALPN.• An application layer solution is feasible if the authentication happens at the application transaction layer and not at the QUIC connection layer. For instance, if the HTTP Extended Connect method is used for tunneling data between a UE and an N3IWF and EAP is to be used to authenticate a specific CONNECT request.
[0118] However, since the solution in this disclosure focuses on authenticating the QUIC connection itself, and crucially, combines the shared key obtained using the authentication protocol with the key obtained through the QUIC / TLS handshake, integrating mutual authentication in the QUIC layer is deemed the most appropriate approach.
[0119] Figure 4 shows a message sequence chart of another method, which corresponds to the second alternative solution, for performing mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node and a second QUIC peer node using QUIC frames for reauthentication. Figure 4 targets scenario 1. In the second alternative solution new RE-AUTHENTICATE and RE-AUTHENTIC ATE_CHALLENGE frames for QUIC are defined to support mutual authentication of an established QUIC connection
[0120] At step 208, the QUIC peers establishes a QUIC connection, where peer 1 is acting as a TLS client in the TLS handshake and peer 2 is acting as a TLS server. The QUIC connection may be server authenticated or unauthenticated as explained in scenario 1 above. During connection establishment the QUIC peers include a transport parameter that indicates support for mutual authentication based on an external key. When the QUIC connection is established bothP113091W001 19peers protects QUIC packets and shares a key for header protection and a current secret from which keys and I Vs for protection of QUIC packets carrying of 1-RTT application data.
[0121] At step 210, an authentication protocol, e.g. EAP, carried on top of the QUIC connection is run between the first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206. The authentication server 206 may be the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) possibly in combination with a Unified Data Management (UDM). Mutual authentication is performed and may, for example, be performed using EAP-AKA’ where first QUIC peer 202 comprises AKA-based network subscription credentials stored in a Subscriber Identify Module (SIM) card or eSIM.
[0122] Upon successful authentication, at step 212a and step 212b, first QUIC peer 202 and the authentication server 206 derives a shared key. The key is provided from the authentication server to QUIC peer 2. Note that the key may be delivered from the authentication server to second QUIC peer 204 at step 213 via other network nodes such as Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and may involve several steps of key derivation. For example, the AMF receives a first shared key from another entity (e.g. the AUSF) and the AMF derives a second shared key from the first shared key and where the second shared key is delivered to second QUIC peer 204 and where first QUIC peer 202 derives both the first shared key and then the second shared key.
[0123] At step 402, after having received the shared key in step 213, the second QUIC peer 204 generates a random authentication challenge (denoted challenge_2) and starts a timer where second QUIC peer must receive a valid authentication response to the authentication challenge from first QUIC peer 202 before the timer expires.
[0124] At step 404, the second QUIC peer 204 sends a QUIC packet to first QUIC peer 202 containing a RE-AUTHENTICATE_CHALLENGE frame in the payload. The RE-AUTHENTIC ATE_CHALLENGE frame contains the authentication challenge (challenge_2).
[0125] At step 406, the first QUIC peer 202 derives an authentication response (denoted MAC_1) based on the received authentication challenge (challenge_2), shared key, and write key for 1-RTT application data. For example, to derive the authentication response the HMAC function may be used to with SHA-256 hash function and concatenation of the shared key and the write key as the key and authentication challenge as the data. First QUIC peer 202 generates a random authentication challenge (denoted challenge_l) and starts a timer where first QUIC peer 202 must receive a valid authentication response to the authentication challenge from second QUIC peer 204 before the timer expires.
[0126] At step 408, the first QUIC peer 202 sends one or more QUIC packets to second QUIC peer 204 containing a RE-AUTHENTICATE frame and a RE-AUTHENTICATE_CHALLENGE frame in the payload. The RE-AUTHENTICATE frame contains the authentication responseP113091W001 20(MAC_1) and the RE-AUTHENTICATE_CHALLENGE frame contains the authentication challenge (challenge_l).
[0127] At step 410, the second QUIC peer 204 verifies the received authentication response by computing a MAC based on challenge_2, shared key and read key for 1-RTT application data and checking that it matches the received authentication response (MAC_1).
[0128] At step 411, if the verification of the authentication response is successful, second QUIC peer 204 stops the timer. If the timer expires before a valid authentication response has been received from first QUIC peer 202, second QUIC peer 204 closes the QUIC connection by sending a CLOSE_CONNECTION frame at step 412 indicating re-authentication failure.
[0129] At step 414, second QUIC peer 204 derives an authentication response (denoted MAC_2) based on the received authentication challenge (challenge_l), shared key, and write key for 1-RTT application data.
[0130] At step 416, second QUIC peer 204 sends a QUIC packet to first QUIC peer 202 containing a RE-AUTHENTICATE frame in the payload. The RE-AUTHENTICATE frame contains the authentication response (MAC_2).
