Heuristic dynamic path optimization method for physical protection system in three-dimensional scene
By using path direction planning, punctuation point setting and geometric model distribution estimation in three-dimensional modeling, combined with the A* heuristic search algorithm, the problem of inefficient path search in three-dimensional modeling is solved, and the weakest path for physical protection systems is realized efficient identification and optimization.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410908145.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-08
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-08
AI Technical Summary
Three-dimensional modeling leads to an exponential growth in the search space of enemy invasion paths in physical protection systems, resulting in inefficient search of the weakest paths in the system and infeasible calculations.
Using three-dimensional path direction planning, punctuation point setting and geometric model-based detection point distribution estimation, heuristic function with the system interception probability as the value, and dynamic programming and navigation of the agent path through the A* heuristic search algorithm is used to identify The weakest path to physical protection systems.
It improves the path search efficiency of physical protection systems in three-dimensional scenarios, realizes efficient identification and dynamic planning of the weakest paths in key infrastructure, and optimizes the physical security protection design.
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Figure CN118966404A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of nuclear security and physical safety analysis, and in particular relates to a heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene. Background Art
[0002] Physical security protection originated from the security needs of military nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, and then gradually expanded to key infrastructure areas such as civilian nuclear power plants, airports, large hydropower stations, and petrochemical plants. The physical security protection of critical infrastructure is achieved through the Physical Protection System (PPS). Therefore, the effectiveness of the design of the physical protection system is an important barrier foundation for determining the security of critical infrastructure.
[0003] Sandia National Laboratories in the United States took the lead in conducting research on the design and evaluation of the effectiveness of physical protection systems, and proposed a series of original methodological theories and model tools, including classic theoretical methods such as the Adversary Intrusion Sequence Interruption Estimation Method (EASI Model) and the Adversary Intrusion Sequence Diagram (ASD Diagram), and derived a variety of variant methods such as SAVI, ASSESS, and SAPE. However, most research work and application analysis scenarios are limited to one-dimensional or two-dimensional simplified models. In recent years, with the rise and maturity of three-dimensional modeling, virtual reality, augmented reality, and artificial intelligence technologies, path optimization and virtual attack and defense drill analysis based on three-dimensional models have gradually become new research hotspots. Three-dimensional modeling can achieve refined and visual model expression of critical infrastructure structures and physical protection function components, but it also brings new problems and challenges to the design and evaluation of the effectiveness of physical protection systems. According to the three-dimensional refined grid division, the search space of the adversary's intrusion path will show an exponential explosion (J.Yang, LXHuang, HMMa, et al. A2D-graph model-based heuristic approach to visual backtracking security vulnerabilities in physical protection systems. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 28:100554, 2022.), resulting in inefficient search for the weakest path of the system and even making the calculation infeasible. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present invention provides a heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scenario. Through three-dimensional path direction planning, navigation point setting, and detection point distribution estimation based on a geometric model, a three-dimensional heuristic function design with a system interception probability as a cost value is established. By using the real-time import of heuristic information such as position, dynamic path planning and navigation of an adversary or response force agent are realized. In combination with the calculation and comparison of the minimum system interception probability value, the weakest path of the physical protection system is efficiently identified, which is used for optimization and improvement of the physical security protection design of critical infrastructure.
[0005] The first object of the present invention is to provide a ray detection function to achieve effective identification of the reachable sections and space cells of the intelligent body during the path search process.
[0006] The second purpose of the present invention is to provide a three-dimensional space distance measurement method based on navigation point markings, which can effectively solve the problem of accurate estimation of three-dimensional distance caused by moving up and down across floors, and assist in achieving precise navigation in three-dimensional space.
[0007] The third purpose of the present invention is to provide a detection probability estimation method based on a geometric distribution model, so as to achieve reasonable estimation of detection probability points on unknown heuristic sections, and then optimize the A* heuristic function design, maximize the A* heuristic search efficiency, and achieve efficient identification of the weakest path of the physical protection system of critical infrastructure in three-dimensional scenarios through the A* heuristic function design.
[0008] The purpose of the present invention is achieved by at least one of the following technical solutions.
[0009] A heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene includes the following steps:
[0010] S1. Establish a three-dimensional structure model based on the design data of the physical protection system of the protection facility, and realize three-dimensional scene visualization through rendering and lighting of the three-dimensional structure model;
[0011] S2. According to the type of detection elements of the physical protection system, determine the mathematical model of the detector detection probability distribution, establish the three-dimensional virtual searchlight model of the detector, and realize the construction and virtual rendering of the three-dimensional dynamic visualization model of the detection field through the scene fusion design of the detection elements;
[0012] S3. According to the structure and connection characteristics of the upper and lower floors of the building in the three-dimensional space, a perspective expression of the virtual interwoven sections between different floors of the virtual three-dimensional space is established. By mapping the adjacent grid elements of the sections at each level, the three-dimensional path planning direction is determined, and the ray detection function in Unity is used to realize the effective identification of the sections that can be reached by the intelligent agent;
[0013] S4. Based on the navigation points and the detection probability estimation based on the geometric distribution model, a three-dimensional heuristic reverse path planning algorithm is constructed to realize the dynamic planning and navigation of the path of the adversary or intelligent agent;
[0014] S5. According to the EASI model theory, dynamically search and calculate the interception probability of the system along the path planning direction to effectively identify the weakest path of the system;
[0015] S6. Based on the weakest path set of the physical protection system obtained through the search, reverse extraction is performed through the path traversal nodes to generate an intelligent agent intrusion attack or return defense route map.
[0016] Furthermore, in step S1, a three-dimensional structure model is established on the 3ds MAX platform, and then the three-dimensional structure model is imported into the Unity platform to realize three-dimensional scene visualization through rendering and lighting;
[0017] The establishment of 3D structure models includes geometric shape construction, texture mapping and .max / .fbx file format conversion;
[0018] The environmental rendering of the three-dimensional structure model is realized through the Unity platform. By setting the photography angle, spatial relationship, composition, texture, and light and shadow rendering parameters, the three-dimensional model of the physical security protection facility can achieve the best visual effect.
[0019] Further, in step S2, the detection element refers to a detection device or system used to detect the occurrence of potential threats or abnormal situations and issue an alarm, including an anti-intrusion detection device, an access control system, and a television monitoring system;
[0020] According to the different detector types and working principles, detectors are classified into active / passive, visible / hidden, space detectors / linear detectors;
[0021] Detection methods include: 1. Access control system based on a combination of boundary penetration detectors and distance detectors, including access control cards, anti-theft security doors based on face recognition or fingerprint scanners; 2. Video surveillance system based on indoor or outdoor motion detection devices.
[0022] Furthermore, a three-dimensional virtual searchlight model of the detector and detection element is established on the 3ds MAX and Unity platforms. Through lighting and color rendering, the detection element and the three-dimensional structure model are integrated into the scene to cover the overlap and blind spots of the detector detection area.
