A secure communication method and device based on communication perception integration

Abstract

The present application proposes a confidential communication method and device based on communication and perception integration, which relates to the fields of synaesthesia integration technology and physical layer security technology. The method includes: modulating a pseudo-random noise sequence and a communication information codeword sequence respectively, and then processing them through OFDM and LFM to generate an artificial noise signal and a confidential communication signal for perception; the artificial noise signal emitted by the transmitter is used to interfere with the eavesdropper, and after receiving the echo signal, the system can extract the distance and speed information of the target and the channel state; using this information, the transmitter optimizes the beamforming matrix and sends a total transmission signal consisting of a confidential signal and an artificial noise signal; after receiving the total transmission signal, the legal receiving end removes the artificial noise and finally recovers the codeword sequence carrying the communication information through a series of reception and demodulation processes. By introducing artificial noise for perception, the present application reduces the SINR at the untrusted perception target, thereby improving the achievable confidential communication rate.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the fields of synaesthesia integration technology and physical layer security technology, and in particular to a confidential communication method and device based on communication perception integration. Background Art

[0002] Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) technology, which uses a single waveform to perform both communication and perception, is considered a key technology for future wireless communication systems. By integrating perception capabilities, ISAC can support emerging environmental awareness applications such as autonomous driving, industrial automation, and drones. Compared to traditional wireless networks that only provide communication, ISAC leverages existing wireless infrastructure and limited spectrum resources to simultaneously perform both communication and perception, thereby improving system performance at a lower cost.

[0003] There are many benefits to using integrated synaesthesia technology. By utilizing the physical world information obtained through perception, it can help synchronize imaging and positioning between decentralized units and better transmit shared data in real time. However, when communication signals are used for perception, there is a security risk of exposing confidential information to eavesdroppers. For example, in order to ensure the performance of perception and communication, a communication and perception integrated transmitter (such as a drone base station) needs to perform beamforming optimization for both the legitimate receiver and the target. This may lead to serious information leakage problems because the perceived target may not be trustworthy and may eavesdrop on the broadcast information signal. In this context, how to maximize the system's confidential communication rate while fully utilizing the perception function of the communication and perception integrated system is crucial to the security of the communication system. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The present application aims to solve one of the technical problems in the related art at least to a certain extent.

[0005] To this end, the first purpose of this application is to propose a confidential communication method based on integrated communication and perception.

[0006] The second purpose of this application is to propose a secure communication device based on integrated communication and perception.

[0007] The third objective of this application is to provide an electronic device.

[0008] The fourth object of this application is to provide a computer-readable storage medium.

[0009] A fifth object of this application is to provide a computer program product.

[0010] To achieve the above objectives, the first embodiment of the present application proposes a secure communication method based on communication and perception integration, which is applied to a secure synaesthesia integration system. The secure synaesthesia integration system is composed of a legitimate transmitting end, a legitimate receiving end with a single antenna, and multiple perception targets. The legitimate transmitting end includes a beamforming matrix composed of multiple antenna units for transmitting signals, and a perception echo signal receiving part composed of only one antenna. The method includes the following steps:

[0011] Minimum frequency shift keying (MSK) is used to modulate a bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence and a bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information. The modulated signals are sampled and then modulated by OFDM and LFM to obtain a pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception and a confidential signal for communication.

[0012] The legitimate transmitting end transmits the pseudo-random artificial noise signal, and in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving the echo signal for sensing, the echo signal is processed to obtain the distance and speed information of each sensing target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target;

[0013] The legitimate transmitting end optimizes the beamforming matrix according to the distance and speed information of each of the sensing targets and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each of the sensing targets, and transmits a total transmission signal consisting of the pseudo-random artificial noise signal and the confidential signal to the legitimate receiving end;

[0014] In response to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal, artificial noise superimposed on the received signal is removed, and LFM reception, OFDM reception and MSK demodulation are performed on the removed received signal to recover the bipolar code element sequence carrying communication information.

