Sensitive load-oriented low-coupling confidential container architecture

By introducing EnclaveAgent container and remote authentication process, the problems of TCB oversized and trust resistance in the existing confidential container architecture are solved, and the container semantics and TEE semantics are decoupled, improving the security and deployment efficiency of confidential containers.

CN119003178APending Publication Date: 2024-11-22ZHEJIANG UNIV
View PDF 0 Cites 2 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411173119.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-26
Publication Date
2024-11-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing confidential container architecture has too large TCB and large attack surface. The overlap of container semantics and TEE semantics increases operation and maintenance risks, and the introduction of non-user software increases user trust resistance, making it difficult to take into account both deployment convenience and security.

Method used

The EnclaveAgent container is introduced, which connects the user-side trusted metric services and connects the remote authentication process in series, so that the load container is started with trust, separates non-user components in the TEE environment, and reduces user trust needs through remote proofing and encryption mirroring processing and reduces TCB.

Benefits of technology

The complete decoupling of container semantics and TEE semantics is achieved, which reduces user trust resistance, improves the credibility of confidential containers, reduces the coupling of different components, and makes confidential containers more efficient, flexible and reliable.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN119003178A_ABST
    Figure CN119003178A_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The invention discloses a sensitive load-oriented low-coupling confidential container architecture, which comprises the following steps of: on the basis of a common container software stack, introducing a customized Containshim program Shim-RunE which is responsible for assisting in completing initialization and runtime processes of a confidential container on the outer side of a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment); a new resident container EnclaveAgent is introduced into each Pod, the EnclaveAgent replaces Agent software introduced into a trusted execution environment by an existing confidential container architecture, and the EnclaveAgent has the following functions of triggering remote certification to obtain a starting strategy, pulling and converting a mirror image of a load confidential container and starting authorization of the load confidential container, so that container semantics and TEE semantics can be completely separated, and the security of the confidential container is improved. Software needing additional trust for adapting to the confidential container environment by the user is reduced, the trust resistance of the user is reduced, and the TCB is reduced on the whole.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of the combination of trusted computing and containers, and specifically relates to a low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, computer technology has advanced rapidly and the Internet industry has developed rapidly. Cloud computing has become the service foundation for shopping, financial management, travel, office work and other industries, providing irreplaceable convenience and stability for society and life. "Going to the cloud" has become an inevitable trend for various network services. However, as more and more services and facilities connected to the Internet become more and more complex, how to maintain security and how to protect user privacy have become urgent problems to be solved in the cloud computing industry. Traditional security measures based on privileged or non-privileged software mainly use resource isolation or permission control to defend against malicious programs, and their protection capabilities are really limited. When malicious programs can control privileged software and even manipulate hardware, higher-level security protection measures are needed to ensure privacy security. In this context, hardware manufacturers have launched hardware support for trusted execution environment (TEE). TEE uses hardware means to run private programs and private data in an isolated environment, effectively blocking external access and tampering.

[0003] Containers are a technology that provides an application-level isolation sandbox based on the isolation capability of the operating system kernel. They are widely used in the field of cloud computing to quickly and efficiently deploy applications. The application of container technology can greatly improve deployment efficiency and reduce the complexity of operation and maintenance. In recent years, the industry has proposed the need to use container technology to deploy TEE programs. It is hoped that the deployed programs can receive hardware protection in the TEE isolation environment, and they can be deployed as easily and quickly as ordinary containers. Therefore, confidential container technology was born. Confidential container technology uses the existing container operation framework and complies with existing container standards (such as OCI) to deploy user applications in the TEE environment.

[0004] The shortcomings of the existing confidential container architecture are as follows: 1) The TCB (Trusted Computing Base) is too large, resulting in a large attack surface. In the field of trusted computing, the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) refers to the sum of trusted components (including software, hardware, etc.) that can provide trusted computing capabilities for the trusted computing system. From the attacker's perspective, the larger the TCB, the greater the complexity of trusted computing, the larger the attack surface, and the greater the probability of attackers successfully attacking. As a designer of a trusted computing system, it is necessary to reduce the TCB as much as possible to maximize the security of confidential programs.