[0131] At step 418, first QUIC peer 202 verifies the received authentication response by computing a MAC based on challenge_l, shared key and read key for 1-RTT application data and checking that it matches the received authentication response (MAC_2).
[0132] Then, at step 420 if the verification of the authentication response is successful, first QUIC peer 202 stops the timer. If the timer expires before a valid authentication response has been received from second QUIC peer 204, second QUIC peer 204 closes the QUIC connection at step 422 by sending a CLOSE_CONNECTION frame indicating re- authentication failure.
[0133] In the flow above second QUIC peer 204 starts the re-authentication exchange to authenticate first QUIC peer 202. But it can also be so that first QUIC peer 202 starts the exchange by generating an authentication challenge, starting a timer, and sending the challenge to second QUIC peer 204. Second QUIC peer 2042 then derives an authentication response and generates a challenge that are sent to first QUIC peer 202 in response. First QUIC peer 202 can then verify the authentication response and derive an authentication response which is sent back to second QUIC peer 204 for verification. As an alternative, both peers may start the re-authentication procedure and send RE-AUTHENTICATE_CHALLENGE frames with authentication challenges to the other peer that is answered with a RE-AUTHENTICATE frame containing the authentication response. Note that the RE-AUTHENTICATE and RE-AUTHENTICATE_CHALLENGE frames in step 408 can be sent in separate QUIC packets.
[0134] An attacker acting as an on-path attacker would like to prevent the re-authenticationP113091W001 21exchange to be performed. With the attacker acting as a middleman, the QUIC connection established in step 208 is actually two QUIC connections: one between first QUIC peer 202 and the attacker and another one between the attacker and second QUIC peer 204. It is assumed that Diffie-Hellman key shares (ephemeral public keys) are used in TLS handshake in step 208 such that key material is different for the two QUIC connections. In particular, with the attacker in the middle, the write and read keys for the 1-RTT application data are different, resulting in that an authentication response generated by one peer will not be accepted by the other peer effectively discovering the on-path attacker.
[0135] Figure 5 shows a wireless device 500, which may be configured to operate as first QUIC peer 202. The wireless device 500 may be alternatively referred to as a UE 500. As used herein, a wireless device refers to a device capable, configured, arranged and / or operable to communicate wirelessly with network nodes and / or other wireless devices. Examples of a wireless device include, but are not limited to, a smart phone, mobile phone, cell phone, voice over IP (VoIP) phone, wireless local loop phone, desktop computer, personal digital assistant (PDA), wireless cameras, gaming console or device, music storage device, playback appliance, wearable terminal device, wireless endpoint, mobile station, tablet, laptop, laptop-embedded equipment (LEE), laptop-mounted equipment (LME), smart device, wireless customer-premise equipment (CPE), vehicle, vehicle-mounted or vehicle embedded / integrated wireless device, and wireless terminal. Other examples include any type of UE identified by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), including a narrow band internet of things (NB-IoT) UE, a machine type communication (MTC) UE, and / or an enhanced MTC (eMTC) UE.
[0136] A wireless device 500 may support device-to-device (D2D) communication, for example by implementing a 3GPP standard for sidelink communication, Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC), vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), or vehicle-to-everything (V2X). In other examples, wireless device 500 may not necessarily have a user in the sense of a human user who owns and / or operates the relevant device. Instead, wireless device 500 may represent a device that is intended for sale to, or operation by, a human user but which may not, or which may not initially, be associated with a specific human user (e.g., a smart sprinkler controller). Alternatively, wireless device 500 may represent a device that is not intended for sale to, or operation by, an end user but which may be associated with or operated for the benefit of a user (e.g., a smart power meter).
[0137] In particular embodiments, wireless device 500 includes processing circuitry 502 that is operatively coupled via a bus 504 to an input / output interface 506, a power source 508, a memory 510, a communication interface 512, and / or any other component, or any combinationP113091W001 22thereof. Certain embodiments of wireless device 500 may include all or a subset of the components shown in Figure 5. The level of integration between the components may vary from one embodiment of wireless device 500 to another. In general, in a particular embodiment of wireless device 500, processing circuitry 502, input / output interface 506, power source 508, memory 510, and communication interface 512 may, in whole or in part, represent or include physical components common to or shared by one or more of the other elements of wireless device 500. Further, certain embodiments of wireless devices 500 may contain multiple instances of a component, such as multiple processors, memories, transceivers, transmitters, receivers, etc.