[0015] Optionally, a process of modulating a bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information by minimum shift keying (MSK), sampling the modulated signal, and then performing OFDM and LFM modulation to obtain a confidential signal for communication includes:

[0016] By modulating the bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information through minimum shift keying (MSK), the MSK signal is obtained, which is expressed as:

[0017]

[0018] Where a k is the value of the kth symbol in the bipolar symbol sequence, is the phase constant of the kth symbol, used to ensure that at t = kT s The phase is continuous at

[0019] After sampling, the MSK signal is converted into a digital signal and then modulated by orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and linear frequency modulation (LFM) to obtain an OFDM-MSK-LFM synaesthesia integrated signal with confidential information. The OFDM-MSK-LFM synaesthesia integrated signal is expressed as:

[0020]

[0021] Where N is the number of subcarriers in the beamforming matrix, M is the number of symbols in a frame, and X u [k] is the kth frequency domain data of the uth symbol in the bipolar code sequence, which is related to the sampled value of the MSK signal. Δf is the subcarrier spacing, T sym is the symbol time, rect(x) is the rectangular window function, and μ is the frequency modulation slope.

[0022] Optionally, the sensing in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving the echo signal, processing the echo signal to obtain distance and speed information of each sensing target and channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target, includes:

[0023] For sending signals x , the echo signal received by the legal sending terminal is expressed as:

[0024] y=A·x·LV T +N

[0025] Wherein, the transmitted signal x specifically refers to the pseudo-random artificial noise signal, A is the complex amplitude factor of the attenuation and phase shift generated during the bidirectional propagation of the electromagnetic wave, is the distance vector, and the delay is is the velocity vector, Doppler frequency shift f d =2υ / λ, N is the received additive white Gaussian noise;

[0026] By removing the transmitted signal x from the echo signal y by dot division, a two-dimensional matrix LV containing the distance information and speed information of each perceived target is obtained. T ;

[0027] For the two-dimensional matrix LV T A 2D-FFT transformation is performed to obtain an estimate of the distance information and speed information of each sensing target, and to achieve an estimate of the channel state information at the legal receiving end and each sensing target.

[0028] Optionally, s0 represents the confidential signal used for communication, s1 represents the pseudo-random artificial noise signal used for perception, and represents the beamforming matrix of the corresponding transmit signal, then the total transmit signal sent by the transmitter is expressed as:

[0029] x=w0(s0+s1)

[0030] Wherein, the transmitted signal x specifically refers to the total transmitted signal.

[0031] Optionally, in response to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal, removing artificial noise superimposed on the received signal includes:

[0032] Assuming that the channel from the legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver is a quasi-static channel model, which remains unchanged during the reception period of a signal, the received signal received by the legitimate receiver is expressed as:

[0033] y=g H w0s0+g H w0s1+z

[0034] Where, represents the channel state information from the legal transmitter to the legal receiver, and the superscript H represents the conjugate transpose. represents the additive Gaussian white noise at the legal receiving end, with a mean of 0 and a variance of

[0035] Based on the received signal y, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the legitimate receiving end is obtained as follows:

[0036]

[0037] Since the pseudo-random artificial noise signal s1 is composed of a pseudo-random bipolar sequence a n Therefore, s1 can be considered as known at the legitimate receiving end. Then the received signal after removing the artificial noise is expressed as:

[0038] y2=g H w0s0+z

[0039] Based on the received signal y2 after removing the artificial noise, the SINR at the legal receiving end is obtained as:

[0040]

[0041] Optionally, also include:

[0042] Calculate the secure communication rate achieved by the secure synaesthesia integrated system.

[0043] Optionally, the calculating the secure communication rate achieved by the secure synaesthesia integrated system includes:

[0044] Assuming that the channels from the legitimate transmitter to all sensing targets are LoS channels, the channel state information from the legitimate transmitter to the sensing target is expressed as:

[0045] h k =α k α(θ k )

[0046] Where, is the channel amplitude, Θ k is the reference path loss at a distance of 1 meter, D k is the distance between the legitimate sender and the sensing target, α(θ k ) is the steering vector, expressed as:

[0047]

[0048] Where θ k is the departure angle AoD from the legitimate transmitter to the sensing target k, λ is the wavelength, and d is the distance between adjacent antennas;

[0049] Then the received signal at the untrusted sensing target k is:

[0050]

[0051] Where, is the additive Gaussian white noise at the perception target k;

[0052] Assume that the legitimate sender obtains the channel state information h at the untrusted sensing target k through effective sensing k , based on the received signal y k ,,The SINR at the untrusted sensing target k is:

[0053]

[0054] According to the SINR at the legitimate receiving end and the SINR at the untrusted sensing target k, the secure communication rate achieved by the secure interawareness integrated system is calculated as:

[0055]

[0056] in, Represents the set of all perception targets, K E Targets (K E <K) is the untrustworthy perception target with potential eavesdroppers, which is represented by the set

[0057] To achieve the above objectives, the second embodiment of the present application proposes a secure communication device based on communication and perception integration, which is applied to a secure synaesthesia integration system. The secure synaesthesia integration system is composed of a legitimate transmitting end, a legitimate receiving end with a single antenna, and multiple perception targets. The legitimate transmitting end includes a beamforming matrix composed of multiple antenna units for transmitting signals, and a perception echo signal receiving part composed of only one antenna. The device includes:

[0058] The signal modulation and sampling module is used to modulate the bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence and the bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information through minimum frequency shift keying (MSK), sample the modulated signals, and then perform OFDM and LFM modulation to obtain the pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception and the confidentiality signal for communication;

[0059] a signal transmission and perception module, configured to transmit the pseudo-random artificial noise signal by the legitimate transmitting end, perform perception in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving an echo signal, and process the echo signal to obtain distance and speed information of each perceived target and channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each perceived target;

[0060] a beamforming and signal optimization module, configured to optimize the beamforming matrix by the legitimate transmitting end based on the distance and speed information of each of the sensing targets and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target, and send a total transmission signal consisting of the pseudo-random artificial noise signal and the confidential signal to the legitimate receiving end;

[0061] The signal receiving and demodulation module is responsive to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal, and is used to remove the artificial noise superimposed on the received signal, and perform LFM reception, OFDM reception and MSK demodulation on the removed received signal to recover the bipolar code element sequence carrying the communication information.

[0062] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, a third embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising: a processor, and a memory communicatively connected to the processor;

[0063] The memory stores computer-executable instructions;

[0064] The processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory to implement the method as described in any one of the first aspects.

[0065] To achieve the above-mentioned purpose, the fourth embodiment of the present application proposes a computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, they are used to implement the method as described in any one of the first aspects.

[0066] To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the fifth embodiment of the present application proposes a computer program product, which implements any one of the methods in the first aspect when executed by a processor.

[0067] The secure communication method, device, electronic device and storage medium based on integrated communication and perception provided by the present application achieve effective generation of pseudo-random noise and secure communication signals by adopting MSK modulation technology combined with OFDM and LFM processing, thereby avoiding the interception of signals by potential eavesdroppers during transmission, and improving the security of communication and the accuracy of target perception; using the perceived echo signal to obtain target information and channel status, optimizing the beamforming matrix, achieving directional transmission and interference suppression of the signal, and further improving the communication quality and the overall performance of the system; by introducing artificial noise for perception, the SINR at untrusted perception targets is reduced, thereby increasing the achievable secure communication rate.

[0068] Additional aspects and advantages of the present application will be given in part in the description below, and in part will become apparent from the description below, or will be learned through practice of the present application. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0069] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of the present application will become apparent and easily understood from the following description of the embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0070] Figure 1 A flowchart of a secure communication method based on integrated communication and perception provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0071] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a scenario of a secure synaesthesia integrated system provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0072] Figure 3 A flowchart of a legitimate sending end provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0073] Figure 4 A flowchart of a legitimate receiving end provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0074] Figure 5 This is a structural block diagram of a secure communication device based on integrated communication and perception provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0075] The following describes in detail embodiments of the present application, examples of which are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals throughout represent the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are intended to be used to explain the present application, and should not be construed as limiting the present application.

[0076] Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) technology, which uses a single waveform to perform both communication and perception, is considered a key technology for future wireless communication systems. By integrating perception capabilities, ISAC can support emerging environmental awareness applications such as autonomous driving, industrial automation, and drones. Compared to traditional wireless networks that only provide communication, ISAC leverages existing wireless infrastructure and limited spectrum resources to simultaneously perform both communication and perception, thereby improving system performance at a lower cost.

[0077] There are many benefits to using integrated synaesthesia technology. By utilizing the physical world information obtained through perception, it can help synchronize imaging and positioning between decentralized units and better transmit shared data in real time. However, when communication signals are used for perception, there is a security risk of exposing confidential information to eavesdroppers. For example, in order to ensure the performance of perception and communication, a communication and perception integrated transmitter (such as a drone base station) needs to perform beamforming optimization for both the legitimate receiver and the target. This may lead to serious information leakage problems because the perceived target may not be trustworthy and may eavesdrop on the broadcast information signal. In this context, how to maximize the system's confidential communication rate while fully utilizing the perception function of the communication and perception integrated system is crucial to the security of the communication system.

