Block chain-based power monitoring credible security operation and maintenance cooperation method, system and device, and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses an electric power monitoring credible security operation and maintenance cooperation method, system and device based on a block chain, and a storage medium, and relates to the technical field of electric power monitoring, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining sensing data of an electric power monitoring terminal side, and carrying out the signature; in combination with the operation and maintenance instruction, block chain consensus storage and verification of the data and the instruction are carried out, the data and the instruction passing verification are stored in a sensing data chain and an operation and maintenance operation chain of the block chain, and verification evidence is provided; acquiring a node historical behavior data set, and performing dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation; performing operation and maintenance instruction compliance analysis and response in combination with a preset electric power safety regulation logic library, and generating a defense strategy set in combination with the attack feature library; the method guarantees the authenticity and integrity of data, and eliminates the forgery risk. The compliance verification time consumption is reduced from the hour level to the millisecond level, the cross-department cooperation efficiency is improved, and the single-point fault and APT attack risk is reduced; the manual auditing amount can be reduced, the accident root cause can be quickly positioned, and the tracing requirement is met.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of power monitoring, and in particular to a blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaboration method, system, device and storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the expansion of the smart grid and the access of distributed energy, the power monitoring system needs to process massive real-time data such as voltage, current, device status, environmental parameters, etc., and support multi-agent (dispatch center, operation and maintenance unit, regulatory department) collaborative decision-making.

[0003] However, the existing technology has the following key bottlenecks: insufficient data trust guarantee: traditional centralized databases are vulnerable to internal tampering or external attacks, and the integrity and authenticity of key monitoring data such as fault recording and operation logs are difficult to prove, leading to frequent disputes in accident accountability; the data of each subsystem (SCADA, EMS, device management system) is stored independently, lacking a global consistency verification mechanism, resulting in "data islands" and trust barriers. Low efficiency of safe operation: operation instructions such as device maintenance and parameter adjustment rely on manual transmission and paper-based approval, with a long process and operation traces that are easy to tamper with, making it difficult to meet the mandatory requirements of power safety regulations for operation traceability; when collaborating across departments, the permission management and data sharing mechanism is rigid, and the authorization process for sensitive operations (such as remote switch control) lacks transparent audit capabilities. System vulnerability is prominent: centralized architecture has single point of failure risk, and main station downtime will cause global monitoring failure, which does not meet the "N-1" safety standard of the power system; existing encryption and access control technologies cannot effectively prevent advanced persistent threats (APT) and malicious operations by internal personnel. SUMMARY

[0004] In view of the above problems, the present application is proposed.

[0005] Therefore, the technical problem solved by the present application is that the existing technology has the problems of insufficient data trust guarantee, low efficiency of safe operation and prominent system vulnerability when the power monitoring system processes massive real-time data and supports multi-agent collaborative decision-making.

[0006] To solve the above technical problems, the present application provides the following technical solutions:

[0007] In a first aspect, the present application provides a blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaboration method, comprising:

[0008] Obtaining sensing data on the power monitoring terminal side and signing it;

[0009] Based on the sensing data and the signature, combined with the operation instruction, the blockchain consensus storage and verification of data and instruction are performed, the verified data and instruction are stored in the sensing data chain and the operation chain of the blockchain, and the verification evidence is provided;

[0010] Based on the verification evidence, a node historical behavior data set is obtained, dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation are performed;

[0011] Based on the operation log in the operation chain of the blockchain, combined with the pre-set power safety procedure logic library, operation instruction compliance analysis and response are performed, combined with the attack feature library, a defense strategy set is generated.

[0012] As a preferred scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain, wherein:

[0013] The blockchain consensus storage and verification of data and instruction based on the sensing data and the signature, combined with the operation instruction, the verified data and instruction are stored in the sensing data chain and the operation chain of the blockchain, and the verification evidence is provided, comprising:

[0014] A permissioned private hybrid chain architecture is constructed, the architecture includes a sensing data chain and an operation chain; cross-node verification is performed on the sensing data and the operation instruction: the signature of the sensing data is verified by using a terminal public key, whether the signature conforms to a preset rule is judged, if the verification fails, the corresponding data packet is discarded; the operation instruction code is compared with a pre-set whitelist library by calling a smart contract, if the instruction violates the rule, the instruction is blocked immediately, and an audit event is generated.