[0138] The processing circuitry 502 is configured to process instructions and data and may be configured to implement any sequential state machine operative to execute instructions stored as machine-readable computer programs in the memory 510. The processing circuitry 502 may be implemented as one or more hardware-implemented state machines (e.g., in discrete logic, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), etc.); programmable logic together with appropriate firmware; one or more stored computer programs, general-purpose processors, such as a microprocessor or digital signal processor (DSP), together with appropriate software; or any combination of the above. For example, the processing circuitry 502 may include multiple central processing units (CPUs).
[0139] In the example, the input / output interface 506 may be configured to provide an interface or interfaces to an input device, output device, or one or more input and / or output devices. Examples of an output device include a speaker, a sound card, a video card, a display, a monitor, a printer, an actuator, an emitter, a smartcard, another output device, or any combination thereof. An input device may allow a user to capture information into wireless device 500. Examples of an input device include a touch-sensitive or presence-sensitive display, a camera (e.g., a digital camera, a digital video camera, a web camera, etc.), a microphone, a sensor, a mouse, a trackball, a directional pad, a trackpad, a scroll wheel, a smartcard, and the like. The presence-sensitive display may include a capacitive or resistive touch sensor to sense input from a user. A sensor may be, for instance, an accelerometer, a gyroscope, a tilt sensor, a force sensor, a magnetometer, an optical sensor, a proximity sensor, a biometric sensor, etc., or any combination thereof. An output device may use the same type of interface port as an input device. For example, a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port may be used to provide an input device and an output device.
[0140] In some embodiments, the power source 508 is structured as a battery or battery pack. Other types of power sources, such as an external power source (e.g., an electricity outlet), photovoltaic device, or power cell, may be used to supply power to circuitry or to charge an associated battery. The power source 508 may further include power circuitry for delivering powerP113091W001 23from the power source 508 itself, and / or an external power source, to the various parts of wireless device 500 via input circuitry or an interface such as an electrical power cable. Power source 508 may perform any formatting, converting, or other modification to make accessible power suitable for the respective components of the wireless device 500 to which power is supplied.
[0141] The memory 510 may be or be configured to include memory such as random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), magnetic disks, optical disks, hard disks, removable cartridges, flash drives, and so forth. In one example, the memory 510 includes one or more programs 514, such as an operating system, web browser application, a widget, gadget engine, or other application, and corresponding data 516. The memory 510 may store, for use by wireless device 500, any of a variety of various operating systems or combinations of operating systems.
[0142] The memory 510 may be configured to include a number of physical drive units, such as redundant array of independent disks (RAID), flash memory, USB flash drive, external hard disk drive, thumb drive, pen drive, key drive, high-density digital versatile disc (HD-DVD) optical disc drive, internal hard disk drive, Blu-Ray optical disc drive, holographic digital data storage (HDDS) optical disc drive, external mini-dual in-line memory module (DIMM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), external micro-DIMM SDRAM, smartcard memory such as tamper resistant module in the form of a universal integrated circuit card (UICC) including one or more subscriber identity modules (SIMs), such as a USIM and / or ISIM, other memory, or any combination thereof. The UICC may for example be an embedded UICC (eUICC), integrated UICC (iUICC) or a removable UICC commonly known as ‘SIM card.’ The memory 510 may allow wireless device 500 to access instructions, programs, and the like, stored on transitory or non-transitory memory media, to off-load data, or to upload data. An article of manufacture, such as one utilizing a communication system may be tangibly embodied as or in the memory 510, which may be or comprise a device-readable storage medium.
[0143] The processing circuitry 502 may be configured to communicate with an access network or other network via or using the communication interface 512. The communication interface 512 may comprise one or more communication subsystems and may include or be communicatively coupled to an antenna 522. The communication interface 512 may include one or more transceivers used to communicate, such as by communicating with one or more remote transceivers of another device capable of wireless communication (e.g., another wireless device or a network node in an access network). Each transceiver may include a transmitter 518 and / or a receiver 520 appropriate to provide network communications (e.g., optical, electrical, frequencyP113091W001 24allocations, and so forth). Moreover, the transmitter 518 and receiver 520 may be coupled to one or more antennas (e.g., antenna 522) and may share circuit components, software, or firmware, or alternatively be implemented separately.
[0144] In the illustrated embodiment, communication functions of the communication interface 512 may include cellular communication, Wi-Fi communication (e.g., according to an IEEE 802.11 family standard), LPWAN communication, data communication, voice communication, multimedia communication, short-range communications such as Bluetooth, near-field communication, location-based communication such as the use of the global positioning system (GPS) to determine a location, another like communication function, or any combination thereof. Communications may be implemented according to one or more communication protocols and / or standards, such as IEEE 802.11, Code Division Multiplexing Access (CDMA), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), GSM, LTE, New Radio (NR), UMTS, WiMax, Ethernet, transmission control protocol / internet protocol (TCP / IP), synchronous optical networking (SONET), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), QUIC, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and so forth.