[0078] To address this issue, an embodiment of the present application provides a secure communication method based on communication and perception integration, which is applied to a secure communication and perception integration system.

[0079] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 2, a secure interaceptive integrated system is considered, which consists of a legitimate transmitter, a legitimate receiver with a single antenna, and K sensing targets. The legitimate transmitter includes a beamforming matrix composed of multiple (N>1) antenna units for transmitting signals, and a sensing echo signal receiving part composed of only one antenna. Assume Represents the set of all perception targets, where K E Targets (K E <K) is the untrustworthy perception target with potential eavesdroppers, which is represented by the set

[0080] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a secure communication method based on integrated communication perception provided by an embodiment of the present application. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps:

[0081] Step 101: modulate a bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence and a bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information respectively through minimum frequency shift keying (MSK), sample the modulated signals respectively, and then modulate them through OFDM and LFM to obtain a pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception and a confidentiality signal for communication.

[0082] In the embodiment of the present application, the bipolar code element sequence carrying communication information is modulated by minimum shift keying (MSK). The modulated MSK signal can be expressed as:

[0083]

[0084] Where a k is the value of the kth code element in the bipolar code element sequence, is the phase constant of the kth symbol, used to ensure that at t = kT s The phase is continuous.

[0085] It should be noted that since the MSK signal is a temporally continuous analog signal, it is necessary to sample the MSK signal into a digital signal and then perform orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and linear frequency modulation (LFM) modulation to obtain an OFDM-MSK-LFM synaesthesia integrated signal with confidential information. The OFDM-MSK-LFM synaesthesia integrated signal is expressed as:

[0086]

[0087] Where N is the number of subcarriers in the beamforming matrix, M is the number of symbols in a frame, and X u [k] is the kth frequency domain data of the uth symbol in the bipolar code sequence, which is related to the sampled value of the MSK signal. Δf is the subcarrier spacing, T sym is the symbol time, rect(x) is the rectangular window function, and μ is the frequency modulation slope.

[0088] Similarly, the generation process of the pseudo-random artificial noise signal is similar to that of the confidential signal, using a bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence a n After MSK modulation, the modulated signal is sampled and then modulated by OFDM and LFM to obtain an OFDM-MSK-LFM pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception, which will not be repeated in this application.

[0089] In the embodiment of the present application, confidential transmission can be achieved when the pseudo-random artificial noise signal is used to realize the perception function.

[0090] In step 102, the legitimate transmitting end sends a pseudo-random artificial noise signal, and in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving the echo signal for sensing, the echo signal is processed to obtain the distance and speed information of each sensed target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensed target.

[0091] In an embodiment of the present application, a pseudo-random artificial noise signal is sent by the beamforming matrix of the legitimate transmitting end to perform a sensing process. When the perception echo signal receiving part of the legitimate transmitting end receives the echo signal, the perception process is started, and the echo signal is processed to obtain the distance and speed information of each perception target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each perception target.

[0092] Specifically, for a transmitted signal x, the echo signal received by the legitimate transmitter can be expressed as:

[0093] y=A·x·LV T +N

[0094] Where, the transmitted signal x specifically refers to the pseudo-random artificial noise signal, A is the complex amplitude factor of the attenuation and phase shift generated by the electromagnetic wave during bidirectional propagation, is the distance vector, and the delay is is the velocity vector, Doppler frequency shift f d =2υ / λ, N is the received additive white Gaussian noise.

[0095] Then, the transmission signal x is removed from the echo signal y by dot division to obtain a two-dimensional matrix LV containing the distance information and speed information of each perceived target. T ; and for the two-dimensional matrix LV T By performing 2D-FFT transformation, we can estimate the distance and speed information of each sensing target, and estimate the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target.

[0096] In step 103, the legitimate transmitting end optimizes the beamforming matrix based on the distance and speed information of each sensing target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target, and sends a total transmission signal consisting of a pseudo-random artificial noise signal and a confidential signal to the legitimate receiving end.