[0005] 2) Container semantics and TEE semantics overlap to varying degrees, increasing operational risks. The special environment of TEE determines that ordinary compiled programs cannot run directly inside the TEE and require the support of additional libraries or compatibility layers. In order to containerize the TEE, additional software needs to be introduced to varying degrees within the TEE to support the operation of containerized TEE programs. The responsibilities of such software include but are not limited to: pulling and processing encrypted container images, and authorizing the startup of TEE confidential payloads. In actual operating scenarios, once errors related to these programs occur, cloud vendors need to enter the TEE environment for debugging or operational operations, which is a violation of trust for users who use the TEE boundary as a trust boundary.

[0006] 3) Introducing more non-user software into TEE increases the trust resistance of users. As mentioned in point 2), the additional software introduced into TEE by the existing confidential container architecture will be included in the remote attestation process and mixed with the user load. Users need to trust the software provided by these cloud vendors to complete the remote attestation process and build the trust chain required by TEE.

[0007] In summary, the contradictions in the existing confidential container architecture design are becoming increasingly prominent: the convenience and efficiency of deployment need to be achieved at the expense of some user security. With the widespread application of TEE technology and the increasing demand for security from cloud users, the industry urgently needs a new confidential container architecture to solve these problems. Summary of the invention

[0008] In view of the above, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads, which can completely separate container semantics and TEE semantics, reduce the software that users need to trust additionally to adapt to the confidential container environment, reduce user trust resistance, and reduce TCB in general.

[0009] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose of the invention, an embodiment provides a low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads, including: In addition to the existing user load container and Pause container, each Pod also introduces a new resident container EnclaveAgent, which is used to connect the load container and the user-side trusted measurement service, and connect the remote authentication process in series to enable the load container to be started in a trusted manner; In the process of pulling up the confidential container instance, the ContainerdShim program on the platform side pulls up the EnclaveAgent process. The EnclaveAgent replaces the agent software introduced by the existing confidential container architecture in the trusted execution environment, and is separated from the user payload container in a different confidential container instance. It has the following functions: triggering remote attestation to obtain the startup policy, pulling and converting the payload confidential container image, and authorizing the payload confidential container startup.

[0010] Preferably, EnclaveAgent is responsible for remote attestation of the trusted execution environment load instance and obtaining the startup policy specified by the user, wherein EnclaveAgent is the attestee of the remote attestation, and the remote attestation service deployed by the user side is the attestor. After the two complete the remote attestation, a trusted communication channel based on an asymmetric key is established. EnclaveAgent uses the trusted communication channel to obtain the startup policy of the user load to be started from the user side, completes the remote attestation process, and then forms a trusted chain between the user side and EnclaveAgent, and trust is transferred from the user side to EnclaveAgent.

[0011] Preferably, EnclaveAgent has the function of pulling the load confidential container image. After receiving the pull command, EnclaveAgent pulls the confidential container image according to the given address, and uses the established trusted communication channel to obtain the decryption key from the user side to decrypt the encrypted container.

[0012] Preferably, EnclaveAgent has a payload confidential container image conversion function. After EnclaveAgent obtains the payload confidential container image, it uses the function of the local encrypted file system to convert the image content layer by layer into the image format of the local confidential file system to facilitate reading and writing during operation. This process includes deduplication processing at the image layer granularity.

[0013] Preferably, EnclaveAgent has the function of authorizing the launch of a payload confidential container. After receiving the launch command, EnclaveAgent locally attests the created trusted execution environment instance. After the local attestation succeeds, the trusted chain is transferred from EnclaveAgent to the payload trusted execution environment instance, completing the trust construction from the user side to the payload trusted execution environment instance.

[0014] Preferably, the local attestation process creates a trusted channel between the EnclaveAgent and the payload trusted execution environment instance, through which the EnclaveAgent provides a startup key to the runtime of the payload trusted execution environment, and the payload trusted execution environment instance decrypts the prepared file system image using the startup key to start the payload program.

[0015] Preferably, the container management backend Containerd uses a rewritten ContainerdShim program, named Shim-RunE process. Compared with the existing Shim-RunC program of Containerd, the Shim-RunE process adds new behaviors, including creating EnclaveAgent, registering Pull-Image service with Containerd, and preparing the encrypted image required to load the confidential container.

[0016] Preferably, the deployer needs to prepare the encrypted image required to load the confidential container in advance. The EnclaveAgent image needs to be built locally before running. The Shim-RunE process will automatically overlay this part of the image with other required image layers, and then create and start it.