[0145] In particular embodiments, wireless device 500 may provide an output of data captured via a sensor, through its communication interface 512, via a wireless connection to a network node, and / or in any appropriate manner. Data captured by sensors of a wireless device 500 can be communicated through a wireless connection to a network node via another wireless device 500. In particular embodiments, such output may be periodic (e.g., once every 15 minutes if it reports the sensed temperature), random (e.g., to even out the load from reporting from several sensors), in response to a triggering event (e.g., when moisture is detected, an alert is sent), in response to a request (e.g., a user initiated request), or a continuous stream (e.g., a live video feed of a patient).
[0146] As another example, wireless device 500 comprises an actuator, a motor, or a switch, related to a communication interface configured to receive wireless input from a network node via a wireless connection. In response to the received wireless input the states of the actuator, the motor, or the switch may change. For example, wireless device 500 may comprise a motor that adjusts the control surfaces or rotors of a drone in flight according to the received input or to a robotic arm performing a medical procedure according to the received input.
[0147] Wireless device 500, when in the form of an Internet of Things (loT) device, may be a device for use in one or more application domains, these domains comprising, but not limited to, wearable technology, extended industrial application and healthcare. Non-limiting examples of such an loT device are a device which is or which is embedded in: a connected refrigerator or freezer, a TV, a connected lighting device, an electricity meter, a robot vacuum cleaner, a voiceP113091W001 25controlled smart speaker, a home security camera, a motion detector, a thermostat, a smoke detector, a door / window sensor, a flood / moisture sensor, an electrical door lock, a connected doorbell, an air conditioning system like a heat pump, an autonomous vehicle, a surveillance system, a weather monitoring device, a vehicle parking monitoring device, an electric vehicle charging station, a smart watch, a fitness tracker, a wearable for tactile augmentation or sensory enhancement, a water sprinkler, an animal- or item-tracking device, a sensor for monitoring a plant or animal, an industrial robot, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), and any kind of medical device, like a heart rate monitor or a remote controlled surgical robot. In particular embodiments, wireless device 500 represents an loT device that comprises circuitry and / or software in dependence of the intended application of the loT device in addition to other components as described in relation to the example embodiment of wireless device 500 shown in Figure 5.
[0148] As yet another specific example, in an loT scenario, wireless device 500 may represent a machine or other device that performs monitoring and / or measurements, and transmits the results of such monitoring and / or measurements to another wireless device and / or a network node. Wireless device 500 may in this case be an M2M device, which may in a 3GPP context be referred to as an MTC device. As one particular example, wireless device 500 may implement the 3GPP NB-IoT standard. In other scenarios, wireless device 500 may represent a vehicle, such as a car, a bus, a truck, a ship and an airplane, or other equipment that is capable of monitoring and / or reporting on its operational status or other functions associated with its operation.
[0149] In practice, any number of wireless devices 500 may be used together with respect to a single use case. For example, a first wireless device 500 might be or be integrated in a drone and provide the drone’s speed information (obtained through a speed sensor) to a second wireless device 500 that is a remote controller operating the drone. When a user makes changes from the remote controller, the first wireless device 500 may adjust the throttle on the drone (e.g., by controlling an actuator) to increase or decrease the drone’s speed. The first and / or the second wireless device 500 can also include more than one of the functionalities described above. For example, wireless device 500 might comprise the sensor and the actuator, and handle communication of data for both the speed sensor and the actuators.
[0150] Figure 6 shows a network node 600 in accordance with some embodiments. As used herein, network node refers to equipment capable, configured, arranged and / or operable to communicate directly or indirectly with a UE and / or with other network nodes or equipment, in a telecommunications network. In an embodiment, the network node 600 could operate as second QUIC peer 204 as described herein and could be a network gateway for non-3GPP access, such as an N3IWF.P113091W001 26
[0151] In particular embodiments, network node 600 includes a processing circuitry 602, a memory 604, a communication interface 606, and a power source 608. In general, in a particular embodiment of network node 600, processing circuitry 602, memory 604, communication interface 606, and power source 608 may, in whole or in part, represent or include physical components common to or shared by one or more of the other elements of network node 600.
[0152] The network node 600 may be composed of multiple distinct network entities, which may each have or utilize their own respective physical components. In certain scenarios in which the network node 600 comprises multiple such entities, one or more of the separate entities may be shared among several network nodes. In some embodiments, the network node 600 may be configured to support multiple radio access technologies (RATs). In such embodiments, some components may be duplicated (e.g., separate memories 604 or portions of memory 604 for different RATs) and some components may be reused (e.g., a same antenna 610 may be shared by different RATs). The network node 600 may also include multiple sets of the various illustrated components for different wireless technologies integrated into network node 600, for example GSM, WCDMA, LTE, NR, Wi-Fi (e.g., according to an IEEE 802.11 family standard), Zigbee, Z-wave, LoRaWAN, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or Bluetooth wireless technologies. These wireless technologies may be integrated into the same or different chip or set of chips and other components within network node 600.