[0015] The beneficial effects of the preferred technical scheme are: the permissioned private hybrid chain architecture is constructed, and the sensing data chain and the operation chain are divided, the classification storage and management of data are realized, the organization and traceability of data are improved. The cross-node verification mechanism ensures the integrity of the sensing data and the compliance of the operation instruction, effectively prevents data tampering and illegal operation, and enhances the security and reliability of the system. At the same time, the illegal instruction is blocked and the audit event is generated, which is convenient for subsequent problem troubleshooting and responsibility tracing.

[0016] As a preferred scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain, wherein:

[0017] The dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation based on the verification evidence and the node historical behavior data set, comprising:

[0018] According to the behavior history data of the node, a real-time trust value is calculated: a historical behavior data set of the node is obtained, historical data efficiency, time decay factor and behavior entropy value are fused, each index is fused according to a preset weight coefficient, and a dynamic trust value of the node is calculated.

[0019] As a preferred scheme of the power monitoring trusted security operation and maintenance collaborative method based on the blockchain, wherein:

[0020] The dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation based on the verification evidence and the obtained node historical behavior data set further comprises:

[0021] The calculated dynamic trust value is synchronized to the cross-domain collaborative gateway in real time, and the cross-domain collaborative gateway dynamically allocates the data processing weight and operation permission of the node according to the trust value.

[0022] The beneficial effects of the preferred technical scheme are that the dynamic trust value is synchronized to the cross-domain collaborative gateway in real time, and the real-time association of the trust value and the permission allocation is realized. The cross-domain collaborative gateway can dynamically adjust the data processing weight and operation permission of the node according to the real-time trust status of the node, and ensure that only the node with high trust degree has high operation permission, thereby further improving the security and resource utilization efficiency of the system.

[0023] As a preferred scheme of the power monitoring trusted security operation and maintenance collaborative method based on the blockchain, wherein:

[0024] The dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation based on the verification evidence and the obtained node historical behavior data set further comprises:

[0025] The behaviors of the node in the preset time window are counted, and the behavior entropy value is obtained by quantifying the randomness of the operation; when the behavior entropy value is lower than a preset threshold, a trust warning is triggered.

[0026] The beneficial effects of the preferred technical scheme are that the behavior entropy value is obtained by quantifying the randomness of the node operation, and the threshold is set to trigger the trust warning, which can timely discover the abnormal change of the node behavior. Once the behavior entropy value abnormally decreases, it indicates that the operation mode of the node becomes too regular, and there may be a potential security threat. At this time, the trust warning is triggered to remind the administrator to take timely measures to ensure the safe operation of the system.

[0027] As a preferred scheme of the power monitoring trusted security operation and maintenance collaborative method based on the blockchain, wherein:

[0028] The operation log in the blockchain operation chain is combined with the preloaded power safety procedure logic library to perform operation instruction compliance analysis and response, and the attack feature library is combined to generate a defense strategy set, which comprises:

[0029] The power safety regulation logic library is preset by the smart contract execution engine, operation instruction is parsed, and it is judged whether the instruction triggers a rule constraint condition; the smart contract execution engine is internally provided with an operation fuse mechanism, the time interval of continuous operations is monitored in real time, when the operation time interval does not conform to the minimum operation interval defined by the power safety regulation, the instruction flow is automatically interrupted, an alarm event is generated, and the fuse event is recorded to the operation chain.

[0030] The beneficial effects of the preferred technical scheme are that: the power safety regulation logic library is preset by the smart contract execution engine, which can automatically and accurately parse the compliance of the operation instruction, and ensure that the instruction conforms to the power safety regulation. The built-in operation fuse mechanism can monitor the operation time interval in real time to prevent safety accidents caused by excessive frequent operation. The automatic interruption of the instruction flow, the generation of the alarm event and the recording of the fuse event facilitate the timely discovery and processing of abnormal operations, and ensure the safe and stable operation of the power system.

[0031] As a preferred scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on a blockchain, wherein:

[0032] The operation log in the operation chain based on the blockchain operation chain is combined with the preset power safety regulation logic library to perform operation instruction compliance analysis and response, and the attack feature library is combined to generate a defense strategy set, and the operation log in the operation chain based on the blockchain operation chain further comprises:

[0033] The smart contract execution engine synchronously accesses the operation log of the operation chain, outputs an instruction trigger resilience enhancement response module, and generates a defense strategy set by fusing the attack feature library and the fault prediction model through the resilience enhancement response module.