[0017] Preferably, the Shim-RunE process needs to register a Pull-Image service with Containerd so that Containerd transfers the image pulling operation to the Shim-RunE process, and the Shim-RunE process calls the interface exposed by EnclaveAgent to command EnclaveAgent to pull the payload confidential container image.

[0018] Preferably, when the Shim-RunE process prepares the container RootFS for the payload confidential container, it is necessary to additionally introduce the local encrypted file system image pulled and processed by the EnclaveAgent. The location of this image is notified to the Shim-RunE process by the EnclaveAgent after the image is successfully processed.

[0019] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads proposed in the present invention completely decouples container semantics from TEE semantics. By separating the components that are necessary for confidential containers but not provided by the user side in a separate TEE environment, TCB is reduced, and the number of components that users need to trust additionally to use the confidential container capabilities is greatly reduced. The credibility of confidential containers is improved, the coupling between different components is reduced, and the confidential containers become more efficient, flexible, and reliable. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0020] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0021] Figure 1It is a structural schematic diagram of a low-coupling confidential container architecture provided by an embodiment; Figure 2 This is a flow chart of the operation of the confidential container architecture provided by the embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0022] To make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific implementation methods described herein are only used to explain the present invention and do not limit the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0023] like Figure 1 As shown, in the low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads provided by the embodiment, the TEE environment is completely separated from the container environment. Inside the container environment, process No. 1 of the container environment is responsible for pulling up the trusted execution environment instance (TEE instance), and the TEE runtime inside the TEE instance is responsible for pulling up the user load container. For each Pod, in addition to the existing user load container and Pause container, a new resident container EnclaveAgent is introduced. The EnclaveAgent is used to connect the user load container and the user-side trusted measurement service, and connect the remote authentication process in series to enable the load container to be started trustworthy.

[0024] In the process of pulling up the confidential container instance, the ContainerdShim program on the platform side pulls up the EnclaveAgent process. The EnclaveAgent replaces the agent software introduced by the existing confidential container architecture in the trusted execution environment, and is separated from the user payload container in a different confidential container instance. It has the following functions: triggering remote attestation to obtain the startup policy, pulling and converting the payload confidential container image, and authorizing the payload confidential container startup.

[0025] (1) EnclaveAgent has the function of triggering remote attestation acquisition startup strategy.

[0026] In the trusted computing scenario, the deployment results and operating environment of the trusted load obtain the trust of the user through remote attestation, which is one of the most important links of trusted computing. In the confidential container architecture proposed by the invention, EnclaveAgent is the attestee of remote attestation, and the remote attestation service deployed on the user side is the attestor. EnclaveAgent shakes hands with the remote attestation service through the network interface provided by the remote attestation service and sends the necessary information of remote attestation. The remote attestation service will verify whether the operating environment, initial state of the program, configuration and other information of the former meet the user requirements. If they meet the requirements, the remote attestation is completed, and a trusted communication channel based on asymmetric secret keys is established in the process. EnclaveAgent subsequently uses the trusted communication channel to obtain the startup policy of the user load to be started from the user side. After the remote attestation process is successfully completed, a trusted chain is formed between the user side and EnclaveAgent, and trust is transferred from the user side to EnclaveAgent.

[0027] (2) EnclaveAgent has the function of pulling the payload confidential container image.

[0028] After receiving the pull command, EnclaveAgent pulls the confidential container image according to the given address, and uses the established trusted communication channel to obtain the decryption key from the user side to decrypt the encrypted container. Since EnclaveAgent runs completely in the TEE environment, there is no information leakage of the confidential load during the whole process.

[0029] (3) EnclaveAgent has the function of converting the payload confidential container image.

[0030] After the EnclaveAgent obtains the payload confidential container image, it uses the function of the local encrypted file system (generally provided by the TEE runtime) to convert the image content layer by layer into the image format of the local confidential file system to facilitate reading and writing during operation. This process includes layer-level deduplication processing to optimize performance.

[0031] (4) Start the authorization function for the payload confidential container of EnclaveAgent.

[0032] After receiving the startup command, EnclaveAgent performs local attestation on the created trusted execution environment instance. The verification content of local attestation and remote attestation is basically the same, except that the interaction mode of the attestation process is changed from remote network to local access via a special TEE hardware mechanism. After the local attestation is successful, the trusted chain is passed from EnclaveAgent to the payload trusted execution environment instance, completing the trust construction from the user side to the payload trusted execution environment instance.