[0153] The processing circuitry 602 may comprise a combination of one or more of a microprocessor, controller, microcontroller, central processing unit, digital signal processor, application- specific integrated circuit, field programmable gate array, or any other suitable computing device, resource, or combination of hardware, software and / or encoded logic operable to provide, either alone or in conjunction with other components, such as the memory 604, to provide network node 600 functionality.
[0154] In some embodiments, the processing circuitry 602 includes a system on a chip (SOC).In some embodiments, the processing circuitry 602 includes one or more of radio frequency (RF) transceiver circuitry 612 and baseband processing circuitry 614. In some embodiments, the RF transceiver circuitry 612 and the baseband processing circuitry 614 may be on separate chips (or sets of chips), boards, or units, such as radio units and digital units. In alternative embodiments, part or all of RF transceiver circuitry 612 and baseband processing circuitry 614 may be on the same chip or set of chips, boards, or units.
[0155] The memory 604 may comprise any form of volatile or non-volatile computer-readable memory including, without limitation, persistent storage, solid-state memory, remotely mounted memory, magnetic media, optical media, random access memory (RAM), read-only memoryP113091W001 27(ROM), mass storage media (for example, a hard disk), removable storage media (for example, a flash drive, a Compact Disk (CD) or a Digital Video Disk (DVD)), and / or any other volatile or non-volatile, non-transitory device-readable and / or computer-executable memory devices that store information, data, and / or instructions that may be used by the processing circuitry 602. The memory 604 may store any suitable instructions, data, or information, including a computer program, software, an application including one or more of logic, rules, code, tables, and / or other instructions capable of being executed by the processing circuitry 602 and utilized by the network node 600. The memory 604 may be used to store any calculations made by the processing circuitry 602 and / or any data received via the communication interface 606. In some embodiments, the processing circuitry 602 and memory 604 is integrated.
[0156] The communication interface 606 is used in wired or wireless communication of signaling and / or data with UEs, other network nodes, and / or any other network equipment. In the illustrated embodiment, communication interface 606 comprises port(s) / terminal(s) 616 to send and receive data, for example to and from a network over a wired connection. In particular embodiments, network node 500 may be capable of wireless communication and communication interface 606 may also include radio front-end circuitry 618 that may be coupled to, or in certain embodiments a part of, an antenna 610. Particular embodiments of radio front-end circuitry 618 include filter (s) 620 and amplifier(s) 622. The radio front-end circuitry 618 may be connected to an antenna 610 and processing circuitry 602. The radio front-end circuitry may be configured to condition signals communicated between antenna 610 and processing circuitry 602. The radio front-end circuitry 618 may receive digital data that is to be sent out to other network nodes or UEs via a wireless connection. The radio front-end circuitry 618 may convert the digital data into a radio signal(s) having the appropriate channel and bandwidth parameters using a combination of filters 620 and / or amplifiers 622. The radio signal(s) may then be transmitted via the antenna 610. Similarly, when receiving data, the antenna 610 may collect radio signals which are then converted into digital data by the radio front-end circuitry 618. The digital data may be passed to the processing circuitry 602. In other embodiments, the communication interface may comprise different components and / or different combinations of components.
[0157] In certain alternative embodiments, network node 600 may be capable of wireless communication but does not include separate radio front-end circuitry 618, instead, the processing circuitry 602 includes radio front-end circuitry and is connected to the antenna 610. Similarly, in some embodiments, all or some of the RF transceiver circuitry 612 is part of the communication interface 606. In still other embodiments, the communication interface 606 includes one or more ports or terminals 616, the radio front-end circuitry 618, and the RF transceiver circuitry 612, asP113091W001 28part of a radio unit (not shown), and the communication interface 606 communicates with the baseband processing circuitry 614, which is part of a digital unit (not shown).
[0158] The antenna 610 may include one or more antennas, or antenna arrays, configured to send and / or receive wireless signals. The antenna 610 may be coupled to the radio front-end circuitry 618 and may be any type of antenna capable of transmitting and receiving data and / or signals wirelessly. In certain embodiments, the antenna 610 is separate from the network node 600 and connectable to the network node 600 through one or more interfaces or ports.