[0034] In a second aspect, the present application provides a power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration system based on a blockchain, comprising:

[0035] A sensor data signature module for obtaining sensor data on the power monitoring terminal side and signing the sensor data;

[0036] A blockchain storage verification module for storing and verifying data and instructions based on sensor data and signatures, combining operation instructions, performing blockchain consensus storage and verification of data and instructions, and providing verification evidence;

[0037] A node trust and permission management module for obtaining a node historical behavior data set based on the verification evidence, performing dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation;

[0038] An operation instruction compliance and defense strategy generation module for performing operation instruction compliance analysis and response based on the operation log in the operation chain based on the blockchain operation chain, combining the preset power safety regulation logic library, and generating a defense strategy set in combination with the attack feature library.

[0039] In a third aspect, the present application provides an electronic device, comprising:

[0040] a memory and a processor;

[0041] The memory is configured to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is configured to execute the computer-executable instructions. When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the blockchain-based power monitoring trusted security operation and maintenance collaboration method as described in the present application.

[0042] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the blockchain-based power monitoring trusted security operation and maintenance collaboration method.

[0043] The application ensures the authenticity and integrity of collected data such as voltage, current and device status from the source of the power monitoring terminal through the lightweight encryption chip of the multi-source trusted perception module and the SM9 signature technology; the double-chain architecture of the blockchain consensus storage module realizes cross-node multiple verification through the sensing data chain and the operation and maintenance operation chain, so that tampering with single node data cannot pass the global consensus, and the risk of forgery of traditional centralized databases is completely eliminated, providing an irrefutable evidence chain for accident accountability; the power safety regulations such as the operation interval fuse mechanism are solidified into automatically executed code rules through the smart contract execution engine, and the compliance verification time of the operation instruction is shortened from hours to milliseconds; the dynamic trust evaluation module dynamically allocates access permissions of the cross-domain collaborative gateway based on real-time behavior entropy, replaces the manual approval process, and improves the cross-department collaboration efficiency by more than 80%, while meeting the strong compliance requirement of operation traceability; through the PBFT consensus mechanism of the blockchain consensus storage module and the sharding redundancy design of the distributed storage cluster, the single-point failure risk is eliminated, and the slave node can take over the service within seconds when the master node is down, which meets the N-1 safety criterion of the power system; the resilience enhancement response module fuses the attack feature library to generate a minimum attack surface defense strategy in real time, such as isolating controlled terminals and enabling redundant links, so that the success rate of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks is reduced by 95%; the threshold decryption protocol of the cross-domain collaborative gateway realizes the "data usability invisibility" among the regulatory departments, dispatching centers and operation and maintenance units, and sensitive operations need to be jointly authorized by at least t agencies to be decrypted, thereby establishing a multi-party trust mechanism under the premise of protecting privacy; the millisecond-level three-dimensional time axis backtracking capability of the visualized audit tracking module makes the cross-domain operation transparent and traceable; the all-process operation log is automatically stored on the blockchain double chain, and the audit data can be directly connected to the power supervision platform, thereby reducing the manual audit workload by 70%; the visualized audit tracking module supports one-key association of original sensing data, operator trust value and influence path through the operation identifier Op_ID, realizes minute-level accident root cause positioning, and meets the strong traceability requirement of the power safety regulations. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0044] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiment description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without any creative labor.

[0045] Figure 1 The present application provides a whole flowchart of a power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaboration method based on a blockchain. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] In order to make the above objectives, characteristics and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the specific embodiments of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative labor should belong to the protection scope of the present application.

[0047] Embodiment 1, refer to Figure 1 For the first embodiment of the present application, the embodiment provides a blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaboration method, comprising:

[0048] S1: acquiring sensing data on the power monitoring terminal side and signing;

[0049] S2: based on the sensing data and the signature, combining the operation and maintenance instructions, carrying out blockchain consensus evidence storage and verification of data and instructions, storing the data and instructions that pass the verification into the sensing data chain and the operation and maintenance operation chain of the blockchain, and providing verification evidence;

[0050] S3: based on the verification evidence, acquiring a node historical behavior data set, and carrying out dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation;

[0051] S4: based on the operation log in the blockchain operation and maintenance operation chain, combining a preset power safety procedure logic library, carrying out operation and maintenance instruction compliance analysis and response, combining an attack feature library, and generating a defense strategy set.

[0052] It should be noted that through steps S1-S4, the sensing data on the power monitoring terminal side is signed, and the data and instructions are combined with the operation and maintenance instructions to carry out blockchain consensus evidence storage and verification, which guarantees the authenticity and integrity of the data in the power monitoring system, prevents the data from being tampered with or forged, and provides a reliable data foundation for subsequent operation and maintenance decision-making. Based on the verification evidence, the node historical behavior data set is acquired to carry out dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation, which can adjust the permissions in real time according to the actual performance of the node, avoid the potential threat of malicious nodes, make the system more flexible and secure to adapt to the changing network environment. The operation and maintenance instructions are combined with the preset power safety procedure logic library for compliance analysis, which ensures that the operation and maintenance operation complies with the safety specifications of the power industry, and at the same time, the attack feature library is combined to generate a defense strategy set, which can timely discover and respond to potential attacks, and enhance the anti-attack ability and resilience of the power monitoring system.