[0023] Furthermore, in step S3, the virtual three-dimensional space is an interwoven presentation of horizontal sections of different floors of the building and vertical sections of upper and lower connecting passages. Different floors represent different horizontal section levels, and different floors are connected by elevator shafts or stairs. The elevator shafts realize straight up or straight down crossings between different floors, and the stairs realize crossings of different step sections in a step-by-step manner according to their specific directions.
[0024] Furthermore, the ray detection function in Unity is used to effectively identify the reachable sections of the agent, including the following steps:
[0025] 4.1. In the generated three-dimensional discretized grid space, randomly select a grid element, whose center point position coordinates are G(x g ,y g ,z g );
[0026] 4.2. According to the side length setting of the grid element, the positions of the center points of eight grid elements on the same horizontal plane are obtained along the eight directions of row, column and diagonal of the two-dimensional horizontal plane;
[0027] 4.3. The distance d above the center of the grid element step At the place, it emits a length of 2d directly downward in different directions. step If the generated grid cell can be detected within the range of the ray, the grid node is regarded as a neighboring node of the current node;
[0028] The grid side length also serves as the agent's advancement length per unit time; the two-dimensional horizontal plane movement directions include eight directions: front, back, left, right, left front, left back, right front, and right back.
[0029] Furthermore, in step S4, according to the floor structure characteristics of the three-dimensional building, the location of the elevator shaft or staircase entrance and exit connecting the upper and lower floors is set as a navigation point, and the three-dimensional space distance calculation can be converted into the superposition of two-dimensional distance calculations on three intersecting planes. The specific calculation expression is as follows:
[0030] D(n,s)=D(n,w1)+D(w1,w2)+D(w2,s) (1)
[0031] Where D(n,s) represents the current node N n To the end node N s The diagonal distance between the current node N n The diagonal distance between the navigation point w1 and the navigation point w2; D(w1,w2) represents the shortest path distance between two navigation points; D(w2,s) represents the distance from the navigation point w2 to the terminal node N. s The diagonal distance between
[0032] Furthermore, the distance heuristic cost is estimated by the following formula (2):
[0033]
[0034] In the formula, x n ,y n ,z n Represents the current node N n The coordinate value in three-dimensional space, They represent the coordinate values of the navigation point w1 in three-dimensional space, They represent the coordinate values of the navigation point w2 in three-dimensional space respectively. The min() function is used to obtain the minimum value of the difference between the horizontal coordinate or vertical coordinate of two points on the two-dimensional plane. Find an estimate of the diagonal distance between two points on a two-dimensional plane.
[0035] Furthermore, the detection probability estimation method based on the geometric distribution model is implemented by the following steps:
[0036] According to the center coordinate position of the current grid cell node, the current node N is calculated by the above formulas (1) to (2). n With terminal node N s The distance between them D(n,s);
[0037] Further, according to the diagonal length d of the grid element cell , determine the current node N n To the final vertex N s The number of grid nodes that the path segment must pass through N grids , N grids The following formula (3) is rounded to get:
[0038]
[0039] According to the calculated number of grid nodes N grids , further through the geometric distribution model assumption, it is estimated that N grids The number of cells m that may become detection points in a grid cell is calculated as follows:
[0040] m=E(Φ)=p·N grids (4)
[0041] Where E(Φ) represents the average value of potential detection opportunity points Φ along the adversary’s intrusion path, and p represents the current node N n To the final vertex N s The probability of any grid node on the road section being a detection node is equal to the number of detection point grids covered by the detection probability divided by the total number of grids.
[0042] Furthermore, the EASI model is used to preset the interruption probability calculation of the adversary intrusion path, and to estimate the detection probability, delay time and response time distribution of the physical protection system based on the detection, delay, response and communication characteristics;
[0043] The EASI model uses the system intercept probability P I As a cost-effectiveness measure, the system intercept probability P I The definition expression is as follows:
[0044]
[0045] In the formula, represents the detection probability of a single detection point, It represents the probability of successfully transmitting the alarm communication to the response force after the enemy intrusion is identified at the nth detection point, which is usually set as a constant; P(R|A n ) represents the probability that the response force successfully interrupts the enemy attack after receiving the alarm information of the nth detection point, n = 1, 2, ... N, N represents the total number of detection opportunity points;
[0046] P(R|A n ) is calculated by the mean and standard deviation of the system response time RFT and the adversary intrusion task remaining time TR using the following formula (6):
[0047]
[0048] P(X≥0) represents the probability that the response force will have enough time to reach the target protection point and effectively intercept the enemy after receiving the system intrusion alarm; assuming that RFT and TR are independent and obey the normal distribution, the random variable X, X=TR-RFT≥0 also follows the mean μ X , the variance is Normal distribution of
[0049] The system response time RFT refers to the time required for the response force to reach the protected target after the system triggers an alarm; the enemy invasion task remaining time TR refers to the time required for the enemy to complete its task after being detected by the system; an effective physical protection system design must ensure that the enemy invasion task remaining time is greater than or equal to the system response time, that is, X=TR-RFT≥0; the values of TR and RFT are calculated by searching the shortest path;
[0050] The path dynamic planning process is implemented by the A* heuristic reverse search algorithm, and the cost function of the A* heuristic algorithm is expressed by the following formula (7):
[0051] F(n)=G(n)+H(n) (7)
[0052] Among them, G(n) represents the starting node N g To the current node N n The actual cost value, H(n) represents the cost from the current node N n To the end node N s The estimated cost of
[0053] Assumptions and Respectively represent the starting node N g Move back to the current node N n and terminal node N s The actual cost value is then the heuristic function H(n) is calculated by the following formula (8):
[0054]
[0055] express and The difference between them is the estimated cost;
[0056] Assume that the current node N n To the end node N s There are H potential detection opportunities on the path segment, then P I s It is calculated by the following formula (9):
[0057]
[0058] In the formula, represents the detection probability at the terminal node, represents the detection probability of the s-1th detection point. The detection probabilities of other detection nodes can be interpreted and obtained by similar methods; P C represents the system communication probability, represents the detection probability of the n+1th detection point, P(R|A n+1 ) and P(R|A s ) represent the response force after receiving the alarm of the n+1th detection point and the terminal node N s The probability of successfully intercepting the enemy after the alarm is sounded;
[0059] Furthermore, the formula (9) is expanded in a recursive form to achieve iterative calculation of the system interception probability at different detection nodes on the path:
[0060]
[0061] In the formula, Indicates the current node Nn The detection probability, Indicates that from the starting node N g Move backward to the n-1th node N n-1 The actual cost value;
[0062] According to the EASI model theory, when the system response time RFT remains unchanged, P(R|A n ) increases with the remaining time TR of the enemy's invasion mission, that is, there exists:
[0063] TR n <TR i (n<i≤s) (11)
[0064] P(R|A n )<P(R|A i )(n<i≤s) (12)
[0065] Among them, TR n Indicates the nth detection point, that is, the current node N n The remaining time of the enemy invasion mission, TR i represents the remaining time of the adversary’s invasion task at the i-th detection point, s represents the total number of detection points, and the remaining time of the adversary’s invasion task becomes smaller and smaller; P(R|A i ) represents the probability that the response force successfully intercepts the enemy after receiving the alarm from the i-th detection point;
[0066] In order to ensure that the estimated cost of the heuristic function is less than or equal to its actual cost, all detection point probabilities are uniformly replaced by the node with the smallest probability value in the detection field. The following inequality is obtained:
[0067]
[0068] Furthermore, through the calculation expression of the heuristic function H(n), the estimated value of the heuristic function is obtained as follows:
[0069]
[0070] In the formula, P(R|A n )and For the current node N n is known;
[0071] Furthermore, the specific implementation steps of the A* heuristic reverse search algorithm are as follows:
[0072] Taking the protected target as the starting source node and the enemy’s intrusion starting position as the end node of the path, the reachable neighboring nodes of the current node are searched according to the three-dimensional path planning direction. During the search process, the system intercepts the probability PI , A* heuristic algorithm generation value function, heuristic function estimate value calculation to get the current node N n Neighboring nodes N n+1 The actual cost value G(n+1), estimated cost value H(n+1) and global cost value F(n+1);
[0073] According to the current node N n The cost values of each neighboring node are compared, and the neighboring node with the lowest cost value is selected as the next path node. The iterative search and cost value update calculation are repeated until the end node is reached.