[0097] In an embodiment of the present application, based on the information obtained in step 102, the system is able to identify and classify different untrusted targets, which is crucial for distinguishing different untrusted targets because their behavior patterns may be different. Moreover, based on this information, the legitimate transmitter can use this information to optimize the beamforming technology to more accurately direct the signal energy to the legitimate receiver while reducing signal leakage to other areas (especially the area where the untrusted target is located).

[0098] As a possible implementation method, beamforming can be achieved by controlling the direction and shape of the beam by adjusting the phase and amplitude of each antenna element in the beamforming matrix. The purpose of optimizing the beamforming matrix is ​​to more accurately control the transmit beam to improve the reception quality of the signal at the legitimate receiving end, while reducing signal leakage to untrusted targets.

[0099] In the embodiment of the present application, the optimization process of the beamforming matrix can be implemented by the following method, but it does not constitute a limitation on the optimization process of the beamforming matrix of the present application.

[0100] 1. Adjust the beamforming matrix to form a narrow beam pointing to the legitimate receiver.

[0101] 2. By optimizing the beamforming matrix, the signal strength in the direction of the legitimate receiving end is enhanced, while the signal strength in other directions is suppressed.

[0102] 3. By adjusting the beamforming matrix, the sensitivity to interference sources is reduced and the reliability of communication is improved.

[0103] 4. Dynamically adjust the beamforming matrix based on the perceived target distance, speed, and channel state information to adapt to environmental changes.

[0104] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the legal sending end provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0105] It can be understood that if s0 is used to represent the confidential signal used for communication, s1 is used to represent the pseudo-random artificial noise signal used for perception, represents the beamforming matrix of the corresponding transmit signal, then the total transmit signal sent by the transmitter can be expressed as:

[0106] x=w0(s0+s1)

[0107] Wherein, the transmitted signal x specifically refers to the total transmitted signal.

[0108] Step 104 , in response to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal, removing the artificial noise superimposed on the received signal, and performing LFM reception, OFDM reception and MSK demodulation on the removed received signal to recover the bipolar code element sequence carrying the communication information.

[0109] Figure 4 A flow chart of a legitimate receiving end provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0110] Assume that the channel from the legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver is a quasi-static channel model, which remains unchanged during the reception period of a signal. represents the channel state information from the legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver. Assuming that the transmitter can fully understand the channel state information g at the legitimate receiver through channel estimation and feedback, the received signal received by the legitimate receiver is expressed as:

[0111] y=g H w0s0+g H w0s1+z

[0112] Where, the superscript H represents the conjugate transpose, represents the additive Gaussian white noise at the legal receiving end, with a mean of 0 and a variance of

[0113] Therefore, based on the received signal y, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the legitimate receiving end can be calculated as:

[0114]

[0115] Since the pseudo-random artificial noise signal s1 is composed of a pseudo-random bipolar sequence a n Therefore, s1 can be considered as known at the legitimate receiving end. Then the received signal after removing the artificial noise can be expressed as:

[0116] y2=g H w0s0+z

[0117] Therefore, based on the received signal y2 after removing the artificial noise, the SINR at the legal receiving end can be calculated as:

[0118]

[0119] In the embodiment of the present application, the secure communication rate achieved by the secure communication system can also be analyzed and calculated. The specific process is as follows:

[0120] Assuming that the channels from the legitimate transmitter to all sensing targets are LoS channels, the channel state information from the legitimate transmitter to the sensing target is expressed as:

[0121] h k =α k α(θ k )

[0122] Where, is the channel amplitude, Θ k is the reference path loss at a distance of 1 meter, D k is the distance between the legitimate sender and the sensing target, α(θ k ) is the steering vector, which can be expressed as follows:

[0123]

[0124] Where θ k is the departure angle AoD from the legitimate transmitter to the sensing target k, λ is the wavelength, and d is the distance between adjacent antennas.

[0125] Therefore, according to the above, the received signal at the untrusted sensing target k is:

[0126]

[0127] Where, is the additive white Gaussian noise at the perception target k.