[0053] Embodiment 2, refer to Figure 1 For an embodiment of the present application, based on the previous embodiment, a blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaboration method is provided, comprising:

[0054] In the embodiment, the step S1 of acquiring the sensing data of the power monitoring terminal side and signing includes:

[0055] The voltage, current and device state data are collected and digitally signed in real time by a lightweight encryption chip.

[0056] In the multi-source trusted perception module, a digital signature technology based on the national SM9 algorithm is used. Specifically, an SM9 master key is pre-stored in the terminal embedded chip, a hash value H(M||T) is calculated after the collected sensing data M is superimposed with a time stamp T, and a terminal private key d s is used to perform a signature operation to generate a signature σ, and the mathematical expression is:

[0057] σ=H(M||T)·d s modq

[0058] Wherein, q is the order of the elliptic curve, and the signature σ and the original data M are transmitted to the block chain consensus storage module together.

[0059] In the embodiment, the step S2 of performing block chain consensus storage and verification of data and instructions based on sensing data and signatures combined with operation and maintenance instructions, storing the data and instructions that pass the verification into the sensing data chain and operation and maintenance operation chain of the block chain, and providing verification evidence includes:

[0060] In the block chain consensus storage module, a permissioned private hybrid chain architecture is constructed, including a sensing data chain and an operation and maintenance operation chain, and a PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) consensus mechanism is used to verify multi-source data and operation and maintenance instructions across nodes.

[0061] Further, the cross-node verification adopts the following double verification mechanism:

[0062] Sensing data integrity verification: verify whether the signature point P satisfies the elliptic curve equation through the terminal public key PK, which is expressed as:

[0063] Verify PK (M,σ)=[H(M||T)·PK==P·G]

[0064] Wherein, G is the base point of the elliptic curve.

[0065] If the verification fails, the data packet is discarded.

[0066] Operation and maintenance instruction compliance verification: call the smart contract to compare the operation instruction code with the pre-stored whitelist library, and immediately block the illegal instruction and generate an audit event.

[0067] In this embodiment, in step S3, based on the verification evidence, obtaining the node historical behavior dataset, and performing dynamic trust value calculation and authority allocation include:

[0068] Through the dynamic trust evaluation module, based on the historical data of node behavior, the real-time trust value is calculated to dynamically adjust the data weight and operation permissions;

[0069] Specifically, real-time trust value calculation includes:

[0070] Obtain the node historical behavior dataset from the blockchain consensus evidence module;

[0071] According to the weight coefficients α, β, γ (satisfying α+β+γ=1), the three indicators are integrated: historical data efficiency N valid / N total ; Time decay factor e -k·t , where t is the time difference from the most recent abnormal operation; behavior entropy value Entropy (B i );

[0072] Output dynamic trust value:

[0073]

[0074] The dynamic trust value is synchronized to the cross-domain collaborative gateway in real time for dynamic permission allocation.

[0075] Furthermore, the behavioral entropy calculation specifically includes:

[0076] Statistics of various operations a of node i within the preset time window j , including data reporting, instruction issuance, and audit query, the frequency of each operation is P(a j );

[0077] The randomness of behavior is quantified by the Shannon entropy formula:

[0078]

[0079] When the entropy value is lower than the threshold, a trust warning is triggered.

[0080] In this embodiment, in step S4, based on the operation log in the blockchain operation and maintenance operation chain, combined with the preset power safety regulations logic library, the operation and maintenance instruction compliance analysis and response are performed, and combined with the attack feature library, the defense strategy set is generated, including:

[0081] Use the smart contract execution engine to pre-set the power safety regulations logic library to analyze whether the operation and maintenance instructions trigger the rule constraints;

[0082] The smart contract execution engine has a built-in operation circuit breaker mechanism. Specifically, it monitors the time interval Δt of continuous operations in real time; when Δt<Δtsafe At this time, the instruction stream is automatically interrupted and an alarm event is generated, where Δt safe is the minimum operation interval defined by the power safety regulations; the fuse event is recorded to the operation chain for audit traceability.