[0159] The antenna 610, communication interface 606, and / or the processing circuitry 602 may be configured to perform some or all of the receiving operations and / or obtaining operations described herein as being performed by the network node 600. Any information, data, and / or signals may be received from a UE, another network node, and / or any other network equipment. Similarly, the antenna 610, the communication interface 606, and / or the processing circuitry 602 may be configured to perform some or all of the transmitting or sending operations described herein as being performed by the network node 600. Any information, data and / or signals may be transmitted to a UE, another network node, and / or any other network equipment.
[0160] The power source 608 provides power to the various components of network node 600 in a form suitable for the respective components (e.g., at a voltage and current level needed for each respective component). The power source 608 may further comprise, or be coupled to, power management circuitry to supply the components of the network node 600 with power for performing the functionality described herein. For example, the network node 600 may be connectable to an external power source (e.g., the power grid, an electricity outlet) via an input circuitry or interface such as an electrical cable, whereby the external power source supplies power to power circuitry of the power source 608. As a further example, the power source 608 may comprise a source of power in the form of a battery or battery pack which is connected to, or integrated in, power circuitry. The battery may provide backup power should the external power source fail.
[0161] Embodiments of the network node 600 may include additional components beyond those shown in Figure 6 for providing certain aspects of the network node’s functionality, including any of the functionality described herein and / or any functionality necessary to support the subject matter described herein. For example, the network node 600 may include user interface equipment to allow input of information into the network node 600 and to allow output of information from the network node 600. This may allow a user to perform diagnostic, maintenance, repair, and other administrative functions for the network node 600.
[0162] Although the computing devices described herein (e.g., UEs, network nodes, hosts)P113091W001 29may include the illustrated combination of hardware components, other embodiments may comprise computing devices with different combinations of components. It is to be understood that these computing devices may comprise any suitable combination of hardware and / or software needed to perform the tasks, features, functions, and methods disclosed herein. Determining, calculating, obtaining or similar operations described herein may be performed by processing circuitry, which may process information by, for example, converting the obtained information into other information, comparing the obtained information or converted information to information stored in the network node, and / or performing one or more operations based on the obtained information or converted information, and as a result of said processing making a determination. Moreover, while components are depicted as single boxes located within a larger box, or nested within multiple boxes, in practice, computing devices may comprise multiple different physical components that make up a single illustrated component, and functionality may be partitioned between separate components. For example, a communication interface may be configured to include any of the components described herein, and / or the functionality of the components may be partitioned between the processing circuitry and the communication interface. In another example, non-computationally intensive functions of any of such components may be implemented in software or firmware and computationally intensive functions may be implemented in hardware.
[0163] In certain embodiments, some or all of the functionality described herein may be provided by processing circuitry executing instructions stored on in memory, which in certain embodiments may be a computer program product in the form of a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. In alternative embodiments, some or all of the functionality may be provided by the processing circuitry without executing instructions stored on a separate or discrete device-readable storage medium, such as in a hard-wired manner. In any of those particular embodiments, whether executing instructions stored on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium or not, the processing circuitry can be configured to perform the described functionality. The benefits provided by such functionality are not limited to the processing circuitry alone or to other components of the computing device, but are enjoyed by the computing device as a whole, and / or by end users and a wireless network generally.
[0164] Those skilled in the art will recognize improvements and modifications to the embodiments of the present disclosure. All such improvements and modifications are considered within the scope of the concepts disclosed herein.
Claims
P113091W001 30CLAIMS1. A method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node (202) and a second QUIC peer node (204), performed by the second QUIC peer node (204), the method comprising:establishing (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);obtaining (213), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key from a server (206), wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206);deriving (214), based on the shared key and a secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection, a new secret;determining (216), based on the new secret, a write key and a first initial value, and a read key and a second initial value;transmitting (218) a QUIC packet to the first QUIC peer node (202) that is encrypted and integrity protected using the write key and the first initial value;receiving (226), from the first QUIC peer node (202), another encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet; anddetermining (230) that the key update procedure is complete and that the first QUIC peer node (202) is authenticated in response to decrypting (228) and verifying the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet using the read key and the second initial value.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the server (206) is an authentication server and the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206) following successful authentication.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206) following successful re-authentication and / or re-keying.
4. The method of any of claims 1 to 3, wherein during the establishing the QUIC connection, a transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204) indicating support for mutual authentication of an already established QUIC connection based on an external key.P113091W001 315. The method of claim 1 to 3, wherein during the establishing the QUIC connection, another transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204) indicating support for the rekeying procedure.
6. The method of any of claims 1 to 5, wherein a header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet comprises an indication that the QUIC packet is associated with a key update procedure and another indication that the key update procedure is based on an external key.
7. The method of any of claims 1 to 6, wherein the new secret comprises a combination of the shared key and the secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection.
8. The method of any of claims 1 to 7, wherein the header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is protected using a header protection key determined during the establishing of the QUIC connection.