[0128] Assume that the legitimate sender can obtain the channel state information h at the untrusted sensing target k through effective sensing k , then, based on the received signal y k ,,The SINR at the untrusted sensing target k can be calculated as:

[0129]

[0130] Finally, the secure communication rate achieved by the secure interawareness integrated system can be calculated based on the SINR at the legitimate receiving end and the SINR at the untrusted sensing target k:

[0131]

[0132] Compared with the synaesthesia integrated system without artificial noise, the solution proposed in this application reduces the SINR at the untrusted perception target by introducing artificial noise for perception, thereby improving the achievable secure communication rate, meeting the synaesthesia integrated system's requirements for secure communication, and has practical significance.

[0133] In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiments, the present application also proposes a confidential communication device based on communication and perception integration, which is applied to a confidential synaesthesia integration system. The confidential synaesthesia integration system consists of a legal transmitting end, a legal receiving end with a single antenna and multiple perception targets. The legal transmitting end includes a beamforming matrix composed of multiple antenna units for sending signals, and a perception echo signal receiving part composed of only one antenna. Figure 4 This is a structural diagram of a secure communication device 10 based on integrated communication perception provided in an embodiment of the present application. Figure 4 As shown, the device includes:

[0134] The signal modulation and sampling module 100 is used to modulate a bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence and a bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information respectively through minimum frequency shift keying (MSK), and sample the modulated signals respectively and then perform OFDM and LFM modulation to obtain a pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception and a confidential signal for communication;

[0135] The signal transmission and sensing module 200 is configured to transmit a pseudo-random artificial noise signal from a legitimate transmitting end, sense an echo signal received by the legitimate transmitting end, and process the echo signal to obtain the distance and speed information of each sensed target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensed target;

[0136] The beamforming and signal optimization module 300 is configured to optimize the beamforming matrix by the legitimate transmitting end based on the distance and speed information of each sensing target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target, and send a total transmission signal composed of a pseudo-random artificial noise signal and a confidential signal to the legitimate receiving end;

[0137] The signal receiving and demodulation module 400 is used to remove the artificial noise superimposed on the received signal in response to the total transmitted signal received by the legal receiving end, and perform LFM reception, OFDM reception and MSK demodulation on the removed received signal to recover the bipolar code element sequence carrying communication information.

[0138] In order to implement the above embodiments, the present application also proposes an electronic device, comprising: a processor, and a memory communicatively connected to the processor; the memory stores computer-executable instructions; the processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory to implement the method provided by the above embodiments.

[0139] In order to implement the above embodiments, the present application also proposes a computer-readable storage medium, in which computer-executable instructions are stored. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by a processor, they are used to implement the methods provided by the above embodiments.

[0140] In order to implement the above embodiments, the present application also proposes a computer program product, including a computer program, which implements the methods provided by the above embodiments when executed by a processor.

[0141] The collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision and disclosure of user personal information involved in this application are in compliance with relevant laws and regulations and do not violate public order and good morals.

[0142] It is important to note that personal information collected from users should be used for legitimate and reasonable purposes and should not be shared or sold beyond these legitimate uses. Furthermore, such collection / sharing should be conducted only after receiving the user's informed consent, including but not limited to notifying the user to read the user agreement / user notice and sign an agreement / authorization that includes the relevant user information before using the feature. Furthermore, any necessary steps must be taken to safeguard and secure access to such personal information and ensure that others with access to personal information comply with its privacy policy and procedures.

[0143] This application contemplates providing implementations that allow users to selectively block the use or access of personal information data. Specifically, this disclosure contemplates providing hardware and / or software to prevent or block access to such personal information data. Risks can be minimized by limiting data collection and deleting data once it is no longer needed. Furthermore, where applicable, such personal information can be de-identified to protect user privacy.

[0144] In the descriptions of the foregoing embodiments, the reference terms "one embodiment", "some embodiments", "example", "specific example", or "some examples" mean that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the schematic expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described may be combined in any one or more embodiments or examples in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art may combine and combine the different embodiments or examples described in this specification and the features of the different embodiments or examples, unless they are mutually inconsistent.

[0145] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of the technical features being referred to. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of such features. Throughout the description of this application, "plurality" means at least two, for example, two, three, etc., unless otherwise specifically defined.

[0146] Any process or method description in a flowchart or otherwise described herein may be understood to represent a module, segment or portion of code comprising one or more executable instructions for implementing the steps of a custom logical function or process, and the scope of the preferred embodiments of the present application includes alternative implementations in which functions may be performed out of the order shown or discussed, including performing functions in a substantially simultaneous manner or in the reverse order depending on the functions involved, which should be understood by those skilled in the art to which the embodiments of the present application belong.