[0083] The smart contract execution engine synchronously accesses the operation log of the operation chain of the blockchain consensus storage module, and the output instruction of the smart contract execution engine triggers the resilience enhancement response module;

[0084] The resilience enhancement response module fuses the attack feature library and the fault prediction model to generate an elastic defense strategy; in the resilience enhancement response module, an APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attack strategy generator is set, and the workflow is as follows:

[0085] Input vulnerability vector v k (from the attack feature library) and weight w k ;

[0086] Solve the defense strategy set S that minimizes the expected risk:

[0087]

[0088] The constraint condition is ResponseTime(s)≤T max , where T max is the maximum tolerable delay of the power system;

[0089] The output strategy includes: isolating the controlled terminal, enabling the redundant communication link, and limiting the flow to run at a low frequency.

[0090] In another possible implementation, the common data sources and generation methods of the attack feature library include:

[0091] In the context of a power monitoring system, the construction of the attack feature library is mainly derived from the following aspects:

[0092] Device operation data anomaly: the power monitoring system monitors the operation parameters of various power equipment (such as transformers, circuit breakers, etc.) in real time. When the operation data of the device abnormally fluctuates, such as a sudden large deviation of voltage from the rated value, a sharp increase in current, etc., if accompanied by abnormal network communication activities, it is likely to be an attack. For example, under normal circumstances, the temperature of the transformer fluctuates within a certain range, if the temperature abnormally rises in a short time, and at this time the system detects that an unknown IP address tries to access the device control port, this abnormal combination of device operation data and network activity will be recorded as an attack feature.

[0093] Communication protocol anomalies: The power monitoring system uses specific communication protocols for data transmission and device control. When abnormal situations occur in the communication protocol, such as protocol fields being tampered with, message formats not conforming to specifications, and abnormal communication frequencies, they may be signs of attacks. For example, in normal communication, devices send status information at a fixed period. If there is a sudden increase in the frequency of abnormal message sending, and the message content does not conform to the protocol, this abnormal communication protocol feature can be included in the attack feature library.

[0094] Control instruction anomalies: The control instructions for devices in the monitoring system have strict permissions and operation specifications. If unauthorized control instructions are issued, or the operation logic of the instructions does not conform to the safety rules of the power system, such as opening and closing important devices at inappropriate times, this abnormal control instruction behavior will be extracted as an attack feature.

[0095] System attack cases: Detailed review and analysis of attack events experienced by the power monitoring system. Record the time of attack, the source IP address of the attack, the means used by the attacker (such as SQL injection, malicious code implantation, etc.), and the impact on the system (such as data loss, device malfunction, etc.). Through the summary of these historical attack cases, representative attack features are extracted. For example, in one attack, the attacker tampered with the device parameters in the database through the SQL injection vulnerability, causing the device to run abnormally. Therefore, the related features of SQL injection (such as specific SQL statement patterns) and the behavior of tampering with device parameters will be added to the attack feature library.

[0096] Industry similar attack cases: Refer to similar attack events that occurred in other power monitoring systems or related fields. Different regions and different enterprises have certain similarities in the architecture and functions of their power monitoring systems, so attack cases from other systems also have important reference value. For example, a power monitoring system in a certain region suffered a new type of DDoS attack, causing system communication to be interrupted. Other power monitoring systems can include the traffic characteristics of this DDoS attack (such as abnormal traffic size, traffic source distribution, etc.) in their own attack feature library to prevent similar attacks.

[0097] In another possible implementation, privacy sharing can be achieved by a cross-domain collaborative gateway using a threshold decryption protocol;

[0098] Specifically, the supervisor private key sk is divided into n fragments sk i Stored in different institutions; when sensitive data needs to be decrypted, at least t institutions jointly calculate:

[0099]

[0100] Where λ iFor Lagrange coefficients, a single fragment cannot restore the complete private key.

[0101] The cross-domain collaboration gateway receives the permission allocation result of the dynamic trust evaluation module, and requests the distributed storage cluster for the fragment data.

[0102] The distributed storage cluster stores the verification evidence by using a data fragmentation mechanism based on Shamir secret sharing; specifically, the data fragmentation method of the distributed storage cluster is as follows: the verification evidence is split into n fragments by using a Shamir secret sharing algorithm; any t fragments can restore the data, but the information entropy of t-1 fragments is zero; and the fragments are distributed and stored in geographically isolated data centers.

[0103] The visualized audit tracking module obtains audit data from the sensing data chain, the operation chain, and the distributed storage cluster of the blockchain consensus evidence module.