9. The method of any of claims 1 to 8, wherein the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet received from the first QUIC peer node (202) comprises an acknowledgement that the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet was received and decrypted and verified by the first QUIC peer node (202).
10. The method of any of claims 1 to 9, wherein the first QUIC peer node (202) is a User Equipment.
11. The method of any of claims 1 to 10, wherein the second QUIC peer node (204) is a network or a User Plane Function, UPF.
12. A second QUIC peer node (204) configured to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204), the second QUIC peer node (204) comprising processing circuitry configured to cause the second QUIC peer node (204) to:establish (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);obtain (213), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key from a server (206), wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206);P113091W001 32derive (214), based on the shared key and a secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection, a new secret;determine (216), based on the new secret, a write key and a first initial value, and a read key and a second initial value;transmit (218) a QUIC packet to the first QUIC peer node (202) that is encrypted and integrity protected using the write key and the first initial value;receive (226), from the first QUIC peer node (202), another encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet; anddetermine (230) that the key update procedure is complete and that the first QUIC peer node (202) is authenticated in response to decrypting (228) and verifying the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet using the read key and the second initial value.
13. The second QUIC peer node (204) of claim 12, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to perform any of the embodiments of claims 2 to 11.
14. A method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node (202) and a second QUIC peer node (204), performed by the first QUIC peer node (202), the method comprising:establishing (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);deriving (212a), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and a server (206);receiving (218), from the second QUIC peer node (204), an encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet,;deriving (220), based on the shared key and a secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection, a new secret;determining (222), based on the new secret, a read key and a first initial value; attempting (222) to decrypt and verify the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet using the read key and the first initial value;in response to successfully decrypting and verifying the encrypted QUIC packet, determining (225), based on the new secret, a write key and a second initial value; and transmitting (226) another encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet to the second QUIC peer node (204), wherein the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is encrypted and integrity protected based on the write key and the second initial value.P113091W001 3315. The method of claim 14, wherein the server (206) is an authentication server and the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206) following successful authentication.
16. The method of claim 14, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206) following successful re-authentication and / or re-keying.
17. The method of any of claims 14 to 16, wherein the method further comprises:determining (224) that the key update procedure is complete and that the second QUIC peer node (204) is authenticated in response to decrypting and verifying the encrypted QUIC packet with the read key and the first initial value.
18. The method of any of claims 14 to 17, wherein during the establishing the QUIC connection, a transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204) indicating support for mutual authentication of an already established QUIC connection based on an external key.
19. The method of claim 14 to 18, wherein during the establishing the QUIC connection, another transport parameter is exchanged between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204) indicating support for the rekeying procedure.
20. The method of any of claims 14 to 19, wherein the new secret comprises a combination of the shared key and the secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection.
21. The method of any of claims 14 to 20, wherein a header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet comprises an indication that the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is associated with a key update procedure and another indication that the key update procedure is based on an external key.
22. The method of any of claims 14 to 21, wherein the header of the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is protected using a header protection key determined during the establishing of the QUIC connection.
23. The method of any of claims 14 to 22, wherein the first QUIC peer node (202) is a UserP113091W001 34Equipment.
24. The method of any of claims 14 to 23, wherein the second QUIC peer node (204) is a network gateway or a User Plane Function, UPF.
25. A first QUIC peer node (202) configured to perform mutual authentication between the first QUIC peer node (202) and a second QUIC peer node (204), the first QUIC peer node (202) comprising processing circuitry configured to cause the first QUIC peer node (202) to:establish (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);derive (212a), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and a server (206);receive (218), from the second QUIC peer node (204), an encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet;derive (220), based on the shared key and a secret established during establishment of the QUIC connection, a new secret;determine (222), based on the new secret, a read key and a first initial value; attempt (222) to decrypt and verify the encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet using the read key and the first initial value;in response to successfully decrypting and verifying the encrypted QUIC packet, determine (225), based on the new secret, a write key and a second initial value; and transmit (226) another encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet to the second QUIC peer node (204), wherein the other encrypted and integrity protected QUIC packet is encrypted and integrity protected based on the write key and the second initial value.
26. The first QUIC peer node (202) of claim 25, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to cause the first QUIC peer node (202) to perform any of the embodiments of claims 15 to 24.
27. A method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node (202) and a second QUIC peer node (204), performed by the second QUIC peer node (204), the method comprising:establishing (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);P113091W001 35obtaining (213), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key from a server (206), wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206);generating (402) a first authentication challenge and starting a first timer; transmitting (404), to the first QUIC peer node (202), a first QUIC packet comprising the first authentication challenge;receiving (408), from the first QUIC peer node (202), one or more QUIC packets comprising a first authentication response to the first authentication challenge and a second authentication challenge;determining (410) that the first authentication response is valid based on the shared key, the first authentication challenge, and a read key and, upon successful validation, stopping the first timer;determining (414) a second authentication response based on the second authentication challenge, the shared key, and a write key; andtransmitting (416) an additional packet to the first QUIC peer node (202) comprising the second authentication response.