[0147] The logic and / or steps represented in the flowcharts or otherwise described herein, for example, can be considered as a sequenced list of executable instructions for implementing the logical functions, and can be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device (e.g., a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can fetch and execute instructions from an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device). For purposes of this specification, a "computer-readable medium" can be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by, or in conjunction with, an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable media include the following: an electrical connection with one or more wires (electronic devices), a portable computer disk cartridge (magnetic device), random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), fiber optic devices, and a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM). Furthermore, the computer-readable medium may even be paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium and then editing, interpreting or processing it in another suitable manner if necessary, and then storing it in a computer memory.

[0148] It should be understood that various parts of the present application can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented using software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented using hardware, as in another embodiment, any one of the following technologies known in the art or a combination thereof can be used to implement: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function on a data signal, an application-specific integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.

[0149] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the method of the above embodiment can be completed by instructing related hardware through a program, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiment.

[0150] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into a processing module, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into a module. The above-mentioned integrated module may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional module. If the integrated module is implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as an independent product, it may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.

[0151] The storage medium mentioned above may be a read-only memory, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, etc. Although the embodiments of the present application have been shown and described above, it is understood that the above embodiments are exemplary and should not be construed as limiting the present application. Persons skilled in the art may make changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations to the above embodiments within the scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A secure communication method based on integrated communication and perception, applied to a secure synaesthesia integrated system, wherein the secure synaesthesia integrated system comprises a legitimate transmitter, a legitimate receiver having a single antenna, and multiple perception targets, wherein the legitimate transmitter comprises a beamforming matrix composed of multiple antenna units for transmitting signals, and a perception echo signal receiving portion composed of only one antenna, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: Minimum frequency shift keying (MSK) is used to modulate a bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence and a bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information. The modulated signals are sampled and then modulated by OFDM and LFM to obtain a pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception and a confidential signal for communication. The legitimate transmitting end transmits the pseudo-random artificial noise signal, and in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving the echo signal for sensing, the echo signal is processed to obtain the distance and speed information of each sensing target and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target; The legitimate transmitting end optimizes the beamforming matrix according to the distance and speed information of each of the sensing targets and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each of the sensing targets, and transmits a total transmission signal consisting of the pseudo-random artificial noise signal and the confidential signal to the legitimate receiving end; In response to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal, artificial noise superimposed on the received signal is removed, and LFM reception, OFDM reception and MSK demodulation are performed on the removed received signal to recover the bipolar code element sequence carrying communication information.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The process of modulating a bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information through minimum frequency shift keying (MSK), sampling the modulated signal, and then performing OFDM and LFM modulation to obtain a confidential signal for communication includes: By modulating the bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information through minimum shift keying (MSK), the MSK signal is obtained, which is expressed as: Where a k is the value of the kth symbol in the bipolar symbol sequence, is the phase constant of the kth symbol, used to ensure that at t = kT s The phase is continuous at After sampling, the MSK signal is converted into a digital signal and then modulated by orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and linear frequency modulation (LFM) to obtain an OFDM-MSK-LFM synaesthesia integrated signal with confidential information. The OFDM-MSK-LFM synaesthesia integrated signal is expressed as: Where N is the number of subcarriers in the beamforming matrix, M is the number of symbols in a frame, and X u [k] is the kth frequency domain data of the uth symbol in the bipolar code sequence, which is related to the sampled value of the MSK signal. Δf is the subcarrier spacing, T sym is the symbol time, rect(x) is the rectangular window function, and μ is the frequency modulation slope.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The sensing in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving the echo signal, processing the echo signal to obtain distance and speed information of each sensing target and channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target, including: For a transmitted signal x, the echo signal received by the legal transmitting terminal is expressed as: y=A·x·LV T +N Wherein, the transmitted signal x specifically refers to the pseudo-random artificial noise signal, A is the complex amplitude factor of the attenuation and phase shift generated during the bidirectional propagation of the electromagnetic wave, is the distance vector, and the delay is is the velocity vector, Doppler frequency shift f d =2υ / λ, N is the received additive white Gaussian noise; By removing the transmitted signal x from the echo signal y by dot division, a two-dimensional matrix LV containing the distance information and speed information of each perceived target is obtained. T ; For the two-dimensional matrix LV T A 2D-FFT transformation is performed to obtain an estimate of the distance information and speed information of each sensing target, and to achieve an estimate of the channel state information at the legal receiving end and each sensing target.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that Also includes: S0 represents the secret signal used for communication, S1 represents the pseudo-random artificial noise signal used for perception, represents the beamforming matrix of the corresponding transmit signal, then the total transmit signal sent by the transmitter is expressed as: x=w0(s0+s1) Wherein, the transmitted signal x specifically refers to the total transmitted signal.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The removing of artificial noise superimposed on the received signal in response to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal comprises: Assuming that the channel from the legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver is a quasi-static channel model, which remains unchanged during the reception period of a signal, the received signal received by the legitimate receiver is expressed as: y=g H w0s0+g H w0s1+z Where, represents the channel state information from the legal transmitter to the legal receiver, and the superscript H represents the conjugate transpose. represents the additive Gaussian white noise at the legal receiving end, with a mean of 0 and a variance of Based on the received signal y, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the legitimate receiving end is obtained as follows: Since the pseudo-random artificial noise signal s1 is composed of a pseudo-random bipolar sequence a n Therefore, s1 can be considered as known at the legitimate receiving end. Then the received signal after removing the artificial noise is expressed as: y2=g H w0s0+z Based on the received signal y2 after removing the artificial noise, the SINR at the legal receiving end is obtained as:

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Also includes: Calculate the secure communication rate achieved by the secure synaesthesia integrated system.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The calculating of the secure communication rate achieved by the secure synaesthesia integrated system includes: Assuming that the channels from the legitimate transmitter to all sensing targets are LoS channels, the channel state information from the legitimate transmitter to the sensing target is expressed as: h k =a k a(θ k ) Where, is the channel amplitude, Θ k is the reference path loss at a distance of 1 meter, D k is the distance between the legitimate sender and the sensing target, α(θ k ) is the steering vector, expressed as: Where θ k is the departure angle AoD from the legitimate transmitter to the sensing target k, λ is the wavelength, and d is the distance between adjacent antennas; Then the received signal at the untrusted sensing target k is: Where, is the additive Gaussian white noise at the perception target k; Assume that the legitimate sender obtains the channel state information h at the untrusted sensing target k through effective sensing k , based on the received signal y k ,, the SINR at the untrusted sensing target k is: According to the SINR at the legitimate receiving end and the SINR at the untrusted sensing target k, the secure communication rate achieved by the secure interawareness integrated system is calculated as: in, Represents the set of all perception targets, K E Targets (K E <K) is the untrustworthy perception target with potential eavesdroppers, which is represented by the set 8. A secure communication device based on integrated communication and perception, applied to a secure synaesthesia integrated system, the secure synaesthesia integrated system comprising a legitimate transmitter, a legitimate receiver having a single antenna, and multiple perception targets, the legitimate transmitter including a beamforming matrix composed of multiple antenna units for transmitting signals, and a perception echo signal receiving portion composed of only one antenna, characterized in that: The device comprises: The signal modulation and sampling module is used to modulate the bipolar pseudo-random noise sequence and the bipolar symbol sequence carrying communication information through minimum frequency shift keying (MSK), sample the modulated signals, and then perform OFDM and LFM modulation to obtain the pseudo-random artificial noise signal for perception and the confidentiality signal for communication; a signal transmission and perception module, configured to transmit the pseudo-random artificial noise signal by the legitimate transmitting end, perform perception in response to the legitimate transmitting end receiving an echo signal, and process the echo signal to obtain distance and speed information of each perceived target and channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each perceived target; a beamforming and signal optimization module, configured to optimize the beamforming matrix by the legitimate transmitting end based on the distance and speed information of each of the sensing targets and the channel state information at the legitimate receiving end and each sensing target, and send a total transmission signal consisting of the pseudo-random artificial noise signal and the confidential signal to the legitimate receiving end; The signal receiving and demodulation module is responsive to the legal receiving end receiving the total transmitted signal, and is used to remove the artificial noise superimposed on the received signal, and perform LFM reception, OFDM reception and MSK demodulation on the removed received signal to recover the bipolar code element sequence carrying the communication information.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: a processor, and a memory communicatively connected to the processor; The memory stores computer-executable instructions; The processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, which are used to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed by a processor.

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