[0104] The visualized audit tracking module can realize millisecond-level operation backtracking: the operation identifier Op pI D associated metadata; according to a three-dimensional time axis, the operation initiation time, the instruction effective time, and the system response time are visualized to show the trajectory:

[0105] Trace(Op I D)={DataHash,Operator,TrustScore,ImpactPath}

[0106] Supporting tracing to the original sensing data according to the impact path ImpactPath.

[0107] Embodiment 3, the above is a schematic scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain of the present embodiment. It should be noted that the technical scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration system based on the blockchain belongs to the same concept as the technical scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain described above. The technical scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration system based on the blockchain in the present embodiment is not described in detail, and the description of the technical scheme of the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain described above can be referred to.

[0108] The present embodiment also provides a power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration system based on the blockchain, comprising:

[0109] A sensing data signature module configured to obtain sensing data from a power monitoring terminal and sign the sensing data.

[0110] A blockchain storage verification module is configured to, based on the sensing data and the signature, in combination with the operation instruction, perform blockchain consensus storage and verification of the data and the instruction, store the data and the instruction that pass the verification into a sensing data chain and an operation chain of the blockchain, and provide verification evidence;

[0111] A node trust and permission management module is configured to, based on the verification evidence, acquire a node historical behavior data set, and perform dynamic trust value calculation and permission allocation;

[0112] An operation instruction compliance and defense strategy generation module is configured to, based on an operation log in the operation chain of the blockchain, in combination with a preset power safety procedure logic library, perform operation instruction compliance analysis and response, and in combination with an attack feature library, generate a defense strategy set.

[0113] The embodiment also provides an electronic device suitable for the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain.

[0114] The memory is configured to store computer executable instructions, and the processor is configured to execute the computer executable instructions to implement the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain.

[0115] The embodiment also provides a storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, and the program is executed by a processor to implement the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain.

[0116] The storage medium proposed in the embodiment and the power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain proposed in the above embodiment belong to the same inventive concept, and the technical details not described in the embodiment can be referred to the above embodiment, and the embodiment and the above embodiment have the same beneficial effects.

[0117] Embodiment 4 provides a power monitoring trusted and secure operation collaboration method based on the blockchain, and in order to verify the beneficial effects of the application, scientific demonstration is performed through simulation experiments.

[0118] Simulation scenario 1: new energy station remote monitoring and decentralized management and control

[0119] 1. Terminal data trustworthiness

[0120] A multi-source trusted perception module is embedded in each inverter terminal to collect direct current voltage and output power data M at a period of 10 ms;

[0121] An SM9 signature sigma is calculated after superimposing a GPS timestamp T:

[0122] sigma = H (M || T) cdot d s mod q

[0123] The signature data packet is transmitted to the edge computing node via LoRaWAN.

[0124] 2. Double-chain evidence storage and dynamic trust

[0125] The edge node acts as a light node of the blockchain consensus evidence storage module, verifying the validity of the signature, and the invalid data discard rate is <0.1%.

[0126] The trust value of the power station operation personnel is calculated through the dynamic trust evaluation module:

[0127] The historical data accuracy rate weight a = 0.6, and the effective data proportion since the power station was put into operation is 99.2%.

[0128] The time decay factor β = 0.3 (no operation error in the last 3 months, t = 90 days);

[0129] Behavioral entropy γ = 0.1 (query / control operation distribution entropy value 1.8);

[0130] Output TrustScore = 0.97, giving high-level operation permission.

[0131] 3. Intelligent contract automatic control

[0132] When the operation personnel sends the "group string shutdown for maintenance" instruction through the mobile terminal, the intelligent contract execution engine detects that the continuous operation interval Δt = 320 ms < Δt safe (500 ms) in the same area, and immediately fuses and alarms.

[0133] Effect: field station data tampering events are zero, cross-provincial operation team collaboration efficiency is improved by 76%, and misoperation interception rate is 100%.

[0134] Simulation scenario 2: multi-agent collaborative operation of industrial park distribution network

[0135] 1. Cross-domain privacy calculation

[0136] The cross-domain collaborative gateway receives the fault location instruction and calls the multi-party secure calculation (MPC) protocol:

[0137] The power grid company provides topology parameters A, the power consumer provides load data B, and the operation vendor provides device status C.

[0138] The three parties jointly calculate the fault probability F = MPC(A, B, C), and the clear text data is not off-domain throughout the process.

[0139] 2. Threshold decryption audit

[0140] When sensitive device nameplate data needs to be decrypted, the distributed storage cluster calls the shard key:

[0141] Power grid company (shard sk1), regulatory bureau (shard sk2), operation and maintenance company (shard sk3);

[0142] Joint computation of any two parties Decryption (threshold t = 2).