[0074] Furthermore, in step S6, the weakest path set of the system refers to the same minimum system interception probability cost value P I There may be a set of multiple shortest paths.
[0075] Through reverse extraction of path traversal nodes, the path is guided from the starting point of the enemy's invasion along the direction of the path development to the end point of the protected target, and the reconstruction of the system's weakest path is completed. Combined with the identification of the background color of the grid elements passed by the path, the path is visualized.
[0076] The present invention has the following beneficial effects compared with the prior art:
[0077] 1. Compared with the existing one-dimensional or two-dimensional physical protection system effectiveness model evaluation, the three-dimensional system modeling design provided by the present invention can load complex topographic data information in actual application scenarios, and realize more accurate, more vivid and more intuitive three-dimensional visualization modeling expression and dynamic reconstruction of spatial distance (physical parameter field) and detection probability field. The constructed three-dimensional entity model can be combined with virtual reality / augmented reality to support interactive simulation and simulation exercise analysis of security defense response of key important infrastructure.
[0078] 2. The physical protection system effectiveness analysis method based on A* heuristic reverse search provided by the present invention establishes a reasonable and accurate estimation of the A* heuristic function through adaptive dynamic planning of the three-dimensional path direction to the environment, precise navigation setting of beacon points, and detection probability estimation based on a geometric distribution model. It solves key technical problems such as the flattening of spatial position information of mobile targets and the inability to accurately estimate distance and spatial detection field during path search that are common in traditional one-dimensional or two-dimensional physical protection system effectiveness evaluations, thereby achieving efficient identification of the weakest path of the physical protection system and dynamic path planning. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0079] Figure 1 A diagram of the effectiveness design and evaluation framework of the physical protection system developed based on the three-dimensional model for the implementation example;
[0080] Figure 2 A two-dimensional plan layout diagram of the facilities of the embodiment;
[0081] Figure 3 This is the two-dimensional plan design drawing of Building No. 3 in Example;
[0082] Figure 4 Design of 3D model of facilities for implementation;
[0083] Figure 5 This is a display diagram of the exterior and interior model of Building No. 3 in Example;
[0084] Figure 6 This is a visualization diagram of the detection field model of the detection camera in the embodiment;
[0085] Figure 7 This is a visualization effect diagram of the detection field parameters of the implementation case facility;
[0086] Figure 8 Provide a roadmap for responding to the defense force for the implementation example;
[0087] Fig. 9 This is a diagram showing the weakest path identification result of the system based on A* heuristic search in the embodiment;
[0088] Fig.10 This is a diagram of the weakest path identification result of the system based on the Dijkstra algorithm in the embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0089] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described are only used to explain the present application and are not used to limit the present application.
[0090] like Figure 1 The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene of this embodiment includes the following steps:
[0091] S1. Based on the input of the design data of the physical protection system of the protection facilities, the system 3D structure model is first developed on the 3ds MAX platform, and then the system 3D model is imported into the Unity platform to realize the 3D scene visualization through rendering and lighting;
[0092] The 3ds MAX is a PC-based 3D modeling and design software developed by Discreet, an American company, which supports 3D modeling, animation development and character rendering; the Unity is a development software that can be used in a variety of application fields such as game development, simulation, virtual reality and visualization design, and is often used for constructing virtual 3D visualization environments.
[0093] The three-dimensional model of the physical protection system is developed and implemented through the 3ds MAX platform, which mainly involves geometric shape construction, texture mapping and .max / .fbx file format conversion;
[0094] The model environment rendering is realized through the Unity platform. By setting rendering parameters such as photography angle, spatial relationship, composition, texture, light and shadow, the three-dimensional model of the physical security protection facility achieves the best visual effect.
[0095] S2. According to the type of detection elements of the physical protection system, determine the mathematical model of the detector detection probability distribution, and establish a three-dimensional virtual searchlight model of the detector on the 3ds MAX and Unity platforms. Through the appropriate fusion design of the detection elements, the three-dimensional dynamic visualization model construction and virtual rendering of the detection field are realized;
[0096] The detection element refers to a detection device or system used to detect potential threats or abnormal situations and issue an alarm, including anti-intrusion detection devices, access control systems, television monitoring systems, etc.
[0097] According to the different types of detectors and working principles, the detection capabilities and detection efficiencies of detectors vary, and the corresponding mathematical model expressions are also different. According to the working characteristics of intrusion detection devices, detectors can be classified into active / passive, visible / hidden, space detectors / linear detectors, etc.
[0098] As a specific embodiment, the detection means mainly include: ① an access control system based on a combination of boundary penetration detectors and distance detectors, such as access cards, anti-theft security doors based on face recognition or fingerprint scanners, etc.; ② a video surveillance system based on indoor or outdoor motion detection devices, such as closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), which are usually installed in corners inside or outside buildings.
[0099] Furthermore, according to the mathematical model of the detector, a 3D virtual searchlight model of the detector is established on the 3ds MAX and Unity platforms. Through lighting and color rendering, the detection element and the 3D structure model are integrated to cover the overlapping detection areas and blind spots of the detector.