[0033] The local attestation process creates a trusted channel between the EnclaveAgent and the payload trusted execution environment instance. The EnclaveAgent provides the startup key to the runtime of the payload trusted execution environment through the trusted channel. The payload trusted execution environment instance decrypts the prepared file system image with the startup key and starts the payload program.

[0034] According to the container standard OCI standard, if the more common container management background Containerd is used, a Shim program that matches the actual runtime of the container is required as the parent process of the entire Pod to control the life cycle of the Pod and the internal container. In order to correspond to the runtime of the confidential container architecture proposed by the present invention, it is necessary to restart the Shim program. Specifically, a new Shim program is designed in the container management background Containerd, named Shim-RunE process. Compared with the existing Shim program of Containerd, the Shim-RunE process has new tasks, including creating EnclaveAgent, registering Pull-Image service with Containerd, and preparing the encrypted image required to load the confidential container. Specifically including: First, when creating a Pod, in addition to processing the Pause container, you also need to create a new container EnclaveAgent and start the container EnclaveAgent. The image of the container EnclaveAgent needs to be built locally in advance before running. The Shim-RunE process will automatically overlay this part of the image with other required image layers (such as the image layer of the TEE runtime), and then create and start it.

[0035] Secondly, the pull operation of the payload container image needs to be completed by the EnclaveAgent inside the TEE, so the Shim-RunE process needs to register a Pull-Image service with Containerd to indicate that Containerd will transfer the image pull operation to Shim-RunE, and Shim-RunE will call the interface exposed by EnclaveAgent to command EnclaveAgent to pull the image.

[0036] Finally, when Shim-RunE prepares the container RootFS for the payload confidential container, it needs to additionally introduce the local encrypted file system image pulled and processed by EnclaveAgent. The location of this image is notified to the Shim-RunE process by EnclaveAgent after the image is successfully processed.

[0037] The provider of confidential container services is called a cloud service provider (CSP). Based on this, the operation process of the above confidential container architecture is described in detail, such as Figure 2As shown, the following steps are included: (1) Before running, CSP uniformly builds the RootFS image of EnclaveAgent and part of the image of the load container (mainly including TEE runtime) on the target machine; (2) Before running, users need to deploy a trusted remote attestation service for themselves. They can use an open source solution they trust, or they can build it themselves. The construction of this service is a common process in the field of confidential computing and is not within the scope of this invention. (3) The container platform management software (such as K8S) on the upper layer of Containerd sends a command to Containerd to create a Pod. Containerd forwards it to the Shim-RunE process of the corresponding Pod. The Shim-RunE process creates the resources required for the Pod, such as namespace, etc.; prepares the Pause container RootFS image and creates the Pause container; uses the EnclaveAgent image built in step (1) to build the RootFS image of the container EnclaveAgent and create the corresponding container; (4) Containerd forwards the start Pod command to the Shim-RunE process. The Shim-RunE process calls OCIruntime such as RunC to start the Pod, start the Pause container and the container EnclaveAgent. After the container EnclaveAgent is started, it contacts the user-side remote attestation service according to the configuration, shakes hands and completes the remote attestation process, and obtains the startup strategy of the user load; (5) Containerd forwards the command to pull the load container image to the Shim-RunE process, and the Shim-RunE process forwards it to the corresponding service interface of EnclaveAgent. EnclaveAgent pulls the encrypted container image from the corresponding registry according to the command, obtains the decryption key of each layer of the image from the user's remote authentication service, and decrypts it in TEE. After deduplication is performed based on the hash value of the image layer, the platform encrypted file system tool is used to convert it into the local file system image format layer by layer, and the storage path is notified to Shim-RunE; (6) Containerd forwards the command to create a container to the Shim-RunE process. The Shim-RunE process overlays the image layers required by the TEE runtime, local load image, etc. to form the final container RootFS according to the requirements of the load image; and configures the environmental parameters according to the requirements of the load container; (7) Containerd forwards the command to run the container to the Shim-RunE process, and the Shim-RunE process calls RunC and other tools to start the container. Process 1 of the container is responsible for starting the TEE instance. After entering the TEE, the TEE runtime contacts the EnclaveAgent for a local certification process. After the EnclaveAgent verifies that the TEE status of the payload is credible, it injects startup privacy data (including the RootFS secret key and user-defined privacy data) into the TEE runtime to complete the startup authorization. The TEE runtime uses the secret key to decrypt the payload RootFS and run the payload.