[0143] 3. Three-dimensional operation backtracking

[0144] After the operation and maintenance personnel operate the high-voltage switch, the visualized audit tracking module extracts through Trace(Op_ID):

[0145] DataHash: Hash of current sudden change waveform when the switch operates;

[0146] Operator: Operator ID (corresponding to TrustScore = 0.88);

[0147] ImpactPath: Associated feeder protection action sequence; 10 seconds of system state before and after operation are displayed on the 3D timeline.

[0148] Effect: Sensitivity data leakage risk reduced by 92%, accident responsibility determination time shortened from 8 hours to 15 minutes

[0149] Simulation scenario 3: Provincial dispatching center APT attack defense

[0150] 1. Resilience enhancement strategy generation

[0151] The resilience enhancement response module detects abnormal parameter modification instructions and calls the anti-APT attack strategy generator:

[0152] Input vulnerability vector v k (CVE-2023-XXX privilege bypass vulnerability, weight w k = 0.7);

[0153] Solve Get the optimal strategy S:

[0154] Isolate the controlled terminal (risk reduction 60%);

[0155] Enable backup fiber link (risk reduction 25%);

[0156] Limit flow operation (risk reduction 15%);

[0157] Response time ResponseTime = 1.2s < T max (3s).

[0158] 2. Real-time warning of behavior entropy

[0159] The dynamic trust evaluation module finds that the behavior entropy of a certain dispatcher account has suddenly changed:

[0160] Normal entropy value Entropy(B i ) = 1.5 (uniform distribution of operation types);

[0161] Attack period entropy value Entropy(B i ) = 0.2 (98% operations are parameter modifications) triggers authority downgrade to read-only mode.

[0162] 3. Fault prediction linkage

[0163] The fault prediction model based on LSTM outputs a line overload probability > 85%, and the smart contract execution engine automatically issues a load reduction instruction to 10 substations, and the instruction signature is stored on-chain for evidence.

[0164] Effect: APT attack blocking rate 100%, overload accident prevention success rate 89%, system availability 99.999%.

[0165] In summary, the application ensures the authenticity and integrity of collected data such as voltage, current and device status from the source of the power monitoring terminal through the lightweight encryption chip of the multi-source trusted perception module and the SM9 signature technology; the double-chain architecture of the blockchain consensus storage module realizes cross-node multiple verification through the sensing data chain and the operation and maintenance operation chain, so that tampering with single node data cannot pass the global consensus, completely eliminating the risk of forgery of traditional centralized databases, providing an irrefutable evidence chain for accident accountability, and through the smart contract execution engine, the power safety procedures such as the operation interval fuse mechanism are solidified into automatically executed code rules, and the compliance verification time of the operation and maintenance instruction is shortened from hours to milliseconds; the dynamic trust evaluation module dynamically allocates access permissions of cross-domain collaborative gateways based on real-time behavior entropy values, replacing the manual approval process, which improves the cross-department collaboration efficiency by more than 80%, while meeting the strong compliance requirement of operation traceability, through the PBFT consensus mechanism of the blockchain consensus storage module and the sharding redundancy design of the distributed storage cluster, the single point failure risk is eliminated, and when the master node is down, the slave node can take over the service within seconds, which meets the N-1 safety standard of the power system; the resilience enhancement response module fuses the attack feature library to generate a minimum attack surface defense strategy in real time, such as isolating controlled terminals and enabling redundant links, which reduces the success rate of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks by 95%, and through the threshold decryption protocol of the cross-domain collaborative gateway, the "data available but not visible" between regulatory departments, dispatching centers and operation and maintenance units is realized, and sensitive operations require joint authorization of at least t agencies to decrypt, thus establishing a multi-party trust mechanism on the premise of protecting privacy; the millisecond-level three-dimensional time axis backtracking capability of the visual audit tracking module makes the cross-domain operation transparent and traceable throughout the process, eliminating the phenomenon of shifting responsibility, and the full-process operation log is automatically stored on the blockchain double chain, and the audit data can be directly connected to the power supervision platform, reducing the manual audit workload by 70%; the visual audit tracking module supports one-key association of original sensing data, operator trust value and influence path through the operation identifier Op_ID, realizes minute-level accident root cause positioning, and meets the strong traceability requirement of the power safety procedures.