[0100] Furthermore, for a rotating or mobile detection device, a time-dependent vector model is constructed according to the swing or rotation direction of the detector to simulate the periodic changes in the detection area range and capability strength, and through interaction with environmental parameters, the detection probability model is adaptively adjusted to environmental change factors;
[0101] By superimposing the detection probability models of different detection points, a detection probability field is constructed and generated to achieve accurate positioning, dynamic trace update and timely warning of enemy intrusion;
[0102] The detection probability field can also cover the effective identification of critical detection areas, and through timely warning of the enemy's intrusion depth, ensure that the system response force has enough time to intercept the enemy;
[0103] The critical detection area is the spatial coverage of the minimum cumulative delay time of the critical detection point relative to the protected target. The critical detection point refers to the detection point corresponding to the remaining time required for the enemy to reach the target exceeds the system response time. The intrusion detection system can only detect the enemy before the critical detection point, and the response force can successfully intercept the enemy.
[0104] S3. According to the structure and connection characteristics of the upper and lower floors of the building in three-dimensional space, a perspective expression of the virtual interwoven sections between different floors is established. By mapping the adjacent grid elements of each level section, the three-dimensional path planning direction is determined, and the ray detection function in Unity is used to realize the effective identification of the sections that can be reached by the intelligent agent;
[0105] The virtual three-dimensional space is an interwoven presentation of the horizontal sections of different floors of the building and the vertical sections of the upper and lower connecting passages. Different floors represent different horizontal section levels, and different floors are connected by elevator shafts or stairs. The elevator shafts realize straight up or straight down crossings between different floors, and the stairs realize crossings of different step sections in a step-by-step manner according to their specific directions.
[0106] Considering that the intelligent agent can move in eight directions, namely rows, columns, and diagonals, on both horizontal and vertical sections, the two-dimensional grid division of each section is realized. Furthermore, by superimposing the horizontal and vertical section direction angles, the adjacent grid element mapping of each level section is realized to determine the three-dimensional path planning direction. The number of moving directions of the agent in the three-dimensional grid space will increase by 26, including upward movement {upper left front (UFL), upper left (UL), upper left back (UBL), upper front (UF), upper (U), upper back (UB), upper right front (UFR), upper right (UR), upper right back (UBR)}, horizontal movement {left front (FL), left (L), left back (BL), front (F), back (B), front right (FR), right (R), back (BR)} and downward movement {lower left front (DFL), lower left (DL), lower left back (DBL), lower front (DF), lower (D), lower back (DB), lower right front (DFR), lower right (DR), lower right back (DBR)}.
[0107] Furthermore, the ray detection function in Unity is used to effectively identify the reachable sections of the agent. The implementation steps are as follows:
[0108] 4.1. In the generated three-dimensional discretized grid space, randomly select a grid element, whose center point position coordinates are G(x g ,y g ,z g );
[0109] 4.2. According to the side length setting of the grid element, the positions of the center points of eight grid elements on the same horizontal plane are obtained along the eight directions of row, column and diagonal of the two-dimensional horizontal plane;
[0110] 4.3, such as Fig. 9 As shown, the distance d above the center point of the grid element step At the point, the length of the emission is 2d in different directions directly below the space (negative z direction). step If the generated grid cell can be detected within the range of the ray, the grid node is regarded as a neighboring node of the current node.
[0111] The grid side length also serves as the agent's advancement length per unit time; the two-dimensional horizontal plane movement directions include eight directions: {front, back, left, right, left front, left back, right front, right back}.
[0112] S4. According to the navigation point setting and the detection probability estimation based on the geometric distribution model, a three-dimensional heuristic reverse path planning algorithm is constructed to realize the dynamic planning and navigation of the adversary or intelligent agent path;
[0113] The navigation points are the necessary points on the path, which play the role of accurate path navigation. They usually appear in pairs and can be set manually or automatically generated to make the path finding process faster. The shortest path between the navigation point pairs can be determined in advance to save the path search cost.
[0114] Furthermore, according to the characteristics of the floor structure of a three-dimensional building, the location of the elevator shaft or staircase entrance and exit connecting the upper and lower floors can be set as a navigation point. In this way, the three-dimensional space distance calculation can be converted into the superposition of two-dimensional distance calculations on three intersecting planes. The specific calculation expression is as follows:
[0115] D(n,s)=D(n,w1)+D(w1,w2)+D(w2,s) (1)
[0116] Where D(n,w1) represents the current node N n The diagonal distance between the navigation point w1 and the terminal node N. D(w1,w2) represents the shortest path distance between two navigation points, which can be determined in advance. D(w2,s) represents the distance from the navigation point w2 to the terminal node N. s The distance between navigation points can be either the exact distance, calculated by the shortest path search, or estimated by the diagonal distance.
[0117] Furthermore, the distance heuristic cost is estimated by the following formula (2):
[0118]
[0119] In the formula, x, y, and z represent three-dimensional coordinate values respectively, and the min() function gives the minimum value of the difference between the horizontal coordinate or vertical coordinate between two points on the two-dimensional plane. This gives an estimate of the diagonal distance between two points in a two-dimensional plane.
[0120] The geometric distribution probability model is used to describe the probability of an event occurring for the first time in a series of independent repeated Bernoulli trials. Aiming at the path planning and heuristic search of the physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene, the present invention provides a detection probability estimation method based on a geometric distribution model to solve the problem that it is difficult to accurately obtain detection points and delay elements on an unknown path.
[0121] Furthermore, the detection probability estimation method based on the geometric distribution model is implemented by the following steps:
[0122] According to the current grid element node (N n ) is calculated by the above formulas (1) to (2) to obtain the current node (N n ) and the terminal node (N s) between the distance D;
[0123] Further, according to the diagonal length d of the grid element cell , determine the current node (N n ) to the final vertex (N s ) is the number of grid nodes N that the path segment must pass through. grids , N grids The following formula (3) is rounded to get:
[0124]
[0125] According to the calculated number of grid nodes N grids , further through the geometric distribution model assumption, it is estimated that N grids The number of cells that may become detection points in a grid cell is calculated as follows:
[0126] m=E(Φ)=p·N grids (4)
[0127] In the formula, p represents the current node (N n ) to the final vertex (N s ) The probability of any grid node on the road section being a detection node is equal to the number of detection point grids covered by the detection probability divided by the total number of grids.
[0128] S5. According to the EASI model theory, dynamically search and calculate the interception probability (P) of the system along the path planning direction. I ) to effectively identify the weakest path in the system.
[0129] The EASI model is a classic method for estimating adversary sequence interruption of physical protection systems. It is mainly used to calculate the interruption probability of a preset adversary intrusion path, and estimates the detection probability, delay time and response time distribution of the physical protection system based on detection, delay, response and communication characteristics.