28. The method of claim 27, wherein received QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the read key is used in decrypting and verifying the received QUIC packets.
29. The method of claim 27, wherein transmitted QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the write key is used in encrypting and integrity protecting the transmitted QUIC packets.
30. The method of claim 27, further comprising:in response to the first timer expiring before receiving the one or more QUIC packets from the first QUIC peer node (202), initiating (412) closure of the QUIC connection.
31. The method of any of claims 27 to 30, wherein the first QUIC peer node (202) is a User Equipment.
32. The method of any of claims 27 to 31, wherein the second QUIC peer node (204) is a network gateway or a User Plane Function, UPF.P113091W001 3633. A second QUIC peer node (204) configured to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204), the second QUIC peer node (204) comprising processing circuitry configured to cause the second QUIC peer node (204) to:establish (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);obtain, after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key from a server (206), wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the server (206);generate (402) a first authentication challenge and start a first timer;transmit (404), to the first QUIC peer node (202), a first QUIC packet comprising the first authentication challenge;receive (408), from the first QUIC peer node (202), one or more QUIC packets comprising a first authentication response to the first authentication challenge and a second authentication challenge;determine (410) that the first authentication response is valid based on the shared key, the first authentication challenge, and a read key and, upon successful validation, stopping the first timer;determine (414) a second authentication response based on the second authentication challenge, the shared key, and a write key; andtransmit (416) an additional packet to the first QUIC peer node (202) comprising the second authentication response.
34. The second QUIC peer node (204) of claim 33, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to perform any of the embodiments of claims 28 to 32.
35. A method to perform mutual authentication between a first QUIC peer node (202) and a second QUIC peer node (204), performed by the first QUIC peer node (202), the method comprising:establishing (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);deriving (212a), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key, wherein the shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and a server (206);receiving (404), from the second QUIC peer node (204), a first QUIC packet comprising a first authentication challenge;determining (406) a first authentication response based on the first authenticationP113091W001 31challenge, the shared key, and a write key;generating (406) a second authentication challenge and starting (406) a second timer; transmitting (408), to the second QUIC peer node (204), one or more QUIC packets comprising the first authentication response to the first authentication challenge and the second authentication challenge;receiving (416), from the second QUIC peer node (204), an additional QUIC packet comprising a second authentication response; anddetermining (418) that the second authentication response is valid based on the second authentication challenge, the shared key, and a read key and, upon successful validation, stopping the second timer.
36. The method of claim 35, wherein received QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the read key is used in decrypting and verifying the received QUIC packets.
37. The method of claim 35, wherein transmitted QUIC packets are encrypted and integrity protected and the write key is used in encrypting and integrity protecting the transmitted QUIC packets.
38. The method of any of claims 35 to 37, further comprising:in response to the second timer expiring before receiving the additional QUIC packet from the second QUIC peer node (204), initiating (422) closure of the QUIC connection.
39. The method of any of claims 35 to 38, wherein the first QUIC peer node (202) is a User Equipment.
40. The method of any of claims 35 to 39, wherein the second QUIC peer node (204) is a network gateway or a User Plane Function, UPF.
41. A first QUIC peer node (202) configured to perform mutual authentication between the first QUIC peer node (202) and a second QUIC peer node (204), the first QUIC peer node (202) comprising processing circuitry configured to cause the first QUIC peer node (202) to:establish (208) a QUIC connection between the first QUIC peer node (202) and the second QUIC peer node (204);derive (212a), after the establishment of the QUIC connection, a shared key, wherein theP113091W001 38shared key is shared between the first QUIC peer node (202) and a server (206);receive (404), from a the second QUIC peer node (204), a first QUIC packet comprising a first authentication challenge;determine (406) a first authentication response based on the first authentication challenge, the shared key, and a write key;generate (406) a second authentication challenge and start (406) a second timer; transmit (408), to the second QUIC peer node (204), one or more QUIC packets comprising the first authentication response to the first authentication challenge and the second authentication challenge;receive (416), from the second QUIC peer node (204), an additional QUIC packet comprising a second authentication response; anddetermine (418) that the second authentication response is valid based on the second authentication challenge, the shared key, and a read key and, upon successful validation, stopping the second timer.
42. The first QUIC peer node (202) of claim 41, wherein the processing circuitry is further configured to cause the first QUIC peer node (202) to perform any of the embodiments of claims 36 to 40.