[0038] The specific implementation methods described above provide a detailed description of the technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention. It should be understood that the above is only the most preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, supplements and equivalent substitutions made within the scope of the principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads, characterized in that: include: In addition to the existing user load container and Pause container, each Pod also introduces a new resident container EnclaveAgent, which is used to connect the user load container and the user-side trusted measurement service, and connect the remote authentication process in series to enable the load container to be started in a trusted manner; In the process of pulling up the confidential container instance, the ContainerdShim program on the platform side pulls up the EnclaveAgent process. The EnclaveAgent replaces the agent software introduced by the existing confidential container architecture in the trusted execution environment, and is separated from the user payload container in a different confidential container instance. It has the following functions: triggering remote attestation to obtain the startup policy, pulling and converting the payload confidential container image, and authorizing the payload confidential container startup.

2. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 1 is characterized in that: EnclaveAgent is responsible for remote attestation of the trusted execution environment load instance and obtaining the startup policy specified by the user. EnclaveAgent is the attestee of remote attestation, and the remote attestation service deployed on the user side is the attestor. After completing the remote attestation, the two establish a trusted communication channel based on asymmetric keys. EnclaveAgent uses the trusted communication channel to obtain the startup policy of the user load container to be started from the user side, completes the remote attestation process, and then forms a trusted chain between the user side and EnclaveAgent, and trust is transferred from the user side to EnclaveAgent.

3. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 1 is characterized in that: EnclaveAgent has the function of pulling the payload confidential container image. After receiving the pull command, EnclaveAgent pulls the confidential container image according to the given address, and uses the established trusted communication channel to obtain the decryption key from the user side to decrypt the encrypted container.

4. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 1 is characterized in that: EnclaveAgent has the function of converting payload confidential container images. After EnclaveAgent obtains the payload confidential container image, it uses the function of the local encrypted file system to convert the image content layer by layer into the image format of the local confidential file system, which is convenient for reading and writing during operation. This process includes deduplication processing at the image layer granularity.

5. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 2, characterized in that: EnclaveAgent has the function of authorizing the launch of the payload confidential container. After receiving the launch command, EnclaveAgent locally proves the created trusted execution environment instance. After the local proof is successful, the trusted chain is passed from EnclaveAgent to the payload trusted execution environment instance, completing the trust construction from the user side to the payload trusted execution environment instance. The local attestation process creates a trusted channel between the EnclaveAgent and the payload trusted execution environment instance. The EnclaveAgent provides the startup key to the runtime of the payload trusted execution environment through the trusted channel. The payload trusted execution environment instance decrypts the prepared file system image with the startup key and starts the payload program.

6. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 1, characterized in that: The container management backend Containerd uses a rewritten ContainerdShim program, named Shim-RunE process. Compared with the existing Shim-RunC program of Containerd, the Shim-RunE process adds new behaviors, including creating EnclaveAgent, registering Pull-Image service with Containerd, and preparing the encrypted image required to load confidential containers.

7. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 6, characterized in that: The deployer needs to prepare the encrypted image required to load the confidential container in advance. The EnclaveAgent image needs to be built locally before running. The Shim-RunE process will automatically overlay this part of the image with other required image layers, and then create and start it.

8. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 6, characterized in that: To register a Pull-Image service with Containerd, the Shim-RunE process needs to register a Pull-Image service with Containerd so that Containerd transfers the image pulling operation to the Shim-RunE process. The Shim-RunE process then calls the interface exposed by EnclaveAgent to command EnclaveAgent to pull the payload confidential container image.

9. The low-coupling confidential container architecture for sensitive loads according to claim 6, characterized in that: When the Shim-RunE process prepares the container RootFS for the payload confidential container, it needs to additionally introduce the local encrypted file system image pulled and processed by EnclaveAgent. The location of this image is notified to the Shim-RunE process by EnclaveAgent after the image is successfully processed.

Citation Information

Cited By

  • Unified management method, device and equipment for confidential containers

    CN119668775A

  • Multi-party computing security verification method, device, system, equipment, medium and product

    CN120110812A