[0130] The EASI model uses the system intercept probability (P I ) as the cost value measurement indicator, the system intercept probability P I The definition expression is as follows:
[0131]
[0132] In the formula, represents the detection probability of a single detection point, It represents the probability of successfully transmitting the alarm communication to the response force after the nth detection point identifies the enemy intrusion, which is usually set as a constant. n ) represents the probability that the response force successfully interrupts the enemy's attack after receiving the alarm information from the nth detection point.
[0133] Furthermore, P(R|A n ) is calculated by the following formula (6) using the mean and standard deviation of the system response time (RFT) and the remaining time of the adversary intrusion task (TR).
[0134]
[0135] Assuming that RFT and TR are independent and follow a normal distribution, the random variable X (X = TR-RFT ≥ 0) also follows the mean μ X , the variance is The normal distribution of .
[0136] The system response time (RFT) refers to the time required for the response force to reach the protected target after the system triggers an alarm; the enemy intrusion mission remaining time (TR) refers to the time required for the enemy to complete its mission after being detected by the system. An effective physical protection system design must ensure that the enemy intrusion mission remaining time is greater than or equal to the system response time, that is, it satisfies X (X = TR-RFT ≥ 0). The values of TR and RFT can be calculated by shortest path search.
[0137] Furthermore, the path planning process is implemented by an A* heuristic reverse search algorithm. The A* heuristic algorithm combines the optimality of the Dijkstra algorithm and the efficiency of the greedy best-first search, and can obtain the optimal solution of the system at the fastest speed. The cost function of the A* heuristic algorithm can be expressed by the following formula (7):
[0138] F(n)=G(n)+H(n) (7)
[0139] Among them, G(n) represents the starting node (N g ) to the current node (N n ), H(n) represents the actual cost value from the current node (N n ) to the final node (N s )’s estimated cost.
[0140] Assumptions and Respectively represent the starting node (N g ) Move back to the current node (N n ) and terminal node (N s), the heuristic function H(n) can be calculated by the following formula (8):
[0141]
[0142] Assume that the current node (N n ) to the final node (N s ) has m potential detection opportunities on the path segment, then It can be further calculated by the following formula (9):
[0143]
[0144] In the formula, represents the detection probability at the terminal node, It represents the detection probability of the s-1th (last) detection point. The detection probabilities of other detection nodes can be interpreted and obtained by similar methods. C represents the system communication probability, P(R|A i ) represents the probability that the response force successfully intercepts the enemy after receiving the alarm from the i-th detection point.
[0145] Furthermore, the formula (9) is expanded in a recursive form to achieve iterative calculation of the system interception probability at different detection nodes on the path:
[0146]
[0147] In the formula, Indicates the current node (N n )’s detection probability, Indicates that from the starting node (N g ) Move backward to the n-1th node N n-1 The actual cost value.
[0148] According to the EASI model theory, when the system response time (RFT) remains unchanged, P(R|A) increases with the increase of the remaining time TR of the adversary's invasion task, that is, there exists:
[0149] TR n <TR i (n<i≤s) (11)
[0150] P(R|A n )<P(R|A i )(n<i≤s) (12)
[0151] At the same time, in order to ensure that the estimated cost value of the heuristic function is less than or equal to its actual cost value, all detection point probabilities are uniformly replaced by the nodes with the smallest probability value in the detection field. The following inequality is obtained:
[0152]
[0153] Furthermore, through the calculation expression of the heuristic function H(n), the estimated value of the heuristic function is obtained as follows:
[0154]
[0155] In the formula, P(R|A n )and For the current node (N n ) is known.
[0156] Furthermore, the specific implementation steps of the A* heuristic reverse search algorithm are as follows:
[0157] Taking the protected target as the starting source node and the enemy’s intrusion starting position as the end node of the path, the reachable neighboring nodes of the current node are searched according to the three-dimensional path planning direction. During the search process, the current node (N n )'s neighboring nodes (N n+1 )’s actual cost G(n+1), estimated cost H(n+1) and global cost F(n+1);
[0158] According to the current node (N n ) Compare the cost values of each neighboring node, select the neighboring node with the lowest cost value as the next path node, and repeat the iterative search and cost value update calculation until the end node is reached.
[0159] S6. Based on the weakest path set of the physical protection system obtained through the search, reverse extraction is performed through the path traversal nodes to generate an intelligent agent intrusion attack or return defense route map.
[0160] The weakest path set of the system refers to the same minimum system interception probability cost value P I There may be multiple shortest paths.
[0161] Furthermore, through reverse extraction of path traversal nodes, the path development direction is guided from the starting point of the enemy's invasion to the end point of the protection target in sequence, and the weakest path of the system is reconstructed. Combined with the background color marking of the grid elements passed by the path, the path is visualized.
[0162] As a specific embodiment, this embodiment provides a hypothetical protection facility case scenario, see Figure 2. The case facility is located in a closed quadrangle, with a length and width of 128 meters and 125 meters respectively, and a wall height of 4 meters. There is a personnel entrance and exit access control system (1# access control and 2# access control) in front and on the right side of the quadrangle, and the staff can only enter the laboratory in the quadrangle through these two entrance and exit access control systems. The entire case facility consists of three main buildings, corresponding to Building 1, Building 2 and Building 3 respectively. Assuming that the protection target (important assets in the safe) is located in Room 207 in Building 3, the initial position of the enemy's intrusion is near the 1# access control system in the off-site area of the case facility, and the response force is deployed at the 2# door position of Building 2. Assuming that the wall cannot be climbed over, the enemy can only enter the case facility from the off-site area through the 1# access control or 2# access control.
[0163] Since the protected target is located in Building 3, this embodiment further decomposes the internal structure of Building 3. Figure 3 . The main structure of Building 3 consists of two floors, with the length, width and height of the whole structure being 71 meters, 54 meters and 21 meters respectively. The protected target is located in Room 207 in the upper left corner of Building 3. The room is equipped with a security door, which has both detection and delay functions. The outer wall of Building 3 is surrounded by infrared detection devices, including infrared equipment #3-1, infrared equipment #3-2, infrared equipment #3-3 and infrared equipment #3-4. Detection cameras are also installed at the corners of the outer wall, corresponding to CCTV #3-1, CCTV #3-2, CCTV #3-3 and CCTV #3-4, to prevent the enemy from climbing over the wall or breaking the window. There is only one entrance and exit gate in the entire Building 3, and the enemy must pass through this gate to enter the interior of Building 3. There is a courtyard garden inside Building 3, which is surrounded by a square corridor. Detection cameras are arranged at the four corners of the corridor, corresponding to CCTV #4-1, CCTV #4-2, CCTV #4-3 and CCTV #4-4. The first and second floors are connected by three pedestrian staircases, including staircase #1, staircase #2 and staircase #3, and each staircase is equipped with a surveillance camera, corresponding to CCTV #4-6, CCTV #4-7 and CCTV #4-5 respectively. The layout of the corridor on the second floor is similar to that of the first floor, with four cameras (CCTV #4-8, CCTV #4-9, CCTV #4-10 and CCTV #4-11) located at the four corners of the corridor.