[0166] It should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application and not to limit the present application. Although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions of the present application can be modified or replaced by equivalents without departing from the spirit and scope of the present application, and they should be covered in the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method, characterized by: include: Obtain sensor data from the power monitoring terminal and sign it; Based on sensor data and signatures, combined with operation and maintenance instructions, blockchain consensus and verification of data and instructions are performed. The verified data and instructions are stored in the sensor data chain and operation and maintenance operation chain of the blockchain, and verification evidence is provided; Based on verification evidence, obtain the node's historical behavior data set to perform dynamic trust value calculation and authority allocation; Based on the operation logs in the blockchain operation and maintenance operation chain, combined with the preset power safety regulations logic library, operation and maintenance instruction compliance analysis and response are carried out, and combined with the attack feature library, a defense strategy set is generated.

2. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Based on sensor data and signatures, combined with operation and maintenance instructions, blockchain consensus and verification of data and instructions are performed, and the verified data and instructions are stored in the sensor data chain and operation and maintenance operation chain of the blockchain, and verification evidence is provided, including: Construct a permissioned private hybrid chain architecture, which includes a sensor data chain and an operation and maintenance operation chain; perform cross-node verification on sensor data and operation and maintenance instructions: use the terminal public key to verify the signature of the sensor data to determine whether the signature complies with the preset rules. If the verification fails, the corresponding data packet is discarded; call the smart contract to compare the operation instruction code with the preset whitelist library. If the instruction violates the rules, the instruction is immediately blocked and an audit event is generated.

3. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that: The acquisition of node historical behavior datasets based on verification evidence and the dynamic trust value calculation and authority allocation include: Calculate the real-time trust value based on the node's historical behavior data: obtain the node's historical behavior data set, integrate the historical data efficiency, time decay factor and behavior entropy value, and integrate various indicators according to the preset weight coefficient to calculate the node's dynamic trust value.

4. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method as claimed in claim 3, characterized in that: The acquisition of node historical behavior datasets based on verification evidence and the dynamic trust value calculation and authority allocation further include: The calculated dynamic trust value is synchronized to the cross-domain collaborative gateway in real time, and the cross-domain collaborative gateway dynamically allocates the data processing weight and operation authority of the node based on the trust value.

5. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: The acquisition of node historical behavior datasets based on verification evidence and the dynamic trust value calculation and authority allocation further include: Statistics are collected on various operations of the node within the preset time window, and the randomness of the operations is quantified to obtain the behavioral entropy value; when the behavioral entropy value is lower than the preset threshold, a trust warning is triggered.

6. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: The operation log in the blockchain operation and maintenance operation chain is combined with the preset power safety regulations logic library to perform compliance analysis and response of operation and maintenance instructions. Combined with the attack feature library, a defense strategy set is generated, including: The smart contract execution engine pre-installs the power safety regulations logic library, parses the operation and maintenance instructions, and determines whether the instructions trigger the rule constraints; the smart contract execution engine has a built-in operation fuse mechanism to monitor the time interval between continuous operations in real time. When the operation time interval does not meet the minimum operation interval defined by the power safety regulations, it automatically interrupts the instruction flow, generates an alarm event, and records the fuse event to the operation and maintenance operation chain.

7. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative method as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that: The operation log in the blockchain operation and maintenance operation chain is combined with the preset power safety regulations logic library to perform compliance analysis and response of operation and maintenance instructions. In combination with the attack feature library, the defense strategy set is generated, which also includes: The smart contract execution engine synchronously accesses the operation log of the operation and maintenance operation chain, outputs instructions to trigger the resilience enhancement response module, and integrates the attack feature library and fault prediction model through the resilience enhancement response module to generate a defense strategy set.

8. A blockchain-based power monitoring trusted and secure operation and maintenance collaborative system, applying the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: include: The sensor data signature module is used to obtain the sensor data from the power monitoring terminal and sign it; The blockchain evidence storage and verification module is used to perform blockchain consensus evidence storage and verification of data and instructions based on sensor data and signatures, combined with operation and maintenance instructions. The verified data and instructions are stored in the sensor data chain and operation and maintenance operation chain of the blockchain, and verification evidence is provided; The node trust and authority management module is used to obtain the node historical behavior data set based on verification evidence, and perform dynamic trust value calculation and authority allocation; The operation and maintenance instruction compliance and defense strategy generation module is used to perform operation and maintenance instruction compliance analysis and response based on the operation logs in the blockchain operation and maintenance operation chain, combined with the preset power safety regulations logic library, and generate a defense strategy set in combination with the attack feature library.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: memory and processor; The memory is used to store computer-executable instructions, and the processor is used to execute the computer-executable instructions. When the computer-executable instructions are executed by the processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that It stores computer-executable instructions, which implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed by a processor.

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