[0164] Step 1: 3D visualization modeling of case facilities
[0165] The specific implementation steps of the three-dimensional visualization modeling of the case facilities include:
[0166] Step 1.1: Case facility structure model development
[0167] Use 3ds MAX and Unity platforms to build a 3D model of the case facilities. Figure 4 In order to more clearly overlook the internal structure of Building 3 where the protection target is located, this embodiment focuses on detailed modeling of Building 3, see Figure 5 .
[0168] Step 1.2: Design of case facility detection function
[0169] The detection function is the first line of defense of the physical protection system, which is used to identify and report potential security threats. This embodiment mainly considers two types of detector models: one is an access control system based on a combination of boundary penetration detectors and distance detectors, such as access cards, anti-theft security doors based on face recognition or fingerprint scanners, etc.; the other detection method is a video surveillance system based on indoor or outdoor motion detection devices, such as closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV), which are usually installed in corners inside or outside buildings.
[0170] (1) Access control system detection probability model
[0171] The operating range of the detection device in the access control system is limited to the location where the detector is installed, and its detection probability mathematical model can be approximated as a point estimate, which is expressed by the following formula (15).
[0172] P D =C (15)
[0173] Wherein, C is a constant between 0 and 1, which indicates the probability of an adversary being detected when attempting to break into a certain access control system. Table 1 lists the design parameters of all access control systems of this embodiment.
[0174] Table 1 Detection performance parameters of the case facility access control system
[0175] Detection element <![CDATA[Probability of detection (P D )]]> Access control #1 0.5 Access control #2 0.5 Door Access #3 0.8 Anti-theft security door 0.9 Infrared detection equipment 0.9
[0176] (2) Detection probability model of video surveillance system
[0177] The detection camera used in this embodiment detects a space in the shape of a conical searchlight, and its projection on the ground is distributed in a circle. The detection probability model of the detection camera is approximated by the following linear attenuation function:
[0178]
[0179] Where P D-center represents the detection probability of the detector projection center, D i represents the straight-line distance between the current position point and the detection center point, and R is the detection radius, which is assumed to be 4m. The performance parameters of the video monitoring system designed in this embodiment are shown in Table 2.
[0180] Table 2 Detection Performance Parameter Table of the Case Facility Video Surveillance System
[0181]
[0182]
[0183] According to the input of the detection camera performance parameters, the 3D model development of the detection camera is realized on the 3ds MAX platform. See Figure 6 . Figure 6 In a) and b) of, the detection space of the fictional closed-circuit television camera is in the shape of a conical searchlight, and the shade of the color between them represents different detection capabilities. For example, the detection probability is the highest at the center of the ground projection circle and gradually decreases along the radius direction. At the same time, during the development of the detection model in this embodiment, issues such as the overlap of the detection areas of the detection cameras and dead corners are considered. See Figure 6 c) of
[0184] After completing the development of all detection camera models of the case facility physical protection system, the system detection probability field can be constructed. See Figure 7 . The detection field is presented in the form of radiation, and the detection probabilities at different positions of the detection nodes are distinguished and marked with different colors. The non-detection area is a grayish-white background. In addition, in order to better identify the critical detection area (TR < RFT) of the system, in this embodiment, the critical detection area is drawn through the calculation of the system response time (RFT), the remaining time of the adversary intrusion task (TR), and the critical detection point. See Figure 7 as shown by the highlighted gray-covered area in
[0185] Step 1.3, Design of the Delay Function of the Case Facility
[0186] The main purpose of the delay function is to delay the progress of the adversary intrusion and gain more time for the system response. The delay function design in this embodiment mainly considers delay elements such as fences, access control at entrances and exits, anti-theft security doors, walls, and windows. The relevant performance design parameters are shown in Table 3.
[0187] Table 3 Performance Design Parameters of Delay Function Elements
[0188] Delay Factor <![CDATA[Probability of detection (P D )]]> <![CDATA[Delay time (T TD )]]> Access control #1 0.5 2s Access control #2 0.5 2s Door Access #3 0.8 15s Anti-theft security door 0.9 10s
[0189] Step 1.4, Design of the Response Function of the Case Facility
[0190] The design of the response function of the case facility mainly makes assumption settings around the deployment of response forces and the attack strategies, weaponry, combat capabilities, and attack starting positions of the intruders. See Figure 2, the protected target is located in Room 207 of Building 3. Assuming that the enemy starts to invade from the right door of the laboratory protection facility, the TV monitoring system and the response force are located at the left door of Building 2. Once the alarm is triggered, the response force is divided into two branches. One group of response force personnel must reach the target protection position before the enemy, and the other group of response force personnel will search for the enemy and annihilate it according to the system monitoring alarm trigger prompt. Due to the emergency situation, the response force will choose the shortest path to reach its mission destination as quickly as possible.
[0191] In order to better verify the response function guarantee of the case facility, this embodiment not only clarifies the deployment of the response force and the enemy's invasion position, but also sets the relevant parameters such as the response force and the enemy's average travel speed, number ratio, and combat capability to achieve confrontation simulation exercise analysis. The response function design parameters of this embodiment are shown in Table 4.
[0192] Table 4 Performance parameters of response forces and adversaries
[0193] power Average travel speed Design Number Combat Ability Response Force 2.5m / s <50 people Strong adversary 3m / s <50 people Weaker
[0194] Step 2: Identification and analysis of the weakest path of the physical protection system
[0195] The physical protection system's weakest path identification and analysis process is specifically implemented by the following steps:
[0196] Step 2.1: Determine the system response time (RFT)
[0197] According to the design and deployment of the response force in this embodiment, the starting position of the security force is the 2# door on the left side of Building 2. When an enemy intrusion alarm is received, the response force will arrive at the target protection location before the enemy in the shortest time, thereby achieving protection of the target. Therefore, when performing path optimization, time can be used as the path cost to achieve optimal path planning. Assuming that the response force is composed of a well-equipped and well-trained team, the response force is very familiar with the internal structure and environment of the protection facility through multiple simulation exercises. Therefore, unnecessary time delays introduced by detours are not considered, but the shortest path is chosen to run to the protection target. At the same time, considering that the communication and weapon equipment carried by the response force are heavy, its average travel speed is set to 2.5m / s.
[0198] The A* heuristic path search is used to obtain the response force's return defense route, see Figure 8 The black background area in the figure indicates the number of grids traversed during the A* algorithm path optimization process. By estimating the cumulative time cost of traversing nodes, the system response time RFT = 61 seconds is finally obtained.
[0199] Step 2.2: Identify the weakest path in the system
[0200] Based on the system response time RFT calculated in step 2.1, the proposed A* heuristic function design is further used to effectively identify the weakest path of the physical protection system, and the comparison and verification with the Dijkstra algorithm are realized. Different from the response force return defense path planning, the physical protection system weak path planning is based on the system interception probability (P I ) as the function cost, the weakest path of the system refers to P I Given the initial position of the adversary's invasion, the weakest path of the system is obtained by reverse path search using the A* algorithm, see Fig. 9 . The white line in the figure represents the weakest path of the system, that is, the most successful attack route for the adversary. The circled points represent the distribution of the system detection field, and the size of the detection probability can be distinguished by color difference. The black area represents the number of nodes traversed by the A* algorithm, extending and spreading outward along the invasion route. The light gray background part represents the adversary's blind exploration area, mainly because in the process of path exploration of the A* algorithm, in the cost value estimation formula of the heuristic function, the time delay caused by the access control system is much greater than the time delay of the adversary's travel in the open area.
[0201] Similarly, the weakest path of the system can be found by searching with the Dijkstra algorithm. Fig.10 The Dijkstra algorithm calculates all possible paths from the adversary's starting position to the target protection end point through a full traversal, and then selects P I The path with the lowest value is taken as the weakest path of the system. Compared with the A* heuristic algorithm, the Dijkstra algorithm can definitely find an optimal solution path, but due to the lack of heuristic information, the computational efficiency is obviously low, because the Dijkstra algorithm needs to spend more time exploring paths that are not related to protecting the target node.
[0202] See Table 5 for the comparison of search results between the A* heuristic algorithm and the Dijkstra algorithm.
[0203] Table 5 Comparison of system effectiveness analysis performance between 3D A* algorithm and Dijkstra algorithm
[0204]
[0205] From the comparative analysis results in Table 5, it can be seen that the proposed A* algorithm and Dijkstra algorithm can both find the weakest path of the system, and the corresponding system interception probability is P I=0.466414838754809, the estimated time taken by the adversary to complete the task is 111.91s, and the total number of path nodes is 466. From the search list, it can be seen that the search efficiency of the A* algorithm is significantly better than that of the Dijkstra algorithm, the number of traversed nodes is reduced by about 50,000, and the calculation time is reduced by nearly two-thirds, which verifies the correctness and efficiency of the A* heuristic function design proposed in this embodiment.
[0206] The preferred embodiments of the present invention disclosed above are only used to help explain the present invention. The preferred embodiments do not describe all the details in detail, nor do they limit the invention to the specific implementation methods described. Obviously, many modifications and changes can be made according to the content of this specification. This specification selects and specifically describes these embodiments in order to better explain the principles and practical applications of the present invention, so that those skilled in the art can understand and use the present invention well.
Claims
1. A heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. Establish a three-dimensional structure model based on the design data of the physical protection system of the protection facility, and realize three-dimensional scene visualization through rendering and lighting of the three-dimensional structure model; S2. According to the type of detection elements of the physical protection system, determine the mathematical model of the detector detection probability distribution, establish the three-dimensional virtual searchlight model of the detector, and realize the construction and virtual rendering of the three-dimensional dynamic visualization model of the detection field through the scene fusion design of the detection elements; S3. According to the structure and connection characteristics of the upper and lower floors of the building in the three-dimensional space, a perspective expression of the virtual interwoven sections between different floors of the virtual three-dimensional space is established. By mapping the adjacent grid elements of the sections at each level, the three-dimensional path planning direction is determined, and the ray detection function in Unity is used to realize the effective identification of the sections that can be reached by the intelligent agent; S4. Based on the navigation points and the detection probability estimation based on the geometric distribution model, a three-dimensional heuristic reverse path planning algorithm is constructed to realize the dynamic planning and navigation of the path of the adversary or intelligent agent; S5. According to the EASI model theory, dynamically search and calculate the interception probability of the system along the path planning direction to effectively identify the weakest path of the system; S6. Based on the weakest path set of the physical protection system obtained through the search, reverse extraction is performed through the path traversal nodes to generate an intelligent agent intrusion attack or return defense route map.
2. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S1, a three-dimensional structure model is established on the 3ds MAX platform, and then the three-dimensional structure model is imported into the Unity platform to realize three-dimensional scene visualization through rendering and lighting; The establishment of 3D structure models includes geometric shape construction, texture mapping and .max / .fbx file format conversion; The environmental rendering of the three-dimensional structure model is realized through the Unity platform. By setting the photography angle, spatial relationship, composition, texture, and light and shadow rendering parameters, the three-dimensional model of the physical security protection facility can achieve the best visual effect.
3. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S2, the detection element refers to a detection device or system used to detect potential threats or abnormal situations and issue an alarm, including an anti-intrusion detection device, an access control system, and a television monitoring system; According to the different detector types and working principles, detectors are classified into active / passive, visible / hidden, space detectors / linear detectors; Detection methods include:
1. Access control systems based on a combination of boundary penetration detectors and distance detectors, including access cards, anti-theft security doors based on face recognition or fingerprint scanners; 2. Video surveillance system based on indoor or outdoor motion detection devices.
4. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 3 is characterized in that: A three-dimensional virtual searchlight model of the detector and detection element is established on the 3ds MAX and Unity platforms. Through lighting and color rendering, the detection element and the three-dimensional structure model are integrated into the scene to cover the overlap and blind spots of the detector detection area.
5. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S3, the virtual three-dimensional space is an interwoven presentation of the horizontal sections of different floors of the building and the vertical sections of the upper and lower connecting passages. Different floors represent different horizontal section levels. Different floors are connected by elevator shafts or stairs. The elevator shafts realize straight up or straight down crossings between different floors, and the stairs realize crossing different step sections in a step-by-step manner according to their specific directions.
6. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1, characterized in that: Use the ray detection function in Unity to effectively identify the reachable sections of the intelligent agent. The following steps are involved: 4.
1. In the generated three-dimensional discretized grid space, randomly select a grid element, whose center point position coordinates are G(x g ,y g ,z g ); 4.
2. According to the side length setting of the grid element, the positions of the center points of eight grid elements on the same horizontal plane are obtained along the eight directions of row, column and diagonal of the two-dimensional horizontal plane; 4.
3. The distance d above the center of the grid element step At the place, it emits a length of 2d directly downward in different directions. step If the generated grid cell can be detected within the range of the ray, the grid node is regarded as a neighboring node of the current node; The grid side length also serves as the agent's advancement length per unit time; the two-dimensional horizontal plane movement directions include eight directions: front, back, left, right, left front, left back, right front, and right back.
7. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S4, according to the floor structure characteristics of the three-dimensional building, the location of the elevator shaft or stair entrance and exit connecting the upper and lower floors is set as a navigation point, and the three-dimensional space distance calculation can be converted into the superposition of two-dimensional distance calculations on three intersecting planes. The specific calculation expression is as follows: D(n,s)=D(n,w1)+D(w1,w2)+D(w2,s)(1) Where D(n,s) represents the current node N n To the end node N s The diagonal distance between the current node N n The diagonal distance between the navigation point w1 and the navigation point w2; D(w1,w2) represents the shortest path distance between two navigation points; D(w2,s) represents the distance from the navigation point w2 to the terminal node N. s The diagonal distance between Furthermore, the distance heuristic cost is estimated by the following formula (2): In the formula, x n ,y n ,z n Represents the current node N n The coordinate value in three-dimensional space, They represent the coordinate values of the navigation point w1 in three-dimensional space, They represent the coordinate values of the navigation point w2 in three-dimensional space respectively. The min() function is used to obtain the minimum value of the difference between the horizontal coordinate or vertical coordinate of two points on the two-dimensional plane. Find an estimate of the diagonal distance between two points on a two-dimensional plane.
8. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 7, characterized in that: The detection probability estimation method based on the geometric distribution model is implemented by the following steps: According to the center coordinate position of the current grid cell node, the current node N is calculated by the above formulas (1) to (2). n With terminal node N s The distance between them D(n,s); Further, according to the diagonal length d of the grid element cell , determine the current node N n To the final vertex N s The number of grid nodes that the path segment must pass through N grids , N grids The following formula (3) is used to round off: According to the calculated number of grid nodes N grids , further through the geometric distribution model assumption, it is estimated that N grids The number of cells m that may become detection points in a grid cell is calculated as follows: m=E(Φ)=p·N grids (4) Where E(Φ) represents the average value of potential detection opportunity points Φ along the adversary’s intrusion path, and p represents the current node N n To the final vertex N s The probability of any grid node on the road section being a detection node is equal to the number of detection point grids covered by the detection probability divided by the total number of grids.
9. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1, characterized in that: The EASI model is used to calculate the interruption probability of the preset adversary intrusion path, and to estimate the detection probability, delay time and response time distribution of the physical protection system based on the detection, delay, response and communication characteristics; The EASI model uses the system intercept probability P I As a cost-effectiveness measure, the system intercept probability P I The definition expression is as follows: In the formula, represents the detection probability of a single detection point, It represents the probability of successfully transmitting the alarm communication to the response force after the enemy intrusion is identified at the nth detection point, which is usually set as a constant; P(R|A n ) represents the probability that the response force successfully interrupts the enemy attack after receiving the alarm information of the nth detection point, n = 1, 2, ... N, N represents the total number of detection opportunity points; P(R|A n ) is calculated by the mean and standard deviation of the system response time RFT and the adversary intrusion task remaining time TR using the following formula (6): P(X≥0) represents the probability that the response force will have enough time to reach the target protection point and effectively intercept the enemy after receiving the system intrusion alarm; assuming that RFT and TR are independent and obey the normal distribution, the random variable X, X=TR-RFT≥0 also follows the mean μ X , the variance is Normal distribution of The system response time RFT refers to the time required for the response force to reach the protected target after the system triggers an alarm; the enemy invasion task remaining time TR refers to the time required for the enemy to complete its task after being detected by the system; an effective physical protection system design must ensure that the enemy invasion task remaining time is greater than or equal to the system response time, that is, X=TR-RFT≥0; the values of TR and RFT are calculated by searching the shortest path; The path dynamic planning process is implemented by the A* heuristic reverse search algorithm, and the cost function of the A* heuristic algorithm is expressed by the following formula (7): F(n)=G(n)+H(n)(7) Among them, G(n) represents the starting node N g To the current node N n The actual cost value, H(n) represents the cost from the current node N n To the end node N s The estimated cost of Assumptions and Respectively represent the starting node N g Move back to the current node N n and terminal node N s The actual cost value is then the heuristic function H(n) is calculated by the following formula (8): express and The difference between them is the estimated cost; Assume that the current node N n To the end node N s There are H potential detection opportunities on the path segment of It is calculated by the following formula (9): In the formula, represents the detection probability at the terminal node, represents the detection probability of the s-1th detection point. The detection probabilities of other detection nodes can be interpreted and obtained by similar methods; P C represents the system communication probability, represents the detection probability of the n+1th detection point, P(R|A n+1 ) and P(R|A s ) represent the response force after receiving the alarm of the n+1th detection point and the terminal node N s The probability of successfully intercepting the enemy after the alarm is sounded; Furthermore, the formula (9) is expanded in a recursive form to achieve iterative calculation of the system interception probability at different detection nodes on the path: In the formula, Indicates the current node N n The detection probability, Indicates that from the starting node N g Move backward to the n-1th node N n-1 The actual cost value; According to the EASI model theory, when the system response time RFT remains unchanged, P(R|A n ) increases with the increase of the remaining time TR of the enemy's invasion mission, that is, there exists: TR n <TR i (n<i≤s)(11)P(R|A n )<P(R|A i )(n<i≤s)(12) Among them, TR n Indicates the nth detection point, that is, the current node N n The remaining time of the enemy invasion mission, TR i represents the remaining time of the adversary’s invasion task at the i-th detection point, s represents the total number of detection points, and the remaining time of the adversary’s invasion task becomes smaller and smaller; P(R|A i ) represents the probability that the response force successfully intercepts the enemy after receiving the alarm from the i-th detection point; In order to ensure that the estimated cost of the heuristic function is less than or equal to its actual cost, all detection point probabilities are uniformly replaced by the node with the smallest probability value in the detection field. The following inequality is obtained: Furthermore, through the calculation expression of the heuristic function H(n), the estimated value of the heuristic function is obtained as follows: In the formula, P(R|A n )and For the current node N n is known; Furthermore, the specific implementation steps of the A* heuristic reverse search algorithm are as follows: Taking the protected target as the starting source node and the enemy’s intrusion starting position as the end node of the path, the reachable neighboring nodes of the current node are searched according to the three-dimensional path planning direction. During the search process, the system intercepts the probability P I , A* heuristic algorithm generation value function, heuristic function estimate value calculation to get the current node N n Neighboring nodes N n+1 The actual cost value G(n+1), estimated cost value H(n+1) and global cost value F(n+1); According to the current node N n The cost values of each neighboring node are compared, and the neighboring node with the lowest cost value is selected as the next path node. The iterative search and cost value update calculation are repeated until the end node is reached.
10. The heuristic dynamic path optimization method for a physical protection system in a three-dimensional scene according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S6, the weakest path set of the system refers to the same minimum system interception probability cost value P I There may be a set of multiple shortest paths. Through reverse extraction of path traversal nodes, the path is guided from the starting point of the enemy's invasion along the direction of the path development to the end point of the protection target, and the reconstruction of the system's weakest path is completed. Combined with the identification of the background color of the grid elements passed by the path, the path is visualized.
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